South Africa

Following the social media circulation of a video in which a white woman lashes out at black police officers using racial slurs, the Zuma administration is proposing harsher penalties against hate speech. Proposed legislation would move hate speech cases from civil courts to criminal courts in South Africa. Currently punishable only by fines, “racist utterances and many other incidents of vicious crimes perpetrated under the influence of racial hate…has necessitated further measures,” according to the minister of justice. If the proposed legislation becomes law, a first-time offender could face three years in prison and a repeat offender up to ten years. The proposed legislation is controversial. Some critics characterize it as a distraction from the real problems of South Africa. The New York Times quotes Joel Modiri, a University of Pretoria lecturer: “here you have a black-majority society that is essentially demanding protection from a white minority. It’s revealing the deeper problem that you have a majority in this country that is fundamentally powerless.” The New York Times comments that the proposed legislation resembles that in Britain, Canada, France, and Germany, but not in the United States, where the First Amendment protects freedom of virtually all expression. The backlash against the white woman’s tirade centers on her use of the word kaffir. The word, of Arab origin, was commonly used in the in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a non-pejorative reference to black people. But, especially under apartheid, it acquired powerful, negative connotations with the black community but also across the racial spectrum. Now, like the ‘n-word’ in the United States, in South Africa the word is rarely uttered or even spelled-out in print. “Sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never hurt me.” But in a South Africa still wounded by apartheid and centuries of white supremacy, words can have profound impact on both individuals and society as a whole.

Critics worldwide of South African President Jacob Zuma characterize his administration as “Mafiosi” in style. South African society is characterized by gross inequality, generally with blacks on the bottom and whites on top. Ostensibly, the president’s goal is the “transformation” of this characterization of society, even if that means an assault on constitutional institutions and the rule of law. However, in cahoots with personal allies, notably the Gupta family, instead of “transformation” he is seeking to remain in power and preserve his wealth. Thus far, he has been successfully countered by the strength of South Africa’s institutions, a mobilized civil society, and the democratic faction within the African National Congress (ANC). Calls for his early recall are mounting within the ANC. A trenchant exposition of this “Mafioso” perspective is provided by Richard Poplak, in the Daily Maverick. Zuma and his political allies certainly have been trying to undermine the independence of the treasury, which has in general followed the policies of the “Washington Consensus” with the goal of economic growth rather than redistribution from the rich to the poor. The focus of this effort has been the removal of the well-regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. The head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), a Zuma ally, indicted Gordhan on corruption charges which were so flimsy as to be clearly politically motivated. A consequence of this assault on the treasury was a rapid fall in the value of the Rand and a rallying of support for Gordhan. However, on October 31, the head of NPA announced that he was withdrawing the charges in the face of overwhelming support for Gordhan from within the ANC and civil society and the near certainty that the courts would throw out the case. The Rand promptly strengthened. The treasury has received good marks from the international financial community. However, with the country’s slow recovery from the 2008 recession and low commodity prices, international financial agencies have raised the possibility of reducing South African bonds to “junk” status. If that happens in December, Zuma may reshuffle his cabinet and thereby remove Gordhan. On the other hand, “junk” status may increase pressure within the ANC to remove Zuma. In the meantime, this episode has probably further weakened Zuma politically, not least within the ANC.

