Military Operations

Bogdan Belei is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Tensions between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea are rising and a miscalculation or miscommunication risks an outbreak of hostilities. Earlier this month, satellite imagery revealed that China is constructing its third airstrip in the disputed Spratly Islands, an archipelago of 750 reefs, cays, and islands claimed—in whole or in part—by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. This news follows a tense summer, during which China deployed oil rigs in disputed waters and naval standoffs between China and Vietnam culminated in a ship ramming. Beijing’s construction establishes a permanent Chinese base in disputed waters, with airstrips that could be used to launch military missions against regional rivals. China has so far only used them to conduct surveillance missions, but this alone has increased tensions and resulted in political disagreements with the United States. As the intensity and frequency of disputes over territory in the South China Sea increase, the situation has the potential to escalate into militarized conflict. In a new Center for Preventive Action (CPA) Contingency Planning Memorandum, “A China-Vietnam Military Clash,” Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, explores the conditions that could escalate tensions between China and Vietnam, and identifies recommendations for how the United States and involved parties could prevent or mitigate such a crisis. For much of recent history, Vietnam has dominated mainland Southeast Asia while China has taken a less assertive approach. More recently, their roles have seemingly reversed. Economic growth has allowed China to develop its military capabilities, and subsequently expand its influence and maritime presence. Kurlantzick says that as the South China Sea has grown in perceived economic value, China has reemerged as a contender for land reclamation and disputed territory, claiming 90 percent of the sea as an exclusive economic zone. In order to exert dominance, China and Vietnam have both increased the quantity of naval vessels and military exercises with their strategic regional partners. The conflict has resulted in exchanges of fire across the China-Vietnam land border and sparked protests from diplomatic officials and nationalists. On both land and sea, the potential for conflict escalation and miscalculation presents risks not only for the region, but also for the United States. Over $5 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea annually and the disruption of shipping in a region with few alternative routes would have negative consequences for the international economy. Additionally, conflict could disrupt the fragile relationship between China and a host of smaller states in East Asia. Paranoia and strategic ambitions may lead to an expanded regional arms race, further heightening the potential for military crisis. If U.S. regional allies that claim territory in the Spratly Islands, such as the Philippines, are drawn into the conflict, the United States would be required to uphold its mutual defense commitments. In an effort to subdue tensions and prevent militarization of the conflict the South China Sea, Kurlantzick proposes several preventive U.S. policy recommendations: • Strengthen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to foster multilateral trust-building and mediation capabilities • Make establishing a South China Sea code of conduct a priority of U.S. diplomacy • Clarify U.S. defense commitments in the case of an unprovoked attack against the Philippines in the South China Sea • Bolster the defense capabilities of Vietnam and other Southeast Asian partners to deter increasingly assertive Chinese activities • Minimize U.S. involvement in any China-Vietnam land border conflict by limiting future U.S.-Vietnam joint exercises to naval exercises and air exercises in the South China Sea For a more in-depth analysis of the fragile relationship and what conflict escalation could mean for the United States, read Joshua Kurlantzick’s report, “A China-Vietnam Military Clash.”

Bruce W. Jentleson is a professor at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy and the 2015-16 Kissinger chair at the Kluge Center in the Library of Congress. Jenna Karp is a Duke University senior studying public policy and global health and an intern in the State Department Foreign Service Internship Program. As the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opens its seventieth session, you’ll hear “never again” rhetoric regarding genocide and other mass atrocities, while witnessing the “yet again” reality. The UNGA passed a resolution two weeks ago establishing an International Day of Commemoration and Dignity for past victims of genocide. One week before, it had held a dialogue marking the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Unfortunately, while R2P was reaffirmed as “a vital and enduring commitment,” the gap between rhetoric and reality is all too evident in Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other countries. Closing the gap between rhetoric and reality is going to take a three-part strategy involving military intervention (when necessary), crisis diplomacy (when possible), and early prevention (steadily, systematically). Military intervention will continue to be necessary in certain situations. This was the only means by which to stop Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 from delivering on his threat to slaughter civilians. Although the immediate objective was achieved in the Libya case, the post-intervention dilemma—what R2P cofounder Gareth Evans calls the “responsibility to rebuild”—has been an abject failure. Libya thus shows both what late-stage military intervention can and cannot achieve. Crisis diplomacy, also largely a late-innings effort, is a second strategy for prevention. In Kenya’s 2013 elections, coordinated diplomacy by the United States, Europe, and the UN helped to prevent replays of the mass violence witnessed in the 2008 elections. More frequent, though, have been cases like Burundi, South Sudan, and Guinea, in which crisis diplomacy has been too little too late—arriving only after atrocities are unfolding, subsequently having limited impact. The final component to closing the gap is early prevention: acting when the number of options are greater, risks are smaller, and potential costs are lower. This basic logic underlies the original conceptualization of R2P put forth by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Even though such logic runs counter to the political reality of postponing action until the bodies begin to pile up, more progress is being made by individual states, international institutions, regional bodies, and even non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to build capacities for R2P early prevention than is often acknowledged. In 2012, the Obama administration established the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB), based in the White House, which is charged with coordinating the State Department, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other federal agencies to ensure the steady attention needed for policy development and pre-establishing a mechanism for crises and other urgent situations. While short on resources and prey to bureaucratic turf battles, the APB has made a positive impact on U.S. preventive policies. Within the UN system, spurred particularly by the 2009 mass killings in Sri Lanka, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Human Rights Up Front initiative in 2013, seeking to make human rights and atrocities prevention more of a “system-wide core responsibility…to act with moral courage to prevent serious and large-scale violations.” Here, too, the results have been limited thus far, but provide the basis upon which further progress can be built. Regional institutions have also made their mark. The European Union (EU) has a number of initiatives including the EU Situation Room, which monitors the global political climate and assesses current crisis awareness. Individual EU member states like Denmark have developed their own R2P-related national action plans. The African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council provides a regional decision-making mechanism linked to the Continental Early Warning System, a data collection and analysis center tasked with monitoring potential conflicts and threats to peace and security. Its “Panel of the Wise” draws on a group of distinguished African leaders who focus on conflict prevention. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework and the Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN) came into play in Guinea in 2008, Niger in 2010, and Mali and Cote d’Ivoire in more recent years. Countries have also taken initiative independently. Ghana has its own National Peace Council, and Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Zambia all have their own national committees. In Asia, there has been less region-wide initiative, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) convened a high-level advisory panel in 2014 that issued recommendations for “mainstreaming” R2P in Southeast Asia. Australia has been especially active, regionally and internationally, by adapting its civilian corps from a solely natural disasters mission to a conflict prevention one, for example. For its part, China has been showing more flexibility than is often acknowledged by Western states, with an increasingly conditional rather than absolutist approach to intervention and state sovereignty. Latin America has a Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and fourteen other countries. Brazil has also formulated its own variation of R2P, “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP). While initially somewhat of a dilution of R2P, it has evolved into a serious component of the policy mix. The NGO community has played a useful and creative role. The Focal Points Initiative led by the Global Centre for R2P now has fifty-one country members with broad, geographic representation. Each is developing internal capacity for promoting R2P at the national level and collectively serving as a like-minded network. The Obama administration must use its remaining time in office to assure the continuity and effectiveness of the APB—Washington is full of doubts about its future—as well as of the State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other executive branch counterparts. At the UN, as Ban Ki-moon finishes his final term, strengthening the Human Rights Up Front Initiative provides a sorely needed opportunity to leave more of a legacy. Regional bodies also have much work to do, including the EU, both directly and in its assistance to Africa and other regions, the AU and the other African initiatives, ASEAN, and Latin American initiatives. And as is so often the case in twenty-first century global affairs, NGOs have their own crucial role to play, as has been the case with the Global Centre’s Focal Points Initiative. To be sure, such early prevention measures will not resolve the Syria of 2015; that requires targeted, more immediate initiatives. But they can help prevent the next Syria. If there is one thing that the world can be sure of, it is that there will be more Syrias unless greater R2P early prevention capacity is built full-spectrum. The world may not achieve “never again,” but it is certainly possible and necessary to have fewer “yet agains”—and to narrow, even if not fully close, the rhetoric-reality gap.

