Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia

  • Saudi Arabia
    Rachel Bronson on U.S.-Saudi Relations and Reforms
    Doctor Bronson talked with SUSRIS in February on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of FDR’s and Ibn Saud’s meeting, sharing her insights on that historic event. Her on-line discussion with the Washington Post was also featured on SUSRIS last July.SUSRIS talked with Doctor Bronson by telephone from her office in New York on May 18, 2005.Interview
    Interview with Rachel Bronson June 1, 2005
  • Saudi Arabia
    SAUDI ARABIA: U.S. Relations
    This publication is now archived. What is the current state of U.S.-Saudi relations?Very strained. Because of mutual mistrust and suspicion, created by the war on terror and intensified by a recent congressional report that allegedly raised questions about Saudi links to extremists, "this is the worst things have been [between the two countries] since the oil embargos of the ’70s," says F. Gregory Gause III, director of the Middle East Studies Program at the University of Vermont. Why are relations so strained?Many Americans don’t believe Saudi Arabia is on the same side as the United States, says Rachel Bronson, director of Middle East andGulf Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Most Americans and many members of Congress, she says, believe that Saudi Arabia is not doing enough to curb terrorist financing and Islamic extremism at home and--in particular--abroad. "There’s a feeling that [the Saudis aren’t] stepping up," she says. Reported links between Saudi Arabian government officials and terrorist financing in the congressional report on 9/11 have exacerbated tensions. How does it look from the Saudi side?Some experts say that average Saudis are resentful and suspicious of the United States. From their point of view, Saudi Arabia has made a concerted effort to unearth local al Qaeda cells and took significant risks in the first and second Gulf wars by making staging areas and military bases available to U.S. forces. The widespread perception, experts say, is that Saudis are being rewarded for their pains by a lackluster U.S. effort on the foreign policy issue they care most about, peace between Israel and Palestine. What’s at stake?The United States "can’t do without Saudi Arabia," says Robert Baer, author of "Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude." "It’s crucial to our national interests," says Baer, a former CIA field officer and a harsh critic of the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia controls 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves and is one of the largest suppliers of crude oil to the United States, providing nearly 10 percent of total U.S. needs. Baer says Saudi Arabia, over the last 30 years, has adjusted production to maintain stable prices and sold oil to the United States on favorable terms in exchange for U.S. military protection. U.S. troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Their presence was a contentious issue--Osama bin Laden was infuriated by "infidels" in Islam’s birthplace--and most of the troops are being shifted to a base in Qatar. What can be done to repair relations?Many experts say that Saudi Arabia must be more forthcoming and transparent about sharing information with the United States in the fight against terrorism and monitoring terrorist funding. "In Saudi Arabia, it’s not clear what the distinction is between private and public funding," says Bronson, a situation that casts doubt on the royal family, which controls most of the country’s money. "Do they know where their money is going?" she asks. "Do they care?" Bronson says the United States must carefully rethink its relationship with Saudi Arabia and question if the parameters of the old alliance continue to be useful. "During the Cold War, the relationship had utility: We fought communism together, in the Middle East, in Central America, everywhere," she says. "Now, it’s not clear that we have the same interests, friends, or enemies. Driving this relationship on autopilot will not work. When the Cold War ended, the rules of the game changed." What was the bilateral relationship based on in the past?Traditionally, country-to-country relations were conducted at senior levels and aimed at protecting national interests, says Gause--oil for the United States and military guarantees for Saudi Arabia. But there is no popular constituency for the relationship in either country, and lately domestic groups--neoconservatives and the religious right in the United States, fundamentalist clerics in Saudi Arabia--are agitating against the traditional relationship. What anti-terror steps has Saudi Arabia taken?Many Americans were disappointed by the initial Saudi reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks. Saudi officials insisted that the hijackers, 15 of 19 of whom were Saudi nationals, were isolated malcontents. The interior minister, Prince Nayaf, had denied that al Qaeda existed in Saudi Arabia. His stance shifted somewhat after the May 12, 2003, terror attacks in Riyadh that killed 34 people, including 8 Americans, and wounded more than 200 others. Since then, Saudi Arabia has moved much more aggressively against internal terror groups, setting up nationwide checkpoints and arresting hundreds of suspects in raids. A raid in Riyadh on August 12 resulted in five arrests after a gun battle in which three police officers were killed. Experts point out that the Saudi royal family is as much a target for al Qaeda as is the United States and it has an incentive to cooperate fully with the U.S.-led war on terror. How much of the current tension is due to the congressional report on 9/11?Quite a lot. Twenty-eight pages of the 858-page report, released on July 24, were blacked out. Some who have read the classified pages say they link Saudi government officials and members of the royal family to the financing of terrorist groups; others say the alleged links are based on circumstantial evidence only. Congressional leaders have been increasingly vocal in their demands that the report be declassified. "There is considerable concern here in the Congress about Saudi Arabia being shielded for foreign policy purposes," Senator Arlen Specter, R-Penn., told The New York Times on July 31. Have Saudis funded terror networks?In accordance with the Muslim custom of donating to the needy, wealthy Saudis routinely give money to Islamic charities and causes. Some of these funds, it has been alleged, directly or indirectly support terrorist activity. In November 2002 it was revealed that part of a charitable donation made by Princess Haifa al-Faisal, the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, made its way to Omar al-Bayoumi, a friend of two of the 9/11 hijackers. How has Saudi Arabia reacted to the 9/11 report?Saudi officials have pushed for the release of the classified pages, saying they have a right to defend themselves against any accusations. Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, flew to Washington on July 29 to ask President Bush to declassify the pages; Bush refused. The administration contends that making the pages public could jeopardize ongoing terror investigations. Who is Omar al-Bayoumi?A Saudi national who studied in the United States from 1994-2000 on a Saudi government fellowship. He befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, in San Diego in late 1999. According to Newsweek magazine, al-Bayoumi met the two men on the day they arrived, helped them get bank accounts and identity documents, and helped arrange flying lessons for them at flight schools in Florida. He also lent them money for the deposit on their apartment and hosted a party to introduce them to the Arab community. His allowance from the Saudi government allegedly increased substantially after he met the two Qaeda members; U.S. government investigators want to know why. After leaving the United States months before 9/11, al-Bayoumi spent time in Britain and then returned to Saudi Arabia. He was questioned by FBI officials there last week in a joint investigation with Saudi officials. Is Saudi Arabia sponsoring terrorism?On a state level, emphatically not, says Gause. "I’m not convinced that anybody high up in the Saudi government, as a matter of policy, would want to finance hijackers," he says. He says that, for the royal family, supporting Osama bin Laden would be like "slitting your own throat." However, "without increased transparency and accountability, there will always be suspicion," Bronson says. There is widespread public support in Saudi Arabia for much of bin Laden’s anti-Western, anti-Israel rhetoric, and many individuals agree with bin Laden’s criticisms of U.S. power and corruption in the Saudi royal family. But, Gause says, very few Saudis would condone his methods. This is especially true after the May 12 bombings, which brought home to the close-knit Saudi society the bloody reality of terrorism. What domestic political pressures does the Saudi regime face?The Saudi regime has been led by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz since a 1995 stroke debilitated 82-year-old King Fahd. Abdullah is seen as a cautious reformer who has scaled back some of the excesses of the free-spending royal family and introduced more openness into politics. At the same time, the conservative religious establishment has grown more radical and fundamentalist. Recently 1,000 imams around the country were relieved of their posts for preaching incendiary messages and brought to Riyadh for re-education in, among other things, tolerance for non-Muslims.The government has societal forces to deal with as well. The unemployment rate is 25 percent, gross domestic product per head has fallen to about $10,500 last year from $18,000 in the 1980s, and 42.3 percent of the country’s population of 24 million is under 14 years old, according to the U.S. State Department. Societal restrictions on women--they are not allowed to drive or leave home alone--minimize their participation in the workforce; one-third of all workers are foreigners, most of whom send a portion of their pay home as remittances. College-educated Saudis are finding that the social safety net, which all but guaranteed them good jobs with the government, is failing. Young, restless, and unemployed, this group is both a force agitating for change and a ready market for bin Laden’s revolutionary rhetoric.
