Japan

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution.  Shinichi Kitaoka, a leading Japanese diplomatic historian, is currently the president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency. He has led various government advisory panels including the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security [PDF], appointed by Prime Minister Abe to consider the legal and policy issues surrounding the right of collective self-defense,  and the Advisory Panel on the History of the Twentieth Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the Twenty-first Century [PDF], a panel convened in advance of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement on the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II.   Getting Rid of the Ghosts in Our Constitutional Debate by Shinichi Kitaoka In Japan, the debate on revising constitution is back, stronger than ever. Yet few have a correct understanding of this issue. Abroad, even fewer understand the basics about the procedure for revision or the history of our constitutional debates. Why is this? Let me provide some of the basics. To be fair, I want to first clarify my own position in the debate. I am a moderate pro-revisionist, which means I think it is better to revise the constitution but I do not think we must. However, I find those who are stubbornly pro-revision or anti-revision in today’s debate in Japan very troubling. How Was It Drafted? One of the arguments for revising our constitution is that the process by which it was enacted was inappropriate. This argument rests on a narrative that has General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander for the allied powers (SCAP), ordering that a new Japanese constitution be drafted in February 1946 by a small group of his American staff in secret. Apparently, this took nine days. The General Headquarters (GHQ) of the SCAP then asked Japanese authorities to announce that they had drafted it. The American occupation authorities threatened that if the Japanese government did not do this the position of the emperor could not be guaranteed. The Japanese government, which presumably placed the foremost importance on maintaining the position of the emperor (I will not debate this assumption here), accepted this demand, and after a few minor corrections, presented the constitution draft as their own. It is against international law for an occupation force to draft a constitution for a country it occupies. It also violated the terms of surrender set forth in the Potsdam Declaration, which determined that the future of the Japanese political system would be “established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” The GHQ knew that it would be illegal for them to promulgate a constitution, and that is why they hid the fact that they drafted it and instead demanded that the Japanese government voluntarily drafted this. Deliberations on the constitution began in the Japanese legislature in May. All of these discussions were translated and reviewed by the GHQ. The official premise was that Japan’s new constitution, adopted in November 1946 to come into force in May 1947, was made by the Japanese government. Was It Forced Upon Japan? Among supporters of the current constitution, some argue that this constitution was not forced upon Japan became most of the Japanese people welcomed it. The public’s welcome, however, does not mean that the constitution was not forced upon the country. Furthermore, some claim that the chief proponent of Article Nine, a focal point of contention since the constitution came into effect, was former Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara. Yet there is no evidence that Shidehara advocated that Japan should give up all military forces. Shidehara negotiated over and over again with the GHQ staff on Article Nine, arguing that Japan be allowed to maintain a minimal military force, yet his argument was rejected.  Thus, it is impossible that Shidehara believed that Japan should completely renounce military force. Claims that the constitution was not forced upon Japan by the United States or that Shidehara was the real proponent of the Article Nine are mere historical fallacies. I do, however, recognize that Japan’s postwar constitution overall is better than the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution). First, it emphasizes basic human rights, pacifism, and internationalism. Second, the symbolic emperor system, rather than positioning the Emperor as a totalitarian monarchy as the Meiji Constitution did, is a far better fit with Japan’s social traditions. Third, a parliamentary cabinet system empowers the prime minister to a significant extent, and thus makes it clear where political responsibility lies, a marked improvement from the Meiji Constitution. In addition, I do not think the constitution should be revised based on the unlawful process of its enactment. The constitution has been more or less accepted within Japanese society. Although it has never been revised, our postwar constitution has gained strong support with some reinterpretation over time. Even if we maintain our current constitution and continue to reinterpret it over time, I think we will survive. But What About Article Nine? Our biggest constitutional debate is over Article Nine. I would like you to look closely at the language of this article. It is comprised of two paragraphs: the first calls for peaceful resolution of disputes, while the latter calls for the renunciation of military forces. Of these two, the first echoes a universal principle established after World War II, a principle that is an essential part of the United Nations Charter. However, Article Nine’s second clause has no precedent in any other nation’s constitution. As a sovereign state, it is impossible not to maintain forces. In addition, the first and second clauses contradict with each other. Our renunciation of war was based on the premise that if a situation arises, the United Nations will sanction an aggressor. But the United Nations does not possess its own forces, leading member nations to send their forces to operate under the UN flag. Thus, a UN member state is obligated to possess military power. This deficiency in Article Nine’s second clause was perceived from the start. When the Korean War broke out in 1950 and again when Japan regained its independence in 1952, Article Nine was hotly debated. The Japanese government established an interpretation in 1954 that having a force to defend itself is the right of all sovereign states, and that maintaining the minimum necessary level of force for self defense does not violate the spirit of our constitution. The Supreme Court supported this interpretation in 1959. Thus, the current constitution’s official interpretation of Article Nine’s second clause is that a minimum necessary level of force is constitutional. The Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) has developed based on this understanding, as has the U.S.-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, critics and the Japanese media have held up Article Nine’s second clause as a clear prohibition against expanding the missions of the SDF. This was the case in 1960 when the Japanese government revised the U.S.-Japan security treaty, in 1972 when Tokyo and Washington negotiated the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, and in 1992, when the Japanese Diet pass the Peace Keeping Operation law (Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations [PDF]). Again last year, this critique was made against the Abe cabinet’s new security legislation allowing the SDF to exercise the right of collective self-defense. In particular, the Diet’s passage of the new security bills was shockingly described as a violation of our constitution, a challenge to constitutional government, and the new laws were denigrated as “war bills.” What is most disappointing is that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), our second largest political party whose leaders governed Japan from 2009-2012, joined in this chorus of criticism.[1] Do they not accept the constitutional reinterpretation in 1954 that created the SDF? If they do, then they accept revising our constitution through interpretation. They cannot then argue that the bill is unconstitutional or suggest that our system of constitutional government is losing ground. If, however, they do not accept the 1954 interpretation of Article Nine, it means they do not accept [the constitutionality of] today’s SDF as well as of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This would be quite far from what the Japanese people support. From 2009-2012 when the former DPJ was in power, these same leaders also contributed to the advancement of Japan’s national security policy. In 2010, they updated the National Defense Program Guidelines, the basis of  which was the 2012 guidelines drafted by the Liberal Democratic Party. Yet this once ruling party has now taken a far more fundamentalist position in its reading of our constitution. The Japanese media that supports our current constitution, such as the Asahi Shimbun, often uses phrases like “Article Nine renounces war.” They advocate against revising this “war renouncing“ constitution. Most Japanese who support revising of Article Nine, however, are calling for a change in the Article’s second clause. It is rare to find a Japanese who supports revision of the first clause, the clause that indeed renounces the use of force to settle international disputes. In academia, it is a taboo to bend the argument of others in order to strengthen yours. This is a vulgar way of justifying yourself. But most of the arguments of those who are “pro-constitution” seem to take this route. China’s rapid military development and its expansionism in the East and South China Seas as well as North Korea’s development of nuclear arsenal force us, the Japanese, to consider how best to ensure the security of our country. Political leaders cannot avoid this reality, and must discuss our defense needs when considering the debate over our constitution. An overwhelming majority of Japanese citizens support the SDF, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations abroad. This is the result of successive governments’ willingness to reinterpret Article Nine’s second clause and to advance national security policies in a realistic manner. The 2015 security legislation too is an extension of this effort to ensure Japan’s security. If a popular consensus forms around these new laws, then Japan’s security policies will stabilize to a certain extent. But if the criticism against the 2015 security legislation persists, Japan’s national security policies will face very severe challenges in the years ahead. The second clause of Article Nine is the root of the anti-revision argument put forward by those who want our current constitution to remain as is, untouched. Last year’s virulent criticism by opposition parties and the media only revealed how strongly the second paragraph of Article Nine is identified with anti-militarism. If this literal reading of the text of Article Nine continues, we must amend or delete this language from our constitution [if we are to adequately provide for our nation’s security.] [1]  The DPJ in 2016 merged with a smaller opposition party, the Japan Innovation Party, to form the Democratic Party.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Tokyo elects first female governor. On Sunday, Yuriko Koike was elected as the first female governor of Tokyo with 2.9 million votes, nearly one million more than her closest competitor. Although she is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), she ran as an independent when the LDP endorsed rival candidate Hiroya Masuda instead. Koike has previously been mocked for lack of commitment to a given political party, earning her comparisons to a conveyer belt sushi restaurant or migratory bird. Of the mayoral candidates, her record was considered to be the most conservative. However, in this election she emphasized programs to benefit the prefecture including increasing government transparency, prioritizing residents’ needs, and emphasizing her green credentials. Koike has a diverse background, having previously served as Japan’s environment minister and defense minister, a role that highlighted her strong nationalist stances, particularly against North Korea and China. She also studied at Cairo University and served as a newscaster. While Koike may now be one of the highest-profile female politicians in Japan, she encountered sexism in the campaign. A former governor of Tokyo said, “We cannot leave Tokyo to a woman with too much make-up.” Tokyo has now been left to Koike, leaving her to face new challenges such as preparing Tokyo for the 2020 Olympics and working with the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, which is still dominated by the LDP. 2. North Korea lobs missiles into Japanese waters. North Korea reportedly fired two mid-range Rodong ballistic missiles on Wednesday. Although one missile exploded shortly after launching, the other fell approximately 155 miles off the coast of northern Japan. The incident marks the first time a North Korean missile has come in such close proximity to Japan since 1998, when a ballistic missile flew over the country. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called the reckless act “a grave threat to Japan’s security.” This is North Korea’s second missile test since the United States and South Korea agreed in July to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. Pyongyang had subsequently threatened to turn future South Korean sites for THAAD into a “sea of fire.” South Korean military officials reportedly view Pyongyang’s recent missile launches as an attempt to demonstrate its ability to target its neighbors. Japan’s annual defense white paper disclosed analysis on North Korea’s missile program and “expressed a sense of alarm” over Pyongyang’s increasingly developed weapons technology. 