South Africa

This post was co-authored by John Campbell and Allen Grane, research associate for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Many friends of South Africa’s post-1994 “non-racial democracy” have seen developments within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), especially under Jacob Zuma, as threatening the open political system based on the rule of law. So long as voting was largely determined by racial identity, the 80 percent of South Africa’s population that is black seemed to ensure that the party would remain in power indefinitely. The White, Coloured, and Asian minorities supported the Democratic Alliance (DA), but together they are not large enough to constitute an alternative to the ANC, except on the provincial level. (The DA has long dominated predominately Coloured and White Western Cape.) The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which calls for an assault on White “privilege,” were largely confined to the townships. Especially under Zuma, internally the ANC appeared to be moving away from grassroots democracy and toward greater centralization under party apparatchiks, with a focus on “Lithuli House” (the ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg), rather than constitutionally mandated government institutions, often referred to as “Union Buildings” (the seat of government in Pretoria). Patronage, often with a criminal dimension, seemed to flourish under Zuma and his close associates. The disreputable Gupta brothers with their apparent goal of “state capture” (to win contracts) and business ties to Zuma’s son became the ANC’s face. However, the August municipal elections appear to signal the end of monolithic ANC domination of South African political life, and any threat of one-party rule is receding. Post-1994 ANC rule is being replaced by the emergence of coalition politics that have the potential of opening the political process and also of imposing a greater degree of political accountability on elected officials than in the past. At least some voters appear to be moving away from voting according to racial identity and toward issues of government policy. Hence, the August elections appear good for South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy. The chart below shows the swing to the DA and the EFF and away from the ANC. (The totals are never 100 percent because of numerous minor parties.) The data for this graph is found on the website of the electoral commission of South Africa here: http://www.elections.org.za/ South Africa’s largest cities are the heart of its economy and part of the modern world. Up to now, the ANC dominated the municipal governments in Tshwane (Pretoria), Gauteng (Johannesburg), eThekwini (Durban), and Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). The DA dominated Cape Town. Now, however, in most of the major cities, coalitions will be required to produce a majority. In Gauteng, where the ANC won the most votes but not 50 percent plus one, the EFF appears to have the upper hand, and a coalition between the center-right DA and the radical EFF cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there could be many strange bedfellows: there is talk of a possible coalition between the Freedom Front, a White, Afrikaner minor party, and the EFF in hitherto solidly ANC Limpopo province. In general, EFF spokesmen are ruling out coalition arrangements with the ANC. There remain questions that can only be answered following in-depth analysis of the election results. Did in fact significant numbers of blacks abandon the ANC? Or, instead, did they stay home while White, Coloured, and Asian turnout soared? (This seems unlikely, given that turnout was at least 58 percent.) The DA did well, but can its rate of growth be sustained? The EFF did not do as well as had been widely predicted. Nevertheless, it did increase its share of votes. Finally, the National Union of Metal Workers, a large, wealthy trade union, has deep support in Nelson Mandela Bay, a center of South Africa’s automobile industry. It has mooted the establishment of a “responsible, left-wing” new political party for the 2019 national elections. Such a new party could have a significant impact on the future of all three of the major parties that contested in 2016.

“It ain’t over ‘til the fat lady sings,” and at the time of this writing, between 80 and 90 percent of the ballots in South Africa’s 2016 municipal elections have been counted. Most provinces have tallied over 80 percent of the vote, with the exception of Gauteng where Johannesburg and Pretoria are located. Nevertheless, it is likely that current trends will hold. If so, about 53 to 54 percent of the vote will go to the African National congress (ANC), vice 62.15 percent in the 2014 national elections; between 27 and 28 percent to the Democratic Alliance (DA), vice 22.23 percent in 2014; between 7 and 8 percent to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), vice 6.35 percent in 2014; and, between 4 and 5 percent to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), vice 2.4 percent in 2014. (The remainder is split among the myriad small parties.) As of this drafting the vote between the ANC and the DA is very close in Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria). The DA looks to have taken the former ANC stronghold of Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). In Johannesburg and Tshwane, township votes, likely to be ANC or EFF, are often the last to be counted, which could result in an ANC “surge” near the end of the  process Commentators report that the elections were almost entirely violence free and were well-conducted. South Africa has a tradition of credible elections, and this one appears no different. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africans have tended to vote along racial lines. Blacks, 80 percent of the population, supported the ANC; Whites and Coloureds, each representing 9 percent of the population, overwhelmingly voted for the DA, joined by Asians. However, over the past several years, the DA has been attempting to expand its racial identity and appeal to black voters, especially within the emerging black middle class and among those born after the end of apartheid. The increase in DA votes in 2016 suggests some success; most of the DA’s new votes appear to have been black. The defections from the ANC similarly would mostly have been black. Voters appear to be moving beyond race and toward issues. The political system is opening up after years of ANC domination, both a cause and an effect of South Africa’s strengthening democracy. Two surprises from the 2016 elections thus far: the first is the revival of IFP, a Zulu cultural movement as well as a political party. Its electoral support has doubled, perhaps reflecting ANC splits in predominately Zulu KwaZulu-Natal province. The other is the EFF. Many had expected that it would do well, perhaps gaining more than 10 percent of the vote, given the accelerating demonstrations in the townships with reference to poor service deliveries associated with ANC politicians. It did do better, but not as well as was expected. The loser is the ANC. Its support has dropped almost 9 percent since 2014. South Africans widely saw the 2016 municipal elections as a referendum on the scandal plagued ANC Zuma government during a time of economic stagnation. Pressure within the ANC for Zuma to go will likely mount. But, Zuma is a wily tactician with a strong degree of control over the internal workings of the ANC party machinery. He may survive yet again.

