Japan

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and David O’Connor look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Violence escalates in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Three police posts in townships in the volatile Rakhine state were attacked this week, further stoking concerns about ethnic conflict and violence in the region. These incidents resulted in the death of eight attackers and nine officers. Subsequent confrontations added to the death toll, which escalated to an estimated forty people. In Maungdaw district, where attacks occurred, a large majority of the population is Rohingya. The recent strife led to the imposition of a curfew, limits on group gathering sizes, and school closures. Border and army officials were also sent to conduct searches in local villages for evidence on the attacks. Members of the Union government visited the capital of the Rakhine state to allay concerns, and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi pledged that the government’s response would be in accordance with the law. 2. Leading Chinese expert floats proposal for new Chinese ADIZ. Wu Shicun, head of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, stated recently that China “reserves the right” to impose a new air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. Although ADIZs are commonly used by many countries, including the United States, Canada, South Korea, and Japan, the declaration of a Chinese ADIZ in the highly-disputed waters of the South China Sea would be viewed as exceptionally confrontational. While China’s less than satisfactory experience after declaring an ADIZ in the East China Sea in 2013 may give the government pause in enacting a new ADIZ, Wu’s statement could also indicate that China is simply waiting for the means to enforce it before declaring an ADIZ in the South China Sea. 3. Philippine leader distances nation from the United States. Rodrigo Duterte is perhaps best known in the United States for his outlandish statements – comparing himself to Hitler and insulting Obama – but his recent statements regarding China, the United States, and the South China Sea are historic for both the Philippines and the wider region. He said, “I will be reconfiguring my foreign policy.” “I will break up with America.” The U.S.-Philippines relationship has lasted more than a hundred years and is a frequent source of controversy. Duterte views it as a vestige of imperialism, and he perhaps recognizes the potential benefits to his country of playing the United States against China, the largest power in the region and the Philippines’ second-largest trading partner. The reconfiguration of the archipelagic nation’s foreign policy will certainly alter the balance of power in the South China Sea, where the Philippines recently won a case regarding China’s claims to the Scarborough Shoal. However, after questioning if the U.S.-Philippines military alliance is really necessary, Duterte said Wednesday that he will not alter the country’s military treaties, adding further confusion to an already volatile situation. 4. Climate accord could deprive Indians of air conditioning. The 28th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer convened in Kigali, Rwanda this week, where they completed a proposed accord to phase out the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in air conditioners and refrigerators worldwide. HFCs are greenhouse gases that are even more powerful than carbon dioxide, introduced in the 1980s to supplant other ozone-depleting gases. However, they have become increasingly dangerous with the proliferation of air conditioners and refrigerators throughout the developing world, and scientists have warned that they could contribute to an average temperature increase of 0.9 degrees Fahrenheit by 2100. Unlike the COP21 Paris Agreement, this accord, if completed, would have the force of international law, with trade and economic sanctions imposed on nations that fail to follow the accord, and wealthy nations mandated to provide financial assistance to help with compliance in developing nations. In India, where temperatures reached 123.8 degrees Fahrenheit this past spring, the purchase of an air conditioner symbolizes an escape from poverty and sweltering heat. Roughly 6 to 9 percent of Indian households own air conditioners, and many more hope to acquire them. However, the proposed accord may make this more difficult and reaching the agreement’s target of eliminating HFC production and usage by 2050, a longer timeline than that advocated by developed nations, will cost the Indian economy 13 to 38 billion dollars. 5. Bhutan opens first law school. A nation whose democracy is still in its infancy is beginning a quest to cultivate a generation who will construct an indigenous, yet sound, meaning of “the law,” and enforce it in accordance with a highly particular set of values. The staff of the newly opened Jigme Singye Wangchuck School of Law in the Bhutanese capital, Thimphu, is approaching the challenge of establishing the appropriate first principles with great care and the belief that this early period may be the best chance to get democratization right in Bhutan. An American, Michael Peil, is vice dean of the school and is also working with international legal consultants. They must account for the fact that most of the Bhutanese population is accustomed to arbitration as opposed to a trial system, and some fear that the standard democratic justice system will not fit the temperament of the isolated Buddhist kingdom. Additionally, Bhutan’s lawyers have traditionally been educated primarily in India, where the legal tradition differs from that of their home country. Bonus: Kirin invests in Brooklyn Brewery. Kirin Holdings, Japan’s second-largest beer brewer, announced this week that it would take a minority stake in Brooklyn Brewery, one of the largest craft brewers in the United States. The two companies will launch a joint venture in Japan in hopes of expanding the country’s craft beer market and propping up Kirin’s profits, which face growing challenges as Japan’s population declines and demand for beer dries up. While the investment is only the most recent in a series of acquisitions of successful craft breweries by massive multinational beverage corporations like Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors, it’s a major step forward in the internationalization of the U.S. craft beer industry, which has been primarily driven by transatlantic acquisitions to date.

Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Thailand detains Hong Kong democracy activist. Thai authorities detained Occupy Central organizer Joshua Wong for twelve hours earlier this week and denied him entry to the country. Wong, who is nineteen, was visiting Thailand to address students in Bangkok. Following his return to Hong Kong, Wong claimed that the Thai government had detained him because it had been directed to do so by the Chinese government. Over the last year, a Swedish citizen who sold books critiquing the Chinese Communist Party and a Chinese journalist who fled to Thailand seeking asylum both disappeared in Thailand, only to reappear months later in the custody of Chinese authorities. With these disappearances in mind, Wong said he feared being similarly handed over to Chinese authorities. 2. Afghanistan to receive $15.2 billion in foreign aid. This past week, the European Union (EU) and government of Afghanistan co-hosted the Brussels conference on Afghanistan. The meeting convened over seventy nations and thirty international organizations to reaffirm their political and financial commitment to Afghan peace, state-building, and development. The governments in attendance agreed upon a donation of roughly $3 billion annually through 2020 on the condition that Afghanistan will address corruption, reabsorb failed asylum seekers, and improve human rights. This arrangement reflects the country’s current economic situation, where 70 percent of its annual income is dependent upon international aid, 42 percent of which is earmarked for defense. EU officials state that this deal stipulates that all unaccompanied minors will only be returned to Afghanistan if their families are identified and their “well-being is assured.” Cases of single women, elderly, and ill will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Although the EU is obligated under international law to give shelter to refugees, countries are allowed to send back “economic migrants” if their country of origin is deemed safe. Roughly 213,000 Afghans sought asylum in Europe during 2015. Many have voiced strong opposition to this arrangement, citing the record high civilian casualties in Afghanistan as the Taliban continues to launch offensives in some the country’s largest cities, including Kunduz. 3. Xi Jinping may delay choosing his successor. Chinese President Xi Jinping, the country’s most powerful party leader since Mao, seems prepared to subvert the tradition of choosing a successor before the beginning of the current leader’s second term. This convention, developed to minimize intra-party friction, has forced previous party leaders to accept successors they would not have preferred. By upending it, Xi could further consolidate his authority and extend his influence beyond his administration, but he also risks upsetting party leaders and raising fears that he may seek a third term. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has already allowed him to attain unusual standing in the party, and there are rumors that he wishes to replace his premier with Wang Qishan, the public face of Xi’s anticorruption drive. An official decision will not be known before the National People’s Congress convention next spring, and internal factional divides are likely to sharpen as the contest unfolds. 4. Mongolian mortgages face an uncertain future. Two years ago, Mongolia’s economy boasted a growth rate of almost 8 percent. Housing prices in Ulaanbaatar in particular were inflated to nearly all-time highs of more than 20 percent, as buildings sprouted up to accommodate rural migrants moving en masse to the country’s capital. But now the generous mortgage program that helped spur construction there has also created a bubble in the affordable housing market. In 2013, the Mongolian finance ministry began offering commercial banks government funding to help underwrite mortgages of 5 or 8 percent. But the central bank discontinued the 5 percent rate last month, and just recently suspended funding for the 8 percent rate after finding that commercial banks were “misusing” the government funds. Mongolia has little choice but to end the program altogether, as funds for it have long since been used up and overall fiscal discipline is waning. However, doing so will have serious economic repercussions: the construction and housing sectors rely heavily on the artificial demand created by state-backed mortgages, and banks are already highly exposed to mortgages that may not be repaid if country-wide economic growth slows further—likely dropping to zero or negative in 2016. 5. New challenges emerge for Chinese projects in Pakistan. Stumbling blocks in the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $46 billion trade and investment initiative, have cropped up in the past few weeks. CPEC aims to connect the Pakistani port of Gwadar with China’s Xinjiang province by road and rail, and if completed as planned, it could provide Pakistan with a major economic boost. Over the next fourteen years, the projects associated with CPEC are expected to create roughly 700,000 new jobs and increase yearly GDP growth by 2–2.5 percent there. However, unrest in Balochistan province, through which much of the new infrastructure will pass, could threaten the corridor’s success. For example, a suicide bombing in August may have specifically aimed at undermining CPEC, and there is growing resentment among the local population over whether new projects will benefit their communities. To address security threats, Pakistan already deployed nearly 15,000 security personnel in June. China’s state-run Global Times has also weighed in on the risks of the project, with an article in mid-September stating, “the increasing cost of security is becoming a big problem in efficiently pushing forward the projects” and that “China may not want to put too much focus on the region.” But all hope is not lost; the project is attracting renewed international attention as Iran has conveyed its interest in joining too. Bonus: Fukushima’s unwitting bovine science heroes. In the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the Japanese government ordered all livestock within a twenty-kilometer radius of the damaged power plant to be euthanized. Because the area was designated a no-entry zone, owners could not have continued to feed the animals, so killing them first was seen as the most humane option. But some cattle owners resisted the edict, releasing their cows to roam free or returning two or three times a week to keep them alive out of compassion. Today, researchers have also benefited from these farmers’ benevolence: they maintain 200 of these cattle several miles northwest of the defunct power plant to study the effects of long-term, low-dose radiation levels on large mammals. The scientists visit every three months to collect samples from the cows, and so far have found no increased incidence of leukemia or cancer but have noticed mysterious white spots appearing on many of the animals. Though many ranchers hope animal husbandry will one day return to Fukushima, that is far from a reality at least for now.