Securing Ukraine’s Future: What Should the United States Do?

With the Trump administration beginning its first one hundred days in office, Thomas Graham provides a roadmap for bringing Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table; Liana Fix underscores the importance of including Ukraine’s European allies to ensure the best possible outcome in cease-fire negotiations; Michael O’Hanlon and Paul B. Stares lay out a strategy to secure Ukraine against future Russian aggression; and Heidi Crebo-Rediker highlights the investment opportunity Ukraine presents for the United States.

This article is part of the Council Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine's Future and the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security.

Toward a Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War: Bringing Russia to the Table

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow.

President Donald Trump will find that it will take much time and effort to negotiate an end to the Russia-Ukraine war that advances U.S. interests and burnishes his reputation as a peacemaker. Because Kyiv faces deteriorating conditions, it should be easier to persuade it to negotiate seriously than it will be Russian President Vladimir Putin, who believes he is making progress toward achieving his maximal goals. The key to getting him to think otherwise is to convince him that time is not on his side. That requires action in four areas:

• articulation of a shared Western and Ukrainian vision of success;
• continued support for Ukraine’s war effort and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community;
• resistance to Russia, including targeted sanctions, ramped-up weapons production, and pressure on its partners; and
• incentives for Russia such as an offer to restore more normal diplomatic relations.

Because the Kremlin sees the war as part of a wider confrontation with the West, the settlement will have to be embedded in a discussion of European security. And that means that the main conversations will have to take place between Washington and Moscow. Because of the complexity of the issues involved, the settlement will not likely come in the form of a single agreement, but rather in a series of agreements devoted to discrete issues, negotiated at different paces over an extended period. The likely elements of a settlement include a cease-fire along the line of contact, non-bloc status for Ukraine coupled with security cooperation with the West, de facto Russian control of the Ukrainian territory it has seized, and limited sanctions relief.

Presidential engagement will be critical to success, but the hard work will have to be done by U.S. and Russian presidential envoys. The process should be initiated by a Trump-Putin phone call, followed by intense U.S. consultations with its allies and Ukraine and talks between the Russian and U.S. envoys, with the goal of agreeing on the conditions for a cease-fire and a roadmap for an enduring settlement. Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would endorse the cease-fire and roadmap at a summit, and Putin would add his endorsement at a subsequent summit with Trump.

To bring Putin to the negotiating table in good faith, the Trump administration should complete the following sequence of actions:

• Shortly after inauguration, President Trump calls President Putin to underscore his desire to restore normal diplomatic relations and resolve the Russia-Ukraine war. He expresses his hope for an early summit, with the condition that they reach an agreement on a roadmap for the settlement of the war that the two presidents can endorse at that summit.
• President Trump calls President Zelenskyy to brief him on his call with Putin and to solicit his commitment to a negotiated settlement of the war.
• General Keith Kellogg, the top U.S. envoy, begins a round of consultations with European allies and Ukraine to develop an agreed vision for Ukraine and a framework for settling the war. President Trump calls major European leaders to gain their support for his approach to the settlement.
• General Kellogg travels to Moscow for meetings with Kremlin and other officials to lay out preliminary thinking on restoring a broad U.S.-Russia dialogue, as well as a framework for settling the war.
• President Trump calls for, and Congress passes, a supplemental aid package for continued support to Ukraine to underscore the United States’ commitment to creating the conditions for good-faith negotiations to end the war.
• A U.S.-Ukraine summit meeting in Kyiv, at which Trump and Zelenskyy agree on a cease-fire and a roadmap for settling the war, followed by a U.S.-Russia summit where Putin adds his endorsement to the cease-fire and roadmap.
• The roadmap is presented to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN Security Council for endorsement (these steps bring in U.S. allies as partners to the settlement and gain China’s support).

Read the full Ukraine Policy Brief, “Toward a Settlement of the Russia-Ukraine War.” 

