Defense and Security

Military Operations

  • United States
    Deepening the U.S. Military Commitment in Iraq
    Yesterday, the White House announced the deployment of “450 additional U.S. military personnel to train, advise, and assist Iraqi Security Forces at Taqaddum military base in eastern Anbar province.” It is easy to conceive of this latest limited addition of U.S. troops to Iraq, and nearby countries, in isolation, and as the logical and necessary next-step in the expanding campaign against ISIL. However, the White House has been announcing troop deployments, with varying justifications and objectives, for over a year now. If you are one of the few people truly interested in how the United States has gradually slid into this open-ended conflict, with little public debate, and zero congressional input, it is worthwhile to review some of the notable milestones along the way. On June 16, 2014: “275 U.S. military personnel are deploying to Iraq to provide support and security for U.S. personnel and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.” This package was initially described as being for force protection and intelligence gathering purposes. Pentagon spokesperson Rear Adm. John Kirby pledged that the deployment “will be of a limited duration” and would be “a discrete, measured, temporary arrangement to help us to get eyes on the ground, to figure out what’s going on and get a better sense of it.” This language is worth bearing in mind, because Kirby told MSNBC earlier this week that even if the U.S.-led coalition went “all-in” to defeat ISIL "it’s still going to take three to five years.” The bombing campaign against ISIL began on Aug. 8, 2014, with President Obama declaring that he had no intention of the United States “being the Iraqi air force.” With U.S. pilots having conducted almost 80 percent of all of the airstrikes against ISIL—in Iraq and Syria—Obama’s expressed concern from last year is now the reality. Since the bombs started dropping there were other intermittent deployment announcements, including on Sept. 2: “350 additional U.S. military personnel to protect our diplomatic facilities and personnel in Baghdad,” and on Nov. 7: “1500 additional U.S. military personnel in a non-combat role to train, advise, and assist Iraqi Security Forces, including Kurdish forces.” What Obama administration officials have attempted to emphasize with each new announcement is that the latest introduction of troops or tasks is logical, necessary, and will have an impact on achieving the strategic objective of the grading and destroying ISIL. Just yesterday, Brett McGurk the Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL told reporters: “Given the fact that the Iraqis have put the Anbar operation center there, I think this will have a fairly dramatic effect on just their situational awareness of the enemy.” If 450 more U.S. advisors—who will not arrive at the base for six to eight weeks—actually have this substantial of an impact on the course of the conflict it would be astonishing and unprecedented. And when they eventually fail to achieve this effect, most politicians and pundits will have forgotten this pledge, as they have for many others made by Obama administration officials over the past year regarding the campaign against ISIL. Finally, as I pointed out recently, with each new U.S. troop deployed to Iraq, you should expect that at least one additional private military contractor will be sent to support them. Naturally, none of the White House or Pentagon proclamations about U.S. troops going to Iraq ever mention the contractors that go with them, because officials want to maintain the impression of a more limited U.S. military footprint and commitment. Yet, between June 2014 and today, the number of private military contractors has grown from between an estimated 1,700 to fully 6,300. That is just another troubling component of America’s growing and deepening commitment to Iraq’s security that interested readers might want to look into.
  • Conflict Prevention
    You Might Have Missed: Airpower in Iraq, Sanctions Effectiveness, and Military Intervention
    Department of Defense, Lt. Gen. John W. Hesterman III, Combined Forces Air Component commander (CFACC) press briefing, June 5, 2015. About the only thing airpower doesn’t do is take, hold, and govern territory. The Iraqis are going to have to do that. And this airpower campaign is going to give them the time and space to do that... Let’s not give [IS] credit for strategic victory, that’s not what’s happening…I didn’t say that they haven’t made tactical advances, I said they haven’t made strategic victories. (3PA: This press briefing, the Pentagon’s first one focused on the air campaign since December 14, is worth watching for Lt. Gen. Hesterman’s staunch defense of airpower. In addition, he consistently downplayed IS’ momentum because they are not able to achieve a strategic victory, which the United States did not achieve in Afghanistan or Iraq.) White House, “On-the-Record Conference Call on the President’s Travel to Germany for the G7 Summit,” June 4, 2015. Press Secretary Ben Rhodes: Sanctions are a tool that can have an immediate impact in deterring actions by governments like Russia.  But over the longer term, they need to be sustained to steadily inform the calculus of countries like Russia that are acting outside of international norms. (3PA: There is a great deal of social science research that shows sanctions do not have an immediate effect. Moreover, it was notable that Rhodes did not mention the lack of long term impact that sanctions had on Cuba. Just two months ago, the White House began pursuing normal diplomatic relations with Cuba on the premise that over fifty years of sanctions and isolation had failed to change the calculus of the Castro regime.) Gen. Hawk Carlisle, Air Force Breakfast Program, Air Force Association, June 1, 2015. Gen. Hawk Carlisle: We’re taking a serious toll on their morale and their capability, the Daesh [self-declared Islamic State]. About 4,200 strikes so far and about 14,000 weapons have been dropped. We’ve taken about 13,000 enemy fighters off the battlefield since the September/October time frame. And despite what again is a lot of talk, we have regained territory, about 25 percent in Iraq—the territory that was lost initially has been gained back. Thomas Szayna, Paul Dreyer, Derek Eaton, and Lisa Saum-Manning, “Army Global Basing Posture,” RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 57. To assess responsiveness of existing and potential Army bases, we evaluated the ability of current and potential bases to support the deployment of Army forces on a variety of specific (scenario-based) short-warning missions, including deployment for deterrence purposes, response to state failure, humanitarian relief, and counterterrorism. Using the RAND Arroyo Center–developed GPM, we found that there are many good choices for basing Army forces in all regions of the world and that small adjustments to Army posture can improve response time for short-warning contingencies and provide for greater robustness within the overall global posture. The adjustments include greater presence at existing facilities and locations and additional contingency access and rotational bases in states currently not hosting U.S. Army forces. Comparing the improvements in responsiveness with current posture, we found that potential gains are small, usually measured in hours rather than days. Choices regarding new bases depend on assessment of trade-offs between the costs associated with upgrading the facilities at proposed locations and the marginal benefits in responsiveness. Given the limited gains in responsiveness, robustness and strengthening defense relationships provide a more valid justification for the infrastructure improvements that might be needed. Several specific locations emerged consistently from our analysis as improving responsiveness. Minimal adjustments by upgrading these locations may have substantial impact for robustness and responsiveness. In Europe, Africa, and Southwest Asia, Djibouti and Cyprus are the most promising for consideration of greater Army forward basing. Within the greater Middle East area, Oman and UAE emerge as good choices. In East Asia, Guam and Australia offer advantages over current arrangements; Thailand is another possibility. New Army basing arrangements appear to be unnecessary in the Americas, although there are many good choices. Our analysis showed the importance of airlift and the capability to increase rapidly the MOG of austere airfields as APODs for short-warning missions. But surface lift is a good alternative to airlift for the bigger force packages associated with the more-demanding missions, especially for intraregional contingencies. In regions with highly developed road and rail transport infrastructures, surface lift has many advantages. For example, surface lift meets deterrence demands in Europe. Sealift offers advantages in East Asia and the western Pacific, particularly if we assume strategic warning and the ability to start the movement of sea-based prepositioned equipment prior to the actual crisis. (3PA: This is an excellent report, especially the appendices, for learning about the nuts-and-bolts of military interventions.)