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Samir Kumar, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Women activists urge Ban Ki-moon to formally end Korean War. Over 100 women activists from thirty-eight countries are putting pressure on United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to formally end the Korean War prior to the end of his tenure on December 31, 2016. A formal letter was submitted by the nonprofit WomenCrossDMZ, whose mission is to end the Korean War on the grounds that the “unresolved conflict gives all governments in the region justification to further militarize and prepare for war, depriving funds for schools, hospitals, and the welfare of the people and the environment.” The Korean War ended with an armistice signed by U.S., North Korean, and Chinese leaders in July 1953. However, the diplomats never reconvened to sign a subsequent peace treaty. The group is urging Ban Ki-moon to work closely with the president of the UN Security Council to have a peace treaty signed by the end of 2018. These calls to action come at a time of increasing instability in the Korean Peninsula, as the North Korean government has now conducted five nuclear tests and is subject to five sanctions resolutions. 2. Chinese executives accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions. Four executives at a major trading company in the border city of Dandong have been accused of violating U.S. sanctions on North Korea meant to impede the country’s development of nuclear weapons. Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Corporation, which in one year handled more than 20 percent of trade between North Korea and China, was accused by a think tank last week of exporting materials that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons to the rogue state. The company’s owner, Ma Xiaohong, is alleged to have conspired with a North Korean bank to disguise the activity by creating shell corporations in Hong Kong and overseas tax shelters, some of which were exposed in the Panama Papers. Last week, Chinese police in the northeastern province of Liaoning announced an investigation into the same company, stating that it was suspected of engaging in “serious economic crimes.” 3. Efforts to fight corruption in Afghanistan stumble. A new report by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) highlighted the continuing corruption challenges the nation faces. In particular, noncompliance has hampered an effort to monitor the finances of eighty-three high officials in the Afghan government though the High Office of Oversight. Although the programs under the High Office of Oversight were budgeted for $26.6 million in USAID assistance, the office struggled to enforce disclosure requirements. Some officials in the previous administration, led by former President Hamid Karzai, never declared their assets when they took or left office, and even Karzai himself did not include full details on assets in German bank accounts. Only Ashraf Ghani, the current president, has entirely followed the rules on asset disclosure. The office has also been criticized for being too closely tied to the government since its leaders are chosen through presidential appointment. The SIGAR report also highlighted the importance of understanding how networks of corruption operate and better integrating security and anti-graft priorities. 4. Singapore urged to step up policing of financial crime. A recent report by the Paris-based global corruption watchdog Financial Action Task Force found Singapore’s existing regulations against money laundering satisfactory for small-scale crimes but vulnerable to sophisticated actors. The review came in light of illicit funding flows from Malaysia’s 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian development bank: earlier this year, it was revealed that about $4 billion had been routed from 1MDB to institutions in Singapore, Switzerland, and other countries. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak was found to have $681 million in his personal account paid from 1MDB. Singapore’s domestic regulator admitted that its lapses had detracted from its financial reputation, but had not indicated specific steps that would follow. The report noted, ominously, that Singapore was not only vulnerable to money launderers but also to terrorism financiers. 5. South China Sea dispute reveals growing rift in Singapore-Beijing relations. Singapore and China have had a relatively close relationship over the past few decades, with a particularly positive economic relationship: China remains Singapore’s second-biggest export market, and Singapore is one of China’s principal foreign investors. However, the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague’s rejection of Chinese claims in the South China Sea have resulted in increasingly fraught diplomatic relations between the two states. Singapore was not a claimant in the recent dispute over maritime territory, but recent remarks relating to the ruling seem to have perturbed China and raised concerns in Beijing over how far the diplomatic relationship between Singapore and China can progress. The latest salvo in this diplomatic scuffle involves Singapore’s ambassador to China, Stanley Loh, and the hawkish Chinese Global Times. Mr. Loh recently charged the Global Times with “false and unfounded” reporting in response to a recent article lambasting Singapore for pursuing the inclusion of the disputed waters issue in a joint statement following last week’s Non-Aligned Movement summit in Venezuela. Mr. Loh’s statement prompted a public response from both the Global Times and China’s foreign affairs ministry, revealing a growing rift the relationship between the two states. Bonus: Something’s fishy at Tokyo’s new Tsukiji market. Plans to relocate the famous Tsukiji wholesale fish, fruit, and vegetable market, a well-known tourist landmark and stalwart Tokyo institution since 1935, ground to a halt this week because of environmental health concerns. In 2001, Tokyo’s governor initiated plans to move the market to a nearby location and build a new facility that could better handle the nearly two thousand tons of fish that the market processes daily. The facility was scheduled to open this November, but trace amounts of arsenic and benzene were recently found in underground water samples at the new site, likely remnants of the Tokyo Gas plant that operated there for over thirty years. The metropolitan government has already spent over $800 million on soil decontamination during construction, but these new pollutants—which could potentially leach toxic gases into the new buildings—accumulated in locations that had not been properly covered by clean soil as the project planners intended. An environmental assessment of the site will likely take until February 2017, so the old Tsukiji market is here to stay at least for now.

This post was coauthored with Brad Glosserman, executive director at Pacific Forum CSIS. The first nine months of 2016 have been very good for Japan-South Korea relations. In addition to the conclusion of the comfort women agreement at the end of December 2015, the two countries have reached several other bilateral economic and security agreements. This progress and the routinization of Cabinet-level exchanges since last year make clear that their relationship has bottomed out and that pragmatic considerations are prevailing over ideological or political concerns. Credit for that progress goes to constituencies in each country committed to rebuilding the bilateral relationship. Trends in the geopolitical environment have also underscored the advantages of cooperation—and the very real costs of a failure to do so. Unfortunately, however, both domestic political factors and that same geopolitical context will constrain additional progress for now. It is therefore incumbent on both governments and supporters of closer Japan-Korea ties to safeguard the gains that have been made while working against possibly growing resistance to moving the relationship forward. Last year ended on a high note when the governments of Japan and South Korea announced agreement to formally resolve the comfort women issue. Japan would offer an apology and acknowledgement of the imperial government’s role in the suffering of the comfort women and offer one billion yen (approximately $9.7 million) to establish a fund that would offer payments to surviving comfort women, their families, and for “projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women.” In exchange, Seoul would consider the issue “finally and irreversibly” settled, and both governments pledged to refrain from criticizing each other regarding comfort woman issues in international settings including the United Nations. In addition, Seoul would “strive to resolve” the issue of the comfort woman statue located in front of the permanent site of the embassy of Japan in Seoul by “consulting with related organizations about possible ways of addressing the issue,” including the possibility of moving the statue to another location. Significantly, the agreement has generated a sense of common purpose, however limited, between Seoul and Tokyo. The absence of an agenda for cooperation had hampered cooperation as well as communication between the two governments, especially at the highest levels. As a result of the comfort woman agreement, the Healing and Reconciliation Foundation has been established, over three-quarters of the surviving comfort women have agreed to receive compensation from the fund, and Japan has sent money to enable the foundation to make payments to victims and their families. This cooperation has lessened but not yet overcome skepticism in South Korea and Japan that the agreement would be fully implemented. That agreement has been adopted alongside a trilateral information sharing arrangement that allows the three governments to share intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction used by North Korea during a crisis. In addition, the United States, Japan, and South Korea held a trilateral missile defense exercise over the summer. The drill was especially important since it demonstrated a commitment to work together to tackle real security problems in the region—and squarely faced the sensitive and contentious issue of hard security cooperation. Finally, Tokyo and Seoul agreed to resume discussions on bilateral currency swap arrangements that had been suspended since February of 2015 as a result of the ill will that dominated the relationship. The new mood was evident in photos of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and South Korean President Park Geun-hye at their bilateral meeting at the G20 summit: the two looked noticeably more relaxed and comfortable than in any previous encounter. There are several explanations for this progress. The first driver is North Korea’s increasingly belligerent and threatening behavior. Pyongyang’s ugly rhetoric and the series of missile and nuclear tests made clear that the two countries’ interest in addressing together (and with the United States) the North Korean threat. The second factor is China. Since taking office, President Park has tried to build a relationship with Beijing that would maximize pressure on North Korea to end its provocations, abandon its nuclear weapons program, and conform to international norms and expectations. Park took considerable risks—and considerable criticism—for that effort. At times, there were fears that Seoul was abandoning its alliance with the United States and was drifting into China’s orbit. Ultimately, however, that gambit failed. Beijing proved an unreliable partner, unwilling to squeeze Pyongyang to Seoul’s satisfaction. The breaking point came when Xi Jinping failed to call Park following North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test and subsequently criticized South Korea for defending itself against the North Korean threat by agreeing to accept the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. Seoul’s disillusionment with China has smoothed the way for closer relations with Japan. The third factor is pressure that the United States applied behind the scenes to push the two countries together. While the primary responsibility for building a better relationship rests on Japan and South Korea, Washington has been instrumental in creating opportunities for dialogue and reminding the two governments of their shared interests. Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken has led a quarterly trilateral vice-ministerial dialogue among the three countries since 2015 and has laid out a rationale for a trilateral relationship that is “strategic in value…complementary in nature…[and] global in scope.” Unfortunately, however, progress is likely to stall. The first reason for pessimism is the advent of the South Korean presidential campaign. With the presidential election scheduled for December 2017, domestic politics will dominate decision-making in Seoul. The comfort women deal may become a political football in the National Assembly in the run-up to the campaign, especially as the opposition Minjoo Party tries to get a foothold by criticizing the Park administration. Although South Korean public opinion toward the comfort women agreement has softened in recent months, the Korean public has not yet been won over. Moreover, some South Korean non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that oppose the agreement continue to seek ways of mobilizing opposition to it, heightening the risk that implementation of the deal could run into political obstacles in Seoul. The second factor is Japan’s geopolitical calculus. It has long appeared that Tokyo considers the bilateral relationship with Seoul vital, but secondary. In practice, this has meant that the Abe cabinet prioritized relations with China over that with Korea; if Japan could overcome historical and territorial disputes with China, then South Korea would be obliged to follow suit. That appears to have been an accurate assessment. Now Prime Minister Abe is focused on Russia, hoping to finally resolve the Northern Territories dispute and come up with a final peace treaty to World War II. If he can square relations with Moscow and Beijing, then Seoul’s options diminish, and it will be pressed to normalize relations with Tokyo as well. The third factor is the United States. While Washington has pushed its two allies to cooperate, discussions with experts and officials indicate that both countries value their bilateral relationship, each also believes that the other should take the first steps to reconcile. Both Tokyo and Seoul also seem to believe that it does not have to do the heavy lifting on relationship tending because Washington will force the other to step up in a crisis. That could change in the event of a Trump victory in November, but even then, the Korean presidential campaign will dominate policy discussions in Seoul. The final important variable is the belief among Japanese that the problems that bedevil the relationship with South Korea reflect deep-seated beliefs that cannot be remedied by fixing a particular problem. While a joint Genron NPO Forum/East Asia Institute Poll from July 2016 shows strong improvement in both countries in their attitudes about Japan-South Korea relations, the poll also shows that South Koreans believe progress on specific issues, such as the continuing territorial dispute over the island of Dokdo/Takeshima, history textbooks, or the comfort women is necessary to improve the relationship, while most Japanese believe that the problems reflect anti-Japan education, anti-Japan media, and South Korean “aggressive anti-Japan acts over historical issues.” In other words, there are no discrete “problems” to be solved; there are systemic forces at work against the relationship, a logic that obviates the need for Japanese to take action. Consistent with this outlook is a belief among many Japanese that the best approach is to let the passage of time solve these irritants. In these circumstances, the most important near-term objective of both governments should be to protect the gains that have been made by continuing to implement existing agreements. There are two remaining issues on the agenda to be dealt with during 2016 and 2017 that will have an impact on prospects for future cooperation. First is the need for a bilateral information sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea. The agreement is primarily symbolic since a trilateral information sharing already exists among the three countries but would provide powerful symbolism of the normalization of the Korea-Japan relationship, particularly since the agreement previously failed to secure Korean domestic approval in the waning days of the Lee Myung-bak administration. Second, the Park administration will have to make a good faith effort to engage South Korean NGOs in a conversation about the relocation of the comfort woman statue. Ultimately, any effort to relocate the statue would be a test of the intensity of South Korean public opinion as well as a test of the South Korean public’s pragmatism as it thinks not only of the past, but of the future relationship with Japan. Relocation of the statue to any alternative site should involve a thoughtful process that perpetuates the memory and dignity of the comfort women while demonstrating South Korean willingness to affirm that both neighbors benefit from mutual future-oriented cooperation. South Korean and Japanese security interests continue to be inextricably linked together and to those of the United States, as they have been since the Korean War. This linkage will become even more important given the common demographic, geostrategic, and economic challenges that both countries face. Scott Snyder and Brad Glosserman are coauthors of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Delhi battles major chikungunya outbreak. Over 1,000 people have fallen ill and at least twelve have died due to a major outbreak of chikungunya in Delhi. Chikungunya, a mosquito-borne virus similar to Zika and dengue, is typically not fatal, but can cause debilitating joint pain along with fever, fatigue, and nausea. Health minister J. P. Nadda has assured the Indian public that chikungunya did not cause the fatalities, but rather exacerbated deadly illnesses that were already ailing the elderly. Of greater concern is the toll chikungunya is taking on public services, as public-sector projects have missed major deadlines due to workers falling ill and migrant laborers returning to their villages. The greater incidence of the disease has been attributed to an unusually intense monsoon season, which, combined with numerous construction projects, has created standing pools of water for mosquitoes to breed. There is no vaccine for chikungunya, and Delhi’s government-operated health facility is receiving up to 1,000 people in its fever clinic on a daily basis. 2. Forty-five legislators expelled from China’s top legislature. Forty-five deputies from Liaoning province to the National People’s Congress (NPC)—nearly half of their province’s overall delegation—were expelled this week from the country’s top legislative body. The legislators’ election was invalidated after it was found that they had engaged in bribery and vote-buying during the 2013 election. They were removed by a special session of the NPC Standing Committee, and their ejection will have both national and provincial ramifications. Many of the legislators were members of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress, from which they were also removed. This left the group without enough members to function and an interim panel was put in place instead. Speculation swirled over why the legislators were expelled at this point in time; among the popular theories were that the move was intended to discourage electoral fraud going forward, or that it was simply a further step in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s broader anticorruption campaign. 3. Duterte’s blunt remarks unnerve Asian U.S. allies. Recent anti-American remarks from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte signal a possible future break in the longstanding U.S.-Philippines relationship and a potential setback in a U.S. “pivot to Asia.” Mr. Duterte’s antagonistic remarks toward the U.S. have generated unease among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region due to what appears to be an abrupt about-face from the Philippines in the face of China’s growing influence in the region. Beijing’s attempt to undercut the July ruling of an international tribunal against Chinese claims in the South China Sea have been bolstered by Mr. Duterte’s comments. Overt examples of inflammatory remarks include Mr. Duterte stating that the Philippines would stop patrolling the South China Sea with the U.S. Navy to avoid being part of any “hostile act” toward China; calling for the departure of U.S. military advisers; and stating the intent to buy armaments from Russia and China. Official response from China has been ambiguous, with a Foreign Ministry spokesperson denying any information of advantageous terms for future arms deals with the Philippines. 4. Countries step up South China Sea joint drills. China and Russia conducted naval exercises off the coast of Guangdong province this week, the first time the countries have held their annual joint naval drills in the South China Sea. The exercises, known as Joint Sea, included anti-submarine warfare, island defense, and island-seizing operations. While Russia maintains a neutral stance on South China Sea territorial disputes, its official position that it is “counter-productive” for external parties to get involved in the conflict meshes well with China’s stance. Meanwhile, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada announced while in Washington, DC, on Thursday that the country intends to increase joint training operations with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. 5. Japanese renewables lose steam. Before the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan derived nearly 30 percent of its total electricity from nuclear power. Now, after shuttering almost all of its nuclear plants, that number has fallen to 1 percent. Under most conditions, this gap would increase demand for alternative energy sources and potentially bolster the renewable energy sector. But renewables in Japan still face an uphill battle. In particular, low worldwide oil and gas prices have kept fossil fuel imports to Japan a viable alternative to expanding the renewables sector. Locations for large hydropower projects are limited, and the solar industry has faltered because of regulatory issues and frequent bankruptcies. And although Japan’s potential for geothermal power generation is among the largest in the world, the majority of geothermal resources are located in protected national parks. At least for the time being—barring a spike in fossil fuel prices or unexpected shift in the regulatory climate—Japan’s goal to double the share of renewables in its electricity mix by 2030 seems quite a ways away. Bonus: Carcinogenic mooncake kerfuffle in Macau. This year’ Mid-Autumn Festival brought with it an unusual health scare: carcinogenic mooncakes. These mooncakes, which came from Hong Kong’s Hang Heung bakery and were sold in a four-star hotel in Macau, were found to contain 8.43 micrograms per kilogram of aflatoxin B1, a chemical believed to be cancerous. A sample in Hong Kong was also found to have high aflatoxin B1 levels. The amounts of aflatoxin B1 found in the mooncakes exceeded the allowed level in Macau, but not in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, this isn’t the first time food safety concerns have tainted mooncakes: in 2014, concerns emerged that gutter oil had been used in the pastries sold by Maxim’s bakery in Hong Kong. Harmful ingredients aren’t the only health concern associated with these treats, either. As a columnist from the South China Morning Post aptly observed, it’s the calories, sugar, and fat in the cakes, not their carcinogens, that should be provoking worry.