3. Uber sells China business to Didi Chuxing. After years of bleeding billions of dollars in subsidies competing for market share in China, ride-hailing service Uber announced this week it plans to sell its China operations to its leading rival in the country, Didi Chuxing. Under the deal struck between the two countries, Didi will take over Uber China, and Uber Global, Uber’s international parent company, will take a 20 percent stake in Didi, which is now valued at $35 billion. Didi will also make a $1 billion investment in Uber Global. The two firms have fought fiercely for several years, attempting to steal customers and drivers from each other by deeply subsidizing rides, and the deal signals that China’s intensely competitive ride-hailing market may begin to cool down. Adding to that impression, Chinese regulators last week made it illegal for the companies to provide services below cost, essentially ending the subsidy war. Commentators have pointed out that Uber’s retreat from China is a reminder of how difficult it is for foreign tech companies to succeed in the country. But in a way, it’s a victory for Uber: for $2 billion invested in China, Uber built an operation valued at $7 billion and gained and a permanent stake in Didi Chuxing, which now dominates the Chinese ride-hailing landscape. 4. Australia faces scrutiny for treatment of refugees. A joint investigation by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) shows that Australia is mistreating refugees trying to reach its shores. Both Australia’s Liberal-National coalition and Labor parties support tough asylum policies. This was demonstrated by the 2013 Operation Sovereign Borders, which placed the military in charge of all asylum operations. Most migrants make the treacherous journey to Australia on boats from Indonesia after paying huge sums of money to criminal gangs, and the Australian government claims that they have the duty to stop this process. Refugees are either turned away or taken to the island nations of Papua New Guinea or Nauru for detention. Amnesty and HRW researchers secretly traveled to the Nauru Regional Processing Centre (after being denied formal entry), where their interviews with eighty out of 1,200 forcibly transferred refugees revealed appalling conditions. Interviewees described their situation as “prison-like” with overcrowded tents, unbearable heat, and constant attacks, robbery, and sexual assault by the local population. The report also details concerns regarding the inhabitants’ mental health and access to adequate medical care and education. Amnesty and HRW claim that the Australian government is well aware of these issues and hopes that the current situation will deter future asylum-seekers. 5. Taiwanese president offers first formal apology to indigenous community. President Tsai Ing-wen, the first female leader of Taiwan, issued the first official apology to the indigenous people of Taiwan at a formal ceremony at the presidential office in Taipei on Monday. This apology is representative of President Tsai’s focus on social justice issues and rectifying historical injustices. At the ceremony, attended by many indigenous aboriginal community leaders, Tsai stated, “If we wish to declare ourselves as a country of one people, we need to face these historical facts. We have to face the truth." Indigenous people make up 2 percent of Taiwan’s population and have historically faced economic, social, and sometimes violent discrimination by ethnic Han Chinese. As the first Taiwanese president to have an indigenous background, Tsai faces high expectations from Taiwan’s indigenous community. At the ceremony, Tsai reassured attendees by announcing the formation of a commission to address social and economic issues affecting indigenous groups and her intention to enact a law guaranteeing basic rights for indigenous people. However, despite hope of better treatment from President Tsai’s administration, some suspect Tsai of focusing on indigenous peoples so as to better construct a Taiwanese cultural identity capable of supporting a formal independence push from the People’s Republic of China. Bonus: Scientists confirm world’s deepest dragon burrow in the South China Sea. Chinese scientists have confirmed that the world’s deepest underwater sinkhole, known as the “Dragon Hole” or “eye” of the South China Sea, lies in the Paracel Islands. At just over 300 meters (987 feet) deep, researchers explored its murky bottom with a small underwater robot. They found more than twenty species of fish and other marine organisms near the surface of the formation, but because of low oxygen levels past 100 meters, finding life deeper into the hole is unlikely. According to local legend, it is also the source of the magical “golden cudgel” belonging to Sun Wukong, the famed monkey-hero from the Chinese classic Journey to the West. Might a dragon-king and his mighty army of shrimp soldiers and crab generals still reside in the hole’s inky depths?

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. The following six essays will present various voices that shape Japan’s debate over its constitution and the prospect of revising it. Contributing their views are: Naomi Takasu, an advocate of protecting the constitution and of nominating Article Nine for the Nobel Peace Prize; Shinichi Kitaoka, a leading Japanese diplomatic historian who served as the vice chairman of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, a panel convened by the Abe cabinet to consult before it passed a cabinet resolution on the right of collective self defense; Karin Koretsune, a graduate student of Japan Women’s University and a member of the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs); Keigo Komamura, a constitutional law scholar and vice president of Keio University; and Masatoshi Asaoka and Ayumi Teraoka, intern and research associate for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Nobel Peace Prize for Article Nine by Naomi Takasu Naomi Takasu is the Joint Representative of Executive Committee for “The Nobel Peace Prize for Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution.” The Japanese constitution, including its Article Nine that renounces war, military forces, and the right of belligerency, is the only constitution in the world that recognizes “that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear, and want” (Preamble). In a world where war has yet to be eliminated, we must recognize and hold high our constitution’s pacifist ideals. Our constitution renounces war, seeking to set an example of reflection on Japan’s past behavior in World War II, speaks not only to the Japanese people but also to all people across the globe. It is a positive contribution to global efforts to sustain peace. However, the Japanese government passed the Diet resolution in July 2014 to allow for the use of the right of collective self-defense, a right that has long been forbidden under our constitution. Based on this cabinet resolution, the Abe government steamrolled deliberations in the Diet over new security legislation last fall that would open the way for Japan to participate in war despite strong opposition. This legislation allows Japan to join and support other nations’ wars, threatening other people’s “right to live in peace.” Abe’s new laws contradict not only Article Nine but also our constitution’s preamble. Article Ninety-eight states that, “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.” In addition, the government has changed the norms that have long been associated with our constitution, yet did not follow the constitution’s provision for revision, Article Ninety-six. Article Ninety-six lays out the process for changing our constitution, a process that includes the will of the Japanese people. Popular sovereignty is the basis of our constitution, and the government’s reinterpretation of Article Nine without consulting the Japanese people violates this fundamental principle. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is considering including “the right to peace” as an international human right in much the same way as our constitution does.  If this right is recognized globally, there will be a way for all the states including those with veto power at the United Nations Security Council to restrain their military activity. We, the advocates for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Article Nine of the Japanese constitution, aim to maintain, make use of, and promote the Article Nine to the world. We will act to abolish Japan’s new security laws, and we support the incorporation of the “right to peace” in the UN Human Rights Charter. For all peace-loving people around the world, please work to create a world where everyone is guaranteed a life of peace. Raise your voice to elevate the right to peace as an international human right. Add your signature to our petition here: https://www.change.org/p/un-stand-up-for-right-to-peace. Each person’s voice and capacity might be small but will become a great force when combined. Let’s keep up our good work from wherever each of us is positioned so that someday the world will become the place where people around the world can live peacefully.

This blog post is co-authored by Masatoshi Asaoka and Ayumi Teraoka, an intern and a research associate for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Japan’s politicians seem more likely to debate constitutional revision, but it will be the Japanese people who will ultimately determine the future of their country. As our last blog showed, attitudes toward revising Japan’s 1947 Constitution in the 1950s and 60s were gauged by the Japanese government, but today public polling on the constitution is largely conducted by Japan’s major media outlets. Newspapers have perhaps been the most thorough in trying to understand how the Japanese people are thinking about the prospect of revising their constitution, and survey results from three major newspapers – the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Nikkei Shimbun offer evidence of some interesting trends since the mid-1990s. Each year, these newspapers poll popular views on Japan’s constitution around Constitution Day, a national holiday celebrating its promulgation in 1947. But first, let’s take a look at 2016 and how attitudes toward revision related to this summer’s Upper House election. 2016 Polling on Constitutional Revision In all three major newspaper polls, fifty percent or more of those polled were still opposed to revision of the constitution, revealing that the majority of Japanese are cautious about change despite the effort by politicians to move the debate forward. The Yomiuri Shimbun poll in March revealed that 49 percent of its respondents supported revision while 50 percent opposed it. The Asahi Shimbun reported in May that 37 percent of its respondents opted for revision and 55 percent were against it. Finally, the Nikkei reported also in May that 40 percent of its respondents were pro-revision while 50 percent were not. Polling After the July Upper House Election The Upper House election on July 10 for the first time produced a potential two-thirds majority in favor of a Diet debate over revising the 1947 Constitution. But some polls suggested the Japanese people were more hesitant, and particularly about revising the document under the Abe cabinet. For example, the Asahi poll on July 14 reported that only 35 percent favored “constitutional revision under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership,” while 43 percent opposed it. Likewise, a Nikkei poll on July 25 found only 38 percent were willing to embrace “constitutional revision under the Abe cabinet” while 49 percent did not. Yet both the liberal-leaning Asahi and the pro-revision Yomiuri polls received more positive responses when they asked the question differently. The July 14 Asahi poll asked if “the debate over how to change the constitution should begin in the Diet session in this coming fall?” 55 percent answered yes. The July 13 Yomiuri poll asked whether people “wish for active debate on constitutional revision in future Diet sessions?,” and 70 percent answered yes. Yet both newspaper polls revealed a roughly similar number of those opposed to even discussing revision: 29 percent of respondents for Asahi and 25 percent for Yomiuri. What About Article Nine? The Yomiuri Shimbun has conducted the most extensive and in-depth surveys on the constitution since 1981, with annual polling beginning in 1993. Yomiuri has in fact advocated a national debate on revision, and in 1994, 2000, and 2004, the paper even published its own drafts of what a new constitution might look like. On Article Nine, the Yomiuri polls reveal, however, that its respondents are divided over whether reinterpreting the existing constitution is best or whether the time has come to revise it. For those who want to revise the famous “no war” clause, the Yomiuri polls push further to ask how to phrase a new draft, and implicitly how to refer to Japan’s existing military forces.   This graph is made by authors based on the Yomiuri polls from 2002-2016. Click for the enlarged image.     This graph is made by authors based on the Yomiuri polls from 1995-2016. Click for the enlarged image.   The Asahi Shimbun, on the other hand, has long reflected the views of Japan’s liberals. Asahi polling on the constitution is available online from 1983, and focuses on protecting individual rights. It was only in 2014 that the Asahi introduced questions in its polls on Japan’s national defense needs. Some Asahi respondents express pro-revision sentiments, but the impetus for revision tends to focus on rights protections rather than Article Nine revision. Nonetheless, since Asahi changed the format of their annual polling in 2014, the majority of pro-revision respondents in 2014 and 2016 cited the need to address the lack of reference in the current constitution on national defense.   This graph is made by authors based on the Asahi polls from 2007-2012. Click for the enlarged image.       This graph is made by authors based on the Asahi polls in 2014 and 2016. Click for the enlarged image.   