  • United States
    Does U.S. Foreign Policy Spur National Security Threats?
    Yesterday on “Face the Nation,” CIA Director John Brennan made an unnoticed but significant acknowledgement about the conduct and consequences of U.S. foreign policy and the ongoing war on terrorism. Asked whether President Obama “seems to be just trying to buy time here, that he’s not ready to make a full commitment here in this war on terrorism and basically is just trying to keep things together well enough that he can leave it to the next president to resolve it. Do you see that?” Brennan responded: I don’t see anything like that. I’ve been involved in this administration in different capacities for the last six and a half years and there has been a full court effort to try to keep this country safe. Dealing with some of these problems in the Middle East, whether you’re talking about Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, others, these are some of the most complex and complicated issues that I’ve seen in my thirty-five years, working on national security issues. So there are no easy solutions. I think the president has tried to make sure that we’re able to push the envelope when we can to protect this country. But we have to recognize that sometimes our engagement and direct involvement will stimulate and spur additional threats to our national security interests. What makes this concluding sentence so extraordinary is that it is—to my knowledge—an unprecedented recognition by a senior official about how U.S. counterterrorism activities can increase direct threats to the United States and its “national security interests.” As I wrote recently, senior U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials increasingly warn of the threat of “lone wolf” terrorist attacks within the United States, which are generally self-instigated and fueled by the narratives constantly promoted by foreign terrorist groups. Unfortunately, these observations by senior officials have had no impact on discussions about U.S. foreign policy conduct. Rather, Washington collectively avoids exploring the possibility that U.S. counterterrorism activities abroad might play a role in compelling U.S. residents to plot and attempt attacks at home. Hopefully, Brennan’s unprecedented recognition is further explored and commented on by the White House, State Department, and Department of Defense. It would be particularly useful if journalists with routine access to officials and spokespersons pressed them on this point, asking which of their agency’s engagements have spurred threats to the United States. More immediately, the next public interview with the CIA director should begin by asking him which engagements and direct involvements he is referring to. This overdue observation of how foreign policy can harm U.S. national security leads to the critical, and rarely asked, question of which specific policies should be adjusted accordingly.
  • United States
    You Might Have Missed: Assassination Plots, Drone Strikes, and Women Special Operators
    Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to President Ford, Foreign Relations of the United States 1917-1972, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 55, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, October 29, 1975. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted a detailed investigation of charges that the Executive Branch engaged in plotting the assassination of foreign leaders. Under your instructions the various intelligence agencies provided the Committee complete access to all documents relevant to such charges. These documents were highly classified and unsanitized, and no claim of Executive Privilege has been made. You provided the documents on the express assumption that they would be used by the Committee in a responsible manner. The final Report of the Committee on the assassination charges has been prepared in draft form and will soon be published. Official acknowledgement of assassination plotting by successive Administrations of the United States Government would have an appalling and shattering impact in the international community. Without question, it would do grave damage to our ability to play a positive role of leadership in world affairs. It would provide profoundly harmful leverage to our adversaries and the resultant humiliation we would suffer would deal a serious blow to our foreign policy from which we could recover only with difficulty. (3PA: This memo from forty years ago about the alleged harm to America’s global image and leadership with the release of the Church Committee investigation into U.S. assassination plots is worth keeping in mind whenever a president claims the publication or acknowledgement of secret programs will be similarly harmful.) Michelle Tan, “Odierno on Iraq: ‘It’s incredibly disappointing to me’,” ArmyTimes, May 28, 2015. "You have to be careful to not be an accelerant," he said. "What we have to do is support [the Iraqis] and help them." It will take time to train the Iraqi forces, Odierno said. "We said early on this will take three to five years," he said. "It takes a while to train people to the capacity necessary to regain the ground that they’ve lost." (3PA: If one reviews U.S. civilian and military officials’ statements after President Obama announced the U.S-led anti-Islamic State (IS) strategy on September 10, 2014, nobody offered such a definitive estimate. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “It may take a year, it may take two years, it may take three years. But we’re determined it has to happen.”  Antony J. Blinken, deputy national security adviser, said it “will probably go beyond even this administration to get to the point of defeat.” However, while officials emphasized that it would be difficult to “ultimately destroy” IS, they did not say three to five years early on.) “Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks,” Pew Research Center, May 28, 2015, p. 12. Amy Butler, “No Sanctuary,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 11-24, 2015, p. 68. Last summer, the Pentagon conducted a sweeping Space Posture review, which prompted the White House to direct the extra funding for space control. Many of the review’s findings are classified, but Lt. Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, military deputy to the Air Force procurement secretary, outlined them in general during a recent breakfast meeting on Capitol Hill. In the past, space system designers focused largely on a “hunker-down” mentality, hardening satellite designs against electromagnetic interference. Now, she says, these systems are under threat. And military planners are examining ways to make satellite architectures more resilient. This includes “disaggregating” systems—splitting what were once a single satellite’s functions into those on many disparate spacecraft—as well as backing up space capabilities with systems in the air or on the ground. It also could point to a need for localized augmentation, as in the case of GPS. Finally, reconstitution is on the table; military planners may be required to build extra spacecraft to loft replacements into orbit quickly in the event of attacks. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Ashley’s War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers in the Special Ops Battlefield (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2015). In another part of the compound, separate from the women and children, the Rangers began working to ascertain the identities of the men of the house, as well as to locate any weapons or explosives. “[Cultural Support Team (CST)], get over here,” a voice called out on the radio. Amber hurried to the spot where six women and nearly a dozen children stood together, about a hundred yards away from the compound. Inside the house the Rangers were doing their work. “I am Amber,” she told the frightened group, looking the women directly in their eyes as Jimmie translated. “I’m an American soldier and we are here to help keep you and your children safe. We will make sure that none of the soldiers come near here.” Slowly she put on her blue nitrile gloves, and softened her tone. “I am going to start by searching you—this just helps us all to stay safe.” Then she removed her helmet to make herself look less scary, and make it clear she was a woman, too. One of the children immediately stopped crying, and Amber draped a teal-colored cotton scarf over what she now called her “combat braids”: two long, blond plaits of hair that extended from just above her ears to her mid-shoulders. The higher-ups had told the CSTs they should be able to prove quickly and uncontrovertibly that they were female while out on the objective; this would put the Afghan women at east, which in turn might encourage them to speak more freely and share valuable information. (p. 191) (3PA: This is a riveting and important book that I highly recommend.)