Here is a quick round-up of this week’s technology headlines and related stories you may have missed: 1. Is the IANA transition going off the rails? The U.S. Department of Commerce notified the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) that it might extend the IANA functions contract beyond its expiry date at the end of September. As part of the IANA transition process (covered extensively here, here and here), the Department of Commerce planned on permanently transferring the IANA functions to ICANN, whose management of those functions would be overseen by the global multistakeholder internet community, by October 1. Commerce gave no reason for the delay, but it is widely believed that some legal and ICANN accountability issues need to be ironed out before the transition can take place. The delay is giving longtime transition opponents, such as U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, more time to drum up support against the transition though it’s hard to see how they will succeed given that arcane internet governance discussions generally draw more yawns than excitement amongst elected officials. 2. Domo Arigato Mr. Brexit. Last weekend, the Japanese foreign ministry published an open letter to the United Kingdom and the European Union, in which Japan expressed concerns about Brexit’s potential to interrupt data flows across the English Channel. Their concerns are warranted. With the UK’s anticipated exit from the European Union, the country may pull out from the bloc’s data protection rules and some observers have questioned whether Brussels would consider the UK’s data protections adequate should Brexit happen. The Japanese foreign ministry’s letter calls for negotiations on data transfers between the UK and EU to be transparent to reduce uncertainty for Japanese businesses, and urges the two parties “to maintain…free transfer of data.” While a public letter of this sort is a rather unusual move for the foreign ministry, it underscores the potential impact of a halt in data flows on the 1,400 Japanese firms operating in the United Kingdom. 3. European Union rumored to extend telecoms regulation to messaging apps. According to Reuters, the European Union is set to unveil a reform of its telecommunication regulations next week that will extend some provisions to "over-the-top" players--industry lingo for apps and services that use the internet to deliver content.  Specifically, companies like Facebook, Microsoft and Google will be required to report security breaches that affect their operations "without undue delay" to national authorities and internet telephony services, like Skype or Viber, will need to provide support for 911 calls (or 112 calls as they’re known in Europe). As with all proposed EU directives, the final regulatory language will need to be negotiated between the European Commission, Parliament and Member States meaning that it might change significantly as it moves through the legislative process. Silicon Valley’s increased lobbying presence in Brussels might have a role to play in shaping the law’s outcome. According a Google regulatory filing, the search giant spent over 15 percent more in lobbying in 2015 than it did in 2014.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. North Korea conducts fifth nuclear test. Pyongyang celebrated the sixty-eighth anniversary of the country’s founding today by conducting its fifth and largest nuclear test. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK claims that the nuclear warhead “has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets,” and that the DPRK can now produce “a variety of smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power.” South Korean President Park Geun-hye has condemned Kim Jong-un’s “fanatic recklessness,” and U.S. President Barack Obama says that Pyongyang’s actions will have “serious consequences.” China, North Korea’s major economic partner and ally, firmly opposes the nuclear test and urges Pyongyang to refrain from further provocative activities. When asked whether Beijing will take specific measures in response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterates its commitment to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserving regional stability. The UN Security Council has announced an emergency meeting to address the nuclear test. 2. Zika debuts in Southeast Asia. Malaysia confirmed its first case of the Zika virus in a twenty-seven-year-old pregnant woman on Wednesday. The Malaysian health ministry is uncertain how exactly she acquired the virus, given that her husband works in neighboring Singapore and the two live in a city close to the border. It is possible that the woman was either bitten by an infected mosquito in Malaysia or that the virus was transmitted sexually by her husband, who has also shown symptoms of Zika. Roughly 200,000 Malaysians make the daily commute to Singapore, which has reported 292 cases in a span of just over one week. The Singaporean government initially responded by isolating Zika-positive patients, but decided to terminate the practice since roughly 80 percent of cases are asymptomatic. Singapore’s warm and humid climate, along with its high population density, make it an ideal locale for the Zika-spreading Aedes aegypti mosquito. The outbreak will likely take a serious toll on Singapore’s economy as officials anticipate a downturn in tourism and local consumption. 3. China pledges to respond to Kyrgyz embassy attack. New information has emerged on last week’s car bombing at the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security identified the attackers as Uighurs linked to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and said the bombing had been called for and supported by people linked to the Nusra front, which operates in Syria. The driver of the car was a Uighur who held a passport from Tajikistan, and an Uzbek national was also implicated. In addition, five Kyrgyz nationals were detained and warrants have been issued for two Turkish residents. Responding to the updates on the attacks, foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying noted that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement had previously conducted attacks against China, and vowed to “firmly strike against them.” As Hua implied, the bombing will likely accelerate China’s counterterrorism efforts. The attack also renews concerns about the security of Chinese nationals and investments in Central Asia, including new projects under the Belt and Road initiative, as well as connections between Uighur groups and terrorist organizations in Syria or other parts of the Middle East. 4. Japan to provide patrol vessels to Philippines. In a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced an agreement for Tokyo to provide more ships to Manila. Japan had previously supplied the Philippines with ten ships, the first of which were delivered in August. The recent announcement includes two ninety-meter vessels—comparable to the largest ships in Japan’s own coastguard fleet—and a loan of up to five used TC-90 surveillance planes. As the Philippines continues to wrangle with China over disputed maritime claims, the Tokyo-Manila deal illustrates the Pacific trend toward increasingly bigger coastguard vessels—valuable additions to more traditional naval vessels due to their ability to deter rivals with lesser risk of military escalation. The new deal could also be construed as an attempt by Japan to increase security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and their aggregate naval resources to better counterbalance Chinese strength in the Pacific. Despite no direct stake in the South China Sea disputes, which has embroiled China and many Southeast Asian nations, Japan remains largely reliant on trade dependent on free passage through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Japan and China also still remain at odds over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and continue to have stand-offs between Japanese coast guard and Chinese fishing vessels. By supporting the Philippines and other regional states, it is possible that Japan hopes to build a unified front against Chinese actions and thus fortify its own security. 5. U.S. covert war legacy troubles Laos. Laos, a country of around 7 million, faces continued strife from unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from Washington’s covert war in the region. In the years since Laos was pounded by B-52 bombers in the 1960s and 1970s, the damage from accidents involving UXO illustrates how history might prove to be a stumbling block for U.S. attempts to “pivot to Asia.” Laos, a poor country with little international recognition, is estimated to have suffered the heaviest per capita bombing in history due to the U.S. covert war against the North Vietnamese–backed Pathet Lao communists. President Obama, in his visit to Laos this week, stated that the United States “did not acknowledge” the war in Laos “at the time.” In his speech, Mr. Obama also declared that the United States would contribute an extra $90 million for ordnance clearance in Laos and assistance for victims over the next three years. U.S. aid over two decades of around $100 million has lessened bomb casualty rates from a high of hundreds a year, but a significant number of Laotians continue to be killed or injured by UXO. The additional U.S. funding will hopefully facilitate a closer look at how pervasive the problem of UXO is across the nation. This, however, is a daunting task: mine-clearing agencies estimate that over 270 million bombs were dropped on the country between 1964 and 1973, and approximate that as many as a third did not explode. Bonus: Luxury comes to Myanmar. Six years ago, one newspaper editor described Yangon, the former capital of Myanmar, as a “crumbling colonial relic.” Today, luxury brands are creeping in to peddle their wares to the city’s wealthy tourists and emerging upper class. Since 2012, when the government relaxed automobile import regulations, Jaguar, BMW, and Mercedes opened up showrooms. Swiss watch boutiques sprang up in upscale hotels, and retail space blossomed. But the Burmese economy is one of contradiction: well-heeled drug lords and former military leaders control a $30-billion-a-year jade trade while per capita GDP is below $2,000 and half of the rural population lives in poverty. As political and economic reforms begin to reshape the country in the coming years, the size of its economy and number of ultra-rich are both predicted to skyrocket—and those with newly greased palms are eager to show off their wealth. But will Myanmar’s citizens at large enjoy the riches, or will a resource curse beset them first?

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. North Korean missile test facilitates China-Japan-South Korea talks. Earlier this week, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida hosted a two-day meeting with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts. The first since March 2015, the talks were slated to focus on increasing regional cooperation; however, North Korea’s Wednesday test of a submarine-launched missile dominated news coverage of the meeting and elicited wholesale criticism from all three foreign ministers. The talks come at a time of increasing tensions between the three states. China and Japan continue to be at odds over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, with Japan lodging numerous official protests in response to a surge in Chinese vessels in the contested waters. Warming relations between China and South Korea were disrupted by the THAAD missile defense shield which was lambasted by China as a U.S.-led move to counter Chinese power. Japan and South Korea have had a historically acrimonious relationship and continue to squabble over sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. However, the North Korean threat may continue to facilitate more unity in China-Japan-South Korea relations as the unilateral criticism of North Korean missile tests continues. 2. UN advisor warns against China’s crackdown on dissent.  Philip Alston, special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights for the United Nations, has expressed strong criticism of Beijing’s repression of personal liberties. Alston experienced harsh restrictions during his mission to China, including government approval for all meetings with private individuals. He was also informed that all academics contacted by the UN were “advised that they should be on vacation.” The mission’s primary purpose was to evaluate China’s progress in fulfilling promises made in 2001 when it ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Alston’s end-of-mission statement lauds China’s achievements in extreme poverty alleviation in recent years, but he argues that the Xi government’s domination of all legal apparatuses has left no avenue for the public to express any grievances. Xi Jinping has encouraged the Communist Party to envelop all elements of Chinese society, emphasizing party ideology and economic development over freedom of expression and public accountability—demonstrated by its widespread crackdown on journalists, academics, and foreign nongovernmental organizations. 3. Kofi Annan selected to head Myanmar commission on Rohingya. For generations, Rohingya Muslims have lived in the area comprised by Myanmar’s Rakhine state but continue to suffer human rights violations due to their persistent perceived status as outsiders. While about one-third of the population of Rakhine are Rohingya Muslims, they are denied citizenship in Myanmar and endure discrimination from the Buddhist majority. Since 2012, when violent clashes erupted in Rakhine between Buddhists and Muslims, thousands of Rohingya have fled violent persecution. Many Rohingya, while seeking refuge in other Southeast Asian countries, have died or fallen victim to human trafficking. Around 125,000 Rohingya remain displaced and live in squalid refugee camps. A newly sanctioned advisory panel, organized by the Myanmar government and to be led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, will attempt to find “lasting solutions” to the continuing acrimony in Rakhine. The inclusion of foreigners on the advisory panel, consisting of three international and six national experts, appears to recognize international criticism of the way the previous military government and Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration have both handled the issue. The commission is scheduled to convene its first meeting on September 5th in Yangon, Myanmar, and submit its final report and recommendations in the second half of 2017. 