    Backgrounder February 16, 2005
  • Saudi Arabia
    SAUDI ARABIA: In al-Qaeda’s Sights
    This publication is now archived. Is al-Qaeda now targeting Saudi Arabia?Yes, many experts say. Al-Qaeda attacked U.S. troops stationed in the oil-rich kingdom several times during the 1990s. But the two recent suspected Qaeda attacks on civilians appear to be aimed directly at destabilizing the country. The assaults—a November 8 car bombing that killed at least seventeen and coordinated car bombings on May 12 that killed thirty-four—targeted Riyadh housing complexes occupied largely by Saudis and foreign Arabs. Experts say al-Qaeda’s ultimate target may be Saudi Arabia’s ruling royal family. The terror network aims "to bring down the Saudi government as well as to create fear and spread terror," Richard Armitage, U.S. deputy secretary of state, said after the November 8 bombing. Why does al-Qaeda want to topple the royal family?Saudi-born Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has long called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family to punish it for allowing U.S. military bases in the kingdom. He broke with the monarchy in 1990 over the Gulf War, when the kingdom invited U.S.-led coalition troops onto Saudi soil to its defend oil fields and to prepare to attack Iraq. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the second Iraq war, U.S. troops pulled out of Saudi Arabia. Why is al-Qaeda still targeting the kingdom?For several reasons, experts say. The royal family maintains a close relationship with the United States, which al-Qaeda views as the home of "infidels." Many Saudis see the powerful princes who run the country as corrupt and dissolute. In this view, the royals are leaders of a strict Islamic state who disregard Islam’s dictums by drinking alcohol or "frequenting the casinos of Monte Carlo," says Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former FBI counterterrorism analyst. Al Qaeda regards the regime as "insufficiently Islamic and an unacceptable candidate to be the guardian of Mecca and Medina," Islam’s holiest sites, Levitt says. And, some experts say, the government is breaking its social contract with Saudi citizens, which gives the royal family control over politics in exchange for lifetime benefits financed by Saudi oil. A growing population and shrinking economy make it more difficult for the government to hold up its end of the deal. Why did terrorists target foreign Arab’s housing compounds in the recent attacks?It’s unclear. Some analysts say the attackers hit the lightly guarded sites because of beefed-up security around government and diplomatic buildings. Others say the militants’ goal is to destabilize the regime by threatening the 6 million foreign workers on whom the Saudi economy depends. They want to "undermine the regime, demonstrating that Saudis are incapable of providing security," Levitt says. Other analysts speculate that the attackers may have acted on outdated information—the complex attacked November 8 once housed U.S. employees of The Boeing Company, but few Americans live there now. And, some analysts say, the attack may have been the work of a Qaeda affiliate group that lacks planning and surveillance expertise. Which affiliate groups are suspected of being responsible for the Saudi attacks?Smaller groups not under bin Laden’s direct control, some analysts say. The recent Riyadh bombing doesn’t have the earmarks of a bin Laden-directed attack, Levitt says, because the "inner circle" prefers to spend several years planning a spectacular attack—but "even as the inner circle does that, they train, fund, and applaud such attacks [as the Riyadh bombing] by affiliates." How are these affiliates related to al-Qaeda?After the fall of al-Qaeda’s headquarters in Afghanistan during the 2001-2002 U.S.-led war, the terror group underwent a structural transformation, shifting from a command-and-control formation under bin Laden to a looser organization based on individual Qaeda cells spread throughout the world, according to some experts. It now functions as a global network via technology and affiliated groups, says Magnus Ranstorp, director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. It "thrives on cyberspace" and other technology to communicate, he says, and relies on sympathetic constituent groups to carry out attacks. "Al-Qaeda is as much a movement, an idea, as it is a hierarchical organization," and its followers plan attacks independently of any central organization, Ranstorp says. How much support does al Qaeda have in Saudi Arabia?No one knows. But many experts worry that a large group of young, disaffected Saudis is ripe for recruitment. According to the United Nations, 39 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen. Economic prospects are bleak. In 1980, Saudi gross domestic product was $15,500 per capita, $2,500 more than the comparable U.S. figure. Now, it’s closer to $7,500, almost $25,000 less than the U.S. amount. Job creation has not kept pace with the growing population, and Saudi Arabia’s education system produces many graduates steeped in conservative Islam and ill-equipped to work in a modern, globalized economy. The result: an undercurrent of discontent that al Qaeda feeds upon, Ranstorp says.Not all experts concur. "There is a large number of young and unemployed who are put off by the fact that they have no say in their government whatsoever, but that still does not make them followers or supporters of this sort of violence," says Richard Murphy, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations. He says the latest attacks on Arabs may have diminished support for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: "It may well be that these two bombings have cost al Qaeda more than they’ve gained. It’s very unsettling to the average Saudi." Could al-Qaeda overthrow the royal family?Experts disagree. With 7,000 princes, the royal family is too strong and too deeply embedded in all aspects of Saudi government for al-Qaeda to threaten it, Murphy says. And, he says, the princes see the country as their family’s creation and will not easily give it up. Others say the regime is vulnerable. Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers are "now locked in confrontation with the Saudi regime," in a clash that is "threatening the stability of the House of Saud," Ranstorp says. He says it could end in three ways—the regime could successfully defend itself and remain in power, civil war could break out between different factions within the country, or a new contender who espouses extreme Islam could emerge, perhaps from within the royal family, and take over. What has Saudi Arabia done to crack down on terror?The May 12 Riyadh bombings were a wake-up call, most experts say. Since then, the government has stepped up surveillance of suspected terrorists and conducted a series of raids, uncovering loads of arms caches and arresting more than six hundred suspected militants. The royal family has made efforts to quiet advocates of extremism in mosques and the media and ordered the deletion of passages in school textbooks that criticized non-Muslims. The Saudi government recently announced that the first elections, for municipal councils, would occur within a year, and Crown Prince Abdullah allowed meetings of his consultative council to be televised. Still, some experts say the regime is not doing enough, and Saudi Arabia has been blamed for financing terrorism while simultaneously fighting it. Does Saudi Arabia finance terrorism?A large proportion of the funds that support al-Qaeda and other terror groups comes from within Saudi Arabia, many experts say, though not directly from Saudi leaders. "For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda; and for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem," a Council on Foreign Relations independent task force report said. "Saudis fund al-Qaeda and are being attacked by al-Qaeda. They seem mutually exclusive but they’re not," Levitt says. Much of the Saudi money may have been funneled to terrorism unknowingly, according to experts, because terror groups collect funds under the guise of Islamic charities and schools. The government agreed to cooperate with FBI and Internal Revenue Service investigations of Saudi terror funding, but Levitt says the U.S. investigators have not received access to all the documents they need. What more can it do to fight terrorism?The regime can take several important steps, experts say. These include moving aggressively to investigate and curb terrorist financing and monitor Saudi charities; reforming the education system so that Saudis graduate with more than a degree in Islamic law and are equipped to enter the global economy; and cooperating with foreign governments in the U.S.-led war on terror. The government must also continue to pursue political reforms and promote the moderate voice of Islam within the kingdom, experts say.