  • United States
    Is U.S. Foreign Policy Making Americans Less Safe?
    Senior U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials increasingly warn of the threat of “lone wolf” individuals attempting terror attacks within the United States. These potential perpetrators are characterized as externally motivated, but predominantly self-directed in plotting and attempting acts of politically and/or ideologically motivated violence. They need not travel to purported foreign “safe havens” to receive training or guidance, nor be in direct contact with terrorist organizations based abroad. Rather, their inspiration, in large part, appears to stem from the principles and narratives promoted by Islamist jihadist groups. On February 12, National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “We face a much greater, more frequent, recurring threat from lone offenders and probably loose networks of individuals. Measured in terms of frequency and numbers, it is attacks from those sources that are increasingly the most noteworthy…” On February 26, during the annual worldwide threats hearing, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned: “Home-grown violent extremists continue to pose the most likely threat to the homeland.” Last Friday, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson stated on MSNBC: “We’re in a new phase…in the global terrorist threat where, because of effective use of social media, the Internet, by ISIL, al-Qaeda, we have to be concerned about the independent actor who is here in the homeland who may strike with little or no warning…” Finally, yesterday, former CIA deputy director Michael Morell described the messaging efforts of jihadist groups generally and the self-declared Islamic State (IS) more specifically: “Their narrative is pretty powerful: The West, the United States, the modern world, is a significant threat to their religion. Their answer to that is to establish a caliphate. And they are being attacked by the U.S. and other Western nations, and by these apostate regimes in the region. Because they are being attacked they need support in two ways; people coming to fight for them, and people coming to stand up and attack coalition nations in their home.” In summary, the most likely—though not most lethal—terror threats to Americans come from individuals living within the United States who are partially motivated to undertake self-directed attacks based upon their perception that the United States and the West are at war with the Muslim world. Remarkably, these two observations have had virtually no impact on U.S. foreign policy discourse. In Washington, there is an agreed-upon, bipartisan understanding that under no circumstances will officials or politicians acknowledge, or even explore, the concept that foreign policy activities might play a role in compelling U.S. residents, who would not otherwise consider terrorism, to plot and attempt attacks. This is somewhat understandable given that there are many different backgrounds, experiences, and precursors that lead people to become violent extremists. Yet, whereas there are constant hearings and debates—even White House summits—about how to “counter violent extremism,” there is rarely any consideration of which U.S. foreign policy activities might themselves be precursors to U.S. terrorism. In fact, the only foreign policy decisions that the Obama administration admits might inspire terrorism are those made by Obama’s predecessor. The first is one that the White House has tried to reverse since January 2009: detaining terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Most recently, at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 18, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter endorsed closing the military prison because, "It still provides a rallying point for Jihadi recruiting." The other decision is the 2003 invasion of Iraq; as President Obama stated on March 17, "ISIL is a direct outgrowth of al-Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences." Of course, another unintended consequence emerged from the U.S.-led airwar in 2011 that ensured the toppling of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya.  As a U.S. military official told the Wall Street Journal today, “ISIL now has an operational presence in Libya, and they have aspirations to make Libya their African hub. Libya is part of their terror map now.”  Compare this recent warning to how the State Department described Libya on the eve of the 2011 airwar: “The Libyan government continued to demonstrate a strong and active commitment to combating terrorist organizations and violent extremism through bilateral and regional counterterrorism and security cooperation, particularly on the issue of foreign fighter flow to Iraq.”  Now, foreign fighters are flowing from Iraq and Syria to establish a stronghold in Libya. This is clearly an unintended, though not at all unsurprising, consequence, but not one that the Obama administration will acknowledge because it happened under its watch. More critically, what foreign policy activities are bolstering the narrative of Islamic jihadist groups today? Is it really just the 122 terror suspects still in Guantanamo? What about drone strikes, which themselves are universally hated? Or, what of the support for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, whose government sentenced that country’s first elected leader to death this week? Finally, is the U.S.-led airwar against IS fueling that narrative and making the likelihood of lone wolf attacks within the United States more likely? What else is the United States doing abroad that could be making Americans less safe from lone wolf terrorism at home? Why is this never asked or considered when officials and politicians discuss how the thirteen-and-a-half-year war on terrorism is progressing?
