• Afghanistan
    Saudi Arabia and the Future of Afghanistan
    U.S. experts say any new approach to bringing stability to Afghanistan must be regional in scope. Saudi Arabia, with historic ties to the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns, could hold a principle seat at the table.  
  • Iraq
    The Trouble with the U.S.-Iraq Pact; Saudis Broker Taliban-Karzai Talks
    F. Gregory Gause III, a leading expert on Iraq and Saudi Arabia, says a lack of leadership among Iraq’s Shiite politicians is holding up approval of a U.S.-Iraqi security pact. He also talks about new Saudi efforts to engage the Taliban in a peace parley.  
  • Political History and Theory
    Thicker Than Oil
    In this book, CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Rachel Bronson presents the first full history of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, revealing why the alliance was formed and what we stand to lose if it collapses. Teaching notes by the author.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Economic and Political Development Trip Report
    Overview In February, Tamara Cofman Wittes and Isobel Coleman met with business leaders, academics, journalists, and civic activists in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Among Wittes and Coleman's key findings are that many Saudis welcomed the emergence of a more open atmosphere, pointing to King Abdullah's ascension to the throne, dynamism in neighboring Gulf states, and a new "post-post-9/11" environment as key catalysts for the change. Yet, there was frustration at the unpredictability and arbitrariness of the newly expanded social and political space. The next U.S. administration may have a new, but narrow, window of opportunity to reintroduce itself to Saudi Arabia. Many Saudis argued for the creation of a deeper, multi-dimensional relationship between both countries that engages civil society, not just the government and business sectors.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Gulf Trip Report
    Overview In February, Martin Indyk and Richard Haass engaged leading Gulf policymakers in detailed conversations about what they are looking for from a new American president. While all those with whom they spoke were fascinated by the American presidential primary elections and seem to be following the results closely, few have yet focused on the possibility that a significant change in U.S. foreign policy might result from a new administration in Washington. There was also a significant disconnect between leaders and publics: The leaders are focused on how the next administration will deal with complex regional security challenge posed by Iran, whereas the publics are hoping that a new president will resolve the Palestinian issue and press authoritarian governments to be more open, transparent and accountable.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Gause: U.S. Trying to Soften Saudi Hard Line toward Maliki Government
    F. Gregory Gause, a leading Saudi Arabia expert, says the U.S. plan to sell some $20 billion in sophisticated military hardware to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states is part of a concerted effort in Washington to get the Saudis to ease their hard line toward the Iraqi government.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Gause: Saudis Aim to Roll Back Iranian Influence in Region
    F. Gregory Gause III, a leading Saudi Arabia expert, says the intensified Saudi diplomacy of recent weeks has been largely aimed at containing Iranian influence in the Middle East.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Thicker than Oil America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia
    Podcast
    In Thicker than Oil, the first full history of the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, Council Senior Fellow Rachel Bronson reveals why the partnership became so intimate and how the countries’ shared interests sowed the seeds of today’s most pressing problem—Islamic radicalism. Join her as she discusses what we stand to lose if the partnership collapses and suggests ways to steer its future course. **Please note special time** 5:45 - 6:00 p.m. Registration 6:00 - 7:00 p.m. Meeting 7:00 - 7:30 p.m. Reception and book signing
