Economics

Financial Markets

  • Fossil Fuels
    Oil Price Volatility: Causes, Effects, and Policy Implications
    Overview Sharp, rapid swings in the price of oil can have outsize effects on companies, economies, and global geopolitics. Oil price spikes can stunt economic growth, for example, and a sudden price plunge can wreak havoc on cash-strapped oil companies. For countries, an oil price roller coaster can blow a hole in government budgets, prompt wholesale economic reform, or alter geopolitical priorities seemingly overnight. At a workshop in New York, the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies convened nearly forty current and former government officials, economists, oil-market analysts, political scientists, and investors to explore what drives oil price volatility, what effects it has on both the economy and geopolitics, and what policy options are available to reduce price volatility. The report, which you can download here, summarizes the discussion's highlights. The report reflects the views of workshop participants alone; CFR takes no position on policy issues.  Framing Questions for the Workshop Is the United States the New Swing Supplier? Is Saudi Arabia permanently out of the business of stabilizing world oil markets? If not, under what conditions might we expect it to act, and what might its limits be? How responsive can we expect the United States’ tight oil production to be to imbalances in world markets? Over what sorts of timescales and at what magnitudes can we expect U.S. production to respond? Is the response potential of U.S. supply asymmetric to rises and declines in prices? What effect should this be expected to have on oil price volatility? What, if anything, can we infer from the last eighteen months of oil production and price behavior? What can we learn from the evolution of the post-shale U.S. natural gas market? How Much Does Speculation Matter? Some argue that financial speculation plays a role larger than supply and demand fundamentals in driving oil price volatility. What do we know about the influence of derivatives trading on oil price volatility? Past research has often cited a lack of inventory buildups as evidence that financial activity was not having a large impact on oil prices. Should the sustained buildup of inventories over the last eighteen months cause us to revisit any of those conclusions? Has financial reform changed the impact of financial activity on oil price volatility? If so, is the impact permanent or will it evolve further as nonbank entities take on roles once performed by banks? Could we see permanent changes in physical inventory levels? What impact would that have on oil price volatility? The Economic Consequences of Oil Price Volatility What are the economic effects of prolonged price volatility (e.g., prices bouncing back and forth between $50 and $100 for several years) on the United States and China? How would such a period influence macroeconomic indicators (e.g., investment, consumption, employment); energy investment (oil, alternatives, and efficiency); government budgets; and monetary policy and dependence of economic outcomes on monetary policy choices? The Geopolitical Consequences of Oil Price Volatility To what extent are Chinese policies aimed at hedging against volatile (rather than simply high) oil prices? Potential policies of interest include foreign direct investment in oil, strengthening relationships with oil producers, buildup of strategic reserves, domestic price controls, and efforts to reduce domestic oil use. What spillovers, if any, do these steps have for geopolitics? How might changes in oil price volatility affect Chinese behavior in these areas? Separately, to what extent is U.S. military posture in the Middle East and elsewhere driven by concerns about oil price volatility? How might an increase in oil price volatility affect demands on the U.S. military? How might a reduction in oil price volatility affect demands on the U.S. military? How does price volatility affect the stability of countries whose fiscal health is tied to oil prices (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Russia, or Nigeria, which have high fuel subsidies and/or are major oil exporters)? Can short, volatility-driven periods of low or high prices provoke interstate conflict? Increasing Supply and Demand as a Response to Oil Price Volatility Policy analysis that focuses on demand for oil or supply of oil alternatives typically underscores the impact of either on prices. But policy could also, in principle, alter volatility directly by increasing the responsiveness of oil supply and demand. How might demand-side government policies—those that promote electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and public transportation—affect elasticity of oil demand? How might government support for oil alternatives, such as biofuels and natural-gas vehicles, affect elasticity of oil demand or of fuel supply? How might government subsidies to oil production, such as intangible drilling costs expensing, percentage depletion, and the manufacturing tax credit, affect elasticity of oil supply? Using the SPR as a Response to Oil Price Volatility What are the technical potential and limits to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in reducing volatility? What are the costs and benefits of using the SPR to reduce volatility in response to discrete supply disruptions or in response to more general volatility? Has U.S. vulnerability to volatility changed in a way that points to a larger or smaller SPR? Should U.S. policy on SPR be reoriented to combat oil price volatility beyond supply disruptions? How would other countries fit into such a strategy if it was pursued? Chart From This Report
  • United States
    An Overview of the Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy of the United States
    Play
    With another interest rate rise potentially on the horizon, please join Federal Reserve Governor Lael Brainard for a discussion on the economic outlook of the United States and the monetary policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve.  
  • Global
    The Finance Industry and Its Impact on the U.S. Economy after the Great Recession
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    Experts discuss the growth of finance in the U.S. economy since the Great Recession and its impact on business production and income inequality, and whether government regulations introduced after 2008 have proven effective in preventing another recession.
  • China
    What Drove China’s Large Reserve Sales?