    Backgrounder by Claire Miller February 7, 2005
  • Saudi Arabia
    SAUDI ARABIA: Withdrawl of U.S. Forces
    This publication is now archived. Will the departure of American forces improve U.S.-Saudi relations?It should. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia had indicated even before the war in Iraq ended that it would benefit both sides if U.S. forces--mostly Air Force personnel--left the country when the threat from Saddam Hussein had ended. Richard Murphy, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, told The New York Times: "Our presence has become more of a burden than a benefit." Why was it a burden for the Saudis?Antagonism toward the seemingly prolonged U.S. presence fed resentment and anger toward the kingdom’s authoritarian government and fueled Islamic extremism. One of the chief grievances of Saudi-born Osama bin Laden was that "infidel" troops from the United States were present in Saudi Arabia, which contains Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina. How long have U.S. forces been in Saudi Arabia?The United States has operated a small military-training mission in Saudi Arabia since the 1950s. During the Cold War, Washington and the Saudi royal family expanded their close ties. The Saudis, who control about 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves, were a source of petroleum, and the United States gave the kingdom security and military assistance. When did the number of U.S. forces increase?The U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia reached its height during the 1991 Gulf War, when some 550,000 coalition troops were based in the Saudi desert. Working with the Saudi military, they had two primary tasks: to protect Saudi oil fields from Iraqi troops who were already occupying Kuwait across the border, and to use Saudi soil as the launching pad for driving Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. U.S., Saudi, and other coalition air forces used bases in Saudi Arabia for the air campaign against Iraq. What happened after the first Gulf War?President George H.W. Bush promised Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd that the troops would withdraw once the mission was over, but the war to free Kuwait became a campaign to contain Saddam. About 5,000 U.S. combat troops and air crews enforced the southern Iraqi "no-fly" zone--where Iraqi aircraft were banned--and helped defend Saudi Arabia from at least seven Saudi military bases. Did the Saudis participate in the 2003 Iraq war?No Saudi troops fought. And after months of prewar uncertainty, the Saudi government granted U.S. access to some of its military facilities. The number of U.S. forces in the kingdom doubled to 10,000, and the coalition air attacks were coordinated by U.S. commanders in the Prince Sultan airbase south of Riyadh, the capital. The Saudis granted over-flight rights to U.S. planes and missiles. And Saudi Arabia also reportedly provided U.S. Special Operations Forces secret staging grounds from which they mounted assaults into western Iraq. In another important move, the Saudis used their vast oil reserves to keep the world oil market stable during the war. The close cooperation was reported in the American press. But Saudi leaders, who faced strong domestic opposition to the war, repeatedly denied that they were allowing attacks from Saudi soil. Where in the region will U.S. troops now be based?Some 400 to 500 troops will remain in Saudi Arabia as part of the longstanding U.S. training mission with the Saudi Arabia National Guard. The air operations center will move to the $1 billion Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which was built in 1996 at Qatar’s expense. The tiny nation, population 750,000, reportedly views the United States as its primary protector in the region. With the threat of Iraq gone, Washington is repositioning other forces in the region as well. Aircraft patrolling the northern no-fly zone from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, for example, have already been recalled to their home bases. What problems did U.S. troops encounter in Saudi Arabia?The main problem was terrorism. Terrorists attacked U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia twice in the 1990s. In 1995, a car bomb in the capital, Riyadh, killed seven people, including five U.S. servicemen. In June 1996, 19 U.S servicemen were killed and about 400 people wounded when a bomb exploded at a U.S. military residence called Khobar Towers near Dhahran, a major port on the Persian Gulf. U.S. troops were then moved to an isolated base in the Saudi desert. Even so, their presence was a flashpoint for domestic critics and generated political problems for Saudi rulers.Another problem was that the Saudis placed increasing restrictions on U.S. forces operating on their soil, limiting, for example, their ability to fly attack missions from Saudi airbases. Some U.S. voices called for a "strategic alternative to Saudi Arabia;" in The Washington Post, a senior Saudi official replied that the United States had "overstayed its welcome."A third problem was cultural. Some habits and practices of the young Americans scandalized religious Saudis; for their part, some U.S. troops resented the restrictions of a conservative Islamic monarchy where alcohol is banned and women’s public role is severely limited. Will the departure of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia reduce terrorism?Many experts don’t think so. The presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil was one of bin Laden’s key gripes; now that they are leaving, anti-American extremism could conceivably diminish. But some terror experts say the issue of U.S. troops was symptomatic of a much deeper global battle for influence being waged by bin Laden and other fundamental Islamic terrorists. Matthew Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that "al-Qaeda’s jihad against the West is much larger than just the situation in Saudi Arabia." Why does the United States maintain close ties with Saudi Arabia?Primarily because of oil. Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves, by far the largest of any nation, give it considerable control over the world oil market. The United States, the world’s largest consumer of oil, relies on Saudi Arabia for about 20 percent of total U.S. crude-oil imports and 10 percent of U.S. oil consumption. Trade between the two countries grew from $56.2 million in 1950 to $19.3 billion in 2000. What do the Saudi people think of the U.S.-Saudi relationship?Although many sons and daughters of Saudi elite have studied and worked in the United States, there has been a sharp swing of negative feelings toward the United States in recent years. A recent poll by Zogby International showed that 97 percent of Saudis view the United States in a negative light, leading some commentators to say that Saudi-American relations have hit their lowest point in decades. A Gallup poll placed the number closer to 65 percent. Underlying this attitude, experts say, is widespread anger over U.S. support for Israel, U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian government, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. What do Americans think of Saudi Arabia?Polls show that Americans’ positive attitudes toward Saudi Arabia dropped dramatically after Sept. 11 because 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. In early 2001, 56 percent of Americans gave Saudi Arabia a favorable rating, according to a Zogby International poll. By December 2001, that number had fallen to 24 percent. Attitudes had shifted slightly by early 2003, to 35 percent of Americans saying they viewed the kingdom in a positive light.
    Backgrounder by Sharon Otterman February 7, 2005
  • Palestinian Territories
    Bronson: Success in Iraq an Open Question
    Conditions in Iraq remain “very unpredictable, very dangerous,” says Rachel Bronson, Olin Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East and Gulf Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. That’s the result, she says, of the Bush administration’s failure to win international backing for the war. But she also chides the Europeans— and the French in particular— for blocking efforts to forge a postwar consensus.On other Middle East issues, she urges the United States to make a clear declaration of its vision for peace between Palestinians and Israelis and says that a critical reconsideration of U.S.