United Nations General Assembly

President Barham Salih discusses the challenges facing Iraq, its role in the region, and its relationship with the United States.

VERSHBOW: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today’s meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations with President Salome Zourabichvili of the Republic of Georgia. I’m Alexander Vershbow. I’m Alexander Vershbow. I’m the distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, retired diplomat, and will be presiding over today’s discussion. It’s a great honor for me to be here with President Zourabichvili who, as you know, was elected president last December and, of course, was earlier, perhaps in simpler times, minister of foreign affairs of Georgia. And this was all after a thirty-year career in the French diplomatic service. Madam President, we first met in the early 1980s, when you were a French embassy officer. I was at the State Department and you were reporting on arms control and east-west relations. I’ve been dying to ask you since that time what inspired you to make the switch to return to the country of your ancestors to become foreign minister, and how difficult was the transition? Did you have this idea for a long time, or is it something that came to you when you were serving as ambassador? ZOURABICHVILI: No. (Laughs.) Neither. I always wanted to do something for the country, and especially after it became independent. What is it that you can do to help support and use your experience? But in fact, it happened without me. And it happened with two persons, one was president Saakashvili, who was a new elected president of Georgia in 2004, and the second one was the President Chirac, who died yesterday. And they met for the official visit of the President Saakashvili in Paris, and they decided it would be a good idea for me to become the foreign minister. VERSHBOW: You were the last to know about this idea? (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: I was the last to know. I was three months French ambassador to Georgia when that was decided. So—and there are things that you do not refused probably in life. So that was one of them. VERSHBOW: Were they shocked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when you turned up one day as their boss? ZOURABICHVILI: They were surprised. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: Good. Well, congratulations on an unusual and extraordinary career. But let’s get down to policy issues. Perhaps we can start with the domestic situation in Georgia. As we all know, Russia is doing everything it can to block Georgia’s path to the West and to prevent you from becoming a stable, thriving democracy. Of course, despite all of this Russian pressure, Georgia has made extraordinary strides in becoming a thriving democracy with a dynamic civil society. And of course, seven years ago there was a peaceful transfer of power from President Saakashvili to the Georgia Dream coalition. But earlier this year, there were renewed doubts about Georgia’s democracy when political unrest erupted in June, following the visit of a Russian parliamentary delegation. What do these protest say about the maturity of Georgian politics and Georgian democracy? And what do you see as the implications going forward? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, first of all, I think that demonstrations anywhere are a sign of democracy. And we have had a lot of signs of democracy in Georgia. And I think that’s good, that’s normal, and it’s part of the Georgian character to be very eloquent in these things. And I think that the Georgian civil society is very active, is very politicized, is very much active in the social network. The media are very active and very critical. And I think that all of that is very good, except for the tendency that is noted elsewhere too, which is polarization—and excessive polarization. But that’s another issue. Coming back to the—to the events of June, I think they have been a bit misrepresented outside of Georgia. There are two very different things that have to be very well understood. One is the reaction of the whole population, indistinctive of any political appearance to the fact of Gavrilov being seated in the seat of the parliament. The more time goes, the more I think that this was planned somehow. How it was planned, I don’t know. But there was a form of provocation. And that is something that we should all take into account, but it’s a reflection of what is the frustration of a country, of a nation, when after how many years—eleven years after the war and twenty-six years of frozen conflicts that have been moved to occupied regions. There is a point in time when the society, the nation doesn’t see any perspective of things being solved, being overcome. And then any incident can turn to that eruption of frustration. And that’s what happened. And I think that everybody should look at that, including our northern neighbor. Then the second phase of these events was that some opposition parties more radical than others tried to use that, as it happens also in many countries, to use that to make their aims attain, because they cannot probably win—or at least it’s their evaluation—through elections. So they try to enter forcefully the parliament. And it’s very clear when you look at the—at the pictures of how the police forces tried to resist for a number of hours were attacked very directly. And in fact, there are now inquests on these facts. And I think that any democratic country would resist the forced entry into the parliament, and especially a country that has at about thirty kilometers from the capital city Russian occupation forces and military forces that could, at any time, come to save someone of something. So I think that we are in that sense just reacting the way any democracy should react. So I’m not really concerned about that aspect. I’m concerned about the first aspect. And that was one of my main messages here when meeting with my diverse counterparts and the secretary-general of the General Assembly. And it was also my message in my speech, that we have to do something. We need movement. We cannot just sit—I was very criticized during this summer for not having gone on the occupation line when there was a new episode of Russians trying to move the fences and provoking us. Well, it’s very clear that the Georgian president cannot go on the occupation line and just look at what the Russians are doing, and how many more kilometers they are moving it forward, without being able to do anything but look. So I think that it’s not the proper attitude. But we have to do something outside. We cannot do anything there, because Georgia has unilaterally declined the use of force for any time to come. We do not have, because we’re respecting the 2008 ceasefire agreements, we do not have any military forces close to the occupation line. So we are trying to resist the different forms of provocations that vary from day to day and are almost every other day they’re closing the crossing points. People are under humanitarian, very difficult situations. And we are to balance between resisting the provocation but at the same time reacting in some ways, because otherwise you appear to be completely accepting the status quo. So we have to move outside. We cannot move on the occupation line. We have to move outside. And that means that our partners have to take upon them the issue. It is not acceptable that because they’re dealing with Ukraine they forget about Georgia. That was my very strong message. Because otherwise it sends to Russia the wrong signal, that it’s enough to go now to a third place and then we will forget about Ukraine. So it’s not logical and it’s not the right positive signal. So, one, we should have Georgia on all the agendas. And each time one talks either publicly or to the Russians in private or in multilateral formats one has to, at the same time Ukraine is mentioned, mention Georgia. And there has to be more activity in terms of trying to push for solutions, for formats to be reactivated. And I’ve been talking a lot about the Geneva format, that is a completely technical and un-useful format this stage, unless it goes back to what it was designed to do which was to be a format for real political substantial discussions. And those discussions at the first stage should be to push, and to ask, and to demand from Russia that it behaves in accordance with the cease-fire agreement of 2008. That is the first step. That’s not simply the solution to the occupied territories, per se, but for instance allowing the EU monitoring mission to accomplish its mandate, which was accepted by Russia, which is to oversee the whole of the territory, and not just the occupation line, first, would prevent a number of incidents, per se. And that would deescalate. And secondly, to give an additional sense of security to both populations living there, to the Georgian authorities. And so it would be stabilize also the region. And so there are many steps like that that can be done, if there is a real engagement of our partners. Where I think that the idea that our partners can be self-satisfied with just declaring once in a while that they recognize Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and they think that they are doing by that a very big thing, I think is not enough. It’s, of course, very important, and it should continue, and it’s something that has brought us until then. But it’s not enough. And we have to say that it’s not enough. VERSHBOW: Well, I can see why you don’t want Ukraine to get all the attention, although right now in terms of lots of publicity I think you’re probably lucky not to be in the same boat as Ukraine right now. (Laughter.) ZOURABICHVILI: I certainly do not want. And that was something I’ve been saying on and off, that I do not want Georgia to be known only for its conflict. And certainly we have many other reasons to be known and to be on the agenda. But on the conflict’s agenda, it is not possible that Georgia is not at least mentioned. Of course, the Ukraine conflict is much more open. It’s in an active phase. And it’s closer and bigger than the Georgian conflict. But that’s not a way to look at conflicts. They are whole and they are to be treated as a whole. VERSHBOW: Coming back to this issue of the Russians, beyond the games that they’re playing along the border—the so-called borderization—how seriously are the Russians meddling in