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Steel Productivity has Plummeted Since Trump’s 2018 Tariffs
by
Benn Steil and
Elisabeth Harding
March 6, 2025
Studies have shown that tariffs depress productivity in protected industries. U.S. steel is a case in point.
Greece-Troika Gap Over Primary Surpluses Has Shrunk Dramatically
Greece has announced that it will not pay the IMF the €300 million due to the Fund on June 5. Instead, it will “bundle” the payments due to the Fund over the course of June into one payment of about €1.7 billion that it will make at the end of the month. This contradicts earlier pledges that it would not resort to bundling. The only country ever to have done so is Zambia, three decades ago.
While the dramatic move suggests that Athens is seriously contemplating outright default, we think such a move, at this point, borders on insanity. This is because the gap between the parties over the main issue between them, the size of the primary budget surplus (the excess of revenues over expenditures, excluding interest payments) Greece will have to achieve in the coming years is now very small relative to what it was a year ago - as shown in the figure above. In contrast, the cost of a Greek default is likely to be a complete cut-off in ECB liquidity support that will crush the Greek banking system and, also likely, force the country out of the Eurozone.
Then again, Greece has always had an affinity for tragedies.
Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil
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Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Are Fed Watchers Watching the Wrong People?
One effect of the financial crisis was to change how the Fed conducts monetary policy. This could be long-lasting and important.Prior to the crisis, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) set a target for the so-called federal funds rate, the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances to each other overnight. The New York Fed would then conduct open market operations – buying and selling securities – in order to nudge that rate towards the target. It did this by affecting the supply of banks’ reserve balances at the Fed, which go up when they sell securities to the Fed and down when they buy them.The Fed kept the level of reserves in the system low enough that some banks needed to borrow from others in order to meet their requirements, thereby ensuring that the fed funds rate was always an important one. The cost of borrowing through other means then tended to move up and down with the fed funds rate, thus giving the Fed effective power over the cost of short-term credit broadly.During the crisis, the Fed’s Quantitative Easing programs – large-scale purchases of assets from the banks – drove up the volume of excess reserves, or reserves beyond those banks are required to hold, to unprecedented levels. A consequence of this is that many institutions can fulfill their reserve requirements without needing to borrow, so competition for reserves is now low and small changes in their supply no longer induce the same changes in the cost of borrowing them that they once did. This means that open market operations are no longer sufficient to drive the cost of borrowing in the fed funds market to the FOMC’s target. This can be seen clearly in the graphic above: the difference between the FOMC’s target for the fed funds rate and the actual fed funds rate increases and begins to gyrate wildly after 2007.This is where recent legislation becomes important. Section 201 of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 amended the 1913 Federal Reserve Act to give the Fed the authority to pay interest on reserves beginning October 1, 2011. The 2008 Economic Stabilization Act brought this forward to October 1, 2008. These changes gave the Fed a new tool to implement monetary policy. Paying interest on reserves helps to set a floor under short-term rates because banks that can earn interest at the Fed are unwilling to lend to others below the rate the Fed is paying. This allows the FOMC to achieve its target for the fed funds rate even with high levels of excess reserves - as can be seen in the graphic from 2009 on.The FOMC has said that the Fed intends to rely on adjustments in the rate of interest on excess reserves to achieve its fed funds target rate as it begins to tighten monetary policy – likely later this year or early next. However, the 2006 Act gave authority for setting the rate of interest on excess reserves to the seven-member (currently five) Federal Reserve Board, and not to the twelve-member (currently ten) FOMC. This could be consequential.The Federal Reserve Act stipulates that the interest rate on reserves should not “exceed the general level of short-term interest rates,” but does not prevent the Board from setting it well below the general level of short-term interest rates. This means that the FOMC could decide that short-term rates should rise to, say, 4 percent, while the Board, thinking this excessive, could decide only to raise the rate on reserves to, say, 3 percent. Because the quantity of excess reserves is currently so massive, it would be virtually impossible for the trading desk at the New York Fed to conduct open market operations sufficient to achieve the 4 percent target set by the FOMC. Overnight rates would therefore trade closer to the Board-determined 3 percent rate on reserves.Section 505 of Senator Richard Shelby’s draft Financial Regulatory Improvement Act would transfer the authority to set the interest rate on reserves to the FOMC, which would restore its ability to control short-term rates generally. But unless and until such an act is passed, or the volume of excess reserves declines significantly, the Board, and not the FOMC, will control how quickly rates rise.This is potentially important because, as the graphic shows, the average Board member is considerably more dovish than the average non-Board FOMC member. Fed watchers may therefore be overestimating the pace of rate increases because they’re focusing on the comments of the wrong committee. For now, at least, it is the Board, and not the FOMC, that wields the real power over rate increases. Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphicsRead about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Are China’s RMB Swap Lines an Empty Vessel?
As our recent CFR interactive shows, central bank currency swaps have spread like wildfire since the financial crisis. In 2006, the Fed had only two open swap lines outstanding, with Canada and Mexico, for just $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively. At its high point in 2008, the Fed had fourteen open swap lines, with as much as $583 billion drawn.
