Ethiopia

Alvin Young is a Rangel Fellow and master's candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. After years of negotiations, Egypt has written to the UN Security Council about what it considers to be Ethiopia's failure to reach an agreement over the filling and operations of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The United States, Russia, and the World Bank, among others, have attempted to mediate the dispute. However, the apparent absence of African Union (AU) leadership in the negotiations reduces the AU's credibility. The GERD is projected to produce electricity for over 75 million Ethiopians and millions more outside the country. Egypt, however, fears that the pace at which Ethiopia fills the reservoir will reduce its water supply from the Nile River. According to recent projections, if Ethiopia filled the dam over ten years, Egypt would experience a 14 percent decrease in water supply from the Nile and lose 18 percent of its farmland. Alternatively, if Ethiopia were to fill the dam in three years, Egypt's water supply would decrease by 50 percent and could see a 67 percent reduction in its agriculture area. Under these scenarios, Egypt considers Ethiopia’s goal to fill the GERD quickly as a threat to its security. The AU's absence in the GERD negotiations is not congruent with its Agenda 2063. This strategic framework aims to deliver collective prosperity and sustainable development. More specifically, the plan calls for "an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena."  Further, not only did President Ramaphosa promise to use South Africa's chair of the AU to help resolve disputes in general, earlier this year, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed publicly invited him to mediate the GERD talks. But Egypt is now attempting to kick the problem up to the Security Council, marginalizing the AU. It could be that the AU lacks the political will and technical background to deliver in the GERD negotiations, and in fact prefers to remain on the sidelines. Still, the GERD involves Africa's second and third most-populous states, with the potential to impact other states as well. The AU's absence undermines its credibility.

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Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently completed his first trip in his current role to Africa. Over three days, he visited Dakar in Senegal, Luanda in Angola, and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, where he also visited the head of the African Union. During the trip, Secretary Pompeo advocated for a stronger U.S.-Africa relationship amidst China’s growing role on the continent.  Though President Trump appears to have no interest in Africa beyond seemingly unfiltered insults, some in his administration have visited, thought not to the same extent as previous administrations. His wife Melania, his daughter Ivanka, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have all visited the continent, though the latter was fired by Trump during his trip. Unlike past administrations, the Trump administration has no high profile, signature Africa policy initiative, such as President Bill Clinton’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), President George W. Bush’s campaign against HIV/AID (the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief, or PEPFAR), or President Barack Obama’s electric power initiative (Power Africa).  The Trump administration’s Africa strategy, Prosper Africa, envisages facilitating greater American private sector investment and trade with Africa. Its Development Finance Corporation has significant potential, building on and ultimately replacing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, but it is underfunded and is only just now becoming operational. Prosper Africa’s roll-out rhetoric by then National Security Advisor John Bolton seemed more concerned with countering China’s political and security influence on the continent than on political, social, or economic development. Meanwhile the Trump administration’s new “travel ban,” suspending immigration to the United States from Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania because of alleged security shortcomings, is unlikely to encourage American private sector involvement with Africa.  But in general, American policy toward Africa—encouraging democracy and the rule of law, facilitating economic development, and supporting the development of African security initiatives and capabilities—remains consistent with that of previous administrations, driven below the cabinet level and from outside the White House. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Tibor Nagy and USAID Administrator Mark Green get high marks for management, and Congress has blocked Trump administration efforts to eviscerate the various assistance programs from which Africa benefits.  Moreover, American soft power endures, going from strength to strength. China may have peppered the continent with Confucius Institutes designed to expand its influence through the study of Chinese language and culture, but the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) Africa league and the enduring power of Hollywood promote American mass culture to a much larger popular audience. Aubrey Hruby observes that the movie “Black Panther” and the NBA do more to build American influence than cabinet visits. And that is even leaving aside Oprah! It is always worth keeping in mind that the American relationship with Africa is much more than presidential administrations.