Military power has reemerged as an important component of Russian foreign policy, which some believe aims to reestablish Russian hegemony in the region.

The New York Times has an article that sheds further light upon what is apparently a disagreement within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) about how successful the U.S.-led war, which is intended to “degrade, and ultimately destroy” the self-declared Islamic State, is progressing. Building upon earlier reporting by the Times and The Daily Beast, today’s article explicitly names the senior Iraq intelligence analyst at CENTCOM, Gregory Hooker, and reiterates the opposition of Hooker’s team to the Obama administration’s generally optimistic portrayal of progress in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). What Brig. Gen. Thomas Weidley, chief of staff of Combined Joint Task Force-OIR, first proclaimed in May remains the Obama administration’s position today: “We believe across Iraq and Syria that Daesh is losing,” adding, “The coalition strategy, I believe, is clear and our campaign is on track.” However, as noted on the one-year anniversary of OIR, despite killing a lot of suspected militants, destroying their equipment and facilities, and reducing the terrain they control, there has been little actual progress in achieving the always unrealistic strategic objective of destroying the Islamic State. Moreover, compared to other U.S.-led air wars in recent history, OIR is actually featuring a very limited number of bombs being dropped per day. The Times story also contains two quotes directly pertinent to my forthcoming book, Red Team: How to Succeed By Thinking Like the Enemy (Basic Books, 2015) First: “Some analysts suggested that leaders in Tampa feared that reporting bad news might anger the White House. Others described an institutional bias that makes it hard for the military to criticize its own operations.” Both phenomena are pressures that all intelligence analysts encounter. There is the inherent challenge in “voicing up” dissenting or challenging opinions that contradict those opinions that are openly promoted by bosses. This pressure is especially prevalent among military analysts, where uniformed officers believe that their proper role is to execute policies that their civilian bosses authorize. Where the strategic guidance is clear, such as that outlined in President Obama’s September 10, 2014, Islamic State strategy speech, military analysts often told me that their professional responsibility is to monitor and assure that the strategy and associated lines of effort are being faithfully implemented. Mavericks exist, but in small numbers and with little impact. The second pressure, the difficulty of self-criticism, is the expected outcome of the hierarchical structures and insular cultures that exist within command staffs. Command staffs are highly susceptible to groupthink, a phenomenon that often prevails within institutions characterized by rigid hierarchy and shared values, and comprised of people who work in dangerous and high-stress environments. By design, individuals conceive of themselves as part of a team that should be working in a unified manner toward achieving a common objective. In such an environment, criticism can put the team effort and strategic mission at risk. The second quote in the Times comes from retired Army Colonel Kevin Benson, who has taught at the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) —recently rebranded Cognitive Dominance Education Program—since 2007. In my book, I feature the efforts of UFMCS to educate and train red teamers for the Army, other armed services, and select civilian agencies. I was fortunate to attend the UFMCS short-course as a student, and witness how Benson—a friend and colleague—teaches critical thinking to instruct military officers (often majors and lieutenant colonels) and a few civilians. In the Times article, Benson is quoted as saying, “You can get pulled into watching the laser dot on a target and watching it blow up. After that, it can be hard to hear that you’re not making progress, because you saw it.” In my book, I document the many challenges faced by the U.S. military in developing and promoting red teams within the Army and Marine Corps. As Benson told me, “Red teams as an integral part of the design and decision-making process give commanders and staffs the opportunity to think the unthinkable—ask ‘what if’, and challenge assumptions and facts.” Reportedly, this sort of “what if?” questioning and assumption challenging is not happening with regards to assessing progress in OIR. If CENTCOM intelligence analysts cannot do this, either due to pressure from their bosses or the inherent difficulty of self-criticism, the White House might empower an autonomous and impartial red team to evaluate the war against the Islamic State. That is, assuming Obama administration officials want to hear the potentially bad news from an independent set of outside analysts.

Yesterday, the New York Times published an infographic, “Death in Syria,” that presents the more than 200,000 combatants and noncombatants who have been killed in the four-and-a-half-year Syrian civil war. The Times’ website relies upon estimates “provided by the Violations Documentation Center [VDC] and are as of Sept. 9, 2015.” This non-governmental organization (NGO) claims to use a three-stage process for gathering and documenting information from within Syria, and verifying its accuracy to the best extent possible. The VDC notes that it strives for “conveying the truth as it is on the condition that those data and information are being regularly reviewed, checked and revised.” These fatality estimates used by the Times should therefore be viewed with an understanding of the inherent difficulties of reporting from within Syria, and the conscious or unconscious biases often found within NGOs. The VDC categorization and numbers conflict significantly with those published by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a human rights NGO based in London—as you can see from the SOHR chart at the very bottom of this post. Even the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights decided to stop providing public estimates of casualties in January 2014, because it could no longer guarantee that the source material for its estimates was accurate. Nevertheless, the Times’ presentation of the VDC data is illuminating for policy discussions about whether and how to intervene militarily in Syria. Consistent with earlier analyses, most people who have tragically lost their lives in Syria are not civilians, but rather active combatants. This is worth bearing in mind when U.S. Senators repeat the inaccurate statement that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has “massacred” 200,000 of his own people. The Syrian security forces under Assad’s authority have perpetrated an untold number of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and as the head of state he must be held accountable by a post-conflict special tribunal for Syria. However, those advocating the use of force to protect civilians should recognize that there first must be an end to the fighting between the combatants, within which civilians have suffered and died tremendously. More specifically, as I wrote almost two years ago, any proposal for using force to protect civilians in Syria must take into account how noncombatants are actually being killed and injured. Note that of the 85,404 civilians estimated to have been killed (by both regime and rebel forces) by the VDC, just 22 percent were killed by Syrian government air attacks. (This includes over one hundred civilians killed by air-launched missiles while shopping in a Douma marketplace on August 16.) Those who propose a no-fly-zone (NFZ) or “cratering” Syrian Air Force runways should recognize that these tactical responses will do nothing to save the lives of most Syrian civilians. Moreover, as was the case with other NFZs throughout history, the Assad regime will simply reprioritize its offensive operations from air power to infantry and artillery attacks, which combined are already killing most Syrian civilians. Of course, the United States and a coalition of outside states could intervene in Syria to protect civilians from such infantry and artillery attacks, as well as the many disappearances by the regime and rebel forces. I have written about what these time-tested military countermeasures consist of: counter-sniper tactics, counter-battery radars and fire, and infantry “movement to contact” operations to clear out Syrian and pro-government militia ground forces that threaten civilian populations. Yet, these operations require a level of cost, commitment, risk, and uncertainty that intervention proponents are apparently unwilling to accept, including a significant number of the unthinkable—“boots on the ground.” So when policymakers and pundits advocate intervening in the Syrian civil war to save civilians, consider whether their proposals would actually achieve this intended objective. Sources: Violations Documentation Center, September 14, 2015; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, August 5, 2015.

