Military Operations | Council on Foreign Relations

North Korea

Where China and the United States Disagree on North Korea

The “artificial earthquake” in North Korea caused by its fourth nuclear test has set off geopolitical tremors in U.S.-China relations, exposing the underlying gap between the two countries that has long been papered over by their common rhetorical commitment to Korean denuclearization. At their Sunnylands summit in June of 2013, Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama vowed to work together on North Korea. Last September in Washington, the two leaders underscored the unacceptability of a North Korean nuclear test. But Secretary of State John Kerry stated in his January 7 conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that previous approaches to the North Korean problem have not worked and that “we cannot continue business as usual.” The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, responded by stating that “[t]here is no hope to put an end to the North Korean nuclear conundrum if the U.S., South Korea, and Japan do not change their policies toward Pyongyang. Solely depending on Beijing’s pressure to force the North to give up its nuclear plan is an illusion.” The now exposed Sino-U.S. gap over North Korea runs deep and extends to at least four critical dimensions: Influence: Since China controls the food and fuel lifelines to North Korea, Western analysts see Beijing holding Pyongyang’s fate in its hands. Yet, North Korea snubbed China and exposed its lack of influence by going ahead with a nuclear test that Xi Jinping had opposed publicly and privately. North Korea has taken Chinese support for granted by assuming that Beijing’s geopolitical interests in stability will not permit China to pull the plug. Washington is now pressing Beijing to move in that direction. Ideology: It is particularly hard for China to turn on its last ally despite the clear economic and strategic divergences that have weakened the Sino-North Korean relationship for decades. It appears even harder for China to give up the idea that, despite four North Korean nuclear tests, U.S. enmity toward Pyongyang is the root cause of peninsular hostility. This view persists despite U.S.-North Korea negotiations leading to agreements such as the Agreed Framework, forbearance despite continued North Korean double-dealing and renewed negotiation efforts through Six Party Talks even despite North Korea’s first nuclear test, and even seeming indifference to Pyongyang’s provocations under the moniker of “strategic patience” during the Obama administration. Instruments: The record of diplomacy with North Korea shows that neither incentives nor efforts at coercion have been successful in inducing North Korean cooperation. Neither has U.S. signaling (in the form of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 overflights of the Korean peninsula) worked to draw a line designed to contain North Korean provocations. But China fears that additional pressure will lead to peninsular instability and has moved too slowly to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang. End state: Underlying surface agreement on the necessity of denuclearization is a yawning gap over the type of Korean peninsula that would be acceptable if, as more and more Americans have concluded, the only way to get rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons is to get rid of the Kim Jong-un regime. China opposes a unified Korea allied with the United States, preferring to maintain a security buffer on the Korean peninsula against U.S. forces. The broader impact of rising competition from the U.S. rebalance and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has begun to inhibit prospects for Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea. North Korea to date has counted on Sino-U.S. geopolitical mistrust to secure space for its survival. North Korea’s underlying assumption behind its nuclear gambit is that it can survive and perhaps even benefit from an open geopolitical rift between the United States and China. Sino-U.S. cooperation is costly to North Korea, while a failure to cooperate on Pyongyang would severely exacerbate Sino-U.S. friction and competition. However, if North Korea cannot exploit geostrategic mistrust between China and the United States for its own gain, the assumption behind Pyongyang’s man-made tremors may lead to fatal consequences for the Kim regime.

Blog Post by Scott A. Snyder January 8, 2016 Asia Unbound
Military Operations

How Many Bombs Did the United States Drop in 2015?