International attention—and panic—are focused on the coronavirus. In Africa, observers are acutely aware of how ill-prepared most countries are for responding to a major pandemic. With more than a billion people undergoing rapid urbanization, stuck with weak healthcare systems, and with growing economic ties to China (it is estimated that there are more than a million Chinese immigrants on the continent) Africa would appear to be highly vulnerable to the spread of the coronavirus. Ethiopian Airlines continues its China service, and some 1,500 passengers arrive in Addis from China every day, many of whom transit to other African destinations. Yet, as of February 12, there have been no reported cased of the disease in Africa. Nor have there been any cases in South America.  It may be that the virus is present but thus far has been undetected. Africa’s weak medical infrastructure makes detection of mild forms of the disease especially difficult. There may be other factors at play specific to the virus. For example, there has been media speculation that the continent’s hot and humid climate is inhospitable to the disease. On the other hand, there are many parts of Africa where the climate is temperate, and two major international airports—Johannesburg and Addis—which both serve cities of about 8 million each, including a significant slum population, enjoy cool, dry climates. Still, neither city has reported any cases of corona virus. Ebola appears to be much more deadly than coronavirus, but it has been concentrated in eastern Congo. The disease has killed some 2,300 people since 2018, with death rates of those who contract Ebola often over 50 percent. Coronavirus has thus far killed 1,107 worldwide as of February 12, with about 2 percent of those who contract the virus dying. The World Health Organization (WHO) is cautiously optimistic about Ebola, and its Emergency Committee will meet soon to discuss whether the disease still constitutes a global health emergency. That is good news.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ambitious reform plans for Ethiopia will be tested in the year ahead. Since taking the helm of government in April 2018, Abiy has been a whirlwind of activity, opening up political space and economic possibilities in his country. But Ethiopia’s complexity, and the way the lessons of its history have been framed, present real challenges to Abiy’s audacious overhaul and his stated goals of bringing more unity to the state, more dynamism and opportunity to its economy, and more justice to its people. Abiy has stressed the importance of unity to Ethiopian politics. His new Prosperity Party represents a fundamental change from the ethnic federalist model that has dictated how politics have been organized in recent decades and has been regularly presented as the solution to the restiveness that plagued the country in earlier eras. In practice, this change not only threatens the interests of those who benefited from the old system; it changes the nature of the Ethiopian national project. In turbulent times it may well be a tougher sell than ethno-nationalism, which can be stoked at will by the prime minister’s opponents. Delivering on his economic promises will be critical to maintaining support, but this too is not an easy task. Opening up to more foreign investment and more competition makes sense, but it comes with risks and painful transitions. It may not be possible to maintain growth at the projected, optimistic levels in the year ahead, and while international support is on the table, it will take even more significant and clearheaded support from abroad to ease the way toward sustainable prosperity. Finally there is the issue of security. For now, dismantling the machinery of repression has meant weakening the state’s ability to maintain order. While the internal displacement crisis of 2019 has abated in large measure, the perils of disorder loom over plans for some 50 million Ethiopians to cast their ballots in May’s general elections. Abiy is encouraging Ethiopians to revise their idea of what the state represents, but he has to ensure that providing security is a bedrock, dependable element of his work in progress. 

