Ethiopia

Ethiopia, a strategically located regional power with over 100 million people and one of the fastest growing economies in the world, has a new prime minister. Abiy Ahmed is a compelling figure and his personal history is resonant—he comes from one of the country’s two largest ethnic groups, has mixed Muslim and Christian heritage, and fought against the Derg (shorthand for Ethiopia's Communist government from 1974 to 1991). At forty-two, he is Africa’s youngest head of state, and his youthful charisma is a breath of fresh air. His political instincts are impressive, as evidenced by his early efforts to listen to and reassure Ethiopia’s disparate regions, and to loosen the restrictions that an increasingly repressive state machinery had used, ineffectively, in pursuit of stability. He is also a man with a very tough job ahead of him. His ascension to office is only the latest development in an attenuated transition process that began with the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012, and has since encompassed shifting dynamics within the ruling party and increasing popular frustration across the country. In accordance with the constitution, Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stepped into the leadership role when Meles died. Ethiopia’s ruling political party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), worked to project an image of tight control and continuity. To that end, Ethiopia’s information minister was widely quoted as saying, “I would like to stress, nothing in Ethiopia will change. The government will continue. Our policies and institutions will continue. Nothing will change in Ethiopia.” But what a difference six years makes. Having been buffeted by popular uprisings, a violent government response, and a national state of emergency that exacerbated popular disaffection, Hailemariam resigned in February of this year. By the beginning of April, Abiy committed to reform and was apologizing for the mistakes of the past. Change wasn’t just on the table—it was at the heart of his appeal to the nation. To be sure, the issues at stake in Ethiopia’s internal political debates are complex and longstanding. But since the death of Meles, the way these debates have manifested has changed significantly. Ethiopia’s recent experience suggests that, no matter how smooth the process of replacing a leader may initially appear, the very fact of long-awaited change at the top awakens latent appetites for devolving power and intensifies expectations of reform throughout society. Old grievances gain new urgency while popular tolerance for heavy-handed or self-serving policies dissipates quickly.  To the south, ruling parties in both Angola and Zimbabwe have worked to carefully manage major leadership transitions of their own, albeit under very different circumstances. They might take a keen interest in Ethiopia’s recent history. Ruling party continuity does not guarantee that new leaders can govern as their predecessors did, or count on the same patience or leeway from their own party or population.  

Rex Tillerson will make his first trip to Africa as Secretary of State between March 6 and March 13. He will visit five of Africa’s fifty-four countries—Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. The trip hardly appears to be a “reset” by the Trump administration in its approach to Africa. The State Department spokesperson, Heather Nauert, when announcing the trip, said that its purpose was “to further our partnerships with the governments and people of Africa.” She also said that the Secretary would be discussing how the United States “can work with our partners to counter terrorism, advance peace and security, promote good governance, and spur mutually beneficial trade and investment.” This rhetoric implies little change in the U.S. agenda in Africa since the end of the cold war and may reflect apparent White House disengagement and disinterest in the world’s second largest continent.  The selection of countries the secretary will visit indicates a strong emphasis on security issues. Djibouti is the site of the only U.S. base in Africa. Nigeria and Chad are deeply involved in the struggle against the Islamist, anti-western Boko Haram, which involves limited U.S. military training and equipment sales. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti are also involved in the struggle against al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization centered in Somalia, where the U.S. military also has assumed a limited support role.  Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia are backsliding with respect to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Kenya faces unresolved issues related to its recent contested presidential elections. Ethiopia’s strong-man prime minister abruptly resigned in February, resulting in a care-taker government that is set to elect a new prime minister soon. Nigeria, the giant of Africa, has established itself as a credible democracy, but goes into a 2019 election cycle that could be violent. Secretary Tillerson’s itinerary does not include what is in many ways the most successful African state, South Africa. It has the continent’s largest economy and is a functioning “non-racial” democracy. Its new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, provides the possibility of a reset in the bilateral relationship, which at present is no more than “cordial” and “correct.” The secretary’s trip is unlikely to advance the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa in any meaningful way. The focus is on security, not economic development, trade and investment, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Further, the Trump administration has yet to articulate a distinctive policy toward Africa. U.S. engagement, limited though it is, appears to be more military than diplomatic, reflecting the Trump administrations security preoccupations. There is still no assistant secretary of state for Africa, no U.S. ambassador to South Africa, and numerous other Africa-related positions remain unfilled. Certain authoritarian African leaders, like Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, have made positive statements about President Trump. Democratic leaders on the other hand, notably Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari and South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, were deeply critical of the president’s public denigration of Africa and Haiti. With the U.S. recessional from Africa, save for security issues, African states are turning to other partners, notably China, France, and the EU. In a thoughtful article, John Stremlau, an American visiting professor at Johannesburg’s prestigious University of the Witswatersrand, suggests that, for the time being, growing the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa may rest more with the legislative branch than with the executive branch and the secretary of state. He points out that since the 1990s Congress has consistently supported closer economic and political partnerships with Africa, reflecting the big American business, philanthropy, and civil society constituency for Africa.  

Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia are close to armed conflict over a Nile dam project; so far the United States is ignoring them.

This is a guest post by Zara Riaz, a research specialist in the Politics Department at Princeton University. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia stands out among neighbors for its political and economic stability. Recent protests and escalating violence, however, expose Ethiopia’s longstanding political tensions and pose a serious threat to the government’s ability to maintain its strong hold. Last November, protests spread across Ethiopia’s Oromia region. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group constituting over 30 percent of the country’s population, demanded an end to the government-sponsored Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, which would have extended the capital city’s limits further onto Oromo territory. The government, dominated by the Tigray minority group representing only 6 percent of the country’s population, announced plans to cancel the initiative in January. Nevertheless, many Oromo have continued to protest their political, economic, and cultural marginalization. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is not unique to the Oromo. The Ethiopian constitution explicitly grants self-determination and the protection of cultural rights for all ethnic groups, however, these rights are far from realized for the majority of the country’s population. For example, speaking Oromiffa is frequently used to identify actual or suspected members of the Oromo Liberation Front, an organization to promote Oromo self-determination that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government. As a result, many Oromos do not feel free to speak their language in public. Protests over officially sanctioned land grabbing have also spread across the Amhara region, home to Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group, the Amhara. Demonstrations among both groups are highlighting that though the country is celebrated for its strong economic growth, only an elite minority benefits. For example, fertile land in Oromia generates roughly 60 percent of Ethiopia’s economic resources, yet the Oromo are repeatedly denied the benefits accruing from these resources. In fact, Oromo land is being used for flower farms in an effort to compete with Kenya for the European market, yet a local resident claims that the government “took 90 percent of the payment and gave 10 percent to the people.” In response to demonstrations, the government is brutally cracking down on dissenters. During the first weekend of August, protests resulted in over one-hundred civilian causalities, while the death toll since the initial protests in November exceeds five-hundred. In the past, government opposition has been routinely interpreted as a threat to national unity and addressed as an act of terrorism. But, current demonstrations by two groups representing over 60 percent of the country’s population will make it more difficult to employ such tactics without igniting further unrest and anger. Though the government in the past has taken advantage of the decades long rivalry once characterizing the relationship between the Oromo and Amhara, the protests are giving birth to a sense of solidarity between the groups in demanding greater representation. These protests across Amhara and Oromo regions and the deteriorating human rights situation in the country cannot be ignored by the international community. Up to now, Western reluctance to condemn the government’s actions has been tied to Ethiopia’s important role in the fight against terrorism in the region. The Western response, which has so far included urging the government to allow international observers in parts of the country and expressing “concern” over the government’s actions, is weak, given the country’s deteriorating situation. The international community should act now to curb the government’s brutality against the protesters to decrease the likelihood of long-term instability in Ethiopia.

Nathan Birhanu is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. The June 2016 border clash between Ethiopia and Eritrea reflected renewed tensions between the two countries that have been mutually hostile since their 1998 – 2000 war. Shortly after the clash, tensions escalated as Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalgn claimed further retaliation will be administered if “destabilizing efforts” continued, while Eritrea accused the Ethiopian administration of human rights abuses. However, recent developments are promoting a welcome de-escalation, reducing the likelihood of  continued fighting. First, in July 2016, Ethiopia was elected to  the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member for the next two years. Considered the most powerful body of the UN, the UNSC can authorize military action, impose international sanctions, and mandate peace keeping operations. Ethiopia had been actively lobbying for the seat, not least because election enhances the prestige of the Addis government. Second, also early in July 2016, Eritrea allowed a consignment of food aid from the UN World Food Program (WFP) to transit its port of Massawa  for humanitarian relief operations in South Sudan. The cargo was the first to pass through Eritrea’s port in a decade. WFP used Massawa to avoid the congested port in Djibouti, thereby accelerating the flow of  aid to a humanitarian disaster area. Finally, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Commission) in June 2016 released a scathing report on Eritrea, detailing rampant human rights abuses by Asmara. Taken together, these three developments appear to have encouraged a certain stabilization. Ethiopia had previously served on the UNSC in 1967 and 1989, well before the establishment  of the current regime in 1993, now led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. The prime minister likely wants to avoid compromising his bolstered international reputation  by instigating conflict with Asmara at the border. Ethiopia will take its seat on the UNSC in January 2017. The potential influence of Ethiopia on the UNSC is not lost on Eritrea. On July 1, 2016, the UN Human Rights Council (Council) passed a resolution requesting that the UN General Assembly submit the Commission’s report on Eritrea’s human rights abuses to the “relevant organs of the UN for consideration and urgent action.” Earlier drafts had explicitly designated the UNSC, but several countries objected, including the United States and China. Eritrean Presidential Advisor Ghebreab Yemane has raised concerns that Ethiopia could use its seat on the UNSC to push for a resolution against Eritrea related to border issues.  By  allowing WFP cargo to transit its major port, Eritrea is offering something of an olive branch to the UN and the international community.  Despite the Council’s report, which Asmara denounces as false, Eritrea is signaling that it is  willing to work within the established system, at least with respect to certain humanitarian crises.