your domestic politics, using disinformation, corruption, measures of all kinds? And is this something you feel the West is not helping you enough? ZOURABICHVILI: It would be very surprising that the Russians, knowing us the way they know us from the very old Soviet times, and having had all their instruments to understand the Georgian psychology and the Georgian history. It would be impossible to think that they would not use their knowledge to do the same thing that they are doing in countries which they know much less and have studied much less. So, yes, of course. They’re using fake news, for instance. They have been pushing a lot on the—just one example—on the Lugar Laboratory that is Georgia, and that is a very effective place for research and fighting the different viruses and making research. And they have started rumors that, in fact, they are trying to invent or use some biological weapons, and that the flu epidemic of this winter was generated by the Lugar Laboratory. And they’ve used that then to close all the crossing points with the Abkhazian region and Tskhinvali region during most part of the winter. And the preoccupation there is not only that it had this effect, and that was a very grave humanitarian situation, but other preoccupation is that a number of people that you wouldn’t have thought were believing that this Lugar Laboratory might be something else. That one is very transparent and, in fact, a very high level of laboratory and of protection. So that is a concern, because you have—they are reaching out to a certain category of the society that normally should be educated enough not to believe those things. VERSHBOW: The Russians are taking some new steps, just in recent days, to consolidate their control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the occupied territories. ZOURABICHVILI: That’s every day. VERSHBOW: But now they’re talking about modernizing the armed forces, establishing regular armed forces. ZOURABICHVILI: Well, there have been—in fact, commanding the armed forces in those places for now a couple of years, they have multiplied the military bases. They have military exercises of different dimensions. I think that we counted 100 in South Ossetia for the past year. Of course, what they call military exercise might vary very much in terms of numbers. So it’s just this cat and mouse game that they’re continuing, which is made of many different things. It’s made of passportization, of depriving the last part of the ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia from their passports and trying to force them to take either Abkhazian documents or Russian passports. It’s a mixture of those. So there is something at each time that varies. And the common objective of all that is to drag it into reacting in some form to the provocations, because they know that if we’re dragged into that, that’s where we cannot win. So it’s really a test of the nerves, which is not easy. But we have to know that it’s a test of the nerves. VERSHBOW: Indeed. Let’s turn to your relations with the EU and NATO. So let’s start with the EU. You’ve, of course, had your association agreement and free trade agreement with the EU, which have been quite successful for about three years now. At the same time, there are new leaders coming into positions of power within the European Union, starting in November. Do you see a more pro-Georgian attitude amongst these new people, or is it too soon to tell? And what are you saying to them as far as what should be the next stage of Georgia’s integration in the European Union? It seems like a membership perspective is a non-starter for many EU member states. But what besides a path to membership would you see as the next step that could support your reforms and also make more irreversible your path to the West? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, first of all, I think it’s irreversible anyway. The second thing that I don’t think that the European new leaders should be pro-Georgian. I think they should be pro-European—really, pro-European. The third thing is that when you were remembering that when I was appointed foreign minister and I toured the different capitals I was told that there was no way that Georgia was going to be integrated in the neighborhood policy. And just a few months later we were becoming part of the neighborhood policy. And since then, our path has been one of constant progress. First, the partnership—oriental partnership. Then the association agreement. Then free and deep trade, and visa liberalization. So almost every two, three, five years there is a very substantial step forward that has been taken, which is very clearly seen by the population. And as a result, we have today 78 percent of popular support, in the latest opinion polls. And that has been constant. It varies from one point— VERSHBOW: People aren’t losing hope. ZOURABICHVILI: They’re not losing hope. They’re not losing direction. Hope is a different thing. And I don’t think that we base anything on hope these days. Just on the realities. So reality-based, it means that we are very clear about the fact that looking at the European Union, there is no appetite today for making a political decision about candidature or membership. So that’s the reality that we have to take into account. On our side, the answer to that is we can understand that you have Brexit, populism, lack of enthusiasm for new enlargement. But on our side, we need to be seeing what is the next movement forward, the next rapprochement with the European Union, the concrete steps, again, that we can have in order to continue showing the population that this road is one of movement and not of standing still. VERSHBOW: And do you have specific asks of them? Customs union, energy union? ZOURABICHVILI: Exactly. The idea is to ask. And there has been very positive answers from different European leaders, Macron being one of them, and the new president of the council, Michel, another. When we say that we want sectoral integration and to become full members of different programs of the European Union, be it in culture, be it in energy, oil and transport, where we are almost already part of the new TNT program. So that’s the direction. So it’s a very concrete, I would say almost a physical direction to say we are ready for so many programs. We want to become a full member of those programs. And let’s forget for some time the question of the status and the political decision. But maybe in a couple of years when you will ready for political decision, you will realize that in fact a de facto Georgia is part of 60 percent, 65 percent of what the European Union is. We are already, for instance, in the peace mission in South Africa. We’re very interest in closer security and defense relationship with the EU. To which extent, that is something to be decided. We are full members of the education—the programs on education. Georgian studies are one of the first users of Erasmus. They are voting with their feet, and so on. So we have all this panoply, I would say, of different programs and we have to present, and that’s what we are now working on, present a very concrete list of where we want to be in the different programs. VERSHBOW: Well, I hope they’re responsive and they don’t cite some of the recent political turbulence as an excuse, because— ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t think so. There is no real. VERSHBOW: Yeah. Turning to NATO. It’s been eleven years now since NATO promised both you and Ukraine that you will be members, but they’ve been conspicuously unable to name a timetable. But at the same time, I think Georgia has made the most of all the different partnership tools and mechanisms that NATO has created—the substantial NATO-Georgia package, NATO has a Joint Training and Evaluations Center on Georgian territory. Do you think the Georgian people are patient and can focus on these interim measures? ZOURABICHVILI: There is a slightly less—for NATO I think it’s seventy-three or -two. I don’t know, I can’t remember the exact numbers. But also it has been constant. And I think that we are exactly in the same position towards—there is a parallelism between the two. With NATO we know, and that’s very clearly said, everybody tells us we are the frontrunners, that we are excellent, that we are doing everything that has to be done. But that we will not have MAP, because in fact giving MAP to Georgia today, everybody knows that in six months’ time we would fulfill the last things that have to be done in MAP. And so immediately after comes the question of membership. So knowing that, again, the same thing. We need—we can for some time just put the status question on the side because of realism, but at the same time we need the movement. So where can we get the movement to get closer and more involved with NATO? We have had—this year we had two military exercises. We had the committee—military committee visiting Georgia, the secretary-general. And we are having the North Atlantic Council visiting Georgia in October. So you can hardly do more in terms of high-level visits. So we need more concrete programs. So what can it be? And we have identified the two directions in which we really could do much more with NATO. One is the Black Sea security. And it’s a very important subject. And in fact, there could be an idea, which I proposed to the secretary-general and which needs to be pushed further, to have a Center of Excellence on Black Sea security in Georgia. That would give the sense of something more happening. The other issue on which we, as everybody else, needs more cooperation with NATO is the issue of cybersecurity. And there too, we have to find the new ways of having more intense cooperation, support, training, because we need—where we are located, and that concerns attacks from Russia, but not only from Russia. We’ve had also Iran and China. So we need to be consolidated in that—in that aspect. And that will give us this sense of movement that we absolutely need also on the side of NATO. VERSHBOW: Recently former NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen made a fairly provocative proposal, saying that Georgia’s membership shouldn’t be postponed inevitable by the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He suggested that allies agree that Georgia could become a member with the proviso that Article 5 guarantees would not apply to the occupied territories until they were restored to