Defense and Security

Security Alliances

  • Philippines
    The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance
    The Philippines is one of the United States’ oldest allies in Asia-Pacific and the long-lasting defense relationship is at the heart of U.S. policy in the region.
    Backgrounder by Eleanor Albert October 21, 2016
  • India
    Three Takeaways on U.S.-India Defense Ties
    Indian Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar came to Washington today for his sixth meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter.  Secretary Carter noted in his opening statement of their joint press conference that he has spent more time with Minister Parrikar “than with any other counterpart.” He did not qualify the statement further, and did not limit his remark to convey “any other non-NATO” counterpart or a similar formulation. For me, that gives us takeaway number one about U.S.-India defense ties: The time Carter and his counterpart, Parrikar, are investing in this venture illustrates the opportunity they perceive in a deepened strategic relationship—but also underscores the hard, time-consuming work required to find a way for the defense systems in both countries to learn to work together more seamlessly. Carter and Parrikar both highlighted the importance of “shared values” in the defense relationship, and repeatedly referenced freedom of navigation and the fight against terrorism to illustrate those shared values. They spoke about a convergence of views, and a gradually-expanding technology partnership, that will make U.S.-India ties “a defining partnership of the twenty-first century.” Carter developed his “handshake” metaphor for the U.S.-India relationship more fully, describing ties as “two important handshakes.” The first handshake brings together the U.S. rebalance to Asia with India’s “Act East” policy, to use the name of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Asia strategy. Both countries’ outstretched hands, so to speak, meet in the Indo-Pacific, where their shared point of view and common sense of conduct create an ever-larger platform for cooperation. The second handshake centers on deeper technology sharing, with increasingly more complex joint projects on the anvil. As the joint statement from the Carter-Parrikar meeting notes, both sides finalized in July five new technology initiative working groups: naval systems; air systems; ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); and “other systems.” This is on top of the working groups already underway through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. All of this gives us takeaway number two: The emphasis on technology partnership is not just about cool new toys, but about enhancing power toward the shared purpose of freedom of navigation and overflight and countering terror. Neither cabinet official mentioned China, nor Pakistan, nor any of the other specific maritime threats such as counterpiracy—but the importance of reinforcing the rule of law came through loud and clear. Parrikar’s Washington visit provided the occasion for the long-delayed formalization of the new U.S.-India Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). After negotiations on this logistics agreement stretched out over more than a decade, many observers (including myself) hoped it would be inked during Carter’s visit to India in April 2016. Unfortunately, that visit elicited language about “expecting” the agreement to be signed in “the coming weeks.” Prime Minister Modi’s Washington visit in June raised expectations once again, but the joint statement from that visit merely “welcomed finalization of the text” of the LEMOA. With today’s signing, this long-ruminated logistics agreement can finally become operational. But notably, both Carter and Parrikar took great pains at their joint press conference to repeatedly explain that the LEMOA agreement was an “enabler,” not a basing agreement “of any kind.” This message surely goes out to Indian listeners, some of whom remain wary that partnership with the United States will erode India’s longstanding policy independence. A follow up question from the press about moving ahead on subsequent agreements prompted a reply from Parrikar emphasizing how long LEMOA had taken, as if it were too early to start thinking about others. This brings me to takeaway number three: As close as India is ready to come to the United States, New Delhi does not desire a military alliance that would tie it to U.S. decision-making and military activities around the world. Indeed, Carter carefully described LEMOA as something that would make operating together easier “when we choose to do so” but that governments would choose when to do so on a case-by-case basis. The repeated clarification shows how partnership with New Delhi will be unlike ties with other close U.S. allies and partners—it has clear limits, and the Indian government will not hesitate to draw those lines. Top photo credit: Original photo taken by Tim D. Godbee and licensed under CC by 2.0. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa   Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa) 
    Blog Post by Alyssa Ayres August 29, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • United States
    Cyber Week in Review: June 17, 2016
    Here is a quick round-up of this week’s technology headlines and related stories you may have missed: 1. Russian government hacked the DNC. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) confirmed last Tuesday that its computer network had been compromised by hackers who stole troves of research on presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump. Cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike identified the attackers as two hacking groups sponsored by the Russian government. According to their report, one group infiltrated the network last summer and had been monitoring DNC emails and online chats ever since.  Russian officials denied the accusations, however. Subsequently, an individual going by the moniker "Guccifer 2.0," after a Romanian hacker on trial in the United States, claimed credit for the hacks and released documents purportedly stolen from the DNC on a WordPress site and to Gawker. Security researchers were quick to point out holes in Guccifer 2.0’s claims, however, and suggested that it was simply an attempted false flag operation by the Russian government. Meanwhile, the Trump campaign claimed Wednesday that the DNC hacked itself to distract the public from its "deeply flawed candidate." 2. United States and China hold second cyber dialogue. Chinese and U.S. officials met Tuesday to further discuss bilateral action against cyber threats,  taking additional steps toward implementing the cybersecurity agreements brokered between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Obama last September. While the U.S. attorney general and secretary of homeland security had to withdraw from the meetings to deal with the Orlando shooting, the meeting went ahead as planned with their deputies representing the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security. The meeting, the second U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues High Level Joint Dialogue, yielded agreements on holding further joint tabletop exercises on cyber incidents, consensus on a hotline mechanism to be tested later this year, and promises to share more information related to investigation of online crime and cyberattacks. Progress is mixed. On the positive side, Chinese media reported this week that the two countries had worked together over the last several months to take down botnet command and control servers and catch individuals suspected of sharing child pornography online. But half a year after the working group first met, the U.S. government has only set up temporary email accounts for information sharing, and a report from a Dutch cybersecurity firm released this week claims to have identified a new advanced persistent threat group sponsored by the Chinese government. 3. NATO recognizes cyberspace as a domain of warfare. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced this week that it officially recognizes cyberspace as a domain of warfare, on par with land, air, and sea. Despite reporting to the contrary, it wasn’t the first time NATO staked out a position on cyberspace: its cyber defense strategy update of 2014 stated that the alliance would respond to serious cyberattacks on its members. Explaining the shift, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that "developing capabilities to more quickly attribute responsibility for cyber intrusions and cyber attacks is a priority for the alliance." Stoltenberg clarified that it would take a "severe" attack to trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which lays out the conditions in which alliance members would have to come to each other’s aid. The decision raises questions about whether NATO—a  defensive alliance—should develop offensive cyber weapons, although NATO officials made it clear that they had no plans to develop an offensive strategy for cyberspace. 4. U.S. government to defend Facebook data transfers. The United States government sought this week to file an amicus curiae brief in the court case between Facebook and privacy activist Max Schrems that’s being decided by the Irish High Court. Schrems has argued that Facebook’s transfer of EU users’ data to the United States under a legal justification known as "model clauses" are illegal following the decision last year of the European Court of Justice to invalidate the Safe Harbor framework governing transatlantic data transfers. The court delayed its decision in the case by two weeks to give the U.S. government time to make its arguments. Schrems called the U.S. government’s action "an unusual move." The government is not alone, however: a number of industry groups whose members also rely on model clauses to transfer data have petitioned to file amicus briefs, as well as a number of online privacy NGOs.