Polling Results Over Time These annual surveys by Japan’s newspapers allow us to look at the longer-term trends in popular thinking about Japan’s constitution. Three conclusions can be drawn. First, the Japanese people remain divided on the idea of revising their existing constitution, just as they were in the early-postwar years. Second, the Abe cabinet has dampened the enthusiasm of some Japanese for revision. Strikingly, all of these surveys revealed that more people supported constitutional revision during the 2000s, but support has noticeably declined over the last couple of years—when the Abe cabinet reinterpreted Article Nine and passed new security legislation in the Diet. Finally, for those who seem ready for a revision debate, Japan’s liberals and conservatives offer very different reasons for revision. While the more detailed Asahi and Yomiuri polls ask their questions slightly differently and offer different choices in answers, their respondents reveal distinctly different priorities. Most Yomiuri respondents claim that revision is necessary because “adjusting by reinterpretation and implementing changes only causes confusion,” and twice as many Yomiuri respondents selected this choice in 2016 compared with 1995. In contrast, while Asahi poll respondents also increasingly support revision, a growing majority of those who favor revision do so in order to “include clauses on new rights and institutions” (from 69 percent in 2007 to 84 percent in 2013). What is clear, however, is that unlike the cabinet polling of the early postwar decades, far fewer Japanese argue for revision based solely on the origins of their constitution. Despite this growing interest in discussing revision, both polls still show the vast majority of Japanese do not want to revise Article Nine. In 2016 polls, Asahi still reported 68 percent against revising Article Nine (27 percent would revise it). Yomiuri polls presented more nuanced views. 82 percent would not revise Article Nine’s first paragraph, which commits Japan to not use force to settle international disputes. But far more Yomiuri respondents were interested in revising the language of the second paragraph, which says Japan will not maintain military forces. 48 percent were for and 48 percent were against rewriting Article Nine’s second paragraph. Yet those who oppose touching Article Nine, both Asahi and Yomiuri respondents rationalized their choices in very similar language: Asahi respondents opposed to revise “because [the constitution] has brought peace”; Yomiuri respondents opposed revision “because it is a world-renowned peace constitution.” <Yomiuri, Asahi, and Nikkei’s polling data from 1995-2016> Conclusion Just like during the 1950s and 60s, the public has been fairly split over this question of constitutional revision over the past two decades. Despite the clear difference over the framing of questions between the liberal and conservative newspapers, both respondents shared mixed feeling about revising their constitution. Strikingly, as the debate gains more momentum in both political and public sphere given the results of the last election the percentage of opposition to constitutional revision in all three surveys marked the highest this year. The future trajectory of this trend is unclear, but what is clear is that that the time is ripe for serious debate over how to shape their own constitution. Third in a three part series on Japanese public opinion on constitutional revision.

This blog post is co-authored with Ayumi Teraoka, research associate for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. For many outside Japan, the growing interest in revising Japan’s constitution seems shocking, and often it is associated with a rightist push to rewrite Article Nine. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s advocacy in the past only reaffirms this impression. But this conversation about the origins of the document, about its suitability to Japanese values, and even about whether it can reflect the needs of a changing Japanese society began in the early postwar years. Much has changed since Japan emerged again as a sovereign nation in 1952, and certainly the political climate of those early postwar years when the economy was in tatters and political control was fiercely contested by a host of parties from progressive left to conservative right. Japan’s conservatives, many with deep personal antagonisms, merged in one party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), that would go on to dominant politics and govern Japan until the early-1990s. The Cold War was in full swing, with repeated crises across the Taiwan Straits, a China in the throes of socialist transformation, and a Korean peninsula cut in two with armies confronting each other across a Demilitarized Zone. Japan’s democratic reforms were now being tested by poverty and economic instability, and a strengthened parliamentary system. The 1947 Constitution still defined this new postwar era and was used to legitimate social and economic reforms as well as political transformation. Japan’s left and right saw it differently; for many on the left, it protected them from a slide back into militarism, and for many on the right, it remained as evidence of the subjugation of their country in defeat. The newly formed LDP initiated renegotiation to revise the security treaty with the United States in 1957, and by the early 1960s, after deep social unrest over this new treaty signed in 1960, focused the country on the national task of economic growth and development. The polls presented here represented this transition from upheaval and political contest to the decade of “double-income” growth that created the foundations of today’s Japan. A look back at some of these defining debates over the Japanese constitution in the 1950s helps put today’s conversation in context. The LDP government asked their citizens what they thought about their new constitution. Four findings from these surveys by the cabinet office offer insights on the current debate over constitutional revision. Finding #1: When asked whether they supported revision, the Japanese were divided. About 40 percent of respondents wanted to participate in a discussion over revision, if needed, rather than allow their government simply to reinterpret their constitution. In other words, some Japanese people wanted to be asked. Another 44 percent, however, responded that they really did not think about the issue at all. Opinion was consistently divided on whether to revise the constitution, but the balance of those “for revision” and those “against revision” shifted back and forth over the years. For the first three years from 1955-1957, the cabinet polls simply asked whether respondents supported revision. As many people opted to revise as those who opted against it. By 1957, those for revision began to outnumber slightly those against. From 1961-63, in response to the same question, the surveys gave respondents a more nuanced set of answers from which to choose: 1) Revise because of inappropriate content, 2) Revise because of how it was drafted, 3) Protect the current constitution because of its content, 4) Protect the current constitution because of current politics, and 5) I don’t know. Responses were scattered across four revise or protect choices (with a slight margin in favor of answer 2), but 30 percent opted for “I don’t know.” Despite these divisions over whether revisions were necessary, there were signs that most Japanese wanted to debate the issue. In the 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1965 surveys, respondents were offered the additional choice of debating whether to revise. In each of these years, around 40 percent selected that option, suggesting a desire for serious deliberation of the pros and cons of revision. When asked how to fix flaws in the 1947 document, more respondents opted to revise than to simply reinterpret the constitution. In the later years, the cabinet asked about how to fix possible flaws in the constitution. Again, the aim seems to be to test the waters on whether Japanese citizens would want to revise the document or simply allow the government to supplement its meaning through implementing changes. While 16 to 19 percent said the Japanese constitution should be kept intact without amendment, considerably more (31-36 percent) answered that it should be revised rather than implementing changes that were inconsistent. Finding #2: Over time, the idea that the document was “MacArthur’s Constitution” seemed less relevant. The cabinet office repeatedly asked about the origins of the constitution —who drafted it and whether it was forced upon the Japanese—and whether the process mattered to how the Japanese felt about it. Yet there were significant changes in how the Japanese government phrased this question. Gradually, the government moved away from identifying the constitution as “MacArthur’s” or as a “U.S.-made” document. One of the few consistent questions asked by the cabinet surveys was how Japan’s citizens thought about the origins of the 1947 constitution. In 1955, the poll asked if the current constitution is something “forced upon us by [Douglas] MacArthur,” directly mentioning the name of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP). In 1956-1957, the survey replaced MacArthur with “the United States.” In 1955, twice as many respondents selected “yes” than “no”, but in 1958-1959, the “yes” and “no” answers were almost equal, suggesting close association most Japanese have between MacArthur and their constitution. From 1960-1965, the surveys again changed their language on the origins of the constitution. The cabinet no longer used the phrase “forced upon us by” Americans, and instead asked if the document was drafted mainly by the Americans or the Japanese. From 1960-64, respondents overwhelmingly chose “mainly the United States” over “mainly Japan.” But interestingly, in 1965, this margin declined. While these early polls show that more Japanese thought that the Americans imposed the 1947 constitution on their country, there was a gradual shift in attitudes about the origins of the document over time. By the mid-1960s, respondents suggested that the origins of the document no longer seemed to matter as much. In 1956-1957, this origin factor was one of the top reasons cited for revising the constitution. Yet a decade later, from 1966-1968, surveys asked if the constitution’s occupation origins were a significant flaw of the constitution or they could be dismissed. More responded that they could dismiss this aspect of their constitution, and we get a sense that the public is beginning to move on from the war’s legacies. Finding #3: The Japanese public is divided on questions related to Article Nine. While hesitant to embrace revision, there are differences in opinions over what kind of military capability Japan might need in the new international politics of the Cold War. Article Nine was treated gingerly by cabinet surveys in the early postwar years. In most surveys, the cabinet did not directly mention Article Nine. Instead, they asked about whether Japanese thought there was a need for revising “the provision that forbids the possession of military forces (guntai)” or to “explicitly recognize the right of self-defense (jiei no tame no kenri) and the right to possess military forces to defend ourselves.” The political climate at the time was deeply contentious over Japan’s postwar Self Defense Force, created in 1954, with opposition parties and many civil society groups deeply convinced that this force was unconstitutional. By the mid-1960s, cabinet questions shift from asking about revision to asking about reinterpreting the constitution. From 1967-1968, the cabinet surveys asked about respondents’ views on how to interpret Article Nine, and in particular, they asked if the Japanese thought the article denies Japan the right to defend itself. A little over a decade after the SDF was established, only 35-42 percent of respondents thought that Japan had the right to exercise self-defense while approximately 30 percent thought it did not. 27-34 percent did not know how to answer that question. More people were against revising Article Nine, and the top reason cited is the risk of war. Respondents were consistently divided over revising Article Nine. This could correlate with the tense domestic politics surrounding revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in the late 1950s. Only in the 1962 and 1963 polls were respondents given the opportunity to say why they opposed revision of Article Nine. The most popular answer, as shown in the pie chart below, was the risk of being entrapped in a war, suggesting that regional tensions in Northeast Asia at that time led to less enthusiasm for rearmament rather than the impulse to arm.     This chart is made by authors based on the cabinet office polling in 1963.   Finding #4: Despite the uneasy sentiments about the occupation roots of their new constitution, the Japanese did not want to make constitutional revision easier. From 1956, the cabinet wanted to see what the Japanese thought about Article Ninety-six, the article that outlines the complex and difficult process for revision. The phrasing of the questions suggested that the revision process was too complicated, and asked what respondents thought. Most polls first asked if respondents understood how Japan’s constitution could be revised. 30-40 percent of respondents were at least partially familiar with the procedures for revision. The surveys asked if respondents were aware of the Diet role and then asked about their familiarity with a national referendum. No results to these detailed questions are provided, however. Overall, roughly 20-25 percent of respondents claimed they understood that a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet was required as well as a national referendum. Cabinet interest in this question of whether to simplify the revision process ended rather abruptly in 1963. But during the years from 1958-1963, it seems the idea of not touching article Ninety-six lost some ground. Nonetheless, 52 percent opposed making revision easier.   This chart is made by authors based on the cabinet office polling in 1958.     This chart is made by authors based on the cabinet office polling in 1963.   Second in a three part series on Japanese public opinion on Constitutional revision.