  • United States
    You Might Have Missed: Islamic Violence, the Bush Legacy, and Rubio on Libya
    Michael Morell, with Bill Harlow, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from Al Qa’ida to ISIS (New York, NY: Twelve, 2015), p. 63. [On September 15, 2001], a senior State Department official walked over and expressed the opinion to the president that it was critical that America’s first response to the [September 11] attack be diplomatic—that we should reason with the Taliban and ask them to turn over Bin Laden and his senior al Qa’ida leadership. As the official walked off, President Bush looked at Cofer and me and said, “Fuck diplomacy. We are going to war.” (3PA: After thirteen and a half years, 2,215 U.S. servicemembers killed, far more than 20,000 civilian deaths, and $718 billion in direct costs to tax payers (so far), we are still at war.) Michael Barbaro, “College Student to Jeb Bush: ‘Your Brother Created ISIS’,” New York Times, May 13, 2015. “It was when 30,000 individuals who were part of the Iraqi military were forced out—they had no employment, they had no income, and they were left with access to all of the same arms and weapons,” Ms. Ziedrich said. She added: “Your brother created ISIS.” Mr. Bush interjected. “All right. Is that a question?” Ms. Ziedrich was not finished. “You don’t need to be pedantic to me, sir.” “Pedantic? Wow,” Mr. Bush replied. Then Ms. Ziedrich asked: “Why are you saying that ISIS was created by us not having a presence in the Middle East when it’s pointless wars where we send young American men to die for the idea of American exceptionalism? Why are you spouting nationalist rhetoric to get us involved in more wars?” Mr. Bush replied: “We respectfully disagree. We have a disagreement. When we left Iraq, security had been arranged, Al Qaeda had been taken out. There was a fragile system that could have been brought up to eliminate the sectarian violence.” “A Conversation With Marco Rubio,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 13, 2015. I thought the Libyan engagement that I just mentioned a moment ago was not handled appropriately. The United States intervened for a very short period of time militarily, I believe it was 72 hours, and then the rest of the operation was left to the Brits and the French, loyal allies who worked hard, but do not have our capabilities. The result in Libya was a protracted conflict that killed people, destroyed infrastructure, left behind the conditions for the rise of multiple militias who refuse to lay down their arms. I actually traveled to Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, before he was captured, and came back and warned that if we did not get—we had allowed the conflict to go too long. If we didn’t now get engaged on the front end to prevent that from happening, not only would Libya become a failed state, but it would also become a haven for extremism to take root as it happened now. (3PA: This is misleading on many fronts. The United States intervened with airstrikes throughout the entire conflict, including with drone strikes against Qaddafi’s personal convoy on the day of extrajudicial murder by Libyan rebels. Moreover, Rubio strongly endorsed the intervention on the logic that: “As long as Qaddafi remains in power, he will be in a position to terrorize his own people and potentially the rest of the world.” Now Libya is a terror state.) Larry Lewis, “We Need an Independent Review of Drone Strikes,” War on the Rocks, May 6, 2015. History is repeating itself. A similar situation arose in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2009. During this period, the U.S. military was causing an unacceptable number of civilian casualties. When an incident occurred, they investigated the incident, made changes to guidance, and promised to keep such an incident from happening again. But these incidents kept happening. So the military repeated this ineffective review process again and again. This “repeat” cycle was only broken when military leaders approved the Joint Civilian Casualty Study, a classified outside review requested by General Petraeus. This effort had two key differences from earlier efforts. First, it was independent, so it was able to overcome false assumptions held by operating forces that contributed to their challenges. And second, the study looked at all potential civilian casualty incidents over a period of years, not just the latest incident. This approach helped identify systemic issues with current tactics and policies as the analysis examined the forest and not just the nearest tree. This study also considered different sets of forces operating within Afghanistan and their relative propensity for causing civilian casualties. The administration should heed past experience and conduct an independent review that looks more holistically at the issues involved, akin to the earlier Joint Civilian Casualty Study. This would help refine policy and tactics, provide a more solid foundation for future operations, inform policy decisions such as whether the military or the CIA should be conducting operations, and help the U.S. government to better live up to its policies and principles. (3PA; Lewis coauthored the Joint Civilian Casualty Study and should be listened to.) Süveyda Karakaya, “Religion and Conflict: Explaining the Puzzling Case of ‘Islamic Violence’,” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, May 1, 2015. If we only look at the proportion of Muslim-plurality countries and the proportion of intra-state conflicts, Muslim-plurality states are indeed more conflict-prone. Sixty-two of 163 intra-state conflicts (38%) occurred in Muslim-plurality states, whereas 24.6% of all states have a Muslimplurality population. Six percent of Muslim-plurality states and 4% of all countries experienced intra-state conflict respectively. Yet, a closer look at some of the explanatory variables that increase the risk of domestic conflict suggest that Muslim-plurality countries are also associated with lower GDP per capita, oil-dependent economies, a higher proportion of young males, more state repression, and autocratic governments…Given the lower levels of GDP per capita, a lack of democracy, more repressive regimes, a higher proportion of young males, and oil or natural resource dependent economies, it is not surprising to find higher rates of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality countries…(p. 20) Islamic faith alone does not make countries more conflict prone once we control for even just one other variable that increases the risk of conflict. (p. 21)
  • Yemen
    Nine Months of Coalition Air Strikes Against the Islamic State
    Today marks the nine month anniversary since the start of the U.S.-led air campaign, later named Operation Inherent Resolve, against the self-declared Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. The air war, which Secretary of State John Kerry then described as definitively not a war, but rather “a heightened level of counterterrorism operation,” shows no sign of ending. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Lloyd Austin told the House Armed Services Committee in March, “The enemy is now in a ‘defensive crouch,’ and is unable to conduct major operations.” The Pentagon has released a series of maps that purportedly detail the loss of territory under control by IS. However, the number and competence of Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces required to ultimately defeat IS militants on the ground, and then control, secure, and administer newly freed territory, are lacking. In an unnoticed indicator found in the prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, two U.S. Air Force lieutenant generals acknowledged: “These combat operations are expected to continue long-term (3+ years).”   U.S. officials have gone to great lengths to emphasize the contribution of coalition members in conducting airstrikes against IS, and, in September, even refused to expand the scope of its targets until those partners publicly committed their support.  It is no surprise, given its vastly larger and more proficient aerial capabilities, that the United States has been the primary source of all airstrikes against IS, even while the number of participating militaries has increased from nine to twelve since September. The table below breaks down coalition support for the 3,731 air strikes. One concern relayed to me from CENTCOM officials was that the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen would cause the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coalition members to redirect their combat sorties from bombing IS toward striking Houthi militants in Yemen. It appears that this concern has not yet become a reality. Between March 25, when the GCC intervention in Yemen began, and May 7, a total of 791 airstrikes were conducted in Iraq and Syria, 74 percent by the United States and 26 percent by coalition members, according to data provided to me by the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). This is a slightly increased contribution from non-U.S. coalition members. It is possible that the slight increase in coalition contributions since March 25 reflects Canada’s April 8 decision to expand its kinetic operations into Syria—becoming the only other country, besides the United States, to do so. As of May 5, Canada had conducted 564 sorties by CF-188 Hornet fighter-attack aircraft. However, the Canadian military does not disclose how many of those sorties resulted in the actual dropping of bombs, so the percentage of overall coalition airstrikes that it is responsible for cannot be attributed. Meanwhile, the U.S. military has documented that lots of people and things are being destroyed. For a military that often claims it does not do “body counts,” it has done so repeatedly. Most recently, General Austin declared in March that 8,500 IS militants had been killed. The Pentagon lists more than 6,000 IS targets as having been destroyed. Most notably, CENTCOM press releases indicate that more than 500 “excavators” have been destroyed—as if IS is the world’s first terrorist landscaping company. All of this destruction is coming at a direct cost to taxpayers of an estimated $2.11 billion, or $8.6 million per day. How this open-ended air war will shift when the United States begins providing close air support for trained Syrian rebels in a few months is unknowable.