Georgia. Was this a helpful proposal? Or do you think it will only— ZOURABICHVILI: I will not comment, because as a president I cannot comment on any particular proposal that I’ve not made. I will just say one thing on that, which is that I don’t think it’s right to say that the discussions of membership and not decision on membership is due to Russia. I think that is very dangerous to say, because first of all I think it’s not true. There are many other—it might be one of the reasons, or one of the concerns. But for someone to say that Georgia is not becoming member of NATO because of Russia, and especially from the secretary-general of NATO, that I think is a concern. The rest, I leave to him. (Laughs.) VERSHBOW: OK. One last question, then we’ll open it up to the—open up to questions and answers from the members. Just your thoughts on President Putin’s policy towards Russia’s neighbors? Do you see any hope that he may soften his—or, modify his strategy of using the frozen conflicts as a way of blocking Georgia’s and Ukraine’s path to the West? And do you think Russia is capable of ever seeing countries like Georgia and Ukraine as partners rather than vassals? (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: Again, I would challenge the idea that Russia has managed to block the path of Georgia towards EU or NATO. It is the contrary that despite the conflict, despite the occupation, Georgia has managed to continue its path. And that, I think, should be something that should be mediated by the Russian leadership, that if that was the objective, that objective has not been reached. And if that is a measure of who has won this war of nerves, then we have won the war of nerves, and we continue. Because there is nothing that will divert Georgia from this path, which is the path that not only the population has chosen, but that is now inscribed in the constitution since last year. So that doesn’t make any doubt. Whether Russia can rethink its policies with the neighbors, I think that I’ve been from the very beginning, at the time when I was negotiating the military bases and I was visiting you in Moscow, from the very time I’ve always said that what we are waiting for is for Russia to rediscover the fact that it has everything to win of treating its neighbors with respect and because none of these neighbors are de facto threatening Russia in any way. So of course, we all have the hope that one day they will understand what is the rule of the international community anywhere else, but I cannot make prognosis as to when that will happen. VERSHBOW: Yeah. No, I’m not optimistic. I think Putin prefers to be feared than loved. Maybe he doesn’t think he can be loved, so he chooses to be feared. But anyway, let’s now invite members of the Council to join the conversation and pose some questions to you, Madam President. Who’d like to be the first? Please. Please identify yourself and make it a real question. (Laughter.) Q: Charles Henderson. What specifically would you like to see from the outside to deal with the Russian occupation? And also, what role would Georgia play in that cooperative approach to dealing with the Russian occupation? ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t know whether it’s a cooperative approach. First it has to be a demanding approach. But we’re expecting that our partners that are dealing and having an intensive dialogue with—more or less, an intensive dialogue with Russia, would be repeating every time, and at any of their meetings with Russia, that it would help in a general way to turn to the behavior that is a normal behavior instead of playing on the tension, the incidents, because it’s nobody’s interest in that region to have instability incidents. It’s a miracle that Georgia has managed over the years, and despite, again, the frozen conflicts, then the war, then the occupation, that Georgia has managed to be really and become a very stable country that is attracting investment, that is in the investors ratings figuring quite well, and is viewed outside as a stable country. And that’s the Georgian miracle that we have to preserve. But meanwhile, our partners have to be active, proactive with the Russians. And I don’t know what you can get, but if you do not ask then it will be considered as a closed subject. And that is what is not acceptable by us. VERSHBOW: Mmm hmm. Other questions? Please, in the back. And please stand up so we can all hear you. Q: Negar Kongary (ph). Thank you for your comments. It’s very, very, very interesting and insightful. Just a quick question. Is there any role that you think some of the countries in the far east can play—specifically Japan, China—in the same way that they’re playing a role in stabilizing some of your—the ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia? ZOURABICHVILI: That they could play in the Caucasus? The Chinese are present a little bit. They’re present like they are probably in other continents, in Africa. They’re present in infrastructure investments and works. They’re not very active otherwise. In political terms, they’re not very active. Whether any of their involvement there would add in any way to the—to the stability and be something that could be helpful one way or the other, I’m not very sure. VERSHBOW: Yes, front row. Q: David Walker. Good morning. May I pick up on the point about economic growth? Certain IFIs, such as the EBRD have been very active in Georgia. What is needed now to continue to transition to full market economy? And you mentioned Erasmus. Could you maybe make a few comments about demographics? A very empowered Georgian youth diaspora, but what role do they play? ZOURABICHVILI: Not enough. That’s one of my priorities and one of my concerns, that we are not making the right use of this experimented and education youth that is flooding around the European and American universities, because we do not have the right instruments for that—neither the salaries nor the promotions. We have to review our policy of how to attract back some of those—some of these—what has become a little bit of a brain drain. So that’s one part, for the development of the economy. And the second one is that we need more foreign investment. More foreign investment in the major projects. You have probably heard about Anaklia, the deep-sea port. That is one of the big projects. And that has become a political discussion for some reason, when it’s really an economic discussion, because this is a very important new orientation, and that fits very well with the ideas of the European Union on increasing their investments in the transport between Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia through the Black Sea and then Caspian Sea, and Kazakhstan. But that needs involvement and investments in the port’s construction. And for the time being, the only investment has been budgetary investment from the Georgian state. And that is not enough. So we have in some way to mobilize more interest. One of my also work is to meet with investors and try to invite them, attract them. And maybe on our side we have also to make proposals clear—in a clearer way. What are the different segments of the economy, because—that’s one example. But we have many other examples in the economy that need today clear and forceful investments to pass the next stage. And that is the hospitality sector, these are infrastructures, again, transport, road, logistics, a cable of connectivity under the Black Sea, and everything that touches to the resorts—spa resorts, sport resorts, mountain resorts—which is a very—becoming very active. We’ve had a touristic boom the last two years. We have managed to keep these tourist attraction despite the restrictions imposed by Russia over the summer, which could have been dramatic for the touristic industry. But we have managed— VERSHBOW: You’re talking about the flight restrictions? ZOURABICHVILI: Yeah. VERSHBOW: Mmm hmm. ZOURABICHVILI: We have managed. We had alternative tourist influx in the country. We are very resilient, in fact. VERSHBOW: Definitely, that’s the case. (Laughter.) There’s another question here in the front, Peter. Q: Peter Pettibone. I want to follow up on that question, and ask whether you have any contact with China, particularly with regard to the Road and Belt Initiative. ZOURABICHVILI: We are in contact. Not that we are an active partner, but they are also promoting the Road and Belt Initiative in Georgia, as anywhere else, because we’re part of the direction and transport. Of course, it involves—it goes to China, because we have the particularity also of having the free trade agreement with European Union, a free trade agreement with China, and a free trade agreement that is in the process of being concluded with India. So we think that we can be and play an important role as a hub between these markets. And not only direct investment in Georgia, but just having companies that use Georgia as a hub for playing on their sides. VERSHBOW: Any chance of a free trade agreement with the United States? And are you asking for anything to help the U.S. to be more engaged in the economy? ZOURABICHVILI: I think they would welcome that. VERSHBOW: OK. ZOURABICHVILI: I can’t say more. VERSHBOW: OK. (Laughs.) Third row, here. Q: Lucy Komisar. I am a journalist. On the issue of NATO and whether Georgia should—could, should—become a member, are you concerned that bringing NATO right up to the border of Russia would be a provocation that would hurt the possibility of ultimately having better relations with the country, rather than put Georgia on a path to getting better relations? ZOURABICHVILI: I don’t think that we have ever been directed and influenced by any form of threats. So these are threats that are recurrent in the Russian declaration, that it might—just recently they have said that they will not prevent us by war to enter NATO, but that it would degrade our relations. Well, they are quite degraded. So we’ll see. And I remember a time when I was negotiating the withdrawal of military bases with Minister Lavrov, and his position at that time that he expressed very clearly was: You can choose any of the alliances that you want. What we need to have is a clear assurance that it’s not directed against us. So I think that we can play in this. And we certainly should not be deterred in our decision and in what is in the interest of the country by what might happen. VERSHBOW: Just a minor fact. During the Cold War the Soviet Union was on NATO’s border. Turkey and Georgia was the NATO-Soviet Union border. So it wouldn’t be an entirely new thing. ZOURABICHVILI: That’s right. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: Here, the second row. Wait for the microphone, please. Q: Thank you very much. I’m Lee Cullum. I’m a journalist also. Madam President, thank you so much for taking time to be here this morning. It’s really heartening to hear a leader as serious and thoughtful as you are. You are interested in the EU, of course. And I wonder, you’ve been in France a long time, what do you see ahead for the EU? It’s been swimming in sea of troubles. Will it be able to regain its equilibrium and its momentum? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, I’m looking at the EU on both sides, as an old EU—(laughs)—member, and from the Georgian perspective. So that gives me two varied perspective of the EU. From my former place where I was and I worked for a long time, in fact I was teaching also EU foreign policy to students in France. What one of the conclusions I have is that EU has never progressed without crisis. All the progressions of its policies, whether it was in the security field or in the institutional field, were always provoked by major crises, whether it was Yugoslavia conflict or other forms. So what I think that Brexit is going to do is going to force an institution that has a very difficult time to find a new energy in itself, it’s going to force it to reform itself, and to find new directions, and a new dynamism, and new leaders, which they really need. And for us, looking from outside, I think that we’re very useful for the European Union. They cannot do without countries like us because, first of all, we are the ones carrying the last bits of enthusiasm for the European Union. So they badly need that. (Laughter.) And also, we are having ideas of more flexibility, of things that you can do outside of these very strict formats that you are a member or you are not a member, and what you get when you’re a member, and how many votes, and what type of majority. They have to get out of this very complex, but internal—inward-looking situation, and start looking outside at the world. And when they doubt about what they are going to become, and I was presenting a speech to a wide audience of European businessmen a few weeks ago. And I was telling them that when you doubt—the day when you doubt, you just close your eyes and try to imagine what would be the world if Europe did not exist. And I think that it’s frightening. (Laughs.) So I’m optimistic, on all grounds. (Laughter.) VERSHBOW: I recall when I was at NATO our commanders always said that Georgia was perhaps punching above its weight, far more than some of the existing allies. Indeed, and they of course bore heavy burdens by being the largest per-capita contributor to our operations in Afghanistan, something not fully appreciated. Person there in the third row. Q: David Handelman from CNN Opinion. Madam President, welcome and thank you for your remarkable career. I’m interested in the current atmosphere in Washington and how that might affect the United States’ ability to—or, willingness to react sufficiently if the Russians do expand their provocations against Georgia. And if they take advantage of this atmosphere to do so, how do you feel about that? Are you concerned about that, the atmosphere in Washington today? ZOURABICHVILI: First of all, you should tell me about the atmosphere in Washington. (Laughter.) I am ready to listen. The only thing I can say, is that in some ways that’s a tendency that has started a few years ago. The U.S. is becoming Georgian in the fact that it’s becoming polarized. And of course, it’s a concern when you’re a major partner. But there is one thing for us which is very positive, is that Georgia has always been outside of the party politics in the United States and has been a common project for both Democrats and Republicans. And I think that we cannot affect what’s happening in Washington. But what we have to keep and to strive for is to remain an issue and a policy that is not dependent on the internal political situation in Washington. VERSHBOW: Back row. Q: Thank you, Madam President. Steve Hellmann. Do you have any advice for Ukraine? ZOURABICHVILI: I would refrain. But I have very good relations with President Zelensky. I have an advice, in fact. And I’ve been proposing, and we are probably going to do it, is what I described as our policy toward the European Union and our program of demands. We are ready to share. And I think it will be useful for Georgia and Ukraine together to go to Brussels quite early on, when the new commission comes in, and present a common front on those issues that we want to be defended. And I think that there is a positive position towards that in Kyiv. VERSHBOW: Question right here, second row. Q: Matthew Hurlock. I’m a lawyer.  I don’t want this question to be too stupid, but what is your—what is, in fact, your perception of what Putin and Russia want to do to Georgia now? I mean, I understand the constant threat so you never forget them, but reabsorbing it would be—I mean, what do you think they actually want to accomplish now, and how does that inform your interactions with them? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, that’s the big difficulty, that really there is no clue about what they want. One thing that one can think is that it’s to prevent the integration to NATO and the European Union. But it’s not working. The idea that Russia could really occupy the whole sort of—is out of the realm of reality, because they know very well they have the experience elsewhere that this would provoke an armed fight that would end nobody knows when. That’s not something that is acceptable for the Georgian citizens and will never be. So it might be a protracted, terrible—and I don’t see that the Russians have this strategy. Thirdly, I don’t think the Russians have a strategy at all. I think that’s my personal analysis and view. I think that large countries and former empires do not have strategies because they always think that force is enough. So they don’t have to—we need strategies. When I’m talking about EU, I need a very clear strategy, and we have to work it out, because we are a small country, we have many neighbors around, and we need to be very clear how to play. And that’s what Georgia has been doing for twenty-seven centuries. And if I’m an optimist, it’s because Georgia has managed through invasions and wars to come to this day by being—while being a small country where everybody wanted to come in and stay. So we need a strategy. But those immense, in the case of Russia, empires or former empires do not need a strategy. So I think it’s an inertia. And for instance, if we—one looks at the 2008 war, that was very clear that Russia didn’t have a strategy. They did it. And in fact, that’s why I think that Sarkozy was very useful. Of course, he didn’t solve the issue, but he was exactly at the right time in the right place to allow Russia to stop. If it hadn’t been a kind of face-saving ceasefire agreement, there was no way that either Putin or Medvedev, and at that time they were the two heads, that either of them would have old the military stop, even if they didn’t intend to walk into Tbilisi and occupy the whole country they would have continued, because it’s like an inertia that moves forward. So it’s very difficult, looking at that in this way, to try to analyze what is it that they really want. Q: (Off mic.) ZOURABICHVILI: Yeah. And I’m strong, I have military might, so I can do anything I want. And if today I decide to do it, I can do it. So it’s very unpredictable at the same time. VERSHBOW: The danger is that the status quo is probably satisfactory for Putin. He doesn’t want to solve these conflicts. He doesn’t want to escalate either. But keeping these companies sort of off-balance, under constant pressure, suits his interests. And he’s not feeling enough pressure from the West to do otherwise. Any other questions? Yes, back here. Q: Good morning, Madam President. Thank you for being with us. I’m Chloe Demrovsky, president and CEO of Disaster Recovery Institute International. My question is a bit different. Georgia has made significant cultural contributions, not the least of which are culinary. And of course, Georgian wine. ZOURABICHVILI: Please come. (Laughter.) Q: So I was curious if you have any soft power strategies for creating rapprochement with your country or to build alliances. Thank you. ZOURABICHVILI: We didn’t have a soft power strategy, but we’ve discovered that we had won without knowing it. VERSHBOW: Cuisine. (Laughs.) ZOURABICHVILI: Cuisine, wine, landscapes, hospitality of the Georgians, and their immense tolerance. The one example that I like to use is that last year we had one million five hundred thousand Russian tourists in the country. And there was not a single incident happened that was recorded or anything. And I think that somewhere this restriction of flights that was imposed this year was maybe a reaction to the soft power, because all these Russians go back to the country very happy of their stay in Georgia. And in fact, when the restrictions on flights were announced by Putin this summer, there were quite a lot of negative reactions in the Russian social media and press. Saying, well, we want to go to Georgia. We have made our reservations and we want to go. So maybe we have a soft power. We certainly have a soft power towards the other countries, because it’s something that is very—that I’m discovering when traveling, visiting on official visits and having—everybody’s ready to come to Georgia. And I’m sure that you all are, that we’re waiting for you. So that is very important to bring investors to make aware of what is really Georgia. For the Europeans, they arrive, and they discover that Georgia is really a European country, which they theoretically maybe imagine, but they imagine more than it’s more an Asian, oriental country. I’m all the time asked: Isn’t it an exception, and isn’t it difficult to be a woman president in Georgia? Well, no, because we are European, and because it has been a tradition in Georgia to have women very powerful. And so it’s not something. But you don’t know that unless you come to the country and visit it. So, yes, this is a very strong. And I think we have to strategize it more. VERSHBOW: And if you haven’t visited Georgia, you should. But otherwise, come