Blogs

Geo-Graphics

A graphical take on geoeconomics.

Latest Post

China’s Central Bank is Becoming the Developing World’s “Payday Lender”

With the developing world’s growing use of costly and opaque “payday loans” from China’s central bank, the IMF and World Bank need to demand far greater transparency from Beijing. 

Read More
Europe and Eurasia
A Full Greek IMF-Debt Default Would Be Four Times All Previous Defaults Combined
Since the IMF’s launch in 1946, 27 countries have had overdue financial obligations of 6 months or more.*  But the amounts involved have always been small, never exceeding SDR 1bn ($1.4bn). This could all change dramatically with Greece, which will default on the SDR 1.2bn ($1.7bn) it owes the Fund next week unless its troika creditors agree to extend further financial assistance before then.  Greece owes the IMF SDR 4.4bn ($6.2bn) through the end of this year and SDR 18.5bn ($26bn) over the coming ten years.  As shown in the graphic above, this is nearly four times the cumulative total of overdue funds in the IMF’s history. Although Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras has blasted the Fund for “pillaging” Greece, the conditions it has imposed on the country have been mild by historical standards – particularly considering the size of the loans involved.  Non-payment by a European state will surely undermine the IMF’s credibility in the eyes of developing countries, and likely accelerate efforts to build alternative institutions. Next up: Ukraine . . . * “Defaults” in the post title are defined as financial obligations overdue by six months of more, or what the IMF refers to as “protracted arrears.”   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Europe and Eurasia
Greece and Its Creditors Should Do a Guns-For-Pensions Deal
IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard has said that Greece needs to slash pension spending by 1% of GDP in order to reach its new budget targets.  The Greek government continues to resist, arguing that Greeks dependent on pensions have already suffered enough.  But it has yet to put a compelling alternative to its creditors. What depresses us is how little attention has been paid to one major area of Greek government spending that seems ripe for the ax: defense spending.  Greece spends a whopping 2.2% of GDP on defense, more than any NATO member-state save the United States and France.  Bringing Greece into line with the NATO average would alone achieve ¾ of what the IMF is demanding through pension cuts. Greece has long argued that its defense posture is grounded in a supposed threat from Turkey – also a big spender on things military.  But surely the United States and the major western European powers can keep a cold peace between NATO allies at much lower cost. So why don’t they?  German and French arms-export interests surely explain the silence on the creditor side: Greece is one of their biggest customers. With Greece sliding towards default and economic chaos, such silence is indefensible.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Europe and Eurasia
Greece-Troika Gap Over Primary Surpluses Has Shrunk Dramatically
Greece has announced that it will not pay the IMF the €300 million due to the Fund on June 5.  Instead, it will “bundle” the payments due to the Fund over the course of June into one payment of about €1.7 billion that it will make at the end of the month.  This contradicts earlier pledges that it would not resort to bundling.  The only country ever to have done so is Zambia, three decades ago. While the dramatic move suggests that Athens is seriously contemplating outright default, we think such a move, at this point, borders on insanity.  This is because the gap between the parties over the main issue between them, the size of the primary budget surplus (the excess of revenues over expenditures, excluding interest payments) Greece will have to achieve in the coming years is now very small relative to what it was a year ago - as shown in the figure above.  In contrast, the cost of a Greek default is likely to be a complete cut-off in ECB liquidity support that will crush the Greek banking system and, also likely, force the country out of the Eurozone. Then again, Greece has always had an affinity for tragedies.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Monetary Policy
    Are Fed Watchers Watching the Wrong People?
    One effect of the financial crisis was to change how the Fed conducts monetary policy.  This could be long-lasting and important.Prior to the crisis, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) set a target for the so-called federal funds rate, the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances to each other overnight.  The New York Fed would then conduct open market operations – buying and selling securities – in order to nudge that rate towards the target.  It did this by affecting the supply of banks’ reserve balances at the Fed, which go up when they sell securities to the Fed and down when they buy them.The Fed kept the level of reserves in the system low enough that some banks needed to borrow from others in order to meet their requirements, thereby ensuring that the fed funds rate was always an important one.  The cost of borrowing through other means then tended to move up and down with the fed funds rate, thus giving the Fed effective power over the cost of short-term credit broadly.During the crisis, the Fed’s Quantitative Easing programs – large-scale purchases of assets from the banks – drove up the volume of excess reserves, or reserves beyond those banks are required to hold, to unprecedented levels.  A consequence of this is that many institutions can fulfill their reserve requirements without needing to borrow, so competition for reserves is now low and small changes in their supply no longer induce the same changes in the cost of borrowing them that they once did.  