    China never was going to transition from one of the most heavily managed currencies in the world to a free float overnight. The critical question always has been how China is going to manage its currency, not whether China will manage its currency. The “market” in China has effectively been a bet on where the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)—and its various masters—wanted the currency to go. The reform last August did not change that. And China made its task more difficult last August by trying to get rid of one of its tools for managing market expectations—the daily fix of the level for yuan against the dollar, which in theory, though rarely in practice, sets the yuan’s daily trading band—precisely when it moved to destabilize market expectations. Both the spot (the “market” price for China’s currency) and the fix (the PBOC’s reference rate) had been remarkably stable in the three to four months prior to China’s August currency reform. Depreciating the fix to the weaker spot price sent a signal, even if the actual initial move was rather small. In a different world, it would be interesting to game out what might have happened had China guided the spot up toward the fix first. Signals matter. OK, glad I got that off my chest. Last week’s well-sourced Wall Street Journal story on the PBOC was interesting to me for its information on the domestic politics of the Chinese currency, not for the news that China’s currency is "back under tight government control." For those who like stories on China’s internal currency politics, I suspect it is up there with the Reuters story from last August highlighting the political pressures on the PBOC. And it raises one of the most critical ongoing questions in the global economy: what has driven large-scale Chinese reserve sales? There are two theories. One is that money is leaving China because of losses in the Chinese banking system. According to this argument, it is rational for Chinese savers to flee hidden losses in Chinese banks, even as China is running a record merchandise trade surplus. The other is that money is leaving China because Chinese savers—and more importantly, Chinese firms, who can use China’s large cross-border trade to move funds in and out of China more easily than most—began to expect that Chinese policymakers wanted China’s currency to weaken.* That some of these firms had built up sizeable foreign currency debts prior to last August only meant that they had a particular incentive to hedge in anticipation of any major currency move. Put differently, one theory argues that depreciation pressure is mostly a response to an underlying desire by Chinese savers to move funds out of China, a desire that had been repressed prior to financial account liberalization. The other argues that capital outflows—or to be precise, capital outflows in excess of China’s quite large trade surplus—are mostly a function of the expectation that Chinese authorities want a weaker yuan to support exports during a time of domestic weakness. The available data to my mind suggests that outflows in excess of the trade surplus stem more from expectations of a currency depreciation than expectations that depositors rather than taxpayers will be forced to recapitalize China’s banks. Consider the earlier plot, prepared by the CFR’s Emma Smith, of changes in the yuan against the dollar * and the balance of foreign exchange (FX) settlement with the banking system. The settlement data aggregates the central bank and the banking system, but it is clear that over time the central bank is the main actor. And as a result it is one of the best proxies for actual intervention by the central bank.** There is a pretty clear pattern. Depreciation induces more sales (and, in the past, appreciation induced more purchases). Stability generally means fewer sales. That is consistent with the argument that outflows—or rather outflows larger than can be financed out of the large merchandise trade surplus—are a response to expectations of future depreciation. Stories about the huge scale of outflows from China are accurate. China’s swing from massive purchases to massive sales dominates other changes in global capital flows. But I would argue that these stories often miss the fact that the pace of monthly outflows has not at all been constant. A huge share of China’s reserve sales actually came in four months—months when the currency was depreciating against both the dollar—and against a currency basket. Which makes May a most interesting month. The yuanhas been quietly depreciating against the dollar. It is getting close to testing its January lows. But it has been appreciating, at least a bit, against the basket. The recent depreciation against the dollar has largely been consistent with management against a basket rather than a desire to depreciate against a basket. * The yuan’s value against a broader basket of course matters. But to date the yuan has been primarily managed against the dollar, and outflows for now seem driven more by expectations of the yuan’s moves against the dollar than the yuan’s move against a basket. I should also note that plot lags currency moves by a day. ** For the currency intervention geeks, there are a number of indicators that provide a guide to China’s reserve sales, and the FX settlement data is among the best. The indicator that tends to attract the most attention—changes in total (“headline”) foreign currency reserves—is actually one of the least reliable indicators of true pressure on China’s currency regime. It leaves out the actions of the state banks, and month over month changes are heavily influenced by valuation changes from moves in the euro against the dollar. *** More throat clearing. I have no doubt that the unrealized losses inside China’s banking system are large. They also could be borne by China’s taxpayers, not by depositors. The logic of a run on the currency hinges in a large part on the assumption that Chinese taxpayers will not absorb the cost associated with the current round of bank recapitalization. I am among those who think that China’s failure to recapitalize its banks prior to liberalizing its financial account was enormously risky.