This blog post is part of a series entitled  Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Last week, four Japanese legislators presented their thoughts on the prospects for revising Japan’s constitution. While the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has long advocated for the debate, its coalition partner, the Komeito, is cautious, and there is significant pushback from opposition parties, including the largest, the Democratic Party. But far less is known about how the Japanese public feels about revising their postwar constitution. Since a national referendum would call upon Japan’s citizens to approve—or reject—proposals by their parliament, we took a look at polling data to see what the Japanese people think about the 1947 Constitution and about the idea of revising it. Contrary to what many outside Japan believe, this is not a new topic. In fact, in the early postwar years, as Japanese leaders shook off the remnants of seven long years of occupation, some Japanese thought the constitution needed to be rewritten. Japan’s citizens were just as divided then as they are today over the legitimacy of a document forged between the staff of the American occupation army and the Japanese legislators forced to negotiate with them. Two essays this week present analysis of the evolution of Japanese popular views on their postwar constitution in an effort to place this year’s election and upcoming Diet debate in context. The first takes a look back at the years immediately after the occupation ended, when the conservative parties consolidated into the LDP, and began their long dominance over Japanese politics. Successive cabinets were concerned about how Japan’s citizens viewed this new document. The cabinet office polls from 1955-1968 regularly queried respondents on the constitution, and from the tone of the questions, government pollsters seemed to worry about whether the Japanese claimed this occupation document as their own. Article Nine too was a critical focal point of these polls, and interestingly, so too was question of whether it should be easier to revise (Article Ninety-six). The Japan program staff also analyzed recent polling, done by Japan’s major media outlets, in an attempt to understand how attitudes on constitutional revision relate to the 2016 Upper House election. Polls taken this year in advance of the May 3rd, Constitution Memorial Day, reveal a public still divided on the question of constitutional revision. The Upper House election tipped the scale in favor of those who are for revision, and afterwards polling suggests a willingness by a majority of Japanese to entertain the debate, but no consensus on what revisions, if any, might be warranted. Many assume Japan’s liberals are far less willing than conservatives to consider revision, but initial polls contradict this simple rendering of popular attitudes. Three sets of media polls identify how attitudes over time for readers of the liberal leaning Asahi Shimbun and the conservative leaning Yomiuri Shimbun, both of which have been surveying popular attitudes on constitutional revision for decades. We have also added more recent polling by the business-oriented Nikkei. A more careful look at why respondents feel the way they do—either for or against revision—gives some needed texture to the debate over how—if asked—the Japanese people might respond if their legislators present them with proposals for revision in a national referendum. First in a three part series on Japanese public opinion on Constitutional revision.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution.  In our final essay by Japan’s legislators, Satsuki Eda, chair of the Democratic Party’s research commission on the constitution, argues against allowing the Abe cabinet to prevail in its effort to revise the constitution. Eda served four terms in the Lower House and is currently serving his fourth-term in the Upper House, representing Okayama prefecture. In Japan’s political alignment of the 1990s, Eda left the Socialist Democratic Federation and after various party mergers, was associated with the New Frontier Party (NFP). He left national politics to run in the 1996 Okayama gubernatorial election, but returned to the Diet in 1998 as a member of the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Throughout his career, Eda has been an influential voice in Diet debates over the reinterpretation and the possible revision of Japan’s constitution. Resisting Prime Minister Abe’s Push to Revise our Constitution by Satsuki Eda  The constitution was a major focal point in the campaign for this summer’s Upper House election. The Democratic Party, together with the Japanese people, sought to crush Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambition of revising our constitution. To date, the world’s citizens have sought to strengthen the universal values of freedom, human rights, democracy, and constitutionalism. National constitutions are what translate these universal values into domestic law. Constitutions thus have a global history, one that began with England’s Magna Carta. States, too, have been transformed. Once the power to govern was a possession of a limited number, yet today states are the possession of their people. In this global historical context, individual nations have claimed the right to define their own constitution. Up until seventy years ago, Japan proceeded in the opposite direction from the world’s progress [towards democracy]. The military assumed control over our nation and pushed us into a world war, and, ultimately, we were confronted with defeat. Japan received the forgiveness and understanding of international society, and turned towards the more welcome path of democracy. As a result, Japanese people have earned the domestic stability and international status we enjoy today. The Democratic Party views Japan’s postwar history largely positively, and we believe that the foundation of our nation’s postwar success has been our constitution. Prime Minister Abe’s views on the constitution are incompatible with ours. He views the current constitution as some sloppy document that was created rashly by American amateurs in the occupation staff, and argues that it is Japanese people’s responsibility to abolish what he sees as a tainted constitution. His Liberal Democratic Party’s draft for a new constitution would replace our Self Defense Force with a National Defense Force and limit some of the fundamental human rights provided under the current constitution. This would contradict our postwar history and experience, and must not, under any conditions, be allowed. The Abe cabinet reinterpreted the constitution in 2014 and push through new legislation in 2015 in order to open the way for the exercise of collective self defense. Under the current constitution, Japan possesses the right of individual self-defense as well as the right of collective self-defense. But past Japanese governments have decided not to exercise the latter. Former Supreme Court justices and many constitutional scholars have lauded this interpretation as being consistent with the spirit of Article Nine. Prime Minister Abe, however, dismissed outright these objections of our leading legal authorities. During my long tenure in Japanese politics, I have never witnessed this degree of arrogance. Before Prime Minister Abe reinterpreted the constitution, there was evidence of some public support for constitutional revision. Now that the Japanese people have witnessed the prime minister’s attempt to force the issue, however, public support has declined significantly. It is the duty of the cabinet to protect the nation’s constitution; the cabinet does not have the right to put a bill to amend the constitution before the Diet. This attempt by our prime minister, the head of the executive branch of government, to initiate constitutional revision must be stopped not only by those of us in the legislative branch but also by the Japanese people. The Democratic Party, however, does not necessarily think it is right to shelve the constitution onto the altar of our ancestor’s and never touch it again. We should not reject revisions that would improve the constitution outright. If we are to consider revision, it must be in order to advance our path further while building on our accomplishments under the postwar constitution. Some of the articles of our current constitution could be fleshed out, and some new provisions reflecting our experience after it was written might be added. For example, Article Ninety-two of the constitution only provides that “regulations concerning the organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.” This article lacks the clarity we need to help build real local autonomy in Japan. Another example for consideration would be some of the new rights that are currently discussed in Japan such as environmental rights and the citizens’ right to access to information. Yet, constitutional revision is not a necessary condition for the advancement of local autonomy nor for the protection of the environment. The current constitution does not obstruct these new demands on our system of governance. Rather [than throw out our current constitution], we should place importance on building a consensus with the Japanese people on how to improve it so as to produce a more future-oriented document. The Democratic Party believes that we should work on constitutional revision through discussion with the Japanese people. Rather than aiming for one vote more than two thirds of our Upper and Lower Houses, we should aim to draft a bill that will generate a consensus among the largest number of legislators in both houses. At least for our first attempt at revision, we need to aim for the largest majority possible. Instead of each party coming up with its own proposal and vociferously defending it in electoral campaigns, politicians should put aside their vanity, create the opportunity to discuss a draft proposal for a revised constitution, and discuss it openly among ourselves as well as with the Japanese people. The Democratic Party does not want to make its own exclusive party draft; it wants to build a national draft with others in the Diet informed by the wishes of the Japanese people. Article Twelve of our constitution prescribes that “the freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people.” Are we, the Japanese people, constantly endeavoring to live up to this promise? I cannot help but think that, after seventy years, our will to maintain the freedoms and rights of our constitution has gradually become perfunctory. All Japanese, on a day-to-day basis, must continue to reflect upon their constitution. 安倍首相の改憲の動きを封じる 今夏の参議院選挙は憲法が争点の一つとなる。民進党は国民と共に、安倍首相の目指す改憲意図を砕かなければならない。 今日まで世界は、自由、人権、民主主義、立憲主義といった価値に普遍性を持たせる方向で、歴史の歩みを進めてきた。この普遍的価値を法規範にしたものが憲法であり、これが英国のマグナカルタから始まる世界の憲法の歴史であり、国家もまた超越者の所有物から国民のものへと変わっていった。この世界の憲法の大きな枠組みの中で、世界各国がそれぞれの憲法を手にしてきたと言える。 日本は70年前までの一時期、この世界の進歩に逆行し、軍事力で国内を統制し世界戦争に挑んで挫折した。その後国際社会の理解と宥恕を得て、現憲法の下で戦後の祝福された歴史を歩み、今日の国内的安定と国際社会での地位を得た。民進党は、この戦後日本の歴史を基本的には正しい歩みととらえ、その根底には日本国憲法があったと考える。 安倍首相の憲法観は、私たちとは相容れない。安倍首相は現憲法を、占領軍の素人が短時間に作った「代物」であるとし、そのいわゆる「悪い憲法」を廃棄することが日本国民の責務だという。安倍首相の率いる自民党の憲法改正草案には、国防軍の創設や基本的人権の制約が含まれており、これは戦後70年の歩みを否定するもので、断じて認めることはできない。 安倍政権は、一昨年の閣議決定と昨年の安保法制の強行制定により、集団的自衛権の行使に道を開いた。日本は憲法のもとで、個別的自衛権のほか集団的自衛権を保持しているが、後者を行使することは憲法上許容されないというのが、歴代内閣により確定した憲法解釈である。ところが安倍首相は、最高裁長官経験者や多くの憲法学者の主張を一顧だにしない態度をとり、この傲慢さは長く日本政治に身を置く私も、これまで経験したことがない。 安倍首相による憲法解釈を変更する以前は、国民世論は憲法改正を是認する意見ももう少し強かったが、国民は首相の強引な改憲指向の姿勢に直面し、今や改憲支持は大きく後退している。内閣には、憲法擁護義務はあっても、改憲の発議権はない。行政権の長である首相が自ら大号令をかける改憲の策動は、国民とともに阻止しなければならないものだ。 しかしながら民進党は、必ずしも憲法を神棚に上げて、指一本触れない姿勢が正しいとは考えない。現憲法の下での戦後の歩みを正しく評価し、この歩みをさらに前に進めるため、憲法をより良いものに改正することを否定してはならない。現憲法のなかには、制定過程の中で十分に配慮を尽くした制度設計になっていない点もあり、その後の歴史の発展の中で生まれてきた新しい憲法の原則もある。 例えば、憲法には「地方自治の本旨」としか規定されていないが、これでは豊かな地域主権の発展のためには十分な規定とは言えない。環境権や知る権利などの新しい権利も登場してきている。ただ、地方自治の前進や環境保全のためには、憲法改正が必要条件というわけではない。現憲法がこれらの要請の障害になってはいない。大切なのは、国民と共に憲法を磨き上げ、未来志向の憲法を作っていくことだ。 民進党は、憲法改正は国民と共に議論しながら取り組むものだと考える。衆参の3分の2を1人超えた程度の多数ではなく、両院の大部分の合意を得た発議を目指すべきだ。少なくとも初回は、そのような発議の形を目指さなければならない。各党が改憲の具体案を出して選挙で大論争をするのではなく、まずは政治家の虚栄心を捨てて改憲原案作成の場を設定し、国民との対話の中で虚心坦懐に議論をすることが必要だ。民進党が現段階において具体的な憲法改正案の作成をしないのは、このような考え方による。 憲法12条は、憲法が国民に保障する自由や権利は、国民の不断の努力によって保持しなければならないと規定している。しかし、国民が現実に不断の努力をしている状況だと言えるだろうか。この70年で次第に不断の努力がおざなりになっていると思えてならない。日常生活の中で、国民みんなが憲法を常に思い返してみることが大切だ。