-Saudi relations is long overdue.Bronson was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on September 18, 2003.In our last interview, shortly before the end of the fighting in Iraq, you described the results of the Bush administration’s efforts to win Security Council backing for the war as “a diplomatic train wreck.” Now, the United States is again seeking U.N. approval of another Iraq resolution. Have the “tracks” been cleared yet?We are still sifting through the rubble of that original train wreck. Post-conflict Iraq would have been a lot easier to manage had there been international unity, rather than division. The United States didn’t work hard enough to make it happen. It let military timetables, rather than diplomatic prudence, drive the train. It was predictable that, even under the rosiest scenarios, Iraq would be very difficult for the United States to manage alone and that Iraq would be very expensive to reconstruct. The situation we see today is very unpredictable, very dangerous. It is not clear that postwar Iraq will be a success, that Iraq will see a better, more stable future. It might, but it is not a sure thing. A lot of heavy lifting needs to be done.At this point, would getting a U.N. mandate and additional troops help much?The Pentagon wants another division’s worth of troops. According to a convincing Congressional Budget Office report, the current U.S. military posture and operating tempo are unsustainable after March 2004. Something has to give. It is not necessarily a case of the more troops the better, but there is a certain number of troops that the United States thinks is required to make its presence sufficiently robust.The United States is also under-resourced in terms of money. The president has just requested $15 billion for Iraqi reconstruction, as part of the $87 billion he’s asking from Congress. The White House itself estimates that Iraq needs between $50 billion and $75 billion. Those estimates are based on projections of petroleum revenue that oil experts think are probably high. In other words, the cost could be even higher than $50 billion to $75 billion. And right now, it looks as if the United States will arrive at a donor’s conference on Iraq in Madrid next month with very anemic funding support from its partners and allies.No one’s made a substantial offer?No. When the president earmarked $15 billion for reconstruction, I thought that was a serious number. Until recently, the United States was saying its contribution of $2.7 billion for reconstruction was enough. It was farcical, embarrassing. Had the Americans continued with that low-ball number, we— rightfully— would have been laughed out of the Madrid conference. Fifteen billion dollars is serious money. It’s the equivalent of what the United States put into Germany under the Marshall Plan.Unfortunately, now the Europeans and Arab states are not coming up with serious money. I agree with Thomas Friedman of The New York Times— the Europeans, the French in particular, should be ashamed of themselves. I can understand arguing that they refuse to financially support an American policy they oppose. But what the French and other Europeans should be saying is, “If you do what we want at the Security Council, if you internationalize the Iraq mission, if you start thinking about a process to shift political control of the country back to the Iraqis, we will increase our funding, we will do something.”But the Europeans— and in particular the French, who are the authors of a joint French-German proposal— aren’t providing any incentives for the administration to listen to them. Neither side is helping themselves. The president has raised the possibility of a larger role for other countries in Iraq but still seems reluctant to cede authority. The French and others in the international community want a larger role but are not providing any reason for the United States to acquiesce. The Pakistanis and the Indians until recently were saying that a U.N. Security Council authorization would allow them to provide the troops. Now even they are backing away.The Americans and the Europeans generally remain at loggerheads?What the Europeans want, in many respects, is right. They want to internationalize this process. They want a plan, though the timetable in their proposal for shifting political authority to the Iraqis is too rapid. The basics of what they want, the United States should want, too: internationalization and a plan. But to the administration’s ears, it sounds as if the Europeans are demanding that the United States internationalize the mission and include them in the political process but they are refusing to pay anything or otherwise contribute. Such an unthoughtful and unhelpful diplomatic strategy frustrates those of us who think the mission should be internationalized. Maybe the Russian proposals will be more helpful. The Russians are much more important to the U.N. debate at the moment then are the French.Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said this week that Germany would help train Iraqi police and lend a hand restoring infrastructure. What do you think of the German position?I have much more sympathy for the Germans than I do for others because they have been so active in Afghanistan. They didn’t support the U.S. Iraq policy but, demonstrating that they are not anti-American, they energetically backed U.S. policy in Afghanistan. They took charge of Afghan security and helped shift control of [the peacekeeping operation] to a NATO-led force. They have been very involved, even regarding Iraq— much of the U.S. military equipment ended up being shipped through Germany.Will the Turks send troops?The United States and the Turks are looking for ways to heal the rift that developed in the run-up to the Iraq war. Now that the United States is desperate to get others to contribute troops, Turkey, which has always wanted a role in Iraq, might be a natural partner. But the Iraqi view, which I think is legitimate, is that the neighbors— Turks, Iranians, Saudis— should not send troops.Regarding the other pressing Mideast issue, in June, President Bush seemed enthusiastic about putting the full weight of the United States behind the road map peace plan. Now it seems the United States doesn’t want to get too involved.The road map, which I was never very optimistic about, seems to have failed. I don’t think the president will now enter into anything new. The administration has so much on its plate, and it doesn’t have many new ideas on how to move forward on this. The trouble is, the United States has been focusing on process and allowing the parties to negotiate toward an end-point. Instead, the United States should announce its vision of an end-point and let the Israelis and Palestinians build a process to reach it.What should the end-point be?The only way to get a peace between these two parties is for the United States to declare its support for two states whose borders would follow the pre-war 1967 lines [in 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank, all of Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and other territory]; the division of Jerusalem; and a limited right of return that permitted Palestinian refugees to go back to Israel only in order to reunite families and offered settlement in Palestine or compensation to all others. This should be official U.S. policy.Such a policy would slowly build constituencies on both sides for an alternative to what their leaders are providing. If the Israeli public felt that [Prime Minister] Ariel Sharon was blocking a legitimate deal, it would sweep him aside. [Palestinian Authority President] Yasir Arafat would support a deal if he felt that his constituents supported it. After all, he is a survivor. The United States can’t wait for him to build support. It should create it, despite him. This doesn’t imply sending force or imposing a peace. That would be a recipe for disaster.What’s happened to the idea that a free Iraq could become a democracy and a beacon throughout the Middle East?That was a very good idea, and I agreed with its premise. But achieving such goals will take years. The president should continue to talk about democracy and continue to insist upon it in Iraq. Promotion of democracy is a goal the United States should be supporting around the world; it is who we are and what we should be behind. But the administration made the prospect of Iraq’s democratic transformation sound so simple, as if it could happen next year, painlessly and effortlessly. If Iraq is moving in a positive direction, that will inspire hope in the rest of the region. If it is not, that will contribute to the dismay, disappointment, frustration, and radicalization of the Middle East.Is there an easy solution to the crisis brewing over Iran’s nuclear program?The problems of the Middle East will be solved only through transatlantic cooperation— Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, all of it. Iran poses a very serious problem and the United States must have intense consultations with its European partners. They’re Iran’s trading partners; they’re the ones who have had contact with Tehran over the last 20 years. The good news is that U.S. and European views on Iran are starting to align.How are U.S.-Saudi relations?The basic premise of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has collapsed. Throughout the Cold War, Saudi Arabia was important to the United States because of its oil, because the United States wanted to keep it out of the hands of the Soviets, because of its geographic position, and because of its ideology. As a theocracy, it provided a natural antidote to communism. Today, the pillars of this relationship have fallen away, and it is not clear what this relationship is about except a crude exchange of security in return for oil. This arrangement is unacceptable to both the American public and the Saudi public. There needs to be a fundamental rethinking of this relationship.On the terrorism front, something has happened, which is under-appreciated. The Saudis defined the May 12 bombings in Riyadh [that killed 34] as an attack against them. They have aggressively rounded up religious zealots, acknowledged al Qaeda’s presence in the kingdom, and broken up terror cells. If that bombing had occurred before September 11, I believe the Saudis would have swept it under the rug and done nothing. But they defined the May bombings as a major attack on Saudi Arabia, which allowed the crown prince to adopt some reforms— that the United States had been urging him to take— and portray them as a Saudi initiative. It took 18 months for the Saudis to respond to September 11.Some good news at least?A small silver lining in a very gray and cloudy area.
