Russia’s Peace Demands on Ukraine Have Not Budged

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

How has the Kremlin responded to the Trump administration’s recent moves, including its decision to suspend weapons shipments to Ukraine?

There has been a malicious glee in Russian media reports after President Donald Trump upbraided his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the Oval Office in late February. Dmitry Medvedev, former president of Russia and current deputy Security Council chairman, gushed that “the ungrateful pig got a firm slap from the masters of the pigsty.”

The Kremlin’s response has been more measured. Russian officials understand that the U.S.-Ukraine relationship is central to any negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war. They are counting on Washington to break Kyiv’s will to fight and compel it to make major concessions to Moscow. Yet Russian officials believe a total breakdown in U.S.-Ukraine relations would only complicate the situation and bring the Europeans into the process in an unhelpful way as they try to bolster support for Ukraine’s anti-Russia resistance. 

Instead, the Kremlin welcomes more sequential steps that erode Ukraine’s position, such as the U.S. decision to suspend arms shipments to Ukraine, which a Kremlin spokesperson called “the best contribution to the cause of peace.”

Trump in his address to Congress this week said Russia has sent “strong signals that they are ready for peace.” Is that true?

Not really. The Kremlin has not budged from its maximal demands for ending the conflict, which Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out last June and include:

• no NATO membership for Ukraine;
• Ukraine’s recognition of Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian provinces (even though Russia does not physically control all the territory of three of them);
• Ukraine’s demilitarization and denazification (code for the installation of a pro-Russia puppet in Kyiv); and
• the lifting of anti-Russia sanctions. 

Putin doubled down on that position just this week, saying during a March 6 visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation that Russia does not intend to make any compromises in peace negotiations. The Russian president sees no need to make any concessions. His armies are making grinding progress on the battlefield, albeit at a heavy cost in men and materiel. The Russian economy has proven resilient to Western sanctions, growing by more than 4 percent each of the past two years. Ukraine, meanwhile, is facing severe manpower shortages, and Western support is flagging.

In these circumstances, Putin has no pressing need to pursue negotiations or ratchet down the fighting. But to placate Trump, he continues to declare his readiness to talk. That seeks to cast the Ukrainians as the chief obstacle to the swift settlement Trump is seeking and encourages greater U.S. pressure on Kyiv. In the Kremlin’s calculus, that creates a win-win situation. They eventually win either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table—if a weakened Ukraine ever agrees to sit down and talk.

Still, the latest Russian barrage on Ukrainian targets this week prompted Trump to respond on Friday with threats of new sanctions and tariffs on Russia to pressure it to join peace talks—a rare signal of concern from the U.S. president about the Kremlin’s behavior. Putin is unlikely to be impressed, however. In 2024, Russian exports to the United States amounted to just $3 billion, and new sanctions mean little if they are not strictly enforced.

Trump has described a deal on Ukrainian minerals as tantamount to a security guarantee because Russia would not be likely to threaten U.S. business interests. Is that valid?

There are at least two problems with this idea.  First, how much private business interest would there be in Ukraine? Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had a reputation for being one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. U.S. foreign direct investment was small. Now, U.S. businesses would be looking at a country devastated by war and still struggling with corruption. Moreover, Ukraine’s mineral wealth is a matter of great speculation, and a sizable portion is located in Russia-occupied territory. These circumstances hardly amount to an attractive investment environment.

Second, Ukraine occupies a special place in the Russian political imagination. Kievan Rus is the source of modern Russian statehood. Ukrainian territory has served as a critical buffer zone against foreign enemies for centuries, as well as a source of Russian power in the past 150 years. Russians consider their preeminence in Ukraine as essential to their security and prosperity. Reasserting or sustaining Russia’s influence in Ukraine would override any concern about threatening U.S. business in Ukraine, especially when U.S. administrations, including Trump’s, have made it clear for decades that the United States is not prepared to go to war against Russia to defend Ukraine. A U.S. business presence in Ukraine in 2014 did nothing to dissuade Russia from seizing Crimea and instigating rebellion in the Donbas.

Are we seeing a genuine opening of ties between Moscow and Washington?

Starting with the February 12 phone call between the two presidents, the Trump administration has taken steps to end the Joe Biden administration’s effort to isolate Russia, and Putin himself, diplomatically. Senior U.S. and Russian officials met recently in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to develop an agenda for renewed relations. Talks are already underway to remove obstacles to the normal functioning of each country’s embassy in Moscow and Washington. The two sides have also agreed to form a team or teams to discuss other issues, including Ukraine.

Both sides have mentioned the possibility of an early summit meeting. Indeed, Putin would like nothing better than to entice Trump to come to Moscow this May to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany with him and Chinese President Xi Jinping. That would validate Russia as a great power and justify the war against what Russia insists are Ukraine’s neo-Nazi leaders.  Such a development cannot be categorically ruled out. That said, a summit prepared in haste, with few substantive agreements, could set back any effort to build more sustainable relations if its promise did not lead to concrete results.

Despite recent developments, it is premature to conclude that a genuine opening of ties is in the offing. The United States and Russia espouse significantly different views on a range of issues, including strategic stability, European security, the Middle East, and the Arctic. They have spoken of a renewal of commercial ties, but private U.S. business will be wary of investing in Russia for the long term, especially after the experience of dealing with a hyper-nationalist state during the past three years. The reality is that the two countries will remain geopolitical rivals well into the future. That does not preclude constructive relations or some form of competitive coexistence, but it will take time, effort, and more vision to reach that goal than we have seen on display thus far.

How can the U.S. brokering role be more effective with Russia?

U.S.-Russia policy is always more effective when it combines deterrence with diplomacy. The Trump administration is right to take steps to restore more normal diplomatic relations with Russia. But it also needs to demonstrate clearly to the Kremlin that it is prepared to vigorously defend U.S. interests. With regard to the Russia-Ukraine war, that entails taking steps to preserve a genuinely independent and sovereign Ukraine and thus prevent Russia from achieving its maximal goals.

These steps should include developing a common vision with European allies and Ukrainian partners on Ukraine’s future; continuing to provide military, financial, and humanitarian support to Ukraine; closely cooperating in building up Europe’s defense and security capabilities; and implementing targeted sanctions against Russia that erode its ability to prosecute the war. Such an approach could lead to an enduring settlement that meets the minimal security needs of both Ukraine and Russia while advancing U.S. interests. But the path to that goal will prove too much longer than the Trump administration anticipates.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.