  • Monetary Policy
    Dan Drezner Asked Three Questions
    He gets three half answers. Drezner’s first question: “Just how much third-party holdings of U.S. debt does Saudi Arabia have?” Wish I knew. The custodial data doesn’t really help us out much. $117 billion—around 20 percent of reserves—certainly seems too low. So it is likely that the ultimate beneficiaries of some of the Treasuries custodied in places like London, Luxembourg or even Switzerland (Swiss holdings are bit higher than can be explained by the Swiss National Bank’s large reserves) are in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the Gulf. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) is generally thought to be a bit of a hybrid between a pure central bank reserve manager (which invests mostly in liquid assets, typically government bonds) and a sovereign wealth fund (which invests in a broader range of assets, including illiquid assets). So there is no reason to think that all of SAMA’s assets are in Treasuries. There are a couple of benchmarks though that might help. If you sum the Treasury holdings of China and Belgium in the Treasury International Capital (TIC) data (Belgium is pretty clearly China, not the Gulf) and compare that total with China’s reserves, Treasuries now look to be around 40 percent of China’s total reserves. Other countries have moved back into agencies, so Treasury holdings aren’t a pure proxy for a country’s holdings of liquid dollar bonds. But this still set out a benchmark of sorts. And if you look at the IMF’s global reserves data (sadly less useful than it once was, as the data for emerging economies is no longer broken out separately), central banks globally hold about 65 percent of their reserves in dollars. This also sets out a benchmark. Countries that manage their currencies tightly against the dollar would normally be expected to hold a higher share of their reserves in dollars than the global average, though this imperative dissipates a bit when a country’s reserves far exceeds its short-term needs. One other thing. The Saudis have a lot of funds on deposit in the world’s banks. $188 billion or so, according data the Saudis disclose. That is large compared to the just under $400 billion in securities the Saudis report. A large share of those deposits are likely in dollars, though they do not appear to be in U.S. banks. The short-term TIC data shows around $60 billion in bank deposits from all of the Gulf. That said, I would not be surprised if the Saudis had a hundred billion dollars or so more in dollar bonds than shows up the TIC data. Enough to make it hard to move rapidly into other assets. Drezner’s second question: “Why did the United States Treasury choose to reveal the $116 billion figure this month?” Wish I knew. A few guesses: 1) It got asked. Bloomberg created a constituency for raising the question internally. 2) It is consistent with the Treasury’s broader push for transparency on reserves and exchange rate intervention. If the Treasury wants China and Korea to report actual intervention in the market, the Treasury couldn’t really be holding back data itself. There was a reason to say yes. 3) The Saudis have quietly increased their reserve transparency. A few years back they started reporting their full reserve portfolio—not just a narrow liquidity tranche—in the IMF’s international financial statistics. And recently they signed on to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) disclosure standards. The times are a-changing. The Saudis here are acting more like other countries, making it a bit easier to treat Saudis a bit more like other countries. 4) The original reason for the aggregation of Asian oil has long disappeared. Ted Truman of Peterson is absolutely right on this. The “Asian oil” category was a relic of the ‘70s and early ‘80s. And it is quite clear that the actual U.S. custodial holdings were not hiding any real secret, and releasing the data would not move markets. The reality was that even with the data aggregation, the Gulf was not making heavy use of U.S. custodians. The Saudis at their peak had close to $750 billion in reserves. The Kuwait Investment Authority likely has around half a trillion in foreign assets. Abu Dhabi’s various funds are comparable if not larger in size. Qatar built up a significant sovereign wealth fund. All peg to the dollar, more or less. Yet the survey data never showed much more than half a trillion in U.S. custodial holdings—split roughly equally between Treasuries and equities. If you do the math, the U.S. data never held the secret to the Gulf’s portfolio. Now my question for the foreign policy specialists: did this modest shift in Treasury policy require a broader shift in U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, or was this something that the broader foreign policy community did not care that much about? Drezner’s third question: “Given Saudi Arabia’s myriad political and economic difficulties, what can we divine from this information?” Not much. The change in headline reserves, and the change in the “fiscal reserves” that SAMA reports monthly matter much more than the details of the Saudi portfolio. The basic challenge for the Saudis is that spending now significantly exceeds current revenues, and will for a long time barring a further increase in the price of oil. Imports are also higher than can be supported by current export revenues. The underlying gap has to be closed by running down reserves, selling off assets, or borrowing from the rest of the world. And the size of the gap is quite different if the long-run price of oil is $40 versus $60. Saudi Arabia’s current account breakeven oil price (the external break even is the price where imports and exports balance) looks to have been around $70 in 2015, a bit higher than the IMF estimated. While I am on the topic of the world’s biggest exporter of oil, one final thought: Shouldn’t Saudi Arabia figure out how it plans to tax oil production before it tries to privatize Aramco, even in part? Most oil exporters that allow private production out of low cost fields have a production tax, and many also have an export tax. Some have a corporate income tax as well. Yes, this means acknowledging that oil supports the budget and will continue to do so for some time, but managing oil revenue dependence is part of life as an oil exporter.
  • South Africa
    South Africa’s Currency Falls Again on Rumors of Finance Minister’s Arrest
    On May 15, the Sunday Times (English, Johannesburg) published rumors of the impending arrest of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan over alleged revenue service irregularities. However, on May 16, Beeld (Afrikaans, Johannesburg) reported that President Zuma denied the Sunday Times report. Nevertheless, the South African national currency, the rand (ZAR), fell the following two days, reaching its weakest level in two months; it has fallen 2.1 percent against the U.S. dollar since March 15. Bloomberg sees the Gordhan investigation as evidence that Zuma is trying to get rid of the finance minister, who has been curbing government spending and corruption and seeks to retain the country’s investment-grade credit rating.  Bloomberg quotes Peter Attard Montalto, an emerging markets strategist, as saying, “We think that markets are vastly underestimating the political risk. The arrest of a respected finance minister in order to engineer a reshuffle to achieve rent-extraction aims would be a major, catastrophic, market event from which it would be difficult to recover.” The Daily Maverick, long critical of Zuma, suggests credibly that the Sunday Times report of the rumor of Gordhan’s impending arrest could have been designed to test the market’s reaction should he be removed. The fall of the rand indicates that the markets would respond as negatively as they did in December 2015 when Zuma fired the respected Nhanhla Nene as finance minister and replaced him with a largely unknown parliamentarian. The blowback was so strong that Zuma was forced to appoint the well-regarded Gordhan as finance minister.  He had previously held the position from 2009 to 2014. Few think the drama is over. Warrick Butler, head of emerging market spot tradition at Standard Bank Group, Ltd., is quoted by Bloomberg as saying, “People are getting tired of the circus and investors don’t like uncertainty.”