Herman J. Cohen is the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs (1989–1993), the former U.S. ambassador to the Gambia and Senegal (1977–80), and was a member of the U.S. Foreign Service for thirty-eight years. The violent conflict in Cameroon, still rarely discussed in Washington, is becoming increasingly dire. Both President Paul Biya’s Francophone regime in Yaounde and the Anglophone separatists in the southwest region are accused of brutal human rights abuses, including the burning of villages, attacks on schools, and the killing of men, women, and children. Despite mediation attempts by the Swiss government and sanctions by the Trump administration, there are no signs of any progress towards a negotiated settlement.  In 1991, I mediated an end to a different African conflict with some striking similarities: the Eritrean war of independence, which raged for nearly three decades. Lessons from that precedent offer clues to a potential endgame in Cameroon. Colonial-style takeovers Both Eritrea and Cameroon’s Anglophone regions were engaged in governing federations with more powerful nations, then lost autonomy when their counterpart took over after deciding the relationship no longer suited them. The Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea was inaugurated in 1952, with two separate governments having their own legislatures, internal controls, and flags, while sharing foreign policy, defense, and currency. Ten years later, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I unilaterally dissolved that arrangement and annexed Eritrea, sparking the long and bloody war.  In 1961, Cameroon’s Anglophone region voted in a UN-sponsored referendum to join Francophone Cameroon in a very similar federal arrangement. Eleven years later, then-President Ahmadou Ahidjo defied the UN to hold his own referendum on whether to effectively annex the Anglophone areas by unifying the two regions, while conveniently providing Ahidjo with expanded powers. Officially, the vote tally was 99.99 percent to dissolve the federation, with 98.2 percent turnout.   A crackdown by the Francophone authorities immediately ensued. Widespread discrimination against Anglophones was compounded by a takeover of the education and judicial systems to abolish the English language. Like the Eritreans subjected to sudden Ethiopian subjugation, this move to consolidate power understandably upset Cameroon’s minority Anglophone population.  What do these parallels tell us about the crisis in Cameroon? Paul Biya cannot expect to win through war Unlike in Eritrea, tensions grew slowly in Cameroon over decades, before boiling over into the open violent conflict of the last several years. But the twenty-nine-year length of the Eritrean war indicates that bloodshed is likely to persist as long as Anglophone Cameroonians feel their culture and autonomy is being stolen by the Yaounde regime (and as long as they have friendly neighbors on their side of the border.) Prolonging this conflict will not lead to a resolution. A mediated negotiation is the only realistic solution, and the United States can lead it The Ethiopia-Eritrea war ended rapidly after the U.S. became the official mediator. In Cameroon, the lack of progress in Swiss mediation does not simply mean the conflict is unsolvable for now. The responsibility to engage in serious negotiations must be made clear to both sides. They will feel comfortable in offering concessions to an influential mediator like the United States that they would not offer each other.  Despite the Trump administration's supposed neglect of Africa, it has in fact been heavily invested in conflict resolution there: currently it is working to end saber-rattling between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter's move to dam the Nile river. President Trump has appointed a highly capable U.S.-Africa diplomat, Tibor Nagy, to the assistant secretary position I once held. Ambassador Nagy is an excellent choice to oversee this process. There are additional incentives for President Trump to pursue peace in Cameroon. The administration’s efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict are likely to be met with failure. By contrast, ending the Cameroon conflict, while difficult, is within this administration's grasp, and it would do far more to improve U.S. standing in Africa than John Bolton's aggressive anti-China, anti-Russia campaign there. The longer the conflict lasts, the less likely that Cameroon will remain a single nation Eritreans refused to accept any federation with Ethiopia after three decades of war. There was simply too much bitterness. Even after the independence accords, a two-year border war in 1998 killed hundreds of thousands; it did not officially end until Ethiopia’s new premier Abiy Ahmed made an unexpected, unilateral peace overture last year.  It may not be too late to return to the UN-approved federation between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon that existed prior to 1972. That arrangement would provide Anglophones with the autonomy they deserve. But time is running out. Genuine democracy is a requirement for post-conflict stability For decades, Ethiopia’s domestic politics relied on a coalition of ethnic parties, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which originally fought the military dictatorship of the 1970s and 1980s. Consternation over the dominance of one small ethnic group, the Tigrayans, eventually led to deadly protests and the ouster of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn last year. In November, Prime Minister Abiy moved to merge the EPRDF parties into a single unit, but this was met with protests by the Tigray constituency, and may ultimately lead to further destabilization just as ethnic tensions in the country are especially inflamed. The weakness of Cameroon’s democratic institutions is aggravated by the monopoly of Paul Biya’s ethnic group, the Beti, over political and economic power. Many of the non-Beti French speakers feel just as marginalized as Anglophones. Ethnic domination within a putative democracy is inherently unsustainable. And after thirty-seven years of autocratic rule and fraudulent elections under Biya, Cameroon’s problems may not end with any resolution of the Anglophone crisis.