to Washington. We’re way ahead of New York on Georgian restaurants and availability of Georgian wine. Yes, question. Q: Madam President, I’m Kevin Sheehan with Multiplier Capital, and investment firm, but formerly with State and Defense. And I wanted to ask you a question about the historical legacy of Mr. Shevardnadze. How is he viewed by Georgia today? And what was his—what is his legacy? ZOURABICHVILI: Well, I think that he, as everything in Georgia, there are always two visions. And it’s very radically different. And that’s why I said we are a vivid Democratic society. Any subject, whatever you start, is going to be the matter for very heated discussion. But all in all, I think that it’s recognized today, with time going by, that he was the one to start Georgia on the path towards EU and NATO. He made the very strategic—he had the strategic vision that was not evident at that time. And that was probably his major input into the modern Georgia. Starting very early, having these very close contacts with German leaders, American leaders, was what really helped to move the Georgia on that direction. And then it was confronted—I think all the Georgian presidents at different times had their very clear input, even if there is a very divisive view about them politically—internal politically. Saakashvili, undoubtably, started Georgia on the path of reforms, consolidated the EU-Atlantic, but the path of reforms, internal reforms, was extremely important. VERSHBOW: Just a couple more minutes. Any other questions? Can I ask one last question? What’s your evaluation of how things are changing in Armenia, one of your other neighbors? ZOURABICHVILI: Positively. VERSHBOW: Do you think that’s going to be irreversible in terms of genuine democratization? Or more of a nonaligned foreign policy? ZOURABICHVILI: It’s always difficult to—I think that—at least their intention today is very clearly to move towards the EU and to take advantage of our experience and try to reproduce that. I think that they really want to take some distance with Moscow, although they have to do it in a—in a careful way. The concern is on the other side, is that their positions on the Karabakh conflict are a bit radical in certain ways, and how that can be managed together with the paths that they are taking is a question that I ask myself. I don’t know. VERSHBOW: OK. But follow Georgia’s example as a role model. Well, thank you very much, Madam President. Let’s give a round of applause of President Zourabichvili. (Applause.) (END)

Following the United Nation’s 2019 Climate Action Summit, panelists discuss the actions cities and countries can take to strengthen climate resilience.

For further reading, please see the CFR In Brief “Trump’s Iran-Saudi Arabia Dilemma” by Philip H. Gordon, the CFR blog post “Scale and Nature of Attacks on Saudi Oil Makes This One Different” by Amy M. Jaffe, and the CFR quiz “See How Much You Know About Saudi Arabia.”

President Lourenço discusses Angola’s course toward the consolidation of democracy, transparency, and prosperity. 

RUBIN: Good morning. I’m Bob Rubin. And on behalf of my colleagues at the Council, welcome to today’s meeting. We are deeply honored to have as our guest State Councilor and Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Mr. Wang Yi, who is also a friend to many of us in the United States. State Councilor, I had the opportunity about two weeks ago to speak at the China Development Forum—I was the luncheon speaker—and I expressed a view that I think is shared by many, but certainly not all in this country, which is that it is imperative that we get our relationship back on a constructive track for a whole host of reasons; economic reasons, but also because the two largest economies in the world are probably the best way to coalesce global response to climate change, nuclear weaponry, and many other transnational issues. But as we all know, there is a lot of strain in our relationship right now, and we enormously appreciate your being with us today to explain China’s views on issues that are of great interest in our country. In accordance with the practices at the Council, I won’t respond—recite from your resume. But our participants can all look in their materials and you have had a(n) extraordinarily distinguished career, which has led to your current leadership position. Our program will be divided into two parts. The first part, the state councilor will speak and deliver his views on a number of issues. Then I will spend a little bit of time with the state councilor. And then we’ll open it up to all of you. If you have questions, raise your hand, identify yourself, briefly state your question so we that we can get in as many as possible. And this will be on the record. State Councilor, the podium is yours. (Applause.) (Note: Min. Wang’s remarks are made through an interpreter.) WANG: Dear friends, I’m happy for today’s opportunity to meet you. I want to thank the Council on Foreign Relations, especially my old friend Richard Haass, whom I have known for several decades, for inviting me to come here to talk to you. This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the issuance of a communique of diplomatic relations between our two countries. It is a critical year for both sides. It is important for us to objectively view the shifting dynamics in each other’s countries with a historical perspective, calibrate our relations, and keep the relationship on the right track. In the past four decades, thanks to the efforts made by leaders and people from various sectors of both sides, our cooperation has come a long way, boosted our respective development, and delivered benefits to people of both countries. The tremendous dividends of this relationship have gone far beyond the imagination of the forerunners who opened the door of China-U.S. engagement. At the same time, we are also two countries vastly different in history, culture, social system, and level of development. The closer our engagement, the more closely entwined our interests, maybe various suspicions and even frictions may ensue. This is not surprising, and it is also no cause for panic. What’s important is how these differences should be viewed, evaluated, and handled. Indeed, we are faced with a host of issues. I had a small-group discussion with some members of the Council before I came here, and I think we are both thinking about what is the crux of these issues. I think these issues boil down to how the United States perceives China. Some American friends have proceeded from the Western theory of realism and, based on the laws governing the rise and fall of historical powers in the past several hundred years, believe that a strong country is about to seek hegemony. And their conclusion is that China is about to seek hegemony in the future and even challenge or displace U.S. leadership. I want to tell you very clearly that this is a serious strategic misjudgment. It is a misguided anticipation that will be extremely detrimental to U.S. interests and the future of the United States. However, regrettably, this self-imagined suspicion is spreading, and it has also amplified the differences between our two countries, and even led to new suspicions. It has also made it more difficult for us to address the specific issues that exist. I want to tell you very clearly that China will follow a path of development different from historical powers. It is a path with Chinese features. It means that China will not repeat the old practice of a strong country seeking hegemony. I don’t think China will become the United States, and China will not challenge the United States. Still less will China take the place of the United States. China follows a path of peaceful development. China is a big country in the East with a five-thousand-year civilization. The Chinese believe in peace. There’s not a single bone of making external expansionism in the body of the Chinese. As early as over six hundred years ago, the Chinese navigator Zheng He led the biggest fleet in the world to the Pacific and west Indian Oceans on seven expeditions, visiting over thirty countries and regions, not taking a single inch of land. That was actually quite inconceivable for those Western powers who were busy making colonial expansion, but the Chinese did that. Moreover, we have come into an age of globalization when peace, development, and win-win are the call of the times, and the old practice of aggression and expansion can no longer work. Hence, China will not repeat a historical path, nor is it possible for China to ever follow that path. The truth is China is determined to follow a new path. Maybe not that many people know that the commitment to the path of peaceful development has been incorporated into the constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the charter of the Communist Party of China. That means it has become a part of national law and the party charter that we must observe. That speaks to China’s firm commitment to peace. China follows a path of win-win through cooperation. Serving the larger interests and delivering benefits to all is something that is inherent in the Chinese tradition. We don’t believe in the law of the jungle whereby the strong prey on the weak or the winner takes all. In thousands of years of engagement between China and its neighbors, China believes in goodwill and mutual respect, believes in giving more and taking less. China also believes in openness and inclusiveness for win-win benefits in developing both the ancient and the current Silk Roads. Forty years ago, China launched the reform and opening up endeavor for mutual engagements and cooperation with other countries and regions. Five years ago President Xi Jinping put forward the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become the most popular cooperation platform in today’s world. So far over 130 countries and international organizations have signed cooperation agreements with China. The reason for its success is a sense of togetherness in undertaking this initiative. This November China will host the first International Import Expo. That is a creative move. We want to invite people in to share China’s opportunities. China follows a path of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. The Chinese believe that, as all living things can live in harmony without harming each other, we can and should have different ways—run forward, side by side—without interfering with each