• Ukraine
    Ukraine’s Struggle for Independence in Russia’s Shadow
    Ukraine has shown resilience and perseverance despite facing multiple challenges—most notably Russian interference—since it achieved independence in 1991. Russia’s threats have culminated in the annexation of Crimea and Europe’s biggest land battle in eighty years.
  • Ukraine
    Rebuilding Ukraine
    To rebuild Ukraine’s economy successfully, argue the authors, policymakers should help facilitate the return of Ukrainian workers and private investment by developing a long-term recovery strategy.
  • Ukraine
    Media Briefing: Trump, Russia, and the Future of Ukraine
    Play
    Given recent developments in the Trump administration's approach to Russia and Ukraine, members are invited to join this virtual media briefing with CFR fellows. As the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches, CFR experts provide insights on the talks between the United States and Russia, the reactions from Europe, and the path forward for Ukraine. To register for this virtual meeting, please click the Register or Decline button or reply to this email.  Please join the Zoom event at least five minutes before the start of the presentation by using the below details: Trump, Russia, and the Future of Ukraine Zoom Webinar ID: 848 1398 4959 Zoom Password: 862896 For additional analysis by CFR experts, please visit CFR’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future.

Experts in this Region

Max Boot Headshot
Max Boot

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies

Dr. Liana Fix Headshot
Liana Fix

Fellow for Europe

Thomas Graham Headshot
Thomas Graham

Distinguished Fellow

Charles A. Kupchan
Charles A. Kupchan

Senior Fellow

Stephen Sestanovich

George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies

  • Ukraine
    Securing Ukraine’s Future: What Should the United States Do?
    Play
    President Donald Trump has indicated his desire to bring a speedy end to the war in Ukraine. How this goal will be accomplished, given the numerous obstacles, remains to be seen. In a series of publications, CFR experts on Ukraine and Russia provide a complementary set of policy recommendations aimed at ensuring Ukraine’s survival and success as an independent state. This meeting is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future and Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.  
  • Ukraine
    Defending Ukraine in the Absence of NATO Security Guarantees
    A cease-fire deal with Russia will not ensure Ukraine’s long-term security. CFR’s Paul Stares and the Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon argue for a multilayered defense system that could prevent another invasion while being financially sustainable for Ukraine’s allies.
  • Ukraine
    Securing Ukraine’s Future: What Should the United States Do?
    As the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looms, President Donald Trump and his administration are working toward bringing the war to a swift end. Five experts lay out recommendations for the Trump administration to ensure Ukraine’s survival and independence in alignment with core U.S. interests.
  • Nuclear Weapons
    The Risk of Nuclear War Continues to Rise
    As the world became more dangerous in 2024, the use of its most dangerous weapons has become more likely. This trajectory raises the stakes for the new Trump administration as it tries to end wars in Europe and the Middle East and, more broadly, to reverse the ominous path toward the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons that has been accelerated by these conflicts. Vladimir Putin became more aggressive in Ukraine last year, engineering the collapse of the nuclear guardrails built over seven decades between the U.S. and Russia and lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. He announced that Russian nuclear forces were on full combat alert and soon followed with military exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces in a combat scenario. Putin capped the year by launching Russia’s new hypersonic ballistic missile against targets in Ukraine, while formally announcing a revised Russian nuclear doctrine that officially lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to meet a conventional threat to Russian territory. The revised doctrine also states that an attack against Russia by a non-nuclear power with the participation or support of a nuclear power will be seen as their joint attack on Russia. U.S. defense analysts assess that Russia is not preparing to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and Putin’s nuclear threats are dismissed by Ukraine’s supporters as “bluffs” to curtail support for Ukraine. But Putin’s rhetoric and policy revisions have had a significant effect. Prior to the war in Ukraine, it was extremely rare for American or Russian leaders to imply a threat of nuclear use. Putin’s threats have dramatically shifted the lexicon on nuclear use, lowering the psychological barrier for use and reopening a debate in Ukraine on whether that nation needs a nuclear deterrent. Such rhetoric, combined