Mailyn Fidler is a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. You can follow her @mailynfidler.  At the first session of the 2016 Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa, questions about cross-border data access—usually a dry topic—took center stage. The moderator and participants grilled representatives from Google and Facebook about the fairness of limited African access to African data held by U.S. companies, invoking the need for greater “internet sovereignty.” These remarks contrasted with one year ago, when I could find no one at this forum talking about African data access problems. Africans are now thinking about this issue, but the U.S. government is not really considering Africa as it debates the future of cross-border data requests. The standards outlined in the Obama administration’s draft proposal will be most easily met by favored U.S. partners; the United Kingdom appears to be first in line for a deal. Left-out countries will have few viable options for accessing data and may turn to damaging alternatives. Background: A Year of MLAT Reform The past year brought cross-border data access into the limelight. Countries have grown frustrated with the primary mechanism for accessing data held by U.S. tech companies: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). As communications increasingly depend on U.S. tech companies, data needed for run-of-the-mill criminal investigations often resides in the United States, and countries turn to MLATs for access. MLATs with the United States generally require countries to meet U.S. legal standards when seeking data stored in the United States. The MLAT process is usually slow and opaque, frustrating countries using it. It can take six weeks to ten months to process requests, depending on the request’s complexity and compliance with U.S. legal standards. Countries also take issue with U.S. law essentially dictating global practices. Countries have sought other troubling means of accessing data, with the UK seeking extraterritorial powers, Russia exploring data localization, and Brazil threatening companies with legal action. Over the past year, efforts to reform cross-border data access have progressed. The United States and the United Kingdom have negotiated a proposed agreement, and the Department of Justice released draft legislation to make such agreements possible for approved countries. (The legislation is unlikely up for consideration until after the U.S. election.) Africans Want Improved Data Access Although Africa currently has low levels of internet penetration, it also has some of the highest internet use growth rates. Internet policy issues are increasingly important to Africans, and African internet policy wonks are joining the call for cross-border data access reform. Tefo Mohapi, the moderator of the opening panel, asked company representatives about building mirror datasets in African countries to allow African countries greater access to data held by U.S. companies, a form of data localization. “It all goes back to internet sovereignty,” Mohapi argued. “You operate with legal impunity without regard for state sovereignty.” Participants continued to criticize the United States, adding that, “America has ceased to be the shining jewel of internet freedom” post-Snowden. African countries are often portrayed as untrustworthy and undeserving of data, even by the company representatives at this conference. Post-Snowden, African countries “want the discourse to expand beyond bad African governments, with the kind United States coming to save us.” African governments should have the same access as the now-untrustworthy United States, participants argued. The company representatives responded to these criticisms by highlighting ongoing cross-border data access reform efforts. They emphasized that existing cross-border data access procedures are burdensome, and that they are in conversation with governments to change the process. They eagerly pointed out that ultimate responsibility for fixing this problem rests with governments, not companies. Only two African countries, South Africa and Egypt, currently have MLATs with the United States. The proposed U.S. legislation could allow countries without MLATs to gain legal access to data (see Section 4), in theory addressing African concerns. In practice, however, it could be difficult for some African countries to meet the legislation’s legal standards. The United States must determine that a country has an independent judiciary, adequate substantial and procedural cyber laws, and adequate international human rights practices. The lack of adequate cyber laws alone would be enough to thwart most African data access agreements with the United States. More generally, the United States will likely not consider countries without MLATs a priority for new data access agreements. African countries’ general lack of political pull could considerably slow or reduce new African data access agreements. Left Out of MLAT Reform: Potential Consequences Cross-border data access reform is generally portrayed as the solution to the data localization laws, prosecutions of tech companies, and extraterritorial application of laws that countries have pursued when frustrated with MLATs. Most countries who have been turning to these methods, however, at least have MLATs, while African countries do not. African countries will likely be last in line for new data access agreements. Being shut out of both data access options means African countries will be twice marginalized. African countries lacking an MLAT and a data access agreement with the United States will have few options for pursuing data. Countries can submit emergency requests to companies or ask for a joint investigation with the United States. African countries are already sensitive to concerns that they lack autonomy, and autonomy-constrained states are often most motivated to protect their autonomy. African countries might respond to their double marginalization by enacting data mirroring requirements, as the moderator at the forum suggested. Another forum participant suggested that African governments might increase internet shutdowns if they lack post-hoc data access, as a way of preemptive control. Ironically, U.S. efforts to allow countries greater access to data in the United States may result in African citizens having less access to the internet. Cross-border data access should not be extended without qualification. Still, current reform plans seem likely to place African countries in a difficult position on a policy area that is increasingly important to them. If the United States really seeks to limit the proliferation of damaging data-access workarounds, it should think about what will happen to those who are left out of cross-border data access reform.