South Africans are voting today, August 3, 2016, in nationwide municipal elections that are widely regarded as a referendum on President Jacob Zuma and the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Economic growth has slowed to near zero, unemployment is sky-high, and the Zuma administration is mired in credible accusations of corruption. There are indications that voter turnout will be heavy; up to 77 percent of eligible voters (or 26 million people) are expected to cast their vote, up 11 percent from the last municipal elections. Nevertheless, an ANC electoral rout is not certain. (High voter turn out is encouraged by the fact that election day is a public holiday in South Africa.) At least up to now, South Africans have largely voted according to their racial identity. Blacks, about 80 percent of the population, have overwhelmingly supported the ANC, thereby ensuring that it has been the party of government since 1994. In the 2014 national elections, it won about 62 percent of the vote. Whites, Coloureds, and Asians have favored the Democratic Alliance (DA), a party which is seeking to attract middle class black voters especially the “born frees,” those born after the end of apartheid. Also in the contest is the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a new party that calls for the expropriation of white property and has resorted to non-parliamentary methods. In the 2015 national elections, the DA won 22 percent of the vote while the EFF won 6 percent of the vote. Polling data indicate that the ANC is in electoral trouble in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. In those three cities it may lose its majority, ushering in an era of coalition building that could include various combinations and permutations involving the DA, the EFF, and even the ANC. The EFF has been especially active in social media, but it is unclear to what extent South Africa’s youngest voters will bother to go to the polls. There is also the possibility that the ANC’s share of the vote may drop below 60 percent for the first time since the 1994 end of apartheid. In either event, pressure within the ANC is likely to mount for Zuma to resign from the presidency. That would mean a new political era for South Africa. The Council on Foreign Relations has published an Expert’s Brief on the South African elections; it can be found here. By August 5, winners and losers in this latest electoral round should be clear.

Mexico’s New Anticorruption Tools President Enrique Peña Nieto signed into law long-awaited rules to step up Mexico’s fight against corruption. He had to veto an earlier version that would have forced private firms that receive government money to reveal their income and assets. The new measures mandate that all public servants disclose their assets, income, and tax returns. They also set up an independent prosecutor’s office and up the punishments for bribery, embezzlement, and influence peddling. While some civil society groups had hoped for more, the new anticorruption system provides new and stronger tools for those eager to take on bad behavior. South Africa Shows Anticorruption Tools Aren’t Enough While laws against corruption are important, they’re not enough—as South Africa shows. The nation’s anticorruption efforts, enshrined in its 1995 Constitution, have foundered under Jacob Zuma’s government. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), created to fight wrongdoing, dropped 783 charges of corruption, fraud, and racketeering against Zuma for his ties to a multi-billion dollar arms deal. In April, Pretoria’s High Court unanimously condemned the dismissals, calling for the charges to be revived. Now the NPA says it will appeal to South Africa’s supreme judicial body to overturn the High Court’s verdict. Though that outcome is unlikely—the Constitutional Court has been democratic South Africa’s strongest anticorruption tool—the process illuminates the limits of laws without political will. Venezuela’s Slow-Motion Coup While Turkey’s failed coup dominates headlines, Venezuela’s military furthered its political control to little international condemnation. Active and retired military officers already governed nearly half of Venezuela’s twenty-three states, one-third of its ministries, and ten state-owned companies in sectors ranging from transportation to agriculture. They set up a new oil and mining company that could absorb state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) assets, giving the Ministry of Defense power over the country’s vast natural resources. In the face of a deepening humanitarian crisis, President Nicolás Maduro expanded Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López’s responsibilities—putting him in charge of all ministries and institutions. The question now is whether Maduro is much more than a figurehead.                                                            