  • Political Transitions
    You Might Have Missed: Drone Strikes, Nation-building, and the U.S. Aviation Inventory
    Elisabeth Bumiller, “Soldier, Thinker, Hunter, Spy: Drawing a Bead on Al Qaeda,” New York Times, September 3, 2011. In Mr. [Michael] Vickers’s [top adviser to then-secretary of defense Leon E. Panetta] assessment, there are perhaps four important Qaeda leaders left in Pakistan, and 10 to 20 leaders over all in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Even if the United States kills them all in drone strikes, Mr. Vickers said, “You still have Al Qaeda, the idea.” (3PA: Since Vickers’ estimate that there were two dozen al-Qaeda leaders left in 2011, more than two-hundred U.S. drone strikes have killed upwards of 1,200 people—apparently non-al-Qaeda leaders. Vickers announced this week that he is stepping down as undersecretary of defense for intelligence after serving in the Department of Defense since 2007.) Seth G. Jones, “Historical Lessons for the Wars in Iraq and Syria,” Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, RAND Corporation, April 30, 2015, p. 4. Of those [141] insurgencies that have ended since World War II, nearly three quarters terminated because of a military victory by one side or the other—with [50 insurgencies] 35 percent ending in a victory by insurgents and [52 insurgencies] 37 percent in a government victory. By comparison, only [39 insurgencies] 27 percent ended in a draw, which included such outcomes as a negotiated settlement. But draws have become more common in recent years. Nicholas Sambanis, Stergio Skaperdas, and William Wohlforth, “Nation-Building through War,” American Political Science Review, 109(2), May 2015, pp. 279-296. France and Prussia were bargaining in the shadow of shifting power under anarchy, a setting extant theories predict would raise the specter of war. But the standard theoretical toolkit misses critical determinants of actors’ expectations of future power shifts and thus cannot explain their strategic choices. By reintegrating the insights of the real Realpolitik —the classical theory of statecraft—our theory fills major gaps in rationalist theories of interstatewar in a way that resonates powerfully with historical evidence. Expectations about what would influence the social identification of southern Germans explain why an arcane monarchical succession problem was deliberately framed as a zero-sum status contest between two great powers who preferred to fight a war rather than lose prestige. Key elements of this case are missed by the most closely related existing approaches. First, modern realist theory misses the intimate connection between the politics of social identity and nationalism, on the one hand, and the power politics of security and balancing, on the other hand…. Second, the diversionary war hypothesis is too narrowly focused on the domestic level and misses the Realpolitik pursuit of power in a competitive interstate environment. In most renderings (see, e.g., Snyder 1991; Snyder and Mansfield 2005) foreign belligerence is a suboptimal response to a domestic crisis… Third, leaders’ concern for status or prestige was not a reflection of their own psychological needs (cf. Lebow 2008), a consequence of “irrationality” or a “myth” covering for other domestic pathologies (e.g., Snyder 1991), or a stand-in for reputation (Dafoe, Huth, and Renshon, 2014). To an important degree, the focus on relative status reflected an assessment of its implication for domestic social identity and subsequent state power. Fourth, the social identity shift produced by war might not have been long-lived had it not been for the underlying cultural bonds tying Germans together, which in turn explained their investments in state capacity in the aftermath of victory. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2016-2045, April 2015, p. 8. National Security Archive, “Lyndon Johnson and the Dominican Intervention of 1965,” Electronic Briefing Book No. 513, May 23, 1965, p. 4. Lyndon B. Johnson: We’re going to have to live with [the Castro Regime] a long time, and I’m prepared to do it. I have nothing in the world I want except to do what I believe to be right. Now, I don’t always know what’s right. Sometimes I take other people’s judgments, and I get misled. Like sending troops in there to Santo Domingo. But the man who misled me was Lyndon Johnson, nobody else. I did that. Ican’t blame a damn human, and I don’t want any of them to take credit for it. [Fortas laughs]And I’ll ride it out. I think it’s a … I’d do the same thing right this second if I got a wire fromAmbassador Sanchez, by God. And I know how it looks. And it looks just the opposite from the way I want [it] to look. I don’t want to be an intervenor. But I think that … I think Mr. [Fidel] Castro done intervened prettygood when he kicked old [Donald] Reid [Cabral] out. And, honestly, of all the people I saw, I thought Reid was the least dictatorial and the mostgenuine and honest of any of that crowd I met.
  • United States
    Obama’s Drone Strikes Reforms Don’t Apply to 46 Percent
    Today, Adam Entous reported the latest confirmation about what informed citizens already knew: the White House’s purported policy guidance for U.S. lethal counterterrorism strikes issued on May 23, 2013 does not apply to CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. The CIA may still target unknown individuals, and they do not have to pose a purported "imminent threat" to the United States. This was widely reported at the time publicly, and I was told by a then-member of a congressional oversight committee that this exception was made clear to them as well. This substantial carve-out for the standards of who can be targeted that apply in Pakistan versus Somalia or Yemen call into question the entire 2013 reform efforts of the Obama administration. Though, long before today, it has been increasingly apparent that U.S. drone strike practices have not matched the promises that President Obama made two years ago. Moreover, this further demonstrates how drones routinely work at cross purposes with other U.S. foreign policy interests. As Secretary of State John Kerry said soon after Obama’s much touted speech, “The only people that we fire a drone at are confirmed terrorist targets at the highest level after a great deal of vetting that takes a long period of time. We don’t just fire a drone at somebody and think they’re a terrorist.” In August 2013, Kerry also pledged while in Pakistan that the guidelines applied to all U.S. drone strikes (we now know this is untrue), and that Obama had “a very real timeline and we hope it’s going to be very, very soon” for ending drone strikes (also apparently not true). What is unclear is whether Kerry was being deliberately misleading or was unaware that the policy guidance does not apply to Pakistan. Either way, it makes America’s leading diplomat appear less credible and believable. Since May 23, 2013, the United States has conducted an estimated total of 96 drone strikes, killing 578 people, 26 of whom were civilians. In Pakistan alone, 44 drone strikes have killed 265 people, including 1 civilian. Therefore, the policy guidance issued in May 2013 has not applied to 46 percent of all drone strikes and 46 percent of all victims. On Thursday, when President Obama wisely declassified the circumstances of the tragic incident regarding Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, he declared, “As President and as Commander-in-Chief, I take full responsibility for all our counterterrorism operations, including the one that inadvertently took the lives of Warren and Giovanni. I profoundly regret what happened.” This, albeit selective, account is admirable. Now, it is long past time that Obama publicly extends the same sympathies to the family of sixteen-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen inadvertently killed in a drone strike in Yemen on October 14, 2011.