South Africa’s Jacob Zuma administration’s notice to the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the International criminal Court (ICC) has been received with consternation by civil society organizations such as Amnesty International. However, it is unclear, even unlikely, that the Zuma administration can take such a step without a parliamentary vote. It is also unclear whether parliament would go along. The administration’s move should be seen in the context of South African domestic politics, and as an effort for a politically weakened Zuma to shore up his ‘African’ credentials domestically. Meanwhile, the South African Constitutional Court will rule in November whether the Zuma administration broke domestic and international law by failing to turn over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir to ICC jurisdiction as required when he visited South Africa for an African Union Summit. (The Court’s ruling will be based on the law at the time of al-Bashir’s visit; South Africa’s moves to withdraw from the ICC will be irrelevant.) The Zuma administration’s ‘respectable’ argument for withdrawal is that the ICC has failed to ‘consult’ on the issue of whether head-of-state immunity trumps an ICC indictment. (Head of state immunity would, of course, emasculate the ICC and largely defeat the purpose of its establishment.) Led by Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and other African heads of state of dubious reputation, claims are regularly made that the ICC is ‘biased’ against Africa and hold Africans to a higher standard than elsewhere. At the most recent African Union (AU) summit, Kenya proposed “… a roadmap for the withdrawal of African nations” from the ICC. Though this proposal failed to pass, the AU interministerial committee is likely to present reform demands at the next meeting of ICC members. Just days before the South African announcement, Burundi became the first African nation to announce its withdrawal from the ICC. Accordingly, Zuma’s moves to withdraw from the ICC will be welcomed by the likes of Sudan’s al-Bashir, Kenya’s Kenyatta, Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza, and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe—but not necessarily by South African public opinion. Following a string of scandals and court decisions against him, Zuma is a wounded political figure. The African National Congress’s poor performance in the August local government elections increases his vulnerability. South African civil society, well-organized and articulate, will ensure that administration efforts to withdraw from the ICC is vetted first by parliament and then by the courts. South Africa was one of the founders of the ICC, and the Treaty of Rome has been incorporated into South African domestic law. Hence, withdrawal would be difficult.

Pravin Gordhan faces charges of fraud and has been summoned to the Pretoria Regional Court on November 2. The charges appear to be spurious. They concern Gordhan’s approval of the early retirement of a government employee and his subsequent re-employment under contract. The claim is that the amount of money involved is just over ZAR 1.1 million (approximately $76,000). Early retirement followed by re-engagement on contract is commonplace in many governments, including that of South Africa. The seemingly trumped up charges should be seen in the context of an ongoing struggle within the governing African National Congress in the aftermath of the August 2016 local government elections and the reverses and scandals that plague the Zuma administration. Gordhan and the Treasury are associated with “reformers” who want to repair the party, restore its eroded grass roots support, and manage the economy to generate badly needed economic growth. Zuma, parts of the security services, various patronage/clientage networks, and (broadly speaking) the traditional party machinery seek to restore the political power of the president and break the intra-party opposition that is associated with Gordhan and many other senior party figures, including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. Zuma’s allies are likely to call on Gordhan to step down, pending his trial. But, Gordhan is unlikely to do so, not least because of his considerable support within the party. Gordhan also enjoys the respect and support of the domestic and international financial community. In attacking Gordhan, Zuma and his allies are playing with international financial fire: in the day since the fraud charge was levied on Gordhan, the rand has fallen nearly four percent to 14.28  to the U.S. dollar. Efforts to remove Gordhan also raise the specter that the international financial rating agencies will down grade South African bond to ‘junk’ status. Hence, it is by no means certain that Gordhan will actually be brought to trial, and if he is, that he will be convicted.