Africa in Transition usually runs an update of the Nigeria Security Tracker on Mondays. However, July 18 is Nelson Mandela Day, so the Tracker update will appear on Tuesday, July 19. Nelson Mandela was born July 18, 1918. He died in 2013; were he living, he would be 98 years of age. In 2009, the UN General Assembly officially declared July 18 Nelson Mandela International Day, starting 2010. It is the celebration of Mandela’s theme that each individual has the ability and responsibility to change the world for the better. In South Africa, Mandela Day is not a public holiday. Instead, it is intended to honor Mandela’s values of inclusive democracy conducted according to the rule of law and to celebrate his public service. Mandela Day is also an occasion for taking stock of where South Africa is and where it is going. Many of Mandela’s colleagues in the struggle against apartheid and for nonracial democracy believe that under the administration of Jacob Zuma, the country has gone astray. Zuma is mired in scandal and surrounded by cronies of dubious reputation. It is widely said, even within his governing African National Congress (ANC), that he uses intimidation, even blackmail, against his political opponents within the party. His governance decisions are increasingly quixotic, notably his effort to replace a respected finance minister with a crony. Markets swooned and he failed. More broadly, the consequences of three centuries of white supremacy, culminating in apartheid, still rest heavy on South Africa. There has been social and economic progress since the 1994 coming of nonracial democracy, but it has been slow. For many, perhaps most black South Africans, some 80 percent of the population, there has been too little change. However, I argue in Morning in South Africa, released last month, that South Africa’s institutions of governance (based on perhaps the world’s most respected constitution) are continuing to strengthen; this is because these institutions of governance are conducted according to the rule of law with an independent judiciary and defended by civil society and a free press. Notably, the judiciary regularly rules against the Zuma administration, and its decisions are upheld. Even though the ANC has an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament, a vigorous opposition ensures that it is no Zuma rubber-stamp. The so-called “Chapter 9” (of the Constitution) institutions continue to impose limits on what the Zuma administration can do. Democracy conducted according to the rule of law enjoys strong support from South Africans across the racial rainbow. Democracies sometimes go through patches of bad, even criminal governance. We Americans remember the last days of Richard Nixon’s administration. And former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover was no stranger to intimidation and blackmail. Democratic institutions, the rule of law, and active civil society have carried the United States through dark days in the past and will do so now in South Africa.

The tragedy-as-soap-opera starring Paralympian Oscar Pistorius is over. Or, maybe not. Pistorius, a Paralympian gold medalist who also competed in non-disabled events, was a major media celebrity and hero in sports mad South Africa. In 2013, he killed his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, by shooting her through a closed bathroom door. He maintains that he thought she was an intruder. In 2014, in a trial before Thokozile Masipa, a female, black judge, he was found guilty of “culpable homicide” (roughly the equivalent of manslaughter) and sentenced to five years imprisonment. South Africa does not have the jury system. In South Africa, both the defense and the prosecution have the right to appeal to a higher court. The prosecution did so. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the verdict of culpable homicide and found him guilty of murder. It then sent him back to Judge Masipa for resentencing. On July 6, 2016, she sentenced him to six years imprisonment, one year more than her sentence for culpable homicide. In her public statement, the judge carefully balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors. Her bottom line: there was no purpose to imposing the usual fifteen-year sentence for murder. (South African judges have discretion in sentencing.) Many South Africans, especially those active on women’s issues, found the judge’s arguments unconvincing. In its aftermath, there has been popular outcry that the sentence reflects the enduring privileges of race and celebrity. (Pistorius is  famous, white, and was once wealthy.) The Pistorius case has for many become emblematic of South Africa’s persistent problems: violence against women, the ubiquitous presence of firearms, the frequency of home invasions, and persistent white privilege. As Greg Nicolson, writes in the Daily Maverick, “Much of the response to Wednesday’s sentencing reflected on the socio-economics of race and class: Pistorius is white and can afford a top legal team, so he was viewed favorably and given a lenient sentence, when black, and particularly poor, people would be judged harshly.” The same observation could too often be made about the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States. The new, six-year sentence may be appealed by the defense and the prosecution. Pistorius’ lawyers have said they will not appeal. It is not yet clear what the prosecution might do, especially given the outcry against the leniency of the sentence. However, if the sentence stands, in eighteen months Pistorius could be given credit for the time he has already served under “correctional supervision” and would be eligible for parole in three years.

