Economics

Capital Flows

  • Financial Markets
    Unintended irony
    From a Tuesday Wall Street Journal story on Citigroup’s efforts to raise common equity: Citigroup officials hope to persuade private investors that have bought preferred shares -- such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corp., Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Kuwait Investment Authority -- to follow the government’s lead in converting some of those stakes into common stock, according to people familiar with the matter. Emphasis added There is a difference between a minority stake held the investment arm of a government that doesn’t regulate a bank or backstop the banks’ liabilities and a large stake held by a banks’ home government. But it is striking that none of the "private investors" mentioned in the Wall Street Journal are actually, well, private investors. Sovereign wealth funds are at best a hybrid. China for example has made it clear that it hopes that the US will protect at least some of its investments from the risk of losses. China’s Vice Premier Wang Qishan told Hank Paulson: "We hope the US side will . . . guarantee the safety of China’s assets and investments in the US" He may have just been thinking of the Agencies ... but he also may have had a few of China’s other large stakes in mind. The classic response is that the only investment that is guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States government is a Treasury bond. Yet, it increasingly looks like the US is inching toward severely diluting the common equity of a set of banks where sovereign funds have substantial stakes,* if not wiping out the existing equity entirely. That potentially -- as Larry Summers warned in a former life -- is a foreign policy issue. Summers pondered this topic at last years Davos session on sovereign funds: [Suppose] the SWF of country A makes an investment in a major bank in country B. The bank gets in big trouble. Is there any control in the world that can assert, that with billions of dollars on the line, their head of state and foreign minister are not going to get involved in the negotiations? I was never fully convinced highly visible sovereign stakes could be wiped out even if there was an economic case to do so, precisely because of the foreign policy spillovers, which is one of the reasons why I was never convinced sovereign funds should be thought of as just another private player in market. But this crisis keeps spinning in ways that put a lot of different presumptions to the test. * These stakes often were structured, I think, as convertible bonds that automatically convert into common equity in the future. Most were not straight equity investments.
  • China
    U.S. External Debt
    This chart compares the Treasury and Agency holdings of China and Japan. As the chart shows, the amount of debt that the U.S. owes to China has increased sharply this decade and the amount owed to Japan remains high. Will the United States’ continuing need for financing leave it in a weaker position relative to the major holders and purchasers of U.S. debt? Dyer: China’s Dollar Dilemma Warnock: Impact of East Asian Reserves Accumulation on U.S. Interest Rates Dyer: Clinton Treads Carefully during visit to China Setser: Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power Kessler: Clinton Urges Continued Investment in U.S.
  • Monetary Policy
    Abu Dhabi’s tentative bailout of Dubai …
    The UAE’s central bank will apparently use $10 billion of its foreign exchange reserves to buy $10 billion of a (planned) $20 billion Dubai debt issue. That will provide Dubai with $10 billion in foreign exchange (Dubai gets the UAE’s dollar reserves in exchange for an IOU, the UAE gets a dollar-denominated claim on Dubai … ) to repay $10 billion of its external debt. Lex writes: Dubai’s $10bn cash injection from the United Arab Emirates’ central bank has eased concerns about the struggling emirate’s ability to make good on $13bn in debt payments due by the end of this year. Just as important as the deal’s dollar figure, however, is the political message it sends. After weeks of uncertainty, Abu Dhabi, the Emirates’ oil-rich sugar daddy, has demonstrated its willingness to stand behind its poorer relation. ... Strictly speaking, the UAE central bank’s purchase of $10bn of five-year Dubai bonds – part of $20bn in new bonds priced at 4 per cent interest – was agreed at the federal level. But at its core, the move amounts to a bail-out by proxy of Dubai by its wealthier neighbour, Abu Dhabi, which is the biggest contributor to the UAE’s federal budget thanks to a quirk of geography that left it holding 8 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. I find it interesting that the financing for Dubai came from the Emirates (the confederation), not Adu Dhabi (the richest emirate). As Lex notes, it arguably is the same thing: Abu Dhabi’s oil ultimately backstops the federal government. But it nonetheless suggests: a) Abu Dhabi - meaning the large investment funds of Abu Dhabi -- itself may not be all that liquid. Abu Dhabi may be kind of like Harvard: very wealthy, but caught between ambitious plans to invest some of its resources at home (Harvard is planning a new science campus, Abu Dhabi is a lot wealthier and is planning a lot more ... ), falling inflows, falling asset values and growing calls on its capital from various illiquid funds it has invested in. B) Abu Dhabi doesn’t want to sell its existing foreign assets at distressed prices to finance Dubai. Tapping on the central banks existing liquid reserves is a way to avoid selling other assets … Of course, financing Dubai through the central bank means that the quality of the assets on the Emirates central bank balance sheet will deteriorate. The central bank has traded $10 billion of liquid foreign assets for $10 billion of Dubai’s illiquid bonds. Dubaican notes that the coupon on the bonds looks well-below market, adding to their illiquidity. And, well, if other demands for liquidity materialize, Abu Dhabi could well have to meet them out of its own resources.
  • Financial Markets
    How Are GCC (and Other) Sovereign Funds Faring? An Update
    This post is by Rachel Ziemba of RGE Monitor where this post first appeared. Thanks to Brad for letting me fill in. Recently,  Reuters reported that the assets under management of Kuwait’s sovereign wealth fund fell to 49b Kuwait Dinar ($177.6 billion) at the end of December from 58 billion Kuwait Dinar ($218 billion) in March 2008. – a face value decline of about $31 billion. Given that Kuwait had record oil revenues in 2008 (and a record fiscal surplus even if revenues tailed off in the second half) and KIA likely received record new capital, this implies that investment losses were even larger. It is significant for two reasons. One it shows that the estimates of fund performance (including those released in a recent paper by Brad Setser and myself) are on track and two, it could suggest that within limits there may be increasing amounts of transparency among sovereign investors. It also will provide an interesting test case of how the population and opposition react to the losses on the national wealth. Unlike funds of its neighbors, Kuwait’s fund has to routinely report to its parliament and at such times information on its assets usually is released to the press. Doing so increases the robustness of estimates of their performance and may also open up channels to domestic pressure concerning how the national wealth is being managed. Domestic politics has influenced decisions in the past - Kuwait Petroleum’s deal with Dow Chemical was reportedly withdrawn under political pressure. So it will be a case to watch, as will the funds of Singapore which have also noted investment losses in response to legislative questioning. The numbers seem to refer to Kuwait’s future generations fund, the larger of the two pools of money managed by KIA. The other, the General Reserve Fund,  is smaller, perhaps around  $40 billion. It is on the one hand more liquid as its name suggests but also holds the countries holdings in domestic equity and property markets. KIA itself though was also authorized to invest in the domestic equity market to prop up prices. In out paper, Brad and I estimated that KIA’s foreign assets  (including the assets of the general reserve fund) fell to $228 billion in Dec 08 from $265b in March. Since evidence suggests that the GRF has an AUM of around $40b, that means we are pretty close, estimating face value losses of $33 billion.  Taking account of the net inflows received in 2008, the valuation losses on the equity and alternative asset-heavy portfolio might have been well over $90 billion – only partly offset by inflows of over $50 billion. This pattern manifested itself across most of the gulf funds as well as other funds with similar asset allocations like funds of Norway, Singapore and many university endowments. Given the performance of risky assets in January and February (especially the deterioration of the last week) KIA has faced  further losses. In fact, based on our model the assets under management for the big GCC pools of capital (ADIA, KIA, QIA, SAMA) are estimated to have fallen to $1085 billion at the end of January from $1115 billion in December 2008 and $1165 billion in December 2007.  This takes the estimated total assets of GCC sovereign funds and central banks to $1.16 trillion by the end of January down from. $1.12 trillion in December. If asset prices end February where they closed yesterday (Feb 20), the AUM might fall to $1.13trillion at the end of this month. All of these estimates assume no major changes in the asset allocation of these funds. This may not be correct. There is evidence that the funds of the gulf are increasing their allocation to liquid assets. This can be accomplished in two ways 1) not rebalancing to maintain an allocation share or 2) allocating new funds, if any, in a new way or selling one asset class to raise funds to buy another. These valuation losses, come at a time when GCC countries (and many other sponsors of sovereign funds) are starting to need more liquidity and when oil prices have fallen below budget break even points even as oil production has fallen. Some governments may already be drawing on their savings to finance deficits. The foreign assets of Saudi Arabia’s central bank and pension funds fell around $5 billion in December, which may only be the start of the trend as Saudi Arabia runs a deficit at current oil prices and production. The following charts update those in the paper, showing among other things that even if the oil price were to inch back up to $75 a barrel, GCC foreign asset purchases would fall far short of those in 2006 and 2007, when oil prices averaged slightly less. Moreover, assuming modest investment returns, it would take a long time for the GCC’s portfolio to return to the peak of early 2008. A few recent trends to note in the world of sovereign wealth. 1)    Sovereign funds are likely to privileging liquid assets as their needs for it increase. Oil funds are particularly vulnerable as their new funds have dried up. However, the other many source of surplus funds has also tapered off with capital flows to emerging economies reversing.  China’s pace of reserve growth has slowed and most others have reversed. As a result these countries may be pickier about how they allocate their assets. Korea is unlikely to allocate more funds to a sovereign fund now that it needs a higher cushion of fx liquidity.  Data in Singapore’s balance of payments which appears with a lag suggests that GIC’s pace of portfolio investment began slowing in Q3 2008. With the Singapore economy contracting sharply, it plans to draw on its reserves, some of which are managed by GIC, to finance its fiscal deficit. 2)    Instead of Investing abroad many are investing at home. If they do invest abroad, they may prioritize sectors consistent with domestic development goals. The latter trend began in 2007/08 but may have been accentuated by the reduction in available capital. Funds like Mubadala may find it easier to attract funds than others. Domestic banks also require capital and many countries are implicitly guaranteeing the debt of their corporate sector. All in all fewer funds are available for investment and other domestic outward investors may win out. .See here for a list of domestic investment by sovereign funds or their parents. 3)    Uncertainty about valuations may be deterring investments. Despite losses, sellers may not be willing to take current prices, mean the gap between buyers and sellers in key resources is. 4)    When they do (return to) invest, the sectors of interest may be shifting. Consumer focused goods may not be so appealing. The investment in the banks is well under water. Resources and other real assets may return to being attractive for a range of sovereign investors, especially those in Asia. Chinese loans to cash-strapped resource companies are only one example.  Some sovereign funds are talking about adding to real estate holdings. Norway’s fund in is talking about finally beginning to implement its planned new allocation to property and CIC officials also raised the possibility. But with prices yet to bottom out in the U.S., Europe, China and elsewhere, this may not yet be the time. 5)   Those funds that maintained conservative asset allocation outperformed their more diversified colleagues in 2008.  Those funds that planned to give more cash to invest in a range of diversified assets may shift their plans. There are some exceptions. Libya seems now to be planning to use its cash to buy Italian companies and Banks (it owns stakes in ENI, Unicredit and announced a recent plan to co-invest with Mediobanco). 6)    Funds that were reliant on leverage or who needed to raise capital in order to make investments have gone silent and are trying to sell some items. The funds of Dubai are a prime example. Isthithmar was reportedly trying to unload Barneys, a rumor it sought to quash. Even if that is untrue, many of the purchases made at the peak are under water and the leverage involved makes them vulnerable. No wonder various of the funds have been merging and seeking out new strategies, seeking investments that will hold their value in the downturn. As always, its very hard to generalize across sovereign funds, but in general with fewer funds available, expect them to continue to be less active than some of the more optimistic observers thought this time last year and focused much more internally.
  • Capital Flows
    How Worried Should We Be About Dubai?