4. Draft commercial surrogacy law approved in India. The federal cabinet in India approved a draft law that bans commercial surrogacy. Instead, it will be replaced by a system in which surrogacy can only be done by a close relative of a couple seeking a child on a voluntary and unpaid basis. To hire a surrogate, a couple would also need to have medical evidence of infertility and have been married for five or more years. Proposed rules in the past had limited who could hire a surrogate by restricting foreigners, singles, and gay couples, a stance reiterated in the new bill. Women will now also only be allowed to act as a surrogate one time. India hosts more than two thousand commercial surrogacy clinics and some argue that regulating the market would be better than banning it outright, as the latter could lead to a surrogacy black market. Although India legalized commercial surrogacy in 2002, recent scandals surrounding the abandonment of surrogate-born children and concern about women’s exploitation has led many nations, including Nepal and Thailand, to ban the practice. As a result, the surrogacy market is now shifting to Cambodia. India’s ban, which still needs to be passed by parliament and will not be implemented for another ten months, is likely to accelerate this shift. 5. Burmese quake damages at least 185 historic temples. On Wednesday afternoon, a 6.8-magnitude earthquake shook central Myanmar, killing three people and damaging at least 185 historic Buddhist pagodas. Luckily, initial reports suggest that the collapsed material is mostly modern additions to the pagodas, and not the original structures themselves. The famed brick towers, which date back as far as the eleventh century, make up many of the 2,500 Buddhist monuments in Bagan, Myanmar’s ancient capital. All together they comprise one of the world’s greatest archaeological sites. Bagan was also Aung San Suu Kyi’s first destination outside of Yangon—for a personal pilgrimage—after being released from house arrest in 2010. Although some locals expressed concern that the damage would deter tourists and endanger the livelihoods of villagers, it seems unlikely that the damage is extensive enough to do so. Myanmar’s tourism sector is booming, growing from around 1 million international visitors in 2012 to up to 6 million by the end of this year. Bonus: China’s economy wins big in Rio. Although China’s overall performance at this year’s Olympic Games in Rio was unexpectedly lackluster, the Chinese economy definitely took home the gold. The world’s largest manufacturer—over ten thousand miles away from Brazil—produced hundreds of thousands of Chinese-made items for the event: brand-new railway cars, official uniforms, stuffed mascots, volleyball equipment, and air conditioning for the main Olympic stadium, among many other things. Chinese mosquito nets in particular, used as a preventive measure against the Zika virus, were also popular among both Chinese and foreign athletes. Now, at least one Chinese e-commerce site is advertising “Olympic” mosquito nets featuring an image of a happy Chinese gymnast sitting inside one. By 2025, Chinese leaders hope the “Made in China” moniker will signify innovation, efficiency, and quality—but even without that golden reputation, the world still seems very eager to buy Chinese products.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Ayumi Teraoka is research associate for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. When I ask my American friends what the most memorable world event from their childhood is, they tell me it is 9/11. For me, born and raised in Japan, it is something altogether different—Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea in 2002. I was a six-grader when I saw Koizumi travel to Pyongyang, shake hands with Kim Jong-il, and bring home five Japanese who had been kidnapped from our coasts decades ago. I could not fully appreciate the meaning of this event until later, but I remember the excitement in Japan and felt that I had witnessed a historic moment. This excitement that history was being made in our time seemed amplified against the backdrop of the rather-depressing Japan that I lived in as a child. I spent my entire childhood and teenage years in what is often called as Japan’s “lost-decades,” the period after Japan’s economic bubble burst and the Cold War ended. Japan’s economy showed only signs of stagnation, and the rapidly changing security environment presented challenges that many “grown-ups” seemed to have a hard time solving. I often heard older Japanese talk with nostalgia about how they missed “Japan’s good old days” and how they felt sorry for us, younger Japanese, for not being able to experience those better days. Conversations were all about the past, and according to them, tomorrow would almost inevitably be worse than yesterday. This is why Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was so memorable, as it showed that political action can change the way we think about our future and our expectations of diplomacy. Koizumi’s populist leadership sent a strong message that we, who live today, own our politics and that better days could be ahead for us, despite what many older Japanese say. This is how the debate over our constitution, and the possibility of revision, resonates with me. Japan’s debate over our current constitution is a prime example of how shaky our sense of ownership is over our political future. Some, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, say it is crafted by the Americans and therefore illegitimate. Some think it is simply too old and therefore irrelevant. Others say it is this constitution that has been the foundation of our postwar Japanese identity and thus is something we should be proud of and protect. Some say it is valuable regardless of its origin since Article Nine has helped prevent Japan from being entrapped in unwanted conflicts abroad. I believe all of these views are true to some extent. I am proud of the peace constitution that holds up the universal values of human rights and renounces war as means of solving disputes. I also like the Machiavellian way of viewing the constitution as a strategic shield for Japan to avoid sending troops to unwanted wars abroad. Yet I am also frustrated at how much time our Diet members spend trying to “make sense” of Article Nine, rather than employing a more straightforward approach to thinking about our security needs or simply rewriting it to get rid of the ambiguity. I am not bothered by why people like or dislike our current constitution. Rather, I am uncomfortable with the fact that few Japanese, including me, feel that we fully own the constitution. It is as if there is always one or two asterisk(s) qualifying our views on our constitution (e.g. it was created by American amateurs; the cabinet can reinterpret the constitution whenever convenient; or most constitutional scholars think the Self Defense Force is unconstitutional.) Yet even if we think there is a problem with the current constitution, we leave it untouched while adding even more asterisks. And because we, the Japanese people, have never been presented with an opportunity to express our will—either to amend or protect it as is—for almost seven decades, it remains unclear whether this constitution (including its asterisks) was maintained by the choice of contemporary Japanese. National elections have never focused on this question of amending the constitution, and until recently, our parliament has never secured the requisite two-thirds majority to even ask for national referendum on revision proposals. This perception that the constitution cannot be touched only limits people’s ability to think beyond what they take for granted. We, the Japanese, have not been able to think of an alternative future, one that we envision. Instead, we defer our problems today to others, including our powerful ally, the United States, or to next generations of Japanese who have yet to be born. I believe we can strengthen our democracy in Japan by claiming ownership for our constitution regardless of its deficiencies. It is only with this sense of ownership that our democracy can mature, and we can take the responsibility for what we have chosen. This is why I think the process of national referendum for constitutional revision is meaningful, as it makes clear that the Japanese people approve the constitution. It will be the people of Japan who own the constitution rather than a group of politicians or a loud vocal minority. Of course, there is always the danger of deferring important decisions to a national referendum. Popular sentiment rather than professional policy expertise may not always lead to rational choices, as the UK referendum on Brexit may have shown. Voters may regret the decisions they have made. But that, in itself, is an important process for a democracy. And this is why it is critical that politicians discuss openly possible revised drafts or amendments for our constitution and explain them thoroughly to the Japanese people before offering choices in a national referendum. Japan faces a series of difficult challenges in the years ahead—aging population, slow economic growth, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arsenal, and an increasingly assertive China. The world too faces complex security challenges ranging from the return of great power competition to newer threats like terrorism and pandemics. As our constitution determines the range of decisions we can make to deal with those issues, it is time we debate what future we might envision under what type of constitution. And after going through these deliberations thoroughly, regardless of whether or not we actually end up revising it, we must fully consider our constitution as our own and take responsibility for all of its contents—including its asterisks.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Indonesia sinks illegal fishing boats. In a move intended to assert sovereignty over resource-rich waters surrounding the Natuna Islands off the Borneo coast, Indonesia sank sixty boats impounded for illegal fishing. While Indonesia has no official territorial disputes with China, the exponential increase in the Chinese fishing fleet (instigated by increasing domestic appetite and state subsidies) and the decreasing fish supply in Chinese coastal waters have resulted in heightened confrontations between Chinese fishing vessels and Indonesian coast guard vessels. Chinese activities in the Natuna Islands area has raised fears that Beijing is attempting to expand its influence through its fishing fleet rather than official naval vessels in the oil- and gas-rich area as a more cost-effective approach. Beijing has in the past described the area around the Natunas as a historical fishing ground, even though it lies almost 1,250 miles from the Chinese coastline and within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Not including the sixty ships scuttled this Wednesday, Indonesia has previously sunk more than 170 fishing vessels impounded for illegal fishing. Jakarta has emerged to take the hawkish lead on maritime security within the ASEAN regional community and has recently agreed to joint patrols with Malaysia and the Philippines. 2. China sees major uptick in cardiovascular disease.  A study published this week from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health shows that China is currently facing an epidemic of cardiovascular disease that is likely to worsen over the course of the next two decades due to increased incidence of high blood pressure and obesity. Data was collected from 26,000 people throughout nine provinces from 1991 through 2011, and the researchers attributed observed trends to changing lifestyles accompanying China’s rapid economic development. The authors note that in 1979, around the time the Chinese government began to open its economy, the prevalence of high blood pressure was 7.7 percent; by 2010, it had risen to 33.5 percent, a rate comparable to that of American adults. In fact, 44 percent of the 6.8 million deaths among Chinese above the age of 35 were related to heart disease. Contributing societal changes associated with China’s urbanization and industrialization include a major shift to “Western” diets—with greater consumption of red meat, sugary drinks, and salty foods—as well as decreased physical activity and high rates of smoking. 3. Japan plans new long-range missiles. After months of tension between Beijing and other Asia-Pacific states over disputed territorial claims, Japan has announced its intention to develop a new tactical ballistic missile. The new surface-to-ship missile will be the longest-range missile ever built by Japan, and is allegedly aimed at countering Chinese military strategy regarding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Persistent tensions between Beijing and Tokyo most recently made news when Tokyo lodged a diplomatic protest with Beijing over the exponential increase in Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing ships around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, in addition to another protest lodged last week. The new missile system, properly positioned in places such as the Okinawan island of Miyako, would work to discourage Chinese naval aggression due to its long-range (300 km) capability. Japan’s move to develop these new missiles is not unanticipated given the China-centric 2013 revisions to the National Defense Program Guidelines, which called for a bolstering of Japanese island defenses and a strengthening of domestic military equipment development process. An August 14th report stated that the new missile system has an expected deployment date of 2023. This announcement was made amidst reports that China, Japan, and South Korea are considering a meeting of their respective foreign ministers despite tensions between the countries. The meeting is projected to lay the foundation for a three-way summit that will discuss the resolution of regional issues, such as the threat posed by North Korea’s plutonium processing. 