As directed by the South African courts, the Treasury has determined that President Jacob Zuma owes the state ZAR 7.8 million (US$ 531,024) for work done on his private home, Nkandla. The South African government has spent over ZAR 246 million (US$ 16,747,680) ostensibly on “security upgrades.” Those include underground bunkers, a heliport, and elaborate communications facilities. But, they also include amenities not related to security such as a swimming pool, a chicken run, and a visitors’ center. It is these types of facilities for which the Treasury is seeking repayment. Public expenditure on Nkandla has become a political football, with the opposition parties accusing the president of gross corruption. There has been a series of parliamentary moves and court cases regarding the issue. The upshot has been to strengthen South Africa’s “Chapter 9” institutions, those established by the constitution as outside the control of the government and designed to protect the human rights of South African citizens and to promote good government. In effect, the Nkandla episode has reaffirmed the constitutional limits on the power of parliament, dominated by Zuma’s African National Congress (ANC), and also on the presidency. The episode has reinforced the rule of law. More immediately, Nkandla has reinforced Zuma’s popular reputation for corruption in the run up to important local government elections scheduled for August. Zuma has alienated some of the founders of the ANC, who have called for him to resign. If the August elections do not go well for the ANC, it is a distinct possibility that the ANC will remove Zuma from the party leadership, and, in effect, the presidency. However, Zuma retains support. Zuma’s political allies, the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (where Nkandla is located) and the ANC Women’s League, have called upon ANC members voluntarily to contribute to the Zuma repayment. The former general secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COASTU), a parliamentary ally of the ANC but an enemy of Zuma, has denounced the proposal. Nkandla occupies tribal trust land controlled by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. In principle, tribal land cannot be mortgaged, bought, or sold. This greatly reduces any market value Nkandla might have. King Zwelithini is a close ally of fellow Zulu Jacob Zuma. On June 28, King Zwelithini announced that he has started the process by which residential occupants of trust land will become fee simple owners of the land they occupy. That means the property could be bought, sold, and mortgaged. This would l be a personal bonanza for Zuma, and it is hard to believe that Zuma’s travails and King Zwelithini’s move are unrelated. *All currency conversions are based on rates from June 30, 2016.

Mailyn Fidler is a Marshall Scholar studying international relations at the University of Oxford. You can follow her on Twitter @mailynfidler.  Two years ago, the African Union (AU) adopted its Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection. The Convention seeks to improve how African states address cybercrime, data protection, e-commerce, and cybersecurity. However, only eight of the AU’s fifty-four members have signed the Convention, with none ratifying it. Despite this currently limited uptake, the Convention, and how the AU produced it, signals that African states value political autonomy and independence when developing cyber policy. The U.S. government should keep this in mind as it reaches out to AU member states in promoting cyber norms and capacity building efforts. Development of the Convention The AU’s development of the Convention reflects a desire of African states to have autonomy over their response to cyberspace challenges. The AU chose to develop its own Convention instead of promoting African participation in existing cyber treaties, most notably the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001). Only one African state, South Africa, participated in the Budapest Convention negotiations, and, even then, had to ask to be included.  The Council of Europe approved three other African country requests to accede, a low rate compared to other regions in the global south, and only one African state has ratified it. South Africa has refused to ratify the Budapest Convention because of sovereignty concerns. Instead, the AU began work on its own approach in 2007. By this time, African states had already started to act as a bloc in international cyber negotiations. For instance, African countries advocated for more equitable access to the Internet and participation in Internet governance during the 2003 and 2005 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) – a stance that challenged prevailing Western views. African solidarity against perceived Western dominance was not limited to cyber issues. At the time, African states were negotiating new Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union, with African governments resisting clauses they perceived as unequal and patronizingly conditional. Some governments also expressed discontent that the International Criminal Court was unfairly targeting African leaders. In 2006, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) began promoting harmonization of data protection, e-commerce and cybersecurity legislation among its members. ECOWAS received support from the International Telecommunications Union and the European Commission for this work as part of the WSIS outcomes.  These efforts, and those of other African regional organizations, provided the catalyst for the AU Commission to work on cyber policy harmonization at the continental level. These events also coincided with a 2007 AU initiative to encourage greater policy harmonization among African regional bodies. Interestingly, influential African states, such as South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, played little role in the Convention’s development, which was instead spearheaded by African Union officials and bureaucratic partners in select African regional organizations. For example, the AU consulted ECOWAS officials about the Convention’s development, but the Nigerian government played little role. The Convention also lacked support from civil society groups and some international companies because of its questionable human rights clauses. Instead of support from regional powerhouses, the Convention has attracted endorsements from less powerful states. Benin and Guinea Bissau signed the AU Convention first (January 2015), followed by Mauritania (February 2015), the Republic of Congo (June 2015), and Chad (June 2015). These signatories are Francophone, reflecting the Convention’s substantial West African roots. In January 2016, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and São Tomé and Príncipe signed, representing the first signatories without significant Francophone influence. No state has ratified the Convention, which requires 15 ratifications to enter into force. Although the content of the Convention mirrors that of the Budapest Convention, European approaches to data protection, and other Western ideas on cybersecurity, the Convention’s politics emphasize an African desire for independence, particularly from Europe. The AU did not invite the Council of Europe to provide formal feedback on the treaty. In contrast, the AU requested and lauded U.S. input. These decisions reflect the AU’s desire to establish greater autonomy in African approaches to cyber policy, especially from the countries that have historically dominated it: a cyber version of “African solutions for African problems.” Challenges for U.S. Outreach The United States needs to keep this African desire for autonomy and independence in mind as it shapes its cyber diplomacy toward the AU. Although the United States has less historical baggage with African states than Europe does, its cooperation with Africa on cyber issues has not been issue free. U.S. companies and civil and human rights advocates, for example, have criticized South Africa’s proposed cybercrimes and cybersecurity bill. Washington will want to stave off closer cooperation between African countries and China. The AU, for example, recently announced a program to work with the China Cyberspace Administration, but the details of this cooperation, including whether it involves mainly investment or cooperation on legal approaches, remain sketchy. The challenge for the United States will be to remain Africa’s cyber partner of choice without becoming overbearing, insisting that it has the only right approach to cyber problems, as it does with other issues. It can form an effective partnership only by recognizing the AU’s autonomy and independence.