    Note: This post is by Rachel Ziemba of RGE Monitor, filling in while Brad is off in the mountains. Many thanks to Brad for letting me fill in again.  I pay attention to macro events in China and several  oil exporters and the whole portfolio of sovereign investors for RGE monitor where this post first appeared. I’ll chime in on a few things related to sovereign investors (including their role in financing the US) this week while Brad is out. In recent weeks CDS spreads on the debt of Dubai’s largest State-linked vehicles like Dubai Holding etc shot up dramatically after Abu Dhabi announced a unilateral recapitalization of its banks. The cost to buy prrotection on the 1 year bond has doubled since late January and now stands at 1073bps. The jump in the 5 yr has been less sharp but stands at over 1400bps. Since Dubai has limited sovereign debt (about $10b and maybe climbing given the likely fiscal deficit) so these large state-linked companies provide a proxy for the perceived credit worthiness of Dubai’s government. Given Dubai’s debt stock ($80b or 148% of GDP), its vulnerability to global liquidity and the worsening outlook for its domestic property market despite the ability to control supply, it is perhaps not a surprise that the outlook for the emirate seems much more precarious, particularly in contrast to its cash rich neighbour, Abu Dhabi. Given the links of these debtors to the government, and the effect that their vulnerabilities could have on the UAE federation, it has widely been assumed that the UAE govt (or rather Abu Dhabi) would come to the aid of Dubai when the crunch came. However, there has been more uncertainty than some expected. Key tests are ahead in coming months as Dubai adjusts to a world where leverage remains scarce. Around $20b of the outstanding debt ($80b) comes due in 2009, including several large syndications like that of Borse Dubai which was having trouble rolling over its $4b loan that expired at the end of February. Breaking views notes that the $4b capital needed is a test case as allowing the institution to implode would have broader reverberations. It now seems that the UAE federal government might be coming to the rescue. Meed suggests that it will loan Borse dubai $1b to make up the shortfall. Borse Dubai only managed to secure $1.25 billion of commitments from commercial banks, although some further commitments from banks could bring the final bank tranche to $1.5 billion. Even the capital that Dubai attracts will come at a higher cost. Borse Dubai might have to pay 430bps above Libor rather than the 130bps the maturing loan carried. Unlike some of its neighbours (especially Abu Dhabi) Dubai’s growth was primarily debt financed, making it more vulnerable to the global liquidity crunch and more local liquidity tightening triggered first by the withdrawal of speculative capital and – later by the fall in the oil price. Although Dubai has little oil, it was clearly a petrodollar recycling hub. It accounted for much of the UAE’s external debt stock (some of Abu Dhabi’s state investors like Mubadala and others accounted for the rest ). Dubai based banks likely also accounted for much of the bank lending to the UAE. Moodys vulnerability indicators show that the UAE is among the most vulnerable in the MENA region (if much less vulnerable that Eastern European countries that are being forced to rapidly and painfully adjust. Data from the BIS (see chart below) show that loans extended to the UAE first tapered off and then fell in Q2 and Q3 of 2008 (the most recent data)  This is consistent with the outflows of short-term capital once dirham revaluation was taken off the table that contributed to a local credit crunch as well as the the escalation of credit crunch on a global scale and a reluctance to lend to the Gulf as the oil price began to fall. Of remaining loans, UK banks are most exposed. Looking at shifts in the UAE’s central bank reserves details the scale of this flows. The UAE’s reserves doubled to almost $100 billion but have subsequently fallen to $44 billion at the end of Q3 (most recent data). No wonder the project finance costs and domestic interbank rates shot up. Liabilities of BIS banks to UAE The following gives an outlook of how net flows of funds (deposits abroad - loans) of the UAE compare to the rest of the GCC. the UAE has consistently borrowed more from foreign banks than it has borrowed abroad for the last 18 months. Despite the drop in loans extended to the UAE, it continued to be a net borrower from the international banking system - unlike for example Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Dubai is experiencing a property bust. Prices and volumes have been falling for some time and even efforts to control the supply (by merging and providing capital to the main mortgage lenders or pulling back on projects have had limited effect.) The secondary market in particular has dried up. Meanwhile with a number of foreigners losing their jobs will be another blow to consumption and property markets. It has been widely assumed that oil-rich Abu Dhabi would come to Dubai’s aid in one way or another, providing the needed capital and solidifying Abu Dhabi’s role within the power structure of the UAE. It seemed likely that federal institutions were taking the upper hand – including the central bank. In fact the first UAE government responses to the financial strains on UAE banks seemed to be evidence enough. But the next stage has been less unclear. Moreover the structure of some of the liquidity provided including the temporary ‘repo window’ still created disincentives for banks to take advantage of the funds – likely because authorities wanted to force regulatory changes to stem the significant credit growth. While most UAE banks received long-term deposits back in the fall from the central bank, they remain undercapitalized given the loss of whole sale financing and the fact that the property bust is undermining the quality of underlying assets – property, credit card debt etc. Standard chartered suggests that UAE banks need an additional $27 billion to be adequately capitalized. Other institutions like a permanent repo window and other tools to control the money supply are also needed. These capital needs persist despite Abu Dhabi’s injections to its banks, however, the support of the emirate’s government does add to the stability of financial institutions there and reduce the risk of systemic risk. Abu Dhabi provided capital injections to five banks operating in the emirate in the form of 5 year deposits. Yet allowing a default of a major state-linked banks could have broader reverberations in the region. Why hasn’t Abu Dhabi made more funds available to Dubai given that the uncertainty undermines UAE asset quality and the “UAE brand”? One explanation might be politics between the emirates. Reportedly Dubai has not actually asked for funds, perhaps fearing a loss of autonomy. However, even Abu Dhabi’s stock of liquid assets might not be quite as high as it might like. In a recent paper, Brad Setser and I argue that the funds of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) may never have been as large as some observers thought (we peg its peak at close to $480b early in 2008 and suggest it may have suffered valuation losses that took its AUM down as low as $300b (watch later in the week for some updated calculations on a range of sovereign funds). The calculations are based on an index based portfolio so we might be a bit off. However, given that liquidity is at a shortage and Abu Dhabi may also run a fiscal deficit, it may prefer to preserve its capital for investments prioritized for domestic development. Yet it is not in its interest to let too large a gap in credit worthiness emerge with Dubai particularly as its banks and institutions are exposed to Dubai’s property markets (perhaps accounting for the extra liquidity injection.) Furthermore there are risks that the property markets and financial institutions throughout the region even if most countries are more insulated. Abu Dhabi may prefer to avoid such a bust. But as Moody’s notes, the corporate sectors of the GCC have not been tested in this way in the past and do face significant financing needs. Broader cost cutting is going on in Dubai including several mergers in the property sector and job reductions. Dubai International Capital and Dubai Group, investment focused entities belonging to Sheikh Mohammed plan a quasi merger. This seems to make sense and may reduce overcapacities. In fact these two entities always seemed to be encroaching on each others turf (investment in financials, private equity holdings etc) in a UAE that was serving as a laboratory for investment abroad, though recently Dubai group was reportedly branching into Islamic finance. Furthermore like others relying on leverage their business model has come under challenge. The sharing of back office support may be the first step to a re-merger. Needless to say, any funds and projects overly reliant on leverage should continue to be very quiet (the QIA might be one exception) The combination of much more subdued credit growth, reduction in oil production and reduction in non-oil trade and services will keep the UAE’s growth weak in 2009. The country’s non-oil diversification has exposed it to sectors that are faltering globally (shipping, tourism, property, finance). Government support and the fact that many sectors are centralized can cushion the blow somewhat – fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary, the budgets of the UAE federal government (which spends mostly in the smaller five emirates) and Dubai show expenditure growth in 2009. Abu Dhabi will likely do so also though its budget has not been disclosed. Yet there is a broader question where will the funds come from or what price will be charged to get there. Yet given the direct linkages between the UAE’s borrowers and the national and sub-national governments, funds should be forthcoming even if they are pricy and become more so with oil at $35 a barrel.
  • Capital Flows
    New York State and the Global Financial Crisis
    Play
    WILLIAM WELD: Having myself dabbled briefly in New York politics a few years ago -- dilettanted, really, more than dabbled -- (laughter) -- I can attest that our guest, our honored guest today, was the most, at that time, universally liked and respected member of the legislature, mainly because of, in my view, the great good humor that he brought to every effort, to complement his high intelligence and mastery of the issues. He reminds me, in that respect, of a certain person who was recently elected to high office in Washington, D.C. Please welcome a member of the board of the Achilles Track Club and a New York City marathoner, our governor, the excellent and honorable David Paterson. (Applause.) Thank you, Governor. I remember your participation in that election a couple of years ago, and the great performance that you gave for the Legislative Correspondents Association when you were still a candidate, and all you have done for finance and in government. And thank you for that very kind introduction. By the way, Governor, you know how long the marathon is? (Pause.) Does anyone know? (Laughter, cross talk.) QUESTIONER: Twenty-six miles. GOVERNOR DAVID PATERSON: Twenty-six miles, 385 feet? QUESTIONER: Right. PATERSON: That assumes that you're standing in the front of the line. (Laughter.) I was running about five minutes, and I had a guide, and I saw all these people, and I said, "What's that?" And she said, "That's Mayor Giuliani. This is the starting line." (Laughter.) So I'm already tired. (Laughter.) Well, thank you, also Richard Haass, who is the president and was kind enough to invite me here today. And to all the members of the Council on Foreign Relations, thank you very much for your service, for your input. People in governments all around the country and around the world look to you for leadership, and we appreciate your kind contributions, helping us negotiate what is a very, very, very difficult time in a very poignant moment in our history, in our history. Foreign policy is evolving right before our eyes. The emergence of economics in the process expands day by day. In fact, I think we could surmise, very much so, after Clausewitz, that perhaps war is really the continuation of finance by a different means. (Soft laughter.) I wholeheartedly agree with that, as I am currently in negotiation on New York state's budget with legislative leaders. (Laughter.) And so what I would like to do is to briefly touch on the important correlative issues of our national economic crisis and the president's response with a stimulus package, and then for a moment touch on the evolution of -- (off mike) -- and international finance, as we know it, in this day and age. As much as foreign policy has evolved into the inclusion of finance as to one of its major factors for consideration, so too finance has inured in the direction of addressing new plateaus, including levels of national, international and even regional finance. The economic strife has ravaged our country. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Roger Altman mentioned his belief that Americans have lost one-quarter of their net worth in 18 months. The housing values in the beginning of 2006, which would have been assessed at $13 trillion, have fallen to $8.8 trillion, just as it is recently accounted for in mid-2008. When you look at retirement benefits, the second-greatest asset for Americans after housing values, they have fallen by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion to $8 trillion as of the last six months. And the Central Bank of Europe, the Federal Reserve, have injected over $2-1/2 trillion into these institutions, of liquidity, trying to ameliorate this problem. These are the largest infusions in history, but they haven't worked. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the advanced economies will fall by 2 percent in 2009. And as of January 29th, the IMF now says that the debt-to-GDP in emerging countries has jumped from 2 percent in 2007 to 7 percent as it stands right now. All of this has created a horrible calamity for New York state; for in New York state 20 percent of our revenues are derived from Wall Street. And in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, where we are right now, the months of January, February and March, that number escalates -- that percentage rises to 30 percent. We estimated our budget deficit, when we closed last year's budget in April, for 2009-2010 at $5 billion. By July, that number rose to $6.4 billion. With a 28 percent increase in our deficit over three months, I took to the airwaves and offered a televised address to New Yorkers, as Governor Rell of Connecticut will offer this evening, to alert people to how serious this financial crisis is, and to magnify the issue by comparing it to the Great Depression, which is the last time we've had this type of economic strife. I was roundly criticized for this, and it was said that I mis- estimated the revenues. I did. I thought at that time, with the budget deficit increasing as it was, that our budget deficit would come in somewhere between nine and a quarter and nine and a half billion dollars. I did mis-estimate it. The deficit for 2009-2010 is now $15.4 billion. It is three times higher than any budget deficit we've every seen, spare one. And that was right after the terrible attack on our country on September 11th, 2001. But even at the time that we had that deficit, the economy was recovering. We were budgeting with the wind at our backs. We don't know where the floor of this crisis actually lies. We know that at least 225,000 New Yorkers are projected to lose their jobs. We know that 671,000 New Yorkers are already not working. We know that the demand for food assistance is up 30 percent just in the last six months. And the problem is no easier for New York City in spite of the fact that under Mayor Bloomberg, they did save. They did make necessary cuts. But they're still being obliterated in this crisis, such as are all the entities of local and state government around this country. Before the crisis, the securities industry employed 5 percent of New York's residents. But the salaries that they derived accounted for 25 percent of earned income citywide. Now that the city comptroller, William Thompson, estimates, along with the state comptroller, Tom DiNapoli, says there will be a 42 percent falloff in Wall Street bonuses, this now means that New York City will lose $1 billion. This is why, in the past couple of months, I have worked with the governors of Massachusetts and New Jersey, of Wisconsin and Ohio and Michigan, as part of a committee from the National Governors Association, to present the president with what we believe would be the right economic stimulus package. We are very pleased that his countercyclical proposals of assistance, to the federal Medicaid assistance percentage, along with education, along with child care credits and with extension of unemployment insurance and food stamps, will go a long way to help Americans at this very difficult time in our history. The president also is offering to reignite the engine of our economy through repair of our infrastructure, repairs that have not been made in 50 years. In that regard, the projection is that $1 billion in infrastructure repair will yield 30,000 jobs. New York State has 1,900 shovel-ready projects in road and bridge and transportation and a clean-water -- and wastewater-treatment proposals that are ready to go at this particular time. The president is also proposing, over the next 10 years, to invest $150 billion in conversion of energy sources to energy efficiency and clean and renewable energy sources. In New York State, we were already ahead of the curve. Thanks to Governor George Pataki and Governor Eliot Spitzer, we have already grown to deferring 20 percent of our electricity use to clean and renewable energy sources. In my State of the State address a couple weeks ago, I have challenged New Yorkers to get to 45 percent by 2015. Realizing this program would create 50,000 jobs for the state, so it will be our state stimulus package, as well as converting to clean and renewable energy sources, which will not only be an infusion to our economy but also will protect our environment. Now I would like to talk about some of the financial issues that we're presented with today and the financial crisis that's now worldwide. I hope we understand that there will be no immediate solution to this situation. There will be no quick fix. The solutions will come in stages. There is no single event or single action that can change the difficult situation we're in. For example, the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, where the IMF was created, was preceded by the conference in London in 1933 and also the tripartite monetary agreements that were established in 1936. So the historic agreements that were arrived at at Bretton Woods really were the result of a lot of hard work that occurred in stages. When the European Union decided to transfer to the euro as a method of exchange in 1992, here again, this was the result of decades of work that brought them to that -- to that decision. From the United States withdrawing from the gold standard in 1971 to the exchange -- the exchange rates that were derived in 1979, this was a process that was incremental that brought them to the establishment of the euro in 1992. And so when these historic and large international and financial solutions are reached, they come in stages. They are established incrementally. I would expect that the stages may move more quickly now as the power and size of finance has grown really exponentially because of the issues that relate to deregulation and technology. But nonetheless we're going to have to recognize that our solution will have to come in stages. And it in that respect that I raise this point that the nature of international finance has changed since Bretton Woods. There are those who are calling for a new Bretton Woods conference. And I think that that actually misses the point. The goals and the achievements at Bretton Woods would not work in this particular era. We're going to have to find our own innovations and use our own creativity to ameliorate what is a different kind of a crisis. Now those who call for a Bretton Woods conference are hoping there will be a new international financial agreement, and I agree with that. But just the use of the term "Bretton Woods" makes us hearken back to thinking about how issues were resolved in the past. In 1944, when those leaders met at that conference, they were trying to deal with the issues of global finance and the issues of national currency reserves. But now the issue of private capital is far more important than any issues of global finance. When those leaders met in New Hampshire in that red-brick building with a white roof to come to the decisions that they made in 1944, they were actually