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Geo-Graphics

A graphical take on geoeconomics.

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China’s Central Bank is Becoming the Developing World’s “Payday Lender”

With the developing world’s growing use of costly and opaque “payday loans” from China’s central bank, the IMF and World Bank need to demand far greater transparency from Beijing. 

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China
Our Mini Mac Index Flame-Broils The Economist—Yet Again
  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1494265385770'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='604px';vizElement.style.height='539px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The “law of one price” holds that identical goods should trade for the same price in an efficient market.  But to what extent does it actually hold internationally? The Economist magazine’s famous Big Mac Index uses the price of McDonald’s Big Macs around the world, expressed in a common currency (U.S. dollars), to estimate the extent to which various currencies are over- or under-valued. The Big Mac is a global product, identical across borders, which makes it an interesting one for this purpose. But burgers travel badly.  So in 2013 we created our own index—one that better meets the condition that the product can flow quickly and cheaply across borders. The Geo-Graphics Mini Mac Index compares the price of iPad minis across countries. iPad minis are a global product that, unlike Big Macs, do in fact travel the earth with their owners. As can readily be seen in the graphic above, our Mini Mac Index shows that the law of one price holds far better than the Big Mac Index – as it has done consistently over the past several years. In January, the average overvaluation of the dollar according to the Big Mac Index was 26 percent – a Whopper.  According to our Mini Mac Index, the average overvaluation was only 9 percent – Small Fries.  This suggests it’s time to deep-fry their index and move over to ours. Overall, the Mini Mac Index suggests that the dollar has become slightly more overvalued (up from 5 percent) since the beginning of 2015.  The euro is undervalued by 11 percent, and the yen by 10 percent.  Having been fairly valued at the beginning of last year, the renminbi – following on the heels of China’s large devaluation in August – is now 5 percent undervalued.  This compares with an implausible 46 percent undervaluation on the Big Mac Index.  Maybe Congress is Lovin’ It, but we think the Economist needs to hold the mustard.
China
Want to Borrow From the IMF? China Just Made It More Expensive.
On November 30 the International Monetary Fund made its long-awaited announcement that it would add the Chinese RMB to its basket of globally important reserve currencies – the Special Drawing Right (SDR). The impact is largely symbolic for China, although from October 2016 it will mean that even if U.S., eurozone, Japanese, and UK interest rates were to remain flat the rate on normal IMF loans will be 21 basis points higher–a 20 percent jump from the current 1.05 percent rate. This is because the Fund’s borrowing rate is set by a formula based on a weighted average of 3-month government borrowing rates for the countries whose currencies comprise the SDR basket (plus 100bp). And China’s rates are much higher than those of the incumbents, as shown in the figure above. What difference will this make? Well, take Greece. Back in June, it was unable to pay back €300 million owed to the Fund. If its borrowing rate had been 21bp higher, it would have owed an additional €65 million. Not only will IMF borrowing rates be higher in the future, thanks to the RMB’s new status, but they will also be more volatile – since Chinese rates are far more variable than U.S. and other SDR incumbent rates. So if you’re thinking of borrowing from the Fund – be prepared to pay more next October.
Europe and Eurasia
How Low Can Mario Go?
In September 2014 the European Central Bank lowered its deposit rate to an all-time low of -0.2 percent, after which ECB President Mario Draghi declared that rates were “now at the lower bound.” What he meant by this was that, by the ECB’s calculations, banks would find holding cash more attractive than an ECB deposit at rates below -0.2 percent, so there was no scope for encouraging banks to lend by pushing this rate lower. The ECB therefore turned to asset purchases, whose efficacy is much in debate, in an effort to ease policy further. But was Draghi right? Had the ECB actually hit “the lower bound,” or could it have usefully cut the rate lower? The answer is important, because negative deposit rates above the lower bound encourage banks to “use it or lose it” – that is, to lend. One way to determine whether Draghi was right is to look at what’s happened to the number of €500 notes in circulation. If the ECB had hit the lower bound on deposit rates, then this number should have risen as banks accumulated cash in vaults. But as the top figure above shows, it’s barely budged: banks do not seem to have moved into cash to avoid negative rates. Another piece of data to check is the spread between the ECB’s deposit rate and the rate at which banks are willing to lend to each other overnight (“EONIA”). Normally, the deposit rate and the interbank rate move in tandem, as banks are generally willing to lend money at a set rate above what they can get from the ECB. But when the deposit rate falls below the lower bound, banks no longer pay it any heed: they just hold cash, and the spread rises. But as we see in the middle figure above, it has not – the spread has in fact fallen back to its historic low. A final piece of data that might suggest we were at the lower bound is bank net interest margins. If banks are already paying 0 percent on customer deposits, then any cut in their lending rates would have to come out of lending margins – that is, profits on lending. At the lower bound on the ECB’s deposit rate, then, further cuts may not stimulate banks to cut their lending rates. On average, however, eurozone banks are still paying 0.7 percent on new household term deposits with a maturity of less than a year, and 0.25 percent on commercial deposits. There is, therefore, scope for such deposit rates to fall further. Additionally, whereas the spread between new lending and deposit rates for both households and businesses has generally fallen over the past several years, as we see in the bottom figure above, it remains at or above the historical average in most countries. Finally, reported Q1-2 2015 net interest margins for Europe’s largest banks are generally not low by historical standards. This suggests that banks may well be willing and able to withstand further compression of lending and deposit rates. In short, the evidence suggests that Draghi was wrong. The ECB, we believe, could stimulate lower lending rates and more lending through further cuts in its deposit rate.