This piece has been co-authored by John Campbell and Nathan Birhanu. Nathan is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. International attention is focused on Brexit, the resulting turmoil in the international financial markets, and the resignation of UK Prime Minister David Cameron. There is the risk of overlooking a dangerous confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea that could lead to war and further destabilize the Horn of Africa. After sixteen years of cease-fire from a border war, Eritrea and Ethiopia clashed on June 12. Hundreds have been reported dead. Both countries are pointing fingers at the other as the original instigator of the incident while maintaining a tenuous, tactical stalemate position. The border war Eritrea and Ethiopia fought against each other from 1998-2000 left approximately 80,000 dead. The war over claims to border towns was largely due to cultural and historical differences between the two states in the aftermath of Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. The disputed border towns had no significant economic value, with the fight once described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.” After a final attack by Ethiopia, the war came to a halt, and the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement to implement a ceasefire. The Algiers Agreement was the vehicle for establishing an independent adjudicator titled the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). Both countries agreed to accept the decision of the EEBC. The EEBC ruled in favor of Eritrea’s claim over the main border town; Ethiopia was unsatisfied with the decision and requested a political dialogue before withdrawing from the disputed territory. The disputed territory thereupon became in effect a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea with sporadic skirmishes over the past sixteen years, until Sunday’s significantly larger clash. What could have caused the recent clash to occur, as either country has little to benefit from a renewed conflict? Ethiopia’s Information Minister, Getachew Reda, has speculated that the attack came from Eritrea to divert attention away from a new UN report that claims Eritrea is guilty of crimes against humanity, including indefinite forced conscription. Reda’s comments also insinuate Eritrea initiated the border incident to legitimize its need for mass conscripts and to win enhanced domestic support. In a similar vein, Eritrea’s Ambassador to Kenya, Beyene Russom, alleged the attack came from Ethiopia in hopes of taking advantage of the negative spotlight focused on Eritrea from the UN report. Ambassador Russom has denounced the UN report as false. In addition, Eritrean Presidential Advisor Yemane Ghebreab told the UN Human Rights Council that Ethiopia is preparing to start a full scale war. In fact, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has recently stated publicly several times that he was prepared to use military force against Eritrea in response to its “provocations.” Investigation of the clash is still underway. Ambassador Russom has acknowledged that satellite imaging could help identify the initiator of the clash, as any large-scale motion of military equipment would be observed. Eritrea has requested the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene to prevent escalation of the border conflict and to initiate dialogue. What is clear is that little, if any, would be gained by either country from continued escalation of conflict. Ethiopia’s current administration is proud of the growth of Ethiopia’s economy over the past fifteen years. Part of Ethiopia’s growth strategy is attracting additional international investors, which renewed conflict would undermine. On the other hand, many in the Ethiopian political class have never really accepted Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. As for Eritrea, it currently faces a loss of youth fleeing the country: Eritreans account for a sizable percentage of refugees arriving in Europe. The hemorrhaging of the youth would likely escalate if a border war were to restart. The Eritrean government appears to wish to avoid a renewed border war. Eritrea’s approach to the UNSC indicates Asmara’s willingness to work for a diplomatic resolution. The sooner communication and dialogue is started, the better. Even in the aftermath of Brexit, Washington needs to keep this potentially nasty conflict on its radar screen.