On July 22, after months of negotiations, Turkey finally agreed to allow the United States to use its bases, most importantly Incirlik Air Base, for manned and unmanned strike sorties against the self-declared Islamic State. Prior to this, Turkey had only permitted that its sovereign territory be used for unarmed surveillance drone flights and (apparently) a combat search and rescue element. This latest development was characterized as a “game-changer” by a senior Obama administration official, in particular for more intensive bombing of the Islamic State in northern Syria. Rather than flying from carriers or Persian Gulf bases, flying out of Incirlik significantly increases the time that coalition strike aircraft can loiter above Islamic State-controlled territories and, potentially, provide close air support for coalition-backed opposition forces on the ground, including the Pentagon-trained rebels that entered Syria on July 12. On August 5, the United States began conducting armed Reaper strikes from Incirlik into Syria. Four days later, six F-16s and three hundred support personnel were deployed from Aviano, Italy to Incirlik; there are also an unknown number of aerial refuelers. On August 12, the United States began flying those F-16s out of Incirlik to attack Islamic State militants, fighting positions, and equipment in Syria. Late last week, Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Killea, chief of staff of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, described access to Incirlik as “a fantastic, strategic location for us to fly from to support anti-ISIL efforts in Syria and Iraq,” adding “the broader use of Incirlik for air operations in Syria is already proving to be a great effects multiplier on the battlefield. Armed [remotely piloted aircraft], strike fighters and aerial refueling tankers originating from Turkey have combined to produce devastating effects against ISIL targets.” In the limited time since the United States has had expanded access to Incirlik, the devastating effects against the Islamic State have not been apparent. Turkey may be placing restrictions on which opposition force ground units the United States can support: the Turkish Foreign Minister spokesperson has said, “Support to People’s Protection Units (YPG) is not one of the elements of the agreement,” while the State Department spokesperson said the opposite two days earlier: “[YPG] have already benefited from coalition air support.” There also might be fewer readily available Islamic State targets that the F-16s and Reapers have been authorized to strike. Finally, after an initial limited number of strikes on July 23, Turkey itself has apparently not conducted any additional strikes against the Islamic State in Syria. Whatever the reasons, the data shows that—like other purported incremental and tactical enhancements to the war against the Islamic State—access to Incirlik has not been a “game-changer.” For the anti-Islamic State airpower coalition, including the United States, there have been fewer airstrikes in Syria in the thirteen days after Incirlik was made available, than in the thirteen days before. The wholly unrealistic strategic objective of “destroying” the Islamic State is no closer to fruition.

This week marks the one-year anniversary of the U.S.-led airwar against the self-declared Islamic State, which in October 2014 was named Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). What began with “targeted strikes against ISIL terrorist convoys” to protect the Iraqi city of Erbil, according to President Obama, expanded into a pledge “to degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State, which has recently been altered to “lasting defeat,” by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. Some U.S. military officials consistently claim that the Islamic State is losing because “they’re defending more than they’re on the offensive. Their attacks are smaller, they are more focused, and they’re less enduring,” as Brig. Gen. Kevin Killea, chief of staff of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR, described it on July 31. Other officials echo the sentiment of Lt. Gen. Bob Neller, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 23 that the Islamic State was not winning: “I don’t believe they’re winning either, I believe they’re at a stalemate.” Everybody in uniform or the U.S. intelligence community that I have spoken to about this would either agree with Neller’s assessment or be more pessimistic about the U.S.-led coalition’s progress toward either Obama or Carter’s declared strategic objective. The one thing that has certainly been achieved, which is unsurprising given the nearly four hundred strike aircraft involved and benign air defense environment, is a tremendous number of suspected fighters have been killed (12,000 by the last estimate provided in May) and their assorted equipment and fighting positions have been destroyed (10,684, according to the Pentagon). As I demonstrated last month, this airwar is relatively limited when compared with recent U.S.-led air campaigns. In many ways this intervention resembles the Iraqi no-fly-zones of the 1990s, where pilots operated under rules of engagement that allow them to do just enough to give the appearance of doing something. “Groundhog Day” was how the commander of the northern no-fly-zone described it to me. Although the Obama administration gave no estimate of how long this air war would last early on, by late fall they settled upon three years, while outgoing Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno recently estimated “10 to 20 years.” To visualize progress during this first year of war, please see the two charts provided below. Understand that these are based upon data provided by the U.S. military, specifically the U.S. Air Force Central Command and the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR.  The first chart covers the overall strike sorties by the United States and coalition partners from August 8, 2014 through August 8, 2015. The second chart is a month-by-month breakdown. Source: Public Affairs Office, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve. Source: U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Airpower Summaries.