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    As Fed Pulls Back, the ECB and BoJ Add Trillions to Global Liquidity
    All eyes and ears are on the Fed as it ponders its first rate increase in nine years.  IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde fears a rerun of the 2013 “taper tantrum,” or what we have been calling a rate ruckus. Emerging markets are clearly vulnerable to renewed outflows, as capital chases higher yields in the U.S. and drives up the cost of dollar funding abroad. Yet missing from the discussion is what other major central banks are doing.  Specifically, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) have ramped up their asset purchase programs in the past year, and are committed to creating large amounts of new liquidity until at least mid-2016. As shown in the graphic above, the liquidity they intend to inject, combined, both this year and next is in line with that from Fed asset purchases at the height of QE3 in 2013. The new net global liquidity created by the ECB and BoJ in each of these years will be greater – even after subtracting the liquidity to be removed by the Fed through balance sheet contraction – than that created by the Big Three at any point since 2011. Why is this good news for emerging markets? First, asset purchases by the ECB and BoJ have a greater tendency to displace existing investment in government debt than do Fed purchases.  As new issuance of government debt is smaller in the euro area and Japan than in the U.S., the ECB and BoJ will have to purchase a larger amount of secondary market assets from private investors in order to meet their target quantity of purchases. Second, investors displaced by ECB or BoJ asset purchases are no less likely to invest in emerging markets than those displaced by Fed purchases.  To see this, let’s walk through their investment options. One is domestic non-government bond or equity markets. In fact, these are smaller in the euro area and Japan than in the U.S., which suggests less scope to reallocate in such markets. For one (large) class of investors – banks – there is also the option to increase lending to households and businesses. But the economic outlook remains weak in Europe and Japan, and weaker than in the U.S. at the time of the Fed’s QE3. This suggests fewer attractive opportunities to expand lending. If domestic markets and bank lending are likely to absorb less of the liquidity than in the U.S., then a greater proportion of money displaced by ECB and BoJ purchases will flow to foreign assets. Whether this is to emerging markets – and which ones – will depend on investors’ risk tolerance. And there is no obvious reason why investors displaced by the ECB or BoJ would be any less risk-loving than those displaced by the Fed. In short, a tightening of U.S. monetary policy does not mean a tightening of global liquidity.  In fact, the ECB and BoJ look set to expand it more than we’ve seen in any two-year period since the start of the crisis in 2007-8.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Greece Fallout: Italy and Spain Have Funded a Massive Backdoor Bailout of French Banks
    In March 2010, two months before the announcement of the first Greek bailout, European banks had €134 billion worth of claims on Greece.  French banks, as shown in the right-hand figure above, had by far the largest exposure: €52 billion – this was 1.6 times that of Germany, eleven times that of Italy, and sixty-two times that of Spain. The €110 billion of loans provided to Greece by the IMF and Eurozone in May 2010 enabled Greece to avoid default on its obligations to these banks.  In the absence of such loans, France would have been forced into a massive bailout of its banking system.  Instead, French banks were able virtually to eliminate their exposure to Greece by selling bonds, allowing bonds to mature, and taking partial write-offs in 2012.  The bailout effectively mutualized much of their exposure within the Eurozone. The impact of this backdoor bailout of French banks is being felt now, with Greece on the precipice of an historic default.  Whereas in March 2010 about 40% of total European lending to Greece was via French banks, today only 0.6% is.  Governments have filled the breach, but not in proportion to their banks’ exposure in 2010.  Rather, it is in proportion to their paid-up capital at the ECB – which in France’s case is only 20%. In consequence, France has actually managed to reduce its total Greek exposure – sovereign and bank – by €8 billion, as seen in the main figure above.  In contrast, Italy, which had virtually no exposure to Greece in 2010 now has a massive one: €39 billion.  Total German exposure is up by a similar amount – €35 billion.  Spain has also seen its exposure rocket from nearly nothing in 2009 to €25 billion today. In short, France has managed to use the Greek bailout to offload €8 billion in junk debt onto its neighbors and burden them with tens of billions more in debt they could have avoided had Greece simply been allowed to default in 2010.  The upshot is that Italy and Spain are much closer to financial crisis today than they should be.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”