fearing what would really be to them a competitive currency devaluation at the hands of the government. Those who are trying to resolve today's crisis fear what has really been a regulatory arbitrage, which has led to damage done at the hands of private industry. And so what we are probably going to have to do is to bring some new actors at the table for the negotiation this time. The private capital interest should be in the decision-making capacity of any resolution of any financial agreements because they are so inseparably involved. And the issue of private capital, particularly as it exists in relation to foreign policy and financial regulation, really just mirrors the fact that there are many actors now not state sponsored that are at the table just in the resolution of foreign policy generally. And what is going to have to happen is that foreign policy and governments are going to have to adjust to this change. Also, I think the most relevant point is that the financial structure of international finance has really evolved as well right before our eyes. The fact is that we could probably congregate finance into three basic levels. They would be national, international and also regional. Most of the solutions that you're hearing about in past few days are national: national bailouts, national interventions, recapitalizing from the federal government many of the banks. You're hearing very few international solutions, save lowering the interest rates that was done correlatively and cooperatively by a few countries back in the end of September. But you're hearing absolutely no regional solutions at all. Now, what do I mean by regional solutions? The banks of New York and the banks of London are quite different, and there are reasons for that. Regions compete for capital based on different investment conditions that they establish, different tax and probably regulation schemes, different legal and employment practices. And they vary from one place to another. So New York and London are certainly the epicenters of financial management in their regions, but you have places like Tokyo and Hong Kong and Singapore and Bahrain. They are also emerging centers, as there are emerging centers in Africa or, as I read the title to an article in late November when I was reading The Economist, it's "Shanghai, Dubai, Mumbai or goodbye." (Laughter.) So the point really is what we are witnessing, in many respects, is the breadth of macroeconomics, in many respects, being curtailed and truncated by the traditions and the realities of microfinance. So what works in New York may not work in London or Hong Kong. And it matters that the epicenter of United States financial policy is here in New York, because the conduct?? would be much different if it were Chicago, or the culture would be much different if it were in Los Angeles. And that's what brings us to New York's role in the economic recovery in this country, and (suddenly ?) it affects the world. New York is one of the states, as are all the states, that regulates insurance policy. Because of the insurance companies that are domiciled in New York, we find that -- actually, that New York is the seventh-largest insurance market, based on the prevailing values. And so in September of 2008, when AIG was teetering on the verge of collapse, it was New York that it fell to to try to assist them. It was me, as governor, who had to initiate what would be an administrative change in policy and a change in regulation to allow AIG to access $20 billion from its subsidiary resources in order to bail out the -- bail out their parent corporation. And eventually, through the New York Federal Reserve, the government brought in $85 billion to bail out AIG, and then even more resources after that. But it fell to New York state to take the first action here. And just to give you an example: I had met the governor of Wisconsin at a governors' meeting, and I'm a new governor, and he came over and he put his arm around me. He said, "Look, if you ever have any problem, just call me." He said, "It is really not as hard as it may seem to you right now. But if you ever have a problem, pick up the phone and call me." So in the middle of this AIG crisis, I pick up the phone and it's the governor of Wisconsin. And he is almost apoplectic. He says, "Governor, we have an insurance company, Capital (sic/Travel) Guard Insurance. It's the largest bondholder in the state of Wisconsin. It's located in Stevens Point, Wisconsin. You've got to get the federal government to save AIG. I don't know what'll happen to our economy if it goes under." And I'm sitting there thinking, "If he's calling me" -- (laughter) -- "we have a bigger problem than I thought." (Laughter.) But that is when I realized what really is the power of regions in terms of evaluating measures and levels of finance. So as governor of the state of New York, I soon realized that I have considerable regulatory authority over New York's financial institutions. And what we're going to need right now is to establish what will be a strong but sensible area of reforming our national system of financial regulation. I am delighted that President Obama, along with his new Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, NEC Chair Larry Summers and Paul Volcker, are addressing this problem straight on. I look forward to whatever is the appropriate way that New York can contribute to what will be a new way of regarding the savings and the retirement funds, not only of New Yorkers but of all Americans, such that they never be in peril again. Now, how are we going to solve this crisis? Well, I would suggest that it is probably a combination of the old with the new. In 1907, there was a run on banks that was getting out of control when it was almost singularly stopped by one private financier, JPMorgan. This is probably the most spectacular demonstration of the power of private finance that has ever been seen. In 1944, the Bretton Woods conference in many respects may have been the most extraordinary moment of government economic leadership that we saw in the 20th century. For the 21st century, I suggest that there may have to be a coalition of these values, that we may have to actually connect the power of private financing with the strength of government regulation, to come to an overall agreement. Let me leave you with this. We have just witnessed the greatest failure of financial regulation in modern history. As we try to preserve the innovation rights and the independence of business, we are going to have to find a way to regulate what is an evolving market at an evolving time in our history. Thank you very much. (Applause.) WELD: Thank you very much, Governor. We're now going to move into a question-and-answer period. I'm going to ask you one or two. And then we'll go to the audience. And I would ask those who are putting questions to please wait for the microphone to get to you and speak directly into it and begin by standing and stating your name and your affiliation. And one question at a time, please, to maximize the number of members who can ask questions. Governor, 10 years ago, there was really no doubt that New York City was the capital of the world, or so it seemed to me. Nowadays, I think it's fair to say Washington, D.C., is the center of attention, at least domestically. And to the extent that Wall Street is the center of attention, it's somewhat unflattering attention, more often than not. And some of our friends in Asia and elsewhere around the world are openly predicting that the United States and Western Europe are going to be our planet's next emerging markets -- and won't that feel great? I guess my question is a 38,000-foot question: What scenario do you see -- I assume underneath it all you're an inveterate optimist like me -- for the dissipation or the reversal of those unwelcome trends? PATERSON: Well, I think that New York, heavily dependent as I described before, on the financial services industry, is going to have to find what would really be the innovative solution that we did during the building of the Erie Canal and the establishment of the Erie Lackawanna Railroad. We started building the Erie Canal in 1817, and at that time New York had a population of about 3 percent of the national average. We were also doing about 3 percent of the business. But because of the manufacturing jobs that we created in 20 years, that number of -- that amount of business that we were doing went from 3 percent to 50 percent. New York by 1840 -- in the mid-1840s, New York state was doing practically 50 percent of the business that was conducted by the country. And the population grew from 3 percent to 13 percent. People moved where the jobs were. Now people are moving away. So we are hoping that some of the cutting-edge industries -- I'll tell you right now, whoever finds the way to perfect the electronic battery to a plug-in hybrid electronic vehicle will revitalize their economy in years and years to come. And New York state, which has the greatest import of students in colleges and universities, and has a number of tremendous research centers, and is already ahead of the rest of the country in the development of electronic storage technology and is trying to get there in the development of a hybrid electronic battery -- these are the types of areas we're investing. And they are job-creating, they are obviously great for the economy and, hopefully, they will keep people in the state. Right now, New York state is losing over a hundred thousand residents every year. WELD: Thank you, Governor. You know, there was a report done for Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer, I think, at the beginning of 2007 that analyzed New York as a financial center versus competition from London. One of their chief recommendations was a liberalization of our immigration policies nationally to promote the most skilled and competitive possible workforce, specifically in and around New York City. Do you think that idea holds promise? PATERSON: Well, I think in New York state and in New York City, we have always welcomed that. New York has always been the international city and would like to attract the best and the brightest. But it's been in reverse. Twenty-eight percent of college graduates in New York who were indigenous to our state are leaving. So our best and our brightest are going other places. So obviously it is a competition right now, even within the boundaries of the United States, for who is creating jobs through cutting-edge research. And we would invite anyone that wants to live here -- legally, of course -- to come and be among us. WELD: There's no one so brave and wise as the politician who's not running for office and who's not going to be, which is why I can use the word "liberalizing." Okay, we're going to move to more knowledgeable questions at this point. Members of the audience, please raise your hand. Sir? QUESTIONER: Bob Katz (sp), major affiliation's with Yale University and -- (inaudible) -- for purposes of this meeting. David, we're having a lot of assault on New York and what we're all about in terms of the financial services industries. A lot of it may be self-inflicted, but do you have any ideas or recommendations for how we defend what I think is a crown jewel both of the region and, frankly, of the country in terms of things we have to offer the world. PATERSON: Well, I think that it's very difficult to try and impress this upon those who are being asked to make a sacrifice. They will be going on television with ads probably reprinted from two years ago when the budget deficit was 20 percent of what it is now, almost as if they never heard of a financial crisis. The reality is that we are going to have to make some tough choices in our budget negotiations. But if we can, the budget that I have released would cut the $15.4 billion deficit, the $1.7 billion remaining from last year and the $13.7 billion from this year. In addition to that, it would reduce a $51 billion indebtedness that this state actually owes to $7 billion over the remaining two years. If we were able to bite the bullet and take that pain for one year, we could move ourselves past all of the other states that have budget deficits right now. There were 12 states that had budget deficits at the end of 2007. There were 25 by mid-2008. They owed $48 billion. There are now 43 states that owe over $155 billion in deficit right now. We could get past this whole thing by embracing the fact that there has been overspending on the part of our state and we're also victims of a downturn in the national economy. It wasn't all us. And also, we derive 20 percent of our resources from Wall Street. Eight percent of -- 18 percent of our jobs are financial. The average in other states is 2 percent. So we could actually get past this. And if we could, even if the deficit widens -- and there's no reason to think that 2009 is going to be any better than 2008 -- we'll be far ahead of the rest of the states. And I think that would really entice people to come here, to work here in emerging fields of medical and scientific research, of energy technology and even in manufacturing, as we're finding that a couple of companies that offshored their jobs to different parts of the world now find that there's a competitive workforce because so many -- so many companies have moved there. And also, the price of energy to transport goods back and forth across the Pacific and the Indian Ocean isn't as economical as it used to, and they're starting to come back and we are ready to welcome them. By the way, Bob asked me to come on a march with the Cornell alumni after they beat the Columbia alumni, of which I'm one. And I was introduced to Happy Reichert, a Cornell alumni who is a little ahead of me. She graduated 1925, and is now 107 years old. So when you see Happy, Bob, please tell her I said hello. (Laughter.) WELD: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. There was just a GAO report done, at the request of Senator Levin, that showed that some hundred or more companies, including many of the ones that had gotten bailouts, had a large number of offshore subsidiaries. And we know that a main reason for offshore subsidiaries is to cheat on U.S. taxes. What are you doing to make sure that the companies in New York are not using offshore subsidiaries to cheat on taxes, now that we so desperately need the money? PATERSON: Well, I think, this is where we have to be very careful about the original bailout package, the $700 billion, which really vested all control in the Department of the Treasury, not even subject to perusal by the Justice Department. This had to be a negotiation, because it really is egregious. And what we were doing was, in a sense, what they did in Japan, which was buying up the bad debt of all the banks and financial institutions, not changing any management and allowing them to fritter away resources in reckless schemes that often hurt the American taxpayer. That has kind of been changed. Ever since Prime Minister Brown decided to recapitalize the financial institutions in Great Britain, it seems to have dawned on the United States. And now with the new administration, we are trying hopefully to be careful. But I think that's why the president reacted so viscerally to this idea of these firms getting bailout money and then the heads of these firms taking bonuses. It's outrageous. Even the company that I referred to before, that New York State helped, the first thing they did, when they got money from the federal government is, they went on a retreat. I mean, just the goal, just the -- you just have to wonder, what is going on in the minds of people who, knowing that we have 2 million Americans who have lost their houses, over the last couple of years, and over 2.5 million Americans who have lost their jobs last year, feel comfortable using resources in the manner that they have? It is an absolute outrage. And so obviously on the state level, we don't have direct participation in the bailouts of these companies that the General Accounting Office reported on. But certainly in terms of the stimulus money, we're going to be very careful as to where it goes. As a matter of fact, the administration did not want to give block grants to the states, because they weren't sure what we would do with them. We don't have the best reputation for financial management. But at the same time, there was a desire to put money into resources that would respond immediately. And that's why the negotiating whether it would be 90 days, 180 days -- I think they will settle at about 120 days -- for what the shovel-ready projects are. Because now everybody with a shovel says they're shovel-ready. The reality is, what we need are projects that are ready to go, because I think that there is a psychological stimulus that goes with the economic stimulus. If people see other people going back to work, then I think we will address the fear that so many Americans rightly have at this time. WELD: Yeah. Sir. No, no, no. PATERSON (?): That's okay. WELD: One to a customer. Sir? QUESTIONER: Joel Motley -- PATERSON: I didn't answer your question. WELD: It's fine, Governor. Go ahead, sir. QUESTIONER: Joel Motley, Governor. When you first started alerting us to these problems, there was a lot of resistance, almost denial, coming out of the legislature. Do you have a sense that that's receding? And what do you attribute, hopefully, a sense of realism that may be settling in to? PATERSON: Well, I think at first, when I issued the warning, it was two months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsuming of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America and, obviously, the problems with AIG. However, I think by now everybody should understand that there's going to have to be extreme sacrifice. I've been disappointed when I have meetings with people who come in and they say, "What we're going to do is we're just going to budget for a $10 billion deficit, (where ?) 