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution.  Natsuo Yamaguchi, president of the Komei party, offers a third essay on Japan’s constitution from the perspective of a national legislator. He has served two terms in Japan’s Lower House (1990-1996); three terms in the Upper House (2001-present); and has led his party since 2009. The Komei Party is affiliated with the populist Buddhist organization, the Sokkai Gakkai, and its members have been strongly pacifist since the party formed in 1964 under the leadership of Daisaku Ikeda. The party split in 1994, with some aligning themselves with the New Frontier Party, but came back together as the New Komeito in 1998. As a member of the ruling coalition from 1999-2009 and again from 2012-present, Komeito has been in a unique position to influence the legislative debate over the interpretation of Japan’s constitution. In responding to my invitation, Representative Yamaguchi agreed to share his personal reflections rather than present the official view of his party. The Status of Our Constitutional Debate by Natsuo Yamaguchi May 3rd is constitution day in Japan, and this year was the sixty-ninth anniversary of our current constitution. The Japanese people accepted this constitution while in shock from their nation’s defeat in World War II and the consequent occupation by U.S. forces. This constitution introduced three principles that distinguished the postwar from the Meiji era’s constitutional monarchy: popular sovereignty, respect for fundamental human rights, and the preservation of everlasting peace. These three principles guided our postwar politics, and have permeated the values of our postwar society. Throughout the postwar, tensions between those who supported our constitution and those who wanted to revise it were pervasive. But two factors changed this: the end of the Cold War and the coalition politics that emerged in Japan since 1993. International changes [after the Cold War] demanded an expansion of Self Defense Force activities abroad, and our parliament has debated a variety of new legislation that affects their operations. We have debated participation in UN Peacekeeping,[1] greater alliance cooperation with the United States,[2] the conditions for mobilizing our forces in a contingency,[3] and most recently, the new security legislation that allows for limited collective self-defense operations.[4] Our parliamentary debates on Article Nine have exposed the limitations of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the Japanese people over these years have begun to consider the realistic demands of our defense needs rather than simply seeing the Constitution in terms of ideology. On the other hand, in this era of coalition politics, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cannot insist on its own ambitions for constitution revision. Today, there are few political parties that would reject outright the idea of revising Japan’s constitution. The debate today is less about whether to revise but rather about how to revise. The trend now is to discuss methods for revision, and what would be revised, while considering the possibility of cooperation among ruling and opposition parties. The LDP, Japan’s ruling party for much of the postwar era, has prepared its own draft for a constitution, and is seeking to compromise with other parties on parts of this draft. The Komeito, while a member of the ruling coalition, takes a different tack, viewing positively our current constitution. We advocate adding to our existing constitution where needed so long as these new rules represent values that were nurtured in the last sixty-nine years and are consistent with the current constitution. While the LDP and the Komeito differ in how they would approach revision, we agree that a partial revision of the existing constitution is more realistic than attempting to revise the document entirely. No consensus has yet to be reached on the specific contents of revision.  A number of issues have been raised for discussion, including new human rights, a clause to strengthen our response to crises, electoral reforms, the establishment of a constitutional court and a rebalance of power between central and local autonomy. Indeed, the people’s interest still lies in Article Nine, and whether the right of self-defense and the status of the Self Defense Force in our society should be explicitly written into the constitution. While the Japanese people approve of their Self Defense Force, they remain cautious about expanding its role and tend to disapprove of removing limits on the use of force. As a result, popular opinion is skeptical of changes to Article Nine. The Legislation for Peace and Security that came into effect this year allows the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense, but our government has openly acknowledged that any further expansion would require constitutional revision. Popular opinion will be sensitive to how effectively this new legislation is implemented. Article Ninety-Six provides a high hurdle for constitutional revision. As long as the Japanese people are skeptical of changing Article Nine, revising this to lower the bar for revision will be difficult. Popular sentiment suggests that anything that requires changes in Japan’s security policy should be dealt with through constitutional reinterpretation and new legislation. There is little indication yet that the Japanese people see any value in creating a new constitution. Given these circumstances, even if the LDP expands its seats or the ruling coalition secures a two-thirds majority in both Houses, constitutional revision will not begin immediately. In order offer ideas for popular approval through a national referendum, ruling and opposition parties will need deeper discussion. It will take some time for a consensus to form among Japan’s legislators. 日本における憲法改正論議の現状　 本年5月3日は、現行憲法が施行されて69回目の憲法記念日となる。国民は、敗戦のショックと占領状況のもとで、新憲法を受け入れた。明治憲法と異なる3原理、すなわち国民主権主義、基本的人権の尊重、恒久平和主義は深く浸透し、その後の政治の指導理念となってきた。 長く続いた改憲派と護憲派の対立に変化をもたらしたのは冷戦終結と93年から始まった連立政権の時代である。 国際社会の変化の中で、自衛隊の活動の拡大が求められ、PKO協力法、周辺事態法、有事法、平和安全法制などの議論の過程で、9条は憲法解釈の限界にさらされてきた。国民は観念論から現実的な思考に変わり始めている。 自民党は、連立政権の時代を迎えて自主憲法制定にこだわることが困難となった。 今日、改正を拒否する政党は限られ、与野党とも改正を視野に入れながら、その方法と内容を議論する方向に変わりつつある。与党である自民党は、改正草案を用意し、他党と合意できる部分から改正の実績を作ろうとしている。連立与党の公明党は、現行憲法を肯定的に捉え、施行後形成された憲法に相応しい価値を新しい規定にして加える「加憲」という方法を提唱する。改正の方法に隔たりがあるが、丸ごとではなく、部分改正が現実的である。 改正の内容についても、9条以外に、新しい人権、緊急事態条項、選挙制度、憲法裁判所、地方自治など多岐にわたる問題提起がなされているが、合意には至っていない。 実際の国民の関心は、今も9条にあり、自衛権や自衛隊の位置づけを明文化すべきか否かにある。国民は、自衛隊の存在を肯定するが、活動の拡大には慎重であり、無限定な自衛権の行使には否定的である。従って、9条の変更には懐疑的になる。本年施行された平和安全法制は限定的に集団的自衛権を認めるが、政府はこれ以上の自衛権の拡大は、憲法改正が必要であると説明している。国民はこの法制の有効性をしばらく見守るだろう。 第96条の改正条項は高いハードルである。9条の変更に国民が懐疑的になるかぎり、ハードルを低くする改正そのものが困難であろう。国民は、現実的に対応を変化させるべきものは、できる限り憲法の解釈変更や立法措置ですませようと考える。憲法改正しかないと国民が思えば高いハードルも越えられると考えている。いまのところ、国民は改正しかないという対象は何かを認識していない。 こうした状況を踏まえると、与党が両院で3分の2を占めたとしても、すぐに改正が進むわけではない。国民の理解を伴って、国民投票にかけるには、与野党の議論の深まりが不可欠であり、合意形成には時間もかかる。 [1] Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace Keeping Operations and Other Operations, 1992. [2] Law Concerning Measures in Order to Secure Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, 1999. [3] Law Concerning Ensuring National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack, 2003. [4] Legislation for Peace and Security, 2015.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. This is the second of four essays by Japanese political leaders on constitutional revision. Hajime Funada is also a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who advocates for revision. Since 1979 Funada has served eleven terms in the Lower House, representing the first district constituency of Tochigi prefecture. He served as chair of the LDP’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision to the Constitution (2014-2015), and played an important role in the Lower House Commission on the Constitution during the deliberations of the Abe cabinet’s new security laws. On Constitutional Revision by Hajime Funada Last year, Japan faced a significant moment in its history—the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. This year Japan’s constitution is in its sixty-ninth year, making it one of the oldest constitutions in the world. A notable characteristic of this constitution is that it has never been revised. Japan’s constitution came into being after the Imperial Parliament discussed and approved the draft proposal submitted by the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). For some time, the perception that the Occupation forced our constitution upon us was pervasive, and therefore many believe it needed to be redrafted by the Japanese themselves. Recently, however, more and more Japanese think that revision is necessary because of the changing international environment surrounding Japan as well as because of changes that have occurred within Japanese society. It is not because the current constitution is so well written that we have avoided revision. Rather, we have allowed a very lenient and flexible interpretation of the current constitution over the years. This is easily seen in the fact that we have one of the world’s most capable military forces, the Self Defense Force (SDF), even though we continue to maintain Article Nine, which states that we must not possess any land, sea, and air forces. Yet by continuing to rely on reinterpretation, we have allowed the credibility of our constitution to diminish. On Article Nine reinterpretation, in fact, we have reached the limit [of what is allowable under our present constitution]. With regards to what a revised constitution might say, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito agree that a new Article Nine must acknowledge our Self Defense Force. Yet given the sensitive nature of this clause, we cannot help but wait for subsequent revisions. For the first effort at constitutional revision, all of Japan’s political parties (except for the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party) are likely to agree on adding various clauses such as a clause to allow Japan to respond to crises, a clause that imposes fiscal discipline on the government, or a new clause protecting certain rights like environmental rights. In our first attempt at revising the constitution, we are likely to be able to reach a consensus on one of these issues. For every nation, the process of revising the constitution is highly respected, and Japan is no exception. Since the ruling coalition already has a two thirds majority in the Lower House of parliament, if those in favor of revising the constitution surpasses the requisite two thirds of the seats in the Upper House this year, we will have one of the conditions for proposing change – a supermajority of our Diet members asking [the Japanese people] to amend or revise the current constitution. However, I am cautious against proceeding with only those who are pro-revision. In order to present the Japanese people with a national referendum – and gain their approval, it is imperative that we build as large a basis of support across parties in the national Diet. To be sure, momentum in Japan is growing for the first ever attempt at constitutional revision since the end of World War II. But it is extremely important that we do not rush. We must take our time and make steady progress by following the established procedures. 憲法改正について 昨年日本は戦後70年という大きな節目を迎えた。日本国憲法も施行以来69歳を迎えたが、世界の憲法の中でも古い部類に入る。しかし一度も改正したことがないのは、極めて珍しい。 日本国憲法は終戦後、連合軍総司令部（GHQ）から草案を提案され、帝国議会での審議ののち承認された。我が国では以前から、現行憲法はGHQから押し付けられたものだから、日本人の手によって作り変えられなければならないと言う考えが多かった。しかし最近では、その後の国際情勢や日本社会の変化によって、現実と憲法が合わなくなってきたから変えるべきだとの考えが多くなった。 日本国憲法がこれまで改正を免れたのは、その条文がよく出来ているからではない。かなり自由な解釈変更によって凌いできたというのが真相である。第9条が戦力の保持を認めないにもかかわらず、世界有数の実力部隊である自衛隊が存在しているのは、その好例である。しかしこれ以上解釈改憲に頼ることは、憲法の信頼性を損なうことにつながり、もはや限界である。 今後の憲法改正の内容については、まず9条において自衛隊の存在を明記することが与党のコンセンサスだが、大変センシティブな項目なので、2回目以降の改正に委ねざるを得ない。初回の改正においては、社民党や共産党を除く各党とも緊急事態条項、財政規律条項、そして環境権をはじめとする新しい人権の追加という点で共通しており、この中から改正テーマを絞り込んで行くこととなる。 憲法改正は各国ともその手続きを大切にしているが、我が国も例外ではない。今年夏の参議院選挙で改憲勢力が3分の2を超えると、既に衆議院が3分の2を超えているので、にわかに発議要件を満たすこととなるが、私は改憲勢力のみでこの手続きを進めることには慎重である。国民投票という高いハードルを越えるためには、国会の中でできる限り幅広い勢力の合意を求める必要がある。 戦後初めての憲法改正という機運は盛り上がりつつあるが、決して焦ることなく、定められた手続きに従って着実に歩みを進めることが、極めて重要な要素となっている。