The primary focus—meaning the commitment of personnel, resources, and senior leaders’ attention—of U.S. counterterrorism policies is the capture or killing (though, overwhelmingly killing) of existing terrorists. Far less money and programmatic attention is dedicated to preventing the emergence of new terrorists. As an anecdotal example of this, I often ask U.S. government officials and mid-level staffers, “what are you doing to prevent a neutral person from becoming a terrorist?” They always claim this this is not their responsibility, and point toward other agencies, usually the Department of State (DOS) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where this is purportedly their obligation internationally or domestically, respectively. DOS and DHS officials then refer generally to “countering violent extremism” policies, while acknowledging that U.S. government efforts on this front have been wholly ineffective. The primary method for killing suspected terrorists is with stand-off precision airstrikes. With regard to the self-declared Islamic State, U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the pathway to “destroying” the terrorist organization is by killing every one of its current members. Last February, Marie Harf, DOS spokesperson, said, “We are killing them and will continue killing ISIS terrorists that pose a threat to us.” Then in June, Lt. Gen. John Hesterman, Combined Forces Air Component commander, stated, “We kill them wherever we find them,” and just this week, Col. Steve Warren, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman, claimed, “If you’re part of ISIL, we will kill you. That’s our rule.” The problem with this "kill-em’-all with airstrikes" rule, is that it is not working. Pentagon officials claim that at least 25,000 Islamic State fighters have been killed (an anonymous official said 23,000 in November, while on Wednesday, Warren added “about 2,500” more were killed in December.) Remarkably, they also claim that alongside the 25,000 fighters killed, only 6 civilians have “likely” been killed in the seventeen-month air campaign. At the same time, officials admit that the size of the group has remained wholly unchanged. In 2014, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated the size of the Islamic State to be between 20,000 and 31,000 fighters, while on Wednesday, Warren again repeated the 30,000 estimate. To summarize the anti-Islamic State bombing calculus: 30,000 – 25,000 = 30,000. Given there is no publicly articulated interest by Obama administration officials in revisiting this approach, let’s review U.S. counterterrorism bombing for 2015. Last year, the United States dropped an estimated total of 23,144 bombs in six countries. Of these, 22,110 were dropped in Iraq and Syria. This estimate is based on the fact that the United States has conducted 77 percent of all airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, while there were 28,714 U.S.-led coalition munitions dropped in 2015. This overall estimate is probably slightly low, because it also assumes one bomb dropped in each drone strike in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, which is not always the case. Sources: Estimate based upon Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2010-2015 Airpower Statistics; Information requested from CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs Office, January 7, 2016; New America Foundation (NAF); Long War Journal (LWJ); The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ).

Blog Post by Micah Zenko January 7, 2016 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
United States

Chuck Hagel’s Revealing Insight Into Obama’s Syria Strategy

Last week, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel gave his first extended interview since resigning as Pentagon chief in November 2014. The curated interview with Foreign Policy is worth reading in its entirety, if for nothing else than the insights into how White House officials and staffers micromanaged Department of Defense decisions; Hagel claims that staffers would call generals “asking fifth-level questions that the White House should not be involved in.” (This would not be the first or last White House charged with this degree of oversight.) However, the most revealing moment of the interview was not an instance of White House micromanagement, but rather indecisiveness. In September 2014, in reaction to the horrific videos of U.S. citizen beheadings released by the self-declared Islamic State, Congress passed legislation mandating that the Pentagon “provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” The most critical question regarding this policy decision was not whether the program would be effective—almost immediately nobody inside or outside of the Pentagon thought it would be—but what direct military support the United States would provide to the Pentagon-trained rebels in Syria. As I later wrote, initial, limited support to Syrian rebels could escalate to a Bay of Pigs situation, where the U.S.-backed rebels were easily killed or captured, and subsequently U.S. credibility further eroded. Astutely recognizing that this question was unresolved as the legislation was passed, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) asked at a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on September 16, 2014, “will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that will be attacking [the rebels]?” The then-Pentagon chief replied, “Any attack on those that we have trained and who are supporting us, we will help ‘em.” In his recent Foreign Policy interview, Hagel astonishingly admitted that he improvised on the spot and came up with that highly consequential policy declaration on his own. “We had never come down on an answer or a conclusion in the White House. I said what I felt I had to say. I couldn’t say, ‘No.’ Christ, every ally would have walked away from us in the Middle East.” If this is actually what happened, it is an extraordinary case of strategic negligence by the White House. Whether and to what extent the United States would provide direct military support to the Syrian rebels who the Pentagon overtly trained and equipped was a major component of the anti-Islamic State strategy that President Obama announced just six days earlier. Either Obama had not personally decided before he made his speech or he had left it unresolved or unclear by the time Hagel and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey testified before the SASC. Whether due to negligence or neglect, this was not a policy declaration that any secretary of defense should have made up on the spot. It is one thing for the White House to consciously leave matters unresolved publicly to retain flexibility as a situation unfolds, but this instance of inadequate policy coordination and indecisiveness suggests that the Obama administration had not even made a decision internally. This is another damning anecdote that reflects on the Obama administration’s poorly conceived and implemented approach to the Syrian civil war and rise of the Islamic State.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 18, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