5 billion (dollars) is coming from the federal stimulus package. I don't understand how anybody in government, or even lobbying, could say something like that. How do you count money that's not in -- they haven't even -- they haven't even passed a bill yet! But it just shows the cognitive dissonance that seems to exist when trying to address these types of problems. This is a serious time for people, and -- for people losing their jobs and losing their homes. It is a very difficult issue for me, who's been an advocate in the legislature for 21 years, to turn around and now start vetoing legislation that I helped sponsor, and actually cutting resources from programs that I've advocated for. I'm not saying that the programs were any less helpful now than they were then. But this is where we are in this budget deficit. When you hear amounts like 700 billion (dollars) in a bailout package or 819 million (dollars) in a stimulus package, you have no idea of what those numbers really mean. It starts to sound like Monopoly. The reality is, 15 billion (dollars) is 15,000 million (dollars). So how many dependent clauses have I heard with "Governor, I know we're having an economic problem, but there's this program, and it's only a hundred million dollars. What's a hundred million dollars next to 15 billion (dollars)? You've got to save this." A hundred million and a hundred million and a hundred million keep adding up, and that's what gets to 15 billion. I'm hoping that people will look at California to see what can happen to New York. California is not sure that in a couple of months they can meet their financial obligations. They already have a cash flow problem. They have a $41 billion deficit. And no matter what the governor tries to do, people hold on to their bonded field of rhetoric that is really inappropriate and should be disqualified at this time. WELD: Yes? QUESTIONER: John Beatty (sp) from UBS. In certain instances, governmental intervention helps to stimulate development of new financial products. By way of example, the Resolution Trust Corporation that was set up to purchase bad assets helped in the development of the private label securitization market. What policies do you think that New York state can initiate to help stimulate the development of new financial products once the economy starts to recover? PATERSON: There's a long assumption between now and when the economy starts to recover. But I'll try to think forward and just say that governments have traditionally invested in places where private industry is less apt to do so -- for instance, research and development, where we would like to take the colleges and universities of New York and make them work the way they do in California and Massachusetts. And so I can't tell you exactly what the areas are of innovation in the next few years. But I would certainly assume that obviously issues of transportation, as -- when the prices of oil and gas go back up, we think that high-speed rail, such as it exists in Europe, would be a great product to bring to the United States. New York suffers because you can't get a flight from Buffalo to Albany or Syracuse to Buffalo now. High-speed rail would shorten up the distances in our state and generate economic development to the upstate regions. Obviously, the issue of trying to convert a lot of information and technology, particularly in the health care, to computerization and make it far more accessible would certainly be a way. But I think that a government invests in energy research where -- if you notice, there have been very few private companies that have invested in ethanol, because it really is not energy return on energy invested as yet. That has to be researched. And so I think it's not as much the end result as it is the catalyst for the opportunity to find those problems where government plays the greatest role. WELD: In the back. QUESTIONER: Esther Newberg, ICM. Governor, what's your involvement with homeland security? And what percentage of state budget would focus on New York City? And what might you tell your new senatorial appointment about how much more money New York City needs? PATERSON: Well, New York City was obviously the epicenter of the attack on our country. And the basis for funding of homeland security during the last administration boggles the mind. New York per capita got less resources than the state of Wyoming, which got four-and-a-half times more in per capita resources than New York. And I'm not suggesting that the terrorists have ruled out Wyoming as a possible spot to hit -- (laughter) -- but it just seemed very unusual, and I think manifestly insensitive at a time when New Yorkers are still reeling from that crisis. We still have emergency service workers sick from -- from their involvement after the fact. We still were urged to go back to work by the EPA, and now that's led to illnesses to people who were working on those sites for months after the crisis. And we are still probably -- we -- I'm not allowed, from security clearance, to tell you, but we are still a region very much under threat. We are obviously sharing the state resources with New York City, where we think it is the right proportion. And at this particular time, particularly with the downturn of our economy and obviously a decrease in morale in the country, we see this from the prism of the -- view that (demonic ?) terrorists evaluate as probably an enhanced time when they might be trying to organize. So in spite of the fact that globally there has been considerable disruption to the leadership of al Qaeda -- the surge in Iraq did great damage to them -- but still there is an ever-present threat, maybe not as much from the larger terrorist organizations but from individuals. You now have the problem of the increase in individual attacks from women, who -- as opposed to men over the past few years. And we are taking that to heed and consider it a priority in the governance of this state. WELD: Right there. QUESTIONER: Thanks. Keith Richburg from The Washington Post. In his budget message the other day, Mayor Bloomberg talked about the $770 million cut in education, and he said basically that now that the state is getting it back from the federal government, he said -- his words, there's "no excuse" for Albany not to give it to the city. In fact, what he said is: There's just no excuse for not giving that money. It's somebody else's money. And he said that equaled something like 14,000 teachers. I mean, how would you answer the mayor on that? WELD: I think that if we do get the stimulus money back from the federal government, that it will go a long way to ameliorate the issue of the 14,000 teachers. I think that there are ways in which the city, among other entities, was hit a little harder than other parts of the state. There are ways that the city was hit less than other parts of the state. So it is a holistic remedy that we have to discuss. We got together with the mayor last Wednesday and had a very productive conversation. And we will go forward as well. And I am guilty of this just as much of the mayor, but you have to tell everyone that you have to understand the cuts that you're giving, and then you look to the source beyond you and act just like the advocates that you were lecturing. (Laughs.) But I've done that to the federal government, as well. (Laughter.) So I'm just as guilty as the mayor. WELD: Yeah? QUESTIONER: (Off mike) -- from LECG. Governor, along with 49 other state administrations, you govern or regulate the insurance industry. Would you favor federal regulation of the insurance industry? PATERSON: Well, I think that the kind of regionalization in state insurance regulation probably would help if the federal government did come in. This is the reason that we tried to make the insurance company accountable for the credit default swaps. And then they tried to say that we have no authority. As long as they're domiciled in our state, we suggest that we do have that kind of authority. But I think federal regulation, particularly with the long tentacles of these types of companies -- and it's almost -- even -- one of the biggest problems that we had with AIG wasn't as much that they were holding back information from us, but they had no central bookkeeping assessment, and therefore they didn't even know what their own debt was. And I think, if you remember, during that period in mid-September, every day their debt grew by $10 billion. And even when the federal government gave them $85 billion, they had to go back and give them a number 40 (billion dollars) -- another 40 (billion dollars). I think, both particularly for these large firms, that asking a state to try to keep track of them when they barely keep track of themselves, that federal regulation certainly might be in order, particularly on some aspects of insurance; maybe not all of them. WELD: In the front. QUESTIONER: Ted Sorensen from Paul Weiss. Governor, in our globalized economy, you preside over an -- a state economy which is larger than most national economies in the world. So you're not only competing with other states, but with other governments around the world, many of which have export-subsidy programs to help their local providers, whether it's providers of goods or services. I generally recall that 30, 40 years ago, we started an export- subsidy program in this state. I have no idea if it's still around, but I wonder whether there is one and whether you would encourage one. PATERSON: I think at this point, perhaps -- if I could expand upon your question, Ted -- as we look at the economic stimulus package in this country, we might be making a little bit of a mistake. And I think that export subsidies would be in order. We don't have them in the fashion that they existed during the Rockefeller administration. What I would say, though, is that it's interesting to hear what seems to be a discussion that's arising over a sort of protectionist doctrine, where the United States would disengage from the rest of the world. And even the other economies are talking about doing the same thing. But of all the places that, I think, should not disengage from the rest of the world and should be exporting is the United States. And let me tell you why. Wall Street revenues were down 40 percent last year. We know that. It was a painful year for all of us. But if you evaluate the other economies around the world, we probably fared better than anywhere else. All of these places that were threatening us; remember when Russia was playing the oil card last summer, when they went into Georgia, and threatening everybody in the world. Do you hear them now? They pray every day that they can even open their stock market. They're in such bad shape. China, the South Asian markets; everyone is suffering. The European economy is somewhat in denial. And what I'm saying is, there is one entity that can borrow money right now -- the United States Treasury. So we are in excellent position, I think, to interact with the rest of the world, because we can actually make money for our taxpayers by exporting, by filling the void, in a lot of these countries that can't get credit, and bringing them supplies and letting them pay for it. Not every country was cheating in the payment of their debts. Countries like Brazil, they are countries that would like to engage in foreign trade but can't get the credit. I think this is an immense opportunity for the United States to go the opposite way of the initial gut reactions of fear and to manifest our resources in exuberant -- I think what we need to recognize is that the issue of power is relative; it's not absolute. Relative to the rest of the world, our capacity to influence markets around the world is greater than it was last year, even though we are in a downturn of our own economy. And I think we have to see past the fear and the anxiety and invest right now in creating subsidies for exports, and move forward and show the world who the economic leader is once and for all in this time of crisis. WELD: Right there, sir. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Governor, Phil Dropkin from the Gerry Foundation and from Granite Associates. If we may, let's just talk about tourism for a moment. As you may be aware, the Gerry Foundation has developed a performing arts venue in upstate New York which is a very significant economic driver for a very -- rather impoverished area. I'm wondering, recognizing the difficulties that the state has, what role do you see the state having in helping to promote tourism in those areas of the state that have historically suffered? And on a personal note, I also run marathons. I would very much appreciate it if you would eliminate the last 365 yards. (Laughter.) PATERSON: I almost eliminated it for myself by falling down about 400 yards from the end some years ago. MR. : (Laughs.) PATERSON: But let me take a step back in order to answer the question. Tourism is floundering in New York. Traffic on the throughways during the holidays was down, for Labor Day and for July 4th. The American consumer has wised up. After $950 billion of credit card debt and after people -- a 40 percent increase in bankruptcies over the last couple of years, people are not spending money. And when we had the National Governors' Conference during the transition period and President Obama came to talk to us about the stimulus package, Governor Sanford of South Carolina, Governor Perry of Texas, Governor Palin of Alaska raised the issue of piling debt on top of debt. And that is obviously a concern, because the debt that we are running up right now could be a house of cards if we don't react to it. But this is exactly why the president wants to invest in a stimulus package right now. He wants to reignite the engine of our economy. The average American citizen was saving 9 percent of our salaries in the '80s. That figure went under 1 percent in the early part of this decade. It's back up to 6 percent. People are saving. If you make tax cuts, they're holding the money. If you give back rebates, they're saving the money. And what we need to do is to get people in -- spending money again, traveling again, being tourists again. But as Paul Krugman wrote in The New York Times in October, the individual virtue has become the public vice. People have gotten it, but we need people to spend right now. And this is the enticement. Now, almost 40 percent of the stimulus package is a tax cut. And I would just say that I'm delighted that we're having the stimulus package, but if you're cutting taxes and your states are in such dire resource that they have to raise taxes, it's a wash. The American consumer won't remember who cut and who raised, they'll just remember that they have less available cash than they have had and will go back to not spending. So in terms of tourism, we see that as an ancillary problem beyond resolving this budget deficit. If we don't resolve this budget deficit, we're not going to have the tourists that we so blissfully want to come and see the treasures of New York. WELD: Yes. QUESTIONER: Governor, Joe Rose, Georgetown Company. The scale of the fiscal problems that Albany's facing now would seem to require a level of reform not just with financial institutions, but also with state government, and you clearly understand that. Do you see any indication that the legislative leaders are going to buy into some of the kind of things that are required, and at the scale and at the time period that's needed? PATERSON: What I'm trying to get the legislative leaders -- and they've pledged cooperation -- is not to look at the moment, but to look at 10 years from now. Look at 18 months from now, because everything that's happened in California seems to happen to New York somewhere between 18 and 24 months later. They had a $15 billion budget deficit last July, we have one right now. So that gap is actually closing. We've got to address this crisis. It's painful. It's hard to tell advocates, I'm sorry, but we're going to have to cut this because in the long run it will do better. The advocates, from their hearts, really are assessing the pain of the sacrifices. They're right, but it has to be a shared sacrifice. Every New Yorker has to be involved that way. I don't think, as I said before, the people really understand what a $15.4 billion budget deficit really is. Let's look at it: ($)15 billion is about (a tenth ?) of ($)120 billion. So a lot of people say, well, gee, that's 8 percent, you ought to be able to find some waste and cut 8 percent out. But that's not true. Seventy percent of the resources that New York gets comes from special dedicated revenue streams and federal money that goes directly to counties. We have to cut fifteen-and-a-half billion dollars out of an available 56 (billion dollar) to $62 billion hole. That would be like asking all of you, after paying your mortgage or your rent, after paying tuition or the cost of food and the cost of fuel, or income taxes and property taxes that you may have, or monthly payments on an automobile, that you've got to cut, after taxes, all of that, by 25 percent. And then you'll see what dire circumstances we're in. You'll probably see some commercials in the next few days where real people will look in the camera and ask me: How can you do this? It's not how I'm doing it, it's let's be revenue-neutral. I'm ready to negotiate. I'm ready to be flexible. I'll take any one of these cuts off the table if someone will replace them with revenue- generating sources. And I'm not talking about trying to tax the rich, whatever part of them are left -- (laughter) -- at a -- at a -- to the tune of $15.4 billion. There is no tax the rich tax plan that can even come close to that. It is going to have to be a shared sacrifice or New York won't be able to -- will lose points on its credit rating, won't be able to borrow, and will compact the problem rather than solving the problem. WELD: Governor, that was a tour de force. Thank you very, very much. PATERSON: Thank you. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2009, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 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FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERGAT 202-347-1400. ------------------------- WILLIAM WELD: Having myself dabbled briefly in New York politics a few years ago -- dilettanted, really, more than dabbled -- (laughter) -- I can attest that our guest, our honored guest today, was the most, at that time, universally liked and respected member of the legislature, mainly because of, in my view, the great good humor that he brought to every effort, to complement his high intelligence and mastery of the issues. He reminds me, in that respect, of a certain person who was recently elected to high office in Washington, D.C. Please welcome a member of the board of the Achilles Track Club and a New York City marathoner, our governor, the excellent and honorable David Paterson. (Applause.) Thank you, Governor. I remember your participation in that election a couple of years ago, and the great performance that you gave for the Legislative Correspondents Association when you were still a candidate, and all you have done for finance and in government. And thank you for that very kind introduction. By the way, Governor, you know how long the marathon is? (Pause.) Does anyone know? (Laughter, cross talk.) QUESTIONER: Twenty-six miles. GOVERNOR DAVID PATERSON: Twenty-six miles, 385 feet? QUESTIONER: Right. PATERSON: That assumes that you're standing in the front of the line. (Laughter.) I was running about five minutes, and I had a guide, and I saw all these people, and I said, "What's that?" And she said, "That's Mayor Giuliani. This is the starting line." (Laughter.) So I'm already tired. (Laughter.) Well, thank you, also Richard Haass, who is the president and was kind enough to invite me here today. And to all the members of the Council on Foreign Relations, thank you very much for your service, for your input. People in governments all around the country and around the world look to you for leadership, and we appreciate your kind contributions, helping us negotiate what is a very, very, very difficult time in a very poignant moment in our history, in our history. Foreign policy is evolving right before our eyes. The emergence of economics in the process expands day by day. In fact, I think we could surmise, very much so, after Clausewitz, that perhaps war is really the continuation of finance by a different means. (Soft laughter.) I wholeheartedly agree with that, as I am currently in negotiation on New York state's budget with legislative leaders. (Laughter.) And so what I would like to do is to briefly touch on the important correlative issues of our national economic crisis and the president's response with a stimulus package, and then for a moment touch on the evolution of -- (off mike) -- and international finance, as we know it, in this day and age. As much as foreign policy has evolved into the inclusion of finance as to one of its major factors for consideration, so too finance has inured in the direction of addressing new plateaus, including levels of national, international and even regional finance. The economic strife has ravaged our country. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Roger Altman mentioned his belief that Americans have lost one-quarter of their net worth in 18 months. The housing values in the beginning of 2006, which would have been assessed at $13 trillion, have fallen to $8.8 trillion, just as it is recently accounted for in mid-2008. When you look at retirement benefits, the second-greatest asset for Americans after housing values, they have fallen by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion to $8 trillion as of the last six months. And the Central Bank of Europe, the Federal Reserve, have injected over $2-1/2 trillion into these institutions, of liquidity, trying to ameliorate this problem. These are the largest infusions in history, but they haven't worked. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the advanced economies will fall by 2 percent in 2009. And as of January 29th, the IMF now says that the debt-to-GDP in emerging countries has jumped from 2 percent in 2007 to 7 percent as it stands right now. All of this has created a horrible calamity for New York state; for in New York state 20 percent of our revenues are derived from Wall Street. And in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, where we are right now, the months of January, February and March, that number escalates -- that percentage rises to 30 percent. We estimated our budget deficit, when we closed last year's budget in April, for 2009-2010 at $5 billion. By July, that number rose to $6.4 billion. With a 28 percent increase in our deficit over three months, I took to the airwaves and offered a televised address to New Yorkers, as Governor Rell of Connecticut will offer this evening, to alert people to how serious this financial crisis is, and to magnify the issue by comparing it to the Great Depression, which is the last time we've had this type of economic strife. I was roundly criticized for this, and it was said that I mis- estimated the revenues. I did. I thought at that time, with the budget deficit increasing as it was, that our budget deficit would come in somewhere between nine and a quarter and nine and a half billion dollars. I did mis-estimate it. The deficit for 2009-2010 is now $15.4 billion. It is three times higher than any budget deficit we've every seen, spare one. And that was right after the terrible attack on our country on September 11th, 2001. But even at the time that we had that deficit, the economy was recovering. We were budgeting with the wind at our backs. We don't know where the floor of this crisis actually lies. We know that at least 225,000 New Yorkers are projected to lose their jobs. We know that 671,000 New Yorkers are already not working. We know that the demand for food assistance is up 30 percent just in the last six months. And the problem is no easier for New York City in spite of the fact that under Mayor Bloomberg, they did save. They did make necessary cuts. But they're still being obliterated in this crisis, such as are all the entities of local and state government around this country. Before the crisis, the securities industry employed 5 percent of New York's residents. But the salaries that they derived accounted for 25 percent of earned income citywide. Now that the city comptroller, William Thompson, estimates, along with the state comptroller, Tom DiNapoli, says there will be a 42 percent falloff in Wall Street bonuses, this now means that New York City will lose $1 billion. This is why, in the past couple of months, I have worked with the governors of Massachusetts and New Jersey, of Wisconsin and Ohio and Michigan, as part of a committee from the National Governors Association, to present the president with what we believe would be the right economic stimulus package. We are very pleased that his countercyclical proposals of assistance, to the federal Medicaid assistance percentage, along with education, along with child care credits and with extension of unemployment insurance and food stamps, will go a long way to help Americans at this very difficult time in our history. The president also is offering to reignite the engine of our economy through repair of our infrastructure, repairs that have not been made in 50 years. In that regard, the projection is that $1 billion in infrastructure repair will yield 30,000 jobs. New York State has 1,900 shovel-ready projects in road and bridge and transportation and a clean-water -- and wastewater-treatment proposals that are ready to go at this particular time. The president is also proposing, over the next 10 years, to invest $150 billion in conversion of energy sources to energy efficiency and clean and renewable energy sources. In New York State, we were already ahead of the curve. Thanks to Governor George Pataki and Governor Eliot Spitzer, we have already grown to deferring 20 percent of our electricity use to clean and renewable energy sources. In my State of the State address a couple weeks ago, I have challenged New Yorkers to get to 45 percent by 2015. Realizing this program would create 50,000 jobs for the state, so it will be our state stimulus package, as well as converting to clean and renewable energy sources, which will not only be an infusion to our economy but also will protect our environment. Now I would like to talk about some of the financial issues that we're presented with today and the financial crisis that's now worldwide. I hope we understand that there will be no immediate solution to this situation. There will be no quick fix. The solutions will come in stages. There is no single event or single action that can change the difficult situation we're in. For example, the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, where the IMF was created, was preceded by the conference in London in 1933 and also the tripartite monetary agreements that were established in 1936. So the historic agreements that were arrived at at Bretton Woods really were the result of a lot of hard work that occurred in stages. When the European Union decided to transfer to the euro as a method of exchange in 1992, here again, this was the result of decades of work that brought them to that -- to that decision. From the United States withdrawing from the gold standard in 1971 to the exchange -- the exchange rates that were derived in 1979, this was a process that was incremental that brought them to the establishment of the euro in 1992. And so when these historic and large international and financial solutions are reached, they come in stages. They are established incrementally. I would expect that the stages may move more quickly now as the power and size of finance has grown really exponentially because of the issues that relate to deregulation and technology. But nonetheless we're going to have to recognize that our solution will have to come in stages. And it in that respect that I raise this point that the nature of international finance has changed since Bretton Woods. There are those who are calling for a new Bretton Woods conference. And I think that that actually misses the point. The goals and the achievements at Bretton Woods would not work in this particular era. We're going to have to find our own innovations and use our own creativity to ameliorate what is a different kind of a crisis. Now those who call for a Bretton Woods conference are hoping there will be a new international financial agreement, and I agree with that. But just the use of the term "Bretton Woods" makes us hearken back to thinking about how issues were resolved in the past. In 1944, when those leaders met at that conference, they were trying to deal with the issues of global finance and the issues of national currency reserves. But now the issue of private capital is far more important than any issues of global finance. When those leaders met in New Hampshire in that red-brick building with a white roof to come to the decisions that they made in 1944, they were actually fearing what would really be to them a competitive currency devaluation at the hands of the government. Those who are trying to resolve today's crisis fear what has really been a regulatory arbitrage, which has led to damage done at the hands of private industry. And so what we are probably going to have to do is to bring some new actors at the table for the negotiation this time. The private capital interest should be in the decision-making capacity of any resolution of any financial agreements because they are so inseparably involved. And the issue of private capital, particularly as it exists in relation to foreign policy and financial regulation, really just mirrors the fact that there are many actors now not state sponsored that are at the table just in the resolution of foreign policy generally. And what is going to have to happen is that foreign policy and governments are going to have to adjust to this change. Also, I think the most relevant point is that the financial structure of international finance has really evolved as well right before our eyes. The fact is that we could probably congregate finance into three basic levels. They would be national, international and also regional. Most of the solutions that you're hearing about in past few days are national: national bailouts, national interventions, recapitalizing from the federal government many of the banks. You're hearing very few international solutions, save lowering the interest rates that was done correlatively and cooperatively by a few countries back in the end of September. But you're hearing absolutely no regional solutions at all. Now, what do I mean by regional solutions? The banks of New York and the banks of London are quite different, and there are reasons for that. Regions compete for capital based on different investment conditions that they establish, different tax and probably regulation schemes, different legal and employment practices. And they vary from one place to another. So New York and London are certainly the epicenters of financial management in their regions, but you have places like Tokyo and Hong Kong and Singapore and Bahrain. They are also emerging centers, as there are emerging centers in Africa or, as I read the title to an article in late November when I was reading The Economist, it's "Shanghai, Dubai, Mumbai or goodbye." (Laughter.) So the point really is what we are witnessing, in many respects, is the breadth of macroeconomics, in many respects, being curtailed and truncated by the traditions and the realities of microfinance. So what works in New York may not work in London or Hong Kong. And it matters that the epicenter of United States financial policy is here in New York, because the conduct?? would be much different if it were Chicago, or the culture would be much different if it were in Los Angeles. And that's what brings us to New York's role in the economic recovery in this country, and (suddenly ?) it affects the world. New York is one of the states, as are all the states, that regulates insurance policy. Because of the insurance companies that are domiciled in New York, we find that -- actually, that New York is the seventh-largest insurance market, based on the prevailing values. And so in September of 2008, when AIG was teetering on the verge of collapse, it was New York that it fell to to try to assist them. It was me, as governor, who had to initiate what would be an administrative change in policy and a change in regulation to allow AIG to access $20 billion from its subsidiary resources in order to bail out the -- bail out their parent corporation. And eventually, through the New York Federal Reserve, the government brought in $85 billion to bail out AIG, and then even more resources after that. But it fell to New York state to take the first action here. And just to give you an example: I had met the governor of Wisconsin at a governors' meeting, and I'm a new governor, and he came over and he put his arm around me. He said, "Look, if you ever have any problem, just call me." He said, "It is really not as hard as it may seem to you right now. But if you ever have a problem, pick up the phone and call me." So in the middle of this AIG crisis, I pick up the phone and it's the governor of Wisconsin. And he is almost apoplectic. He says, "Governor, we have an insurance company, Capital (sic/Travel) Guard Insurance. It's the largest bondholder in the state of Wisconsin. It's located in Stevens Point, Wisconsin. You've got to get the federal government to save AIG. I don't know what'll happen to our economy if it goes under." And I'm sitting there thinking, "If he's calling me" -- (laughter) -- "we have a bigger problem than I thought." (Laughter.) But that is when I realized what really is the power of regions in terms of evaluating measures and levels of finance. So as governor of the state of New York, I soon realized that I have considerable regulatory authority over New York's financial institutions. And what we're going to need right now is to establish what will be a strong but sensible area of reforming our national system of financial regulation. I am delighted that President Obama, along with his new Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, NEC Chair Larry Summers and Paul Volcker, are addressing this problem straight on. I look forward to whatever is the appropriate way that New York can contribute to what will be a new way of regarding the savings and the retirement funds, not only of New Yorkers but of all Americans, such that they never be in peril again. Now, how are we going to solve this crisis? Well, I would suggest that it is probably a combination of the old with the new. In 1907, there was a run on banks that was getting out of control when it was almost singularly stopped by one private financier, JPMorgan. This is probably the most spectacular demonstration of the power of private finance that has ever been seen. In 1944, the Bretton Woods conference in many respects may have been the most extraordinary moment of government economic leadership that we saw in the 20th century. For the 21st century, I suggest that there may have to be a coalition of these values, that we may have to actually connect the power of private financing with the strength of government regulation, to come to an overall agreement. Let me leave you with this. We have just witnessed the greatest failure of financial regulation in modern history. As we try to preserve the innovation rights and the independence of business, we are going to have to find a way to regulate what is an evolving market at an evolving time in our history. Thank you very much. (Applause.) WELD: Thank you very much, Governor. We're now going to move into a question-and-answer period. I'm going to ask you one or two. And then we'll go to the audience. And I would ask those who are putting questions to please wait for the microphone to get to you and speak directly into it and begin by standing and stating your name and your affiliation. And one question at a time, please, to maximize the number of members who can ask questions. Governor, 10 years ago, there was really no doubt that New York City was the capital of the world, or so it seemed to me. Nowadays, I think it's fair to say Washington, D.C., is the center of attention, at least domestically. And to the extent that Wall Street is the center of attention, it's somewhat unflattering attention, more often than not. And some of our friends in Asia and elsewhere around the world are openly predicting that the United States and Western Europe are going to be our planet's next emerging markets -- and won't that feel great? I guess my question is a 38,000-foot question: What scenario do you see -- I assume underneath it all you're an inveterate optimist like me -- for the dissipation or the reversal of those unwelcome trends? PATERSON: Well, I think that New York, heavily dependent as I described before, on the financial services industry, is going to have to find what would really be the innovative solution that we did during the building of the Erie Canal and the establishment of the Erie Lackawanna Railroad. We started building the Erie Canal in 1817, and at that time New York had a population of about 3 percent of the national average. We were also doing about 3 percent of the business. But because of the manufacturing jobs that we created in 20 years, that number of -- that amount of business that we were doing went from 3 percent to 50 percent. New York by 1840 -- in the mid-1840s, New York state was doing practically 50 percent of the business that was conducted by the country. And the population grew from 3 percent to 13 percent. People moved where the jobs were. Now people are moving away. So we are hoping that some of the cutting-edge industries -- I'll tell you right now, whoever finds the way to perfect the electronic battery to a plug-in hybrid electronic vehicle will revitalize their economy in years and years to come. And New York state, which has the greatest import of students in colleges and universities, and has a number of tremendous research centers, and is already ahead of the rest of the country in the development of electronic storage technology and is trying to get there in the development of a hybrid electronic battery -- these are the types of areas we're investing. And they are job-creating, they are obviously great for the economy and, hopefully, they will keep people in the state. Right now, New York state is losing over a hundred thousand residents every year. WELD: Thank you, Governor. You know, there was a report done for Mayor Bloomberg and Senator Schumer, I think, at the beginning of 2007 that analyzed New York as a financial center versus competition from London. One of their chief recommendations was a liberalization of our immigration policies nationally to promote the most skilled and competitive possible workforce, specifically in and around New York City. Do you think that idea holds promise? PATERSON: Well, I think in New York state and in New York City, we have always welcomed that. New York has always been the international city and would like to attract the best and the brightest. But it's been in reverse. Twenty-eight percent of college graduates in New York who were indigenous to our state are leaving. So our best and our brightest are going other places. So obviously it is a competition right now, even within the boundaries of the United States, for who is creating jobs through cutting-edge research. And we would invite anyone that wants to live here -- legally, of course -- to come and be among us. WELD: There's no one so brave and wise as the politician who's not running for office and who's not going to be, which is why I can use the word "liberalizing." Okay, we're going to move to more knowledgeable questions at this point. Members of the audience, please raise your hand. Sir? QUESTIONER: Bob Katz (sp), major affiliation's with Yale University and -- (inaudible) -- for purposes of this meeting. David, we're having a lot of assault on New York and what we're all about in terms of the financial services industries. A lot of it may be self-inflicted, but do you have any ideas or recommendations for how we defend what I think is a crown jewel both of the region and, frankly, of the country in terms of things we have to offer the world. PATERSON: Well, I think that it's very difficult to try and impress this upon those who are being asked to make a sacrifice. They will be going on television with ads probably reprinted from two years ago when the budget deficit was 20 percent of what it is now, almost as if they never heard of a financial crisis. The reality is that we are going to have to make some tough choices in our budget negotiations. But if we can, the budget that I have released would cut the $15.4 billion deficit, the $1.7 billion remaining from last year and the $13.7 billion from this year. In addition to that, it would reduce a $51 billion indebtedness that this state actually owes to $7 billion over the remaining two years. If we were able to bite the bullet and take that pain for one year, we could move ourselves past all of the other states that have budget deficits right now. There were 12 states that had budget deficits at the end of 2007. There were 25 by mid-2008. They owed $48 billion. There are now 43 states that owe over $155 billion in deficit right now. We could get past this whole thing by embracing the fact that there has been overspending on the part of our state and we're also victims of a downturn in the national economy. It wasn't all us. And also, we derive 20 percent of our resources from Wall Street. Eight percent of -- 18 percent of our jobs are financial. The average in other states is 2 percent. So we could actually get past this. And if we could, even if the deficit widens -- and there's no reason to think that 2009 is going to be any better than 2008 -- we'll be far ahead of the rest of the states. And I think that would really entice people to come here, to work here in emerging fields of medical and scientific research, of energy technology and even in manufacturing, as we're finding that a couple of companies that offshored their jobs to different parts of the world now find that there's a competitive workforce because so many -- so many companies have moved there. And also, the price of energy to transport goods back and forth across the Pacific and the Indian Ocean isn't as economical as it used to, and they're starting to come back and we are ready to welcome them. By the way, Bob asked me to come on a march with the Cornell alumni after they beat the Columbia alumni, of which I'm one. And I was introduced to Happy Reichert, a Cornell alumni who is a little ahead of me. She graduated 1925, and is now 107 years old. So when you see Happy, Bob, please tell her I said hello. (Laughter.) WELD: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. There was just a GAO report done, at the request of Senator Levin, that showed that some hundred or more companies, including many of the ones that had gotten bailouts, had a large number of offshore subsidiaries. And we know that a main reason for offshore subsidiaries is to cheat on U.S. taxes. What are you doing to make sure that the companies in New York are not using offshore subsidiaries to cheat on taxes, now that we so desperately need the money? PATERSON: Well, I think, this is where we have to be very careful about the original bailout package, the $700 billion, which really vested all control in the Department of the Treasury, not even subject to perusal by the Justice Department. This had to be a negotiation, because it really is egregious. And what we were doing was, in a sense, what they did in Japan, which was buying up the bad debt of all the banks and financial institutions, not changing any management and allowing them to fritter away resources in reckless schemes that often hurt the American taxpayer. That has kind of been changed. Ever since Prime Minister Brown decided to recapitalize the financial institutions in Great Britain, it seems to have dawned on the United States. And now with the new administration, we are trying hopefully to be careful. But I think that's why the president reacted so viscerally to this idea of these firms getting bailout money and then the heads of these firms taking bonuses. It's outrageous. Even the company that I referred to before, that New York State helped, the first thing they did, when they got money from the federal government is, they went on a retreat. I mean, just the goal, just the -- you just have to wonder, what is going on in the minds of people who, knowing that we have 2 million Americans who have lost their houses, over the last couple of years, and over 2.5 million Americans who have lost their jobs last year, feel comfortable using resources in the manner that they have? It is an absolute outrage. And so obviously on the state level, we don't have direct participation in the bailouts of these companies that the General Accounting Office reported on. But certainly in terms of the stimulus money, we're going to be very careful as to where it goes. As a matter of fact, the administration did not want to give block grants to the states, because they weren't sure what we would do with them. We don't have the best reputation for financial management. But at the same time, there was a desire to put money into resources that would respond immediately. And that's why the negotiating whether it would be 90 days, 180 days -- I think they will settle at about 120 days -- for what the shovel-ready projects are. Because now everybody with a shovel says they're shovel-ready. The reality is, what we need are projects that are ready to go, because I think that there is a psychological stimulus that goes with the economic stimulus. If people see other people going back to work, then I think we will address the fear that so many Americans rightly have at this time. WELD: Yeah. Sir. No, no, no. PATERSON (?): That's okay. WELD: One to a customer. Sir? QUESTIONER: Joel Motley -- PATERSON: I didn't answer your question. WELD: It's fine, Governor. Go ahead, sir. QUESTIONER: Joel Motley, Governor. When you first started alerting us to these problems, there was a lot of resistance, almost denial, coming out of the legislature. Do you have a sense that that's receding? And what do you attribute, hopefully, a sense of realism that may be settling in to? PATERSON: Well, I think at first, when I issued the warning, it was two months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsuming of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America and, obviously, the problems with AIG. However, I think by now everybody should understand that there's going to have to be extreme sacrifice. I've been disappointed when I have meetings with people who come in and they say, "What we're going to do is we're just going to budget for a $10 billion deficit, (where ?) 