Why the U.S. Presidential Election Matters for Ukraine
Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump offer sharply different approaches on U.S. policy toward Ukraine’s war with Russia, reflecting broader disagreement toward NATO and U.S. alliances.
October 9, 2024 11:17 am (EST)
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Paul Stares is the General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Molly Carlough is a research associate for the Center for Preventive Action.
The U.S. presidential election in November could have a profound effect on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and by extension, the future of European security. Presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump have distinctly divergent views on the war that reflect their different visions for U.S. foreign policy. Given the stakes involved, it is important to understand where they land on the major policy questions.
What are the candidates’ objectives in Ukraine?
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Harris has broadly indicated she would continue to pursue the policy objectives [PDF] of the Joe Biden administration, namely to help Ukraine defend and restore its sovereignty against Russian aggression while reducing the risk of direct North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement in the war with Russia. In her first presidential debate with former President Trump on September 10, she underscored her belief in NATO and preserving Ukraine’s ability to fight for its independence. She has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy numerous times, including in the days leading up to the Russian invasion in February 2022; each time she reiterated the United States’ ardent support for Ukraine and highlighted the importance of victory against Russian aggression. After meeting with Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in February 2024, she argued that “international rules and norms are on the line.”
Conversely, Trump has been vague about the level of future U.S. support for Ukraine if reelected. He has twice publicly refused to commit to backing a Ukrainian victory over Russia. At a CNN Town Hall in May 2023, Trump said he does not “think in terms of winning and losing” but of getting the war “settled” to end the bloodshed and avoid further escalation. He echoed this sentiment in the recent presidential debate, repeating his intent to quickly negotiate a peace agreement. In combination with his close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his statements have raised fears that he will pressure Ukraine to reach a settlement to end the conflict on terms that would favor Russia and compromise long-standing U.S. foreign policy principles. However, in a post on his social media platform Truth Social in April 2024, Trump wrote that Ukraine’s survival is not only important to Europe, but also to the United States. Additionally, Trump’s previous administration enacted several measures to curb Russian aggression, including levying numerous sanctions and providing Ukraine with lethal military aid. It is conceivable, therefore, that a second Trump government could dodge the dire outcomes that many people fear, though these cannot be precluded.
How do they compare on U.S. military and financial assistance to Ukraine?
Harris is committed to supplying further military and financial assistance to Ukraine, in keeping with the Biden administration’s current policies. She has repeated the administration’s adage that the United States will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” and was the figurehead for the Biden administration’s announcement of $1.5 billion in additional aid to Ukraine at the Swiss peace summit this year. In private meetings with Zelenskyy in recent months, she also reportedly sought to assuage concerns that U.S. support could decline due to increasing Republican opposition in the U.S. Congress.
Since February 2022, Congress has approved more than $175 billion in aid to Ukraine. The most recent aid package approved by Congress in April provided $61 billion in additional aid and is estimated to last through January 2025. The bill faced many obstacles, chief among them former President Trump and his running mate JD Vance. In February, Trump pressured House Republicans to block a previous foreign aid package that included military assistance for both Ukraine and Israel. In April, when a new bill was introduced for Ukraine aid alone, JD Vance was a key member of the conservative opposition that stalled its passage. Trump ultimately gave tacit support to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) to bring the new aid bill to the House floor.
In general, Trump advocates that any aid for Ukraine should come from U.S. allies in NATO. Since his first term, Trump has called for NATO members to reach, and even exceed, the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for military spending included in the alliance’s mandate. He has often accompanied such demands with threats to withdraw the United States from the alliance, notably saying at a campaign rally in February that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” if NATO members do not contribute more to military spending. Moreover, there is a growing contingent of Republican lawmakers led by JD Vance that argue no amount of aid or investment in the U.S. or other countries’ defense industrial bases will fulfill the requirements for a Ukrainian victory. Instead, the United States is depleting its reserves to the detriment of its ability to respond to direct threats to its interests, including a scenario in which China invades Taiwan, they say. Despite Trump’s claims, the majority of NATO members have already reached or exceeded the 2 percent threshold and continue to pledge significant aid to Ukraine.