United States

Presidential Candidates Use of Force Tracker

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. Presidential campaigns are largely consequence-free environments unburdened by the pressures and responsibilities that come with actually sitting in the White House. A candidate can say or pledge to do anything no matter how troubling, costly, or unlikely. The one policy recommendation that every presidential candidate has strongly endorsed during this election cycle—with differing degrees of scope and intensity— is the use of military power. With the sixteen-month war against the self-declared Islamic State stalemated and the percentage of Americans naming “national security and terrorism” the top federal government priority having nearly doubled since April, appeals to force have played an unusually significant role this presidential campaign. This is unsurprising, since military force remains the most responsive, fungible, and destructive foreign-policy tool that a candidate can propose. Unfortunately, the military options put forth may sound tough, but they are rarely articulated in a concrete and actionable manner, which makes it difficult to evaluate the wisdom of the proposals. To capture and better understand the sort of military missions that prospective presidents might pursue once in office, we are publishing the Presidential Candidates Use of Force Tracker. The information relies upon each active candidate’s campaign webpage, interviews, public speeches, and participation in the presidential debates. The candidates appear alphabetically, with each listing containing the military options they proposed, the relevant country or threat, the stated political and/or military objectives, and whether it would be conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. We use direct quotes to assure that the proposed option is not taken out of context, and so readers can judge for themselves the candidates’ seriousness. We include only kinetic uses of force, not shows of force, such as Governor Chris Christie’s pledge to personally fly Air Force One over disputed islands in the South China Sea. The Tracker will be updated over the next year as candidates propose new military options, clarify or state new political and military objectives, and, in some cases, switch their policy recommendations entirely. View the Presidential Candidates Use of Force Tracker below (it requires scrolling to the right), or as a Google spreadsheet.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 16, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Defense and Security

From No Boots to Nightmare Fuel in Syria

Yesterday, while being interviewed by Norah O’Donnell of CBS News, President Barack Obama made a revealing statement about the careful manner in which U.S. military interventions are made. O’Donnell asked Obama if he was going back on his word by authorizing an expansion of U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria with the deployment of what the Pentagon calls a “specialized expeditionary targeting force.” The president earnestly replied, “You know, when I said no boots on the ground, I think the American people understood generally that we’re not going to do an Iraq-style invasion of Iraq or Syria with battalions that are moving across the desert.” It is difficult to imagine that the American people misinterpreted Obama’s pledge of “no boots on the ground,” which he only made publicly sixteen times between August 2013 and July 2015. Moreover, it is unclear how he knows how Americans interpret his pledges. However, the obvious reason that all presidents and senior administration officials initially downplay the mission and role of U.S. military interventions is to catalyze domestic political support. This is because opinion polling of Americans reveals that they overwhelmingly do not support wars that they believe will be unilateral, long, bloody, and costly. Obama was simply following the precedent of his predecessors by first downplaying a U.S. military commitment, then incrementally increasing that commitment and approving new missions, all while consistently claiming that there has been absolutely no mission creep and no violation of previous pledges. Each gradual accretion of personnel, weapons, and missions is announced in a “nothing new to see here” manner and packaged as a wise and minor policy adjustment that will bring the United States closer to achieving its strategic objective—in this case, to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the self-declared Islamic State. When the first 275 U.S. troops were sent to Iraq in June 2014, Pentagon spokesperson Rear Adm. John Kirby pledged that the deployment “will be of a limited duration” and be “a discrete, measured, temporary arrangement to help us to get eyes on the ground, to figure out what’s going on and get a better sense of it.” Compare that to the latest deployment of two hundred special operations forces, which Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described on Tuesday as “a force that will essentially do raids throughout the territory of Syria,” and is intended “to make ISIL wonder…when they go to bed at night who’s going to be coming in the window?” A puzzling mission set where Navy SEALS are supposed to serve as nightmare fuel for jihadists. Consider that in November 2014 Obama pledged that the sort of circumstance where U.S. troops might be deployed on the ground were, “If we discovered that ISIL had gotten possession of a nuclear weapon, and we had to run an operation to get it out of their hands.” Now “specialized” troops will conduct high risk operations to simply attempt to capture and kill a few more Islamic State members, of which there is apparently an inexhaustible supply. On Monday, an anonymous Pentagon official claimed that an estimated 23,000 Islamic State fighters have been killed in 8,600 U.S.-led coalition airstrikes over the past sixteen months. The following day, Secretary Carter was asked, “how many ISIL forces are there in Iraq and Syria?” He replied: “estimates in the neighborhood of 30,000.” That is the exact same estimate for the Islamic State’s size that the U.S. intelligence community provided sixteen months ago. Is this strategy working?

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 3, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Political Transitions