    Interview with Bernard Gwertzman and Rachel Bronson September 19, 2003
  • Saudi Arabia
    Saudi Expert Gregory Gause Says Riyadh Attacks Could Be ‘Wake-Up Call’ for Saudis to Crack Down on Terrorists
    F. Gregory Gause III, a prominent expert on Saudi society and politics, says that the terrorist attacks on residential compounds in Riyadh will force the Saudi leadership to make a critical decision. If the Saudis deny domestic terrorism is a problem—as they did after 9/11—“it will just further alienate U.S.-Saudi relations,” he says. But, “if this is a wake-up call for the top Saudi leadership about the need to face more directly and forthrightly the problem of violent extremist Islamist movements within Saudi Arabia, then I think it actually could help U.S.-Saudi relations.”Gause, associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont and director of its Middle East Studies Department, was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on May 15, 2003.Other InterviewsWhat kind of impact will Monday’s terrorist attacks in Riyadh have on U.S.-Saudi relations, which had already been strained for some time?A lot depends on how the Saudis react. If they go into denial like they did after 9/11, I think that it will worsen U.S.-Saudi relations. However, if this is a wake-up call for the top Saudi leadership about the need to face more directly and forthrightly the problem of violent extremist Islamist movements within Saudi Arabia, then I think it actually could help U.S.-Saudi relations. It would remove the excuse that I think some people at the top levels of the Saudi security system had, [who said], “Look, this al-Qaeda business is not a problem for us. It might be a problem in other places, but we’re secure here, we have our situation under control.” The events of Monday showed that that’s not the case.Crown Prince Abdullah made a rather forceful speech on television, saying the culprits had to be wiped out. Will those sentiments be translated into policy, or will his tough talk just fade away?The effort to round up and break up the cells that were involved in this attack is definitely going to be policy. The question is what happens in the longer term. Is this going to be the beginning of an effort by the Saudis to use all of the means at their disposal—not just police and security means, but also the religious establishment itself, their own media, their own political discourse circles within the kingdom—to take on the ideas behind bin Ladenism?What could be done to change the relationship between the clergy and the government or the people?I don’t think that there’s much that you can do to change the institutional arrangements. What we’ll see is an effort by the official religious establishment to forthrightly condemn not just the violence but also the ideas that lead to violence. The whole issue of jihad is central to this. The success of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union had a profound impact on ideological currents within parts of the Muslim world but particularly in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis were so involved in the Afghan jihad, [which was] the beginning of the Osama bin Laden phenomenon….The infatuation with jihad was not confronted directly by the regime in Saudi Arabia. After September 11, after a period of denial and evasion, from about mid-2002, you began to get a more forthright effort to confront this idea that the interpretation of jihad that bin Laden and [others] put out is legitimate. The war of ideas—in the war on terrorism—is something that the Saudis have not taken as big a role in as they could. Perhaps the attacks on Monday will lead them to use their resources both in the larger Muslim world and at home to really take on those ideas directly, in the education system, in the media, and in the religious establishment.If there were a democratic election, would the Saudi royal family be elected?In a democratic election for a legislature, you’d get a lot of people [elected] whose sympathies are very close to bin Laden. If there were an election for a ruler of the country, Crown Prince Abdullah might not do too badly. But the key is not so much how popular these royal family members are—their popularity ebbs and flows, some are more popular than others. The bottom line is there’s no practical alternative to them, and even people who are not particularly enamored of them, and disagree with them on policy, from a more liberal [perspective], say, “Look, there’s no alternative to them to hold the country together.”Most Americans, from the history books, know that President Franklin Roosevelt visited King Abdul Aziz at the end of World War II, and American oil companies worked in Saudi Arabia, and a lot of Saudis have studied and worked in the United States. What is the U.S.-Saudi relationship like today?The same factors that led to President Roosevelt meeting Abdul Aziz and that have nurtured the relationship over decades are still there. Oil is still there. Twenty-five percent of all the proven oil reserves in the world are in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the biggest oil exporter in the world. It’s the biggest oil producer in OPEC [the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. It’s rivaled only by Russia and the United States as an oil producer, but unlike Russia and the United States, the Saudis could up their oil production capacity pretty easily, whereas we’re on the decline. So it’s that centrality in the oil world that is the main element of the relationship, always has been, and it’s the reason why the relationship is still important.There are other elements, of course. Saudi Arabia does have an enormous amount of influence in the Muslim world; Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities, are located there. The Saudis have used their oil wealth to try to spread their version of Islam. To some extent, we saw that as positive when we were competing against communism and Arab nationalism in the ’50s, ’60s, and ’70s. We saw it as positive when the Saudis were confronting the Iranian revolutionaries for influence in the Muslim world. Clearly, since the ’90s, that influence has taken a very anti-American turn.Why did anti-Americanism take hold so quickly in Saudi Arabia?There are basically three reasons. One, the very close relationship between us and the Saudi regime after the first Gulf War, which was in many ways closer than it had been, certainly more publicly and militarily closer [as a result of] the stationing of American forces in Saudi Arabia. I think this rubbed a lot of people in Saudi Arabia the wrong way. For some it was just the presence of the forces. For others it symbolized the overall close relationship.Another element as the 1990s wore on was Iraq. By the mid-1990s, Saddam Hussein had basically won the propaganda war, and it was generally believed that economic sanctions on Iraq were aimed at, in effect, impoverishing an entire Arab-Muslim country, and were not aimed at getting rid of Saddam Hussein.And then, with the collapse of the Mideast peace process and the [increase in] Israeli-Palestinian violence, the second intifada was brought home through the new Arab satellite television channels into everybody’s living room every day.Why did the terrorists target Saudi Arabia itself this time?[Terrorists] hit in Saudi Arabia a couple of times in the mid-1990s [in the 1995 attack on a Saudi national guard center and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers]. Then the Saudi security forces kind of cracked down on them, and bin Laden made a strategic change [to attack targets outside Saudi Arabia]. In the aftermath of September 11, and the roll-up of al-Qaeda around the world, the attack on its base in Afghanistan, and the fall of the Taliban, perhaps [the May 12 attacks represent] a reassessment of the strategy, and bin Laden is going back to the original targets, which were within the Arab world—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Algeria.We also have to recognize that, in picking these targets, these residential compounds, the attackers were trying to differentiate between Saudi Muslims and foreigners. In fact, before the attacks, one of the Saudi opposition websites published a communique [from suspected extremists]. Part of it directly addressed the Saudi people and said, in effect, “We’re not out to get you, we’re out to get these Christian crusaders.” That’s a direct quote—the use of the term “Christian crusaders.” I think that [the Riyadh attacks] are going to backfire on them, because Saudis were killed, as were other Arabs who lived in the residential compounds. This kind of attack, right in the middle of Riyadh, will have a different impact than, say, the Khobar Towers bombing, which was very much against American military personnel.Is the terrorists’ goal to overthrow the house of Saud?Definitely. In the communique they issued—it’s on an opposition website, and so it’s hard to check its veracity—they implicated the Saudi ruling family. They basically said that the Saudi regime is not a Muslim regime and cooperates with non-Muslims to attack Muslims, so it’s lost whatever Islamic legitimacy it might have had.That’s the irony—this is supposedly the most orthodox of the Muslim regimes, right?Yes. When you set the bar that high for your own legitimacy, you can always be faulted for not reaching it.Will there be a real showdown between the Saudi rulers and al-Qaeda?It’s inevitable that there’s going to be a showdown between the Saudi security services and people who are suspected by them of being implicated directly in these events. A larger question is: Is this going to be the spur to a reassessment in Saudi Arabia of what it is in their society that produces these people? There’s plenty of support for that kind of reassessment. I’m not talking about the end of the relationship between the ruling family and the religious establishment, but a reassessment of how religion and the religious establishment are portraying Islam both to their own society and to the world.We have a tendency to [use a kind of] shorthand [to describe] what is a complicated ideological turn that I refer to as bin Ladenism. [Many people in the West] tend to shorthand that and say it’s Wahhabism [Saudi Arabia’s officially sanctioned strain of Islam]. [Bin Ladenism] is a mix of all sorts of things that come out of the Afghan experience—and certainly the kind of close-mindedness, the austerity, the rejection of difference that characterizes the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia are part of it. But so are Egyptian Islamic Jihad ideas. [Calling that mix] Wahhabism can lead to a real misunderstanding, because if in fact Wahhabism is the origin of the kind of violence [that took place in Riyadh], then it would be almost impossible to reform the Saudi regime. But if we see this kind of ideological turn toward a violent, anti-American, anti-[Saudi] government [approach] as something that is a departure from, if you will, mainstream Wahhabism, then you can say that the Saudis can do something about it in a way that we can cooperate with them on. That is an important distinction to draw.