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution.  The next four essays present the views of leading Japanese legislators on constitutional revision.  I invited each to share their thoughts with us, and all four graciously agreed to comment in Japanese. I have translated the essays into English for an audience largely unfamiliar with Japanese politics. For readers with greater in-depth knowledge of Japan, I have included the original Japanese-language essay as reference. Our first reflection today is by former Lower House Member Kazuo Aichi, a long time leader of the Liberal Democratic Party’s deliberations on constitutional revision. Before he retired in 2009, Aichi served for eight terms (from 1976-2000), representing the first district constituency of Miyagi prefecture, and returned to office in 2005 for his final term. In the Diet, he served as director of the Special Research Commission on the Constitution in the Lower House. Today, he serves as secretary general of the Caucus for A New Japanese Constitution, a cross party group of legislators led by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in support of constitutional revision. On Constitutional Revision by Kazuo Aichi Because of the hard work of many, most of the obstacles to revising Japan’s constitution have been removed. We now have a national referendum law, for example, and so we are prepared to tackle constitutional revision at any time. Now it is up to the will of the Japanese people. The only question that remains is whether our citizens want to renew their constitution. Sovereignty resides in the people in any democracy, and I believe that the time has come for the Japanese people to realize that they are in charge of drafting a new constitution that will reflect today’s changing Japanese society. Constitutional revision provides the only opportunity for the people of Japan to get directly involved in defining what should be the fundamental principle of our nation’s politics. It is an exercise of popular sovereignty – their ultimate right in our democracy. Since the end of World War II, Japan has experienced almost seventy years of liberal democracy, and there have been repeated debates among politicians over this task of constitutional revision. Now, I believe, the people of Japan are well positioned to take a more active role in this debate and to clarify where they stand on this question of revision. My belief is that the Japanese do not simply want to approve or reject drafts proposed by their Diet. Rather, I think that the people of my country want the opportunity to have their voices and their experiences directly reflected in the draft. People from across Japan want their regional perspectives to be heard, and there is a strong desire for a vigorous discussion that will allow us to build a consensus around a new draft. The Japanese people must play the central role in this process of constitutional revision if it is to be worthy of our nation in this new twenty-first century. I believe Japan’s political parties must take the steps necessary to realize this popular participation in a national debate. Shouldn’t this discussion over our constitution help our democracy mature? My sense is that our democracy can grow further as the current democratic system still seems dominated by the national bureaucracy rather than by the will of the people. If you would like me to comment on specific articles for revision, I would have to say that Article Nine ought ultimately to be revised. However, I would also argue that it might be wiser for us to shelve this effort, and maintain Article Nine as is for now. Article Ninety-six, on the other hand, should be revised so as to make changes in our constitution easier. I believe this would make it easier for the Japanese public to participate in the revision process. Finally, I believe that we should add some new provisions to our constitution. I would support adding a provision for environmental protection and a provision that would allow our government to respond quickly to national crises. 憲法改正について 大勢の関係者の永年にわたる地道な努力の甲斐があって、憲法改正に関する障害（例えば国民投票法の制定）はほとんど取り除かれ、今やいつでも改正作業の取り掛かれる状況になっていると言えよう。 後は主権者国民の意志であるといってよかろう。 つまり国民が憲法を新しくしたいと思うかどうかと言う点が残された課題である。 国民は民主主義国家における主権者であり、時代の進展に合わせて国家の基本理念である新憲法の制定に積極的に参加すべき存在であることを国民が自覚する時期にきていると思う。 憲法改正は国政の根本に国民が直接関与することができる唯一の機会であると同時に国民としてもっている最高の権力を行使できる機会でもあるということである。 戦後、自由民主主義体制になり既に半世紀を越え、幾多の憲法改正論を経て、今や国民は自らの意志を積極的に明らかにする立場にあると思う。 国会によって作成された改正案に対する賛否を表明するにとどまらず、生活実感に起因する意見を直接改正草案に反映させる機会を国民は望んでいると思う。 日本各地において各層の人々が意見を述べ、活発な議論の高まりが憲法改正草案に実りをもたらす運動として広がっていくことを望んでいる。 ２１世紀の新時代にふさわしく、国民が主体となる憲法改正作業が全国に展開されるようにならなくてはならない。このような状況をつくるうえで、政党が果たすべき役割は大きいと思う。このような運動を通じて日本の民主主義を成熟させていくことができるのではないか。日本国家の現状は体制は民主主義ではあるが実態は中央官僚支配体制であり、民主主義の成熟度は決して高くないというのが私の抱いている実感である。 憲法改正について具体的な点についていくつか私見をのべるとすると、まず９条については最終的には改正すべきであると思うが、当面は現状維持として棚上げしておくのがいいと思う。 ９６条のハードルはさげるべきであると思う。国民の参加がもっと容易になることが望ましいと思うからである。 環境権の条項、緊急事態に対応する条項などは是非追加すべきであると思う。

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. As elections go, yesterday’s Upper House vote was not a compelling display of popular interest in governance, yet it was an undeniable victory for the prime minister and his party. Voter turnout was only 54.7 percent, on the lower end of postwar Upper House election turnouts but larger than the last Upper House contest in 2013. But Japan’s younger voters gave their ruling party a boost. 40 percent of Japan’s newest voters, eighteen-and nineteen-year-olds, opted for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). All in all, it was a vote for the status quo – and for the government’s agenda. The LDP gained fifty-six seats, and the Komeito fourteen, for a total of seventy.  The small Initiatives From Osaka (IFO or Osaka Ishin no Kai) also did well (seven seats, up five seats), adding to the pro-revision coalition. The opposition parties fared less well.  Democratic Party (DP), a merger of the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Japan Innovation Party, took thirty-two seats, but notably won 23 percent of the proportional representation vote giving the former DPJ the best outcome since it left office in 2012, suggesting that the party merger formed in March may have helped the embattled DPJ. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) took six seats – no more, no less for the party most likely to veto government policy choices. While the effort to build an anti-Abe electoral backlash failed from preventing the ruling coalition to secure majority of contested seats, voter support in urban electorates at the end of the day for some opposition party candidates should be enough to give the ruling coalition pause. Today, members of Japan’s 242-seat Upper House identify as follows: LDP 121; Komeito 25;  DP 49; JCP 14; IFO 12; Party for Japanese Kokoro 3; Social Democratic Party (SDP) 2;  People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends 2; Assembly to Energize Japan 2; ruling coalition affiliated independents 3; opposition parties affiliated independents 5; independents 3; and other 1.[1] Abe has an electoral mandate but it is not clear how much wind he has beneath his sails for policy reform. While polling suggests Abe is on the right track with loyal voters, turnout in elections since he returned to office in 2012 reveals an undercurrent of apathy among the voters. The LDP’s campaign slogan says it all, “Let’s Move Japan Forward….” Few could argue with that. Who wants to go backwards? In policy terms, forward means more Abenomics, and a slightly suggestive pose on revising the constitution. Yet it is hard to make the case that Abenomics has worked. The prime minister has tweaked his policy instruments a bit, backing away from raising the consumption tax (a good move if you want to attract votes as well as encourage consumption) and promising greater fiscal stimulus (again especially good for rural Japanese who are feeling the economic pain the most). The Bank of Japan governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, also seems to be poised to do just a bit more easing as well. The prime minister sees constitutional revision also as portending a brighter future identity for Japanese. But few Japanese have a clear idea of what he means in practical terms. Last time there was an Upper House election, Abe argued for reducing the threshold for revision but that idea went nowhere. This time round rallying those who want a debate seems to have worked. A beaming Abe in the evening hours yesterday suggested that the LDP draft could become the basis of a broader discussion among all political parties.  Speaking with a popular journalist, Akira Ikegami, during the live election coverage on TV Tokyo, Abe pointed out that, Our party has already demonstrated our desire to change Article Nine and Article Ninety-six. But we want to go beyond those articles, to revise it all - including the preamble. But politics is the art of realizing goals.  Without a two-thirds majority, it seems useless to debate how to reform the constitution or which articles to rewrite.[2] Clearly, Japanese voters have yet to sign up for any particular version of a new constitution, and exit polling revealed a confusing picture. NHK exit polling found 33 percent for, 32 percent against, and 36 percent uncertain, while remarkably, the liberal Asahi Shimbun reported 49 percent for revision and 44 percent against in its exit polling. Nine political parties went into this election, but not all ended up with seats in the Upper House. Virtually all had some sort of position on the constitution, and interestingly newer parties that defined themselves solely in terms of the revision debate – pro or con – got little traction with Japanese voters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Party Name Seats up for Reelection[3] Seats Won Position on Constitution Party for Japanese Kokoro 0 0 Pro revision.  Aims to implement our own Constitution that reflects our long history and tradition and our custom and mind. Liberal Democratic Party 50 56 Pro revision.  