  On September 16, 2014, there was a brief exchange regarding the nascent war against the self-declared Islamic State—totally unnoticed at the time—between the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the secretary of defense: Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): We are now recruiting these young men to go and fight in Syria against ISIL [Islamic State], but if they’re attacked by Bashar Assad, we’re not gonna help them? Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel: They will defend themselves, Senator. McCain: Will we help them against Assad’s air… Hagel: We will help them and we will support them, as we have trained them. McCain: How will we help them—will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that will be attacking them? Hagel: Any attack on those that we have trained and who are supporting us, we will help ‘em. Nine days later, then-Pentagon spokesperson Rear Adm. John Kirby further confirmed this policy position: “The secretary was clear in his testimony that, once we have trained opposition forces, should they come under attack, we would defend them.” Thus, this broad policy guidance—that the United States would “help” and “defend” any Syrian rebels that went through the Congressionally-mandated and Pentagon-directed train-and-equip program—was clear from the very beginning. However, the manner in which Obama administration officials refuse to publicly provide any further clarifying information about this highly consequential position reveals a lot about how it goes to war. Every member of Congress or staffer who I spoke with in the past ten months was tremendously troubled by the lack of clarity about the U.S. commitment to these rebels and the likelihood that they would make a difference on the ground. Subsequently, on multiple occasions, policymakers appropriately pressed administration officials for further clarification of precisely when, how, and on what legal basis the United States would support and directly defend Pentagon-trained rebels. In short, they simply refused to provide an answer. Starting with then-Secretary of Defense Hagel back in September: “We haven’t really done anything but come up with a concept.” Then, Secretary of State John Kerry in February: “Defending those who are engaged in the fight of ISIL, it seems to me, is an important part of defeating ISIL. But that’s a debate as to how that’s implemented that is taking place in the administration.” More recently, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter passed when asked again: “We have an obligation….We’re going to have to decide exactly under what conditions and what way we’ll make that tactical decision when we introduce them.” These non-answers are essential to keep in mind given Adam Entous’ reporting in today’s Wall Street Journal. Weeks after the first small group of Pentagon-trained rebels were deployed back into northern Syria, the Obama administration has chosen to defend them against absolutely any force that attacks them. An unnamed senior military official is quoted as saying: “For offensive operations, it’s ISIS only. But if attacked, we’ll defend them against anyone who’s attacking them. We’re not looking to engage the regime, but we’ve made a commitment to help defend these people.” This truly significant decision, which more deeply commits U.S. credibility and military power to the outcome of the Syrian civil war, comes not from behind a White House or Pentagon podium, but rather from an anonymous official speaking to a reporter. This should have been declared publicly by President Obama or Secretary Carter, who should have then been willing to answer some of the clarifying questions that administration officials have refused to address in Congressional hearings. A final point about the way that the Obama administration goes to war is that the legal basis for this policy decision is totally unclear. As noted, administration officials have been questioned about this multiple times by Congress and been told basically, “we will get back to you.” On March 3, when Congress was still going through the motions of debating an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) asked Secretary Carter: Under the authorization to use military force, can we protect the people we train against an attack by Assad?... I’ve asked the White House general counsel this very question. And he told me very quickly, no. The AUMF would not allow the United States, to engage the air forces of Assad. That is not included within the authorization. So that to me is a very important point. Could you check with the White House and see where they come out on this at a later time? Whether the White House ever provided an answer to this question is unknown, but it is now beside the point since Congress has still not authorized this latest open-ended war that began one year ago this week. Or, if there is a legal basis for which the Obama administration has made this latest policy decision to protect Pentagon-backed rebels from the Assad regime, it has never been stated publicly. Again, the White House or the Pentagon should immediately articulate this legal basis publicly, but given their pattern of behavior we certainly should not expect them to do so.

Samantha Andrews is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the United States provides targeting assistance to the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council in Yemen, it should consider that its allies’ standards for target selection may be less rigorous. However, the United States is still partially responsible for airstrikes enabled with its intelligence. Contrary to the official U.S. position that it remains in a “non-combat advisory and coordinating role to the Saudi-led campaign,” this enabling support makes the United States a combatant in the Yemen air campaign. Even if the United States is not pulling the trigger, the “live intelligence feeds from surveillance flights over Yemen” that “help Saudi Arabia decide what and where to bomb” are indispensable for the launch of airstrikes against Houthi rebels. Recognizing U.S. responsibility and enabling combat role could help to limit the inextricably high number of civilian casualties resulting from coalition airstrikes by increasingly accountability among allies. Shortly after the Saudi-led coalition began Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen on March 26, the United Nations reported the first civilian casualties. On March 31, an airstrike hit a dairy factory, killing 31 civilians. Since then, the United Nations reported on at least 9 other airstrikes that killed a total of 329 civilians, including at least 35 children, and wounded 356 others. This includes an incident on July 6 when coalition airstrikes hit two separate provinces, killing 76, but excludes the initial estimates from July 24 that airstrikes reportedly killed at least 120 civilians. Even though U.S. intelligence is indispensable for coalition airstrikes, the Obama administration’s response to reports of civilian casualties has been to shift the blame to the Saudis or Houthi rebels. On May 6, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest responded to a question about concerns for civilian casualties stating, “We certainly are pleased that the Saudis have indicated a willingness to scale back their military efforts, but we haven’t seen a corresponding response from the Houthi rebels.” Later, on July 6, State Department Spokesperson John Kirby responded to a direct question about the Saudi-led coalition’s “pattern of attacks, destroying civilian homes and resulting in scores of civilian deaths and injuries” by suggesting that he would let Saudi Arabia “speak to their operational capabilities and performance.” In both cases, there was no mention of the U.S. role. There is precedent for providing joint targeting assistance to U.S. allies while avoiding culpability for civilian casualties resulting from airstrikes. In 2007, the United States established the Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell in Ankara, Turkey to provide real-time intelligence feeds to the Turkish military targeting Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, members in northern Iraq. Similar to the advisory role that the United States plays in the Saudi-led coalition, the United States worked “side-by-side” with the Turkish military “to analyze incoming intelligence.” In total, U.S. intelligence facilitated over two hundred cross-border and artillery strikes. Yet, when the Turkish military used surveillance from a U.S Predator drone on December 8, 2011, to mistakenly drop a bomb that killed thirty-four civilians, a senior Pentagon official announced, “The Turks made the call. It wasn’t an American decision.” This response reveals consequential flaws in joint target selection. According to a former senior U.S. military official involved in sharing intelligence with Turkey before the December attack, he and his fellow officers were troubled by the Turks notion of “guilt by association” in selecting targets. Whereas U.S. standards for target selection seek a high degree of confidence in discriminating between combatants and non-combatants, the Turkish military blurred this distinction. Further, the U.S. Predator drone that initially identified the civilian caravan was asked to fly offsite before the airstrike. Only when the drone was out of range, and could no longer monitor the attack, did Turkish warplanes strike. Subsequently, any potential intelligence the United States could have provided to the Turkish military about the civilian nature of the caravan was missed. Startlingly, U.S. officials admitted that compliance with Turkish requests was standard procedure. To minimize civilian casualties in Yemen, the Obama administration should consider the lessons from the Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell. Specifically, it should reevaluate its assistance to Saudi Arabia to make it contingent upon greater involvement in joint target selection and approval. Live intelligence feeds from drones should be used to conduct damage assessment, including confirming the impact of the weapon. In an environment where the United States and its allies have limited intelligence on the ground, these considerations would encourage allies to exercise greater discrimination and alleviate potentially negative consequences for the United States. As the Obama administration seeks “to mobilize allies and partners to share the burden” of military action, it should bear in mind that U.S. allies will not always apply the same rigorous standards to avoid civilian casualties. When airstrikes are enabled with U.S. intelligence, the country should acknowledge its enabling role, accepting at least partial responsibility for the collateral damage, and hold its partners to higher standards. Only then can the United States begin to put in place joint targeting measures to minimize civilian casualties.