other. We believe in a diverse world where countries can live in harmony and learn from each other. In contemporary times China once made attempts at introducing various foreign systems, but none of them worked on Chinese soil. Eventually, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, we have found a path of development that fits China’s national conditions and the trend of our time. That has achieved tremendous success. The international authoritative institutions survey shows that the Chinese people are really confident about the future of China and satisfied with their government. The rating of China ranks among the top. Well, this path is a path of socialism with Chinese features. Since this is the right path, we will stay on this path as we move forward. The Chinese ancient philosopher Confucius believed that a gentleman should seek harmony in diversity and should not do to others what one would not like himself. We believe that also applies to state-to-state relations. We respect our differences, think from others’ perspective. We can achieve true harmony. There’s no one size that fits all in today’s world. It is important that we enhance mutual understanding and live in peace and harmony as we develop state-to-state relations. History has shown that if one is bent on remolding the other according to one’s own standards or insists on imposing one’s system upon others, most probably that would not work, and even invite disastrous implications or consequences. I want to emphasize the China will not—did not copy foreign pattern and will not copy foreign pattern, and China will not ask others to copy China’s pattern either. Dear friends, peaceful development, cooperation, and seeking common ground is China’s firm conviction. The last few decades have seen over 1.3 billion Chinese people getting a better life, and at the same time China is making a greater contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world and promoting shared interests and well-being of people in all countries. In this world rife with uncertainties and instability, what role is China playing? Let me tell you the following. China has become a force for world peace. In its nearly seventy-year history of the People’s Republic, China has never provoked any war or conflict. We have peacefully settled our boundary questions with most of our land neighbors. In the South China Sea, the Chinese islands and reefs had been illegally occupied, but China has exercised utmost restraint and undertaken in written form to settle the disputes through peaceful means. Together with ASEAN countries, we have developed regional rules to be observed by all, thus easing the once-tense situation. And in every place of conflict and war, we can find Chinese peacekeepers. China is the top contributor of military peacekeepers among P-5 and the second-largest contributor of U.N. peacekeeping funds. And for ten years running, Chinese military ships have provided escort missions for over six thousand ships in the waters of the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. China has become an engine for global growth. Over the years, China has contributed seventy percent of global growth, thus becoming a—(inaudible)—engine of global growth. In 1997, when Asia was ravaged by a financial crisis, despite huge pressure on its currency China has kept the value of its currency stable to support its neighbors. In 2008, during the sweeping international financial crisis, the Chinese economy bucked the trend to register strong growth, thus becoming an anchor of global growth, thus playing an irreplaceable role in the recovery that followed. Now there are over three hundred million Chinese people in the middle income group. According to some forecasts, China is expected to become the largest market, especially in retail goods, with an annual import of $2 trillion U.S. The Chinese economy is shifting from high-speed growth to high-quality growth. China is opening wider, bringing more development opportunities to the world. China has also become a model in poverty alleviation. The past few decades have seen nearly eight hundred million Chinese people lifted out of poverty, or over seventy percent of the global total. This is a miracle never seen in human history. Our current goal is to lift another forty million Chinese out of poverty in three years and lift all the remaining rural population out of poverty by 2020. This will be a great feat of vast significance for global growth. At the same time, as the biggest developing country, China is following closely how our developing partners are doing. Through experience-sharing, assistance, and personnel training, we are supporting poverty-alleviation efforts in other developing countries. So far China has sent to over 160 countries and international organizations nearly four hundred billion yuan in development aid. Through South-South Cooperation Fund, China-U.N. Peace and Development Fund, Climate Change South-South Cooperation Fund, and other mechanisms, we are helping other developing countries in implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. China’s foreign assistance never comes with political strings attached. We respect the need of recipient countries and help them build capacity for independent and sustainable development. Thus, our foreign assistance has been—(inaudible)—by other developing countries. China has become a force to rely on in the global fight against terrorism. Terrorism is an enemy of mankind. China stands firmly against terrorism in all manifestations, and it will never allow the spread of terrorism in its territory or allow any place of China to become an origin of terrorism. This is China’s largest—a big, major contribution to the global fight against terrorism. China is an important member of the global campaign against terrorism. We are deeply involved in the U.N. and other multilateral cooperation mechanisms to help Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in enhancing capacity-building through peaceful reconstruction, through promoting peace talks, and development assistance. We are helping them to remove breeding ground. Between China and the U.S., we have effective cooperation and information-sharing in fighting terrorism and cutting terrorist financing. China has also become a partner in mediating hotspot issues. China has taken part in the settlement of almost all hotspot issues—in DPRK, Iran, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, and other issues. We are contributing our wisdom and solutions—(inaudible)—constructive role. On the peninsula nuclear issue, we see a paradigm of successful cooperation between China and the U.S. China is committed to denuclearization, peace/stability on the peninsula, and a negotiated end to the issue. We are encouraging the U.S.-DPRK engagement and improvement of inter-Korean relationship, thus playing an important role. It is because of China’s commitment and the efforts of all parties that we see a major turnaround on the peninsula this year, and further cooperation with China will become a key in promoting and completing denuclearization. China has become—(inaudible)—for international order. After the Second World War, countries have done some reflections, and together they founded the U.N. and international order based on multilateralism. China is a founding member of the U.N. and a permanent member on the Security Council. China is actively integrated in the existing international system. We have joined almost all major international organizations and signed over three hundred international conventions. China is playing an increasingly important role in global governance. Although the existing international order is not one hundred percent perfect, but it is effective on the whole. So we must observe and preserve the existing order. China cannot and will not start a new order. Multilateralism, free trade, and other well-established international norms must never be undermined. To reform and improve a system is only to make it more just and equitable, and more responsive to the current circumstances. Dear friends, for the U.S. and for other countries around the world a China that pursues peace, cooperation, and openness and opportunity or a challenge. Is a China that plays a positive and a constructive role on the global stage a partner or a rival? I believe that anyone with no bias or hidden agenda will come to a sensible conclusion. A Chinese writer once observed in the long journey of a person’s life only a few steps are critical. Sixty-nine years ago, the then U.S. administration took a hostile policy toward China, leading to twenty-three years of estrangement and confrontation between China and the U.S. And then forty-six years ago, President Nixon opened the door to reengagement between our two countries, ushering in an era of peace and prosperity. Now, the relationship between our two countries is a common asset. It is the result of generations of people’s efforts, so it must be preserved and valued. Just like this glass, it is easy to break it, but it will be difficult to restore a broken glass. So now we see this relationship coming once again to a crossroads. If our two sides can look at each other in a positive and accommodating light, expand and deepen cooperation, and manage our differences then we can overcome the current difficulties to start a more promising journey to a brighter future. At this critical juncture, I will count on the people with vision in both countries to assume their responsibilities and take concrete actions to maintain healthy and stable growth of the relationship. Let us together take this relationship forward in the right direction. History will remember those who take the lead through the mist. So this is—I want to say to you. Thank you. (Applause.) RUBIN: State Councilor, thank you very much. Those were very useful comments, and in the spirit of your comments, which called for a constructive relationship between our two countries based on a mutual understanding of each other’s issues, let me ask you a few more specific questions, if I may. I think it was in 2014 or thereabouts that President Xi said something to the effect that Asia is for the Asians. What did he mean by that? And a related question, I guess, is that I’ve had the impression, at least, that China felt that our alliances, in a way, were useful because they constrained or restrained, I suppose, Japan and others from developing greater