  • Development
    Five Questions on Sustainable Investing With Audrey Choi
    This post features a conversation with Audrey Choi, chief executive officer of Morgan Stanley’s Institute for Sustainable Investing and managing director of its Global Sustainable Finance Group. Choi talks about the evolving $20 trillion sector, including important U.S. policy changes and her thoughts on where sustainable investing is headed. 1) What does sustainable investing mean, and how has it evolved in recent years? There has been an evolution in sustainable investing over the past five to ten years in both definition and practice. Investors have moved away from predominately avoiding—or divesting from—industries and companies considered harmful toward taking a more proactive approach as well. They are pursuing positive social and environmental impact while also expecting competitive financial returns. Traditionally, there was a tendency to divide investing and philanthropy, using the first to build wealth and the other to make a positive social difference. Sustainable investing, which includes values-based, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) integration, thematic investing, and impact investing approaches, allows investors to align their values or mission with their investment portfolio. Another shift has been the increase in research addressing the misconception that doing good requires a financial trade-off. Harvard University and Brookings compared a portfolio of companies that performed poorly on sustainability with a portfolio of companies that performed very well on the same issues. One dollar in the low performance portfolio grew to $14.46 between 1993 and 2014. The same dollar in the high performance portfolio rose to $28.36 over the same period. And at Morgan Stanley’s Institute for Sustainable Investing, we examined ten thousand mutual funds across seven years of performance, comparing sustainable to traditional investing strategies. We found that 64 percent of the time, sustainable strategies performed either the same, or slightly better, than traditional ones. Meanwhile, volatility for those strategies was the same, or slightly less, 64 percent of the time. Finally, the University of Oxford conducted a meta-analysis of over two hundred studies and found that incorporating ESG business practices resulted in better operational performance, lower cost of capital, and better stock price performance. We’re also seeing a shift in how sustainability factors into stock and company valuations. More and more investors and analysts are asking how to incorporate ESG into existing models of valuation. Whether a multinational company disposes of waste responsibly, monitors its water usage, and recycles increasingly matters. Sustainability efforts are more than corporate reports—they are considerations that can be materially relevant to core business practices and results. 2) How is “sustainability” measured, and what counts as sustainable investing? We take the broad view that sustainable investing encompasses both financial sustainability and environmental and social sustainability. As part of the sustainable investing evolution, there has been a great deal of work in the field to better understand the type of sustainability considerations that can have both real business and investment impact. The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) and the Sustainable Accounting Standards Board (SASB) are two important examples of increasingly-recognized bodies developing standards and frameworks for measuring and reporting on sustainability. UNPRI has not only established what responsible investment should entail, but as a membership organization, it is a platform for signatories (asset managers, owners, and service providers) to express their commitment to a more sustainable global financial system. And SASB has created standards for ESG considerations across eighty industries, helping public corporations disclose material issues to investors.  As part of its standard-setting work, SASB found that climate change alone affects seventy-two of seventy-nine industries—each in specific and different ways. That’s 93 percent of the capital markets, or $33.8 trillion dollars. 3) How does sustainable investing compare to philanthropy or development aid, through NGOs and others? Are there some areas that should be left to private donors rather than investors? Ultimately, driving large-scale positive social and environmental change requires government, philanthropy, and investment dollars to work in common cause. Tax dollars and philanthropy alone are not sufficient to fix the world’s problems. Private investment can play a crucial role in filling that gap. Still, sustainable investing should not be seen as a replacement to philanthropy. Indeed, there are critical situations when philanthropy and government aid should be the first resort, such as when an immediate response is required, as in humanitarian efforts and disaster relief. Aid is critical in these instances where financial returns, cannot, or should not, be expected. But governments and philanthropies also play critical roles as catalytic investors. They provide the visionary risk capital to enable discovery and innovation, setting the stage for future markets. For example, microfinance began as a donor-led space, eventually growing to a robust field where private sector investment has enabled scale and reach. 4) What are the U.S. rules and regulations that have helped, or hindered, sustainable investing? In the U.S. context, one of the most important recent changes was the revision to U.S. Department of Labor guidance around ESG investing for Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plans, announced late last year by Secretary Thomas Perez. Employee retirement plans, such as pension funds or 401(k)s, are bound by the ERISA, which sets a fiduciary duty, or legal obligation, for managers to act in the interest of plan participants. In October 2015, Secretary Perez and the Department of Labor issued a clarification that “environmental, social, and governance factors may have a direct relationship to the economic and financial value of an investment.”  Rather than an external and separate consideration, ESG factors could now be considered relevant in evaluating an investment’s economic qualities. This clarification went a long way in addressing the perception that ESG consideration might be at odds with fulfilling fiduciary duty. Globally, another important development was the Paris Climate Conference (COP21) agreement that set binding targets to limit global emissions. It sent a clear signal of change that may open new conversations on ESG and sustainable investing, as well as the inclusion of climate change-related risk as a material financial consideration. 