  • South Korea
    You Might Have Missed: Drone Strike Policies, North Korea, and Conflict Prevention
    Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, White House, April 23, 2015. John Earnest, White House Spokesperson:  I can tell you that Mr. Gadahn was not specifically targeted.  But in a fashion that was similar to the operation that we were discussing that resulted in the death of Dr. Weinstein and Mr. Lo Porto, the operation was against an al Qaeda compound.  So again, this is a scenario where U.S. officials had determined with near certainty that an operation could be carried out against an al Qaeda compound that was frequented, or at least where at least one al Qaeda leader was locatedAnd that operation did result in the death of Mr. Gadahn… What I would also readily admit to you is that in the aftermath of a situation like this, it raises legitimate questions about whether additional changes need to be made to those protocols. Again, to put it more bluntly, we have national security professionals who diligently follow those protocols based on everything that we know so far.  They follow those protocols, and yet it still resulted in this unintended but very tragic consequence.  And that’s why the President has directed his team to conduct a review of this particular operation to see if there are lessons learned, reforms that we can implement to this process. (3PA: This is the first time the White House has anthropomorphized a compound as being equal to an al-Qaeda leader. U.S. drone strike policy does not say that a “compound” can pose an imminent threat. Moreover, the tragic incident will result in a review of one counterterrorism operation in January 2015, but not of the thirteen-year drone program itself.) Jeremy Scahill, “Germany is the Tell-Tale Heart of America’s Drone War,” The Intercept, April 17, 2015. Amid fierce European criticism of America’s targeted killing program, U.S. and German government officials have long downplayed Ramstein’s role in lethal U.S. drone operations and have issued carefully phrased evasions when confronted with direct questions about the base. But the slides show that the facilities at Ramstein perform an essential function in lethal drone strikes conducted by the CIA and the U.S. military in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa… “Ramstein carries the signal to tell the drone what to do and it returns the display of what the drone sees. Without Ramstein, drones could not function, at least not as they do now,” the source said. The new evidence places German Chancellor Angela Merkel in an awkward position given Germany’s close diplomatic alliance with the United States. The German government has granted the U.S. the right to use the property, but only under the condition that the Americans do nothing there that violates German law. “U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea,” Senate Armed Services Committee, April 16, 2015. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): The likelihood of an armed conflict between South Korea and North Korea, how would you evaluate that on 1 to 10 scale, 1 being very unlikely, 10 being highly likely. Say in the next 10 years, general? Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander, UN Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea: Well, sir, I caveat by saying I think that if K.J.U. [Kim Jong-Un] knows that if he were to conduct a conventional attack on South Korea it’d be the end. So I don’t think that’s his purpose. I think it’s to maintain his regime. But I think over a 10-year period it’s above a 5. It’s a 6 probably.Military Cyber Programs and Posture,” Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 14, 2015. Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL): In your planning, do you plan to hit non-military targets? Eric Rosenbach, principal cyber advisor to the secretary of defense: Sir, I can talk about more detail in a close session, but yes, but in a very, very precise and confined way, they would always adhere to the law of war and all of the things we think about for collateral damage and other targeting. And I’m sure, General McLaughlin can speak more to that and in particular in a classified environment. Nelson: Such as if, for example, that you wanted to take out the enemy’s air defenses, you could go in and knock out power stations, the civilian stations. Rosenbach: Sir, you know, I think talking in a classified environment would be better for specifics and then I can go into great detail about things like that. Alon Ben-David, “Israel Learns About Close Air Support In Gaza,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 27, 2015. The fiercest fighting occurred as Israel’s Golani infantry brigade approached the Shejaiya neighborhood, east of Gaza City, where Hamas ordered the Palestinian population to stay put. After 4 hr. of combat, the Israelis suffered 13 casualties. Most of the Golani senior command was either killed or wounded. Under heavy fire and unable to pull back, the brigade begged for heavy air support. IAF [Israeli Air Force] commander Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel decided to act against all safety procedures and ordered the Golani forces to take cover in their armored vehicles. Then, the air force began dropping dozens of 2,000-lb. Joint Direct Attack Munitions on the building sheltering Palestinian combatants, within 100 meters of friendly forces. In 2 hr., Shejaiya absorbed more than 100 tons of explosives, which inflicted massive destruction on the neighborhood. Israeli forces were able to pull back and evacuate their casualties. Palestinians reported that 40 people, both combatants and civilians, were killed in the bombing. The following day, the Golani brigade reentered Shejaiya to complete its mission. Word about the extremely close air support that the brigade received quickly spread to other brigades, which then asked the air force to provide them with the same support. The air force did that at several other locations, practically destroying the first few rows of buildings on the outskirts of Palestinian urban areas. “Those days taught us that from now on, any ground maneuver into a dense urban area will have to be very closely supported from the air,” says an air force official, “and that the entry ticket into a serried [compact] urban area is 100‑200 tons of munitions.” Stephen Watts, “Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s Fragile State,” RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 29. DoD [Department of Defense] planners do not themselves, however, have formal processes designed to identify risks ahead of time and take steps to mitigate them. State Department personnel are highly sensitive to the potential political risks of such assistance, but they typically think about risk identification and mitigation in highly informal, intuitive ways—ways that at least some at the State Department contend are inadequate to the many challenges posed by SSA [security sector assistance]. Moreover, the State Department does not have adequate resources to oversee its current commitments, much less an expanded approach to risk identification and mitigation. Neither DoD nor the State Department, in other words, appears well positioned to identify and mitigate SSA risks. (3PA: This paragraph, which is based upon interviews with Pentagon and State Department staffers, makes clear why the U.S. government is so unable to identify and prevent conflict.)