military capability and also for constraining further geopolitical engagement. Is that still their view about alliances and if we didn’t have the alliances, what do you think our allies would do in the military and geopolitical area? WANG: Well, Asia belongs to the people of—(inaudible)—similar things like—(inaudible)— RUBIN: How do you make this louder? WANG: —belongs to the African people. This is just actually encouragement for Asian countries to enhance—(inaudible)—common efforts to—(inaudible)—Asia. But this does not mean we cannot continue—(inaudible)—a closed continent—(inaudible)—closed. China has never been closed. Historically, for five thousand years—(inaudible)—China’s open—(inaudible)—be strong and prosperous like in Han Dynasty and Tang Dynasty; when China was closed—(inaudible)—like the Ming and Qing Dynasties. (Inaudible)—based on the current situation, the reason why we have come such a long way in development is because we have pursued reform—(inaudible). And that policy has delivered tremendous benefits to China. (Inaudible.) Last April at the—(inaudible)—annual meeting, President Xi Jinping made it very clear publicly that China will open even wider and will never go back in its openness. To that stands as an encouragement for all Asian countries to work together in accelerating our development, keeping abreast of the times in this globalized age. So we hope that the American friends—(inaudible)—positive perspective. As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, that is something that was born in the Cold War era. It is something between the U.S. and Japan. We have no intention to interfere. It’s something that should be left to—(inaudible)—to decide. But if we can (give ?) our perspective on this, we hope there will be much more mutual understanding—(inaudible)—rejecting the old pattern of thinking, way of thinking, because we are living in a (new ?) age of globalization. The United States is our biggest trading partner. Japan is our—(inaudible). Our interests are closely entwined. And even on the military side, we are open to (more ?) communication and common effort in maintaining peace and security in this region. So I expect—(inaudible)—arrangements made by the United States and Japan. At the same time, we hope any arrangement made by the two countries will (actually ?) contribute—(inaudible)—for peace and security in this region like China has been playing a positive role in this region. Thank you. RUBIN: Thank you, State Councilor. In that context, you had mentioned the South China Sea. There’s, obviously, a difference of view with respect to the sovereignty with—where the South China Sea fits with respect to China’s sovereignty, or sovereign territory. What do you think would be an effective process for resolving our differences? WANG: Well, on the South China Sea, I also talked about this in our brief conversation. I think the American—(inaudible)—historical background of this issue—(inaudible)—at the end of the Second World War, when our two countries were allies. The Chinese soldiers—troops actually traveled in U.S. warships to these islands and recovered the islands in the South China Sea—the Nansha Islands, the Spratlys—from the Japanese. This is something that has been stated very clearly in the Potsdam Proclamation. Hence, it is very clear that China has the sovereignty over Nansha. But when things took a turn, that was in 1960s and ’70s, when China was going through a cultural revolution. The domestic situation was not going so well, and that was the time when some Chinese neighbors started to occupy those Chinese islands and reefs. Several countries took these islands and China’s sovereignty was undermined. Even so, China still believes in peaceful means in seeking solutions. China signed the DOC with ASEAN countries back in 2002. I was the one putting Chinese signature on the document. The DOC said very clearly that there would be no use or threat of force, but the issues would be left to those nations directly by the parties concerned. And we will honor our word of the DOC. And now China and ASEAN countries are working on the COC, which can be seen as a reinforcement of the DOC. It will be a stronger document, and it will further prove China’s commitment to peaceful settlement of the—of the disputes, even though China is becoming stronger. So we hope that people will get down to the real facts surrounding the South China Sea issue and also recognize China’s sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement. RUBIN: Well— WANG: (Inaudible)—history. Some people say maybe there are acts of militarization. But on those islands and reefs, there are some facilities for civil purpose like lighthouses and ports, docks for emergency assistance to provide relevant services to those distressed vessels. And there are similar different—at the same time, there are some defensive military facilities, as some other countries have done. At the same time, I should point out that very often the United States has sent heavy weaponry—strategic weaponry into these areas, like strategic bombers over our heads, sending military vessels very close to Chinese islands and reefs, and has people on those islands feel the pressure and threat. There is a need, they feel, for them to enhance defensive facilities. But these facilities are for pure defensive purposes, have nothing to do with militarization. I also want to tell you that China’s sovereign claims in the South China Sea have never changed. We have the same—we had the same claims when we founded New China—the People’s Republic of China—and these claims have remained the same until today. We have made no new claims. But if you want to ask China to give them up or change these claims, that would be impossible either. Each government needs to be responsible to its people and needs to defend the sovereignty and territory integrity of the country. I hope to have your understanding on this. Thank you. RUBIN: Thank you, State Councilor. That seems to me a good example of the kind of issue that is, on one hand, very complex, but on the other hand, calls for us to have a constructive relationship within which we can try to make progress and find a solution that works for both countries. Recently, China, though in a very small way, participated in a Russian military exercise, and your two leaders met. Russia, as you know, is viewed in this country and I think pretty much around the world as a deeply disruptive country at the present time—assassinations in the U.K., interference in our elections, Syria, Ukraine, and so forth. What is China’s view of Russia and what is China trying to accomplish or what is their purpose? What are they trying to accomplish for both the shorter run and the longer run by engaging with Russia? WANG: On China-Russia relationship, you know, there was a quite tortuous course in this relationship. There was a time when the two countries fought. It’s a fact known to all, and we both have drawn lessons from the past, and we want to build a new kind of relationship featuring nonconfrontation, non-conflict, and no targeting any third country. The reason why China wants to enhance relations with Russia is because Russia is our largest neighbor, and there is a need for normal and friendly ties between neighbors. Hence, China wants to develop such a good neighborly relationship with the Russian side, certainly. The two economies are highly complementary. We need the Russian energy like oil and natural gas, and they need Chinese processed goods, quality and inexpensive Chinese goods. And, hence, we are fostering closer economic ties. Internationally, Russia is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. China needs to enhance cooperation with all other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, including Russia and the United States, to fulfill our special responsibility mandated by the U.N. Charter. That is maintaining global peace and security. On international issues, China and Russia are on the same page. Our two countries, China and the U.S., are on the same page on many issues, too, like on the Korean Peninsula issue we both believe in denuclearization and fighting terrorism. China and the United States are—(audio break). So it’s only natural for China to foster and develop normal and friendly ties with all other countries, not just Russia, but also the United States. Thank you. Oh, one more thing. You said we participated in the military drill with the Russian side. We also participated in the past in PACRIM (sic; RIMPAC)—(inaudible)—by the U.S. We wanted to continue to participate, but the United States disinvited us. Well, it’s OK. Whenever you change your mind and you welcome us, then we will consider it. (Laughter.) We’re also doing those military exercises with other countries, like ASEAN countries. So this is all normal. Like military—mil-to-mil ties to increase mutual understanding, we think it is normal and we don’t see a need for one to read too much about this. Thank you. RUBIN: Let me just—and maybe you have incentive to respond to this. I am curious. I mean, Russia, to many in this country, seems like a major disruptive force in global affairs. Do you have any view on that perspective? WANG: Well, we do have a divergence of view on this. The China-Russia relationship has grown very strong. There is peace in the four-thousand-kilometer-long China-Russia boundary. We don’t see Russia as a threat to China. As for differences the United States has with the Russian side—and they’re serious differences—my suggestion is for a dialogue and consultation to take place to seek solutions. We believe that anything can be worked out through equal dialogue. RUBIN: OK. (Laughter.) WANG: Thank you. RUBIN: Let me ask you this, State Councilor, and, again, this is coming from somebody who has an enormously strong view that we have to have—an imperative, actually, that we have to have a constructive relationship in both of our interests to deal with climate change, nuclear proliferation, economic well-being, and so forth. On the other hand, a lot of things affect American attitudes. Let me give you an example. We’ve been criticized around the world, as long as I’ve been around, for the way we—for racial relationships in the United States—that is to say, how we’ve treated our people in certain respects. So now you come to the question of Xinjiang Province or, rather, autonomous region, and the issues and the actions that have taken