This is a guest post by Gabriella Meltzer, Research Associate in Global Health for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies program. El Niño was first discovered in the 1600s when fishermen noticed that in some years, water temperatures in the Pacific became warmer than usual. Hence, according to the National Ocean Service, El Niño today refers to “large-scale ocean-atmosphere climate interaction linked to a periodic warming in sea surface temperatures across the central and east-central Equatorial Pacific.” These anomalous weather patterns vary across regions, ranging from heavy rainfall and flooding to severe drought. The El Niño of 2015-2016 has thus far proven itself to be the worst on record because of its interaction with global climate change, where higher atmospheric temperatures due to greenhouse gas emissions lead to a higher frequency and greater intensity of the extreme weather events characteristic of an El Niño year. Perhaps no country has felt this more than Ethiopia, which is experiencing its worst drought in roughly half a century. The country has faced three consecutive failed rains, the most intense and recent being in June 2015 with the arrival of El Niño to its doorstep. The primary rainy season from June through September is critical to Ethiopia’s agricultural sector, which contributes 42.3 percent of the country’s GDP and employs roughly 73 percent of its labor force. Ethiopia has suffered from chronic food insecurity for over thirty years as a result of intense population growth whose overcultivation of small landholdings has put immense pressure on the soil in an already fragile environment. Yet, the drought occurring now has brought a level of devastation that, according to the United Nations, could rival the major famine in 1984 that killed upwards of 900,000 people. As of February 2016, 75 percent of harvests have been lost, one million livestock have died, and ten to fifteen million people require emergency humanitarian food assistance, with 430,000 children experiencing severe malnutrition. Between 2004 and 2012, Ethiopia’s economy grew at roughly 11 percent annually, outperforming the 7 percent annual growth required to achieve the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015. Ethiopia is frequently touted as a sub-Saharan Africa success story in development circles due to government investments in healthcare, agriculture, education, and infrastructure. Yet as of February 1, the Ethiopian government and its aid partners have announced that they need a total of $1.4 billion in 2016 to address the current drought-induced crisis, and have only received roughly one-third of this amount thus far. The World Food Programme has said that $500 million of this request is urgently needed by the end of this month to extend aid efforts through April. With the political urgency surrounding the current crisis in Syria, organizations like Save the Children have found it challenging to garner public attention and fiscal support for this equally severe humanitarian situation. Despite its efforts to present itself to the world as leading sub-Saharan Africa’s economic renaissance, Ethiopia remains desperately poor, with a human development index of merely .442 (on a scale of 1.0), ranked 174th in the world. The country only reduced poverty by one-third by the close of the MDGs, and nearly 90 percent of the entire population of 96.5 million is living in multidimensional poverty. Despite all of this, the Ethiopian government has still funded 46 percent of its humanitarian requirements. Through its flooding, record snowfalls, and droughts, El Niño has proven to be a far greater threat than any nation could have anticipated. This is particularly the case for a resource-poor country such as Ethiopia, whose communities rely on subsistence farming for survival. Ethiopia is justified in its pleas for help, and donor countries should act quickly to aid the many potential victims of famine. However, the adverse effects of climate change will continue to exact an outsized toll on countries like Ethiopia, and in addition to the rapid mobilization of resources in a time of crisis, there needs to be a forward-looking plan to help vulnerable nations build resilience.

The former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Herman J. (Hank) Cohen wrote an important article in African Arguments entitled “Time to Bring Eritrea in From the Cold.” For those involved in policy formulation and implementation in the Horn of Africa it is a “must read.” In a few short and lucid paragraphs Ambassador Cohen reviews the sorry history since 1997 of the tangled relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the complications posed by Somalia and al-Shabaab, the jihadist organization with ties to al-Qaeda, and the U.S. response. By 2008, the administration of President George W. Bush determined that Eritrea was a “state sponsor of terrorism” and imposed sanctions. Subsequently, President Barack Obama’s administration said that Eritrea allowed arms shipments to be delivered to al-Shabaab. In 2009, the administration sponsored a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 1907) that in effect made Eritrea the international pariah it is today. But, times change. Cohen recalls that “all available intelligence” indicates no Eritrean contact with al-Shabaab since 2009. Further, as Cohen points out, Eritrea is fearful of Islamic radicalism. There are signs of a warming in the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This confluence provides a special opportunity for a new approach to Eritrea with positive implications for the Horn of Africa. Normal relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be a win-win not only for both countries economically as well as politically, but also for the Horn of Africa region. How to move forward? Specifically, Cohen suggests that a European member of the Security Council should propose the repeal of UNSC 1907, and the United States should agree to abstain. He also proposes a face-saving solution to the long standing border issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to be mediated by a neutral European nation. Cohen shows that the benefits for U.S. policy would be significant. Normalization of Ethiopian/Eritrean relations would open the space for the United States and others to encourage better governance in both countries, and military cooperation between the United States and Eritrea could materially assist in the struggle against jihadi terrorism in the region. Ambassador Cohen makes a compelling case for a rethink of U.S. policy in the Horn and he proposes a practical strategy for moving forward.