    Interview with Bernard Gwertzman May 16, 2003
  • Saudi Arabia
    Saudis in ‘Dramatic Debate’ Over U.S. Relations, Says Council’s Middle East Studies Fellow Youssef Ibrahim
    Youssef Ibrahim, a Council senior fellow in Middle East Studies, argues that since 9/11, Saudi Arabia is undergoing a “dramatic debate” about its relationship with America—the most heated such debate in 50 years. With Crown Prince Abdullah pitted against embittered hard-liners within the royal family and with critics of the Saudis within the Bush administration livid after 9/11, U.S.-Saudi relations are increasingly fraught. But Ibrahim warns that Saudi Arabia’s unique capability to pump extra oil will continue to make it indispensable to the global economy—and that a post-Saddam Iraq would be no substitute. Ibrahim, who is also manager of strategic planning for the Council’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, made these comments in an interview with Bernard Gwertzman, contributing editor for cfr.org, on December 3, 2002. Other Interviews Q. What’s your analysis of the current Saudi-American relationship? A. It is confused, to say the least. It reflects confusion and a debate inside Saudi Arabia itself. In my opinion, this is a dramatic debate. Since they removed King Saud 50 years ago, I don’t think that the Saudi royal family has been engaged in as dramatic a debate about its relationship with America as it is today. And this debate is taking place between two wings of the family. You have got to remember that the crown prince is a bit of a maverick. It reflects a clash within the royal family over relations with the U.S. and what it should be. It reflects Crown Prince Abdullah’s desire to solidify this relationship with the United States. One of the dramatic highlights of this [debate] was Abdullah’s invitation three years ago to American oil companies to come, after 20 years of absence, and participate in energy projects in Saudi Arabia. And it is interesting to see how three years later it has been sabotaged. It has been sabotaged by two elements. First, any national oil company in the world will resist foreign companies coming in, and the Saudis are no different. The temptation is to say we can do it ourselves. The other element has been, to a very large extent, political. The initiative has been sabotaged to some extent by the deteriorating situation between Israel and the Palestinians. Before 9/11, Abdullah had sent a couple of angry messages to President Bush complaining about the Israeli-Palestinian situation. And of course then came 9/11, which changed everything for Saudi Arabia in this country and created a feeling of hostility, which has largely contributed to the paralysis which has come upon not only our relationship with Saudi Arabia, but projects like the oil initiative. Q. Let’s talk about the politics. Crown Prince Abdullah initiated an approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that was endorsed by the Arab League. Was there opposition in Saudi Arabia to that initiative? A. When he made that initiative, it broke completely and dramatically the waves of attacks going on against Saudi Arabia in the United States, and it abruptly changed the climate in this country toward Saudi Arabia. Yes, of course, Abdullah was opposed in Saudi Arabia. A big wing of the royal family argued, “This is not the Saudi way. We do not do initiatives. We always let other people do initiatives, and we support [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak, for instance. Why are you putting us up front like this? You are putting us at risk.” And the next thing you know, the initiative was sunk when [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon invaded the West Bank, and all the trouble worsened. Then Abdullah arrives at the Arab summit in Beirut. Half the Arab presidents don’t show up. It is deeply embarrassing. And you get the royal family saying, “We told you so. We told you not to put us up front.” It gets worse. He comes here. The meeting with the President Bush at his Crawford ranch goes so badly that, basically, the initiative dies completely. True, the president came out and said, we support a Palestinian state, and all of this. But there was a lot more talk than action. And here’s Abdullah’s initiative, gone. Q. Isn’t it unusual that the president would even invite a Saudi leader to Crawford? He doesn’t invite many leaders there. A. It is remarkable. It is an indication of the appreciation for Saudi Arabia of the old crowd in the Bush camp—in other words, Bush’s father’s crowd. This is an important element of the American national interest in Saudi Arabia. After all, the Saudis sit on so much oil, and they sit in a strategic area. And of course, the whole idea in Bush’s invitation was “You’re a farmer, and I’m a farmer. Come and spend two days on my farm, and we’re going to make friends.” But as you know, the visit went very, very badly. It was supposed to be a two-day visit in Crawford. Instead, Abdullah arrives and he has a meeting with Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice before traveling to Crawford. And Abdullah was telling Cheney, “You have come to the region. You have asked us to help you on Iraq, and I’m telling you, you have to do something about the Palestinians.” And Cheney argued that Iraq and the Palestinians were separate issues. That night, Cheney flew to Crawford to brief the president. And the first day of the visit in Crawford didn’t happen. Abdullah was so angry that they had to call Bush senior to meet with him on his way to Crawford. The meeting in Crawford ended up being 4 hours instead of 48. Abdullah walked out. There was no joint press conference. The president gave one himself. The people in Saudi Arabia who were attacking Abdullah kept saying, “See, we told you that you should not have gone to Crawford.” Instead of an improvement in Saudi-American relations, a further deterioration developed. Q. How bad are U.S.-Saudi relations now? A. I think there is a wing in the U.S., led by Colin Powell and probably the president himself, who are trying to salvage it. But there are others in the administration who say we don’t need Saudi Arabia. And many of those who say that also strongly favor regime change in Iraq. Q. How important is Saudi oil to the U.S. and the world? A. It is more important to the world than to the United States. We now consume 20 million barrels a day in the United States. We import 9 million barrels a day. Of that, 1.5 million barrels come from Saudi Arabia. We can do without it. We can buy the oil from neighbors, from Mexico and Venezuela. It will not change the fact that the world still needs to consume 75 million barrels of oil a day. And the clients who Mexico has to drop, the Saudis can pick up. Only the Saudis can produce more oil. They have excess production capacity. Others are pumping as much oil as they can, so if they sell oil to us, they are going to have to drop someone else. That somebody will go to Saudi Arabia. The result is the Saudis continue to sell their oil, and we lose our influence in Saudi Arabia, so that is not very smart. Q. What if there is a regime change in Iraq? Wouldn’t that mean more oil for the U.S. and less dependence on Saudi oil? A. The issue of Iraq is non-expert talk. Experts know it is a miracle that the Iraqi oil industry has managed in the past 12 years, without spare parts, to continue to function at the level it is functioning at—about 1.5 million barrels a day or 2 million. This is testimony to the skill and education of the Iraqi engineers who have kept it going. But the system is in very bad shape. It’s running essentially on band aids. To stabilize a system like this, you will need at least one to two years and an expenditure of probably up to $6 billion to $10 billion. To take it beyond that—to transform Iraq into an American pumping station, for example—you will need another four to five years and several billion dollars, at least $40 billion to raise production from, say, 2 million barrels a day to 4 or 5million barrels. We assume that any Iraqi government will want to do this. But that is a wrong assumption, because no government that has oil as a national resource would want to see that oil sold cheaply. Q. And the Saudis produce how much? A. They produce 7.5 million barrels per day. If they turn the valves on, they can raise production to 11 million barrels a day. The Saudis are the only ones who can do this. Q. Let’s go back to 9/11. Fifteen of the 19 terrorists were Saudi. Should we hold the Saudis partly responsible for 9/11? A. We should certainly hold the Saudis responsible for permitting, for years and years and years, a group of extremely fundamentalist, radical preachers take hold of their educational system and to produce, in the process, people who became very vulnerable to being recruited by someone like Osama bin Laden. That certainly harmed not only the Saudis but the entire Arab and Muslim world. When the Saudi oil money arrived, that Wahhabi strain of Islam suddenly possessed enough money to spread its wings around the world. You had a complete reversal. You have to remember that 25 years ago, the Saudis went to countries like Egypt, or Lebanon, or Syria, or Iraq—secular countries, which were practicing a secular version of Islam for their education—and they returned home bringing a very modern and moderate version of Islam to their country. The oil revolution reversed this completely. Suddenly you had 6 or 7 million poor Egyptian workers over the years going to Saudi Arabia, getting that version of radical Islam, and bringing it back to Egypt. So instead of things going in the direction of moderating Islam, it went into the direction of radical Muslim fundamentalism. Q. There has been a lot of talk about controlling money going to Islamic charities. Are the Saudis taking steps to control things? A. They are doing things. In fact, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill has gone to Saudi Arabia at least five times, and the Saudi secretary of the treasury has come here, and we have formed a committee on banking transactions. The Saudis said now that they would coordinate charities, and all, in the end, would be collected and then channeled through the religious ministry, which they can control. But that is easier said than done. One of the five tenets of Islam is that you have to give a fifth of your income to charity. A lot of Saudis and people in the Gulf states are very religious and very rich, and they do give a lot of money to charities. It happens across the Arab world. ….The second problem is that once you give money to a charity, it is difficult to follow it to the nth degree. All you can do is give it your best. Remember that when Irish Americans gave money, [former British Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher complained that some of it ended up with the IRA. So are the swamps being dried? Yes. Are they going to be completely dry? No. Q. In the Saudis’ debate, who is opposed to Abdullah? A. You have to think of Saudi Arabia as two countries. One is modern Saudi Arabia, which we call the Hijaz. These are Saudis who live along the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, who have been traveling and trading with the rest of the world. And there is the Najd, the heart of the Saudi desert. This is where the hard-line, very closed tribal elements live. They are big proponents of the Wahhabi strain of Islam. These tensions exist in the royal family themselves. There are at least 20,000 princes in the royal family. Of these, 5,000 to 6,000 are “on hand” princes who are running things—deputy governor there, governor there, minister of this, minister of that. It is like a corporation. They really run the country. Q. Let’s talk about succession. King Fahd is in a coma? A. For all practical purposes. King Fahd changed the rules and decided that the next older brother does not have to succeed. Abdullah is, in fact, the next older brother, and he would normally be expected to name Prince Sultan as his successor. But this could change. Abdullah heads the National Guard and Sultan, the defense minister, heads the army. So there is a balance of power. Q. Does Sultan agree with Abdullah on the United States? A. Sultan and the minister of the interior, Prince Nayef, think the U.S. is taking Saudi Arabia for granted. They think that Saudi Arabia should make a stand and say, “If you do not feel you should make Saudi Arabia part of the U.S. national interest, we also feel we have other alternatives.” Abdullah is of the camp that feels the U.S. has been our friend and ally for 60 years, and even though there are elements inveighing against the Saudis, the president and the State Department will prevail. But there is one golden rule in Saudi Arabia. They stand and fall together. They will have arguments and family councils, but in the end they will agree and abide by the decision. I see some signs of reform in Saudi Arabia. Abdullah gave a very rough speech to the religious establishment to tell their preachers to stop inveighing against others, and two days ago, Prince Nayef launched a vicious attack on the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is the tent from which all the movements radical developments began. It’s a stunning development. Top
    Interview with Bernard Gwertzman and Youssef Michel Ibrahim December 4, 2002
  • Saudi Arabia
    Youssef Ibrahim discusses Saudi feelings toward the U.S.