Guest Post: Obama, Don’t Cross the Rubicon in Syria

Bogdan Belei is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. On his way to Rome in 49 BCE, Julius Caesar paused before crossing the Rubicon. With only a single legion under his command, and outnumbered two to one by Pompey’s legions, the general faced the serious threat of defeat if he committed his forces to invade Rome. Ultimately, Caesar led his army to victory and solidified the Roman Empire. But the decision to fight his opposition was driven by the reality that Caesar had only one alternative to victory: surrender. Today, the Obama administration has placed itself in a similar situation in Syria due to its strategy of “degrading and ultimately destroying” the self-declared Islamic State. Likewise, its rigid stance on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s removal has limited the U.S. flexibility needed to effectively responding in Syria—where the situational environment and range of actors have shifted dramatically since Obama first suggested Assad must “step aside” in 2011. The United States has neither committed the resources, nor demonstrated the political will necessary to eradicate the Islamic State or remove Assad. On its current path, the U.S. strategy is unlikely to foster any political resolution of the civil war. If the Obama administration is willing to rethink its endgame in Syria, there are several realistic strategies for achieving incremental goals that could help stabilize the civil war and limit unnecessary confrontations with U.S. adversaries. First, the United States should end future offensive weapons support to rebels fighting Assad, while encouraging Gulf States, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to do the same. In the four years that U.S. and coalition countries have supplied and trained “moderate rebels,” these forces have not decisively countered the Islamic State, or achieved their goal of deposing Assad. The Pentagon’s disastrous train-and-equip program resulted in groups of U.S.-backed rebels, dispatched July 12 and September 20 respectively, being immediately attacked and disarmed upon entry into Syria. Some fighters have even defected to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This strategy has not brought the United States closer to its intended endgame, and potential adversaries have subsequently increased their military role in the conflict, further risking escalation. Second, the Obama administration should pursue a political dialogue. Current negotiations at Geneva have fallen short of achieving progress, largely due to the existing military stalemate, and therefore should be reexamined. This would require directly bargaining with Russia and Iran, rather than just bringing them to the table. It’s true that the situation in Syria became more complex with the introduction of Russian airstrikes and heightened role of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in support of Assad, making his ouster by force less likely. However, both Russia and Iran have strategic interests in Syria’s future, and neither Moscow nor Tehran are politically suicidal. Russia’s intervention, at least partially, involves a long-term objective to preserve its access to the warm-ports in Tartus and Latakia and secure an ally in Damascus. Both objectives require some level of stability and Russia may be willing to deescalate its military involvement in exchange for American flexibility on Syria’s political future. Sijbren de Jong, an analyst at the Hague Center for Strategic Studies, has said, “They [Russia] don’t care whether Assad stays or not. They want to secure their interests, and they want to keep access to the Mediterranean for sure.” Iran is arguably more committed to Assad than Russia. Besides being an ally, Syria is a land-route between Iran and Hezbollah, and the Assad regime remains a valuable asset in its regional struggle with Saudi Arabia. But the costs of propping up Assad since 2011 are mounting and Iran may welcome an opportunity for at least partial relief. If the United States can successfully encourage Saudi Arabia to decrease its arms and funding to Sunni rebels, Iran might subsequently be more willing to downscale its engagement as well. Third, given that humanitarian concerns are purportedly at the core of policy discussions, the United States should consider establishing a “safe-zone” on Syria’s northwest border with Turkey. “Safe zones” are intended to serve as humanitarian corridors for civilian populations, and require ground troops, air power, humanitarian aid, and designated territory to be successful. These measures should only be taken once there is progress on the diplomatic front to lessen the likelihood of provocations and potential disaster. Establishing a “safe zone” is preferable to a “no-fly-zone” (NFZ), a designated space where Russian and Syrian aircraft would not be allowed to enter, because it would protect civilians not just from aerial bombardments, but also protect them from ground attacks and bombardments from artillery, rockets, and missiles, and provide them with humanitarian services. A “safe-zone’s” largest challenge would be multilateral commitment. This policy would only succeed with adequate humanitarian aid and ground forces. As witnessed in 1992 when Serbs besieged the UN-backed “safe haven” in Srebrenica, a lack of military enforcement could result in a failure to prevent civilian casualties. France and Turkey have already voiced a willingness to commit military troops to enforce the “safe zone,” in part because the European Union and Turkey have disproportionately suffered from the refugee crisis. A zone implemented as a humanitarian mission with multilateral support would increase the consequences of any provocations or operations in or near the “safe-zone,” and therefore hold Russia and Iran to some international accountability. Winning the peace in Syria will require adjusting U.S. strategy from pursuing an unlikely endgame that would require more resources and military force than is politically feasible, to one of incremental, attainable goals. This would involve ending support to factions fueling the conflict, which would create the necessary space for political dialogue and ultimately allow for cooperation on Syria’s humanitarian crisis. Without de-escalation, there are few realistic paths toward solving Syria’s political future. Caesar and his legion crossed the Rubicon because of two things: the threat of defeat and the reward of the Roman Empire. In Syria, neither awaits the United States.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko November 20, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Syria

Russia’s Campaign in Syria: Three Things to Know

Russian airstrikes in Syria could have an impact on Syria’s internal evolution, the politics of the region, and relations among the great powers, says CFR’s Stephen Sestanovich.