Numerous countries will hold elections in 2020. Here are ten to watch. 

Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and is a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. Uganda is heading toward a debt crisis. According to a senior official at the Bank of Uganda, unless the country is able to sustain a growth rate of at least 7 percent—which economic projections show Uganda will not do—the country will default on its payments. As is the case for many African countries, China is Uganda’s largest creditor, making up 39 percent of total debt this past fiscal year. If Uganda defaults, it is unclear how China will react. Will China flex its muscles and negotiate for the rights to Uganda’s sovereign assets like it did in Sri Lanka, or ease the debt pressure, by restructuring Uganda’s loans over a longer time period as it did in Ethiopia?   Generally speaking, foreign governments and international financial institutions are hesitant to make loans to Uganda. They remain skeptical that Uganda will be able to honor them—except, apparently, China. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently admitted that China is the only partner that would agree to lend Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya $3.5 billion to construct a series of railways and roads. In addition, China is financing a $4 billion oil pipeline, currently under construction, that will connect the western region of Uganda to the port in Tanga, Tanzania—giving the landlocked country access to the Indian Ocean. Many of China’s loans to Sub-Saharan Africa can be seen in the context of China’s belt and road initiative.  China has reacted differently to each country’s individual debt crisis. At one end of the spectrum, China allegedly uses its leverage to gain strategic and material concessions if a debtor country is unable to pay their debts, exemplified by Sri Lanka handing over control of the Hambantota Port to China for ninety-nine years. China's alleged practice of debt-trap diplomacy, as it has been dubbed, has been hotly debated, though there seems to be a consensus that their lending practices are problematic. At the other end, China works with governments to restructure loans over a longer time period—often forgiving past interest payments—as illustrated by China’s twenty-year-loan extension to Ethiopia.  Completed in 2010, the Hambantota port did not draw enough ships to make the operations economically feasible. By July 2015, Sri Lanka could not service its payments. Consequently, in order to avoid defaulting on its debt, the government relinquished control of the port to China for nearly a century. Uganda’s auditor general report warns that the conditions of their loans similarly threaten the country’s sovereign assets. If the economic predictions hold and the country defaults on its payments to China, Uganda’s infrastructure projects might face a similar fate.  Ethiopia faces a similar debt crisis, linked in large part to the Chinese-financed, $4 billion Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. Opened in January 2018, the railway intended to expand Ethiopia’s export market by connecting its capital to the sea via Djibouti. But Ethiopia is importing more than it is exporting via the railway, not generating the revenue needed to service its debt to China. In response, China renegotiated the terms of the loan with Ethiopia to extend the payments over a longer period of time.  Based on China’s approach to Ethiopia and the similarity of its infrastructure projects connecting Uganda to the sea, it is more likely that China will work with Uganda to extend the repayment terms of the loans. There is speculation that China sought control of the Hambantota port because it is strategically important. According to some analysts, the port should be thought of as part of a string of pearls—China’s plan to have a line of ports stretching from Beijing to the Persian Gulf. Viewed this way, the Hambantota port is of much more strategic significance to China than Ethiopia’s and Uganda’s railways. Finally, internal and external criticism of China's lending practices are likely to encourage a more constructive approach to debtor countries.