  • Saudi Arabia
    Bronson: Saudis ‘Deeply Concerned’ Over Iran’s Nuclear Program
    Rachel Bronson, CFR’s top Middle East expert and author of a new book on Saudi-American relations, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership With Saudi Arabia, says that she does not expect Saudi-American relations to approach the closeness of the Cold War years, when the two countries were allied against the spread of Communism. “We should expect it to be a rockier road, although I do expect the relationship to muddle through,” says Bronson, a senior fellow and director of Middle East and Gulf Studies at CFR.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Thicker Than Oil
    Read an excerpt of Thicker Than Oil. For fifty-five years, the United States and Saudi Arabia were solid partners. Then came the 9/11 attacks, which sorely tested that relationship. In Thicker Than Oil, Rachel Bronson reveals why the partnership became so intimate and how the countries' shared interests sowed the seeds of today's most pressing problem—Islamic radicalism. Drawing on a wide range of archival material, declassified documents, and interviews with leading Saudi and American officials, Bronson chronicles a history of close, and always controversial, contacts. She argues that contrary to popular belief, the relationship was never simply about "oil for security." Saudi Arabia's geographic location and religiously motivated foreign policy figured prominently in American efforts to defeat "godless communism." From Africa to Afghanistan, Egypt to Nicaragua, the two worked to beat back Soviet expansion. But decisions made for hardheaded Cold War purposes left behind a legacy that today enflames the Middle East. In this landmark work, Bronson exposes the political calculations that drove this secretive relationship. Her lively narrative is interwoven with colorful stories of diplomatic adventures and misadventures—including details of high-level back-channel conversations, awkward cross-cultural encounters, and a bizarre American request for the Saudi government to subsidize Polish pork exports, a demand the U.S. Ambassador refused to deliver. Looking forward, she outlines the challenges confronting the relationship. The Saudi government faces a zealous internal opposition bent on America's and Saudi Arabia's destruction. Yet from the perspective of both countries, the status quo is clearly unsustainable. This book shows how this crucial relationship evolved, and suggests ways to chart its future course. A Council on Foreign Relations Book
  • Peacekeeping
    A Conversation with Prince Turki al-Faisal
    Play
    Watch Prince Turki al-Faisal talk about the Saudi-U.S. relationship and about the global security challenges that they both face.
  • Saudi Arabia
    IMF ignores exchange rate surveillance …
    For Saudi Arabia. Just how is the continuation of Saudi Arabia's dollar peg consistent with the IMF's long-term expectations for oil prices ($40-55 a barrel?) and the dollar (tend to depreciate over time)?   And why does it make sense for a country with a very large current account surplus to continue to peg to currency of a country with a large current account deficit through 2010? From the IMF Article IV, with emphasis added. Directors supported the authorities' prudent conduct of monetary policy, which also entails increasing domestic interest rates in line with international developments in the interest rate structure. This policy is consistent with the exchange rate peg, and has contributed to Saudi Arabia's remarkable degree of price stability. Directors endorsed the authorities' decision to keep the current pegged exchange rate regime unchanged in the period leading to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monetary union in 2010. I can see why the G-7 is calling for the IMF to take a bit more active role in exchange rate surveillance.  That doesn't mean endorsing the current exchange rate policy of every country. I know the Saudis are not terribly transparent, but one last thing:  Shouldn't the IMF be able to do better than just putting up an end-of-2004 forecasts for Saudi Arabia's fiscal and current account surpluses?  We are almost in 2006 now.  Hint - try $100 billion for the 2005 current account surplus.