5 billion (dollars) is coming from the federal stimulus package. I don't understand how anybody in government, or even lobbying, could say something like that. How do you count money that's not in -- they haven't even -- they haven't even passed a bill yet! But it just shows the cognitive dissonance that seems to exist when trying to address these types of problems. This is a serious time for people, and -- for people losing their jobs and losing their homes. It is a very difficult issue for me, who's been an advocate in the legislature for 21 years, to turn around and now start vetoing legislation that I helped sponsor, and actually cutting resources from programs that I've advocated for. I'm not saying that the programs were any less helpful now than they were then. But this is where we are in this budget deficit. When you hear amounts like 700 billion (dollars) in a bailout package or 819 million (dollars) in a stimulus package, you have no idea of what those numbers really mean. It starts to sound like Monopoly. The reality is, 15 billion (dollars) is 15,000 million (dollars). So how many dependent clauses have I heard with "Governor, I know we're having an economic problem, but there's this program, and it's only a hundred million dollars. What's a hundred million dollars next to 15 billion (dollars)? You've got to save this." A hundred million and a hundred million and a hundred million keep adding up, and that's what gets to 15 billion. I'm hoping that people will look at California to see what can happen to New York. California is not sure that in a couple of months they can meet their financial obligations. They already have a cash flow problem. They have a $41 billion deficit. And no matter what the governor tries to do, people hold on to their bonded field of rhetoric that is really inappropriate and should be disqualified at this time. WELD: Yes? QUESTIONER: John Beatty (sp) from UBS. In certain instances, governmental intervention helps to stimulate development of new financial products. By way of example, the Resolution Trust Corporation that was set up to purchase bad assets helped in the development of the private label securitization market. What policies do you think that New York state can initiate to help stimulate the development of new financial products once the economy starts to recover? PATERSON: There's a long assumption between now and when the economy starts to recover. But I'll try to think forward and just say that governments have traditionally invested in places where private industry is less apt to do so -- for instance, research and development, where we would like to take the colleges and universities of New York and make them work the way they do in California and Massachusetts. And so I can't tell you exactly what the areas are of innovation in the next few years. But I would certainly assume that obviously issues of transportation, as -- when the prices of oil and gas go back up, we think that high-speed rail, such as it exists in Europe, would be a great product to bring to the United States. New York suffers because you can't get a flight from Buffalo to Albany or Syracuse to Buffalo now. High-speed rail would shorten up the distances in our state and generate economic development to the upstate regions. Obviously, the issue of trying to convert a lot of information and technology, particularly in the health care, to computerization and make it far more accessible would certainly be a way. But I think that a government invests in energy research where -- if you notice, there have been very few private companies that have invested in ethanol, because it really is not energy return on energy invested as yet. That has to be researched. And so I think it's not as much the end result as it is the catalyst for the opportunity to find those problems where government plays the greatest role. WELD: In the back. QUESTIONER: Esther Newberg, ICM. Governor, what's your involvement with homeland security? And what percentage of state budget would focus on New York City? And what might you tell your new senatorial appointment about how much more money New York City needs? PATERSON: Well, New York City was obviously the epicenter of the attack on our country. And the basis for funding of homeland security during the last administration boggles the mind. New York per capita got less resources than the state of Wyoming, which got four-and-a-half times more in per capita resources than New York. And I'm not suggesting that the terrorists have ruled out Wyoming as a possible spot to hit -- (laughter) -- but it just seemed very unusual, and I think manifestly insensitive at a time when New Yorkers are still reeling from that crisis. We still have emergency service workers sick from -- from their involvement after the fact. We still were urged to go back to work by the EPA, and now that's led to illnesses to people who were working on those sites for months after the crisis. And we are still probably -- we -- I'm not allowed, from security clearance, to tell you, but we are still a region very much under threat. We are obviously sharing the state resources with New York City, where we think it is the right proportion. And at this particular time, particularly with the downturn of our economy and obviously a decrease in morale in the country, we see this from the prism of the -- view that (demonic ?) terrorists evaluate as probably an enhanced time when they might be trying to organize. So in spite of the fact that globally there has been considerable disruption to the leadership of al Qaeda -- the surge in Iraq did great damage to them -- but still there is an ever-present threat, maybe not as much from the larger terrorist organizations but from individuals. You now have the problem of the increase in individual attacks from women, who -- as opposed to men over the past few years. And we are taking that to heed and consider it a priority in the governance of this state. WELD: Right there. QUESTIONER: Thanks. Keith Richburg from The Washington Post. In his budget message the other day, Mayor Bloomberg talked about the $770 million cut in education, and he said basically that now that the state is getting it back from the federal government, he said -- his words, there's "no excuse" for Albany not to give it to the city. In fact, what he said is: There's just no excuse for not giving that money. It's somebody else's money. And he said that equaled something like 14,000 teachers. I mean, how would you answer the mayor on that? WELD: I think that if we do get the stimulus money back from the federal government, that it will go a long way to ameliorate the issue of the 14,000 teachers. I think that there are ways in which the city, among other entities, was hit a little harder than other parts of the state. There are ways that the city was hit less than other parts of the state. So it is a holistic remedy that we have to discuss. We got together with the mayor last Wednesday and had a very productive conversation. And we will go forward as well. And I am guilty of this just as much of the mayor, but you have to tell everyone that you have to understand the cuts that you're giving, and then you look to the source beyond you and act just like the advocates that you were lecturing. (Laughs.) But I've done that to the federal government, as well. (Laughter.) So I'm just as guilty as the mayor. WELD: Yeah? QUESTIONER: (Off mike) -- from LECG. Governor, along with 49 other state administrations, you govern or regulate the insurance industry. Would you favor federal regulation of the insurance industry? PATERSON: Well, I think that the kind of regionalization in state insurance regulation probably would help if the federal government did come in. This is the reason that we tried to make the insurance company accountable for the credit default swaps. And then they tried to say that we have no authority. As long as they're domiciled in our state, we suggest that we do have that kind of authority. But I think federal regulation, particularly with the long tentacles of these types of companies -- and it's almost -- even -- one of the biggest problems that we had with AIG wasn't as much that they were holding back information from us, but they had no central bookkeeping assessment, and therefore they didn't even know what their own debt was. And I think, if you remember, during that period in mid-September, every day their debt grew by $10 billion. And even when the federal government gave them $85 billion, they had to go back and give them a number 40 (billion dollars) -- another 40 (billion dollars). I think, both particularly for these large firms, that asking a state to try to keep track of them when they barely keep track of themselves, that federal regulation certainly might be in order, particularly on some aspects of insurance; maybe not all of them. WELD: In the front. QUESTIONER: Ted Sorensen from Paul Weiss. Governor, in our globalized economy, you preside over an -- a state economy which is larger than most national economies in the world. So you're not only competing with other states, but with other governments around the world, many of which have export-subsidy programs to help their local providers, whether it's providers of goods or services. I generally recall that 30, 40 years ago, we started an export- subsidy program in this state. I have no idea if it's still around, but I wonder whether there is one and whether you would encourage one. PATERSON: I think at this point, perhaps -- if I could expand upon your question, Ted -- as we look at the economic stimulus package in this country, we might be making a little bit of a mistake. And I think that export subsidies would be in order. We don't have them in the fashion that they existed during the Rockefeller administration. What I would say, though, is that it's interesting to hear what seems to be a discussion that's arising over a sort of protectionist doctrine, where the United States would disengage from the rest of the world. And even the other economies are talking about doing the same thing. But of all the places that, I think, should not disengage from the rest of the world and should be exporting is the United States. And let me tell you why. Wall Street revenues were down 40 percent last year. We know that. It was a painful year for all of us. But if you evaluate the other economies around the world, we probably fared better than anywhere else. All of these places that were threatening us; remember when Russia was playing the oil card last summer, when they went into Georgia, and threatening everybody in the world. Do you hear them now? They pray every day that they can even open their stock market. They're in such bad shape. China, the South Asian markets; everyone is suffering. The European economy is somewhat in denial. And what I'm saying is, there is one entity that can borrow money right now -- the United States Treasury. So we are in excellent position, I think, to interact with the rest of the world, because we can actually make money for our taxpayers by exporting, by filling the void, in a lot of these countries that can't get credit, and bringing them supplies and letting them pay for it. Not every country was cheating in the payment of their debts. Countries like Brazil, they are countries that would like to engage in foreign trade but can't get the credit. I think this is an immense opportunity for the United States to go the opposite way of the initial gut reactions of fear and to manifest our resources in exuberant -- I think what we need to recognize is that the issue of power is relative; it's not absolute. Relative to the rest of the world, our capacity to influence markets around the world is greater than it was last year, even though we are in a downturn of our own economy. And I think we have to see past the fear and the anxiety and invest right now in creating subsidies for exports, and move forward and show the world who the economic leader is once and for all in this time of crisis. WELD: Right there, sir. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Governor, Phil Dropkin from the Gerry Foundation and from Granite Associates. If we may, let's just talk about tourism for a moment. As you may be aware, the Gerry Foundation has developed a performing arts venue in upstate New York which is a very significant economic driver for a very -- rather impoverished area. I'm wondering, recognizing the difficulties that the state has, what role do you see the state having in helping to promote tourism in those areas of the state that have historically suffered? And on a personal note, I also run marathons. I would very much appreciate it if you would eliminate the last 365 yards. (Laughter.) PATERSON: I almost eliminated it for myself by falling down about 400 yards from the end some years ago. MR. : (Laughs.) PATERSON: But let me take a step back in order to answer the question. Tourism is floundering in New York. Traffic on the throughways during the holidays was down, for Labor Day and for July 4th. The American consumer has wised up. After $950 billion of credit card debt and after people -- a 40 percent increase in bankruptcies over the last couple of years, people are not spending money. And when we had the National Governors' Conference during the transition period and President Obama came to talk to us about the stimulus package, Governor Sanford of South Carolina, Governor Perry of Texas, Governor Palin of Alaska raised the issue of piling debt on top of debt. And that is obviously a concern, because the debt that we are running up right now could be a house of cards if we don't react to it. But this is exactly why the president wants to invest in a stimulus package right now. He wants to reignite the engine of our economy. The average American citizen was saving 9 percent of our salaries in the '80s. That figure went under 1 percent in the early part of this decade. It's back up to 6 percent. People are saving. If you make tax cuts, they're holding the money. If you give back rebates, they're saving the money. And what we need to do is to get people in -- spending money again, traveling again, being tourists again. But as Paul Krugman wrote in The New York Times in October, the individual virtue has become the public vice. People have gotten it, but we need people to spend right now. And this is the enticement. Now, almost 40 percent of the stimulus package is a tax cut. And I would just say that I'm delighted that we're having the stimulus package, but if you're cutting taxes and your states are in such dire resource that they have to raise taxes, it's a wash. The American consumer won't remember who cut and who raised, they'll just remember that they have less available cash than they have had and will go back to not spending. So in terms of tourism, we see that as an ancillary problem beyond resolving this budget deficit. If we don't resolve this budget deficit, we're not going to have the tourists that we so blissfully want to come and see the treasures of New York. WELD: Yes. QUESTIONER: Governor, Joe Rose, Georgetown Company. The scale of the fiscal problems that Albany's facing now would seem to require a level of reform not just with financial institutions, but also with state government, and you clearly understand that. Do you see any indication that the legislative leaders are going to buy into some of the kind of things that are required, and at the scale and at the time period that's needed? PATERSON: What I'm trying to get the legislative leaders -- and they've pledged cooperation -- is not to look at the moment, but to look at 10 years from now. Look at 18 months from now, because everything that's happened in California seems to happen to New York somewhere between 18 and 24 months later. They had a $15 billion budget deficit last July, we have one right now. So that gap is actually closing. We've got to address this crisis. It's painful. It's hard to tell advocates, I'm sorry, but we're going to have to cut this because in the long run it will do better. The advocates, from their hearts, really are assessing the pain of the sacrifices. They're right, but it has to be a shared sacrifice. Every New Yorker has to be involved that way. I don't think, as I said before, the people really understand what a $15.4 billion budget deficit really is. Let's look at it: ($)15 billion is about (a tenth ?) of ($)120 billion. So a lot of people say, well, gee, that's 8 percent, you ought to be able to find some waste and cut 8 percent out. But that's not true. Seventy percent of the resources that New York gets comes from special dedicated revenue streams and federal money that goes directly to counties. We have to cut fifteen-and-a-half billion dollars out of an available 56 (billion dollar) to $62 billion hole. That would be like asking all of you, after paying your mortgage or your rent, after paying tuition or the cost of food and the cost of fuel, or income taxes and property taxes that you may have, or monthly payments on an automobile, that you've got to cut, after taxes, all of that, by 25 percent. And then you'll see what dire circumstances we're in. You'll probably see some commercials in the next few days where real people will look in the camera and ask me: How can you do this? It's not how I'm doing it, it's let's be revenue-neutral. I'm ready to negotiate. I'm ready to be flexible. I'll take any one of these cuts off the table if someone will replace them with revenue- generating sources. And I'm not talking about trying to tax the rich, whatever part of them are left -- (laughter) -- at a -- at a -- to the tune of $15.4 billion. There is no tax the rich tax plan that can even come close to that. It is going to have to be a shared sacrifice or New York won't be able to -- will lose points on its credit rating, won't be able to borrow, and will compact the problem rather than solving the problem. WELD: Governor, that was a tour de force. Thank you very, very much. PATERSON: Thank you. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2009, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANYREPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLYPROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSIONCONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITIONLAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALLREMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOTAFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TOANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTOFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERGAT 202-347-1400. -------------------------
  • Capital Flows
    New York State and the Global Financial Crisis
    Play
    Watch New York Governor David A. Paterson discuss the proposed federal stimulus package and the need for policymakers to work with private financial institutions to create innovate solutions to the economic crisis.
  • Financial Markets
    How badly were the Gulf’s sovereign funds hurt by the 2008 crisis?
