France | Council on Foreign Relations

The Security Challenge at the 2024 Paris Olympics

French authorities are particularly vigilant of the terrorist threat to the games posed by Islamist extremists, a danger the country has endured for decades.

In Brief by Jonathan Masters Jul 25, 2024

What Do France’s Surprise Election Results Mean for the Far Right?

The surprising shift to the left in snap elections has broken the far-right populist fever in France, but now a crisis of governability looms in Paris that has further weakened President Emmanuel Macron’s grip on power.

Expert Brief by Matthias Matthijs Jul 10, 2024

Biden in France, Future of Ukraine, and U.S.-Europe Relations

CFR experts discuss President Joe Biden's first state visit to France, U.S.-Europe relations, and the future of support to Ukraine.

Event with Liana Fix, Charles A. Kupchan, and Matthias Matthijs Jun 4, 2024

Sub-Saharan Africa

Mali, Kidnapping, and Criminals

Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group Al Mulathameen (translated by the New York Times as “The Brigade of the Masked Ones”) kidnapped more than forty international workers from the Algerian natural gas field, ln Amenas, which lies along the middle of Algeria’s eastern border with Libya. The attack was ostensibly in retaliation for French intervention in Mali, and specifically, the Algerian government’s decision to allow French military planes through their air space en route to Mali. And that seems to be the assumption of much of the Western press commentary. But we should be cautious about uncritically swallowing the claim that the kidnapping was politically motivated. Belmokhtar is “Mr. Marlboro,” the chieftain of a highly successful smuggling ring. We should consider that his motives included the criminal. Belmokhtar is legendary in Algeria for his ability to avoid arrest. He also had a falling out with AQIM some time ago. Western response to the situation in Mali since last weekend highlights the dearth of information and understanding about the Sahel. Hence, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s September 2012, paper “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region” is a must-read. Wolfram Lacher, the author, is a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Written before the present round of the crisis, it is extraordinarily prescient. Among many other things, he shows that Mali’s last “democratic” government’s “…complicity with organized crime was the main factor enabling AQIM growth and a driver of conflict in the north of the country.” The military coup of March 2012, did not end this: “actors involved in organized crime currently wield decisive political and military influence in northern Mali.” It becomes very hard to differentiate between “good guys” and “bad guys,” between terrorists, criminals, and elements of governance. Indeed, on Mali, there is probably too much emphasis on Islam and “al-Qaeda-linked terrorism” (whatever that means) and not enough on organized crime.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 17, 2013 Africa in Transition
France

Amid Conflict, Poverty Is the Reality for Most Malians

With attention focused on radical Islamists, a dysfunctional government in Bamako, and the French military intervention, it is easy to overlook that for most Malians, to stay alive is, in itself, often a struggle. To cite a few illustrative statistics from the CIA World FactBook, the country’s birthrate and infant mortality rate are the second highest in the world. Infant mortality exceeds 10 percent. Life expectancy at birth is among the shortest in the world. More than 10 percent of the population is nomadic; in the north, that percentage is far higher. With climate change and the Sahara desert creeping ever southward, life for rural and nomadic populations in the north is getting worse; even at the best of times. Drought is now a common reality. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, citing Malian statistics, about a quarter of the population faces severe food insecurity. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has appealed to international donors for U.S.$214 million for Mali; it has received U.S.$76.3 million. The current round of fighting makes the misery worse. Very often the popular response is flight–to anywhere else. Oxfam estimates that 30,000 so far have fled since the French began their campaign last week. They join some 345,000 previously internally and externally displaced persons due to the ongoing unrest. The Catholic Information Service for Africa, citing non-governmental organizations in Mali, estimates that the number of displaced persons could reach 700,000. Already it estimates that about a third of Mali’s population of more than fifteen million is affected by the interrelated crises involving food availability, nutrition, and military conflict. This extreme privation plays a major, if often hidden, role in refugee flows and the availability of children to fight as soldiers (often the only means of obtaining a meal). The deteriorating situation likely also encourages the religious millenarianism that underlies amputations and stonings. The UN high commissioner for refugees has primary responsibility for the care of displaced persons. He has asked international donors for U.S.$123 million to fund its Malian operations. So far, only 63 percent of that, U.S.$77.4 million, has been contributed. The funding shortfalls for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the UN high commissioner of refugees together amounts to around U.S.$183.3 million. In a wartime environment, that is peanuts to most nations and international donors. But, it is also the difference between life and death for huge numbers of people.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 16, 2013 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigeria’s Role in the Mali Intervention