with the change in strategic doctrine, lowers the threshold for using nuclear weapons not only in the current conflict but in future ones. Furthermore, Putin must recognize that, to maintain deterrence, he cannot keep issuing threats before action is eventually required. Russia’s need for support in the Ukraine war and the consequent 2024 Russia-North Korea mutual defense treaty make it more likely that an unpredictable North Korea will gain more sophisticated nuclear knowledge and technology. Russia also led the effort in the U.N. to ease the pressure on North Korea’s nuclear program by vetoing a resolution that would have extended the mandate of the panel tasked with reporting on North Korea compliance with U.N. sanctions. These developments, on the heels of North Korea’s announcement that it would no longer seek reunification and reconciliation with South Korea, have reopened debates in both South Korea and Japan on whether a non-nuclear status still serves their national security interests. Similarly, the Middle East war has undermined nuclear guardrails. Iran may become a nuclear weapons state in response to Israel’s debilitating attacks on it and its proxies. This, in turn, has unleashed speculation as to whether Israel will preempt such a possibility by escalating the conflict with a direct attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s closer cooperation with Russia and China has also increased concerns about further cooperation on developing Iran’s nuclear capacity. Looming over the deterioration of the nuclear guardrails and contributing to lowering the nuclear threshold is China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear force in 2024. As the Defense Department’s recent report on China’s military capabilities explains, China “probably perceives that a stronger nuclear force is needed to deter U.S. intervention, check potential nuclear escalation or first strike, and will allow for increased control of the scope and scale of escalation during a conflict in a way its previously smaller and less diverse nuclear force could not.” Further raising the nuclear risk levels are advancing technologies. AI can dangerously automate the command and control of nuclear weapons. The increased role of nuclear energy to address climate change could increase the spread of nuclear weapons capability, unless diligently addressed. President-elect Donald Trump has indicated that resolving the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is a top priority for the incoming administration. But solutions to these conflicts must include reversing the acceleration towards the use and spread of nuclear weapons. Risk reduction measures are a feasible starting point. Russia signaled that it hasn’t totally dismissed the need for these types of measures with its notification in advance to the Pentagon before its November launch of its ballistic missile strike in Ukraine. China and India’s reported roles in signaling Putin to deescalate his nuclear threats indicates their understanding of risk reduction. While the inclusion of nuclear risk reduction measures as part of any agreement to end the conflicts may seem like small steps in the face accelerating threats, the understanding of the risks involved is the bedrock for more far-reaching measures.
  • Ukraine
    The Art of a Good Deal: Ukraine’s Strategic Economic Opportunity for the United States
    As President Donald Trump pursues a quick end to the war in Ukraine, he should recognize that maximizing Ukraine's security in any negotiated settlement is in the long-term economic interests of the United States. 
  • Ukraine
    Partners in Peacemaking: How the United States and Europe Can End the War in Ukraine
    It would be easy for President Donald Trump to exclude his European counterparts from peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. But involving European partners is necessary to secure a better deal for the United States.
  • Ukraine
    Toward a Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War
    To bring Russia to the negotiating table and end the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin needs to believe time is no longer on his side. Here's what the Trump administration needs to do to make that happen.
  • Ukraine
    Neutrality: An Alternative to Ukraine’s Membership in NATO
    While Ukraine’s acceptance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears unattainable, armed neutrality may be the country’s next best option to protect against future Russian aggression.
  • Ukraine
    The World Next Year: Wars, New Governments, and Stormy Weather to Watch in 2025
    Podcast
    In this special year-end episode, hosts Bob McMahon and Carla Anne Robbins sit down with the New York Times’ chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe Steven Erlanger to review the biggest stories of the past year and discuss developments to watch in 2025. They analyze the conflicts and political developments in the Middle East and Europe, President-elect Donald Trump’s picks for his national security team, the state of democracy worldwide, and more.