Nathan Birhanu is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. Albinism is a hereditary condition from birth where an individual, partially or completely, lacks pigmentation in the skin, hair, and eyes. The condition is found in one in every 20,000 people globally. The topic of albinism is of importance in sub-Saharan Africa where rates can reach as high as one in 1,400 people because of a variety of factors. June 13 was International Albinism Awareness Day, enacted by the UN to bring special attention to security and cultural challenges faced by people with albinism. In rural areas of Eastern and Southern Africa, the bodies of people with albinism are thought to have magical or special properties; in some areas their body parts are sought after for traditional medicine or ritualistic practices. This has caused attacks, deaths, kidnappings, and threats against the group. Due to being conspicuous in their communities, people with albinism also face cultural issues where many are shunned because of the lack of understanding of the genetic basis of the condition: they experience social isolation, fears of contagion, and discrimination. Governments have attempted to address these challenges. On May 31, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture Rejoice Thizwilondi delivered a speech, stating, “The awareness campaign about the attacks, stigma, and discrimination experienced by people with albinism... presents all Africans with a platform to reflect the violation of the people with albinism. Africa should rise against the inhumane treatment meted out to our brothers and sisters.” South Africa’s awareness campaigns over the years have resulted in greater understanding and protection of people with albinism. However, Malawi and Tanzania struggle to curb anti-albinism sentiment and violence. Malawi and Tanzania have enacted laws or taken action to deter assaults or discrimination against albinism, but it is an uphill challenge. Economic hardships, the media’s inaccurate portrayal of people with albinism, and the lack of in-depth studies of albinism compound the problem. During an interview, Ikponwosa Ero, the first independent expert on albinism appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, states, “There is a lack of understanding about people with albinism, not only in developing countries but also in developed nations . . . So when you bring in this lack of knowledge in the context of poverty, witchcraft beliefs, and economic factors, you get a dangerous combination. This is what has led to this current situation.” Governments find it difficult to allocate resources to fight discrimination against albinism because of competing demands; individuals of the demographic are relatively few. Ero also goes on to explain the delicate balance of conducting albinism awareness campaigns to deter attacks without simultaneously perpetuating the image of African tropes of witchcraft and magical rituals. The media has a central role in fighting anti-albinism attitudes by bringing the topic to light but without propagating stereotypes or spreading erroneous information. The Malawi Health Equity Network has pleaded with their media to stop reports of albinism bodies being sold on the rationale that the reports are promoting a demand that is not actually present. Such ambiguity is one of the main reasons Ero says: “There is a set of perplexing themes going on here. And this is why I say an in-depth study is really needed.” Nevertheless, there have been strides in fighting discrimination against people with albinism, thanks to the efforts by government, civil society, and aid agencies. South Africa’s awareness campaigns show what is possible.

In 2016, once again, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has found no retiring African leader qualified for the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African leadership. Mo Ibrahim, a British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, set-up the prize in 2006. It may be awarded annually to an African elected head of state who promoted good governance and then left office in accordance with the constitution. The prize is very rich: $5 million, spread over ten years, followed by $200,000 a year for life. The foundation has awarded the prize to an African head of state only four times since the prize was established. It was awarded to the following: Mozambique’s Joaquim Chissano (2007)   Reuters/Mike Hutchings   Botswana’s Festus Mogae (2008)   Reuters/Jorge Dan Lopez   Cape Verde’s Pedro Verona Pires (2011)   Reuters/Haruyoshi Yamaguchi   Namibia’s Hifikepunye Pohamba (2015)   Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko In addition, the foundation made an exceptional award to Nelson Mandela in 2007, long after he had left office, and awarded a separate award to Desmond Tutu, then archbishop of Cape Town and a founder of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The prize committee is highly distinguished and, at present, comprised of Martii Ahtisaari, former president of Finland and Nobel laureate for his peace-building work; Aïcha Bah Diallo, former Guinea education minister and chair of the UNESCO Committee on women’s education in Africa; Graça Machel, former first lady of Mozambique and South Africa, advocate for education; Festus Mogae, former president of Botswana; Mohammed El Baardei, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency; Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland and former UN high commissioner for human rights; and Salim A. Salim, former secretary general of the Organization of African Unity. The prize’s criteria has been met only four times and is widely taken as an indictment of the quality of African national leadership. Others, however, criticize the prize’s criteria as unduly ‘Western.’