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) endorsed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa for the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC) on September 26. The election of party president will take place in 2017; the next presidential elections will take place in 2019. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation the ANC party president is likely to be the next president of South Africa. Cyril Ramaphosa was a founder of the NUM as a black trade union in the late apartheid era. A lawyer, he was a leading ANC negotiator of the peaceful transition from apartheid to South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy that culminated in Nelson Mandela’s election as president in 1994. It is widely said that Mandela favored Ramaphosa as his successor, but he bowed to the will of the party and endorsed Thabo Mbeki. Thereafter, Ramaphosa left politics and accumulated a substantial fortune. He re-entered politics in 2012. In the aftermath of scandals and court judgments against it and it’s very poor electoral performance in the August 2016 elections, the scandal-prone administration of President Jacob Zuma is in a shambles. Zuma retains significant support within the party machinery, state owned enterprises, and among the heads of the security agencies. He also commands the loyalty of a big patronage network. Those ANC party leaders who want Zuma to go before the end of his term in 2017 so that the party can rid itself of scandal and rebuild following its relative defeat in August, have rallied around the finance minister Pravin Gordhan. They include Ramaphosa. At present the pro-Zuma and anti-Zuma factions appear to be evenly balanced and governance largely at a standstill. At the same time the NUM endorsed Ramaphosa, its secretary general said that “Zuma must serve his term.” NUM may be seeking a compromise between the pro and anti-Zuma factions: Zuma gets to remain in office until the end of his term as president of the ANC. But, he is blocked from choosing his successor. That would, in effect, further reduce Zuma’s political power for his remaining time in office. ANC faction fighting is likely to continue. That Ramaphosa will prevail is far from certain. He is much more popular in London and New York and within parts of the South African business community than he is among the ANC rank and file.

Those universities commonly regarded as the best in South Africa have been roiled by student unrest over the past two years. First, it was protests against the symbols of imperialism and racism such as the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Then in October 2015, protests over university fees and tuition hikes began. After reaching a settlement last year the university fees and tuition have been raised once again, inciting major student protests. The students are now calling to make university education free. South Africa is the only sub-Saharan African country that contributes to the journalists’ lists of the world’s top five-hundred universities. For example, The Times Higher Education ranking of top universities in the world includes the University of Cape Town (148), the University of Witwatersrand also known as ‘Wits’ (182), and Stellenbosch University (401-500). All other African universities are ranked in the general category of eight-hundred and above. (Such lists are notoriously contentious and controversial but they do reflect commonly-held perceptions in the developed world.) Apartheid had a particularly baleful influence on South African education at all levels, and the black majority was mostly excluded from higher education, though there were a few black-only universities with limited curricula. At base, the current unrest is a consequence of trying to address those consequences. For background on the challenges to South African education, see chapter 5 of my new book, Morning in South Africa. At present, the center of the unrest is at the University of Cape Town and Wits, though it is often to be found at other formerly white-only universities, as well. As is so often the case in South Africa, an underlying issue is the integration of Black Africans fully into national life, in this case Black students into historically ‘White’ universities. (South Africa is about 80 percent Black, 9 percent is Coloured, and 9 percent White.) With a focus on free tuition, demonstrations have also spread to black-majority institutions. Under apartheid, UCT and Wits were ‘White’ universities. (A few non-Whites were enrolled during the last years of apartheid.) Now, both have non-White majorities, though the percentage of Whites is much higher than 9 percent. But, in terms of administration, faculty, and general atmosphere, they remain ‘White.’ Black students frequently complain that they are marginalized and ‘disrespected.’ Further, university tuition and fees are especially burdensome for students from a poor demographic. Yet, as elsewhere in the world, university education is becoming more expensive and the value of the national currency is falling, with a resulting pressure on administrations to raise tuition and fees. Black students often come from primary and secondary schools little improved over the “Bantu” schools of the apartheid era. The high academic standards which they must meet at UCT and Wits can be a challenge. The universities have financial aid available to help alleviate the economic burden, and there are remedial programs that attempt to make up for weak secondary schools. Nevertheless, for black students, who are often the first of their family to attend a high-quality university, the road is not easy. These issues will be familiar to Americans, where federal and state governments over the past generation has sought to make quality higher education available to those formerly excluded by pervasive racism and, in the southern states, legally-based segregation.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Bloomberg Markets’ Michael Cohen and Helen Nyambura-Mwaura have analyzed the current state of Africa’s economies in a very interesting article. They point out that despite the current poor performance of Africa’s larger economies (particularly Nigeria and South Africa), some of the continent’s smaller economies, especially in East Africa, are doing well and will likely continue to do so. Unlike Nigeria and South Africa, such East African countries as Kenya and Tanzania have avoided a reliance on commodities. Focusing on agriculture and manufacturing, these economies are poised to continue growing at over 5 percent this year. These countries have also continued to work together toward greater regional regulation and cooperation, as well as committing significant investment in transportation links and telecommunications. The article highlights a home truth about how the continent is treated by international business: Africa is too often painted with a broad brush. They quote economist John Ashbourne, “The narrative of 6 percent growth as far as the eye can see and Africa as a new China is dead, or at least dying, but it was always a bit overblown… At the end of the day Africa is still huge, has a growing population, and massive natural resources. There will always be opportunities.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that many businesses will stop viewing Africa in a homogenous light anytime soon. As the authors points out, the current disinterest in Nigeria and South Africa is likely to negatively affect investor and business interest in other African economies still showing promise. Those countries can continue to grow their own economies by practicing sound business practices, limiting corruption, and continuing to build regional economic ties.