    Blog Post by Adam Segal June 17, 2016 Net Politics
  • United States
    Making States Responsible for Their Activities In Cyberspace: The Role of the European Union
    Annegret Bendiek is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).  It’s cliché to say that we are increasingly dependent on internet-enabled technologies. Nevertheless, Europe is struggling to keep up. Shrinking budgets limit European countries’ ability to invest in building resilience against cyberattacks. The interconnectedness of critical infrastructure, along with the coming internet of things, forces European policy makers to consider the following question: how we protect and create resilient critical infrastructure? Finding an answer to this question is politically fraught. Security experts who adhere to the realist school of international relations theory argue that policymakers must accept the increasing militarization of cyberspace. They argue that states must build up their offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. This view has gained currency in a number of countries, as strategic planners issue national security policies with a cyber component. Likewise, the European Union and NATO have begun corralling their respective members to establish common defensive capabilities. It is also hard to overlook the reemergence of the state in cyberspace as they emphasize their digital sovereignty. More liberal minded scholars warn that the build-up of offensive capabilities only repeats the mistakes of the past. It will foster mistrust, lead to a new arms race and might even lead to the internet’s fragmentation as states assert their sovereignty. A free, open and trustworthy internet is an important global public good, and an offensive build-up puts that at risk. Following up on the approach of work under the auspices of the United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), much of policymakers’ attention has been focused on finding agreement common norms for state behavior in cyberspace with mixed success. Recently U.S. and EU officials have been adapting concepts found in the law of state responsibility, which sets out how and when a state is responsible for a breach of its international obligations, to promote certain cyber norms. For example, policymakers across the Atlantic are promoting the idea of state responsibility—states are responsible for the cyber activity originating from their territory. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues picked up and endorsed this idea in its 2015 report, and will likely expand on this notion when its work resumes later this year. As the European Union will update its 2013 cybersecurity strategy, and will extend it to a “strategy for cyberspace” it should make the norm of state responsibility a cornerstone. A number of member states are developing their offensive and defensive capabilities, making an EU-wide strategy essential to ensure that their actions are compatible with norms that support a free, open, and trustworthy internet. The European Union can promote state responsibility in cyberspace in three ways:           EU coordination. Since 2003, EU officials have coordinated their cyber efforts through a Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues. Having this group agree to a common position on the norm of state responsibility would give the European External Action Service—the European Union’s diplomatic corps—a common message and outreach strategy with which to build support. The External Action Service’s work can be supported by the European Network and Information Security Agency, the authoritative reference for cybersecurity in the European Union.             Transatlantic support. Making states responsible for their cyber activities is only possible if states can attribute offensive cyber incidents. Despite their differences on privacy, espionage, and surveillance, the European Union and the United States need to cooperate to solve the attribution problem. One way they could do this is by supporting an effort to create an independent court of arbitration with the forensic capabilities to identify parties responsible for offensive cyber activities. An independent third party would improve the credibility of attributing an incident to a particular state thereby making it responsible.             Military restraint. Under international law, if a state has had its sovereignty violated, it is entitled to use all necessary and proportionate means to terminate that violation. This would apply in cyberspace, where a targeted state could engage in what has been dubbed “active defense” to end an ongoing cyberattack started by another state. Although taking these types of countermeasures are legal under international law, in practice, responses of this kind easily run the risk of escalation, possible legal breaches, and undermining the tradition of military restraint in foreign and security policy. To avoid this, EU member states should ensure that their respective militaries remain committed to a defensive approach, and promote this posture within NATO, the OSCE and other multilateral security institutions.   The internet is too precious and important to be left to the realists and to those who can only think in the categories of conflict and confrontation. A transatlantic initiative is required to ensure that it remains free, open and trustworthy. Without this, we might wake up one day and see that the cyber world of the twenty-first century looks dangerously similarly to political world of the nineteenth century.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics June 15, 2016 Net Politics
  • Security Alliances
    Reforming the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program
    The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides U.S. government funds to members of foreign militaries to take classes at U.S. military facilities, has the potential to be a powerful tool of U.S. influence. IMET is designed to help foreign militaries bolster their relationships with the United States, learn about U.S. military equipment, improve military professionalism, and instill democratic values in their members. For forty years, the program has played an important role in the United States’ relations with many strategic partners and in cultivating foreign officers who become influential policymakers. Although the program’s funding is relatively small, it could have an outsize impact on the United States’ military-to-military relations with many nations. Yet IMET today is in need of significant reform. The program contains no system for tracking which foreign military officers attended IMET. Additionally, the program is not effectively promoting democracy and respect for civilian command of armed forces. A 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that most IMET programs did not include material on human rights and democracy. Although some U.S. policymakers now want to expand IMET to include officers from a broader range of developing nations, such as Myanmar, the program should be revamped before it is enlarged. The reforms should include more effectively screening IMET candidates, developing a system to follow the careers of IMET alumni, and institutionalizing coursework on professionalism, human rights, and democracy in IMET’s curriculum. The Situation Launched in 1976, IMET supports training for foreign military personnel from “allied and friendly nations.” It designates funding for members of foreign militaries to take courses at technical schools, colleges, universities, and professional schools affiliated with branches of the U.S. armed forces. Most of the courses are categorized as either professional military education, which focuses on broad leadership training, or technical classes, which teach students skills specific to military occupational specialties. When it was founded, IMET focused on boosting foreign militaries’ relations with the United States and educating armed forces about U.S. weapons. Reforms initiated in the 2000s were supposed to refocus IMET to include more coursework on military professionalism, human rights, and the role of a military in a democracy. Funding for IMET is delivered on a country-by-country basis. It is only a small portion of overall U.S. security assistance to most countries. About 120 countries, mostly lower- and middle-income developing nations, receive IMET funding each year. The Stakes IMET is only a small portion of U.S. security assistance, but many policymakers believe the program is more effective at boosting foreign militaries’ ties to the