Dion Nissenbaum, “Turkey to Let U.S. Military Launch Strikes Against Islamic State From Turkish Soil,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2015. The deal, agreed to by President Barack Obama and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will allow the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey to send manned and unmanned planes to attack Islamic State fighters, the officials said. The two leaders spoke on Wednesday, the White House said. (3PA:  In an earlier book, I wrote extensively about the limits that Turkey placed on U.S. military access to Incirlik airbase from 1991 to 2003. For an abridged version, see my article about why U.S. drones can’t fly from or over every single country: “For example, basing rights agreements can limit the number of civilian, military, and contractor personnel at an airbase or post; what access they have to the electromagnetic spectrum; what types of aircraft they can fly; how many sorties they can conduct per day; when those sorties can occur and how long they can last; whether the aircraft can drop bombs on another country and what sort of bombs; and whether they can use lethal force in self-defense. When the United States led the enforcement of the northern no-fly zone over Iraq from the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey from 1991 to 2003, a Turkish military official at the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher was always on board U.S. Air Force AWACS planes, monitoring the airspace to assure that the United States did not violate its highly restrictive basing agreement.”) James Dobbins, et al., “Choices for America in a Turbulent World,” RAND Corporation, 2015. Today, the United States faces no existential threat; rather, it confronts an unusually wide and diverse array of challenges. (p. xiv) (3PA: This key finding from a major new RAND study is worth keeping in mind as Pentagon officials continuously claim that Russia poses an “existential threat” to the United States.) JASON, The Mitre Group, “Open and Crowd-Sourced Data for Treaty Verification,” October 2014. Rapid advances in technology have led to the global proliferation of inexpensive, networked sensors that are now providing significant new levels of societal transparency. As a result of the increase in quality, quantity, connectivity and availability of open information and crowd-sourced analysis, the landscape for verifying compliance with international treaties has been greatly broadened. Of comparable importance is the impact more generally on tracking activities potentially threatening to US and international security. These technologies present both challenges and opportunities for the government to make effective use of the available information and analysis. Agility will be required in adopting the new technologies and exploiting the data. To this end, government should give high priority to 1) tracking public sector activities involving sensor development and data sharing in support of increased transparency; and 2) developing a strategic plan for keeping up with the evolving protocols for collecting, transmitting and analyzing the resulting data. The data are significant in arms control treaty verification and monitoring. Raw data obtained by these public means may be reliably validated by independent confirmation, supported by checks for internal consistency from quantitative analysis of the clutter (as distinct from errors) in the data. There is an opportunity to enhance transparency and confidence through cooperative activities with other nations, and through exchanges among technical experts in areas of mutual interest such as the environment, climate and public health. We also recommend training and tasking staff in foreign missions to identify appropriate sources of open information, and engaging the business community to share open source information and analysis. Finally, we advocate keeping open source information and analysis open to the greatest degree possible and appropriate so as to encourage vetting as well as increased transparency. (p. 65) (3PA: The JASONs is an independent scientific advisory group that has conducted classified and unclassified research projects for the U.S. government on national security matters since 1960.) “Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations,” Government Accountability Office, July 22, 2015. To date, the CT [Counterterrorism] Bureau has not evaluated the CVE [Countering Violent Extremism] program despite having identified the program as a priority goal for the bureau. The bureau acknowledged that such an evaluation would help it to ensure accountability, better measure program impact and effectiveness, and shape future programming decisions, but has postponed plans to evaluate the CVE program every fiscal year since 2012. The bureau cited two main reasons for postponing these plans. First, the bureau said it is difficult to evaluate the CVE program given that its goal is to deny terrorist groups new recruits and measuring and attributing this negative effect can be a complex task. Second, the CVE program is a relatively new effort for the U.S. government and most of its partners, so evaluation methodologies are still evolving. As of June 2015, the CT Bureau was unsure what future evaluations it would undertake but indicated that it was working to finalize its evaluation plans for 2015. (p. 20) (3PA: This means the bureau within the U.S. government that is most responsible for keeping people in other countries from becoming terrorists has not evaluated if its programs work.)

Without any formal announcement from Washington, the United States became further militarily committed to the civil war in Syria last week. It was reported that the first wave of a few dozen U.S.-trained Syrian rebels had crossed the Jordanian border into Syria on July 12. They were reportedly instructed to integrate themselves into other rebel units in order to increase the opposition forces’ overall combat effectiveness. Commander Elissa Smith, a Pentagon spokesperson, wrote that rebels are expected to “coordinate with other moderate opposition forces to build trust between organizations that are countering ISIL.” This consequential development is one of the many barely noticed examples of mission creep that have unfolded since the fight against the self-declared Islamic State began last summer. However, this latest step is unique in that it has occurred without the Obama administration offering any clarification of important questions posed by Congressional overseers over the past ten months. Unless there is a secret plan that adequately answers these questions, the Syria train-and-equip program is one of the more poorly conceived and implausible foreign policy schemes in modern history. Since last September, military officials in the Middle East have been meeting with exiled rebel leaders and canvassing former fighters in refugee camps to assemble this force. Given the poor U.S. record of developing “moderate” proxy forces that will neither harm civilians nor eventually turn against U.S. interests, the vetting of the rebels included psychological evaluations and biometric screenings. While there are tens of thousands of rebels willing to receive training and equipment to go after the Assad regime, few are willing to fight the Islamic State. The initial plans were to train 5,400 over the first year and between 5,000 and 5,500 each consecutive year to reach 15,000. Given this ambitious agenda, senators were stunned two weeks ago when Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter acknowledged, “As of July 3, we are currently training about 60 fighters,” at a reported cost of $36 million so far. The apparent plans for the U.S.