5) Looking ahead, what is the outlook for sustainable investing, in the short and long term? Within ten to fifteen years, we believe sustainable investing should be perceived as a redundant term. Sustainability considerations will be a part of a best-in-class investing thesis, rather than being a separate analysis. Just as political and cyber risk has become a core part of the risk and return analysis, so too do we believe that sustainability factors will become a core part of risk and return analysis. There has already been impressive growth in the field. In 2012, the U.S. Sustainable Investing Forum reported one out of every nine dollars invested in the United States had some type of sustainable mandate to it. From 2012 to 2014, that figure grew by 76 percent to one out of every six dollars. Though the starting point was small, we are seeing rapid growth, with more than $20 trillion dollars now invested in the sector globally. Another driver of change in sustainable investing is the influence of millennials. Compared to other generations, millennials are three times as likely to pick an employer based on their ESG performance. They are also twice as likely to check product packaging for sustainable sourcing information before they choose a product. And this philosophy carries over to their investing decisions. Millennials are twice as likely to check a mutual fund or equity investment and choose it because of sustainability, and twice as likely to divest—or walk away—because of objectionable corporate activity. As this generation is set to inherit more than $30 trillion in the United States over the next thirty to forty years, it will be significant how they integrate their sustainability priorities into their investment decisions going forward.  
  • United States
    Why U.S. Economic Leadership Matters
    Play
    Jacob J. Lew discusses America’s leadership in the global economy.
  • China
    Tackling Climate Change Through Agriculture
    Emerging Voices highlights new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges from contributing scholars and practitioners. This post is from Dr. D. Michael Shafer, president and founder of Warm Heart Worldwide and professor emeritus of political science at Rutgers University. Warm Heart is a community-based development organization dedicated to building socially- and economically-sustainable communities in rural areas of northern Thailand. Though a monumental step forward on climate change, the Paris Agreement fails to recognize one of the biggest climate change issues for developing countries: agriculture. Poor farmers’ dependence on unsustainable planting, cultivating, and harvesting techniques make them unwitting contributors to global warming by emitting black carbon and greenhouse gases (GHGs). This problem extends beyond China and India (the Paris deal’s focus) to places as diverse as Indonesia, Cameroon, and Iran. By burning field wastes, poor farmers release up to twenty-five percent of the world’s total of “black carbon”—clouds of smoke that count as the second-largest warming source after CO2—emitting 330,000 metric tons every year. And rice growers in impoverished and densely-populated areas produce high levels of methane, a hydrocarbon gas twenty-five times as warming as CO2. Traditional flooded paddy techniques account for up to fifteen percent of total GHG emissions from agriculture. These agricultural practices are bad for the environment; they are also bad for people. Degraded soil yields barely enough to feed a family. To double the global food supply by 2050—necessary to avoid shortages and malnourishment, especially in developing countries—traditional farmers will need to improve land use and water management, and adopt new seed, harvesting, and storage technologies. The good news is that solutions to reduce poor farmers’ global warming footprint and improve productivity already exist. First, they can learn to convert their agricultural waste into biochar and then into biochar fertilizer. Agricultural biochar is a “super charcoal” made by pyrolyzing (charring) rice straw, corn cobs, or maize stalks at high heat without any oxygen, a clean process that is also carbon negative—meaning it removes CO2 from the atmosphere and cools the earth instead of warms it. Making biochar is low-cost and low-tech, and its positive effects go beyond climate change mitigation to food security and health more generally. Poor farmers can use biochar as an additive to improve soil’s water penetration and retention—essential as drought conditions spread—to reduce acid levels, and to boost soil fertility. Biochar also aids in decontaminating soil near landfills, toxic waste dumps, and mines—areas where poor farmers are often relegated. For families lacking clean water access, biochar works as a natural water filter. Second, rice growers can switch from standard flooded paddy techniques to a method known as “system for rice intensification,” or SRI. Rather than flooding the paddy for an entire growing season, SRI involves regularly draining and drying out the paddy, refilling it only when the rice begins to wilt. And instead of transplanting seed bundles from the nursery to flooded paddy mud, rice growers plant individual seedlings in orderly rows. Though SRI requires more labor than traditional rice cultivation, it pays more dividends. Because SRI paddies are mostly dry, they reduce the methane released into the environment. SRI can also increase a farmer’s yields by as much as fifty percent, and reduce water needs by forty percent. Yet many poor, rural farmers are not aware that these solutions exist, for several reasons. They may be skipped over by development programs that test innovative projects in select locations—often those most likely to yield results. Others are distrustful of “development” advice from outsiders, so that even when biochar or SRI programs make it to their villages, they fail to take off. So what can work? Agricultural development in poor, rural farming communities that is spread by example. Farmers are more likely to try something when they see another’s success. Grassroots programs such as Digital Green do this by producing short, instructional videos that film poor farmers using simple, easily-replicated, and low-cost techniques. With little more than a tiny, battery-powered projector, Digital Green then shares the videos with women’s co-ops and other community members—ninety percent of whom adopt the innovation, compared to a ten percent adoption rate for expert-led trainings. From a climate change perspective, the benefits of cleaner, more productive, and more sustainable agriculture in poor, rural areas will be striking and immediate. Switching from burning field waste to making biochar would significantly reduce the amount of black carbon and CO2 equivalent released into the atmosphere each year, as well as their warming effects. And switching from flooded paddy to SRI could cut total methane emissions from rice production by between twenty-two and sixty-two percent. Converting just a quarter of Asian rice growers, who produce roughly ninety percent of the world’s rice, could reduce GHG emissions by 3.8 percent annually—nearly Japan’s annual contribution to global GHG emissions. From a human development perspective, the changes will also be immense, helping to feed the estimated 2.5 to 3 billion people the world will add by 2050. Most importantly, limiting poor farmers’ global warming contribution and improving the health and wellbeing of millions will not require expensive overheads, long-term aid interventions, or complicated, high-tech innovations. But it will require considering agriculture as vital to any climate change solution.    