Seeks to conduct thorough debates in Commission on Constitution in both Houses, cooperate with the opposition parties, and gain consensus from the citizens Initiatives from Osaka 2 7 Pro revision. Revise constitution to introduce free education, constitutional court, and institutional reform and more regional sovereignty. Komeito 9 14 No mention in manifesto New Renaissance Party 1 0 It is too soon for constitutional amendment. Democratic Party 45 32 Opposed to revising Article Nine; Aims to plan a constitution that is future-oriented with the cooperation from the people. People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends 2 1 Respects the concept of constitution under the principles of national sovereignty, basic human rights, and pacifism. Social Democratic Party 2 1 Prevent revision of existing pacifist constitution. Japanese Communist Party 3 6 Prevent any revision, including the preamble. * All English renditions of political party names are taken from official websites. While the headlines focus on the pro-revision winners, those who lost on an anti-revision platform also deserve attention. For example, the SDP, a longstanding opponent of the LDP on its interpretation of the constitution, lost an important representative— Tadatomo Yoshida, the party head— leaving only four members serving in the Upper and Lower Houses. A newer party, the Voice of Citizen’s Anger, led by Setsu Kobayashi, one of the expert constitutional scholars called to testify last summer in the Diet, did not win any seats. The People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends, led by Ichiro Ozawa, also lost a seat, leaving only two seats in both Houses of the diet. Yet in the game of numbers, this Upper House election brings the prospect of a revision process into the realm of the possible. Virtually every media yesterday added up the Upper House legislators that could be described as pro-revision, both those (re) elected on Sunday and those who were not up for reelection. The widely accepted consensus is that for the first time in the postwar era, both houses of parliament have the requisite two-thirds majority to initiate a debate on constitutional revision. So if we are heading toward a debate over the Japanese constitution, what will that debate look like? Prior to Sunday’s election, I asked four Japanese politicians to share their thoughts on how this Japanese debate might proceed: on the pro-revision side, two LDP legislators, Kazuo Aichi and Hajime Funada, who have held responsibility for crafting their party’s position; Secretary General of the Komeito Natsuo Yamaguchi, who will provide his thoughts on how to build a consensus from the unique vantage point of being in the current ruling coalition but opposed to/cautious on revision; and, finally, Satsuki Eda, chair of the DP’s Research Committee on the Constitution and a longstanding advocate of protecting Japan’s current constitution. [1] As of July 11, 4:00 p.m. EST, the Upper House has yet to announce official results of this election, therefore we are relying on media reports. These numbers are from the Asahi Shimbun, and Nikkei and NHK also report the same numbers. The Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the LDP won fifty-five seats as Kenji Nakanishi ran as an independent and was later recognized as a LDP member. [2] “TXN Senkyo SP Ikegami Akira no saninsen raibu” [TXN Election Special: Akira Ikegami’s Live Coverage on Upper House Election], TV Tokyo, July 10, 2016, 7:50 p.m. [3] These numbers are taken from the official website of the House of Councillors.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Dhaka attacks designed to “reverberate globally.” Bangladesh is still reeling from last Friday when at least five Bangladeshi men stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka’s affluent Gulshan neighborhood and unleashed horror within. The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the assault soon after it started, warning that similar attacks would ensue until its version of Islamic law was established worldwide, and releasing images apparently depicting the inside of the restaurant during the nearly twelve-hour siege in which citizens of five different nationalities died. While the Hasina government has denied that IS was behind the attacks—insisting that the gunmen were linked to Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), a domestic jihadist group seeking to establish an Islamic emirate—independent security analysts say the sophistication of the attack, along with the fact that the targets were mostly foreign, leave little doubt that the perpetrators were at least in contact with international terror groups. The style of the attack is an escalation of the country’s recent spate of Islamist violence, which was carried out largely using primitive weapons like machetes. This attack has particularly shaken the country, given that the restaurant was located in a high-security complex, moments away from the embassies that make up the diplomatic enclave, and that the perpetrators came from well-educated and affluent backgrounds, casting doubt once again to the well-worn narrative that poverty and hopelessness are the causes of terrorism. Analysts worldwide are calling for the Hasina government to take a more active stance in acknowledging the presence of IS in the country, arguing that continued cynicism would only further destabilize the region. 2. UN urges Myanmar government to curb violence against Muslims. Buddhist village mobs in Myanmar have burned down two mosques in northern Kachin and central Bago states in the span of merely one week, resulting from personal and construction disputes, respectively. The UN special human rights envoy to Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, recently completed a twelve-day tour of the country and urged Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to take more deliberate action against these attacks. Violence and discrimination against Muslims in predominately Buddhist Myanmar has persisted since 2012, when rioting forced 100,000 members of the Rohingya Muslim minority group out of their homes in Rakhine State. The 1.1 million stateless Rohingya are classified by the Myanmar government as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, 140,000 of whom are now confined to displacement camps where their movement is restricted and they cannot access basic goods and service. According to the UN, at least 86,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar between 2012 and 2014 for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, where many are deported or subject to human trafficking. 3. Hacker’s arrest sparks debate in China. As the Chinese government moves forward on legislation governing cybersecurity, the arrest of a suspected hacker has raised questions about the best way to promote online security. In December 2015, a young security researcher named Yuan Wei discovered a vulnerability in the networks of online dating platform Jiayuan. The website fixed the problem, but then a few months later went to the police, claiming they’d been hacked. A police investigation determined that Yuan was the culprit and arrested him, sparking a debate over “white hat” hackers who attempt to break into networks to discover vulnerabilities so that the networks can be made more secure. According to one Chinese lawyer, Yuan is not culpable if he did not damage or steal any data from Jiayuan’s computers. However, Yuan’s defenders argue that accessing data is often necessary to convince companies that the threat to their systems is real. The debate comes just as the Chinese legislature is reviewing a proposed Cybersecurity Law. While some Chinese experts claim the law will provide greater protections for white-hat hackers like Yuan Wei, a straight reading of the current draft suggests that it would simply further criminalize hacking, even if done in the public interest. 4. New South Korean anti-corruption law draws criticism. When the South Korean legislature approved a new anti-graft law last March, the regulations were considered an ambitious effort to curtail bribery in a culture with a long gift-giving tradition and in the wake of various corruption scandals. Indeed, South Korea ranked thirty-seventh in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2015, among the worst for OECD countries. However, concerns are now emerging that reducing gift-giving will hurt farmers and small business in an already slowing economy. Among the provisions in the new law are fines of 30 million won ($26,000) and a potential three-year prison sentence for officials engaged in bribery. The law also placed a limit on meals and gifts that government workers can accept of 30,000 won and 50,000 won respectively (approximately $25 and $43). Advocacy groups affiliated with these sectors have argued that the price levels allowed for gifts and meals should be raised. The Korea Federation of Small Businesses estimates potential annual losses of 2.6 trillion won ($2.2 billion) from the new regulations. The law is expected to come into force this fall, but whether amendments will be made before then remains to be seen. 5. Yield on Japan’s twenty-year bond dips below rock bottom. This week, yields of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) sunk to record lows in response to deep unease about the state of the world economy. The twenty-year JGB yield even became negative for the first time ever. While a grim turn of events for investors, the occasion was something of a boost for the Japanese government, which auctioned off ten-year JGBs (with a negative 0.255 percent yield) for a profit of around 60 billion yen ($590 million) on Tuesday. Sovereign debt has increasingly become a haven for otherwise worried investors, despite the fact that the amount of global bonds with negative yields has reached nearly $10 billion. Currency markets have also reacted strongly to the Brexit vote two weeks ago, with the yen at a four-year high, yuan at a six-year low, and the pound at a thirty-one-year low against the dollar. Bonus: Grandpa tells a story (about the South China Sea). In a new animation produced by CCTV America, a chipper white-haired man gives his granddaughter a three-minute rundown of the South China Sea maritime disputes, or at least his version of it. Most of grandpa’s story is historical, beginning when Chinese boats were the “first to discover” the now-disputed features during the Han Dynasty, around two thousand years ago. His account gives the impression that the swath of water, and all it contains, belongs to China simply by dint of history. In reality, China has never made an official “historic claim” to the area encompassed by its nine-dash line. The vast majority of international legal experts, in fact, have concluded that China’s historic claim over the South China Sea is invalid. One expert has suggested that the Chinese government uses the concept of historical rights to inject “confusion into the conversation” while the country consolidates its near-seas interests. This simple animation seems to be lifted from the playbook of China’s traditional statecraft, using a kind of “cartographic aggression” to reformulate history to bolster nationalism and territorial claims. CCTV America has produced some other snazzy videos about the South China Sea dispute, but viewers should be careful lest they think that grandpa’s tale tells the whole story.