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Testimony before the Congressional Anti-Terrorist Finance Task Force
    Acting Majority Leader Blunt, Congresswoman Kelly, Congresswoman Maloney, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about Saudi Arabia’s role in terrorist financing. As you may know I have just completed a manuscript, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia,which chronicles the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship from 1945 to the present. The subject of this hearing is therefore of particular interest to me. Although the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Corporation of New York made my research possible, I bear sole responsibility for my remarks. What I will suggest to you today is that Saudi Arabia has made significant strides in reducing its role in terrorist financing and the financing of radical groups. I will then identify two specific areas where their efforts leave room for improvement and where the United States should continue to focus its attention. I will then outline the role that Congress can usefully play in this process. I will conclude by sketching future trends that may undermine current Saudi efforts. Since the May 2003 simultaneous bombings in Riyadh, the Saudi royal family has acknowledged that it is directly threatened by radical terrorist cells. Some members of the royal family realized this earlier. But it was not until the 2003 attacks that others, including the very powerful Interior Minister Prince Naif, fully recognized the threat that such cells posed to the regime itself and the futility of pursuing a strategy based on accommodation. Since 2003, the kingdom has taken important strides towards cracking down on homegrown terrorist cells and reducing the flow of funds towards radical groups both inside and outside the kingdom. These measures include: Stripping charity boxes from malls and mosques, something one former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia has likened to banning the collection plate at Sunday mass. Shutting down or reorganizing Saudi domestic charities to improve transparency and facilitate governmental oversight. In 2004, American officials estimated that Saudi domestic charitable giving increased 300%, a fact attributable in part to a redirection of international donations. Instituting a battery of new laws to better comply with international standards. In July 2004 the Financial Action Task Force, an OECD organization devoted to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, judged that the kingdom was “compliant or largely compliant” with international standards in almost every indicator of effectiveness. Acknowledging the problem at the highest level. Perhaps the most important development in Saudi Arabia’s overall ability to address the problem of domestic terrorism has been Abdullah’s ascension from Crown Prince to King after the passing of King Fahd in August 2005. Although he is no Jeffersonian democrat, and does not claim to be, King Abdullah appears well aware that economic, political, and social reform is necessary, if only to further secure the rule of his family. Still, there are groups and individuals that continue to support financially radical cells abroad. One disconcerting observation is that despite increased barriers for moving money, Saudi funds continue to find their way to causes at odds with U.S. interests. For example, in his July 2005 testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Under Secretary of the Treasury Stuart Levey testified that “even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq.” Of particular concern is Saudi Arabia’s decision to designate wealthy global Islamic institutions based in the kingdom—such as the Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the International Islamic Relief Organization—as “multilateral organizations,” rather than charities. The Kingdom is slowly standing up a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to addresses this problem. But the FIU is not yet functioning and therefore has not extended its influence over these institutions. Until this definitional loophole is closed, Americans will have every reason to believe that the kingdom is not doing all that it can to prevent the flow of funds from leaving its borders. Another major challenge, in addition to the one of reigning in multilateral organizations, is the persistence of Islamic Affairs Departments that continue to operate within Saudi embassies abroad. These departments are proselytizing agencies and are hardly consistent with normal definitions of diplomatic offices. Although Riyadh has closed these departments in the United States and Germany, they continue to operate and proselytize elsewhere. This is not in America’s interests and Washington should push for them to be closed down. Members of this committee should be under no illusions that reining in multilateral institutions and closing Islamic Affairs Departments will be an easy task for Saudi decision makers. Such institutions were built over decades and often served a political purpose such as “fighting godless communism” or staunching the influence of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which the United States supported. Their history is deep and uprooting such institutions will be politically costly. Still it is vital that the U.S. government work with the Saudi government to ensure progress on these fronts. And it is here that I commend the efforts of this task force. This task force’s work keeps the spotlight on the issue of