Explainer Video with Stephen Sestanovich November 4, 2015
Military Operations

Red Team

Read excerpts from Red Team. Red teaming is a practice as old as the role of the Devil’s Advocate, the eleventh-century Vatican official charged with discrediting candidates for sainthood. Today, red teams—comprised primarily of fearless skeptics and those assuming the role of saboteurs who seek to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of institutions or potential competitors—are used widely in both the public and private sector. Red teaming, including simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analyses, helps institutions in competitive environments identify weaknesses, challenge assumptions, and anticipate potential threats ahead of the next special operations raid, malicious cyberattack, or corporate merger. But not all red teams are created equal; indeed, some cause more damage than they prevent. In Red Team, CFR Senior Fellow Micah Zenko provides an in-depth investigation into the work of red teams, revealing the best practices, most common pitfalls, and most effective applications of these modern-day devil's advocates. The best practices of red teaming can be applied to the Central Intelligence Agency, New York Police Department, or a pharmaceutical company, and executed correctly they can yield impressive results: red teams give businesses an edge over their competition, poke holes in vital intelligence estimates, and troubleshoot dangerous military missions long before boots are on the ground. But red teams are only as good as leaders allow them to be, and Zenko shows not only how to create and empower red teams, but also what to do with the information they produce. Essential reading for business leaders and policymakers alike, Red Team will revolutionize the way organizations think about, exploit, compensate for, and correct their institutional strengths and weaknesses. Drawing on little-known case studies and unprecedented access to elite red teamers in the United States and abroad, Zenko shows how any group—from military units to friendly hackers—can win by thinking like the enemy. A Council on Foreign Relations Book Educators: Access Teaching Notes for Red Team.

Book by Micah Zenko November 1, 2015 Center for Preventive Action
United States

How the U.S. Government Condemns or Ignores Indiscriminate Bombing

If you watch U.S. government press conferences, you will occasionally come across a moment of incidental but illuminating honesty. Yesterday, one such moment occurred during a routine press briefing with Col. Steve Warren, spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the command element for the war against the self-declared Islamic State. Col Warren was asked about the growing number of disturbing allegations of Russia’s indiscriminate use of airpower in Syria. Just the day before, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “it appears the vast majority of [Russian] strikes, by some estimates as high as 85 percent to 90 percent, use dumb bombs.” Warren echoed Carter’s assessment, claiming that, “Russians have chosen to use a majority of really, just dumb bombs, just gravity bombs, push them out the back of an airplane, and let them fall where they will.” Col. Warren went further to castigate Russia for its use of one particular type of ordinance: “You know, there’s been reporting that the Russians are using cluster munitions in Syria, which we also find to be irresponsible. These munitions have a high dud rate, they can cause damage and they can hurt civilians, and they’re just, you know, not good.” That cluster munitions are “not good,” except as a reliable method for killing noncombatants outside of an intended target field, is a well-known and established fact. According to one UN estimate, the failure rates for cluster munitions vary from between 2 and 5 percent (according to manufacturers) to between 10 and 30 percent (according to mine clearance personnel). They were subsequently banned by the UN Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force in August 2010 and has been endorsed by ninety-eight states parties. Notable states that have refused to sign and ratify the convention include those that consistently uses airpower to achieve their military objectives, such as Russia, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The latter has led a relatively indiscriminate bombing campaign of its own in Yemen against Houthi rebels and innocent noncombatants. For over seven months, the United States has strongly endorsed and supported this air campaign by providing in-air refueling, combat-search-and-rescue support, analytical support for target selection, and a redoubling of arms sales and contractor support for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—over $8 billion authorized by President Obama in the last seven months alone. One of the munitions that GCC air forces have used to kill civilians is U.S.-supplied cluster munitions—the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, which are manufactured by the Textron Systems Corporation. According to Human Rights Watch, in one attack alone in either late June or early July, ten civilians were killed and thirty wounded, and many of the submunitions were unexploded, lying on the ground in villages and hanging from trees. Of course, the GCC countries have also used a number of other bombs, whether smart or dumb, in a manner that is both indiscriminate and militarily ineffective. Just this past Monday, a Doctors Without Borders hospital was bombed, injuring one staff member, threatening the lives of civilians, and leaving 200,000 people without access to medical care. So what have U.S. government spokespersons had to say about Saudi Arabia’s use of cluster munitions and indiscriminate airpower in Yemen? On August 20, State Department spokesperson Rear Admiral John Kirby stated that the administration had “discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions with the Saudis” and considered them “permissible” if they are “used appropriately and according with those end-use rules.” The White House and Department of Defense have barely mentioned it or even been asked. When questioned about civilian casualties by Saudi air operations in Yemen on October 7, White House press secretary Josh Earnest responded, “We have routinely urged the coalition to appreciate the need to prevent civilian casualties.” Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes claimed similarly on September 3, “We have to hold all of ourselves to the highest possible standard when it relates to preventing civilian deaths, and that will continue to be a part of our dialogue as it relates to Yemen.” If cluster munitions are “not good” for Russia to use in Syria, why are they acceptable for Saudi Arabia to use in Yemen, especially since there are many examples of civilian deaths caused by them? Now, that’s a good question for reporters to ask at the next press briefing.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko October 29, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
North Korea