United States than other types of aid. IMET creates personal relationships in a way that other types of security aid cannot, and the program often includes men and women who later ascend to the ranks of colonel or general. For more than four decades, the program has played a role in bonding foreign and U.S. officers, and in cultivating U.S. influence in strategically vital nations. In a 2014 study, political scientists Jonathan Waverley and Jesse Savage found that U.S. military training “increases the [foreign] military’s power relative to the [civilian government] in ways that other forms of military assistance do not,” because of the prestige accrued and bonds formed among officers. Recognizing IMET’s promise, Congress has increased IMET funding 70 percent since 2000; in fiscal year 2016 IMET was allocated $108 million. However, IMET’s importance makes it even more critical that the program be reshaped to function in the best interests of the United States. A 2014 study by the National Defense University found that the majority of IMET graduates are never contacted by the U.S. military again. This lack of information makes it difficult for U.S. policymakers to identify foreign military leaders who could be liaisons for future military-to-military relations or to assess IMET’s utility at all. A lack of institutional memory also makes it hard for the Pentagon and U.S. arms manufacturers to find IMET graduates who were trained on U.S. weapons systems. In addition, IMET’s admissions processes and curriculum do not sufficiently emphasize military professionalism or the importance of democracy and human rights. According to interviews with officers from a range of countries, few IMET courses focus on the role of a military in a democracy. Moreover, several U.S. government audits have found that screening of candidates for past abuses is minimal. Yet history suggests that allowing foreign officers who have committed abuses into IMET, with the rationale that the training will influence them to act more humanely, has proven a false hope. During the Cold War, IMET welcomed Burmese, Indonesian, Pakistani, Thai, and Egyptian senior officers who had demonstrated histories of abusive behavior. There is no evidence that they returned home and behaved differently. Instead, the United States should choose the most professional and least abusive candidates to come to IMET, rather than hoping that IMET will radically reverse officers’ qualities. Failing to utilize IMET to promote respect for democratic rule and civilian command harms U.S. interests. In countries such as Thailand, Egypt, and Pakistan, continued military involvement in politics weakens civilian governments and stokes instability, making these states unreliable strategic partners over the long term. In addition, continued involvement in politics undermines these militaries’ professionalism and their ability to actually fight wars. For example, the Thai armed forces have more generals per capita than any other military in the world, largely so they can effectively stage regular coups. The Thai army has performed poorly in its most recent military encounters, including an ongoing counterinsurgency effort in southern Thailand dating to 2001. Although U.S. training programs cannot be expected to dramatically determine political dynamics in foreign countries, failing to use U.S. training to emphasize respect for democratic institutions sends a message that assistance does not distinguish between abusive and law-abiding militaries. In addition, if foreign military leaders attend IMET and then intervene in politics back home, their history of U.S. education undermines U.S. rhetorical support for democracy. Foreign officers’ U.S. training is impossible to hide. For example, the international media quickly discovered that leaders of coups in Mali in 2012 and Honduras in 2009 had attended IMET-funded programs. How to Proceed Given IMET’s importance, it is critical that the program better serve U.S. interests and foster U.S. values. The Department of Defense should revamp how participants are selected for IMET, how IMET attendees are tracked, and how U.S. leaders use IMET in bilateral relations. Follow and support IMET alumni. The Department of Defense should develop a comprehensive system for tracking IMET alumni. Such a system would allow the U.S. government to track which graduates have been promoted and could help defense attachés at U.S. embassies cultivate relationships with foreign militaries. The Department of Defense also should provide three to five million dollars in seed funding to create an IMET alumni association. The association would sponsor events where IMET alumni could interact with U.S. diplomats and military attachés. Make IMET more selective. Once a country is approved to receive IMET, defense attachés at U.S. embassies should play a more active role in prequalifying IMET enrollees. The Department of Defense should assign attachés overseas who have experience vetting IMET candidates. Better screening would actually defuse congressional and human rights criticisms of IMET for funding abusive officers, and make it less likely that Congress would suspend IMET funding for a particular country. This prequalification should include a thorough analysis of proposed participants’ records for apolitical professionalism. In nations where the military has a long record of rights abuses, it may be necessary to open IMET spaces only to those below a certain age. Employ instructors from other democracies. To emphasize respect for human rights and a civilian chain of command, at least 5 percent of IMET’s funding should be earmarked for foreign instructors from the militaries of countries, such as Brazil, that recently made a successful transition to democracy. Use IMET more as both a carrot and a stick. Although U.S. law already prohibits IMET funding for a country where a “duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup,” the legislation has many loopholes. Most obviously, a U.S. president can choose not to call a military takeover a coup, and maintain IMET funding. Congress should rewrite legislation to make it impossible to provide IMET funds to a military that deposes an elected government. To be sure, cutting off IMET could be counterproductive for short-term strategic relations with that nation. However, taking this risk is necessary. Suspending IMET allows the United States to send an important signal to citizens of that country that Washington does not tolerate coups. In these young democracies, cultivating public support for U.S. policy is critical to sustaining bilateral relations in the long-term. Moreover, in the post–Cold War era, military regimes from Egypt to Thailand have proven themselves highly incapable of handling modern, globalized economies and security challenges, from violence in Sinai to Thailand’s macroeconomic policy. A potential short-term chill in a bilateral relationship is worth the prospect of helping end regimes that undermine regional security and prosperity. In addition, when elected governments are quickly restored, as happened after the 2006 Thai coup, the United States resumes IMET funding; evidence suggests that military relations are then revived at the same level as before the coup. Building Support Reforming IMET so that U.S. leaders can track graduates will improve the program’s effectiveness and might also make it easier for U.S. defense companies to find foreign customers. Anecdotal studies of foreign officers who have attended IMET suggest that they have positive views of bilateral relations with the United States. Comprehensively tracking these graduates would give the Pentagon an important database of potentially pro-U.S. officers. Changing some of IMET’s focus to better promote rights and professionalism will be harder than implementing the reforms designed to monitor alumni. Some U.S. policymakers may resist the idea of barring soldiers with records of abuses from getting IMET funds, arguing that the United States should not turn down opportunities to influence foreign military leaders. Yet vetting IMET participants would actually make it less likely that Congress would totally cut off IMET funds for any nations. The United States also has many other tools that it could use to influence authoritarian regimes—even military leaders who have committed abuses—without providing them the prestige afforded by IMET. Many of those tools can be maintained even if a foreign military has staged a coup, allowing the United States to preserve influence with a coup government even while cutting off IMET. 