Partners in Peacemaking: How the United States and Europe Can End the War in Ukraine

Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe.

President Donald Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine within six months of his inauguration. In principle, the United States could negotiate a peace deal with Russia and Ukraine without involving the leaders of Europe (specifically, the European Union and non-EU NATO members). However, by involving European partners in negotiating a cease-fire, the Trump administration can help secure a better deal for the United States. The advantages include keeping U.S. costs down by having Europe take over the lion’s share of the costs for Ukraine’s financial and economic survival through Russian frozen assets, while the United States provides critical weapons transfers; securing an eventual cease-fire through a European peacekeeping force or mission; integrating Ukraine into the West through accelerated EU membership; and giving the United States greater freedom to operate in the Indo-Pacific by persuading its European allies to increase their defense spending.

Ahead of negotiations with Russia, the Trump administration should include its European allies by taking the following steps:

• Develop a unified negotiation position with Ukraine and Europe, as well as a division of labor in talks. This move will prevent Russian attempts at sowing division and increase the costs for Russia if it violates a future cease-fire deal.
• Work with Europe to fully seize its €260 billion of Russian frozen assets and create a vehicle for the short- and long-term needs of Ukraine. This approach will add pressure on Moscow to enter negotiations as it cannot rely on outlasting Kyiv in domestic economic stability.
• Expect Europe to assume responsibility for a durable peace and contribute to securing a cease-fire in Ukraine. This contribution can take different models (from international peacekeeping to a robust monitoring or tripwire mission), depending on the level of U.S. involvement as well as the contours of a cease-fire deal.
• Encourage Europe to set a deadline—e.g., 2030—for Ukraine’s EU membership, and support the EU on domestic reforms in Ukraine. This move will also accelerate internal EU reform, reassure Ukrainians about their future in the West, and deny Russian President Vladimir Putin a geopolitical victory.
• Negotiate a new defense spending goal of 3.5 percent of GDP with European NATO allies and encourage investments in Europe’s defense-industrial base. The United States has to accept that buying exclusively U.S. weapons only makes Europe weaker and more, not less, dependent on the United States for its security.

Read the full Ukraine Policy Brief, “Partners in Peacemaking: How the United States and Europe Can End the War in Ukraine.” 

Defending Ukraine in the Absence of NATO Security Guarantees

Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director for research for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution and Paul B. Stares is the John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action.

Ukrainian officials have consistently opposed reaching a cease-fire agreement with Russia unless they also receive clear NATO security guarantees. Anything less, they believe, will leave the country exposed to future Russian aggression. However, there is another path, and a more plausible one: Ukraine can defend itself effectively if attacked in the aftermath of a cease-fire agreement by creating a multilayered territorial defense system for the roughly 80 percent of its pre-2014 territory that it still controls. This step would comprise a hardened outer defense perimeter, a strategic rapid-response force to respond to serious threats, and enhanced protection for major population centers and critical infrastructure. A defense system configured this way would require a substantial military force—some 550,000 on active duty (drawing on professional and conscripted personnel) and another 450,000 in ready reserve. Given Ukraine’s demographic outlook, creating such a force will be difficult, but not impossible.

Arming, training, and supporting the force will require substantial foreign assistance for the foreseeable future. Ukraine will need to spend between $20 billion and $40 billion per year, comparable to the defense budgets of Israel and South Korea. This estimate is much lower than current wartime expenditures, while also being cheaper for foreign benefactors to support compared to what they would likely have to pay to defend against Russia in the event Ukraine were defeated. 