It is early to assess the long term consequences for sub-Saharan Africa of the United Kingdom’s (UK) vote to leave the European Union (EU) on June 24. However, in the short term, it is useful to look at the performance in the exchange rates and stock exchanges of Nigeria and South Africa since the referendum. They provide something of an indication of the wider impact Brexit had on Africa. Nigeria and South Africa together account for more than half of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product. Both have long had close ties with the UK, especially with respect to trade and financial services. In addition, there are myriad other ties between the UK and Nigeria and South Africa. For example, there is a large British expatriate community living in South Africa. The Nigerian expatriate population in the UK is also significant, and wealthy Nigerians have long favored the UK for education, health services, and second homes. Stock Market Exchange: Source: Bloomberg Terminal Foreign Exchange Rates:  Source: Bloomberg Terminal Highlights of the above figures show:   As of June 28, the decline in the selected stock exchanges has had a narrow range, between 3.5% (UK –the lowest) and 4.81 percent(Nigeria—the highest). The second greatest decline was the New York Stock Exchange. Forward exchange rates for the pound (UK) and the dollar (U.S.) are stable, but investors foresee continued fall in the value of the naira (Nigeria) and a small decline in the value of the rand (South Africa). Beyond the statistics, there can be a silver lining in the clouds. In the aftermath of Brexit, according to Bloomberg, foreigners acquired shares in South African companies at the highest rate in the past seven years. Especially popular were shares in gold producers. South African companies that earn dollars but report profits in British pounds sterling have particularly benefited from the fall in sterling against the U.S. dollar. Those companies include SABMiller PLC (beer) and British American Tobacco, according to Bloomberg. For now, this data would indicate that the direct, short-term impact of Brexit on sub-Saharan Africa will not be as large as had been anticipated. This data also reflects the assumption that Brexit will actually happen. That remains to be seen.

Asmita Parshotam, Cyril Prinsloo, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos have written a thoughtful analysis of the impact on South Africa should the UK vote to exit the European Union on June 23. Their analysis was published June 21 by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Given the hype about the role of China and the other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, and India) countries, the SAIIA analysis of the role of the EU and the UK in the South African economy is highly useful—and sobering. They make the fundamental point that the economic and financial relationship among the EU, the UK, and South Africa is highly significant. To select only two figures among many that the SAIIA analysts cite: in 2015 twenty-one percent of South Africa’s global exports went to the EU, and EU-South Africa trade accounted for a quarter of South Africa’s global trade. The UK alone accounts for 3.7 percent of South Africa’s global trade. They also describe the importance of EU and UK investment in South Africa. They conclude that Brexit, if it happens, will have significant and negative consequences for South Africa. Brexit, they predict, will likely lead to financial volatility, with the pound losing value. They suggest that spill over from the resulting uncertainty will likely discourage investors from pursuing emerging markets, such as South Africa. That, in turn, would strain the South African economy, already plagued by near-zero rates of growth. They also make the uncomfortable point that though Brexit would directly affect South Africa, there is literally nothing Pretoria can do to affect the outcome.