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by Joshua Kurlantzick June 8, 2016
  • Middle East and North Africa
    The President Gratuitously Damages American Alliances
    American alliances are not in good shape these days, with many countries worrying that President Obama does not value the alliances, their own role in those alliances, or the commitments our alliances imply to the safety of states that are to some degree dependent on the United States. It is therefore mysterious why the president decided to inflict further damage in interviews with The Atlantic.  One can think easily of two famous moments when such comments, and those not even by a president, had dire effects. In January 1950, Secretary of State Acheson spoke about the American defense perimeter in Asia, saying our "defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus....The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." Excluded here was Korea, and many analysts have said this speech contributed to the decision by the North to invade South Korea several months later. On July 25, 1990, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq met with Saddam Hussein and said "We have no opinion on your Arab – Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960′s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America." Eight days later Saddam invaded Kuwait. Words have consequences. In these recent interviews, the president undermined trans-Atlantic relations and relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies. Take his comment on the Russian invasion of Ukraine: The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do. This is an example of where we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for. Well, it is actually an example of saying something off the cuff that can only encourage further Russian aggression and demoralize Ukrainians fighting for their country. Why say it, even if you think it? Take this description of Mr. Obama’s words from The New York Times: The Saudis, Mr. Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg, the [Atlantic] magazine’s national correspondent, “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.” Reflexively backing them against Iran, the president said, “would mean that we have to start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. And that would be in the interest neither of the United States nor of the Middle East.” Saudi Arabia has been an American ally since 1945, and now faces an aggressive Iran with troops and proxies all over the Arab world (Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen) and with a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program. Other American allies border it and share its fears: Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain (where the Fifth Fleet is located), and the United Arab Emirates. What does the president have to say to calm their fears? Nothing. Instead he builds them, and suggests that he looks upon growing Iranian power with indifference--or even with approval. To those comments he added criticisms of the United Kingdom and France, as if he were concerned lest any key allies be left out. It’s worth mentioning as well this line from The Times: The portrait that emerges from the interviews is of a president openly contemptuous of Washington’s foreign-policy establishment, which he said was obsessed with preserving presidential credibility, even at the cost of blundering into ill-advised military adventures. As to credibility, those advisers who told him he was sacrificing his when--for example--he failed to enforce his red line on Syria were right. Presidential credibility can never be the goal of American foreign policy, but it is an important asset. Foreign leaders, whether hostile or friendly, must be able to trust that when the president says something, he means it and will stick to it. Allies rely on the United States, but "the United States" is an abstraction. In fact they rely on the words of the top officials with whom they interact; for them, in this sense the president IS the United States. Mr. Obama’s deprecation of presidential credibility is alarming for Americans, and dangerous for our friends. Mr. Obama seems "openly contemptuous" of anyone who disagrees with him, and has for seven years. The problem in his eyes is not that there are tough policy questions, and difficult decisions, and several sides to hard questions; nope, there is his view and there are the ignorant, unintelligent views of those who differ, of whom he is indeed "openly contemptuous." Those who think the tone of American politics is ugly because participants disrespect each other might consider how much of that tone originates with or is worsened by the president. In any event, his comments in this interview will not help the national security interests of the United States. They will undermine the confidence of allies. It is anyone’s guess why felt that these thoughts should have been spoken now.         _________________________________________________________Note: Elliott Abrams is a member of the foreign policy advisory group for Sen. Marco Rubio
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams March 10, 2016 Pressure Points
  • Cybersecurity
    The Use of Cyber Power in the War Between Russia and Ukraine
    Jarno Limnéll is a professor of cybersecurity at Finland’s Aalto University and vice president at Insta Group Plc. You can follow him on Twitter @JarnoLim. As cyber environment continues to evolve, many cyber experts, government officials and academics are following the conflict in Ukraine, and particularly its cyber dimension, very carefully. Russia is believed to be in the top three most cyber-capable countries (the United States and China being the other two) and its actions in Ukraine may set a precedent of how countries integrate cyber operations into military activity. As many have said before, a "pure cyberwar," where military conflict occurs only in the digital environment, is unlikely to take place anywhere. A more likely occurrence are wars, crises, and conflicts where the exploitation of the digital environment is an integral part of other military activities. This is exactly what has happened in Ukraine. Cyber operations are well suited to the vague concept of hybrid warfare, where states use a mix of conventional and unconventional means to achieve their military goals. In cyberspace, the adversary is usually difficult to locate, nations can conduct offensive actions with less political risk, and international law concerning cyber operations is still a grey area. Even though destructive cyberattacks have not been reported in Ukraine, there have been a variety of cyber activities carried out through the digital domain. A number of the cyber incidents that we know of have occurred against civilian targets, not military ones. The most prominent cyber activities in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict have been cyber espionage and propaganda warfare campaigns, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against Ukrainian media and governmental organizations and defacements of several NATO websites, the jamming of Ukrainian policy-makers’ communications, manipulation of information and videos, a campaign to corrupt voting processes in Ukraine, leaking confidential e-mails, phone calls and documents, and various disruptions in networks and information systems. In eastern Ukraine, Russian signals intelligence operations have made use of Internet data to locate and target Ukrainian military forces. Attacks on critical infrastructure and attacks on defense systems have not happened during the Russo-Ukrainian war. Maybe in the future we will learn that there were such attacks, but at the moment there are no visible signs of them. Why? There are several reasons, but five stand out. First, , Russian authorities seem to have determined that there has been no practical need to engage in destructive offensive cyber operations to achieve their military and political objectives in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russians seem to have calculated that the moderate use of physical force has been enough. Second, Ukraine’s critical infrastructure is not as advanced and technology-dependent as that found in the West. Ukraine may not have provided lucrative enough targets for destructive cyberattacks. Third, severe cyberattacks would probably have meant the escalation of the conflict, which has not been the aim of either side. In addition, sophisticated cyberattacks often have unpredictable side-effects and there is a risk that the attacker might shoot themselves in the foot. An easy example is Stuxnet, where malware was designed for a specific set of equipment and circumstances but eventually ended up in the wild causing headaches for others who weren’t the intended target. Fourth, the implementation of destructive cyber operations may in practice be more difficult than the public discussion about cyberspace assumes them to be. It’s actually pretty hard to design a discrete cyber weapon that only does what you want it to do on a specific target. Fifth, states are likely to save their most destructive cyber capabilities until they really need them, like countering an existential threat. The conflict in Ukraine most definitely does not fall into that category for Russia. In future wars and conflicts, it is more likely that cyber operations will be deployed to shape the battlespace rather than as decisive activities in their own right. States with successful cyber capabilities will find a way to combine both their physical and cyber capabilities as efficiently as possible towards a common purpose. Although we haven’t seen any destructive cyber incidents in the Russian-Ukrainian war, that doesn’t mean it won’t happen. The five reasons I’ve laid out might not hold true in the future. The latest news from Ukraine tells us that malware probably infected at least three regional power authorities in Ukraine and left about 1.4 million homes without electricity for few hours. However, many crucial questions in this incident remain unanswered. The war in Ukraine isn’t over yet, and this year may bring a different set of interests to conduct destructive cyberattacks.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics January 11, 2016 Net Politics
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Is Turkey Really at the Table?