terrorist financing and makes it clear to Riyadh that this issue is of utmost importance not only to the administration, but the American people as well. What is less helpful is the vitriolic anti-Saudi bashing that continues to permeate the American political debate. For example, a letter circulated among congressmen and women in May 2005 calling Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization “premature” was particularly short-sighted, as WTO accession will help those in the kingdom who tend to be the strongest supporters of the United States. Legislation to withhold from the Saudis a paltry $25,000 for military training also poorly serves U.S. interests as the lack of that money would keep the United States Military from working with counterparts in the kingdom who ultimately will be responsible for fighting terror at home and abroad. Not only are such initiatives poorly thought through, but they are counter- productive. While these measures may play well with constituents back home, they have the potential to distract the White House from the very important issue of terrorist financing. The result has tended to be a U.S. complacency—a continuation of the status quo—toward the kingdom, rather than a focused effort to redefine this troubled relationship. Notwithstanding the problems I outlined above, it is important to reiterate that since the May 2003 bombings, the general trend lines regarding Saudi Arabia’s willingness to track and deter finances leaving the kingdom have been moving in the right direction. Coming problems could undue them. First, high oil prices provide a new set of opportunities and challenges. On the positive side, Saudi Arabia’s internal security budget topped $7 billion in 2003 as a result of increased profits. In 2004 this budget grew to an estimated $8 - $8.5 billion, with a virtually open-ended capability to spend on any internal security purpose. On the negative side, the fact that there is now more money in the system increases the likelihood that it will leak across borders. Vigilance by both American and Saudi leaders is necessary. Instability in Iraq will also provide reasons for some in the kingdom to fund questionable people and causes. Inside Saudi Arabia there is fear of the rising influence of Iraq’s Shi’a population and its influence over Shi’a populations across the region. Although the Saudi government appears less agitated about a Shi’a government in Iraq than a radical Shi’a government in Iraq inspired by Iran, concern about the situation on Saudi Arabia’s border rises to the highest political levels. At the Council on Foreign Relations in September 2005, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal stated that the United States and Saudi Arabia “fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason.” A fear of rising Shi’a power in Iraq will undoubtedly inspire some in the kingdom to look for Sunni regional allies. One senior Pakistani official mentioned in an off-the-record conversation his fears that this was already occurring as he perceived increased Saudi funding to particularly worrisome mosques and madrassas. There are few political issues more important than Saudi Arabia’s role in terrorist financing, and the financing of extremism. The good news is that the kingdom, independently and in cooperation with the United States, has made great strides toward dealing with the problem. Still, success in this effort requires constant attention, a fact to which this committee clearly subscribes.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Bronson: King Abdullah’s Ascension Seen as Important ‘Plus’ by Washington
    Rachel Bronson, the Council’s top expert on Saudi Arabia, says the death of King Fahd and the ascension of Crown Prince Abdullah to the throne will be welcomed by both Saudi society and the United States. Bronson—whose book on the history of U.S.-Saudi relations, Thicker than Oil, is due out next Spring—says Abdullah has been helpful to the United States in the war against terrorism, and within the constraints of Saudi society, has been in the forefront of domestic reforms.“As crown prince, Abdullah showed himself to be more forward-leaning on reform than some of his brothers. Not as much, in some ways, as [King] Fahd was, but more so than the others,” she says.Bronson, a Council senior fellow and director of its Middle East and Gulf Studies program, was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on August 1, 2005.King Fahd of Saudi Arabia died early this morning after a decade-long illness. Crown Prince Abdullah, who’s been running the government, was named the new king. Does this mean much in terms of domestic Saudi affairs? And what does this mean for U.S.-Saudi relations?It means more for Saudi domestic politics than it does for the Kingdom’s foreign policy.  King Abdullah, as you mentioned, has been running the Kingdom basically since 1995 when King Fahd had his first stroke. World leaders have dealt with him and know him, and I don’t expect too many changes. He and President Bush had a good meeting in April at Crawford, and I would expect relatively smooth relations at the most senior levels between Saudi Arabia and the United States over the coming years.Domestically, being king may give Abdullah more weight in pushing through certain aspects of social and political reform. He will still face constraints from within the royal family, but the change of title does make him more powerful.  In terms of reform, which is high on President Bush’s agenda, the shift to Abdullah is a welcomed change. At home, Abdullah is viewed as more pious and less corrupt than his half brothers. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, corruption was a rallying point against King Fahd. Osama bin Laden’s criticism of the House of Saud’s corruption resonated with many inside the Kingdom. Crown Prince Abdullah has been a steadying hand, trying to root out some of the corruption.Clearly, Crown Prince Abdullah has been in charge through the very difficult years since the September 11 attacks. He also came forth with a peace plan for Arabs and Israelis in 2001 which was approved by the Arab League. Is he going to remain interested in foreign affairs? Abdullah is known to be more focused on regional politics than King Fahd, who was more interested in global politics. This is in part due to different priorities, but also in part due to the different periods in which they ruled. When King Fahd was actively ruling, Saudi Arabia was heavily involved in trying to hedge Soviet, and often Libyan, expansion in Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Saudi money and political capital were tied up in Africa and Central Asia. In Central America—you may remember they were involved in funding—That’s right, the Saudis helped fund the Contras in Nicaragua.Yes, so they were very global. Crown Prince Abdullah was always focused more on the region: the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict. So I think you may see a more parochial view—if you consider the region parochial—which, at this moment, given a lot of the problems that the region is facing, is probably very useful. Abdullah did float the Abdullah Plan in February 2002.  Interestingly, this was a follow-up on the Fahd Plan, which Abdullah defended back in the early 1980s Abdullah. Still, Fahd wanted to get beyond the Arab-Israeli crisis, whereas I don’t think Abdullah believes that is possible.Returning to the previous question, I don’t think yesterday’s change in leadership will mean much in terms of changing foreign policies, but over the past ten years since Abdullah has taken over, you have seen an increased attention to local issues, with less involvement in far away adventures.On Iraq, the only thing you hear on the subject of Saudi-Iraq relations is that a lot of the insurgents are coming from Saudi Arabia. Do you think the Saudis might help the Iraqi government out?I don’t think we’re going to see much of a change because, again, Abdullah has been basically running the show since 1995—these decisions around Iraq are largely his. But what you are seeing is very good cooperation with the United States on the tactical war on terror, and a constant dialogue about these Saudis showing up in Iraq. While the Americans are concerned with the Saudis flowing into Iraq, the Saudis are as concerned with terrorists and arms flowing out of Iraq. I think you’re going to see continuing working relations with the United States on this issue. Tied to Abdullah becoming king, is Turki al-Faisal [the king’s nephew and the former head of Saudi Intelligence] becoming the ambassador to the United States. I think that’s a clear indication of the seriousness with which the Saudis are approaching this fight on terror and their desire to work closely with the Americans.That was my next question. Two weeks ago, it was quietly announced that Turki al-Faisal was chosen to replace Prince Bandar [bin Sultan], who’s been there for years. What’s the significance of that?Prince Bandar became Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States in 1983. Turki al-Faisal is a controversial figure, although the right choice. He knows the bad guys from Afghanistan, he supported many of them. He knew bin Laden personally. He was the director of Saudi Arabia’s general intelligence from 1997 to 2001. He’s got dirt on his hands, but he’s also very Western-leaning and was one of the Saudis who saw the trouble the religious radicals could cause the Kingdom and the United States long before many of his countrymen. And so while his past makes him controversial, it also makes him potentially very effective. Nobody on this planet knows these guys better than Turki al-Faisal.He also brings something else. When he became ambassador to the United Kingdom, it was sort of a marginal post, certainly less important than being the chief of intelligence. But he now brings to Washington a fairly good understanding of the second generation of terrorists, the ones born or bred in Europe, often hailing from London. While in England, he was active in trying to “convert” some of the more rabid clerics. He now brings this knowledge to Washington. On the war on terror, which is clearly a major issue for the Bush administration, I think his appointment is a good sign. It also suggests Abdullah is committed to this war, and interestingly, that he’s trying to put his own guys into important positions.On reform—another big issue for the Bush administration—Abdullah as king is also a good sign. As Crown Prince, Abdullah showed himself to be more forward-leaning on reform than some of his brothers. Not as much, in some ways, as Fahd was, but more so than the others. And understanding the need for a little bit more openness, he’s instituted the national dialogues—which have been very important. Elections have come under him. The mutaween, the Saudi religious police, have been reigned in, although it seems they’re getting more power again. I think in terms of reform, Washington is probably breathing a sigh of relief he’s finally king and that he’ll have a little more heft to bring to his fights with his brothers in trying to move in that