Simon Allison published an article on December 15 in South Africa’s Daily Maverick entitled "Africa for Optimists: 2013 in Review." He picks five of the “most encouraging” African stories from 2013 and provides links to read more about them. They are: 1)      The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Allison points out is both an infrastructure and a political and diplomatic achievement. Sudan and Egypt–always concerned about the upstream diversion of water from the Nile, such as the Grand Renaissance Dam involves–have now come to the table to discuss the dam’s construction and to ensure equitable management of the Nile’s water. There is an intergovernmental committee to plan for any negative impact. Allison concludes that, “managed sensibly, there is plenty of water to go around.” 2)      There has been a decline in piracy off the Somali coast. Ships are better equipped with armed guards. The European Union’s flotilla has had an impact, and local Somali communities are less supportive of piracy. 3)      Madagascar, which is in many ways still a mess, has successfully held elections. They were supported by the Southern African Development Community, which has improved the security situation. 4)      The defeat of the M23 rebel group in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Allison attributes the defeat of this particularly vicious rebel group to the improved performance by the Congolese army and to the UN’s innovative peacekeeping force, which is made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. Unlike other UN peacekeepers, it has the mandate to go on the offensive. 5)      Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote is planning to construct an oil refinery in Nigeria. Not only would this reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported oil, but it would also create jobs. To me, some of these achievements are of greater magnitude than others. The defeat of M23 and a new mandate for UN peacekeepers seems to me to be unalloyed good news. So, too is the decline of piracy off Somalia, though as Allison observes, it is balanced by an upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. As for the Ethiopian Dam, I think it is too soon to tell whether the concerns of Egypt and Sudan have been permanently allayed, though for the time being, the news is positive. With respect to Madagascar, there is still a runoff election to be held. And the oil refinery to be built in Nigeria by Dangote, “Africa’s richest man,” will cost an estimated U.S.$9 billion. Dangote has found U.S.$3.3 billion so far for the project, which is a good start. Allison’s list is an important contribution, not least because it highlights how much is going on in Africa that fails to receive sustained American media attention. It is also a rebuke to overly simple narratives, whether they be “Africa Rising” or “Africa the Hopeless Continent.”

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The Australia based, Walk Free Foundation on Oct 17 published their first annual Global Slavery Index. The Index ranks 162 countries by how prevalent slavery is in each country and by absolute numbers of the population that is in slavery. They use a comprehensive definition of slavery, including: “slavery, forced labor, or human trafficking. “Slavery” refers to the condition of treating another person as if they were property–something to be bought, sold, traded, or even destroyed. “Forced labor” is a related but not identical concept, referring to work taken without consent, by threats or coercion. “Human trafficking” is another related concept, referring to the process through which people are brought, through deception, threats, or coercion, into slavery, forced labor, or other forms of severe exploitation.” This broad definition aims to encompass three widely ratified and recognized international treaties: the Slavery Convention, the Forced Labor Convention, and the Trafficking Protocol. Under this umbrella definition, Mauritania ranks highest on the prevalence of slavery in any country. Fully 25 percent of the population is deemed to be enslaved. The nine other nations with the highest prevalence are: Haiti, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Moldova, Benin, the Ivory Coast, the Gambia, and Gabon. Half of the ten countries with the highest prevalence of slavery worldwide are African. Walk Free also ranks countries by the absolute number of people in slavery. The ten countries with the most slaves are: India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, Thailand, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Together these countries account for 76 percent of the 29.8 million people in slavery worldwide. Countries with the lowest prevalence of slavery are: Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Iceland. The United States ranks 134, with 57,000-63,000 enslaved people. Mauritius, with an Index rank of 143, has the least slavery in sub-Saharan Africa, Swaziland ranks 126, Angola ranks 116, South Africa ranks 115, Madagascar ranks 112, and Kenya ranks 102. The Index uses pre-existing data. Some of which were collected by individual countries and by Kevin Bales at Free the Slaves. This is the first time however, that the data were collected together into a single report to provide a global overview of modern slavery. Walk Free was founded in May 2012 by Andrew and Nicola Forrest. The aims of the foundation include: identifying countries and industries most responsible for modern slavery; identifying and implement interventions in those countries and industries that will have the greatest impact on modern slavery; and to critically assess the impact of these interventions. They believe that slavery can be, finally, eliminated with broad grassroots public support, legislative action, and socially responsible corporate policy.