This means that open market operations are no longer sufficient to drive the cost of borrowing in the fed funds market to the FOMC’s target. This can be seen clearly in the graphic above: the difference between the FOMC’s target for the fed funds rate and the actual fed funds rate increases and begins to gyrate wildly after 2007.This is where recent legislation becomes important. Section 201 of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 amended the 1913 Federal Reserve Act to give the Fed the authority to pay interest on reserves beginning October 1, 2011.  The 2008 Economic Stabilization Act brought this forward to October 1, 2008.  These changes gave the Fed a new tool to implement monetary policy.  Paying interest on reserves helps to set a floor under short-term rates because banks that can earn interest at the Fed are unwilling to lend to others below the rate the Fed is paying.  This allows the FOMC to achieve its target for the fed funds rate even with high levels of excess reserves -  as can be seen in the graphic from 2009 on.The FOMC has said that the Fed intends to rely on adjustments in the rate of interest on excess reserves to achieve its fed funds target rate as it begins to tighten monetary policy – likely later this year or early next.  However, the 2006 Act gave authority for setting the rate of interest on excess reserves to the seven-member (currently five) Federal Reserve Board, and not to the twelve-member (currently ten) FOMC.  This could be consequential.The Federal Reserve Act stipulates that the interest rate on reserves should not “exceed the general level of short-term interest rates,” but does not prevent the Board from setting it well below the general level of short-term interest rates.  This means that the FOMC could decide that short-term rates should rise to, say, 4 percent, while the Board, thinking this excessive, could decide only to raise the rate on reserves to, say, 3 percent.  Because the quantity of excess reserves is currently so massive, it would be virtually impossible for the trading desk at the New York Fed to conduct open market operations sufficient to achieve the 4 percent target set by the FOMC.  Overnight rates would therefore trade closer to the Board-determined 3 percent rate on reserves.Section 505 of Senator Richard Shelby’s draft Financial Regulatory Improvement Act would transfer the authority to set the interest rate on reserves to the FOMC, which would restore its ability to control short-term rates generally.  But unless and until such an act is passed, or the volume of excess reserves declines significantly, the Board, and not the FOMC, will control how quickly rates rise.This is potentially important because, as the graphic shows, the average Board member is considerably more dovish than the average non-Board FOMC member.  Fed watchers may therefore be overestimating the pace of rate increases because they’re focusing on the comments of the wrong committee.  For now, at least, it is the Board, and not the FOMC, that wields the real power over rate increases. Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphicsRead about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • China
    Are China’s RMB Swap Lines an Empty Vessel?
    As our recent CFR interactive shows, central bank currency swaps have spread like wildfire since the financial crisis.  In 2006, the Fed had only two open swap lines outstanding, with Canada and Mexico, for just $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively.  At its high point in 2008, the Fed had fourteen open swap lines, with as much as $583 billion drawn. The central bank that has been most active in creating swap lines, however, is China; the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is expected to sign a swap agreement with Chile this week, bringing the total number of outstanding swap lines to thirty-one.  The extension of these swap lines is clearly part of China’s high-profile recent initiatives to internationalize the RMB. What is most interesting about this effort so far is that whereas everyone seems interested in having a swap line with China, almost no one has thus far had any interest in using it.  And when they have used it the amounts accessed have been tiny – as shown in the middle figure in our graphic above. The only actual RMB swap use advertised by China was back in 2010, when it sent 20 billion yuan (about $3 billion) to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to enable companies in Hong Kong to settle RMB trade with the mainland. But this is basically China trading with itself.  The Korean Ministry of Finance publicized a tiny swap in 2013 in which it accessed 62 million yuan (about $10 million) to help Korean importers make payments. The only interesting case is that of Argentina, which activated its RMB swap line last year, and has reportedly drawn $2.7 billion worth.  The effect of the swaps on Argentina’s reserves is shown at the far right of the graphic. Argentina has the right to draw on a total of $11 billion worth of RMB.  Its central bank has made a point of emphasizing that, under the terms of its agreement with the PBoC, the RMB may be freely converted into dollars – which Argentina, whose reserves have plummeted from $53bn in 2011 to $31bn today, is worryingly short of. In effect, then, what Argentina has done by activating the RMB swap line is to add “vouchers” for dollars, freeing up the actual dollars in its reserves for imminent needs, such as imports and FX market intervention, and signaling to the markets that billions more can be accessed in a pinch. The take-away is that whereas the RMB is slowly becoming an alternative to the dollar for settling Chinese goods trade, it is still far from being a currency that anyone actually needs – except maybe as a substitute for Fed dollar swap lines, which few central banks currently have access to.  If Russia’s dollar reserves continue to fall, therefore, China may be the first place it turns.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”