Using PSYOP against North Korea

Andrew Injoo Park is is a former intern for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this blog are Mr. Park’s own and do not reflect those of CFR or its staff and members. CFR takes no institutional stance and prizes independence for the organization’s members and staff. This past August was a stressful month for Koreans. North Korean mines at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) maimed two South Korean soldiers. In response, Seoul resumed propaganda broadcasts for the first time in eleven years, and the two Koreas even exchanged artillery fire, although the incident did not escalate further. Until the two sides reached an agreement after three days of marathon negotiations, the possibility of war (however unlikely) loomed over the Korean peninsula yet again. To better deter and respond to Pyongyang’s provocations such as the August incident and to obtain greater leverage over the North Korean regime, the United States and South Korea should utilize more psychological operations, also known as “PSYOP.” PSYOP refers to strategies or tactics that exploit an adversary’s particular psychological and cultural propensities and its means of communication. PSYOP also employs psychological means other than conventional military methods. Most importantly, PSYOP seeks to induce confusion, fear, hopelessness, and distrust in an adversary’s mind through sabotage, propaganda, special operations, psychological and economic pressure, or guerilla warfare. The two Koreas have been using PSYOP for decades. The first PSYOP on the Korean peninsula was conducted during the Korean War (1950–1953), when both sides utilized propaganda leaflets to induce each other’s troops to defect. Until the early 2000s, the two Koreas continued to send propaganda leaflets and broadcasts over the DMZ. Since June 2004, however, after making an agreement with the North, the South Korean government stopped utilizing PSYOP. North Korea, however, continues to deliver its leader’s New Year’s address to the South every year and has been urging for the ”Korean ethnics” to unite and cope with American imperialists’ nuclear pressure together. The North Koreans have also been asserting that “cooperation among [Korean] ethnics” is patriotism and a shortcut to unification and that cooperation with a foreign power is a betrayal of one’s country and an act of dividing the Korean nation. Through propaganda, North Korea has fostered friendly groups that promote anti-South Korean and anti-U.S. narratives within the South’s civil society. These groups even conducted violent anti-government demonstrations and planned to attack police stations and military arsenals to accumulate weapons for a future revolution. One of the sympathizers, Kim Ki-jong attacked U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert recently. North Korea also influenced South Korean political factions that targeted conservative interests such as the Saenuri Party and President Park Geun-hye. While the South Korean Supreme Court later disbanded many of these groups, North Korea has amply demonstrated that PSYOP could be used to wreak much havoc within South Korea. By forgoing the use of PSYOP, South Korea is failing to utilize a tool of potential leverage against the North, which appears to be more concerned about loudspeaker broadcasts than conventional military exercises. In the aftermath of North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, the United States sent two nuclear-capable B-52 bombers three times to the Korean peninsula in order to simulate raids over the North. Yet, North Korea did not fire a single shell toward the South and simply denounced the sorties, threatening that “the event could imperil regional stability.” Back in 2010, however, when the South Korean military dispersed four-hundred thousand propaganda leaflets into the North as a response to the Yeonpyeong shelling, North Korea responded by conducting a live-fire artillery exercise near Yeonpyeong Island. Furthermore, when a human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) sent balloons filled with leaflets to the North in 2014 and 2015, the North Korean military shot at balloons to prevent them from crossing the border. During the recent DMZ negotiations, the main request by the North Korean delegates was for the South stop the loudspeaker broadcasts. Why is North Korea so irritated by PSYOP?’ According to Lee Kwang-baek, the president of Radio Free Chosun (an NGO that has been transmitting radio broadcasts to North Korea since 2005), “the majority of North Korean citizens, thirsting for the news from the outside world, listen to the propaganda broadcasts, which fan the flames of their doubt about Kim Jong Un’s regime.” Also, according to the 2012 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, a survey on 1,983 defectors living in the South in 2011 showed that North Koreans’ longing for experience with foreign societies grew by 44 percent and that desire to defect grew by 32.8 percent after watching or hearing South Korean broadcasts. Hence, the United States and South Korea should capitalize on North Korea’s psychological weakness and greatly expand the use of PSYOP as a tool of leverage toward Pyongyang. Specifically, the United States and South Korea should take following measures: The two countries should resume PSYOP, including loudspeaker broadcasts and large electrical screens at the DMZ if the North launches another provocation. As Lee Soo-suk, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy, argues, the [South Korea] has the means to press the North thanks to a phrase in the joint statement released after the recent crisis at the DMZ; South Korea can essentially choose to resume loudspeaker broadcasts if “an abnormal situation breaks out.” South Korea should conduct smaller-scale PSYOP. First, the South Korean National Assembly should pass Assemblyman Ha Tae-kyung’s “North Korea Private Broadcasting Production Bill,” which was proposed on August 27. When the South Korean government ceased all of its radio and TV broadcasting toward the North in 2004, numerous defector-led NGOs began to broadcast radio and fly balloons, filled with leaflets, radios, USB drives, and DVDs. According to Ha, the South Korean government is not funding the NGOs, while the U.S. government funds the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, and the British government funds BBC’s shortwave radio broadcasting toward the North. The United States and South Korea should also funnel radios into North Korea through Chinese merchants that deal with North Korea’s jangmadang (black market). According to the 2012 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, 20.7 percent of North Koreans acquire radios from a jangmadang or traders, and 25.9 percent acquire from friends or the military (the Korean People’s Army gathers radios and other items sent along with leaflets by the South). Furthermore, Kim Cheol-su, a defector who escaped from the North last year, testified that “up to 30 to 40 percent” of North Korean citizens now listen to illegal radio channels and are learning the truth about the Kim Jong-un regime. The recent DMZ crisis has demonstrated the North Korean regime’s acute sense of vulnerability with regard to PSYOP, which could be an excellent tool of leverage against the regime. In addition, more exposure to the outside world could gradually reshape how ordinary North Koreans think and could bring about unification of the two Koreas.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound October 28, 2015 Asia Unbound
China