    This article originally appeared here on Politico.com on Tuesday, November 24, 2015. To Westerners, it might seem that Vladimir Putin was exaggerating in anger when, after a Turkish F-16 on Tuesday shot down a Russian fighter jet allegedly violating Turkish airspace, he referred to the government in Ankara as “terrorists’ accomplices.” Americans aren’t used to thinking of Turkey—our NATO ally and most powerful backstop in the Muslim world—in this way. And surely Putin is just engaging in some saber-rattling. But as Turkey and Russia dispute the incident, it is casting a spotlight on one of the most troubling developments in the evolving struggle in the Middle East: When it comes to fighting the Islamic State and extremism more generally, Turkey—and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—has become a significant part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. You wouldn’t know this from the official rhetoric. NATO is standing firmly by Turkey in the wake of Tuesday’s incident. And the Obama administration often trumpets the critical importance of Turkey’s participation in the international coalition to counter ISIL. Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy for that coalition, told Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News this summer that the United States “can’t succeed against Daesh [the Islamic State] without Turkey.” And after a bloody two weeks—during which ISIL claimed credit for the Paris shooting and bombing spree, the killing of 43 people in another bombing in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula—Erdogan, an Islamist who runs a country that is 99.8 percent Muslim, appeared with President Barack Obama ahead of the G-20 summit in Antalya and spoke firmly against jihadism: “We are confronted with a collective terrorism activity around the world. As you know, terrorism does not recognize any religion, any race, any nation or any country. … And this terrorist action is not only against the people of France. It is an action against all of the people of the globe.” Continue reading here...
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook November 25, 2015 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • United States
    What Andrzej Duda and Benjamin Netanyahu Have in Common
    What do Andrzej Duda and Benjamin Netanyahu have in common? The answer is Russia. Duda is president of Poland and Netanyahu is prime minister of Israel. For Poles, Russia is a never-ending problem and has been one throughout Polish history. Watching Putin maneuver against Georgia and Ukraine, take Crimea and part of Georgia by force, and threaten NATO countries, all of Poland’s traditional fears of its big neighbor are called to mind. So the Poles rely on both their membership in NATO and their own arms buildup for national security. They have under way a multi-year arms program, increasing defense spending each year and exceeding their NATO peers in percentage terms over and over again. Netanyahu may have thought that Russia was no worry, given simple geography and the fact that American foreign policy and military strength had kept the Russians out of the Middle East for a half century. But then along came Barack Obama, and now the Russians have made a major move in Syria. The American reaction—thus far, one phone conversation by John Kerry and one by Ashton Carter—will not have deterred Putin, so Netanyahu is today in Moscow talking with the Russians. What’s the problem? After all, Russia appears determined to use force to keep Assad in power, but Israel has never had a policy of expelling Assad. That was Mr. Obama’s announced policy, not Mr. Netanyahu’s. Israel problem is that in keeping Assad in office, Putin is becoming an ever more important ally of Iran and Hezbollah, who have been fighting for Assad for three years now. Indeed Assad would be long gone despite Russian arms sales if Iran and Hezbollah did not have troops on the ground (estimates are 5-6,000 from Hezbollah) doing what his own army can no longer successfully do. So Russia is now a Hezbollah and Iranian ally and their military ties will grow as they work for the same goals on the same territory in Syria. A Russian alliance with Iran and Hezbollah is bad enough in principle. It is worse in practice, for Israel has long had a policy of interdicting arms transfers from Iran or Syria to Hezbollah. All those Israeli bombing runs in Syria (bombing runs our own military says are just too difficult and dangerous, if not impossible, due to Syrian air defenses) are aimed at blowing up such transfers. Will Israel be able to do that if Syria and Hezbollah have new Russian anti-aircraft weaponry, manned by Russians? Might some Russians be killed—and then what? Because the Syrian rebels and the Islamic State forces arrayed against the Assad regime have no air force—zero aircraft are at their disposal—just who is supposed to be deterred by Russian anti-aircraft batteries? The United States? Israel? So Netanyahu has plenty to talk about with Putin. Today, for the first time since Russian forces were ordered out of Egypt by Anwar Sadat in 1972, Israel must contend with this threat. Like the Poles, Israelis must now study the military positioning and the military intentions of Putin and his generals. Like the Poles, Israel must contend with a region once understood to be under impregnable American protection, but now seen as up for grabs. Few goals of American foreign policy have been more less contentious, more broadly understood and agreed, and more successful for the last fifty years than keeping the Russians out of the Middle East. The collapse of that policy will be one of Mr. Obama’s worst and most dangerous legacies.    