Nigeria–the giant of West Africa–could be expected to play an outsized role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force to intervene in Mali. The commander of the force is Nigerian, and Nigeria has reported it will supply 900 of the total force of 3,300. In the past, Nigeria has also footed the lion’s share of the costs of regional intervention forces. However, at present Nigeria’s military is overstretched. There are troops on active duty in thirty-three of the thirty-six Nigerian states and the army, in effect, has the lead in responding to the Boko Haram insurgency in the north. Therefore, it is no surprise that President Goodluck Jonathan last week reported a cut to Nigeria’s initial troop pledge to the ECOWAS Mali force and signaled that his country would be unable to fund most of the operation, unlike in the past. Unfolding events appear to have bolstered that troop pledge again, however. With the acceleration of Mali-centric activity following the French intervention, President Jonathan announced that Nigerian troops would arrive in Mali imminently. There are reports that some are already there. It is unclear what, if any, operational significance the presence of small numbers of troops from ECOWAS states will have on the current fighting. However, the Nigerian presence keeps open the ECOWAS role. France already has around 750 troops on the ground, and is planning to more than triple that to at least 2,500. The United States, UK, Belgium, Denmark, and Canada have all pledged transport planes, and in some cases, logistical and training support. Many Nigerians inside the government have maintained that Boko Haram has links with international jihad networks, especially al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the leading elements among Mali’s Islamic insurgency. Mali has used that claim as a basis of requests for outside help. If such links do exist on meaningful terms, it would seem likely that Boko Haram will escalate their attacks in northern Nigeria in solidarity with its Islamic brothers. If that happens, there will be yet more pressure on the already overstretched Nigerian forces.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 15, 2013 Africa in Transition

Middle East and North Africa

Time for Panetta to Visit Paris

Foreign Policy reports that Secretary of Defense Panetta is in Europe: "The SecDef is wheels up from Lisbon this morning, headed for a day-stop in Madrid and then staying overnight in Rome. In Madrid, he will meet with the crown prince, the president, and the minister of defense, and he will hold his second press conference of the day, Situation Report is told. In Portugal, Panetta visited Air Base Lajes.... Panetta also visited Strike Force NATO, a U.S.-led command in Portugal that conducts maritime security operations." Panetta is also scheduled to visit London. Now, much as a chat with the Crown Prince of Spain is alluring, and as nice as London is,where the Secretary really needs to go is Paris. This would be a useful gesture of support for the French effort in Mali. Moreover, it would be a signal that real American support is coming as soon as details have been worked out, and would provide an opportunity for him to learn first-hand what the French plan is. When the British and French took the lead and made a real commitment in Libya, the United States pulled back. If we expect allies to bear some weight in the struggle against Islamist terror groups, we must be both grateful and supportive when they act. France is acting now, at some real risk, and it is our turn to show that we are good allies. For Secretary Panetta to be in Europe this week and skip Paris would be indefensible. What a signal that would send.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams January 15, 2013 Pressure Points
France

French Enter Mali But How Will It End?

According to the New York Times, the French intervention in Mali to halt the southern march of Islamist forces has gone well. Franco-Malian recovery of the fabled cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal can be foreseen, though the fighting may be very bloody. That will mean fewer amputations and stonings, but it will not resolve the fundamental issues: a detached and discredited government in Bamako, an alienated north, and a fierce popular anger that expresses itself in Islamic terms. All of this against a background of recurrent food insecurity related to desertification. As the earlier example of the Polisario shows, a desert based insurgency can last a long time, perhaps longer than a French commitment to a country that is marginal to its fundamental interests. The Islamist regime in northern Mali has inherent instabilities: it includes Tuaregs as well as Arabs, who regard themselves as “white,” ruling over a population it regards as “black.” Political maneuverings among those calling the shots amounts to little more than warlordism. Especially if there was a credible government in Bamako–there is not, and no real immediate prospect of one–there is a chance the northern coalition could collapse under its own weight. French intervention likely forestalls that option. A “crusader” attack on Islam may draw those disparate elements together, though the press is reporting an initial positive reaction from Malians. It remains to be seen whether this latest “crusader” episode will fuel Islamic violence elsewhere. What about the “al-Qaeda links?” Perhaps now it will become clearer how significant they are. “African solutions for African problems” and the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) also appear to be in tatters. The Economic Community of West African States, with UN Security Council authorization, was putting together an African intervention force, though progress was slow. While there may be a future role for such a force, it is bound to be different from what was originally envisaged. As for TSCTP, the core was U.S. military training of elite African units. In Mali, some of those trained were Tauregs, many of whom defected to the insurgents. The fact that the coup in Mali was led by an officer who had received TSCTP training should also be cause for concern.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 14, 2013 Africa in Transition
United States