  • United States
    Yemen: The Worst Reason for War
    The excellent New York Times journalists David K. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim have an article tacking stock of the nine-day old Saudi-led air campaign against Houthi and Houthi-affiliated fighting forces in Yemen. On the evening of the first airstrikes, the White House revealed that the United States was aiding this intervention: “President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations.” Unclear as to why the Obama administration hastily and enthusiastically endorsed and supported the air campaign, I wrote a piece analyzing the justifications that U.S. officials were offering (I counted seven). Most disturbing were two acknowledgments by Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. Central Command—the geographic region containing the Persian Gulf. First, he said, “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.” Austin also admitted when asked when he learned of the intervention, “I had a conversation with the CHOD [the Saudi Chief of Defense] right before they took action, so it was shortly before.” So the military commander responsible for providing the logistical and intelligence support to the intervention did not know its goals or objectives, and only learned of it right before it began. It was with this background and understanding of the air campaign so far that I then came across this passage in Kirkpatrick and Fahim’s article this morning: American officials said they supported the Saudi campaign mainly because of a lack of alternatives. “If you ask why we’re backing this, beyond the fact that the Saudis are allies and have been allies for a long time, the answer you’re going to get from most people—if they were being honest—is that we weren’t going to be able to stop it,” said an American defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the official was discussing internal government deliberations. “If the Saudis were willing to step in, the thinking was that they should be encouraged,” the official said. “We were not going to send our military, that’s for certain.” So if the United States cannot stop a misguided intervention by its partners into a proxy civil war ten thousand kilometers away, the only alternative is to join them? Surely the unnamed Pentagon official is aware that the intervention is directly at odds with other, allegedly more pressing, U.S. foreign policy interests in the region: making Yemen an even more unstable country, as evidenced by the prison break that included members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and assuredly diverting the already meager GCC air assets participating in the coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Rather, since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen was inevitable, America’s support for it was predetermined. This is especially puzzling since none of the countries bombing Yemen are mutual defense treaty allies with the United States, so there is no obligation, even under the most tortured self-defense justification, to support them. Moreover, even when allies undertake foreign military misadventures, that should not mean that U.S. support is mandatory. In 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus, President Richard Nixon was surprised but provided no support and, in 1982,  when the United Kingdom went to war with Argentina over the Falklands Islands, President Ronald Reagan remained neutral. Quotes by anonymous officials are not formal policy declarations, but they often accurately capture the honest thinking of those who work to develop and implement foreign policy. Recall the “presidential advisor” who, in the New Yorker, admiringly described the president’s actions in Libya as “leading from behind.” The defense official quoted above has articulated a far more troubling doctrine of America being led into war by a nervous Gulf monarchy, and the White House lacking the agency to do anything about it, other than to climb on board and offer the unmatched U.S. military enabling support for this war. Finally, this intervention is going terribly based upon all of the courageous reporting from those in the country. Per usual, the victims of the war will be innocent non-combatants. Just this morning, UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs Valerie Amos released a statement warning: “Reports from humanitarian partners in different parts of the country indicate that some 519 people have been killed and nearly 1,700 injured in the past two weeks–over 90 of them children.” Why did the White House so eagerly sign up to back the Saudi-led intervention that has such unclear goals and is causing such obvious destruction and death?
  • Wars and Conflict
    Ashley’s War
    The poignant and gripping story of a groundbreaking team of female American warriors who served alongside Special Operations soldiers on the battlefield in Afghanistan­.
  • Military Operations
    You Might Have Missed: Yemen, Islamic State, and MDGs
    Lt. Gen. Ellen M. Pawlikowski and Lt. Gen. James M. Holmes, “Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House of Representatives,” U.S. Department of the Air Force, March 26, 2015, p. 16. All three mission areas (Stand-Off, Direct Attack, and Penetrator munitions) in the Air-to-Surface munitions inventory are short of inventory objectives. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and SDB weapons along with Low Observable platforms are force multipliers in a highly contested environment and their shortage could increase friendly force attrition driving a much higher level of effort enabling the attack of other critical targets. The shortage of penetrator weapons will result in some inability to target adversary critical capabilities and increase risk. Combat operations and support for our coalition partners in Iraq and Syria are reducing the direct attack munitions (JDAM) inventories faster than we are procuring them. These combat operations are expected to continue long term (3+ years). Combat expenditures have been replaced using OCO funding; however replenishment takes over three years. Direct attack munition shortages drive the use of non-preferred munitions with decreased effectiveness and resulting in increased time and Air Force attrition to accomplish COCOM objectives. (3PA: This is what is called a “tell” in poker. U.S. officials have refused to estimate the length of the airwar against IS, while the Pentagon is expecting it to last over three years.) “Fiscal Year 2016 Defense Authorization Request,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2015. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): When we give all this equipment to Yemen, and then we see it falling apart, do we not have any way to retrieve that? Gen. Lloyd Austin, Commander, U.S. Central Command: Certainly in the case like Yemen, sir, we don’t have the ability to go back in and retrieve it...once we’ve provided the weapons to them, sir. Manchin: It’s theirs. Austin: Yes, sir.... Manchin: How can you assure me that Syria, whoever we support in Syria, that won’t fall in the wrong hands. Austin: There’s no way to absolutely assure you that that won’t happen. (3PA: Craig Whitlock reported that an estimated $500 million in defense weapons and equipment provided to Yemen had either been destroyed or gone missing.) “Assessing Development Goals: The Good, the Bad and the Hideous,” The Economist, March 28, 2015. “ISIS Poll,” CNN/ORC International, March 13-15, 2015. Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S. Confirms Military Withdrawal From Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2015. But the defense official said the U.S. still has some ability to carry out strikes in Yemen as part of its counterterrorism program, which mainly targets militants using strikes by unmanned drones based in the region. “We still, of course, retain the capability to do unilateral counterterrorism strikes anywhere in the world,” the official said. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Standards, January 2, 2015, p.3. Jim Michaels, “U.S. General: Taliban Beaten in Helmand Province,” USA Today, January 12, 2010. U.S. forces have driven the Taliban from most towns and villages in the strategic Helmand province of Afghanistan, leaving incoming troops with the mission of holding key areas and rebuilding the economy, Marine commanders say. "They’ve taken on the Taliban, the insurgency, right in the heartland and they’ve defeated them," said Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills in an interview with USA TODAY. (3PA: The Taliban’s defeat has been announced by U.S. officials many times.  Most notably, President Bush declared in September 2005: "As a result of the United States military, Taliban no longer is in existence. And the people of Afghanistan are now free.")