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Regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, there is significant uncertainty around the continuation of U.S. aid to Ukraine given political divisions within and between the major parties in Congress. Many experts argue that even if further supplemental aid were to gain congressional approval, it would be a fraction of previous packages.
What are the candidates’ plans for cease-fire and peace negotiations?
Donald Trump believes he can bring a swift end to the conflict. He has often argued that Russia would never have invaded had he still been president and believes that he can easily bring both Putin and Zelenskyy to the negotiating table, though his stated timeline has changed. Numerous times Trump has claimed his ability to settle the war within twenty-four hours but has more recently extended that timeframe to inauguration day on January 20. How he plans to achieve this and what the terms of any agreement would be remain unclear. Trump has indicated in several interviews that he knows both Putin and Zelenskyy “very well” and would condition further aid to Ukraine on their participation in negotiations while threatening increased support for Ukraine to bring Putin to the table. A report released by two of Trump’s national security advisors, Fred Fleitz and Keith Kellogg, detail additional inducements. For Ukraine, they include robust security guarantees without asking them to relinquish their territorial aspirations, while for Russia, they include suspending NATO membership for Ukraine and limited sanctions relief.
After meeting with Zelenskyy in New York last month, Trump told reporters that he wants “to see a fair deal made” to end the conflict. However, when pressed on what a such a deal would entail, Trump indicated it was “too early” to say. Trump has publicly declared Putin’s terms for peace—that Ukraine would have to renounce its NATO ambitions and cede the four Russian-occupied territories, including Crimea—unacceptable, but it remains to be seen whether he will maintain this position. Vance, for instance, has been vocal that any peace deal would require “significant territorial concessions by Ukraine.”
Until last month, Harris did not make direct statements regarding her position on negotiations. However, after meeting with Zelenskyy in Washington on September 26, Harris condemned any peace deals involving the annexation of Ukrainian territory and denial of Ukrainian membership in security alliances as “proposals for surrender” rather than peace. Throughout the conflict, the Biden administration has recognized that the war will end through some form of settlement but maintains the policy that the United States should not dictate Ukraine’s engagement in peace talks. Harris has been responsible for ensuring adherence to this policy with her participation at the peace summit in Geneva this summer where she vowed to continue U.S. support for “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine. In her 60 Minutes interview on October 8, she did rule out negotiating bilaterally with Putin about Ukraine without Kyiv’s participation: “Ukraine must have a say in the future of Ukraine,” she said. Harris also voiced skepticism that Trump could quickly end the war without Ukraine essentially submitting to Russia’s demands.
Will the candidates alter the Biden administration’s limits on Ukraine’s use of long-range strike capabilities?
The Biden administration, and presumably Vice President Harris by extension, have ardently opposed the use of U.S. weapons to strike long-range targets in Russia, despite increasing pressure from Zelenskyy and others to do so. While U.S. controls have recently weakened, it is unclear whether a Harris administration would eliminate all restrictions. The core concern is that allowing such strikes could lead Russia to respond with direct attacks on a NATO country or even the use of nuclear weapons. For his part, Trump has indicated his desire to avoid escalation, declaring on multiple occasions that the war could easily escalate into “World War III.” Trump’s desire to pursue a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine, as well as his warm relationship with Putin, further suggest he would not loosen restrictions on Ukraine’s use of U.S. weapons.
What are the candidates’ stances on Ukraine’s membership in NATO?
Trump’s emphasis on ending the war quickly will place pressure on Ukraine to compromise, given its weak position in the war vis-à-vis Russia. A central facet of any compromise would be Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Kellog and Fleitz indicate as much in their report where they identify the suspension of Ukraine’s accession as leverage to bring Russia to the negotiating table. Trump has also voiced his opposition to NATO membership, calling promises to do so a “mistake,” and echoing sentiments from the Kremlin’s statements that NATO’s encroachment provoked the invasion.
Harris has not yet commented on the issue. After slow-walking U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s eventual membership, the Biden administration has indicated its support for Ukraine’s accession following the end of the conflict and implementation of domestic reform. As President Biden has said, the United States and its allies are “building a bridge to NATO for Ukraine,” but the specifics of what the pathway entails are ambiguous. There is no evidence to suggest Harris would alter this policy.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.