Mali: Vive La France

The French intervention in Mali deserves American applause and support, and thus far is getting both. While regarded for many years as one of Africa’s model democracies, Mali had a weak central government and never seriously addressed the north-south regional conflict within the country. That conflict exploded last year, and the timing reflected the return home of Malians who had served in Qadhafi’s forces. They brought arms back with them and quickly overwhelmed Malian Defense Force (MDF) troops and captured most of the north. This humiliation for the MDF in turn contributed to a military coup that has left Mali with an even weaker government--and left it ineligible for American aid. International attention turned to Mali because among the forces in the north--who include Tuaregs who have long sought more regional autonomy and better treatment by the central government, Islamist groups, criminal gangs who live from the ransoms paid by people they kidnap, and those returning from Libya (and these groups overlap)--is AQIM, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. If northern Mali turns permanently into ungoverned territory that can be used as an AQIM and AQ base, it will become an African version of Afghanistan before the U.S. military action there. Prior to last week the international planning to help Mali was completely inadequate. A plan approved by the UN Security Council called for 5,500 MDF troops to be backed by several thousand troops from neighboring African states that, like Mali, are members of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. But the MDF no longer has 5,500 soldiers to field; the ECOWAS troops will be slow in coming and they are untrained and unequipped for desert warfare; and the months needed to get such a force ready would give AQIM useful time to get stronger and take more territory. Indeed they began to move south and seeing the dangers France acted. In previous statements going back to last year President Hollande had said France would not do this, so his reversal reflects a new conclusion that the situation is dire and must be prevented from worsening. French success in stopping AQIM advances--or the advances of groups like the Islamist-led Ansar Dine--are very much in American interests and we should be giving France any military and intelligence help it needs. It appears that President Obama has made that decision, and one can only hope that we stick with it--especially if the going gets rough. A negotiated political solution between the central government and northern groups is what Mali needs, but that will be impossible until the government is strengthened and AQIM is dealt a severe military setback. So France’s intervention is critical and must be helped to succeed. President Hollande has made a difficult and indeed dangerous decision: AQ has already made threats about terrorist attacks inside France. France deserves our full support.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams January 14, 2013 Pressure Points

Sub-Saharan Africa

French President Suggests al-Qaeda Links in Northern Nigeria

President Hollande said on December 21 that the French national kidnapped in northern Nigeria was the victim of an armed group that “no doubt has links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)... who are now in Mali.” Hollande’s administration sponsored and pushed hard for the UN Security Council resolution passed unanimously on December 20 authorizing West African intervention in northern Mali. Alas, it is credible that the gunmen who kidnapped the French expatriate and killed two Nigerian guards do have links to radical Islamist groups in Mali. Nigeria’s indigenous radical Islamic insurrection against Abuja is diffuse, or fragmenting. In some parts of Nigeria’s North, law and order has broken down almost entirely. It is plausible that some group has indeed established links with AQIM, a group that has long kidnapped Europeans in Algeria and elsewhere in the Maghreb.

Blog Post by John Campbell December 21, 2012 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Racism Obstructs Extremism in Mali

In Nigeria, it is often said that the Arab racism inoculates the Sahel against al-Qaeda. Now, there is a credible report of black African defections from al-Qaeda linked groups in northern Mali. Hicham Bilal, who claims to have been the only black battalion leader within the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), defected in November and returned to his native Niger. In a press interview he accused jihadist groups in Mali of racism. The leadership is “white,” while blacks are "cannon fodder," he said. He also complained that MUJAO included drug traffickers. MUJAO controls the city of Gao. According to another journalist, race may also play a role in Ansar Dine-controlled Timbuktu. Its leadership is “white,” from Algeria and Mauritania. Racial tensions within the northern Malian radical jihadist groups could become a source of weakness, perhaps providing diplomatic opportunities once there is a credible government in Bamako. If, however, the UN Security Council votes on December 20, 2012, to approve the deployment of a force in northern Mali put together by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the jihadist groups may pull together. The UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by France, is widely supported in West Africa, and the New York Times expects the vote in favor to be unanimous. The resolution includes provision for Western training and equipment for the Malian army. However, it may be a long time before intervention actually takes place. It is foreseen that the ECOWAS force would number some 3,300, but it is not clear where that number of troops will come from. In the past, Nigeria was the powerhouse of West Africa and would supply a large percentage of the troops for multinational forces. The Nigerian military, however, is currently stretched thin with the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria.