South Africa’s minister of police reports that the country’s murder rate increased by 4.9 percent from March 2015 to March 2016. That is more than fifty people killed every day. Official statistics show 142.2 sexual offences per day in the same time period, a slight reduction that likely is due to under reporting. South Africa’s population is estimated at approximately fifty-three million. These statistics are appalling, but some context is needed. South Africa’s murder rate is by no means the highest in the world: according to NationMaster, which has compiled data from the UN and various census reports, South Africa ranks fifteen per capita, behind (among others) Honduras (one), Jamaica (four), Uganda (eleven) and Malawi (twelve). Tanzania, with about the same population as South Africa, ranks twenty-three; Nigeria, almost four times as large in population, ranks fifty-nine. Other types of crime in South Africa are also up: carjacking’s increased by 14.3 percent and house robberies by 2.7 percent. South Africa has the best official statistics in Africa. Nonetheless, as elsewhere, murder and rape are probably under reported. As always, when comparing crime statistics from one country to another, there are definitional and other issues. Nevertheless, the NationMaster ranking is a rough indication of how countries stack up against each other. The police minister, Nathi Nhleko, attributed the rise in the murder rate largely to domestic violence and alcohol abuse. He said, “What it says about us South Africans is that we are violent, we have a prevalent culture of violence. It’s not about what the government can do, it’s about what we can do. It’s a huge societal issue that we have to deal with.” South Africans are deeply concerned about the prevalence of a culture of violence. That concern played a role in the commentary on the Oscar Pistorius killing of his girlfriend Riva Steenkamp. It is also a concern in the United States. On the NationMaster list cited above, the United States ranks ninety-nine, much lower than South Africa’s rank, and about mid-way on the list. But, especially in cities like St. Louis, Baltimore, Detroit, New Orleans, and Chicago the murder rate is likely much higher.

A month after the governing African National Congress (ANC) lost heavily in South Africa’s municipal elections, the party is at war with itself. From my perspective, the struggle is between democratic reformers who want to restore public confidence in the ANC and win back lost voters, and those around President Jacob Zuma who are seeking to preserve their patronage networks based on publicly owned enterprises and sleazy contracts. An effort, apparently orchestrated by the president’s allies, if not the president himself, is underway to remove Pravin Gordhan, the well-regarded treasury minister. (Gordhan has sought to introduce a wide range of reforms in the publicly owned enterprises.) But, the heart of the matter is not the treasury minister or government contracts but rather control of the ANC in a period of leadership change. President Zuma must leave office in 2019, if not forced out earlier. Sometimes a comedian captures well where a society or an institution is in a period of political turmoil. ‘Evita Bezuidenhout’ has done so in An Open Letter to the ANC published in the Daily Maverick. Evita is a character created by Pieter-Dirk Uys, an actor probably most famous for his performances in drag. In the days of National Party domination, her performances were a send-up of the absurdities of apartheid. Now, she has turned to the ANC. Her letter is full of sly jokes and is thoroughly entertaining. But, she also makes serious points: “‘What do people think of when they see a fat politician in parliament?’ They immediately think of a thin voter. And many ANC voters are poorer and thinner than before.” With respect to the municipal elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) performed well, and the mass of voters “proved they have learnt a lot in the last 21 years.” She won’t leave the ANC because many in the party “are still working hard to keep the country more or less balanced.” She will not abandon the ANC to “ambitious and charismatic comrades focused on getting the most for themselves… They are ruthless and successful because they know that as loyalty to the president is paramount, no one will dare challenge their thievery in the public arena.” She closes by recalling that during the transition to non-racial democracy, the National Party under F.W. de Klerk “did something no one would expect.” She calls on the ANC to do the same now. Perhaps she is hinting at ANC “recall” of Zuma from the presidency – but she is not explicit. Drag performers are popular satirists in South Africa, with a long tradition of outrageous criticism that is tolerated by the powers that be. Like Evita, the Australian Barry Humphries character ‘Dame Edna” is also popular. Pieter-Dirk Uys, who is openly gay, is also widely celebrated in South Africa for his role in popular HIV/AIDS education.