4. North Korea resumes plutonium production. On Wednesday, in its first-ever response to a foreign media inquiry, North Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute confirmed that the country had resumed plutonium production for nuclear arms. The plutonium is gathered from spent fuel from a reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which Pyongyang shuttered in 2007 and restarted sometime before last year. The Institute also asserted that North Korea will not discontinue nuclear tests—the fourth of which took place in January—as long as perceived threats from the United States remain. A U.S. Department of State spokesman called the report “a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions which prohibit such activities,” and suggested that North Korea’s escalatory actions would only further steel international resolve to counter them. But given that the United Nations has already enacted its strongest sanctions yet against North Korea, it is unclear if any amount of pressure from international players, besides China, will have any hope of changing North Korea’s tack. 5. Beijing police permitted to use weapons to defend doctors. The Beijing municipal government announced this week that police there are now permitted to use weapons to defend medical professionals from attacks by patients. The new measure is part of a year-long campaign aimed at reducing hospital violence, a widespread occurrence in the country. Many patients, unsatisfied with their treatment, growing medical costs, overcrowding, or corruption in hospitals, have responded by attacking doctors; some attacks have even been fatal. According to one study, nearly 60 percent of Chinese medical staff have been verbally abused and 13 percent have suffered physical assault by patients. In 2014, Beijing hospitals made plans to recruit 1,500 “guardian angel” volunteers to mediate tense doctor-patient relations in order to prevent violence against staff. Sadly, it seems divine intervention was not enough to keep doctors safe. Bonus: Kurds struggle for acceptance in Japan. Refugee status has never been given to a Kurd living in Japan, but that has not deterred those seeking asylum. Approximately 1,200 Kurds live in two of Tokyo’s northern suburbs. While they are often not authorized for employment and on temporary six-month permits, many Kurds work in the construction industry, which is increasingly reliant on foreign labor. A number of Kurds have also assisted with earthquake-relief projects. However, gaining acceptance in Japan is challenging since the country is known for its reluctance to accept immigrants. In 2015 alone, over 7,500 people sought refugee status in Japan but just twenty-seven received it. Currently, non-Japanese make up a mere 2 percent of the country’s population, although demographic pressures may force the adoption of a more accommodating immigration stance. The country does have a burgeoning Muslim population, though, which is estimated to have grown from just over 5,000 in the mid-1980s to as large as 70,000 to 80,000 in recent years. Other tensions have trailed the Kurds as well, including clashes with Turks living in Japan during the 2015 Turkish elections.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Masatoshi Asaoka is currently a master’s candidate in the Asian studies program of Georgetown University and an intern for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Since coming to intern at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) this summer, I have been exposed to Japan’s constitutional debate and how my government has interpreted the constitution. During my internship, I read through innumerable pages of Diet debate over the meaning of collective self-defense and compiled polling data on public sentiments about the constitution. My research at CFR made me think about our past political discourse in Japan, and more importantly, about how the Japanese people can shape our future constitutional debate. I became more aware of the debate on constitutional revision when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his cabinet made the decision to reinterpret the constitution in July 2014 and permit the use of force with other countries if it is in Japan’s security needs. Those who supported the Abe cabinet’s decision to reinterpret the constitution argued that it was necessary because the security environment surrounding Japan is rapidly changing. Yet many opposed the cabinet decision and massive protests were held in front of the Diet building. Far from Tokyo, Takeshi Onaga became the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, winning by a landslide in November 2014, by opposing the Japanese government’s plan to build a new U.S. Marine base there. Both Tokyo’s protestors and Governor Onaga shared the belief that their democratic rights had been infringed upon by the national government because of decisions made against their will. In the midst of all this protest in Tokyo, I went to Okinawa for ten days to see the base problem from the other side. I visited the Peace Memorial Museums in Itoman City; prayed for those who felt forced to commit suicide in underground caves in World War II, called gama in Okinawan dialect; and talked to local activists over awamori, Okinawa’s famous distilled rice wine. I found this distrust of the Japanese government’s aims is deeply embedded in Okinawa’s bloody history, from the invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the early seventeenth century to the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 that led to the U.S. military landing. But there is more to their protests than history. The people in Okinawa who oppose having U.S. bases on their island feel their voices do not reach far enough to impact political decisions in Tokyo. Not everyone in Okinawa is against hosting the U.S. bases, and there are times when Tokyo officials have compromised with Okinawan protestors. One such compromise was the 1996 agreement between Tokyo and Washington to relocate the U.S. Marines from Futenma Air Base, located in densely populated Ginowan City.[1] Yet recent protests reveal a sense of neglect in Okinawa. A similar sense of neglect seems evident in the popular protests against the new security legislation last September. While Diet members deliberated, the scale of the protests outside continued to grow as more Japanese felt dissatisfied that their voices were not being heard by the government. We must avoid this neglect of popular opinion if we are to debate our constitution. Although revisions of our constitution must be approved through a national referendum, the prior debate about what needs to be revised is just as important to the revision process. Our voices must also be included in that conversation about what must—or must not—be changed. For example, we should proactively discuss what principles represent Japanese tradition and what sort of rights are fundamental to Japanese citizens. There is much to be learned from our debates over the Okinawa bases and over the new security laws. We should no longer leave issues of the constitution to the government to decide or reinterpret, as they may not always represent the wills of people as shown last summer when the government passed the highly unpopular security legislation. Typically, when people from opposing sides of Japan’s political spectrum discuss the constitution, particularly Article Nine, conservatives tend to talk about strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and how to cope with emerging threats, whereas liberals prefer to focus on war memory and the need to protect our postwar pacifism. Rather than dividing ourselves into pro or con positions on constitutional revision, however, we must find a more constructive way to find common ground. We must also think about what kind of country the Japanese people want to leave to our future generations. By focusing on our country’s future, we should be able to talk with each other no matter how different our views or interests may be. The Japanese people, from the right and from the left, conservatives and liberals, need to talk about what kind of Japan we want to have in ten, fifty, even a hundred years from now. Rather than seeing the Upper House election results in terms of either a constitutional crisis or as a long sought opportunity for change, we should note that increasing numbers of Japanese seem to favor a national debate. This is an opportunity for a broad conversation, not simply a conversation that will take place among opposing parties in the Diet. We must talk about our security options as well as what Article Nine means to the Japanese people and their national identity. All Japanese should acknowledge that they have an important voice in the shaping of Japanese identity, and should commit to having a constructive and respectful debate about our country’s constitution. The only way democracy can thrive in Japan is through greater debate and increase understanding across political lines between the conservatives and liberals. Our constitution should not be reduced to a pro- or con- position; rather a debate over the constitution should be perceived of as a discussion on Japan’s future. While I may sound idealistic, I am not. My hope is that our country can focus on the real problems Japan is now facing or may face in the near future. There are many challenges ahead of us: economic competition with the emerging markets in our neighboring countries, rising conventional and unconventional security threats, demographic decline, and so on. Japan’s citizens must see themselves as partners with their government in decision making over the revision of their constitution. The entire process of deliberating whether to revise our constitution, no matter what the outcome, must be inclusive. Citizens should not feel left out, while our legislators and government discuss our future. Like protesters in Tokyo and Okinawa, we should not feel as if our government refuses to listen to our wishes. Recently, Prime Minister Abe announced that his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, will not initiate a debate over constitutional revision based on their party’s draft, which has not gained much popularity. This gives the public a chance to take the lead in setting the tone of our national debate. Our government needs to carefully listen to public opinion beyond the election season and work together to craft a new basis for our debate over Japan’s constitution. Our society can only be strengthened if we take pride in our democracy and as citizens, claim our right to shape its future. [1] Today, many protestors in Okinawa oppose the Henoko relocation plan, a plan to relocate Futenma Air Base to Henoko, Nago City located in the northern part of Okinawa.

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution. Keigo Komamura, a Japanese constitutional scholar, is professor of law and vice president of Keio University. He serves on the advisory council for the constitutional revision research project led by Helen Hardacre, Reischauer Institute professor of Japanese religions and society at Harvard University. His most recent publication is an edited volume with Satoshi Machidori, Kenpou kaisei no hikaku seijigaku [Comparative Politics of Constitutional Revision], published by Koubundou Press in 2016.  The Unbearable Lightness of Our Constitution by Keigo Komamura In July 2014, Abe changed the long-held government interpretation of the constitution to allow for the limited exercise of the right to collective self-defense, and in September of the following year, his government presented ten bills to the Diet to revise our security policy accordingly. In addition, the prime minister declared that by winning the Upper House elections this July, he will take concrete steps toward amending our constitution. Specifically, the prime minister seeks to introduce a contingency clause. I believe that the Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of the constitution to allow the collective self-defense and his introduction of a contingency clause are not only questionable in terms of their constitutionality, but they are not rational as policy choices either. Yet foreign experts, upon seeing these actions, may see these acts as justifiable and may not understand why so many in Japan have protested against the Abe cabinet’s approach, perceiving it as destroying the spirit of our constitution and even our constitutionalism. I do not reject the idea of constitutional revision as a whole, as I will describe later. However, I cannot be optimistic about the Abe cabinet’s constitutional policies. While for those who are interested in Japan or East Asia, each of these measures may seem commonplace at first glance, but to get at the real meaning behind his comprehensive effort at reforming Japan, reforms he describes as “breaking away from the postwar regime,” we scholars must explain why we are lamenting the “unbearable lightness of our constitution.” To do this, we must look at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s overall effort to revise the constitution. The draft constitution announced by the LDP in 2012 is crucial. It is easily apparent from reading it that the LDP aims for full rather than partial revision of our constitution. But even this is not accurate. The draft does not simply want to revise or rewrite the language of our current constitution. It aims to replace it. In other words, the LDP draft breaks from the fundamental legitimacy of our current constitution, replacing it with a completely different document. It is not like a remake of an old movie like Batman that is premised on the same story. This is not a remake of our constitution—a Japanese constitution “returns,” or Japanese constitution “forever,” or a Japanese constitution “begins.” It is a completely different story. So, what is so different about this LDP draft? If the LDP draft were to become the new constitution, three fundamental words in our current constitution would disappear. I will not go through the importance of each, but to be concise I will cut to the conclusion. These words are “individual,” “humanity,” and “universal principles.” These phrases of course represent the values at the core of freedom and equality, the