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams September 21, 2015 Pressure Points
  • Cybersecurity
    Cyberspace’s Other Attribution Problem
    Benjamin Brake is an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a foreign affairs analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State or the U.S. government. Claims that technical experts have solved attribution ignore legal challenges that could slow or limit how states might lawfully respond to a major cyberattack. First, a country hit with a major cyberattack would face the novel challenge of persuading allies that the scale and effects of a cyberattack were grave enough to trigger a right to self-defense under the UN Charter. No simple task, given that the UN rules were drawn up seven decades ago by countries seeking to end the scourge of traditional, kinetic warfare. Jurists still debate how self-defense applies in cyberspace and U.S. officials admit building a consensus could be a challenge. If a victim state does corral a consensus that the right to use force in self-defense has been triggered, a second legal question could compound the attribution challenge even further. Can the actions of a hacker be attributed to a nation-state as a matter of law? Answering this question presents a major legal hurdle if the attack is launched by an ostensibly non-state hacker with murky ties to an adversary government—a growing trend already seen in cyberattacks linked to Russia and Iran. Legal precedents born out of traditional conflicts and proxy wars suggest the evidentiary burden to attribute the actions of non-state hackers to a state will be substantial. And experiences from recent incidents offer a discouraging preview. It took less than 24 hours for a prominent cybersecurity expert to cast doubt on claims by unnamed U.S. officials that China was behind the breach of OPM’s networks. Official accounts of Pyongyang’s role in the Sony attack played out similarly, with news outlets featuring competing expert accounts of responsibility—a line-up of suspects that included North Koreans, Russians, hacktivists, cyber criminals, and disgruntled employees. Old Law in New Battles In 2013, some of the world’s major cyber powers reached a consensus that law applies in cyberspace, including principles of the law of state responsibility. Attributing conduct to a nation-state under this body of customary international law, however, requires extensive evidence of state control over a hacker—a significant ask of intelligence agencies already burdened with looking out for and mitigating the cyberattacks themselves. Under the law of state responsibility, a state is accountable for the actions of individuals acting under its “effective control.” Legal scholars debate what “effective control” looks like in practice, but the International Court of Justice has ruled that violations of the law of armed conflict by private individuals can be attributed to a state only if it could be shown the state “directed or enforced” an operation. In a landmark 1986 case, evidence the United States financed, organized, trained, supplied, and equipped the Nicaraguan contras, as well as aided in the selection of targets and planning of contra operations, was not enough to show the United States exercised effective control over the contras. Contra war crimes, it followed, could not be attributed to the United States. Extending the Nicaragua precedent to cyberspace, a victim of a cyberattack would likely have to prove more than an adversary supplied a cyber weapon to a non-state actor. A victim would instead have to show the state ordered or had “effective control” over all aspects of the cyberattack. Without such evidence, a victim’s lawful response options may be limited to actions against the non-state actors—cold comfort for a nation reeling from a cyberattack perpetrated by hackers financed, organized, trained, supplied, and equipped by a nation-state adversary. The victim state can of course decide for itself whether it has met the burden of proof in its attribution and unilaterally unleash an armed response—attribution, it has been said, is what states make of it—but a desire for international legitimacy could require meeting international law’s significant evidentiary burden before acting in self-defense. Sovereign Impunity Together, clearing these two legal thresholds will pose a significant challenge for countries seeking to respond to cyberattacks. Only after both are cleared is a victim endowed with a right to use force in self-defense against an attacker’s armed forces or other military objectives. This double burden could leave a victim state choosing between two bad outcomes: responding with force in a manner deemed illegitimate in the eyes of the international community; or responding with “non-forcible countermeasures” (criminal sanctions or diplomatic measures such as a demarche). Either outcome would lend support to the growing sense of cyberspace as a lawless frontier. Expert contributors to the Tallinn Manual, an influential treatise on how international law applies to cyber warfare, are attempting to develop a consensus around how the law of state responsibility applies to the use of proxies in cyber operations. But until a shared understanding of state responsibility in cyberspace emerges, governments must themselves push for and enforce—as publicly as possible to ensure their behavior sets responsible precedents—a standard that punishes the use of proxies for cyberattacks and holds countries accountable for the consequences of those attacks. Public attributions, declassification of relevant intelligence, and the responsible use of countermeasures will do far more than tribunals and legal scholars can to shape how we deal with attribution and responsibility in cyberspace.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics August 5, 2015 Net Politics
  • Japan
    Japan’s Diet Uproar
    Committee deliberations on the Abe cabinet’s new security legislation erupted into a spectacle of contention today as the ruling coalition used their majority to move their bill to the floor of the Diet’s Lower House. Opposition members rushed the dais of the special committee chairman, Yasukazu Hamada, calling for an end to “Abe politics” and accusing the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-Komeito coalition of ramming through legislation that the Japanese people do not support. In a press conference after the vote, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself acknowledged that he has not succeeded in gaining the public’s understanding for a legislative package that would allow Japan’s military greater latitude to work alongside others. In a cabinet decision last July, the prime minister announced he would change the government’s interpretation of the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense. Implementing legislation, presented to the Diet last month, allows the Self Defense Force (SDF) to operate in concert with the United States and other forces to “protect the lives of the Japanese people and the survival of Japanese nation.” On June 22, Abe extended the Diet session to September 27 to ensure passage of the new laws. In practical terms, the Abe government was seeking to clarify the legal basis for three types of military operations. The first was operations providing for Japan’s own security, largely designed to improve the ability of U.S. and Japanese militaries to plan for a variety of contingencies. The second was to allow the SDF to provide logistical support to others who were fighting elsewhere if that conflict threatened Japanese security interests. Included was the provision of ammunition and fuel to the U.S. military during a conflict. Finally, the legislation clarified the ability of the SDF to participate in coalition efforts, including those sponsored by the United Nations, in humanitarian and disaster relief. In short, none of the contingencies publicly presented here involved scenarios that Japan has not confronted to date. This legislation is critical to the implementation of recently concluded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines. Indeed, part of the political challenge