A U.S. Naval Signal in the South China Sea

A U.S. destroyer’s recent operation demonstrates how the United States is protecting its interests in the South China Sea, says Capt. Sean Liedman, CFR’s Navy fellow.

Interview with Sean R. Liedman and Jonathan Masters October 28, 2015
Afghanistan

Can Afghan Forces Resist the Taliban?

The battle for Kunduz highlights the military and political challenges facing Afghanistan and the narrowly defined U.S. mission there, says CFR’s Stephen Biddle.

Interview with Stephen Biddle and Zachary Laub October 9, 2015 National Security and Defense Program
Russia

Has Russia Gone Rogue?

In his Senate testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, CFR's Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies Stephen Sestanovich argued that the United States should challenge responsible Russians to see how strange their country's military policy in Syria looks to the outside world. Takeaways: Russian actions in the Middle East reflect the doubling (and more) of their defense budget in the past ten years. This program of modernization is still unfolding; the biggest procurement projects are ahead. As Russia's capabilities have increased, so has its anti-Western rhetoric. Russian actions reflect the new nationalism of Russian public opinion. The seizure of Crimea and continuing attempts to fragment eastern Ukraine have given this nationalist mood an angrier, more embattled tone. Russia's actions are a response, as President Obama has noted, to the weakness of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia's oldest (and now only) real ally in the region. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter may well be right that Russian policy is "doomed to fail." But even in the course of failing it may do a great deal of damage, both in Syria and beyond. It should therefore be a goal of the United States and its allies to limit Russia’s intervention. Anyone responsible for the national security of the United States should worry about where Russia's reckless behavior will lead next. We should not by any means conclude that we face an endless, never-cresting wave of activism. If anything, what Putin is doing now in Syria probably reduces the risk of near-term military provocations in Europe, especially against our NATO allies.

Testimony by Stephen Sestanovich October 7, 2015
Military Operations

The Increasing Prevalence of Civilian Casualties From Air Strikes in Afghanistan

This morning, Gen. John Campbell, Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, provided partial clarity about a U.S. aerial attack in Kunduz, Afghanistan against a Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency trauma hospital, which MSF reported killed twelve staff members at least ten patients, while injuring thirty-seven people including nineteen staff members. Gen. Campbell revealed that the attack was conducted by an AC-130 gunship at the request of Afghan ground forces taking enemy fire: “An airstrike was then called to eliminate the Taliban threat and several civilians were accidentally struck.” In addition, Campbell announced: “I have ordered a thorough investigation into this tragic incident and the investigation is ongoing. The Afghans have ordered the same. If errors were committed, we will acknowledge them, we’ll hold those responsible accountable, and we will take steps to ensure mistakes are not repeated.…We’re going to do everything we can in this case to be open and transparent.” If this investigation is actually open and transparent it would be truly extraordinary, given that despite over 1,700 Afghan civilians having been killed by coalition airstrikes since 2008, there have been few detailed public investigations released. The most critical and impactful element of such investigation should be to understand why such mistakes are being repeated more frequently in the past few years. The chart below combines the monthly U.S. Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) airpower statistics for Afghanistan, with the biannual reports from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict reports. Gen. Campbell is scheduled to testify tomorrow morning before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The first question put to Gen. Campbell should be why is the harm to Afghan civilians from coalition airstrikes (per weapons release) actually increasing? And why have the promises by previous U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to prevent civilian casualties from airstrikes gone unfulfilled? Sources: AFCENT, “Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) 2010-2015 Airpower Statistics,” September 30, 2015; AFCENT, “CFACC 2007-2010,” March 31, 2010; and UNAMA, Reports on Civilian Protection, 2008-2015.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko October 5, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Afghanistan