-backed rebels in Syria are murky and implausible. Former Pentagon spokesperson Rear Admiral John Kirby described the three things the trained rebels will do in Syria: “One…to defend their own communities and their own citizens and go back to their own towns and cities and help defend their neighbors. Two, to eventually go on the offensive against ISIL inside Syria. And three, to help work with political opposition leaders towards a political solution in Syria.” The implicit threat offered both privately and publicly by Pentagon officials is that if the trained rebels do not follow this prioritized list of requirements, they will lose U.S. military support and equipment. Given that they are explicitly backed by the United States, and have been publicly identified by local journalists, these rebels will be an especially attractive target for attacks by the Islamic State, the Syrian military, and other rebel forces. As Carter pledged last week, “We have some obligations to them once they are inserted in the field.” What exactly is the extent of U.S. support beyond “some obligations”? This question has gone unanswered since the plan to train and arm Syrian rebels emerged, but it is increasingly pressing now that they are on the ground in Syria. On September 16, 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said U.S. support to Syrian rebels was under debate: “We haven’t really done anything but come up with a concept.” Five months later, on February 24, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry said the same thing: “The authorization is such that defending those who are engaged in the fight of ISIL, it seems to me, is an important part of defeating ISIL. But that’s a debate as to how that’s implemented that is taking place in the administration.” Carter’s recent remarks were no different: “We have an obligation….We’re going to have to decide exactly under what conditions and what way we’ll make that tactical decision when we introduce them.” Either the White House has not decided what degree of support the United States will provide, or it has simply refused to state this publicly for over ten months. Given that the United States has made such a consequential overt commitment to these rebels, this should be made plain for Congress and the American public immediately. More troubling, Carter admitted that the United States has not even told the rebels what support they would receive once they were in Syria; presumably, they are finding this out the hard way now. One can imagine many situations where the United States would be forced to deepen its involvement in Syria’s civil war on behalf of these initial sixty rebels. For example, will the United States provide close air support if the rebels attack Syrian forces instead of the Islamic State? Will it withhold close air support when aggressors against the rebels are not the Islamic State, but rather the Syrian army, government-sponsored militias, or other rebel forces? Will it provide increasingly advanced weapons if the rebels claim they need them in order to maintain momentum (rest assured, they will request them)? Also, given that U.S.-vetted rebels are fighting alongside non-vetted rebels, will the United States provide guns and ammunition to the former, but not the latter? And what if they share? Moreover, if the rebels are facing defeat or capture like the Cuban exiles in 1961, will President Obama authorize a high-risk, helicopter-borne special operations force to extract them from Syria? Finally, it is unknown if this arrangement is even legal under U.S. law. Back in March, Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey if the military had the existing legal authority to provide air cover to Syrian rebels. Dempsey deferred to “those with that expertise.” Then again last week, Carter was asked the same thing and replied, “I am not sure about the legalities of it, Senator, to be quite honest.” That was only thirteen days ago. There has been no follow-up statement that clarifies what is the legal basis for the United States to provide air support for these rebels under any of the scenarios described above. Sadly, nobody on Capitol Hill has publicly declared that they have any problem with this. Now that the first U.S.-backed Syrian rebels have been deployed, resolving the issue of what support the U.S. military will provide and under what legal basis is crucial as they will be vastly outmanned and outgunned by the Syrian military (178,000 forces) and Islamic State (20,000 and 31,500 fighters). Though virtually nobody in Washington appears to care about this latest instance of mission creep, the White House still should provide answers to these critical questions.

Gitanjali M. Singh, et al., “Estimated Global, Regional, and National Disease Burdens Related to Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption in 2010,” Circulation, June 29, 2015. Worldwide, the model estimated 184,000 (95%UI=161,000-208,000) deaths/year attributable to SSB consumption: 133,000 (126,000-139,000) from diabetes, 45,000 (26,000-61,000) from CVD, and 6,450(4,300-8,600) from cancers. (p. 2) (Supplemental Table 2) SSBs were defined as any sugar-sweetened sodas, fruit drinks, sports/energy drinks, sweetened iced tea, or homemade SSBs such as frescas, which contained at least 50 kcal per 8oz serving; 100% fruit juice was excluded. (p. 4) (3PA: Note that "only" 70,000 people worldwide die from all forms of conflict and/or terrorism. More Americans die from diseases related to sugar-sweetened beverage consumption than the average 15,473 Americans killed in violent deaths each year, or the 11,208 killed by firearm homicides.) Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL at the Pentagon, White House Office of the Press Secretary, July 7, 2015. “If we try to do everything ourselves all across the Middle East, all across North Africa, we’ll be playing Whack-a-Mole and there will be a whole lot of unintended consequences that ultimately make us less secure.” (3PA: Compare this to what Assistant Defense Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Michael Sheehan proclaimed in June 2013, which directly contradicts Obama: "Whack-a-Mole, in my view, works because terrorists aren’t plastic things that pop up again. When you kill them, they don’t come back. Yes, somebody else may come back, but that guy is probably less effective, less trained, and by the way, knows his buddy before him got...killed.") Hearing on the Strategy to Counter ISIL, Senate Armed Services Committee, July 7, 2015. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): General Dempsey, would you agree that there’re more terrorist organizations with more safe havens, with more weapons, with more capability, with more men to strike the homeland than any time since 9/11? Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey: Yes. Graham: Do you believe that ISIL is expanding in other countries as we speak? Dempsey: Yes. (3PA: Indeed, the number of terrorist attacks, their lethality, as well as the size of terrorist organizations has worsened in past years. Note that Sen. Graham did not follow up to ask why terrorist organizations were larger and more capable. U.S. officials are too vested in the country’s counterterrorism strategy—nearly unchanged over the past thirteen years—to recognize that it is failing. To overcome this, I have suggested that a National Commission on the War on Terrorism be established to evaluate strategic documents and the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies to date, analyze underlying reasons for homegrown terrorism, and provide policy recommendations.) John Kirby, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, July 6, 2015. QUESTION: John, what about Said’s first question, which was: What are you doing to try to – I don’t know – improve the accuracy or somehow dissuade the Saudis from hitting civilian areas? I mean, just today, there was a strike that killed dozens of civilians. KIRBY: Well, look. We remain in close touch with the Saudi Government regarding a wide range of issues. With respect to Yemen, I’d refer you to them for discussion of their operational details. That’s really for the Saudi Government to speak to. And we take all accounts and reports of civilian casualties seriously, and again, have been very clear about our desire to see a humanitarian pause. (3PA: The Saudi-led coalition would not be conducting these airstrikes, which are killing civilians, without the enabling capabilities being provided by the United States, primarily targeting intelligence, air refueling, combat search and rescue, and vessel searches.) Karl P. Mueller (eds.), Precision and Purpose Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, RAND Corporation, July 2015, p. 4. (3PA: I highly recommend this report, which is the most well researched and comprehensive study of the 2011 air war in Libya. Unfortunately, it came out shortly after I published a similar chart, listed below, comparing the average strike sorties per day and average bombs dropped per day in various air wars since the 1990s.)

