North Korean Troops in Russia: A Dangerous New Phase in the Ukraine War

Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations. Benjamin Harris is a CFR research associate for Europe and U.S. foreign policy.

What is North Korea’s military doing in the Russia-Ukraine war? 

North Korea has already been helping Russia sustain its firepower on the battlefield, providing it with millions of artillery shells, as well as rockets and missiles. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) confirmed this week that at least three thousand North Korean soldiers were sent to the Russian far east for training, seemingly to participate in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Reportedly, between ten thousand and twelve thousand of North Korea’s elite special forces, known as the “Storm Corps,” could be sent or promised to Russia.

South Korean intelligence reports that these forces have been given false passports and uniforms to mask themselves as members of the Russian forces, which indicates that neither Russia nor North Korea are currently willing to publicly acknowledge these troops as “co-belligerents.”

South Korea and Ukraine claim that the North Korean forces are being sent to retake the Kursk region in western Russia from Ukrainian forces, after Kyiv’s surprise fall incursion. Russian President Vladimir Putin has thus far been forced to use Russian conscripts—a domestically unpopular move—for this operation.

What does this say about the growing relationship between North Korea and Russia? 

In June 2024, the two countries signed a mutual defense pact that technically obligates the two to defend one another from invasions. Some scholars predicted they might use a Ukrainian incursion into Russia (such as the Kursk offensive) as a pretext for triggering the pact, but their decision to obfuscate the North Koreans’ identities indicates they are not yet doing so.

Russia is currently gaining on the battlefield and, therefore, unlikely acting out of desperation by deploying soldiers from North Korea. Rather, Putin is probably making this move based on tactical considerations. In helping Russia retake Kursk, the North Korean contingent can also allow Putin to focus Russian forces on their advance in eastern Ukraine, the main front where Russia has been steadily, if slowly, advancing. Heading into the winter season, it seems likely that these trends will accelerate as the Ukrainian energy crisis becomes more acute, and the U.S. election could potentially disrupt Western support for Ukraine.

On a strategic level, this deployment demonstrates an ominous new level of security cooperation between two actors of the so-called “axis of upheaval,” consisting of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. In return for its support of Russia, North Korea most likely wants more military and economic aid and is keen to have its elite forces gain important combat experience, which they haven’t had for decades and will help modernize their military. A concerning possibility is that the June pact opened the door for Russia to provide North Korea with support for its nuclear and space programs, which would violate United Nations sanctions.

What are the consequences for Ukraine and its Western supporters?

North Korea’s actions mark a dangerous, further globalization of the Russia-Ukraine war, likely bringing South Korea and other Indo-Pacific allies closer to the European theater. If North Korea and Russia increase their military cooperation, South Korea is likely to expand its support for Ukraine, including potentially lethal aid, and enmesh itself more closely in the alliance network the United States is cultivating in the Indo-Pacific.

In material terms, North Korea’s military is largely concentrated against South Korea, meaning that many of its capabilities are not translatable to the faraway battlefields in Russia and Ukraine. More concerning and problematic is the massive economic and military hardware support that North Korea and China provide to Russia. North Korea sent eight million shells to Ukraine last year, as well as dozens of short-range missiles, which will do far more to keep the Russian war machine afloat than a few thousand troops. Western supporters of Ukraine, by contrast, have struggled to match this provision of ammunition and weapons.

How is China viewing these developments? 

China has made repeated attempts to debunk Western fears about its alleged collusion with North Korea and Russia. The same day Washington confirmed that Pyongyang’s troops were in Russia, the Chinese embassy in Washington released a statement that dismissed the notion of an “axis of upheaval,” echoing earlier statements from Chinese officials.

However, unless China distances itself more explicitly from North Korea-Russia cooperation, the West’s perception of China as an enabler in the Ukraine war and a growing geopolitical threat will only harden. This could further undercut Beijing’s efforts to improve its trading relationships with the European Union (EU). Just weeks ago, the EU signaled its growing ire with China, agreeing to impose hefty tariffs on electric vehicles.

China is also concerned that an intensification of North Korea-Russia ties could erode its influence on Pyongyang. China and North Korea renewed a mutual defense treaty in 2021, and China so far has been North Korea's most critical partner for economic aid.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.