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nielsen: Ivory Coast Now Top Business Prospect in Africa
    Nielsen’s “Africa’s Prospects: Macro Environment, Business, Consumer and Retail Outlook Indicators” of February 2016 rank orders sub-Saharan Africa’s nine leading markets. The list represents 71% of the region’s GDP, and half of its population. Ivory Coast is ranked first, Kenya second, Tanzania third, and Nigeria is fourth. It ranks Zambia as fifth, Cameroon as sixth, South Africa as seventh, Uganda as eighth, and Ghana brings up the rear. Nielsen cites Ivory Coast’s growing economy and political stability. Nigeria, ranked first in 2015, declined because of “deteriorating macroeconomic indicators” and declining consumer confidence. A recent report from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics notes that the inflow of capital into the economy stood at $9.6 billion, a 53 percent drop from the previous year. Nigeria has been hard hit by declining oil and gas prices, while Ivory Coast’s primary export commodity, cocoa, has not declined. Nigeria faces the challenge of the Boko Haram insurrection that has resulted in some three million internally displaced persons. It remains to be seen whether the March 13 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack at an Ivorian resort signals that Abidjan will face a sustained terrorist threat that could have an impact on investor confidence. Nielsen is a S&P 500 company. It provides a wide range of measurement services that are highly respected. Nielsen’s “Africa Prospects,” some twenty-six pages in length, includes a wide range of economic and consumer data. For example, it compares the price of a basket of commonly consumed items in various countries. Such a basket costs $34 in Angola, $27 in Ghana, but only $15.33 in South Africa. Nigerians—alongside Angolans and Ghanians—are facing rising prices due to inflationary pressures.
  • Trade
    China’s Volatile Growth
    This article was co-authored with Fred Hu, Chairman and Founder of Primavera Capital Group, a China-based global investment firm. MILAN – Uncertainty about China’s economic prospects is roiling global markets – not least because so many questions are so difficult to answer. In fact, China’s trajectory has become almost impossible to anticipate, owing to the confusing – if not conflicting – signals being sent by policymakers. In the real economy, the export-driven tradable sector is contracting, owing to weak foreign demand. Faced with slow growth in Europe and Japan, moderate growth in the United States, and serious challenges in developing countries (with the exception of India), the Chinese trade engine has lost much of its steam. At the same time, however, rising domestic demand has kept China’s growth rate relatively high – a feat that has been achieved without a substantial increase in household indebtedness. As private consumption has expanded, services have proliferated, generating employment for many. This is clear evidence of a healthy economic rebalancing. The situation in the corporate sector is mixed. On one hand, highly innovative and dynamic private firms are driving growth. Indeed, as a forthcoming book by George S. Yip and Bruce McKern documents, these innovations are occurring in a wide range of areas, from biotechnology to renewable energy. The most visible progress has come in the information technology sector, thanks to firms like Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Lenovo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. On the other hand, the corporate sector remains subject to serious vulnerabilities. The rapid expansion of credit in 2009 led to huge over-investment and excess capacity in commodity sectors, basic industries like steel, and especially real estate. The now-struggling pillars of China’s old economic-growth model bear considerable responsibility for the current growth slowdown. Despite these challenges, the reality is that China’s transition to a more innovative, consumer-driven economy is well underway. This suggests that the economy is experiencing a bumpy deceleration, not a meltdown, and that moderate growth can reasonably be expected in the medium term – that is, unless the financial system’s problems intensify. As it stands, non-performing loans are on the rise, owing largely to the weaknesses in heavy industry and real estate. While official sources report that NPLs account for 1.67% of loans held by commercial banks, the Chinese investment bank CICC estimates the figure to be closer to 8%. If so, the banking sector – and the wider economy – could suffer considerably. Whether it does depends on the decisiveness of the policy response. As in the late 1990s, after the Asian financial crisis, China may need to rely on the large state balance sheet for loan consolidation, debt write-offs, and bank recapitalization. But the concerns do not end there. Net private capital outflows remain substantial, and show no signs of slowing. As a result, the reserves held by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) have declined by roughly $500 billion over the last year, with particularly large declines of some $100 billion in each of the last two months. These outflows, together with volatility in the stock and currency markets, have left investors and policymakers increasingly worried. Unfortunately, a clear explanation for this behavior has yet to emerge. Some blame it on the combination of progress toward opening the capital market and an overvalued exchange rate, anticipating that net inflows will resume once the currency resets closer to market level. Others suspect the influence of inside information: The capital exodus is a signal that economic conditions and growth prospects are much worse than official figures imply. Still others cite the impact of President Xi Jinping’s intensive anti-corruption campaign and, more generally, declining official tolerance for heterodox views. Those who feel directly threatened by the anti-graft campaign might be inclined to take their money out of China. But many others may be doing so for fear that, far from giving the markets a more “decisive role” in the economy, the government may be moving