    It takes a bit of courage to put out a paper that is sure to get a few things wrong. But when it comes to the Gulf’s sovereign funds, the alternative to getting a few things wrong is not writing much at all. The funds cloud themselves in secrecy. Educated guesses have to substitute for analysis based on hard data. The large Gulf sovereign funds are financed out of oil revenue, so the amount of new money they have to invest abroad is presumably linked to size of the fiscal and current account surpluses of key Gulf states. If – and it is a challenge – the path of spending and investment can be estimated, the size of that surplus will be largely a function of the price of oil. Production volume matter too, but in most circumstances production changes more slowly than price. And the Gulf funds are known to be large investors in the world’s equity markets, so their performance is likely to track, at least in broad terms, movements in major equity indexes. Sure, they have invested in “alternatives” – London real estate, private equity, hedge funds – too. But most “alternative” investments also have performed poorly over the past year. Rachel Ziemba of RGEMonitor and I used these basic insights to built a model of the Gulf funds that allows us to estimate – very roughly – the trajectory of the various Gulf funds over the past few years. That model is only going to be as good as our assumptions – and while we made every effort to calibrate the model using available data it no doubt is going to be somewhat off. That probably isn’t the best advertisement for the Setser/ Ziemba paper on the Gulf’s large sovereign funds. But sometimes caveats are important. This is a paper with a lot of known unknowns. Among other things, Rachel and I argue: -- The capital losses on the Gulf’s existing portfolio overwhelmed large inflows from high oil prices in 2008. Close to $300 billion flowed into the big Gulf funds -- the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority/ Abu Dhabi Investment Council, the Kuwait Investment Authority, the Qatar Investment Authority and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency’s foreign assets. But the market value of their Gulf’s foreign portfolio fell by an estimated $350 billion over the course of 2008. Throw in a roughly $30b fall in the Gulf’s reserves as hot money betting on a revaluation left and the total value of the Gulf’s external assets likely went down over the course of 2008. -- The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) was never as large as some have claimed. If ADIA ended 2000 with around $150 billion (as the Wall Street Journal reported then), we would be surprised if it ever had more than $500-$550 billion. It now has substantially less. Its large equity portfolio implies that it, not surprisingly, had a rough 2008. We estimate that the combined external portfolio of ADIA and the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, a smaller fund spun out of ADIA in 2008, was around $330 billion at the end of 2008.* Even so Abu Dhabi is fabulously wealthy -- $330 billion is a huge sum for Abu Dhabi’s small native-born population. Just perhaps not quite as fabulously wealthy as it once was. -- The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency now manages the largest Gulf fund. SAMA benefited from holding a more conservative portfolio than the other large Gulf funds. We assume that SAMA put about 20% of the rise in its foreign assets** into equities. Given the size of its portfolio and the size of the fall in global equities, this meant it experienced a significant loss. However, we think it had a lower share of its portfolio in equities than the other funds and thus smaller losses. And since the Saudis pump more oil than anyone else in the Gulf, they also benefited more than anyone else from high average oil prices in 2008. -- The oil exporters should care far more about the value of their foreign portfolio when oil is worth $40 a barrel than when oil is worth $140 a barrel. At least if the oil exporter has a budget (or investment plans) that require more than $40 oil. Or if it has banks that may have trouble borrowing abroad in bad times. Some oil exporters likely were too keen to chase returns (and liquidity premiums) in the boom. That left them with a portfolio that fell when oil fell – and thus with less money than expected when they really needed the money. Any oil fund with a “stabilization” as well as an “long-term savings” function likely needs to pay more attention to its liquidity – and to holding assets that hold their value when oil falls. In the past year that was Treasuries. On a more personal note, this paper presents the results of about three years worth of work. I first started to look into the growth in the oil exporters’ foreign assets in late 2005. It quickly became clear that not all of the oil windfall was managed by central banks – there was a notable gap between the Gulf’s current account surplus and its reserve growth. But tracking down the money wasn’t easy. The US data also didn’t provide many clues, as the Gulf’s recorded purchases of US assets were (and remain) very small relative to the Gulf’s external surplus.*** The BIS bank data didn’t help that much either. And that created a bit of a puzzle -- the Gulf’s petrodollars seemed to be disappearing from the rest of the world’s balance of payments data. And there are few things that interest me more than puzzles in the balance of payments data.**** My new paper tries to fill in some of these gaps by providing a framework for estimating the size, portfolio composition and future growth of the major Gulf funds. It builds on my earlier work on oil and global adjustment and the work of Ramin Toloui, who showed that the IMF’s balance of payments data for key Gulf countries provided the basis for estimating inflows into the large Gulf’s funds. That data though comes out with a lag, and it doesn’t tell you anything about the size of the Gulf’s existing stock of assets. Rachel and I essentially built a model to estimate inflows into various funds -- and then tied those inflows to a model portfolio. This model allows us to anchor our estimates of the Gulf fund’s current size and performance to an estimate of their past size and performance. That provides – or so we hope – the basis for a more informed discussion and debate over the past and future impact of these funds on the global economy.**** it also allows us to provide rough answers to some pressing current questions – like the size of the draw on the Gulf’s foreign assets associated with a fall in the price of oil to say $25 a barrel. Do take a look. And let me know what you think. *Our estimates for ADIA excludes the private assets of the Al-Nahyan family. That is true for the other funds as well. We haven’t tried to estimate the private wealth of any of the Gulf’s royal families. ** We actually assume that 20% of SAMA’s foreign securities portfolio -- including the foreign securities portfolio of the Saudi government pension funds that SAMA seems to manage -- is in equities. *** The missing assets weren’t showing up in the banking data either. **** It turns out, I suspect, that a large share of the Gulf’s dollar portfolio is managed by private fund managers, and generally managers based in London. Better balance of payments data from the UK would have helped to solve this mystery. But so far there is little evidence that Britain is all that interested in improving its balance of payments data. ***** The paper includes a detailed description of our underlying assumptions. If we are wrong, it will likely be because some of those assumptions are off.
  • Monetary Policy
    Secrets of SAFE: A sharp slowdown in reserve growth and large “hot” outflows in q4….
    China’s formal foreign exchange reserves rose by about $40 billion in the fourth quarter, rising from $1906 billion to $1946 billion. Adjusted for valuation changes, that works to a $55 billion or so increase. But appearances can be deceiving. In the past, China “hid” the pace of increase in its reserves by forcing the banks to hold dollars as part of their required reserves. Those dollars showed up on the PBoC’s balance sheet as “other foreign assets” but weren’t counted as part of China’s formal reserves. In the fourth quarter, China’s reported reserves overstate its true reserve growth, as the banks reserve requirement was cut. That led to a $26 billion fall in the PBoC’s other foreign assets in October and, I assume, a comparable fall in December. Given the size of the reduction in the reserve requirement in December, that is conservative.* That means that the PBoC’s “true” reserves didn’t grow at all in the fourth quarter, best I can tell. Valuation changes had a fairly modest impact on the data for the quarter as a whole, but a huge impact on the data for individual months. They pulled reserves down in October and pushed reserves up in December. Both effects were quite significant – in the $50 billion range. That has one big implication: China was adding to its reserves (if reserves are defined broadly to capture the PBoC’s other foreign assets) in October but not in December. My best guess is that China added about $15-20 billion to its reserves in October, another $10 billion in November and lost $20 billion in December. My numbers are a bit different than those of Morgan Stanley’s Wang Qing. He believs capital outflows peaked in October. I would put the peak in December -- which incidentally implies that the small RMB devaluation that China tried in early December had a big impact on capital flows. I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on the monthly estimates though. Combine China’s huge reserves and large moves in the currency markets and you get large valuation changes. If my estimate of the currency composition of China’s reserves is off, my monthly estimates will be a bit off too. The trend though is clear. Chinese reserve growth looks to have peaked earlier this year.* On a rolling 3m basis (adjusting for valuation changes and likely changes in the PBoC’s other foreign assets), Chinese reserve growth has essentially stopped. The sharp fall in the pace of reserve growth is at odds with the trend in the trade data. Exports are now falling – but imports are falling faster. Some of the fall in imports is in anticipation of future falls in exports (no need to import components), some reflects a fall in commodity prices but some also reflects a fall in China’s domestic demand. Y/y imports from the US and Europe were down in November – and that isn’t because China imports a lot of components or commodities from Europe. As a result, China’s trade surplus is rising – China’s fourth quarter surplus set a record ($114 billion), and its surplus for all of 2008 topped its 2007 surplus. Given that oil averaged $100 in 2008 – well over its 2007 average – that indicates that for much of the year export growth was much stronger than import growth. There is only one way to square a record trade surplus with the sharp fall in reserve growth: Hot money is now flowing out of China. Here is one way of thinking of it: The trade surplus should have produced a $115 billion increase in China’s foreign assets. FDI inflows and interest income should combine to produce another $30-40 billion. The fall in the reserve requirement should have added another $50-55 billion (if not more) to China’s reserves. Sum it up and China’s reserves would have increased by about $200 billion in the absence of hot money flows. Instead they went up by about $50 billion. That implies that money is now flowing out of China as fast as it flowed in during the first part of 2008. And in December, the outflows were absolutely brutal. December reserves were up by $20 billion or so after accounting for valuation changes – but the fall in the reserve requirement alone should have pushed reserves up by at least $25 billion. Throw in a close to $40 billion trade surplus and another $10 billion or so from FDI and interest income, and the small increases in reserves implies $70 billion plus in monthly hot only outflows … That’s huge. Annualized, it is well in excess of 10% of China’s GDP. Probably above 15% … No wonder the PBoC is worried about unusual swings in capital flows. China can absorb such a swing in capital flows better than most. And in some sense the outflows now just represent a reversal of earlier inflows, not a broad based movement of funds out of China. But it does still highlight that China’s controls are porous – In one sense this is good – it makes it harder for China to engineer a controlled depreciation against the dollar. And that may mute internal calls for China to prop up its exports with a depreciation. China presumably doesn’t want to create perception that the renminbi is a one way bet down after it was long considered a one-way bet up. Andrew Batson of the Wall Street Journal: The threat of outflows, analysts say, appears to have kept China from significantly depreciating its currency, despite pressure from exporters for a cheaper yuan. Chinese exporters are suffering from a decline in demand in the U.S. and Europe, and a less valuable yuan would help make their goods more attractive. A brief downward push in the yuan’s value in early December was met with panic selling in the foreign-exchange market, but since then, the central bank has held the yuan around 6.85 to the U.S. dollar. "If they engineer a depreciation it may change the expectations not only among foreign investors, but also among China’s own residents," thereby encouraging ordinary people to send money abroad en masse, said Wang Qing, an economist for Morgan Stanley. Indeed, investors have been steadily reversing bets on gains in the currency: Yuan bank deposits in Hong Kong, for example, have been falling every month since June. Reluctance in Beijing to weaken the yuan from current levels is largely welcome news for China’s neighbors and trading partners. They have worried that a weaker yuan could start a cycle of competitive devaluations that would worsen the current global economic woes. And so long as China’s exports are holding up better than the world’s imports – and China’s surplus is rising – there isn’t a fundamental case for a depreciation either. There is by contrast a strong case for a bigger domestic stimulus -- that would help China and help China’s neighbors by helping to bring China’s surplus down, or at least keep it from rising. See the World Bank’s David Dollar. What of Chinese purchases of US treasuries – a hot topic last week. Slower Chinese reserve growth implies reduced purchases of Treasuries, right? Umm, no. We don’t have the November or December TIC data yet, only the October data. But so far there is no evidence that slower reserve growth has translated into reduced Treasury purchases or reduced dollar purchases. Consider a graph of the average increase in China’s reserves over the last 3ms v China’s average purchases (using the Setser/ Pandey adjusted data series which tries to capture flows through London) What is going on? Well, China is clearly increasing the Treasury’s share of its portfolio by shedding risk assets. And the strong rise in the China’s dollar holdings? That may be a bit deceptive. My best guess is that China has pulled funds from private fund managers and private custodians and parked those funds in short-term Treasuries. That would explain why the TIC data is suddenly capturing huge flows from China. It is just a hunch though … Over time, if hot money outflows subside, China’s reserve growth should converge to its current account surplus (plus net FDI inflows). That implies ongoing Treasury purchases – though not at the current pace – barring a shift back into “risk” assets. And if hot money outflows continue, watch for Hong Kong and Taiwan to buy more Treasuries. The money flowing out of China doesn’t just disappear … it has to go somewhere. UPDATE: Nick Lardy of the Peterson Institute believes China shifted foreign exchange from the PBoC to ABC in q4 to help with the recapitalization of ABC. If that is true, this would help to explain the modest reserve growth. It thus implies more modest hot money outflows. To have an impact on reserve growth, this would need to be funds that haven’t already been shifted to the CIC. There is no doubt that the CIC injected some money into the CIC. The question is whether or not SAFE did too, and whether or not the CIC was using funds that were transferred to the CIC long ago or more recently. If anyone has useful details, I am all ears. * Logan Wright of Stone and McCarthy is on the case; he should have a definitive estimate soon. ** This chart shows the change in the foreign assets that appear on the PBoC’s balance sheet. It doesn’t try to adjust for funds shifted to the banks in 2003 (the recapitalization of BoC and CCB) or the funds shifted to the banks in 2005-06 (ICBC recapitalization, the use of swaps to allow the banks to manage a portion of the PBoC’s reserves) or the funds shifted to the CIC in late 07 and q1 08. I’ll have a post going through all this data in great detail soon.
  • Ukraine
    The Business and Politics Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute
    Jeffrey Mankoff, an expert on Russia, says the dispute that led Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine has its origins in differences over pricing as well as Ukraine’s interest in closer ties with the West.
  • Capital Flows
    Shrinking Reserves
    The experience of the 1997-98 East Asian crisis encouraged many developing countries to accumulate vast sums of foreign exchange reserves in order to self-insure against future crises. As our chart indicates, as of the end of November, emerging market countries were burning through these reserves. This crisis will put to test previous thoughts about necessary reserve levels and the efficacy of self-insurance. Economist: Shrinking Cushion Economist: Russia’s Economy-The Flight from the Rouble Jung-a: S. Korea Reserves Fall as Won Weakens Subramanian: Self-insurance-The Debate India Must Have Mallaby: Supersize the IMF
  • Capital Flows
    Sovereign loss funds ...