To secure Ukraine’s long-term defense against Russian aggression, the Trump administration should consider the following recommendations:

• Planning for the long-term defense of Ukraine in the absence of NATO security guarantees needs to begin now, regardless of the timing of cease-fire negotiations. Ukraine will play the lead role, to be sure, but its many Western friends can help, possibly under NATO auspices (even absent inviting Ukraine to join the alliance). Western countries have a major stake in Ukraine’s future success and will have to play a significant role in resourcing the effort, so their involvement at the planning stage is crucial, too. Undertaking this task together will enhance Ukraine’s negotiating position at any cease-fire discussions, among other benefits.
• If cease-fire negotiations begin, the goal should be not just to end the fighting but enhance Ukraine’s defensive prospects. This can be achieved in a variety of ways, such as through monitoring arrangements, buffer zones, and restrictions on the deployment of forces in the vicinity of the line of control. While such provisions could prolong negotiations, pursuing them is legitimate and worthwhile. The terms of a cease-fire should not compromise Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future aggression, including by restricting its defense capabilities or the provision of Western military assistance and training.
• Once a cease-fire is agreed, no time should be wasted to immediately begin the process of bolstering Ukraine’s defenses against possible future Russian aggression. In the short term, the level of military and financial support should not decline to take advantage of what could simply be a pause in the fighting and help Ukraine create its robust and sustainable self-defense force.

Read the full report, Defending Ukraine in the Absence of NATO Security Guarantees.

The Art of a Good Deal: Ukraine's Strategic Economic Opportunity for the United States

Heidi Crebo-Rediker is a senior fellow in the Center for Geoeconomic Studies.

As President Donald Trump seeks to negotiate a swift end to Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, it is critically important that the administration recognize the compelling investment opportunity Ukraine presents: Ukraine possesses significant reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements, has a cutting-edge defense industry, and a robust technology and cyber sector, all of which can offer vast benefits for U.S. economic and security interests. As such, protecting Ukraine’s economic assets and its ability to contribute to the security needs of itself, the United States, and Europe as a whole needs to be a key component of any negotiated settlement. Moreover, investing in Ukraine’s industries and integrating them into Western markets can advance both the United States’ national security and economic leadership, secure resilience, and strengthen NATO, while simultaneously preventing Russia and China from access to those very same resources. Ensuring Ukrainian independence and sovereignty should be the goal of the United States not only because it is the right thing to do, but because it is also a good deal for the United States.

To best advance U.S. interests during negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, the Trump administration should consider the following recommendations:

• Agree to a comprehensive strategic partnership in critical minerals and rare earths. Ukraine’s skilled workforce and established mining and metallurgy infrastructure ideally positions the country to modernize its critical minerals sector and related industries, through collaboration with U.S. mining firms and investors, as well as end users. As part of this, the U.S. government should expand the economic toolbox and remit of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, and any other relevant agency to support this strategic investment in Ukraine’s mining industry. Doing so would foster the emergence of secure supply chains and advance technological capabilities.
• Develop a strategic defense manufacturing cooperation agreement. Ukraine has a long-standing connection to the U.S. Department of Defense and defense ministries of NATO members. As Ukraine transitions to NATO standards, its defense sector offers opportunities for U.S. defense contractors to coproduce arms and munitions, as well as modernize, alongside Ukraine’s defense innovation community. Deepening collaboration would ensure NATO allies have access to affordable, interoperable weaponry, alleviating the financial burden on the United States and advancing transatlantic burden-sharing.
• Support defense-tech investment that can underpin the U.S. defense industrial base. Given the administration’s push to modernize and move the U.S. military to a faster innovation cycle and a lower-cost, autonomous-weaponry strategy, the ability for U.S. companies to work with both Ukrainian drone and related defense-tech companies is a huge opportunity to forge a joint U.S.-Ukraine defense innovation complex—and could contribute to the efforts of Congress and even Elon Musk’s nascent Department of Government Efficiency to cut spending while increasing efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, for U.S. firms, Ukraine presents a cost-competitive option for outsourcing and joint research in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, diversifying supply chains, and strengthening digital security.

Read the full Ukraine Policy Brief, “The Art of a Good Deal: Ukraine's Strategic Economic Opportunity for the United States.” 

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.