Kunduz Airstrike and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

This blog post updated an earlier post, and was again coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that its hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan was attacked yesterday by air forces several times over the course of a thirty-minute period. The latest MSF communication stated, “At least 16 people died—nine MSF staff, 7 patients from Intensive care unit, among them three children.” Col. Brian Tribus, spokesperson for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, acknowledged airstrikes on Kunduz at 2:15 a.m., noting it was the twelfth in that vicinity since Tuesday, against “individuals threatening” Coalition forces, which "may have resulted in collateral damage to a nearby medical facility." Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter declared, “A full investigation into the tragic incident is underway in coordination with the Afghan government.” According to an anonymous U.S. official, the attack was by an AC-130 gunship at the request of U.S. ground troops coming under fire. This means it was not a pre-planned airstrike, which, under U.S. military policy for Afghanistan, requires a collateral damage estimation to characterize the extent of collateral damage risk, but rather it was a close air support airstrike done at the request of a support ground commander who perceived an imminent threat to Coalition forces. For the last month for which there is data available (August), there were 143 Coalition airstrikes in Afghanistan, the most in ten months. In an effort to document the overall civilian deaths, assign responsibility, and identify the means of lethality, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has produced 15 reports on the protection of civilians since 2007. The reports are prepared by UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit that is directed by the country representative for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Georgette Gagnon. As the best independent and impartial source of information, we have summarized UNAMA’s grim data for the nearly 22,849 documented civilian deaths in the tables below. Terminology Aerial attack or air strike: Firing ordnance from aircraft, including close air support (CAS) from fixed-wing aircraft, and close combat attack (CCA) from rotary-wing aircraft, and attacks using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Anti-Government Elements: ‘Anti-Government Elements’ encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well as individuals and non-State organized armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities and assuming a variety of labels including the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, and other militia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives including armed criminal groups directly engaged in hostile acts on behalf a party to the conflict. Civilian: For the purposes of the conduct of hostilities “civilians” are understood, under international humanitarian law, to mean all persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces or members of organized armed groups who have a continuous combat function, of a party to a conflict. Civilians may lose their protection against attacks for such time as they take direct part in hostilities. A person who is a member of a military/paramilitary force or of an organized armed group and who is hors de combat (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, detained or surrendering) or who belongs to the medical or religious personnel of the armed forces must be protected from attack. ‘Complex attack’: a deliberate and coordinated attack which includes a suicide device (i.e body-borne improvised explosive device, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), more than one attacker and more than one type of device (i.e. body-borne improvised explosive device and mortars). All three elements must be present for an attack to be considered complex. EOF Incidents: Escalation of Force incidents also referred to as “force protection” incidents: situations where civilians do not pay attention to warnings from military personnel when in the proximity of, approaching or overtaking military convoys or do not follow instructions at check points. ISAF defines EoFs as: “a defensive process which seeks to determine the presence of a threat, its eventual extent and when applicable to match the threat with an appropriate defensive response for Force protection.” IED: Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can take the form of suicide bombs, such as Personal-Borne IEDs (PB-IED), Radio-Controlled IEDs (RC-IEDs), Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VB-IEDs), Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SV-IED), Command-Wire IEDs (CW-IEDs), Victim-Operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), and Pressure-Plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). IM Forces: “International Military Forces” includes all foreign soldiers forming part of ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan (including Operation Enduring Freedom) who are under the command of the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), who is also Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan. The term also encompasses Special Operations Forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces. Pro-Government Forces: Afghan Government National Security Forces and other forces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control of the Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited to, the ANA, ANP, ABP, NDS, ALP and other Pro-Government local defense forces. Afghanistan National Security Forces include: ANA, which reports to the Ministry of Defense and is formally incorporated into the armed forces of Afghanistan; Afghan Local Police, which are considered a de facto part of the armed forces because of their function and do not have the legal protection afforded to civilians; and ANP, AUP, and ANBP, which are law enforcement agencies not formally incorporated into the armed forces of Afghanistan that report to the Ministry of Interior. Members of law enforcement agencies lose their protection as civilians when they function as part of the armed forces or directly participate in hostilities. For members of police units which never have combat functions, use of force in self-defense does not result in loss of protection as a civilian. This term also includes international military forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces (see IM Forces). Targeted Killing: Intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by States or their agents acting under color of law (or by an organized armed group in armed conflict) against a specific individual who is not in the perpetrator’s physical custody. Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict, they may be legal. UAVs: also defined as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). There is no distinction between the terms RPA, UAV and drones. UNAMA may be under reporting the number of civilian casualties from UAVs because UNAMA is not always able to confirm which type of aerial platform was used during an operation (i.e. fixed-wing, rotary-wing or UAV) that resulted in civilian casualties. International military forces do not routinely make information about air operations available due to its classification.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko October 3, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action