two principles Western modern philosophy developed through an intense religious struggle. By recognizing that each of us has the ability to assert our rights, the “individual” was rescued from history and from the group. Beyond belonging to any one particular political collective or group, the way was opened for each of us to deliberate on our interests and policy preferences because we were given access to universal principles – we were part of a larger “humanity” and thus had a relationship through these universal principles to others who we may not even know. These are the values that have long been shared by the world’s constitutional democracies, and these are the values that are in danger of being banished from our constitution. On the other hand, the LDP draft adds new phrases not found in our current constitution. These phrases include “our long history and unique culture (nagai rekishi to koyuu no bunka),” “to protect the country and homeland with pride and spirit (kuni to kyodo wo hokori to kigai wo motte mamoru koto),” “our beautiful land (utsukushii kokudo),” and “our good traditions (yoki dentou).” These concepts cannot be found in established legal tradition, at least not in modern [constitutional] law. If I dare to be more blunt, I would say that this language is no more than a narrative attached to a very specific community with a shared, unique culture. As you may have already understood, I believe Prime Minister Abe and the LDP’s goal for Japan is to discard the legacy of modern governance and to restore a very Japanese narrative [to our constitution]. It goes without saying that narratives, unlike the law, cannot find their legitimacy [in other universal example] nor can they be advanced through deliberation. People must simply choose whether they will share this narrative or not, and if they do not, they are deprived of the right to be part of the community. Japan is not alone in this retreat to national storytelling. Recent statements by politicians in our country as well as Korea and China all reveal a willingness to break with old taboos, and indeed find some sort of heroism in not being “politically correct.” Let’s think of this as the progression of the “Trump effect.” In this tense time, why do political leaders attempt to wrap themselves in national narratives? Is it not because of Japan’s adherence to universal principles that we have the dignity to openly challenge Chinese and South Korean assertions of their own national narratives? Is it not because of our belief in the universal principles of freedom and democracy that we can openly criticize the United States for imposing their laws upon us? (This is the premise of the LDP’s position on the occupation, isn’t it?) Japan cannot be making itself the cause of regional instability of northeast Asia by competing for leadership….or can it? There are additional problems. Prime Minister Abe seems to be trying to weaken the law itself. Attempts to write the national narrative into the constitution is evidence of this. Legal scholars can all trace back to the days of Plato to find how strongly a national narrative appeals to popular sentiment. We are all aware of how easily this rhetoric can be combined and linked to nationalism. Despite the role of law in taming the power of our national tales, the LDP’s draft constitution seeks to interweave law and narrative in one document. Furthermore, it is important for the law to remain relatively autonomous from politics. Institutions that guard this autonomy, both through their knowledge of the law and their interpretation of it, are critical. Prime Minister Abe changed this when he appointed a diplomat [rather than a legal expert] as the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. He changed the university system, allowing outsiders to intervene in the selection of the president. Recently, this intervention in our universities has gone so far as to affect curriculum as the government has suggested abolishing all humanities departments. Our media has taken less and less of a role as critics of our politics and society, and even Japan’s world-class public broadcasting station is now staffed with those favored by the government. Commercial broadcasters are becoming intimidated by the government’s focus on their program content. Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Sanae Takaichi stated in a Diet session on February 8, 2016 [PDF] that if a broadcaster is becoming radical, [the government will] provide administrative guidance. She went onto say that if there is no sign of compliance, [the government] might take further actions.[1] In a speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress in April 2015, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the “rule of law” three times. However, we must not believe his words easily. A government that easily destroys the autonomy of the law and the autonomy of knowledge undermines its international credibility. Prime Minister Abe’s aim of “breaking away from our postwar regime” is, in short, a break with the current constitution of Japan. By breaking with our American made constitution, in other words, he is discarding the legitimate foundations of our shared [values] in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Yet our prime minister is like an acrobat, justifying these constitutional changes as a way to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Abe, in his books,[2] emphasized the need to rewrite the constitution from scratch. What this means is that he is willing to discard completely the carefully built legacy of Japan’s longtime ruling party, retaining neither good nor bad. I am not opposed to constitutional revision. Revising the constitution when needed is a right granted to us in Article Ninety-six. Moreover, I believe constitutional revision is the only path available if we as a nation are to fundamentally rethink our national security and seriously transform our social awareness to be grounded in realism. But revisions should be considered only after fully appreciating the intellectual legacy that created postwar Japan. There is a euphoria among LDP politicians because of their electoral success, and this euphoria has led to a clamoring for the destruction of this intellectual legacy and support for the prime minister’s [rhetorical] acrobatics. In order to continue to be intoxicated by this euphoria, these politicians want to wrap Japan in a new national narrative. I cannot think of a more dangerous thing to do than revising our constitution in such a circumstance. [1] Takaichi responded to a question asked by Souichiro Okuno from then-Democratic Party of Japan (now the Democratic Party) in a budget committee session of the House of Representatives on February 8, 2016. [2] Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has written two books: Shinzo Abe, Atarashii kuni e [Toward a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 2006), and Shinzo Abe, Atarashii kuni e: utuskushii kuni e kanzen ban [Toward a New Country: Complete Version of Toward a Beautiful Country], (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 2013).

This blog post is part of a series entitled Will the Japanese Change Their Constitution?, in which leading experts discuss the prospects for revising Japan’s postwar constitution.  Karin Koretsune is a graduate student at Japan Women’s University [Nihon Joshi Daigaku] and a member of the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy s (SEALDs).[1] She is the author of Nihon joshidaisei no yononaka wocchi [A Woman College Student’s View of Japan] (2014). A Constitution like Air by Karin Koretsune In the summer of 2015, people broke through the iron gates set up by police and occupied the front of the Diet building. Reportedly, either 100,000 or 300,000 people gathered to protest against the Abe cabinet’s security legislation that was rammed through our parliament on September 19. And on the front line of those protests stood the SEALDs. The SEALDs, the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy s, is a student-led emergency response group organized to protect a liberal and democratic Japan. It was founded on Constitution Day on May 2, 2015 with an eye toward this summer’s Upper House election. Its activities are divided into two time periods. Until the summer of 2015, we called for collaborative work among civil society groups and opposition political parties and focused our efforts on protesting against the Abe cabinet’s security legislation. After the bill was passed by the Diet, we aimed at preventing the party coalition of the LDP and the Komeito from securing the two-thirds majority of the Upper House seats in the 2016 election, and during the campaign season, members of the SEALDs gave speeches in support of candidates in heavily competitive districts. Now that our election activities are finished, the SEALDs will dissolve today, August 15. What Is SEALDs? The SEALDs does not take the form of an organization. There is no leader, and each project is run by a person who claims himself/herself to be a “sub commander,” named after Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos.[2] While there are about sixteen project teams including our demonstration team, outreach team, and design team, our work is based on the principle that “whoever has an idea takes action,” and we act fluidly. To begin with, you only need to join a group on LINE, a popular social media service in Japan, to become a member of the SEALDs. If you tire of it, you can just leave from that LINE group. Our motto for such a fluid group is “each member thinks and makes decisions independently.” As a result, no member of the SEALDs can claim to represent the SEALDs’ views on Japan’s constitution. What I can write, however, is my personal take on the effort to revise Japan’s constitution and why I joined the SEALDs. I would like to empathize this point before I go any further. My Encounter With Japan’s Constitution I first encountered Japan’s constitution when I was in the third grade. In class, I kept writing down my favorite quotes from the constitution. Back then, my homeroom class was somewhat chaotic. Our teacher was a young male teacher who always bragged about his experience of traveling across the world as part of Japan’s Peace Boat.[3] He did this at the start of each class, boring us, but more importantly taking time away from our break by going overtime each morning. He blamed us instead, saying we were just not concentrating during class. We were furious and acted out. One time, the teacher lost his temper, tackling a male student, punching and kicking him. The boy could only shout for him to stop, but to no avail. I was shocked to witness a classmate assaulted without any means of response. It was clear that a child was no match physically in a conflict with an adult. What was worse is that this violence was later treated as if it had never occurred. The teacher pretended to know nothing, and claimed the student fell on his own. School authorities believed him, and student witnesses were disregarded. I learned then that children were not given the same rights as adults; their words were not valued. I wanted to reveal the teacher’s “crime.” I thought only the law can protect us if we were to be in a closed space with the same dangerous person. I took out a small book of Japan’s six law codes and opened a page of what seems to be the section of criminal law. The book was indeed very old and was written in antiquated Japanese, which I could not read. I had almost given up when I opened the book to the front page. It was our constitution, written in contemporary Japanese, and I could read it. One article caught my eye. It said, “The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.” I got very excited. It was Article Thirty-six of the constitution. I continued reading. Article Ninety-eight read: This constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation.... And Article Ninety-nine continued, “The Emperor or the Regent…and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this constitution.” I had found what I was looking for—evidence that it was the teachers’ responsibility to see that action was taken. They had been wrong to pretend nothing had happened. The next day, I explained all the articles to my teacher, and said “Don’t you get it? What you are doing is against the constitution.” He remained silent, perhaps confused by my strange lecture. Moreover, my school was a private school, and he was not a public official. Yet I was enthralled with my encounter with our constitution. At nine years of age, I had been deeply frightened, but my confidence was restored because I knew I had the right to fight the injustice. As an individual, I had the right to reject those who sought to enforce their views on me or to act against me with violence. This encounter with the fundamental human rights guaranteed by our constitution helped me get through school after that. What Am I Against? Members of the SEALDs have various views toward the constitution and are not necessarily unanimous against revising it. In Japan, when debating whether to revise our constitution, we identify people as being in one of two factions: the pro-revision faction (Kaikenha)” or the “protect the constitution faction (Gokenha).” The SEALDs has members of both. At issue, however, is the content of our constitution. What is shared among the SEALDs members is a strong worry about the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s draft proposal and the underlying point of view it represents. I am not necessarily against revising constitution either. The procedure for revision is already embedded in the constitution so clearly when necessary, it can be revised. But we must have a rich national debate. The LDP does not like the idea of a “rich national debate.” That was evident when looking back at the passage of the security legislation, which was essentially a revision of Article Nine. All of the constitutional scholars who testified before the Diet, even including the one called in by the LDP, made clear that the bill was “unconstitutional.” Furthermore, according to media polling, over seventy percent of the public felt “it was not explained to the people sufficiently.” Normally, a bill that elicited this much concern would have been carried over to the next Diet session and debated fully. But instead the ruling coalition extended the Diet session and forcibly passed it into law as an illegitimate means. The LDP announced its draft proposal for a new constitution in 2012. Many experts have examined it, and I did too. It is evident that the public good has a bigger priority than the rights of individuals. The LDP, in its “Constitutional Revision Draft Proposal Q&A [PDF],” notes that it will “fundamentally review the writing based on the theory of natural rights of humankind,” and accordingly, their draft stated that people’s freedom, exercise of rights, and freedom of speech “shall not contradict the public and public order.” Other newly added ethical provisions, such as “A family is considered as a natural and fundamental entity of society” and “Family members shall help each other,” are also scary, especially for women. In Japan, there is still a strong belief that women should sacrifice themselves in order to raise children and help the elderly or that working women should still take primary responsibility for both their family and their work responsibilities. LDP politicians incessantly make these kinds of controversial statements. Based on these ethical provisions, the state might institutionalize these obligations as a family and impose them onto women again, despite those cares for kids and seniors should be taken on by the society. Another newly-added provision would allow our government to respond quickly to national crises also worries me. I believe this will be used to give the government complete authority without ensuring sufficient limits or oversight.  “National crises” will be determined by law, thus defined by a simple majority of Diet members. Thus the definition of what constitutes a crisis could easily change. Furthermore, this state of emergency has no time limits, making it possible for the government to assume extralegal authority for as long as it wants. Worse, this state of emergency allows the government to issue ordinances at will, limiting various individual rights. Even if the Diet disapproves them afterwards, there is no provision to repeal them. When large earthquakes hit Japan or if a terrorist attack occurs, the government should be able to act swiftly. But in Japan, there are already laws and ordinances in place that would allow this, and we should revise and update them if necessary. There is no reason to include in the constitution a new provision to give full authority to the government under crises. The constitution that the LDP aims for is far different from the constitution I relied on when I was a child. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expressed his strong desire to revise our constitution during his time in office. The SEALDs sought to prevent him from succeeding, and thus sought to prevent the ruling coalition from securing a two-thirds majority in the Upper House in the July election. With this aim, our opposition parties agreed to work together in the election, but they were not able to prevent the pro-revision candidates from securing the requisite number of seats to proceed with debate on constitutional amendment. The LDP did not campaign on revising the constitution during this election. Instead, they put forward Abenomics as their primary goal. The voters likely chose the LDP with the expectation that it will revive our economy. But, as a result, the debate on revising constitution will begin in earnest now. The Abe Cabinet will probably start gradually with innocuous provisions so that as many pro-revision Diet members as possible can agree. Our constitution is like air. We take it for granted and so cannot seem to focus on how to debate its value. I am sure many Japanese have experienced either the type of violence I witnessed in my classrooms or at least some type of unreasonable discrimination. Yet it is rare that we the Japanese translate those experiences as being related to our constitution. Even when we face a violation of our rights, many simply think of it as their own fault or responsibility and hide the experience because they are embarrassed. It is only when we become more aware of our individual rights that we will be able to embrace a discussion on constitutional revision, and claim it as our own. [1] This is the preferred translation of the organization’s name according to their official website. [2] Subcomandante Marcos led an armed uprising in Chiapas, Mexico’s southernmost province, in 1994, aiming at dramatizing bleak living conditions, poverty and alienation of Mexico’s indigenous population. [3] Peace Boat is a Japan-based international non-governmental and non-profit organization that works to promote peace, human rights, equal and sustainable development and respect for the environment. Peace Boat carries out its main activities through a chartered passenger ship that travels the world on peace voyages.

On Monday, in a ten-minute video, Japan’s emperor spoke directly to his people, asking them to allow him to give up the throne prior to his death. In the closed world of Japan’s imperial family, where the Imperial Household Agency largely manages and represents the family’s affairs, Akihito’s decision to challenge precedent seems striking. Yet he also spoke directly to the Japanese people. Now in his eighty-second year, Emperor Akihito has sat on the throne for twenty-seven years, assuming his position upon the death of his father, Emperor Hirohito, and ushering in a new era in Japan’s history. His reign is called Heisei—roughly translated as an era where peace can be realized—and yet the Heisei years have been full of change—and challenge—for the Japanese people. Under the 1947 Constitution, Japan’s emperor serves as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people,” with no direct role in political affairs. Yet he continues to act as Japan’s official head of state, welcoming all state visitors as well as all new ambassadors assigned to his country. Emperor Akihito is the second to serve in this new symbolic role. His father, the Showa Emperor, was twenty-five when he assumed the throne in 1926, and he would go on to be associated with Japan’s tumultuous years of domestic social upheaval and military expansion abroad that led to defeat and foreign occupation. Akihito in contrast has no direct personal association with the war, and by the time he assumed the role of emperor, he was a mature fifty-five. Undoubtedly, his ascension to the throne in 1989 provided him with a unique window on managing the process of succession after his father’s protracted illness and passing. In his video, the emperor spoke very personally about the challenges he sees ahead as he ages, expressing concern that he will be increasingly unable to fulfill the duties expected of him. This apparently was not a sudden decision. According to NHK coverage of Monday’s video, the emperor had expressed the idea of abdicating five years ago to the empress and to the staff of the Imperial Household Agency. Reluctantly, they have acquiesced to his wishes. Akihito and his wife, Empress Michiko, have had a decidedly postwar image. They met and married in 1959, when Japan was on the verge of the spectacular “double digit” economic growth that would catapult it to global recognition as an “economic superpower.” She is the first commoner to marry into the imperial family, and together with many Japanese families, they raised their children amidst an economically prosperous and democratic Japan. When they were crown prince and princess, the emperor and empress traveled abroad often showing the world a new, more cosmopolitan Japanese imperial family. Despite his largely ceremonial role, Emperor Akihito has been an important Japanese voice abroad. In 1992, just three years after his father’s death, he and Empress Michiko visited China undertaking the deeply sensitive task of demonstrating Japan’s desire for postwar reconciliation. The imperial couple has also visited other sites of World War II battles, including Saipan and Palau, to honor those who died in locales across the Pacific. In 1994, the couple also visited eleven American cities of the United States. As a student at Columbia University, I participated in the ceremony that welcomed then-Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko to our campus, where they spoke to us about our interests in their country. But it was their stopover in Honolulu, Hawaii, to pay their respects to those who lost their lives in World War II at Punch Bowl Cemetery, a few miles from Pearl Harbor, which drew the most attention. More recently, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko’s role in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 2011 showed just how important the imperial family is to the Japanese people. When elected officials labored to respond to the catastrophe after the earthquake, Emperor Akihito took to the airwaves to call upon the Japanese people to come together to overcome this tremendous crisis. He called on all Japanese “to work hand in hand, treating each other with compassion, in order to overcome these trying times.” Then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced rolling blackouts after the loss of power following the crippling of reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, and the emperor insisted that the imperial compound would also shut out its lights and conserve energy along with all Japanese households. In the weeks that stretched into months and then years of recovery, the imperial couple repeatedly visited the devastated Tohoku region, meeting those in shelters and temporary housing, listening to their heartbreaking stories of loss and encouraging their recovery. The emperor’s desire to step down seems a deeply personal one, and yet it opens up some thorny political questions. The role of Japan’s emperor is determined by the constitution (Article One through Eight), but the rules for succession are determined by law and thus are subject to parliamentary debate. The Imperial House Law sets forth the relationship between the imperial family and the state, the terms of their succession, and the role of the imperial institution in Japanese society. To change any of these requires new legislation and, as is the case with any government sponsored bill, would open the way for a broader and possibly contentious debate between ruling and opposition parties. Re-legislating the terms of succession, particularly now as the prime minister and others seek to consider constitutional revision, seems a delicate political task. In his brief remarks following the emperor’s video address to the nation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said he took seriously the emperor’s wishes, and noted he would take this under consideration as his government considered how to respond appropriately.  The Abe cabinet could draft a very narrow bill that speaks only to Emperor Akihito’s request to step down, or it could consider broader amendment of the succession process. Japanese government has already considered amending the law that governs the imperial family and its succession. In December 2004, an advisory committee was formed to consider “a stable succession,” bringing ten leaders together to consider the succession process. The crown prince had no male heir, and there was concern over the lack of an eligible successor. Many believed the law should be changed to allow female succession so that Princess Aiko, the daughter of the crown prince and princess, could then become Japan’s first female heir. The advisory committee report in fact argued for changing the emphasis on male primogeniture and for making it possible for a female to inherit the throne. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in his opening address to the Diet in 2006 noted his intention to submit a bill that year for deliberation, however, the next month, the palace announced the pregnancy of the crown prince’s younger brother Prince Fumihito of Akishino and his wife, Princess Kiko of Akishino. In September that year, the princess gave birth to a son, obviating the need to change the law. Emperor Akihito situates his own predicament within the larger social trends in Japan, and his statement repeatedly referenced the feelings of the Japanese people. His statement opened by acknowledging that “in the midst of a rapidly aging society…your  emperor, too, is advancing in age,” yet his message seemed to speak to a broader concern over how his family can best serve in their role as their nation’s symbol. Having watched his father’s protracted demise in 1989, and the impact that had on the day-to-day lives of many Japanese, Emperor Akihito clearly does not want to create that burden for his people. He believes the job requires a younger and fitter occupant. How this next generation might see their roles is also an important part of the story of succession. His three grown children are all married with families of their own, families not unlike those of other Japanese but for their particular role as symbols of the nation. Yet their lives are highly choreographed, and constrained. The question now is whether Japan’s political and social leaders can effectively translate their Emperor’s desire into a matter-of-fact process for succession without other political causes interceding in the debate. Both on the right and the left, constitutional scholars and others note with caution the possibility that changing the terms of succession could open the way for political influence over the imperial family. Interestingly, there seems little public inference at the moment about the danger of the imperial family asserting influence over the state. Tampering with the law makes many nervous about opening the way for larger—perhaps more conflicted—debates about social change and governance in Japan. On August 8, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga echoed the prime minister’s caution when asked about whether this would touch upon Japan’s constitution, and emphasized that the Abe cabinet did not “think that this was a constitutional issue as it did not influence nation’s governance.” Clearly, the Heisei emperor has opened up an important conversation, however gingerly managed by the government, about how to improve his family’s ability to best serve the interests of the Japanese people.