direction.Now, who are his key brothers who are often seen as rivals? There are a lot of brothers—the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdel Aziz, had forty-three sons. While I think the personalities matter, we should see splits in the royal family as reflective of splits in the Saudi population more generally. The brothers of immediate importance include Prince Sultan, the minister of defense and aviation, who has just been named Crown Prince. There’s Prince Nayef, who’s the interior minister and younger than him in age, and there’s Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh. [Princeton assistant professor of Near Eastern Studies] Michael Doran characterized the rivalry within the royal family in his Foreign Affairs piece as “Nayef vs. Abdullah.” [The article, The Saudi Paradox, ran in the January/February 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs]. And while that’s an over-simplification, it is a useful distinction. Crown Prince Abdullah, now King Abdullah, is trying to move this society toward a little bit more openness, a little bit more tolerance, and a little bit more engagement with the outside world slightly faster than it seems Nayef, who has been much more conservative, would prefer. Nayef is the one who clamped down on women driving in the 1990s; he’s the one who hauled in the human-rights activists who are now languishing in jail, and the one ultimately responsible for the mutaween. Whenever there’s a break on reform, the breaks are usually traced back to Prince Nayef.Within Saudi Arabia, everyone knew the king was incapacitated for a decade, so I suppose there’s no great surprise—or jubilation, for that matter—at the news of his death.There’s no great surprise and it’s been a slow transition. What we have missed here in the States is the fact that Saudi Arabia has actually been going through a major—though underreported—political crisis for the last ten years. You have a monarchy with out a monarch, a highly dysfunctional political entity.So for the United States, in summary, it’s a plus.Yes, I think it’s a plus and it couldn’t have come soon enough.What will everyone be watching for?The decision that everyone should be watching, and the one that will become King Abdullah’s legacy, is who he chooses to succeed Crown Prince Sultan [the current defense minister]. First, because there’s a chance Sultan may not outlast Abdullah, but also because it will be hard, though not impossible, to remove anyone that Abdullah designates. Fahd chose Abdullah to succeed him and Sultan to succeed Abdullah. Now Abdullah has a chance to strongly suggest who should follow Sultan– an extremely important decision.So he did not designate his other brother, Nayef?No, not yet. He could. But that’s going to be an interesting battle, and if they’re going to pass over Nayef, Nayef will have enormous powers in getting somebody else into key positions. Prince Salman is also waiting in the wings and is someone that Washington probably could work with. So his legacy will not only be what he does as king, but whether he can assure who comes after Prince Sultan, which every king before him has been able to do.What are the most important things on the current U.S. agenda with Saudi Arabia?I think there are three things the United States wants from Saudi Arabia. It wants seriousness of purpose in the war on terror, including continued monitoring and reigning in of terrorist financing. The Saudis have shown some improvement on this, certainly since September 11, but they still have a way to go. As part of the fight against terrorism, Washington also wants Saudi Arabia to stabilize its policies toward Iraq, and tamp down on the religious excesses within Saudi society and its proselytizing, which has been allowed to flourish since the early 1980s.Secondly, the United States would like to see some movement toward political and social reform. Abdullah is a good king for that.The third issue is oil. At the moment, oil prices are clearly higher than the United States would like, but Saudi Arabia, in general, is not seen as the main culprit of that. There are a number of contributing factors, including voracious demand from India and China. So oil will always be important to American-Saudi conversations, but it’s an area where we have shared interests in bringing the price down a little bit, and Saudi Arabia is not viewed as the key to the current crisis.
  • Saudi Arabia
    Rachel Bronson on President Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz - The Meeting at Great Bitter Lake
    Sixty years ago Allied forces were closing in on Nazi Germany and victory in Europe was just months away. For a week in early February, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss the shape of post-war Europe. The summit ended on February 11, 1945 and FDR departed for a rendezvous at the Great Bitter Lake, a waypoint along the Suez Canal in Egypt, with Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud. The King, known as Ibn Saud, sailed from Jeddah aboard an American warship to the meeting with FDR. The two leaders’ focus was shaping the future relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.Rachel Bronson, Director of Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book, Thicker than Oil: Ameica’s Uneasy Relationship with Saudi Arabia, recently spoke with SUSRIS about the meeting. In this conversation she provided the historical context of the meeting and perspective on the relationship that resulted from FDR’s and Ibn Saud’s rendezvous at Great Bitter Lake.Read the online interview.