In 2014, following the first revision of Nigeria’s gross domestic product data in two decades, Abuja announced that its economy had overtaken South Africa’s as the largest in Africa. Using the rebased data, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that that Nigeria’s economy grew at 12.7 percent between 2012 and 2013. Thereafter, there was some triumphalist rhetoric about the size and strength of the economy from personalities in then-president Goodluck Jonathan’s administration in the run up to the 2015 elections and among those promoting foreign investment in Nigeria. However, in 2016, reflecting the dramatic fall in petroleum prices and the value of the national currency, the naira, the IMF concluded that Nigeria’s GDP had fallen behind that of South Africa. The Economist noted that foreign investors are likely to be discouraged by the latest figures. A clear-eyed August 22 editorial, Vanguard, an independent, national-circulating newspaper based in Lagos, argued that Nigeria’s economic was “never as strong as the 2014/15 rebasing of the GDP had portrayed.” Instead, Nigeria’s economy was “like a clay-footed elephant that could collapse under the slightest pressure. Thus, it took just a slide in oil revenue compounded by ineffective policy responses to it…to bring the elephant down.” Among the home truths cited by Vanguard: —Even when its GDP was higher, Nigerians were “almost four times poorer” than South Africans. —Nigeria has been unable to exploit its domestic market because of low production capacity. —Nigeria’s huge population is not sufficiently channeled into economic productive activity. —Vanguard concludes that Nigeria must diversify its economy and develop local industrial production if it is to thrive. Nigeria’s current population estimates are in the range of 187 million. A UN agency estimates that by 2050, the country’s population will be around 400 million, making it the largest country in the world. It is the current size of the Nigerian market, and its potential future size, that has fascinated investors. Yet, far from being a blessing, a huge population that is growing rapidly is a drag on national development when education, health, and other basic infrastructure is inadequate to engage it in productive activity.

Following the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) decline in the August 3 municipal elections, in effect a referendum on the scandal plagued administration of President Jacob Zuma, South African politics looks dramatically different. The big winners were the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical party based in the townships. But, minority parties are also more important now. In the elections, in four metropolitan areas and twenty-three smaller local councils, no single party secured the necessary 50 percent plus one majority. A largely monolithic ANC (it had controlled all of the major metropolitan areas except Cape Town and still has a huge majority in the National Assembly), now faces multiparty coalitions in Johannesburg, Tshwane (Pretoria), Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), and Rustenburg. These metros are at the heart of South Africa’s modern economy; Johannesburg is the richest city in sub-Saharan Africa and the country’s economic engine. Of the largest metros, the ANC retains unchallenged control only of Durban. Since the elections, in the large metros, the EFF has been in the catbird seat. Were it to support the ANC, the latter could form a municipal government; the same would be true if it threw its support to the DA. In the twenty-three smaller councils, some of the minority parties were able to play a similar role, enhancing their importance. In some areas, the parties joined the DA in formal coalitions, thereby excluding the EFF. On August 17, the EFF announced that it would enter no formal coalitions with either the ANC or the DA in the large metros. Instead, in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Rustenburg, it supported the DA. That allowed the DA to organize the municipal governments in three of the four metros meeting the August 24 deadline, in Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay. The new opportunities and the risks for the DA are large. It has the reputation of being the party of good governance. However, it will be a minority government in the disputed metros. Should it fall short on service delivery in the townships, the EFF will not have to carry any of the responsibility. On the other hand, if it enjoys measurable success before the national elections in 2019, it will have gone a long way toward establishing itself as an alternative to the ANC as the party of government. As for the ANC, the National Executive Council has taken “collective” responsibility for the party’s electoral failures rather than saddling Jacob Zuma with the blame. This makes it unlikely that the party will “recall” Zuma from the presidency anytime soon. The South African media is speculating that Zuma will reshuffle his cabinet, targeting his communist, labor movement critics, and Praven Gordhan, the finance minister who has opposed Zuma’s policies. Zuma staying on will largely preclude any improvement in the short-term in the official U.S.