to assert greater control. Capital tends to flow to places where rules are clear and stable. Given China’s systemic importance in the global economy, uncertainty about its plans and prospects is bound to send tremors through global capital markets. That is why it is so important that the Chinese government increase the transparency of its decision-making, including by communicating its policy decisions more effectively. Consider the soothing impact of PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s recent statement (following a long and baffling official silence on exchange-rate policy) that the central bank would keep the renminbi “basically stable” against a basket of currencies and the dollar. But the principal unaddressed problem affecting China’s financial system is the pervasiveness of state control and ownership, and the implicit guarantees that pervade asset markets. This leads to misallocation of capital (with small and medium-size private enterprises struggling the most) and the mispricing of risk, while contributing to a lax credit culture. The absence of credit discipline is particularly problematic when combined with highly accommodative monetary policy, because it can artificially keep zombie companies afloat. To resolve this problem, China’s leaders must segregate the state balance sheet from the credit allocation system; but there is no clear roadmap for doing so. Moreover, they should build on efforts taken to open up the capital account, thereby improving the efficiency of capital allocation over time, though this process is undoubtedly complicated by the capriciousness of cross-border capital flows. China’s current bout of economic volatility is likely to persist, though increased transparency could do much to blunt it. Add to that the smart use of state resources, together with sure-footed reforms, and China should be able to achieve moderate yet sustainable long-term growth. This article originally appeared on project-syndicate.org.
  • G20 (Group of Twenty)
    G20 Hopes for a Cure
    Five things we learned from this weekend’s G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bankers.           A desire for better. The communiqué candidly acknowledges growing threats to the global economy, and signals a desire for stronger growth at a time when “downside risks and vulnerabilities have risen.” There also was recognition that monetary policy has carried most of the load in recent years, and going forward more responsibility rests on governments to accelerate long-promised fiscal and structural reforms.             Other people’s money. The problem with a full-throated call for growth is that there is no evidence that any major country leaves the meeting with different policies than they entered the weekend with. The U.S. government would like to see more demand, but Congress is unlikely to go along with new spending proposals. German finance minister Schauble threw cold water on the idea of new debt financed spending ahead of the meeting, and Japan remains committed (for now) to future fiscal consolidation. Only China seems focused on fiscal expansion, though its unclear the extent to which the boost to demand from the budget goes beyond allowing the automatic adjustment of spending to the slowdown. One area of coordination was on infrastructure, where the G20 again called for more spending by the World Bank and other international financial institutions, but the amounts involved are likely to be small.             China gets the benefit of the doubt. One question prior to the meeting was whether there would be an effort, led by the United States, to press the Chinese for stronger and more explicit commitments to support demand and avoid further depreciation. While Chinese officials did embrace these objectives and reportedly made strong statements in the meeting that they did not intend further devaluation, the communiqué largely avoided the type of specific commitments markets were hoping for. With China continuing to lose $100 billion in reserves each month, some will see this as opening the door for further depreciation against the dollar.                 The Plaza is still just a hotel. Prior to the meeting, there were a surprising number of analysts talking about the prospect of an agreement on currencies similar to the Plaza Accord of 1985. Such ideas were always fantastical. The G20 called for countries to refrain from cheapening their currencies to gain a competitive edge. They reaffirmed their policy that exchange rates should be market determined, and that governments should adopt policies aimed at domestic macro balance and not intervene in foreign instruments. This formulation has been in place since the yen weakened in the spring of 2013 following the introduction of Abenomics. There was a mild hint at future possible action in their commitment to consult closely on exchange markets and their reminder that markets can get it wrong, but no binding commitments. A possible new sovereign debt initiative. Among the issues for further action (buried at number 12) is to explore “market-based ways to speed up” the strengthening of existing sovereign debt contracts. Recall that last year, in the wake of Argentina litigation and concerns about holdouts in the Greek debt restructuring, the G20 endorsed the inclusion of new clauses in debt contracts that would make it easier to get broad participation in debt deals. That was a significant step, but there was always a question about what to do with the nearly $1 trillion in existing bonds that didn’t have the new clauses. In a paper I did with Greg Makoff, we argued that the G20 should take the lead in encouraging market-based transactions to swap old debt for new debt, and it now seems the G20 is open to going in this direction. This could be a meaningful step toward a better functioning debt market (but it wouldn’t help Venezuela).   In sum, the communiqué is about as much as can be expected in the current environment—a commitment to stay the course, combined with a recognition of the risks and a promise to do more if needed. Tomorrow, we will see if markets take confidence from such commitments, or were hoping for something a bit bolder.  