The following text is the entirety of John Campbell’s speech delivered as part of the Department of State’s Ralph J Bunche Library Series, on June 8, 2016.  From a certain perspective, South Africa is a mess. Many South Africans are disappointed by the way the country has seemingly squandered its promise as the ‘Rainbow Nation.’ Under the Jacob Zuma presidential administration, the country is treading water with respect to poverty and addressing the lasting consequences of apartheid. Corruption is rife. You can read all about it in the Mail and Guardian or the Daily Maverick. As a person, Jacob Zuma is very far from Nelson Mandela. He is mired in scandal. There was the misuse of public funds on his private house, Nkandla, including a swimming pool billed as a “fire retardant feature.” There is the rape charge. Though he was not convicted, much of the public believes him to be guilty. The public prosecutor may reopen the numerous charges of his personal corruption with respect to arms sales. His cronies, the Gupta brothers, have been meddling with high level government appointments. There is fear that Zuma and the people around him are seeking to undermine South Africa’s model constitution to advance their own financial interests. The general sense of squalor is captured by a joke that is making the rounds. It goes like this: Snow White, Superman, and Pinocchio were out for a walk in the enchanted forest. They saw a sign for a contest for the most beautiful woman in the world. Snow White promptly entered. A half hour later she rejoined her friends and announced she had won – hands down. They walked on and came to another sign, a contest for the strongest man in the world. Superman promptly entered. A half hour later he rejoined his friends and announced he had won, “aced it.” They continued to walk, and came upon a third sign, this time for a contest for the greatest liar in the world. Pinocchio, up to now feeling left out, perked up and announced that with his nose, he would enter and certainly win. A half an hour later he rejoined his friends, who asked how it went. Through his tears of disappointment, Pinocchio could only say, “Who on earth is Jacob Zuma?” Yet, I have written a book with the core argument that despite the corruption and incompetency of the Zuma administration, the country’s democratic institutions are strong enough to weather the current period of poor governance. Just as the United States weathered Richard Nixon in the past, and perhaps will be required to weather another deeply flawed personality in the future, South Africa can weather Jacob Zuma and his cronies. In both countries there is an independent judiciary, a free press, and strong civil society based on the rule of law. The book is called Morning in South Africa. In the spirit of the Tappet Brothers shameless commerce division, the easiest way to get it is on Amazon. The book is aimed at American readers who stopped paying attention to the South African story after the 1994 election and Nelson Mandela’s inauguration. I hope to bring them up to speed on what has happened since, and to assure them that as rocky as things might appear now, the country’s “deeper truths and better angels,” in Simon Barber’s words, remain intact. Politically the country is a fully functioning democracy with among the best protections of human rights in the world. Morning in South Africa, the title, recalls the theme Ronald Reagan used for his re-election campaign in 1984, “it’s morning in America.” Which, if you were black and poor, or a union organizer, or an anti-apartheid activist, it certainly was not. Nonetheless, Reagan’s optimism was infectious and the slogan did reflect a broader national reality. What with Watergate, defeat in Vietnam, stagflation, energy shortages and the Iran hostage crisis, the ‘70s had been difficult. Relatively speaking, things were looking up at the end of Reagan’s first term. I mean the title of the book to capture a similar ambiguity about South Africa; there are grounds for a parallel optimism notwithstanding Jacob Zuma and the slow pace of economic and social change since the end of apartheid. The book opens with an orientation to the history of South Africa and certain of its parallels to that of the American south. A review of current demographic trends highlights the persistent consequences of white supremacy and apartheid. Whites continue to have much longer life spans than everybody else, a reflection of their access to better education and health services. For whites, it is about the same as in Israel or Russia; f or blacks, in Nigeria or Cameroon. The book includes a discussion of education, health, contemporary politics, and land reform with an eye as to how South Africa’s democracy is responding to thorny challenges. The book highlights the strength of constitutionally mandated institutions, the rule of law, and the independence of the judiciary. South Africa is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy. The constitution limits what governments can do at all levels and has among the most elaborate protections of human rights of any country in the world. It is a check on the African National Congress’s (ANC) huge parliamentary majority and frustrates Zuma. Notably, South Africa has outlawed capital punishment and is the only African country that permits gay marriage. Both are the result of judicial rulings based on human rights provision in the constitution. Both are deeply unpopular. But such is the popular respect for the constitution that there has been no significant effort to amend it to permit the first and ban the second. Despite current pessimism, there is little that is new about South Africa’s root challenges. They include the consequences of apartheid and pandemic disease, especially HIV/AIDS. Corruption is not new. It was a characteristic of the apartheid state. The current gloom, the depth of which is new, owes much to the slow economic recovery from the worldwide slump of 2008, the effect of falling commodity prices, and discontent with President Jacob Zuma’s style of governance. Nevertheless, post-apartheid South Africa is stalled, not broken. The highly respected Ibrahim Index of African Governance for 2015 places South Africa at the top of its five analytical categories: safety, rule of law, human rights, economic opportunity, and human development. The only states that it rates higher are small and relatively wealthy, such as Mauritius, Botswana, and Cape Verde. But like other developing countries, South Africa is characterized by gross inequality of income and wealth, but even more so. South Africa has the highest Gini coefficient of any country in the world. There is a small minority of rich people and a huge majority of poor people. But, a generation after apartheid, in South Africa, economic and social inequality is still largely along racial lines. To cite two examples: The gulf between white wealth and that of everybody else is greater now than it was in 1994. In other words, whites are richer now relative to everybody else than they were during the last days of apartheid. On