Samantha Andrews is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Today’s reported car bombing in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, is further evidence that, while the self-declared Islamic State may currently be the underdog in the jihadi rivalry unfolding in Yemen, it is steadily becoming stronger. Political instability resulting from the Houthi uprising, and subsequent Saudi-led intervention, has created a power vacuum in which the Islamic State is exerting its influence. Combined with its recent string of deadly attacks in Yemen and increase in affiliate groups, the group poses a direct challenge to Yemen’s largest jihadist group—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Eight months after Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced his group’s expansion into the country, its numbers are estimated to have grown from eighty to three hundred. By January 2015, the Islamic State was reported to have a presence in at least three provinces in southern and central Yemen. Suicide bombings carried out on March 20 in Sanaa by an affiliate marked the group’s first major attack in the country, killing more than 130 people. Since then, the Islamic State and its affiliates have conducted at least five other attacks, including three more bombings in Sanaa within the last two months. Further, the number of affiliates appears to be growing. In April, an Islamic State-affiliated group, the Soldiers of the Caliphate in Yemen, released a video announcing that they “have come to Yemen.” Four days later, Yemen’s Second Mountaineer Brigade released a video showing the beheading of four Yemeni soldiers and shooting of ten others. The exact number of IS-affiliate groups in Yemen is unknown. While the Islamic State’s presence in Yemen is still small in comparison to AQAP, its growth challenges AQAP’s entrenched power in the country, which has remained nearly unopposed by the intrusion of other jihadist rivals since 2009. Now, its overlapping ideology with the Islamic State threatens to draw away critical support. A budding rivalry is increasingly evident. In response to al-Baghdadi’s declaration, AQAP quickly released a counterstatement calling the move “illegitimate.” Whereas AQAP had previously supported the Islamic State—declaring “solidarity with our Muslim brothers in Iraq”—this marked the beginning of the rivalry that is unfolding in Yemen today. A recent shift in AQAP’s tactics suggests that it is attempting to win over more loyalty from the Yemeni population. Historically, AQAP, like the Islamic State, has seized territory and imposed strict Islamic law. However, when AQAP seized Al-Mukala, Yemen’s fifth largest city, three months ago, it relinquished control to a civilian council, maintaining only a single police station to arbitrate disputes. It then gave the council $4 million to provide public services. This contrasts with life under Islamic State-rule, which imposes its rule in almost all political and social matters. Since this shift in AQAP’s tactics is unprecedented, it may believe that offering greater autonomy to the local populace will broaden its appeal. Even more problematic, U.S. operations against AQAP may be helping the Islamic State expand. Currently, U.S. lethal counterterrorism operations in Yemen target only AQAP operatives and leaders. Killing them, which even temporarily weakens the group, could provide the Islamic State with an opportunity to fill a power vacuum and expand territorially. For example, the White House announced just two weeks ago that Nasir al-Wahishi, al-Qaeda’s second in command and leader of AQAP, had been killed in a U.S. counterterrorism operation in Yemen. What the White House calls a “major blow to AQAP” may actually also be a win for the Islamic State, whose objective is to grow its influence in those provinces dominated by AQAP. The expansion and entrenchment of the Islamic State into Yemen threatens to shift the balance of power among jihadis that has long favored AQAP. In order to bring the United States “closer to degrading and ultimately defeating these groups,” the Obama administration will have to adapt its counterterrorism strategies to deal with the dynamics of the new rivalry. Otherwise, the United States risks inadvertently strengthening the Islamic State in Yemen and perpetuating a “whack-a-mole” strategy in the Middle East.

Last week, in response to long-standing FOIA requests, the CIA declassified—with significant redactions—five documents related to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The most notable was a June 2005 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report into CIA accountability regarding the findings of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, which was produced by the House and Senate intelligence committees. That joint inquiry was published in December 2002—long before the 9/11 Commission report—and served as the most comprehensive public investigation into Intelligence Community (IC) shortcomings. The 2005 OIG report reviewed the joint inquiry’s central findings to determine if senior CIA officials should be reprimanded for their actions. Most attention on the OIG report has focused on the now-declassified finding about allegations of Saudi Arabia’s support for al-Qaeda. Those who believed that the CIA had intentionally hid evidence of Saudi Arabia-al-Qaeda connections were surely disappointed by this key passage: The [OIG Accountability Review] Team encountered no evidence that the Saudi Government knowingly and willingly supported al-Qa’ida terrorists. Individuals in both the Near East Division (NE) and the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [redacted] told the Team they had not seen any reliable reporting confirming Saudi Government involvement with the financial support for terrorism prior to 9/11, although a few also speculated that dissident sympathizers within the government may have aided al-Qa’ida. (p. 440) Beyond this brief declassified portion of the OIG report, there were many fascinating findings and insights, which are useful to understand the IC’s approach to terrorism before 9/11, as well as the type of constraints and organizational biases that make intelligence analysis so inherently difficult. One wonders which of these pre-9/11 shortcomings—so obvious with the benefit of hindsight—are having a comparable impact on intelligence collection and analysis today. The following consists of the top ten insights from the June 2005 CIA OIG report, with context and commentary provided for each: The Team found: • No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by CTC or any other component. • No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993. • No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional hijackings. • Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target. • No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.   That said, the CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analytic products. The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy support and operational-support activities. Analysis focused primarily on current and tactical issues rather than on strategic analysis. (pp. xvii-xviii) (3PA: Intelligence analysts, then and now, rarely have the amount of time that they would like to conduct the sort of in-depth strategic analyses that policymakers want. Another document that the CIA published last week, with fewer redactions than previous versions, was an August 2001 OIG Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Directorate of Operations. That report found that the CTC’s primary analytical arm, the AIG (Assessment and Information Group) devoted “a significant amount of time—interviewees estimated between 30 and 50 percent—to counterterrorism operations support, working closely with their colleagues in the [redacted] operations groups on targeting and planning aimed at penetrations, recruitments, renditions, and disruptions.” In other words, they were helping to capture and kill terrorists rather than undertake long-range analysis of terrorism.) …Differences between the CIA and the Department of Defense over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of these CIA-military differences. (p. xxii) (3PA: The pre-9/11 fight between the Pentagon and CIA over who would pay for the Predator, and have the final authority to approve drone strikes, was what led to the CIA becoming the lead executive agency for drone strikes after 9/11. This historical act of bureaucratic happenstance was never intended to be a permanent solution, yet remains with us today.) …The intelligence priorities in place on 11 September 2001 were based on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-35, signed by President Clinton on 2 March 1995. [redacted] The Intelligence Community’s approach to priorities in the years following PDD-35 was to add issues to the various tiers, but not to remove any. Nor was there any significant effort to connect intelligence priorities to resource issues–providing increases to some while decreasing resources provided to lower priority issues. The 9/11 Team believes that a formal reprioritization of intelligence priorities in the years leading up to 9/11 might have provided important context for resource decisions relating to counterterrorism. A number of senior leaders, including the DCI, have stated that the IC had to deal with major challenges that competed for available resources. Indeed, as a Tier 1B issue, terrorism remained at the same level–at least in the formal prioritization [redacted] until after 9/11. (pp. 137-139) (3PA: It is