-South African bilateral relationship. In Africa, opposition victories in credible elections promote the development of good governance and a democratic culture. The same is true of coalition building, which promotes accountability. Hence, what happened on August 3 and thereafter is good for a democratic South Africa. It should also be noted that the ANC generally accepted the elections and has not challenged the results. Despite the prominence of cronyism and corruption within the Zuma administration, at least some of the party remains democratic at heart. August 3 and the subsequent results has also been good for “non-racial” South Africa, with signs, here and there, that racial identity politics is breaking down. Hence in one disputed council in Limpopo province, the White Freedom Front Plus political party is likely to join a Black coalition, and the new mayor of Port Elizabeth is a Xhosa-speaking White. Taken altogether there is a basis for optimism.

Nathan Birhanu is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. In recent years, the mining industry has struggled to turn a profit due to a slowdown in demand from China’s economy and an oversupply from producers. South Africa’s mining companies, who export primarily platinum, iron ore, gold, coal, and manganese, have been heavily affected by the downturn. While industrial mining conducted by large-scale companies has seen a decline in operations and profits, artisanal mining (small-scale mining by single individuals using hand tools and limited technology) has increased in South Africa in way of “zama zamas.” Zama zama, a colloquial term which stems from Zulu, means “to try again” or “take a chance.” The term now refers to artisanal miners that conduct illegal mining in mines that have been discontinued. A majority of them are migrants from neighboring countries, while others are South African miners who have lost their jobs during the economic downturn. An estimated six thousand zama zamas are in the ground at any one time. Often, they pay low-level mine employees to gain access to a company’s disused mines. Due to the entrance fee and security risks, zama zamas can stay underground for months at a time, occasionally more than a mile deep, having food delivered down at exuberant prices and sending excavated minerals back up. The minerals they mine, usually gold, are sold to local dealers within South Africa and, if large enough, to exporters. (Investors even fund the equipment for zama zama ventures in turn for a portion of profits.) Such hard labor has considerable risks. The unregulated and illicit nature of the work has brought about violence, corruption, and turf warfare. Rival zama zama factions have been known to fight over profitable territory, rob fellow miners at gunpoint for excavated spoils, and trap one another in the mines to deter competition. Mine collapses and rock falls have also killed hundreds. The South African government sees the increasing trend of artisanal miners as unfavorable, and it is taking efforts to inhibit or stop such operations. However, the security services and government regulatory agencies do not have the wherewithal or experience to enforce laws on illegal mining. Police are also unwilling to take the considerable risk required to go into the deep mines to confront zama zamas. Others have called for the government to sanction artisanal mining, regulate it, and tax it. Some zama zama investors have even gone to the Department of Mineral Resources to obtain licenses to mine legally only to be turned away. In 2010, the South African government lost $500 million in tax and export revenue in gold alone from illegal mining. In addition, the unemployment rate in South Africa is 26 percent, and 66.2 percent of the population over the age of 20 has less than a high school education. Such a high unemployment rate, coupled with a dearth of highly skilled technical labor, is a significant challenge to economic growth and decreasing poverty. Artisanal mining could alleviate part of this issue. Finally, proposals have been presented in the past for the government to nationalize mines, and may have discouraged investment in the industry. However, if freelance artisanal miners were authorized to mine in shafts abandoned by companies, popular pressure for nationalization might diminish. The increasing trend of zama zamas does not seem to be abating anytime soon, and regardless of what policy is set, there are profits to be made in South Africa’s mines. If zama zamas won’t get them, the government, mining companies, or international investors will.