for Abe was his public promise to the U.S. Congress that he would get the laws passed. Coming back to Tokyo, Abe faced an incensed opposition in the Diet that claimed he had no right to commit to Washington before they had time to deliberate his government’s bill. Criticism of Abe’s agenda only worsened from there. On June 4, the Lower House special committee convened to deliberate the bill called in three constitutional scholars. To the amazement of all, the expert called by the ruling LDP, Yasuo Hasebe of Waseda University, testified that the Abe cabinet’s 2014 decision to reinterpret the constitution was in fact unconstitutional. Hasebe’s testimony lit a smoldering fire of protest. Constitutional scholars and other legal communities convened public meetings, and across Japan, local assemblies passed resolutions in protest to the Abe cabinet’s position on collective self-defense. A total of 9,766 Japanese scholars, artists and other public intellectuals, including Nobel laureate Toshihide Masukawa, signed a petition opposing the new security legislation. As the deliberations in the Diet continued, protestors took to the streets outside with “no war” and anti-Abe slogans on their placards. On July 12, about 750 members of Gambare Nippon!, a conservative activist group, lodged a counter protest. The following night, two hundred supporters of Article Nine responded, and then on the evening of July 14, the media reported twenty thousand protesters including students, NPO groups, and older Japanese gathered in Hibiya Park to demonstrate their opposition to the new bill. Inside the Diet, Japan’s new legislative balance was on full display. Opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the much smaller parties (including the Social Democratic Party, the People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends) all stood against the security bill. But the focus was on what the new Japan Innovation Party (JIP) would do. Many thought the JIP would align with the ruling coalition in support of the legislation, but ultimately the party president, Yorihisa Matsuno, rejected the government bill, and instead offered up his own parliamentary bill on July 8. The JIP bill, with some support from the former ruling party, the DPJ, took on the core principles of the Abe cabinet’s legislation. Two were obvious deal breakers: first, the JIP bill rejected the need for a reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense, instead relying on the existing right of self-defense inherent in the SDF’s established missions; and second, the JIP bill also rejected the idea that the SDF should be deployed anywhere near an area where combat was taking place. In short, committee deliberations revealed there was little room for compromise between the ruling coalition and the JIP-led counterproposal. Today’s committee passage of the government bill thus ended Abe’s short-lived effort at seeking compromise. Tomorrow the ruling coalition will call a full vote in the Lower House, using its majority to conclude this first round of the Lower House deliberation. From there, the bill will move to the Upper House, which has sixty days to deliberate before taking its own vote. The ruling coalition has a majority in the House of Councillors, with 133 of 242 seats, but may need the cooperation of smaller opposition parties to gain the necessary votes for it to pass. With the JIP now firmly against the government’s version, it is likely that the bill will return to the Lower House for passage. All of this must be complete by the new September 27 deadline for the current Diet session. Today’s vote to move the bill out of the committee demonstrates that the Abe cabinet plans to use its supra majority to conclude the process. As tempers flare in this first round of committee deliberations, however, there is some concern within the LDP that this could take a political toll as they look ahead to the fall and to the next Upper House election next summer. This summer will test the LDP and its coalition partner, the Komeito, whose supporters seem more at ease with the sentiment of the opposition than with the LDP. The prime minister’s support rating has been dropping by the week, and today it falls two points lower than his disapproval rating. Abe has faced this drop in polling before when he pursued a new government secrecy law in late 2013 and when his cabinet announced the new policy on collective self-defense last summer. Opposition parties were vociferous in their criticism then, and media commentary warned of the need for consensus and popular support. But this time feels different. Citizen activism against the prime minister’s policies is spreading, and on the streets and in town halls across Japan, there is a push to build a coalition of opposition to Abe’s effort at defense policy reform. Abe’s leadership has been questioned largely by his critics but now increasingly by members of his own party. The NHK, Japan’s public broadcasting station, and the Yomiuri Shimbun, a strong supporter of the new security legislation, report in their polling that the majority of Japanese believe the discussion on this critical policy change is insufficient, noting 56 percent and 80 percent of their respondents, respectively, felt dissatisfied. Today’s Diet drama is just the first of many steps in the two months of Diet debate to go. There is plenty of time for this newfound appetite for opposition to the Abe government to grow. It is too early to tell if this political fracas will have a lasting impact on Abe’s political capital. Additional hurdles between now and the end of September are politically sensitive for the Abe government. The government remains locked into a standoff with the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture over a new base for the U.S. Marines there, with construction expected to begin in August-September. Another flare-up with Seoul over the UNESCO world heritage sites has also prompted backlash against the government. In addition, the prime minister will issue his much anticipated statement on August 15 commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Ironically his success in rekindling diplomacy with Beijing may also be playing into the domestic debate over Japan’s military preparedness. A protracted contest over Japan’s defense reforms weakens the prime minister’s hand. Having publicly promised the United States that he will complete the legislation, Abe will be hard pressed to step back. But a deeply divided Japanese public over alliance cooperation is not the outcome U.S. policymakers hoped for. Moreover, there is a growing agenda for maritime cooperation in Asia, even as both Washington and Tokyo seek to reduce the risk of inadvertent clashes between their militaries and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Abe is reportedly considering a visit to China in September to meet with Xi Jinping, after the Chinese president hosts his own commemoration of Japan’s defeat and end of the war on the continent on September 3 but before Xi arrives in Washington later in the month. The Diet uproar signals a tough road ahead for Japan’s prime minister. Abe must be aware that some of the decisions he has taken would promote controversy, but he has in many ways styled himself after his grandfather, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who did not step back from domestic opposition when it came time to revise the U.S.-Japan security treaty over half a century ago. But today’s strategic quandary for Japan is far different than the late 1950s, and popular sentiment about Japan’s own military option is far more complex. As his diplomatic skills are tested in the months ahead, so too will be Abe’s ability to gauge domestic sentiment on Japan’s military and its constitution. If he pushes too far, too fast, the backlash could seriously impair Japan’s ability to provide for its security in a rapidly changing Asia. On the other hand, stepping back from the defense agenda he has nurtured so carefully could complicate his ability to promote the array of other reforms he has proposed. At the very least, Abe must regain his public’s confidence if he is to complete his task.