amazing to think that this was the haphazard manner by which the IC provided guidance for intelligence collection and analysis, with such incomplete prioritization. Starting in February 2003, this process was replaced by the more rigorous National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which is reviewed annually, at least, by the president and senior national security officials.) …The budget-related actions of the former Chief of CTC might also have contributed to a negative perception of CTC within OMB. [redacted] stated that OMB officers were skeptical when the Agency pushed for permanent increases in its counterterrorism budget because they thought a lot of it was “crying wolf;” this officer recalled that the then-Chief of CTC would give what he called the “dead baby” speech. (pp. 191-192) (3PA: Employing the threat of terrorist fatalities to obtain more resources remains a consistent tactic, as does the disbelief of budget officials and congressional appropriators that more money is needed by the military and IC.) …CTC also hired contractors to help address personnel needs. The number of term employees (blue-badge contractors) was relatively small, however, the Team was unable to obtain reliable data on the number of independent and industrial contractors working in the CTC during FY 1996-2001. Thus, the Team was not able to assess the full extent of CTC’s efforts to augment its staff using contractors. (p. 197) (3PA: Just as today, the military and IC use contractors to enhance their workforce, but fail to compile good data about those contractors, or use that data to employ contractors in a more effective and less costly manner. In July 2010, when the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was asked how many contractors were in the IC, he replied, “We can certainly count up the number of government employees that we have, absolutely. Counting contractors is a little bit more difficult.”) …The Team therefore cannot accurately determine the overall size of the analyst cadre devoted to working on al-Qa’ida immediately prior to 9/11. The Team believes it is probably somewhat higher than the Joint Inquiry’s figure of “fewer than 40” but, based on our analysis, it is below the 49 - 34 in AIG plus 15 in the DI–which CTC offered in 2002 as the number of analysts working on al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11. (p. 228) (3PA: Before 9/11, there were only forty to fifty analysts working on al-Qaeda.) …AIG analysts in [redacted] who worked most closely on al-Qa’ida undertook only limited alternative analysis in the years prior to 9/11, however. In a review of analytic papers produced by [redacted] the Team found only one example of such analysis; [redacted]. In interviews, most of the analysis in [redacted] recall utilizing no alternative analysis, and “did not have the luxury to do so.” That said, the [redacted] FY 02 Research Plan listed a paper, “Key UBL Assumptions Check,” which was to take a comprehensive look at the key assumptions underlying analysis of the entire Bin Ladin issue and which likely would have employed alternative analysis techniques; 9/11 occurred before the branch could get to this paper. Probably in response to this dearth of pre-9/11 alternative analysis, on 12 September 2001, the DCI created the Red Cell, a unit of senior DI analysts and other IC officers tasked with thinking “outside the box” on counterterrorism. In short order, the Red Cell’s nontraditional approach began receiving praise from the President, Vice President, and other senior policymakers. Later, the Red Cell’s mandate expanded to other intelligence topics. (pp. 247-249) (3PA: IC analysts and policymaker-consumers constantly express their desire to produce and receive alternative analysis, which is distinct from main-line authoritative analysis. However, the “tyranny of the inbox” often makes this an impractical task—a concern that remains prevalent in the CIA and elsewhere to this day. Also, my forthcoming book, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy, includes a case study on the creation and development of the CIA’s Red Cell.) …The price of the dashed hopes of action against the UBL by the tribal assets became clearer in December. On 20 December, [redacted] reported Bin Ladin’s return to Kandahar where the tribal assets could most easily monitor his activities. This set up an intense period during which the assets considered a ground attack on Bin Ladin, while policymakers and CIA considered a cruise missile attack. [redacted] After some delays, on 23 December they picked either 25 or 26 December for their operation to capture Bin Ladin. The Chief of the UBL Station, [redacted] meanwhile, reported [redacted] on 22 December that [redacted]. He predicted that the interest in this [redacted] among the CIA leadership and at the NSC would be “intense.” Asset-reporting problems on the 22nd prevented any action on that date. On 23 December, at noon and then again at 7:30 pm Islamabad time, [redacted] reported that Bin Ladin [redacted]. With this information in hand, the CIA and policymakers, including the National Security Advisor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Attorney General, the DCI, and the Assistant DCI for Collection (ADCI/C), among others, deliberated on launching a cruise missile attack against Bin Ladin while he slept. Recollections vary slightly in detail but agree on the most important point: the outcome of the meeting. The CIA presented its information derived from the tribal assets. CTC appeared confident that the information was accurate, initially offering an estimate of 75-percent reliability; under questioning from the National Security Advisor [Sandy Berger], however, it lowered the estimate to 50 percent. According to one participant [in the White House meeting], in response to concerns from some Principals about the potential for killing innocent civilians, the military presented two estimates that diverged greatly on the anticipated extent of collateral damage. One participant recalls that the JCS-2 asserted that the collateral damage would be tolerable. Then officers from the [redacted] gave numbers perhaps three times as high as those from the J-2. In the end, the session ended with the decision not to act. The DCI in his testimony later said that, in this case, as in others where policymakers contemplated missile attacks against Bin Ladin, information on the Saudi terrorist’s location was based on a single thread of intelligence, and they made the decision that it was not good enough. Others told the Team that the estimated collateral damage was also an important factor. The ADCI for Collection recalls that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Gen. Hugh Shelton] pulled out charts estimating a high number of deaths and injuries and that he said the proponents of launching the missiles “want me to kill 600 people.” (pp. 375-376) (3PA: The CIA lowering its probability estimate of the accuracy of the intelligence from 75 percent to 50 percent after questioning from Berger violates every principle of providing analytical support to policymakers. Similarly, different military officers providing differing estimates of the collateral damage from a cruise missile strike against bin Ladin is not the sort of sound military advice that civilian officials require when authorizing the use of force.) …A more general explanation for deciding against collective action that was applicable to all contemplated cruise missile attacks was the inherent delay in the process. According to UBL Station’s late May 1999 assessment of the 13-16 May period, even with improvement in timeliness, the normal delays from the time [redacted] observed events to the time the information about those events arrived at CIA Headquarters would be from one to three hours. The time needed first to process the information at Headquarters and to get the National Command Authority decision to launch missiles and then for the cruise missile to arrive at their target made for great uncertainty whether the person targeted (Bin Ladin) would remain in place long enough to be hit. (p. 378) (3PA: The impossibility of knowing bin Ladin’s location one to three hours into the future was what compelled the Clinton administration to push the CIA and military to find a weapons platform that would “collapse the kill chain.” Thus, by February 16, 2001, the United States had successfully developed and tested the armed Predator drone.) …Judging by the available evidence, the Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the top leadership in the US military for precise, actionable intelligence before the military leadership would endorse a decision to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or to launch cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan. The military demanded a precision that, in CIA’s view, the Intelligence Community was incapable of providing. Military interviewees offered their views on why senior military officials (and policymakers) generally were reluctant to act on intelligence. One senior military interviewee [redacted] told the 9/11 Team that the military had a cultural reluctance and distrust about working with CIA prior to 9/11. [redacted] said some in the military feared that, if the military went into Afghanistan and the going got rough, the CIA would leave them in the lurch. (p. 401) (3PA: Again, it is difficult to remember that the military and CIA once had an inherent dislike of each other, and routinely protected their own bureaucratic interests at the expense of achieving shared national missions.)