Blog Post by John Campbell December 20, 2012 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Mauritania’s Uncertain Position in Face of President’s Extended Recuperation

This is a guest post by Geoff Porter, an analyst with North Africa Risk Consulting, Inc. (NARCO). He is a specialist in North Africa and the Sahel. One month ago, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz was shot and evacuated to Paris. He has not returned. At the best of times, the president’s absence is not good, but this timing is especially troublesome because of the uncertainty next door in Mali. Almost half the country is clumsily controlled by non-state actors, some of whom have links to al-Qaeda. Is Mauritania the next shoe to drop in the Sahara/Sahel crisis? A month on, it is still not clear how President Abdelaziz was shot. The official version is well known: the president was returning late at night from his farm outside the capital; security around the capital was high because of unspecified threats; the president was traveling off road, ahead of his security detail; jittery soldiers fired on a speeding car. Other interpretations have since flourished, ranging from the plausible to the salacious. The shooting was a coup attempt by disgruntled officers. It was an assassination attempt by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It didn’t take place on the road at all, but was at the hands of a cuckolded officer at the president’s farmhouse. And it goes on. This begs the question of who is in control. Ostensibly, Abdelaziz is still president. He allegedly delegated some powers to Prime Minister Moulay Ould Mohamed Laghdaf. Army Chief of Staff Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has assumed some responsibilities. The Coordination of Democratic Opposition (COD) is calling for greater clarity around both the shooting and who’s in charge. A presidential spokesman dismissed the whole episode–presidents get sick. Where does this leave us? There’s always the possibility of Abdelaziz’s imminent return. The longer he stays in Paris, however, the less likely this is. If he does not return, he could orchestrate a handoff–likely through some compromise with Ghazouani, Laghdaf, and Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, speaker of the parliament. This would probably result in new elections with a President Abdelaziz lookalike elected. Worst-case scenario? The military seizes upon President Abdelaziz’s absence to stage a coup (bloodless except for President Abdelaziz,) which is met by widespread popular opposition. The situation in Mauritania is especially problematic given the situation in neighboring Mali. The non-state actors there have varying islamist and jihadist orientations. Mauritania itself has had its share of problems with AQIM. A power vacuum in Nouakchott could broaden the belt of instability in Mali further west toward the Atlantic coast, and transform ECOWAS efforts to address Mali into a Mali/Mauritania situation. ECOWAS does not currently have the political wherewithal or bureaucratic capacity to deal with both situations.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell November 16, 2012 Africa in Transition
Economic Crises

The Growing Franco-German Divide

Unlike Germany, France under the leadership of François Hollande has failed to articulate a long-term vision for Europe, says the Peterson Institute’s Jacob Funk Kirkegaard.

Interview with Jacob Funk Kirkegaard and Christopher Alessi October 24, 2012
Europe and Eurasia

The IMF Is Shocked, Shocked, at Greece’s Fiscal Failure. Should It Be?

The IMF last week told the Greek government to get with the program—specifically, the economic adjustment program that Greece agreed to as a condition for receiving loans from the Fund. Greece is indeed way off target, but that’s apparently par for the course with such programs. In 2003, the IMF’s own independent evaluation office looked at the difference between actual and projected changes in fiscal balances in countries receiving funds from its Extended Fund Facilities (EFF) and so-called Stand-By Arrangements (SBA). As shown in the graphic above, nearly ¾ of market-based countries (that is, countries not in transition from central planning) receiving funds from the EFF or SBA underperformed their targets in the second year of their program. By this standard, Greece looks like a normal ward of the IMF. However, Der Spiegel reported on Monday that the Troika of official Greek lenders (the European Commission, ECB, and IMF) was now pegging Greece’s budget deficit at €20 billion. If accurate, that would put Greece on track to miss its IMF fiscal deficit target by €13 billion, or a whopping 6 percent of GDP – making it an extreme target-underperformer even by the standards of the many past underperformers. Der Spiegel: Troika Nearly Doubles Estimate of Greek Shortfall IMF: Statement on Mission to Greece Geo-Graphics: Does “More Europe” Mean More Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy? IMF Evaluation Report: Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs

Blog Post by Benn Steil and Dinah Walker September 26, 2012 Geo-Graphics
Sub-Saharan Africa