  • Development
    This Week in Markets and Democracy: Central America’s Anticorruption Support, UNDP at Fifty, Foreign Bribery Action
    Central America’s Anticorruption Support The presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were in Washington to discuss plans for the $750 million that Congress authorized to help their nations take on violence and boost economic development. The outlay comes in the wake of a record uptick in Central American migration to the United States. Nearly 3 million people have fled their homes and neighborhoods, including 100,000 unaccompanied minors who arrived at the southern border between October 2013 and July 2015. The U.S. funding requires Northern Triangle governments to address myriad domestic problems, including strengthening legal systems, protecting human rights, and rooting out corruption. U.S. anticorruption efforts will be met with broad civil society and multilateral support, dovetailing with grassroots campaigns against graft and high-level impunity in Honduras and Guatemala, and furthering the resolve of multilateral-backed bodies such as Honduras’s new Mission Against Corruption and Impunity (MACCIH). The UNDP at Fifty The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the multilateral’s agency dedicated to reducing poverty and inequality, turned fifty on Wednesday. Since its founding, the number of poor dropped from one in three to one in eight people globally. UNDP helped spur these positive changes through its work in 170 countries and by rallying members to make ambitious commitments through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). But development aid is changing. Though worldwide government spending reached a $134.7 billion peak in 2013, it is far short of the UN’s 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) target, with a rich-country average closer to 0.39 percent. And Western governments are increasingly turning their attention and dollars to security assistance. The OECD recently widened the definition of aid to include military spending in fragile countries, and the United States is allocating more foreign assistance to programs such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). UNDP and other believers in traditional economic and social development worry this shift will not only slow, but undermine decades of gains. Foreign Bribery Actions Up Though only settling two Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases last year, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is ramping up foreign corruption prosecutions. Dedicated staff will rise by 50 percent from nineteen to twenty-nine prosecutors this year, and an assistant attorney general recently announced many pending cases. Meanwhile, foreign authorities are also upping their actions. The UK just convicted its first corporation under the five-year old Bribery Act, finding Sweett Group guilty of paying bribes to secure construction contracts in the UAE. The $3.3 million fine follows a $25.2 million settlement with the British outpost of South Africa’s Standard Bank last December for illegal payments in a Tanzanian infrastructure project. The UK law goes even further than the FCPA in scope, holding companies accountable not just for giving or taking bribes, but also for failing to prevent bribes, as Sweett Group discovered.  
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Africa and Barclays Africa
    This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The recent rumor of Barclays PLC’s potential sale of its African businesses has caused a stir in South Africa. While Barclay’s has yet to confirm any decisions, there is plenty of reason to suspect the rumors are credible. Barclay’s has recently had to pay large regulatory fines for illegally rigging the London interbank rate, they have cut back substantially in Asia, and, perhaps worst of all, economic growth has significantly decreased in Africa. If Barclays PLC were to divest of holdings in Africa, it begs the question of who would buy their shares in Barclays Africa, specifically South Africa-based ABSA, one of the country’s largest banks. Barclays PLC currently owns sixty-two percent of ABSA and, if the sale rumors are true, it is not clear whether Barclays PLC would sell ABSA in its entirety or only a part. No matter how much of ABSA would be up for sale, it is unclear who would want to buy the shares. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth across sub-Saharan Africa was 3.5 percent in 2015, down from 4.5 percent in 2014. While this is higher than in other regions, investors are still wary. Growth is not expected to increase in the coming years, and many companies are shy about entering sub-Saharan African markets with which they are unfamiliar yet are known for political volatility. One company that is not shy of these markets is the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) in South Africa. PIC Chief Executive Officer, Daniel Matjila, has said that PIC “would be keen to participate and increase our position (in ABSA).” PIC is already the second largest shareholder in ABSA with 5.44 percent of shares. However, there is a major limitation on a potential PIC purchase of ABSA. As a state-owned corporation, PIC is unlikely to receive regulatory approval for a majority share in an international bank (ABSA operates across Africa, including Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya). There is wider discussion in South Africa regarding the purchase of ABSA. There have been calls in South Africa for a large black-owned bank. Who or what organization would make this purchase is up in the air, but there has been hopeful speculation about black South African businessmen joining forces to purchase the ABSA shares and make this dream a reality. Barclays’ intentions are still unclear. Times may be hard, but there are still plenty of reasons for it to stay in Africa. Africa contributes about fifteen percent of the bank’s pre-tax revenue, and there are still several African countries that are expected to enjoy high GDP growth this year. It is possible that Barclays could also choose to divest of holdings in specific countries, thereby decreasing its shares by only a small margin. On March 1, when Barclays will announce its full year results, its intentions may become clear.