    National Public Radio: All Things Considered ROBERT SIEGEL, host: One aspect of the Saudi-US relationship is financial. The Saudis bank much of their considerable national wealth in the United States in dollars. According to Youssef Ibrahim of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Saudis are so distressed by US Middle East policy right now that some bankers are making noises about taking Saudi deposits elsewhere.Mr. YOUSSEF IBRAHIM (Council on Foreign Relations): When you think about Saudi Arabia, here is a statistic to ponder. There are 200 families in Saudi Arabia who control more than $200 million each. And if you do the calculation and the math, generally speaking, we estimate that there is between $550 billion to $650 billion of private Saudi money invested largely in the United States or United States-related instruments. In addition to this, of course, the Saudi government has invested in Treasury bonds something along the lines of $70 billion. And there is, of course, oil. Saudi Arabia does sit on one-third of the world’s oil reserves. The other third, Iran and Iraq sit on it, and we are not speaking to either of them.SIEGEL: And if, in fact, the Saudis were so upset with the US that they said, “We’re going to first of all take our money elsewhere,” where would they take it?Mr. IBRAHIM: That’s a good question, and there aren’t really too many alternatives, but I must say that the euro is evolving as a mighty alternative. Already—I was in Saudi Arabia for two weeks; I just came back from there and stopped in London just before the weekend, and spoke with some of the bankers there. There is movement of some Saudi funds—and one should not exaggerate this—towards Europe. But, of course, the vastness of the American economy and the comfort that the Saudis felt here cannot yet be matched by the Europeans. On the other hand, the investigation we have launched into how much money Saudis and other Arabs are giving to Muslim charitable or non-charitable organizations has scared a lot of the Saudi money.SIEGEL: When you were just in Saudi Arabia, how did you find attitudes toward the United States compared with your previous visits there?Mr. IBRAHIM: In 25 years of covering Saudi Arabia, I would tell you categorically I have never seen anger of that dimension, and I would describe it as verging on rage. I think there has been a satellite revolution which has completely changed the perspective. Back in the Gulf War in 1990, CNN held the Arab world in its palm. Everybody was CNN, including the Arab stations. Today, you ask for something, you wish for it, and you get it. We wished for a free Arab satellite station, we got Al-Jazeera. You like it, you don’t like it, it is holding the imagination of the Arab world, and it’s now imitated by all the other Arab satellite stations. And you are sitting there looking at people who are watching the footage coming out of Israel and the occupied territories and Palestinian areas 18 hours a day, and it is very enraging footage if you are looking at it from an Arab perspective, and that’s what they see.SIEGEL: Are you talking about the attitudes of the Saudi elites, the royal family, the people who run the country, about the people in the streets, or about everyone?Mr. IBRAHIM: That is the astonishing part. I think now it covers the whole range. I am talking from the proverbial Arab street all the way to the ruling elite, and I think Abdullah is no exception. And the message we heard, the angry messages that are coming out of Saudi Arabia, leaked to the press, accurately reflects the attitude of the leadership. What the Saudi leadership is saying—“Look, you’ve been angry at us and insulting us since September 11 because 15 Saudis were on that plane. There are 20 million Saudis who were not on those planes. We have been a loyal ally for 60 years, and if you’re threatening to divorce us, well, it works both ways. We are also ready for the worst.”SIEGEL: Thank you, Youssef.Mr. IBRAHIM: You’re welcome.SIEGEL: Youssef Ibrahim of the Council on Foreign Relations spoke to us from New York City.
    Interview with Youssef Michel Ibrahim and Robert Siegel June 26, 2002
  • Saudi Arabia
    Strengthening the U.S.-Saudi Relationship
    Introduction The U.S.-Saudi relationship is based on common interests that are fundamental and critical to both countries. Since September 11, however, many factions on both sides are calling for a divorce. Yet, advocating for a divorce does not take into account the powerful influence a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship has on American strategic interests and regional stability. Rather than a divorce, leaders on both sides must work to strengthen the relationship and reforge common goals. Since the end of the Gulf War, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been largely neglected. There is no broad engagement of intellectuals, media, foreign affairs experts, and religious figures about the importance or benefit of the relationship. The cultures remain distant and the potential for misunderstanding and misreading is great. Symbols of common purpose have faded. Indeed, September 11 revealed the degree to which the gap had grown. Saudi Arabia is key to U.S. policy and pursuit of interests in the region. The absence of serious dialogue has undercut the fundamental foundations of this relationship. Sustained attention to the relationship is urgently required and serious discussion on numerous levels is painfully necessary. Through consultations on political, economic, and military issues, both sides can work toward addressing the wide gaps dividing the two countries. Now is the time to begin such discussions. The United States has in Crown Prince Abdullah a partner who is committed to positive reform in Saudi Arabia and who understands the benefit of a strong, stable U.S.-Saudi relationship. Abdullah's prominence provides the United States with an opportunity to achieve progress in moving the relationship forward. Within the context of the current escalation of violence among Israelis and Palestinians and the surge of demonstrations in the region, the United States must work with Saudi Arabia as a partner in moving all sides toward peace. Through his initiative, the Crown Prince has demonstrated his willingness and ability to take serious steps and serious risks toward peace in the region. This is an opportunity that the United States should not overlook. As the crisis deepens, Saudi involvement and coordination with the United States is crucial in helping to stop the violence and, eventually, moving the parties toward the peace table. As the United States addresses the critical components of the relationship, it must avoid further deepening the gap between the Saudi public's perceptions of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and the Saudi leadership's perception. A renewed U.S.-Saudi dialogue must work toward sustained communication that enforces the stability and the strength of the relationship. Priorities U.S. Influence The U.S.-Saudi relationship helps further American interests. Given the demands on the relationship, U.S. priorities and leverage must be devoted to primary national security and foreign policy issues. These issues are of pressing importance for the United States and must be dealt with urgently:   Middle East peace negotiations Islamic political radicalism and its export Oil supply and price stability Iraq Internal Saudi issues-i.e., economic advancement and stability-are important to the U.S.-Saudi dialogue but should be pursued with a difference in tone, urgency, and commitment. This is largely because the Crown Prince recognizes the need to undertake domestic reforms. In focusing on issues of social, political, and economic development, the United States will have the greatest chance for breakthrough if it focuses on issues that engage Saudi interests and parallel Crown Prince Abdullah's own priorities-i.e., rule of law, accession to the World Trade Organization, economic opening, and education. This should be a broad, collaborative dialogue going beyond the institutions of government. Dialogue The superficiality of contact between American intellectuals and media and those in the Arab world is serving the interests of neither; the lack of depth and variety of contact is reflected in U.S. policies. This trend will be difficult to reverse because dialogue will immediately focus on "hot button" issues and not proceed to deeper discussion. Creating a dialogue between intellectual and religious elites from the two countries should be a priority for American foundations and institutions, but it needs to be pursued patiently with a long-term view of expanding the discussion. Consultations should include Saudis who have studied at U.S. schools and universities and "next generation" leaders. Saudi Stability Maintaining Saudi stability is a cornerstone of U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia has gone through serious change over the past fifty years-some of which is potentially destabilizing. Saudi Arabia faces significant social challenges-demography and galloping population growth, relatively slow growth in economic opportunity, tight social and religious controls, and a volatile region. The pressures on Saudi Arabia will grow over the years. Crown Prince Abdullah's regime provides a window of opportunity for the United States to move the relationship along to accommodate Saudi Arabia's and the U.S. need for change. There is reason for serious concern regarding the Saudi succession and the potential instability that may ensue after the reign of the prominent sons of Abdul Aziz. Uncertainty as a result of the generational shift in leadership from the sons of Abdul Aziz to the grandsons will be an underlying feature of Saudi politics in the future and will thus shape U.S.