Mali Descends into Hell

Under the best of circumstances, life for Malians has been hard for millennia. The country faces recurrent drought and the Sahara encroaches. The social and economic statistics are poor. That in part was why the country’s stable governance for two decades was so remarkable, and its subsequent collapse such a tragedy. In the capital, Bamako, a political settlement between the military junta that overthrew the constitutional government and an interim civilian government supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still elusive. The interim president has just returned after two months of hospitalization and recuperation in France following a beating by a mob in his own palace. Amnesty International has released a report documenting atrocities committed by junta forces in response to a failed counter coup. The Malian government – a state party to the International criminal Court (ICC) – has asked that body to investigate, prosecute and try perpetrators of crimes in the North because it lacks the capacity to do so. In the northern part of the country, the radical Islamist group Ansar Dine and other groups have destroyed West African Islamic monuments that are World Heritage Sites – because they were apparently not Islamic enough. And over the weekend, Ansar Dine stoned to death an unmarried couple in front of 300 witnesses, according to graphic and chilling reportage by the New York Times. Meanwhile, ECOWAS is trying to put together an intervention force of 3,000. Yet, as the president of Chad told the French foreign minister, only France (or NATO or even the U.S.) has the necessary capacity to make such a force effective. According to the press, however, there is little West African enthusiasm for French participation in an ECOWAS force and, presumably, even less for NATO or the U.S. Even with outside assistance, it is difficult to see how even a well supplied international force could impose order on the trackless deserts in the North. It could, however, retake Timbuktu, Gao and a few other population centers. But guerrilla fighting could continue indefinitely. Conventional wisdom among those outsiders who watch Mali is that a political settlement is needed first in Bamako before the Islamist tide can be rolled back in the North. However, while there may be little West African enthusiasm for a French role in an international military force, Ansar Dine atrocities may generate popular support in France for some form of intervention. Other than providing limited logistical support for an international force, I doubt there would be much political support in the U.S. for involvement in Mali, especially during election season. So, while ECOWAS may be able to broker a political settlement in Bamako, and the ICC acquires yet another African case, for the time being, it looks like there are no limits to the barbarism and atrocities in the North.

Blog Post by John Campbell July 31, 2012 Africa in Transition
Elections and Voting

France’s Presidential Election: Three Things to Know

Following the first round of France’s presidential election, CFR’s Charles A. Kupchan discusses Nicolas Sarkozy’s chances and the potential impact of a Francois Hollande win on transatlantic ties and the eurozone crisis.

Explainer Video with Charles A. Kupchan April 23, 2012
Elections and Voting

France’s High Stakes Presidential Vote

France’s next president faces tough choices on EU integration, immigration, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and economic reforms, says CFR’s Charles Kupchan.

Expert Brief by Charles A. Kupchan April 17, 2012
Kenya

Dedieu’s Death Focuses World Attention on Kidnapping and Piracy in the Horn

Marie Dedieu, who was kidnapped from Ras-Kitau on Manda island and taken hostage, is pictured in this undated handout photo released to Reuters on October 3, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters) A heavily armed band of Somalis kidnapped Marie Dedieu, once a prominent French feminist, from the tourist island of Manda off the coast of Kenya on October 1. She had lived there for some years following health problems that left her wheelchair-bound. According to the press, her kidnappers took her without her wheelchair or medications. The French government tried to send her medications, but her captors refused to give them to her, according to French news reports. She died on October 19. The French authorities are still trying to recover her body. The French, Kenyan, and Somali governments are expressing outrage. According to the New York Times, French Foreign Minister Juppé called the kidnappers “savages.” The kidnapping may be part of a pattern of Somali attacks on tourist facilities—one million tourists visited Kenya last year, including about 174,000 from the United Kingdom and roughly 108,000 from the United States. (The Kenyan ministry of tourism has requested government funding for a new six month marketing campaign to assuage safety concerns.) These attacks have been part of the Kenyan government’s justification for its incursion into southern Somalia. Commentators in the region have been quick to identify the attacks as the work of al-Shabaab. In the case of Marie Dedieu’s horrific death, it may be too soon to label it international terrorism. Kidnapping and piracy in the Horn are ubiquitous, and often the motivation is money. Rather than having a political purpose, the kidnappers may have been criminals looking for ransom. However, if it is true that the kidnappers denied her French-supplied medicine, that would indicate they were not concerned to keep her alive so that she could be ransomed. On the other hand, the French ministry of defense is saying that the kidnappers are trying to sell her body, indicating a mercenary motive. In any event, this tragedy will likely have political consequences, at least in the short-term. It will probably strengthen international sympathy for the Kenyan incursion into Somalia, and it may dampen domestic Kenyan opposition to it. That said, the history of outside incursions into Somalia is sad, and even with international approbation, Kenya’s intervention is high-risk.

Blog Post by John Campbell October 20, 2011 Africa in Transition