The central bank that has been most active in creating swap lines, however, is China; the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) is expected to sign a swap agreement with Chile this week, bringing the total number of outstanding swap lines to thirty-one. The extension of these swap lines is clearly part of China’s high-profile recent initiatives to internationalize the RMB.
What is most interesting about this effort so far is that whereas everyone seems interested in having a swap line with China, almost no one has thus far had any interest in using it. And when they have used it the amounts accessed have been tiny – as shown in the middle figure in our graphic above.
The only actual RMB swap use advertised by China was back in 2010, when it sent 20 billion yuan (about $3 billion) to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to enable companies in Hong Kong to settle RMB trade with the mainland. But this is basically China trading with itself. The Korean Ministry of Finance publicized a tiny swap in 2013 in which it accessed 62 million yuan (about $10 million) to help Korean importers make payments.
The only interesting case is that of Argentina, which activated its RMB swap line last year, and has reportedly drawn $2.7 billion worth. The effect of the swaps on Argentina’s reserves is shown at the far right of the graphic.
Argentina has the right to draw on a total of $11 billion worth of RMB. Its central bank has made a point of emphasizing that, under the terms of its agreement with the PBoC, the RMB may be freely converted into dollars – which Argentina, whose reserves have plummeted from $53bn in 2011 to $31bn today, is worryingly short of.
In effect, then, what Argentina has done by activating the RMB swap line is to add “vouchers” for dollars, freeing up the actual dollars in its reserves for imminent needs, such as imports and FX market intervention, and signaling to the markets that billions more can be accessed in a pinch.
The take-away is that whereas the RMB is slowly becoming an alternative to the dollar for settling Chinese goods trade, it is still far from being a currency that anyone actually needs – except maybe as a substitute for Fed dollar swap lines, which few central banks currently have access to. If Russia’s dollar reserves continue to fall, therefore, China may be the first place it turns.
Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil
Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics
Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Which Countries Stand to Lose Big from a Greek Default?
The IMF has turned up the heat on Greece’s Eurozone neighbors, calling on them to write off “significant amounts” of Greek sovereign debt. Writing off debt, however, doesn’t make the pain disappear—it transfers it to the creditors.
No doubt, Greece’s sovereign creditors, which now own 2/3 of Greece’s €324 billion debt, are in a much stronger position to bear that pain than Greece is. Nevertheless, we are talking real money here—2% of GDP for these creditors.
Germany, naturally, would bear the largest potential loss—€58 billion, or 1.9% of GDP. But as a percentage of GDP, little Slovenia has the most at risk—2.6%.
The most worrying case among the creditors, though, is heavily indebted Italy, which would bear up to €39 billion in losses, or 2.4% of GDP. Italy’s debt dynamics are ugly as is—the FT’s Wolfgang Münchau called them “unsustainable” last September, and not much has improved since then. The IMF expects only 0.5% growth in Italy this year.
As shown in the bottom figure above, Italy’s IMF-projected new net debt for this year would more than double, from €35 billion to €74 billion, on a full Greek default—its highest annual net-debt increase since 2009. With a Greek exit from the Eurozone, Italy will have the currency union’s second highest net debt to GDP ratio, at 114%—just behind Portugal’s 119%.
With the Bank of Italy buying up Italian debt under the ECB’s new quantitative easing program, the markets may decide to accept this with equanimity. Yet assuming that a Greek default is accompanied by Grexit, this can’t be taken for granted. Risk-shifting only works as long as the shiftees have the ability and willingness to bear it, and a Greek default will, around the Eurozone, undermine both.
Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil
Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics
Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
Should the United States Encourage Japan to Join the AIIB?
On April 15, China’s finance ministry revealed the 57 “prospective founding members” of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of which China is the architect. The likely founders include many U.S. allies, such as the UK, Australia, and South Korea, which the Obama Administration had lobbied not to join, seeing the AIIB as a Chinese alternative to the U.S.-architected World Bank.
The ally snub to Washington is a diplomatic failure for the Administration, although one that partially reflects the misguided refusal of the GOP-dominated Congress to ratify long-overdue IMF governance reform. This refusal made it that much easier for China to argue that new institutions to give fair voice to rising powers were both necessary and inevitable.
One major U.S. ally that has not yet made a decision as to whether to join is Japan. The Obama Administration is presumably still opposed to its participation; but whatever the merits of that position before other G7 members decided to come on board, it should be abandoned now. It is no longer in U.S. interests.
Governance of the new AIIB has not yet been determined, although China is believed to support a 75%/25% voting split between Asian and non-Asian members, with voting shares within each group allocated according to gross domestic product (GDP). China also foreswore veto power, which the U.S. has within the IMF and World Bank, in order to persuade U.S. allies to join.
With such a governance structure, China will be highly dominant within the organization – having 43% of the votes, nearly 5 times more than number 2 India (if current-dollar GDP determines voting power), as shown in the left-hand figure above. U.S. ally countries – the UK, Germany, France, and other European nations, and Australia and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific – would have only 28% of the vote.
With Japan as a member, however, close U.S. allies would have 41% of the vote – more than China’s 35%, as shown in the right-hand figure above. Therefore, even if the United States chooses to remain outside the AIIB, it should, at this point – assuming that it wishes to temper China’s dominance - be encouraging Japan to join.
Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil
Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics
Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