Anyone fishing for a good news story out of Africa recently, and rightly, has celebrated Ethiopia, where dynamic young Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has dramatically opened political space, departing from decades of repressive, tightly controlled government. Abiy is a charismatic whirlwind of activity—making peace with neighboring Eritrea, working to open the Ethiopian economy to new opportunities for growth, and even mediating between protestors and securocrats in Sudan. Anyone who cares about stability and prosperity in Africa, and anyone who understands how important African partnership will be to tackle the foreign policy challenges of the future, is pulling for him to succeed. Just days ago, Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg wove Ethiopia into a major foreign policy address, citing the country as an example of “what it looks like when hope triumphs over hostility.” But Ethiopia faces real and urgent challenges, and it is critical that well-wishers not ignore them. Abiy has lifted the lid off of a pressure cooker—one his predecessors held in place with sometimes brutal force—and in some cases the result has not been euphoria, but rather messy, complex eruptions of communal violence. Ethiopia’s story is not a simple one, and the millions internally displaced over the past year, the worrying reports of forced returns, and the potential for 2020 elections to be a flashpoint should focus the minds of policy-makers around concrete ways to provide support to what is sure to be a long and complex transition.  Ethiopia is one of the world’s dozen most populous countries, characterized by tremendous ethnic and linguistic diversity. Over 60 percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five. Despite real gains over the past years, many Ethiopians still live in severe poverty, and official literacy rates hover at around half of the population. It is not an easy country to govern in any circumstance. Against that backdrop, and at a moment of profound change, in which the role of the state and indeed the unifying national idea is being rethought, the possibility of more instability is very real.  The Unites States and others ought to be more ambitious in finding new ways to support the resilience of governing institutions, mechanisms for reconciling longstanding grievances, and the capacity of a government inclined to respect the civil and political rights of citizens to also deliver services and opportunity. Countless talented and patriotic Ethiopians from around the country and across the diaspora have mobilized, sometimes upending their own lives, to lend support to their government’s liberalizing project. They know this will not be a year’s work—it is a generational project. A clear sense of U.S. strategic interests indicates that it is one that deserves more of our own attention and support.

David Pilling has written a review of what he sees as some of the most important African events of 2018 for the Financial Times, a highly influential paper with respect to Western perspectives of Africa, published in London. He recalls the popular challenge now underway against Omar al-Bashir’s rule in Sudan; the deaths of Kofi Annan, the first African secretary General of UN, and Winnie Mandela, a flawed leader of the South African liberation movement; the highly positive emergence of the reform-minded Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian prime minister; and the international attention to Congolese surgeon Denis Mukwege, who won a Nobel Peace prize for his work with rape victims. He notes a continent-wide growth rate of 2.7 percent that was highly uneven: disappointing in Nigeria and South Africa, while among the highest in the world in Ghana, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Senegal and Tanzania.  His “five things that shook Africa in 2018,” and my comments: The African Continental Free Trade Area: I agree with Pilling’s characterization of it as a “step in the right direction.” Over time, and in concert with other factors such as infrastructure development, it has the potential for transforming African trade and therefore development. It is to be hoped that the big hold-out, Nigeria, will eventually sign-on. South Africa, the other hold-out, already has. Abiymania: Prime Minister Ahmed’s political reforms in Ethiopia are remarkable so far. I wholeheartedly endorse the enthusiasm for Ahmed and the new possibilities he has created domestically and internationally, such as the rapprochement with Eritrea. Zimbabwe’s flawed election: I do not believe that it was realistic to expect much change given the ZANU-PF’s continuing grip on power. Mugabe’s departure was just that, and little else. Bobi Wine: The Ugandan rapper is challenging the hold of autocrat Yoweri Museveni. While encouraging, it remains to be seen how much staying power he has at the moment. It is definitely something to keep an eye on. The China debt scare: I believe that it is much exaggerated, and I generally agree with Pilling’s point that, irrespective of the actual seriousness of African debt to China, it has certainly drummed up a lot of interest in Africa, and, for better or worse, was a central theme in the Trump administration's rhetoric around the new Africa strategy, if not its substance. Instead of Zimbabwe’s flawed elections, the rise of Bobi Wine, and the China debt scare on Pilling’s list, I would add: The change of leadership in South Africa: Removing Jacob Zuma and replacing him with Cyril Ramaphosa, all done according to party procedure and the rule of law, is no small feat. President Ramaphosa’s turn-around of governance in South Africa, especially his efforts to dismantle the corruption networks associated with former president Jacob Zuma, is encouraging. Though there is much to be done, Ramaphosa has deftly managed a divided ANC. Boko Haram’s resurgence: It poses a serious challenge to President Muhammadu Buhari’s reelection and could further destabilize the Giant of Africa, threatening the stability of its neighbors and the lives of millions of those displaced by the violence. Ebola’s resurgence in eastern Congo: Ebola appears no longer to be episodic but is now becoming endemic. By itself, it poses a major challenge to public health, if not of the same magnitude as HIV/AIDS. The real issue is that the outbreak, now present in some urban areas, is occurring in a highly-populated conflict zone near international borders during election season.  But, Pilling’s bottom line is right: “the continent took baby steps towards a brighter future.”  For what it is worth.