    Blog Post by Sheila A. Smith July 15, 2015 Asia Unbound
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Greece and Its Creditors Should Do a Guns-For-Pensions Deal
    IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard has said that Greece needs to slash pension spending by 1% of GDP in order to reach its new budget targets.  The Greek government continues to resist, arguing that Greeks dependent on pensions have already suffered enough.  But it has yet to put a compelling alternative to its creditors. What depresses us is how little attention has been paid to one major area of Greek government spending that seems ripe for the ax: defense spending.  Greece spends a whopping 2.2% of GDP on defense, more than any NATO member-state save the United States and France.  Bringing Greece into line with the NATO average would alone achieve ¾ of what the IMF is demanding through pension cuts. Greece has long argued that its defense posture is grounded in a supposed threat from Turkey – also a big spender on things military.  But surely the United States and the major western European powers can keep a cold peace between NATO allies at much lower cost. So why don’t they?  German and French arms-export interests surely explain the silence on the creditor side: Greece is one of their biggest customers. With Greece sliding towards default and economic chaos, such silence is indefensible.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
    Blog Post by Benn Steil and Dinah Walker June 23, 2015 Geo-Graphics
  • Regional Organizations
    NATO Membership Has Its Privileges (Unfortunately Ukraine Won’t See Them)
    Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is the most egregious effort since World War II to forcibly alter the borders of a sovereign European state. It is also the biggest test of Western resolve since the Cold War ended a quarter century ago. If history is any guide, at this week’s summit in Wales, President Obama and fellow NATO leaders are unlikely to extend significant assistance to Ukraine, and will probably instead focus on providing reassurance to the alliance’s own membership. NATO has already committed to deploying a limited rapid reaction force of perhaps 4,000 troops to its front-line members, including Poland and the Baltic States. Today in Estonia, President Obama promised that the allies would meet in Wales with Ukrainian president Petro O. Poroshenko “to show that our 28 nations are united in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and right to defend its territory.” He also endorsed “concrete commitments” by NATO to help Ukraine—as well as Georgia and Moldova—modernize their security forces. However, it’s unclear whether Obama will be able to get the alliance to deliver on his promise. Most NATO members would presumably endorse tighter economic sanctions on Russia, but these are unlikely to influence Russian president Vladimir Putin. When it comes to providing sophisticated arms and training to Ukrainian forces, NATO members are more divided: many fear that escalation could precipitate an open military conflict with nuclear-armed Russia. The undecided within the alliance may well seize on President Putin’s “seven-point plan” for a ceasefire in Ukraine—announced just today—to plead for more time before taking bold steps. Meanwhile, the crisis has revealed how valuable NATO membership is—and shown how vulnerable are European nations like Ukraine that remain outside its protective embrace. A bit of history on NATO’s origins helps place Ukraine’s predicament in context. During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had ambitious plans for a postwar world order. He envisioned a global system of collective security to anchor world peace, which would give a managerial role to the great powers. All the world’s countries would have a place to meet, in a universal assembly. But the peace would be guaranteed by the “Four Policemen”—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. With the addition of liberated France, these countries eventually became the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council. Alas, FDR’s harmonious vision quickly collapsed. He had assumed that the big powers would exercise restraint in pursuing their interests. But the hoped-for great power concert broke down. First, territorial disputes in Central Europe (particularly over Germany’s future) sparked East-West tensions. Second, Moscow insisted on a regional sphere of influence and demanded political control over governments in neighboring countries. The bipolar division crystallized, paralyzing the UN Security Council. Except on rare occasions as in the early Korean War (when the Soviets were boycotting it) or the Congo crisis of the 1960s, the Security Council played only a marginal global role. The lesson was clear: when the P5 are divided on matters of national interest, collective security through the United Nations is impossible. This remains true today, as we have seen recently both in Syria and Ukraine. It was the failure of the UN that led to the birth of NATO. With America’s “One World” dreams dashed, the Truman administration set about in the late 1940s to consolidate a narrower “Free World” community, based initially on a core of likeminded, democratic states. The security pillar of the transatlantic community was and remains NATO. Unlike the UN, a universal but dysfunctional collective security organization, NATO would embody the principle of collective defense. There was and remains an important difference between these two concepts. Whereas the UN Charter treated international peace and security as a “public good” to be enjoyed in principle by all UN member states, NATO treated security as a “club good.” In signing the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) of 1949, the twelve original members of NATO agreed under Article 5 “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” In such a circumstance, each party would take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.” For alliance members, it was all for one—and one for all. Outsiders were out of luck. Creating NATO was a revolutionary strategic commitment for the United States, which had generally avoided “entangling alliances” since Thomas Jefferson had warned against them. The NAT soon enmeshed the United States in a complex peacetime alliance, involving a continuous program of military assistance and forward deployment of U.S. military forces to Europe, all under a U.S. Supreme Allied Commander. Although NATO never fired a shot in hostilities during the Cold War, it served as an indispensable instrument of containment and a guarantee of extended deterrence to U.S. allies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, transatlantic officials and defense intellectuals engaged in ferocious debates about whether NATO should expand. The United States and its allies ultimately decided to open NATO’s door—and extend its Article 5 guarantee—to any European country that met the requirements for membership. The Partnership for Peace, initially created as a stopgap measure to stabilize Eastern Europe and professionalize its militaries, soon became a waiting room for aspirants to full membership. Unfortunately for Ukraine, its aspirations for NATO membership have always inspired skepticism, being at once too big, too internally divided, and too close (geographically and culturally) to Mother Russia. When the Moscow-leaning Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, the West placed Ukrainian membership on ice. In Wales, NATO leaders will be joined by his Western-leaning successor. But the most that Poroshenko can hope for is a doubling down on Western sanctions against Russia and limited military assistance, so that his country can survive intact in its unenviable no-man’s land.
    Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick September 3, 2014 The Internationalist
  • Ukraine
    NATO’s Brave New World
    With crises brewing in Ukraine and the Middle East, the transatlantic alliance must develop new capabilities to address the rising threat of unconventional warfare, says CFR’s Janine Davidson.
    Interview with Janine Davidson and Bernard Gwertzman August 28, 2014
  • United States
    Ballistic Missile Defense
    U.S. missile defense in the twenty-first century is focused on emerging threats from North Korea and Iran, but critics say these systems are too costly and largely unproven.
    Backgrounder by Jonathan Masters August 15, 2014