This blog post is the first in a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. In 1947, Japan adopted a new constitution, and it stands today without amendment as the organizing principle of Japan’s postwar democracy. But there are some in Japan (including the prime minister) who think the time has come to amend it. Drafted under occupation, this document has long divided Japan’s right and left. For the right, it was dubbed “MacArthur’s Constitution,” a reference to the American general who led the allied occupation of Japan after World War II. For the left, it became known as the “peace constitution,” the document that eradicated the prewar military’s hold on the Japanese state and committed Japan to a path of peace with its neighbors in the wake of a failed experiment with imperial conquest. Article Nine, the famous “no war” clause that limits the purpose of the postwar military to the defense of their nation, remains the defining statement of Japan’s postwar international relations. Article Nine. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Much ink has been spilled on whether Article Nine has been implemented faithfully or not. Implicated in these differences, however, was not simply the military’s mission but also a lesser known article’s call for the firm establishment of civilian control over postwar state. Within Japan, the 1947 constitution means far more. Replacing the Meiji Constitution of 1889, Japan’s first attempt at designing a modern state, the current Japanese constitution introduced the notion of popular sovereignty, removed the last vestiges of power from the oligarchs and the institutions that supported them, and placed the future of the Japanese nation in the hands of the people. The Emperor would nominally be the head of state but gone were the days when the country would be ruled in his name. Instead, Japan’s bicameral parliament, its ties cut from the aristocrats who held sway over one chamber, would be fully accountable to the people for governing their country. Also embedded in the new constitution were changes in the economic and social foundations of that Meiji state, including reform of land ownership and the equal rights of women. By stripping power from the elites that led Japan to war, and empowering those whose voices had been silenced as the military expanded its sway in the 1930s, the constitution was designed to alter the balance between the authority of the state and rights of Japanese citizens. Three generations later, this foundational document is attracting considerable attention. With each election, the prospect of a national debate on revising the constitution seems closer at hand. In a few days, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, himself a conspicuous advocate of revision, will lead his party to the polls for the Upper House. His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has had constitutional revision in their platform since inception, and has recently presented several drafts of a revised document for voter consideration. If Abe can wrestle enough votes from the anti-revision opposition parties and persuade some independents to join him, this Upper House election could turn this longstanding conservative dream into a legislative reality. Today, there are newer parties that also feel the time has come to consider the opportunities that could accrue from revision. Cross party deliberations began in earnest when the Lower House formed the Research Commission on the Constitution in 2000. The result was an 850+ page catalogue of ideas [PDF] ranging from privacy and environmental protections to a wholesale restructuring of Japan’s highly centralized government. For example, the Japan Innovation Party (now merged with the former Democratic Party of Japan) came into politics arguing for a reconstitution of central-local authority, claiming that greater local autonomy was the solution to many of their country’s governance problems. Other smaller parties have suggested that while Article Nine should remain protected, other aspects of reform require a serious look at the 1947 document. To date, the main hurdle has been meeting the high standards set forth in the constitution for revision. Chapter IX, Article Ninety-six of the Japanese constitution outlines the procedures for revision: Article Ninety-six. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution. For years now, Diet members have been hard at work in crafting a national referendum law. A subcommittee was formed to study the experiences of other democracies and procedures for constitutional amendment. The first law passed in 2007 during the first Abe cabinet and was updated again in 2014 to allow eighteen-year-olds to participate. Japan had only allowed those twenty or older to vote in elections, and thus the National Referendum Law opens elections to eighteen-and nineteen-year-olds. This upcoming Upper House election will be the first national election for this age group. All that is needed now is the requisite two-thirds majority in each of the Diet’s two chambers to begin deliberations on whether (and how) to amend the 1947 document. The LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, comprise a two-thirds majority in the lower house of parliament, a comfortable margin for passing any legislation, but gaining a similar majority in the Upper House has long been difficult. In the 2013 Upper House campaign, this prompted Abe and others to flirt with the notion of revising Article Ninety-six to bring the threshold down to one half of the members of both houses, yet this was roundly criticized and the prime minister dropped the idea. This Sunday will be Abe’s second chance to initiate formal deliberations on revision, realizing the LDP’s long held ambition to remove what many conservatives criticize as the last vestige of Japan’s postwar identity. Prime Minister Abe has frequently articulated his discomfort with the origins of the constitution. In an interview on April 27, 2013 with the right-leaning Sankei Shimbun, the prime minister made his thoughts clear: “It is simply an illusion to argue that we, the Japanese, can take credit for opening a new, postwar era when we drafted it. In 1946, our constitution was made up by amateurs in the General Headquarters (GHQ) with no background in constitutional or international law in only eight days.” Last year, as the government defended its reinterpretation of the constitution to allow for the right of collective self-defense, a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) critic raised this disparaging evaluation of the nation’s constitution by its prime minister. Abe unabashedly retorted [PDF] that there was nothing wrong with the prime minister stating the facts. The facts may be a bit more complex, however. The process of drafting a postwar constitution after World War II begun early in the occupation, and a Japanese drafting committee was formed. The initial draft however did not venture far from its predecessor, and General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the allied powers (SCAP), began to lay down his thoughts on what concepts needed to be included. Charles Kades, head of the government section of the SCAP, later wrote of the intense interaction between Americans and Japanese in those initial debates. For over a year, this back and forth between the occupation staff and the Japanese Committee on the Bill for Revision of the Imperial Constitution led by Hitoshi Ashida, a prewar diplomat and a prominent figure in early political party formation after the war, wrestled over their respective visions of Japan’s postwar government. Perhaps the most important was Kades-Ashida negotiation over the text of Article Nine. To be sure, Japan was an occupied nation, and the GHQ’s determination to “demilitarize and democratize” Japanese society drove the process. But the document that was promulgated by the Imperial Diet on November 3, 1946 and came into effect on May 3, 1947 took far more than eight days to draft, and Japanese and Americans were responsible for the document that has shaped Japanese governance for almost seventy years. Moreover, Kades and Beate Sirota Gordon, the twenty-two-year-old woman tasked with drafting the section on women’s rights, were admired by those Japanese who embraced the transformative power of Japan’s new constitution. For younger Japanese, however, this question of ownership could have greater salience. Many praise Japan’s “peace constitution” for keeping Japan out of conflict in the seven decades since that cataclysmic war; yet a growing number seems tempted by the logic that “MacArthur’s Constitution” sits uncomfortably on their polity as an imported and imposed document. Media polling suggests a complex landscape of opinion. Japanese remain divided over the wisdom of changing what has worked so well. Even those who are advocates of revision suggest it may be premature given these differences over what what needs to be changed. In the weeks running up to this Sunday’s election, Abe himself has sought to dampen expectations of sudden change to Article Nine. Protests against his new security legislation last summer reopened old fears about government tampering with Japan’s postwar commitment to peace, and some of the new contenders for seats in the Upper House emerged because of that political clash. Again this week, the vice president of the LDP, Masahiko Komura, reiterated his party’s position, arguing that “there is zero possibility” the LDP would touch Article Nine even if Sunday’s election went its way. Outside of Japan, misconceptions about Japan’s constitutional debate abound, often driven by the headlines of the moment. To help understand the complexity of this Japanese conversation, I have invited fifteen guests to share their perspective, ten Japanese citizens and five non-Japanese analysts of Japan. Some have had–and will continue to have–a direct role in shaping Japan’s debate; all have an avid interest in understanding the currents and the consequences of what I see as a defining conversation for the people of Japan. For those of us outside the country, listening in, it is imperative that we understand the debate and learn more about the advocates and institutions that will shape it. What would a Japanese designed constitution look like? What would remain of the current constitution? How would today’s Japanese seek to alter the balance of power between the individual and the state? What individual rights might be asserted–or altered? This conversation on Asia Unbound will run through the rest of the summer with roughly two essays per week. I will return next Monday to assess the July 10 Upper House election results and what they mean for the prospects for revision. Finally, while this series does not aim to advocate a position on the constitutional debate, it does seek to inform–and I hope you will share your questions or comments in the weeks that follow. You can share your thoughts on the public comments section that follows, or send me an email ([email protected]) if you prefer to remain offline.