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering October 26 to November 2, was compiled with support from Rebecca Turkington and Ao Yin.

Rebecca Turkington is the assistant director of the Women and Foreign Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. On Thursday, the Ethiopian parliament elected its first female president, Sahle-Work Zewde. Though the role is largely ceremonial, it holds symbolic importance for women across the country and the continent, as Zewde will be the only female head of state in Africa. (Saara Kuugongelwa-Ahmadhila, prime minister of Namibia, is the only female head of government in Africa.) In her opening speech, she emphasized the importance of equality, telling MPs that if they thought she was talking too much about women, that she had only just begun. Her election comes on the heels of another important step forward for Ethiopia, and neighboring Rwanda, who joined the meager ranks of countries with ministerial gender parity. In a cabinet reshuffle last week, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed ten female ministers, comprising half of the all cabinet posts. Days later, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame announced that Rwanda’s new cabinet would also be gender-balanced. According to data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, fewer than ten countries have reached parity at the cabinet level. The global average for female government ministers is 18.3 percent, and more than a dozen countries have no women cabinet members at all. Ethiopia and Rwanda are part of a small club, and further unique for granting women substantial portfolios. Both named women to key ministerial posts; Ethiopia’s new minsters of defense and peace, and Rwanda’s ministers of trade and economic planning, are women. Of the female ministers in office worldwide, the vast majority hold posts that oversee social issues. In 2017, women were most likely to be ministers of environment (108), social affairs (102), family/children/youth (98), women’s affairs (68), education (67), and culture (65). Far fewer women served as ministers for justice (38), finance (19), and a mere fifteen countries—including Ethiopia—have a woman at the helm of the defense ministry. In their announcements of the new appointments, both Prime Minister Abiy and President Kagame remarked that they believed women would improve the effectiveness of the cabinet. Abiy told lawmakers that women would help battle corruption and bring accountability to the government. Kagame noted to judicial officials that "a higher number of women in decision-making roles have led to a decrease in gender discrimination and gender-based crimes.” To a certain extent, research bears this out. Women’s political participation is correlated with a number of gains that are particularly important for post-conflict countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda. A report from CFR’s Women and Foreign Policy program finds that, over a number of metrics, greater women’s participation in peace and security processes leads to more stability. Further studies find higher levels of women’s representation in government leads to a longer duration of peace, and lower likelihood of civil war relapse. Greater numbers of women in cabinet level posts correlates with friendlier working environments for women, and women’s political participation encourages confidence in democratic institutions and is linked with lower levels of extralegal killing, torture, disappearances and other forms of state abuse.  There are important caveats to these findings. Historically, the appointment of women to high-ranking posts has sometimes been instrumentalized for political ends, and several studies acknowledge that the transformative potential of women’s political representation is hindered when grassroots women’s activism is smothered. The Rwandan case in particular is evidence that even when women have high levels of descriptive representation, without an autonomous civil society, gains do not necessarily trickle down. Nevertheless, this recent news represents a welcome step forward. In addition to Ethiopia and Rwanda’s history-making cabinet line-ups, Mali’s president announced last month a new cabinet that is 30 percent female, including in key posts like the minister of foreign affairs. Women in ministerial roles are slowly changing the face of African politics. Their presence is a necessary—if not sufficient—element to achieving long-lasting equality and stability. 

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering October 7 to October 16, was compiled with support from Rebecca Turkington and Ao Yin.