-Saudi relations. The Arab-Israel Crisis: Abdullah's Initiative Saudi Arabia will be the key to any success the United States has in reducing the violence between the Israelis and Palestinians. If the United States recognizes Saudi Arabia as a key partner, keeps it informed, and consults with it on issues of mutual importance, the U.S. can expect that Saudi Arabia will invest its prestige in the outcome. Abdullah's initiative is more than a vision; it demonstrates the level of concern the Saudi leadership has regarding the situation. It communicated with the Israeli public and addressed their concerns for broader peace in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia rarely takes the high profile, political role, even in Arab councils that it is now taking. The challenge for the Bush administration is to effectively harness the change. Abdullah's initiative will not be effective unless the United States helps the parties move toward a cease-fire and a political process that will connect the end of violence to the Saudi proposal. If the United States can begin a credible peace process and keep Saudi Arabia involved, it should expect Saudi Arabia to work toward reducing the volume of anti-Israel and U.S. rhetoric in the public fora, education, and media, and sell the concept of peace to the Saudi public. The need is underlined by recent experience. The United States has complained of Saudi Arabia's lack of involvement in the peace process since Oslo, and Saudi Arabia is frustrated by what it saw as U.S. disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially at a time of serious escalation. Military Military Posture The U.S.-Saudi military relationship is longstanding and a centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. Nevertheless, the U.S military presence in Saudi Arabia is not "secure." The absence of serious dialogue and communication has resulted in mutual misunderstanding of goals and purpose of the military relationship at the highest levels of both governments. The United States must work toward restoration of this strategic dialogue. The United States and Saudi Arabia must address, through consultation and dialogue, the growing tensions surrounding the U.S. military presence in the Saudi kingdom. Neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia want a reduction in the level of military cooperation, but U.S. military activities in their current form are increasingly unsatisfactory to both sides. The United States must address its military presence in the region within the context of both U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Gulf relations. The United States must explore new concepts and ideas with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) about objectives, divisions of labor, risk, and ways to minimize political friction and improve efficiency in U.S. military deployment in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United States see their defense relationship differently. Both agree that the U.S. military is present in Saudi Arabia in the event that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are invaded. The agreement stops there. The United States wishes Saudi Arabia would extend its cooperation to other missions important to American interests. The Saudis see these interests, notably those related to enforcing the no-fly zones, as not necessarily congruent with their own. The United States should not strive for an explicit set of agreements on military arrangements with Saudi Arabia, rather a consultative dialogue that sets out clearly the goals and continuously reviews the management of the relationship. Consultations on details are important. When possible, the Saudis should be convinced that the United States will operate with their consent. The U.S.-Saudi defense relationship has been a major outlet for American arms sales and defense supplies. Saudi cooperation has helped defer the cost of U.S. operations in Saudi Arabia. While this arrangement has been a cornerstone of the military and political relationship, Saudi Arabia sees it as a political and fiscal burden given their current economy. Conflict with Iraq U.S. military action against Iraq would be extremely difficult without the political support of Saudi Arabia and access to its airspace, ports and bases. Without permission to use port facilities, bases, or airfields in Saudi Arabia, a major U.S. military operation against Iraq would be incredibly difficult. Moreover, Saudi political support is critical to the willingness of most GCC and other Arab countries to support major U.S. military operations against Iraq. Jordan will not allow the United States to launch military operations against Iraq from its territory unless Saudi Arabia supports the U.S. operation. Moreover, Jordan is not a useful option for military operations against Iraq for a number of reasons: attitude of the monarchy, a divided population, and the difficulty in providing security for bases. If Jordan were to be involved in a U.S. military operation against Iraq, the United States would carry an even greater obligation for Jordan and the Hashemite monarchy's security. Moreover, securing American deployments in Jordan would be difficult. Saudi Arabia has grave reservations about U.S. military action against Iraq and does not think that U.S. strategy is adequate to carry Arab opinion, unseat Saddam, and provide for Iraq's stability thereafter. Saudi Arabia might support U.S. action against Iraq if there are clearly understood, shared objectives that are limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein, are short in duration in order to minimize Iraqi casualties, and result in a unitary post-Saddam Iraqi government that is acceptable to Saudi Arabia. Egypt's close relationship with Saudi Arabia makes it an important factor in Saudi Arabia's decision to support U.S. military action. Egypt often serves as a political cover for Saudi activities in the region, and vise versa. Saudi Arabia now enjoys fully normalized relations with Iran and would welcome any U.S. attempt toward engagement with Iran. U.S. steps would be viewed as offsetting other regional political costs that Saudi Arabia may incur if it supports U.S. military action against Iraq. Islamic Radicalism The issue of Islamic radicalism and its export is key to the stability of the region and central to American policy interests. The question is complex, but must be addressed. The United States must support Saudi efforts in confronting the impact of radical theology and its role in Saudi intellectual life. The U.S. objective is to engage the Saudi government and offer them assistance as they address: financial flows in support of Islamic radicalism; strengthening intelligence collection on individuals engaged in subversive activities. Oil Security The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a long, extremely successful petroleum relationship. Saudi Arabia will continue to be the largest source of the world's oil for the foreseeable future, making it a U.S. strategic concern for the long run. Denying Saudi Arabia and the peninsula's oil reserves to powers hostile to the United States has been a constant in American policy for over half a century. The United States is interested in the broadest possible oil market, including Russia, and yet, should not signal to Saudi Arabia a confrontational oil diversification strategy. The United States should work toward lessening and diversifying reliance on imported oil. Domestic instability born of a domestic fiscal crisis and a malfunctioning labor market is a serious potential threat to Saudi oil supply and world oil security. Financial Cooperation Saudi Arabians have what is estimated to be almost $700 billion assets invested in the United States. Maintaining these financial flows is important to the stability of American financial markets. The institutional link between the U.S. government and Saudi financial institutions has dwindled. Given the amount of resources invested in the United States and the renewed campaign to choke off al-Qaeda funds, the United States has strong interests in Saudi financial policies and should work to reestablish this institutional link. There is no clear evidence that Saudis are pulling their funds from the U.S. financial market post-9/11; yet, it would be valuable to monitor financial flows post-9/11. At the same time, the United States must be careful to use financial mechanisms wisely and with due process in order to avoid frightening Arab investment.
    Report by The Council on Foreign Relations May 30, 2002