  • United States
    Reimagining National Service
    Play
    Experts share their perspectives on how service organizations can promote a culture of national service in the United States.
  • Defense and Security
    You Might Have Missed: Arming Rebels, Oplan Exodus, and Women and Drone Strikes
    Richard Eichenberg, “Do Women Dislike Drone Strikes More Than Other Types of Airstrikes? (yes, but only a little),” Ike’s World of Polls from Tufts, February 27, 2015. (3PA: This gender gap in support for drone strikes is consistent with all polls of women and men regarding the use of force, as I’ve noted before.) “The Committee Report on the Mamasapano Incident,” Senate Committee on Public Order, Senate of the Philippines, January 25, 2015, pp. 94-95. The testimonies of various resource persons, particularly during the executive hearings, appear to contradict the statement of the DFA that Oplan Exodus was 100% purely Filipino planned and implemented. The following facts were attested to: • One of the Americans ordered Pangilinan to fire the artillery. However, Pangilinan refused and told him “Do not dictate to me what to do. I am the commander here!” • The Americans provided surveillance in the area through their ISR. TV monitors were brought in by the Americans to the HQ. Department of Defense Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Secretary of Defence Fallon in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room, U.S. Department of Defense, March 11, 2015. Q:  Chairman Dempsey made it clear that he thought that the Syrian rebels need to have some assurances that they will get some type of protection as they go into the fight. I’m wondering, do you agree with that, that there needs to be some sort of assurance given to the rebels? Is it dependent on whether or not they are attacked by ISIL or Assad? And what are the parameters that have to be discussed and that are being debated now, that you think need to be considered as you look at this? SEC. CARTER: I do agree with General Dempsey. The forces that we train in Syria, we will have some obligation to support them after they’re trained. We all understand that. And we’re working through what kinds of support and under what conditions we would do so, to include the possibility that, even though they’re trained and equipped to combat ISIL, they could come into contact with forces of the Assad regime. So that’s definitely something that we’re aware of and something that we’re discussing, as the chairman said this morning and I completely agree with him. (3PA: The ad hoc plan to arm Syrian rebels and confused promises made to them by policymakers is similar to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, as I recently pointed out.) Max Abrahms and Philip B. K. Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization, March 2015, pp. 1-32. Beginning with the most general of tests, we find in a sample of militant groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that those lacking centralized leaderships are more than twice as likely to target civilians. MENA groups are also more likely to engage in civilian targeting when the leaders are hindered from communicating tactical instructions to the rank and file. We then examine the impact of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign on the targeting choices of militant groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. When their leaderships are degraded through decapitation strikes, militant groups become significantly less discriminate in their targeting choices. Espen Geelmuyden Rod and Nils B Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats? The Internet in Authoritarian Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research, 1(14), 2015, pp. 1-14. While previous research has established that expansion of the Internet is more likely to be implemented in democracies, this should not lead us to assume that the Internet fosters democratization. Rather, we will have to take a closer look at how non-democratic countries expand Internet coverage, under which conditions this occurs, and what effects it produces…Our first finding is that governments that are more concerned about controlling the domestic information environment have higher Internet expansion rates. The result directly contradicts the ‘liberation technology’ argument, because one would expect that such regimes would be deterred from implementing a technology that enables free information flow. From a ‘repression technology’ perspective, on the other hand, the finding is more intuitive. If the Internet can be used as a tool to solidify autocratic survival by shaping public opinion as well as to identify dissenters, then more repressive regimes should be the most interested in providing online connection. Since the users of ICT are likely to be members of the urbanized, intellectual, and political elite, monitoring has immediate information benefits for autocratic leaders. Our second test, the impact of Internet penetration on regime change, is less conclusive but clearly does not produce evidence to suggest that democracy advances in autocracies that expand the Internet. If anything, the relationship is the opposite. By looking at episodes of democratic and autocratic changes in low and high penetration countries after the introduction of Web 2.0 (2006–10), we find that the frequency of democratic shifts is higher in the low than in the high penetration group. Conversely, the strengthening of autocratic rule seems to be more frequent in the group of more rapid adopters. Finally, we illustrated how the introduction of the Internet can play into the hands of autocratic governments by looking more closely at the mechanisms of repression associated with the new technology in Saudi Arabia. In sum, the first two decades of humankind’s experience with the Internet lends more support to the notion of ‘repression technology’ than ‘liberation technology’. Patrick Porter, The Global Village Myth: Distance, War, and the Limits of Power (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015). Does technology kill distance? Many policymakers and scholars think so. The “globalized” nature of our world is a mantra of the modern corporation, the university, government, and military. Those who embrace it not only call for more open markets, more “international” citizenship, or greater attention to the world beyond. They also assume the passing of an old territorial, state-based order. Fear is never far away from the rhetoric of globalism, about new vulnerabilities and the ease with which aggressors can apply violence over large spaces. Notions of a fragile small world are pervasive in debate about security, from the preservation of biological life to the defense of a way of life. Globalists claim that a revolution in information, communications, transport, and weapons technology has reduced the transaction costs of interaction over space and linked the world to a point where it has shrunk or even collapsed distance. This creates an unprecedented condition of vulnerability, sensitivities, and connectedness, making the United States and its allies increasingly open to violent threats. Globalists rarely specify exactly the extent to which this has happened. Regardless, they claim that the net effect is to transform international relations and make the world an intrinsically dangerous place. This book takes aim at globalism, challenging its empirical claims and what it tends toward, the waste of blood and treasure in a utopian impulse to pursue security by remaking the world. My focus is not on geography, or the description of the earth. Instead, the focus is geopolitics, or how people interact with nature in pursuit of security and the relationship between politics, location, and material things. Above all, it is a study of “distance,” or that which separates us, and how it is generated. And it is a caution again liberal wars, or the pursuit of security through the creation of liberal subjects abroad. The cause of armed liberalism, especially of the kind that puts troops on the ground, is now in low water. But the ideas that power it endure. As after Korea and Vietnam, those ideas may make a comeback. (pp. 2-3) (3PA: This is an important and original look at the world, and worth reading.)