the other hand, male unemployment in the black townships approaches 50 percent. Such realities help account for the ANC’s – and Zuma’s – electoral success. They also drive irresponsible political movements such as Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters. Yet, in the face of current scandals, it is easy to lose sight of how much the ANC governments of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have accomplished since 1994. The institutional and ideological props of white supremacy are gone. In education, the ANC government has rationalized and deracialized the nineteen different systems inherited from apartheid. In public health, under Zuma, there has been a turn for the better with respect to HIV/AIDS, perhaps his signature accomplishment as president. The ANC government has established a safety net of allowances that has cut in half the numbers of the very poor. There are about 17 million beneficiaries, out of a population of about 50 million. Beneficiaries are mostly children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled. Social allowances are about 4 percent of GDP, judged sustainable indefinitely if growth is 3 percent or better, as it usually was from 1994 to 2008. Government economic policy has promoted the growth of a black middle class. There is a political consensus over a National Development Plan that provides a blueprint for economic growth and reform of education and public health. Electoral democracy is strong. The country has conducted credible national elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014. In addition, there have been four, also credible, local government elections nationwide, with another coming up this August. The Economist Democracy Index in 2012 rated the quality of South African elections as only slightly below those of Japan and the United States. Democracy as a form of governance in South Africa remains popular. An Afrobarometer poll showed that 72 percent of the respondents were committed to constitutional democracy, 11 percent were indifferent, and 15 percent held that nondemocratic methods are sometimes preferable. Since 1994, South Africa has been a functioning democracy conducted according to the rule of law, largely—though not completely—without legal reference to race even if social and economic change has been slow and incomplete. Ownership of the economy continues to be dominated by whites, now joined by well-connected blacks, but the “face” of South Africa, ranging from television presenters to post office clerks, reflects the country’s racial demographics. Blacks are present in elite institutions ranging from formerly all-white universities to hospitals and country clubs, though by no means in proportion to their share of the population. Nevertheless, black Africans are no longer strangers in their own country. Earlier in my remarks I observed that South Africa has a developed democratic culture. What did I mean? Let me provide an example. The contentious issue of land redistribution from whites to blacks illustrates the strength of the rule of law. At least 80 percent of the population across all racial lines believes that it should be done, but strictly according to the law. Blacks much more than other racial groups believe that whites are due no compensation for their property that the state redistributes. But they, too, affirm that any such distribution must be governed by the law. And the constitution –especially sacred to many blacks because it ended apartheid – recognizes private property. There are signs that many in the ruling ANC power structure have determined that Jacob Zuma must go. It remains to be seen whether South Africans will demand inclusive leadership in the model of Nelson Mandela that would address the needs of the majority population without compromising the country’s democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the argument here is that thanks to the strength of its democratic culture and institutions, the odds are good that South Africa will meet successfully its current challenges. How to account for South Africa’s positive trajectory? Part of the answer is history. South Africa as a limited democracy dates from 1911. That year only white males had the right to vote. White women gained the suffrage in 1939, and then all races and genders in 1994. In 1994, democracy was extended to hitherto excluded parts of the population. But, it did not have to be invented out of whole cloth. Similarly the independence of judiciary dates from the periods of Dutch and British rule and was maintained during the darkest days of apartheid. Democracy and the rule of law have become indigenous to South Africa. A final word about the bilateral relationship. The United States and South Africa share democratic commonalities and the historical experience of white supremacy and its consequences. That would seem to be a good foundation for a special diplomatic relationship. At the time of the 1994 transition, many in the Clinton administration anticipated that future bilateral ties between the two multiracial democracies would be close, exceptional, and mutually beneficial. However, almost a generation later, the official relationship is correct, barely cordial, and hardly special. Moreover, the likelihood is remote of a close partnership anytime soon. In February, the ANC Secretary General Mantashe accused the American embassy in Pretoria of plotting “regime change” – by means of the Young African Leaders Initiative. In fact, the Embassy had consulted with Mantashe, along with others on South African nominees for the program. What happened? One answer is the relative absence of shared diplomatic goals or common security concerns. This reality mitigates against a close partnership. Economic links, while not trivial, were not important enough to overcome the lack of shared security goals. At a deeper level, back to history. History, and often the distorted memory of that history, has been a brake. South Africa and the United States were allies during World War I, World War II, and during the Cold War. Jan Smuts and Woodrow Wilson were close collaborators in the creation of the League of Nations. But, those now in power in Pretoria regard the South African governments that participated in those struggles as at best “colonial” and fundamentally racist. Both Smuts and Wilson are at present condemned as personal racists. Hence, many in the ANC view these wartime alliances with ambiguity if not distaste. For former freedom fighters, there is little history of a community of interest between South Africa and the United States. A consequence is that our bilateral relationship is much closer with, say, Nigeria, than with South Africa. A warming of the official, bilateral relationship will probably have to wait for a generational change within the ANC. Meanwhile, however, the myriad other links between the United states and South Africa, ranging from the economic to the cultural to the scientific to the artistic to mutual tourism are going from strength to strength. The bilateral relationship is more than Jacob Zuma.