    Ok, my title is a more-than-a-bit unfair. But sovereign wealth funds are fundamentally vehicles for investing central bank reserves -- or Treasury reserves from surplus oil revenue -- in equities and real estate rather than in classic reserve assets. And this year classic reserve assets have done rather well. Equities and real estate have not. The likely result has been large losses. Most sovereign funds remain, despite the efforts of Ted Truman, the US Treasury and the IMF, remain rather secretive, so we don’t know for sure. But it is hard to see how a large sovereign fund could have done well this year. Take a large fund oil fund, one that started 2007 with maybe $500 billion. -- Say 60% of the fund was invested in equities. The fund started the year with $300 billion in equities, and probably ended the year with $150-$180 billion. Equities globally are down between 40% and 50% in dollar terms. -- Say 20% of the fund was invested in real estate, hedge funds and private equities. The fund started the year with $100 billion in "alternatives" and probably ended the year with between $60 and $80 billion. It is hard to tell exactly, as many "alternative" assets aren’t traded in liquid markets, though the fact that some endowments are trying to sell their limited parnerships in private equity funds at large discounts suggests that if these assets were marked to market, they would be down. -- Say 20% of the fund was invested in government bonds. Setting aside exchange rate moves, they held their value. For simplicity’s stake, let’s say $100 billion remained $100 billion (say mark to market gains on long-term treasuries offset any slide the dollar value of euro-denominated bonds). The fund would have ended the year with between $310 billion and $360 billion. Even if the fund received $50 billion from high oil prices (and kept the entire $50 billion in cash, avoiding any losses over the course of the year), it would end the year with between $360 and $410 billion. This fund, of course, is fictional. But it is meant to capture the dynamics of a fund like the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. No one knows how much ADIA manages, though it clearly doesn’t have the $800 billion some claimed. Abu Dhabi’s ruling sheik has said as much. The IIF put ADIA’s assets at around $350 billion in June 2008 (before the sell off); SAMBA put ADIA at around $450 billion before the sell-off. Rachel Ziemba and I are working on a model that suggests that if ADIA had $150 billion at the end of $200, it would have risen to around $450 billion at the end of 2007. I have enough confidence in the model to think that if the starting number is right (a huge if), we probably aren’t off by more than $50-100 billion in either way -- at least so long as ADIA has generated close to market returns on a portfolio that has a lot of equity market exposure. The Setser/ Ziemba model (which we will be publishing soon as part of a broader paper on the Gulf’s funds) implies that if ADIA’s equity, real estate and private equity portfolio is marked to a (harsh) secondary market price, ADIA (really ADIA and ADIC, as ADIC was spun off from ADIA back when Abu Dhabi was flush) might have as little as $300 billion in foreign assets now. And probably no more than $350 billion. Remember, ADIA is widely thought to have had between 55-70% of its portfolios in equities, with a substantial chuck in emerging market equities. Stanley Reed of Business Week reports: While ADIA won’t disclose its total assets or precise allocations, officials at the fund, which is a sophisticated investor knowledgeable about the whole gamut of asset classes, earlier this year provided visiting BusinessWeek reporters with documents showing that the fund’s benchmarks called for having 55% to 71% of its portfolio invested in equities and a further 12% to 28% in so-called alternatives: real estate, hedge funds, and private equity. The Kuwait Investment Authority had around $265b at the end of March 2008 -- a total that includes some domestic investments. Its foreign portfolio is probably now down to $200-225 billion -- though much depends on how aggressively the KIA moved to emulate ADIA’s portfolio over the past few years and thus the extent of its exposure to the fall in equities and real estate. The Qatar Investment Authority has taken large losses on its portfolio -- which is much less diversified than the portfolios of the KIA and ADIA. But Qatar has a tiny population and a lot of gas revenue from newly developed fields, so it generates lots of cash -- and that cash inflow made up for most losses. It probably ended the year with $60 billion. Sum that up and the big Gulf funds likely have a portfolio that is closer to $600 billion than to a $1 trillion now. I have left out Oman (whose fund is small) and Dubai (which will likely need to sell its external assets to raise cash to cover its external debts). The Saudis --whose conservative portfolio did well this year -- have about $500 billion in disclosed assets. $32 billion of reserves, $412 billion of non-reserve foreign assets and another $67 billion or so of foreign assets that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency seems to manage for the government pension funds (see SAMA’s bulletin, table 8a, memorandum items, independent organizations). And then throw in $85 billion in central bank reserves in the other GCC countries (a total that is a bit dated, it is probably lower now) All told, that leaves the GCC governments with a bit over a trillion dollars (say $1.1 to $1.2 trillion) in foreign assets by my count. This is still a huge sum for a region with only 40 million or so native born inhabitants. But it is somewhat smaller than the numbers that were circulating not so long ago. The "somewhat over $1 trillion" total leaves aside the no doubt substantial private assets of the region’s ruling families. It also leaving aside the now substantial debts of many of the region’s private (or quasi-private) firms, as well as their foreign assets. This analysis has another corollary: the large sovereign wealth funds have a rather less than many estimate. Here is my (rough) math: ADIA/ ADIC: $350 billion KIA: $200 billion -- we should know better in April. QIA: $60-70 billion. Norway’s government fund: $308 billion (end November data, down from $400 billion at its peak) Temasek: around $70 in foreign assets before the market meltdown, no doubt much less now. Singapore’s GIC: $200 billion, though I don’t have a great deal of confidence in this estimate. The GIC manages a substantial chunk of Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves ($165 billion) as well as Singapore’s accumulated fiscal surplus and some pension fund assets. China Investment Corporation (CIC): $100 billion -- counting only its foreign assets and ignoring any mark to market losses on Blackstone and Morgan Stanley. Or $200-300 billion if the CIC and the foreign assets China’s state banks (which the CIC owns) effectively manage for the CIC -- as these are funds that the banks received as a result of their recapitalization -- are aggregated together. But only a small fraction of that has been invested in equities and similar assets. The CIC claims to be 90% in cash -- and China’s state banks mainly hold debt securities. Korea Investment Corporation: $30 billion (The KIC’s web sitereports that it manages $17 billion in foreign exchange reserves and $3 billion from the Treasury -- but the web site doesn’t look to have been updated for the additional $10 billion the KIC received earlier this year). That sets aside the losses on the KIC’s investment in Merrill. And that isn’t likely to grow soon -- not when Korea need cash. All told, I get a total in the $1.3 to $1.5 trillion range for the large funds with substantial foreign equity investments. That total leaves out a host of smaller funds with some external exposure -- as well as a lot of funds that are managed by central banks that some count as sovereign funds (see Truman for a comprehensive list) That’s down substantially for the year, as one would expect. And perhaps as importantly, it is down relative to the world’s traditional foreign exchange reserves, which now -- counting SAMA’s non-reserve foreign assets as part of reserves -- exceed $7 trillion. So much for forecasts that sovereign funds would emerge as huge forces in global markets, and would provide permanent support for risks assets. If oil stays at its current level -- and China doesn’t add to its sovereign fund -- I have a hard time seeing how sovereign funds reach $2 trillion anytime soon, let alone a much larger number. A lot though hinges on the definition of what constitutes a sovereign fund. If SAMA and Russia’s stabilization and future fund are counted as sovereign funds even though their portfolios that are closer to classic central bank reserve portfolios, it is easy to push up the total assets of sovereign funds. Conversely, some large central banks that invest primarily in bonds and other assets with limited credit risk have (or perhaps had) substantial equity portfolios. It is possible, for example, that both SAMA had around $60 billion in foreign equity investments (if not more) and SAFE had about $100 billion invested in global equities before the market crashed. That would be about 20% of SAMA’s securities portfolio in July* and 5% of SAFE’s portfolio. Any assessment of the impact of sovereign investors on the market should take into the investments that some large central banks made in risk assets. But it isn’t obvious that central banks will have as much appetite for these assets in the future as they had in 2007. If SAFE put $100 billion into global equities (5% of its portfolio) and if it marks that portion of its portfolio to market, it has a lot less than $100 billion now -- * SAMA was thought to have had about 20% of its portfolio in equities. At the end of June 2008, it had $297 billion in securities in its portfolio. If 20% of those had been in equities, it would have had about $60. Some thought it had a higher equity share. It is a little hard though, to reconcile a higher equity share with the subsequent strong growth in SAMA’s total assets. Since the end of June, SAMA’s deposits are up by $46b and its securities holdings are up $16b -- a $62 billion increase through the end of October. Either the Saudis got even more money from high oil than I anticipated, offsetting equity market losses -- or they had a smaller equity portfolio. There are still plenty of mysteries in the Gulf ...
  • Capital Flows
    C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics featuring Walter Lukken
    Podcast
    The C. Peter McColough Roundtable Series on International Economics is presented by the Corporate Program and the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • Financial Markets
    Good bye, petrodollars ...
    Estimates of the break-even oil price in Saudi Arabia’s budget vary, ranging from under $40 a barrel to around $50 a barrel. Sometimes that is because of different assumptions about Saudi Arabia’s actual production -- the more the Saudis cut back production, the higher the oil price they need to balance their budget. Sometimes that reflects different assumptions about the relevant oil price: the price Saudi Arabia gets on its actual production blend is a bit lower than the benchmark price for sweet light oil. And sometimes it just reflects a failure to adjust for the games the Saudis play with their budget. Formally, the Saudis plan to spend 410 billion Saudi Riyal -- or $109 billion -- in 2008 (more here). That incidentally is less that the 443 SAR ($118 billion) the Saudis actually spent in 2007, as spending ran a bit over the 380 billion SAR ($101b) in the formal budget. I don’t believe for a second that the Saudis are really going to spend less in 2008 than in 2007. Rachel Ziemba -- who watches the local press closely for RGE -- thinks the Saudis actual 2008 spending will come in around 532b SAR ($142 billion). That works out to a break-even price for the Saudis’ blend -- using the IMF’s assumption of 7.5 mbd of exports -- of around 51 or 52 dollars a barrel. My calculation ignored the Saudis non-oil revenue. But it also ignored the Saudis production costs. Neither amounts to all that much though, so I doubt my rough math is too far off. The IMF estimated the Saudis 2008 break-even price at $50 a barrel. Moreover, Saudi spending has been growing at something like 15% a year, if not a bit more -- remember, the Saudis had to increase their budget substantially just to assure that salaries kept up with inflation. And the Saudis probably aren’t going to scale back spending immediately. They don’t want the Saudi economy to come to a sudden halt. Projecting existing spending patterns out, I wouldn’t be surprised if the Saudis spent 585 SAR ($156) in 2009 -- a spending level that produces a crude estimated break-even price of the Saudi blend of around $57. For sweet light, that works out to an oil price of $60 or more .. Sweet light doesn’t current trade for anything like that. There is a reason why SAMBA estimates that the Saudis might soon run a rather substantial (over 20% of GDP) budget deficit if sweet light crude is at $40 . Not that the Saudis need to worry all that much right now. The Saudis added close to $60 billion to their reserves in the third quarter of 2008 alone. They are in a good position to use the Saudi Treasury’s accumulated petrodollars (and replenished domestic borrowing capacity, as the Saudi government has repaid a lot of domestic debt) to cover a temporary dip in oil revenues. That after all is the point of saving funds when times are good. The Russians -- who need an oil price of $70 (if not a bit more ... ) to cover their budget -- aren’t in quite as good a position. Particularly when they also need to draw on their reserves to bailout (or take over) their corporate sector ... Indeed, if oil stays at $40-45 a barrel, only Norway would still be adding to its stock of petrodollars (or petroeuros). Most other oil exporters would be sellers. The IMF (see table 4/ p. 30) puts the break-even price for Algeria and Libya in the 50s. And I don’t buy the IMF’s estimates for the break-even price for Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar. Not in the sense of providing an accurate picture of the true drain on each country’s oil revenue. The IIF puts Kuwait’s break-even price at around $50 counting a significant (one-off) transfer to the social security system. The National Bank of Kuwait puts Kuwait’s break-even price at $54 a barrel even if the one-off transfer payment is excluded. I like the IIF’s work on the Gulf, but in this I would bet the National Bank is closer to being right. The UAE number seems to be for the federal budget -- and thus excludes the budgets of individual sheikdoms. Moreover, Martin Wolf’s wonderful phrase "what looked like private lending turned out to be public spending" applies with unusual force in most of the Gulf, where a lot of the bigger local borrowers have close links to the state. And there was more private lending in the UAE than in most places. Qatar’s formal budget almost certainly doesn’t capture a lot of spending through various "private" foundations -- nor the funds needed to finance various quasi-private investment plans. $60 a barrel was the number that was floating around Doha this summer ... The IIF believes that the Gulf will run a small ($50 billion) current account surplus if oil is around $55 a barrel. I personally would expect the Gulf to perhaps run a current account deficit if sweet light oil is at $55 in the absence of a major fiscal contraction (and a major cut in various "private" and quasi-private investment plans). And there is no doubt that the Gulf would run a substantial (think $50-75b) current account deficit if oil is the low 40s. Bye-bye petrodollars. There isn’t much reason for the US to worry though. The US oil import bill will fall nearly as fast as the oil exporters reserves ... Indeed, some Gulf states are already in a position where they are selling off some of their foreign assets. Not to cover a fiscal deficit. But to bailout their over-extended private and quasi-private firms. If the domestic stock market is slipping, the local sovereign wealth fund can start buying shares of local firms ... If the banks are short local currency liquidity, reserve requirements and loan to deposit caps can be lifted. Or the sovereign fund can place a large local currency deposit with the banks .... the UAE, for example, recently put $20 billion on deposit with local banks. If a firm (or investment company) cannot refinance its external debts, it can get a loan from a sovereign fund ... Stephen Kotkin recently reviewed Christopher M. Davidson’s book on Dubai. The reviewer was a bit more positive on Dubai’s model than I would be, even arguing that a purge of recent financial excesses woudl be salutary ("the world’s searing financial debacle could turn out to be salutary for an overleveraged Dubai, reining in local inflation as well as an insane real estate market.") Maybe. But Dubai’s biggest vulnerability is that it was built with borrowed money not oil revenue. Absent a bit of help from further up Sheikh Zayed road, Dubai is in a real pinch ... The region’s sovereign funds are facing increasing local demands just when the slump in global markets has cut into the value of their portfolios. The IIF argues that the Gulf funds held 40-50% of their assets bonds, and thus have withstood the credit crisis relatively well. That is -- in my view -- only true if SAMA is counted as a sovereign fund. ADIA held between 12-18% of its assets in safe bonds, with the majority in equities. The KIA’s portfolio, I suspect, probably wasn’t that different than ADIA’s portfolio. The KIA started taking on more risk after 2004. To be sure, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar are still fabulously wealthy. But they aren’t quite as wealthy as they once were. And all of a sudden they actually will have to make choices rather than having more to spend on everything. Whether prestigious investments abroad or ambitious projects at home ... I always thought the notion that sovereign funds were intrinsically stabilizing forces in the market was overstated. For one, the absence of disclosure meant that it was impossible to know precisely how they impacted markets. But more importantly, their market impact likely would vary over time. In practice, they were big buyers of risk assets when risk was under-priced in 2006 and the first part of 2007. They seem to have kept on buying in the later part of 2007 -- helping to stabilize the market at no small cost to themselves. At some point in 2008 they got cold feet (or at least some did) and started to build up their cash positions. At least that is my best guess. And now they are likely to need to sell into a down market. Setting aside the period in late 2007 and early 2008 when they bought in a down market, sovereign funds generally seem to have added to the boom during the boom times (which isn’t necessarily stabilizing) and then joined nearly everyone else in pulling back from risk. They haven’t always been a stabilizing presence in global markets. Then again, the whole point of having a sovereign funds is to protect the sovereign funds’ home country against macroeconomic volatility -- not to prop up global markets (or global banks). They shouldn’t ever have been expected to always be a stabilizing force in global markets. By contrast, the sovereign funds themselves should have anticipated that they would be called on to support their home countries in bad times. And in retrospect, that means that they probably should have had a higher portion of their assets in investments that would hold their value when global growth slowed -- not in assets whose value is linked to global growth. After all the price of oil is also a function of global growth And most oil exporters still need to worry about the size of the external portfolio when oil is down, not when oil is up ...
  • Capital Flows
    Action, Reaction, or Over-Reaction?
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    Watch Nobel Laureate in economics, A. Michael Spence, analyze the many policy measures addressing the global crisis.