place in that region. I think it would be very helpful to us—us, who care enormously about having constructive relations with China—if you could explain the actions the Chinese government has taken in the autonomous region. WANG: First of all, I want to tell you that the affairs of Xinjiang autonomous region are China’s internal affairs. We do not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and we hope that other countries will not interfere in China’s domestic affairs. Xinjiang is home to a large number of Muslim people. And I’d tell you that the percentage of those who are Muslim in Xinjiang and the per capita possession of religious (certificates ?) in Xinjiang are the highest globally, or among the highest globally. I believe that shows, according to our constitution, that China is respecting the freedom of religious belief in Xinjiang. At the same time, there were terrorist incidents in the Xinjiang, hurting innocent lives including Muslim people and people of other faith or ethnic groups. These are pure terrorist attacks. Who launched them? They were launched by people—by IS and al-Qaida elements. They took a lot of terrorist and violent videos, and showed these videos to those disgruntled people who they say were out of work, and they were deeply influenced and they were turned into terrorists and violent people, and that was a time when Xinjiang was very unsafe and insecure. So what should the Chinese government do? It must live up to its responsibility for law and order, for protecting the safety of the people and their property. That is the bound duty of any government. Hence, over the years, in Xinjiang and in other parts of China, to protect law and order, acting in accordance with law and regulations, we are doing what we should. In the past couple of years, we’ve seen no more terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. There are twenty million people living in Xinjiang. They support the measures taken by their government because they now feel safe and secure. They can have a good sleep at night. They are no longer living in fear of terrorism. Isn’t it a good thing? That is a good thing the government does for its people. I think it’s something that any government should do. There are some individual people not happy with what the Chinese government is doing, still, influenced by those extremist ideas. What we see is they’re trying to—(inaudible)—fabricating some stories which have no base to affect how foreigners may perceive—(inaudible). I want to bring you to the real facts, to what is really happening in Xinjiang. China will never allow this threat of terrorism in China. If such a large country as China that is coming under the influence of terrorism, you can well imagine how disastrous that would be for the whole world. And, as I said before, the Chinese government is deeply firm in fighting the spread of terrorism in China. That’s what we need for our domestic development. It is also China’s contribution to the global cause against terror. Thank you. RUBIN: State Councilor, thank you, and that is very helpful on a number of issues of great interest to all of us. Now we’ll take questions from all who are here. Yes, sir. And please state your question—say who you are, state your questions briefly, so we can get as many questions in as possible. Q: Odeh Aburdene, the Capital Trust Group. Mr. State Minister, what’s China’s policy on Iran in view of the tension between the Trump administration and the Iranian regime? And how do you see the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran? WANG: China and Iran have maintained normal state-to-state relations. Iran is a major country in the Middle East region. We respect its status and influence. We hope to see stability and growth of that country playing a positive and constructive role in the region. It is in this direction that we have been developing relations with Iran and doing our work. As you know, including the United States, with years of negotiations we worked out a JCPOA. Maybe it’s not a perfect document. We don’t see any international agreements to be perfect. But as we arrived at consensus on the JCPOA and signed it and that agreement was endorsed by the Security Council in the U.N., we believe any international agreement needs to be followed, observed. And major countries should set an example in observing international agreements. If major countries are not honoring international agreements, just imagine how things would be for smaller countries. The biggest result of the JCPOA is to effectively curb Iran’s nuclear program development, and it ensures that 100 percent Iran’s nuclear facilities will be under the rigorous monitoring of the IAEA. I think that’s a positive thing for the region. If we do not have a JCPOA and if Iran, like the United States, withdraws from the JCPOA, it will have no—its hands will not be tied in developing nuclear weapons. That may even invite an arms race in that region. Is that good for the people in that region? Is that good for global peace? Of course not. So how shall we go about this issue nowadays? I believe first and foremost we need to uphold the sanctity, efficacy, and effectiveness of this international agreement. At the same time, we may have another platform. With openness and a fair mind, we can provide all stakeholders to talk about issues of interest like the missile issue and others. Iran may also be invited to this platform to present its case. Isn’t that a positive approach? We hope that we will not be the act of using domestic models and intellectual actions to undermine an international agreement that has been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. Otherwise, its impact is not just about the Iranian nuclear issue or the JCPOA, it may impact the entire global order, making people feel doubtful if we should go ahead with any other international agreements and if there is credibility with the major countries. That’s a matter of serious nature. As for relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we certainly want to see improved relations between them, patching up their differences, mending fences, and they will show mutual accommodation between the two countries. I have faith that that day will come, and we will look forward to that day. Thank you. RUBIN: It may not be tomorrow. (Laughter.) Yes, sir. Yeah. Q: Barnett Rubin, New York University. The United States has very much appreciated the cooperation of China in efforts to fight terrorism and to bring peace and development to Afghanistan. But there is one point which we sometimes find difficult to understand in view of China’s strong stance against terrorism, and that is, why does China defend terrorists based in Pakistan from U.N. Security Council resolutions? What is China doing to end state-supported and -sanctioned terrorism in Pakistan? And will China-India cooperation in Afghanistan, as discussed after the Wuhan summit, extend to cooperation against terrorism based in Pakistan against India and Afghanistan? WANG: I’m concerned if you have very close ties with India. It seems that you and your Indian friends are very much on the same page (on this issue ?). I want to say first and foremost China is against all forms of terrorism. And secondly, we have been supporting and encouraging Pakistan in its efforts in fighting terrorism. Years ago, at the request of the U.S., Pakistan participated in the fight against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Pakistan actually paid a heavy price for that. Pakistan has paid a heavy price and has made a huge contribution. We believe that there should be a fair judgment of what they did. As for the listing issue at the U.N., which organizations should be listed and which not, we will continue to be fair in—(inaudible). If all parties come to a consensus, we will support it. But it is the parties that are rightly concerned who are not coming around to the same conclusion, like India and Pakistan don’t have the same conclusions. Then what should we do? Maybe we can set aside this a little bit, and when there is a consensus we can move this forward. I think that is a reasonable approach. Whether these people are terrorists or not there should be solid facts and proof. If there is irrefutable evidence, no one can turn its back on it. I don’t think Pakistan will do that. As for the differences that you referred to, they are very complicated because they involve some historical background and territorial issues. So we hope that the parties directly concerned will be able to come to a consensus, and then together we will be able to push the process forward. We think that is a better way to go, and we will stay in close touch with India on this issue because we also have very good ties with the Indian side. We hope to see an early consensus, and together we can contribute to the fight against terror. I thank you. RUBIN: Oh, back—yeah, right over there. Yep. Q: Liz Claman from the Fox Business Network. Welcome to New York City, sir. Thank you for being here. It is no surprise that the U.S. government, specifically the Trump administration, would like China to drop the requirement that American businesses who want to do business in China have to have a Chinese partner, the concern of course being that the Chinese partner may, let’s say, borrow intellectual property. We’ll use a nice word there. Is China willing to drop this requirement in the spirit of, as you said at the beginning of your speech, getting U.S.-China relations back on track? Thank you. WANG: The first thing I want to tell you is that there’s not a single piece of legislation or requirement in China asking for forced technology transfer from foreign firms to their Chinese counterparts. If you find anything like that, please bring it to our attention. Secondly, some foreign companies are entering the Chinese market working in partnership with their Chinese counterparts. They have their own comparative advantage—American firms on the technology side, China on the market side. American firms want a share in the Chinese market and Chinese companies want to have technological cooperation with their American counterparts. In the spirit of contract, they reached an agreement, and based on that agreement there will be certain amount of technological cooperation or technology transfer from American firms to the Chinese partners to enhance their presence on the Chinese market. At the same time, the American firms, they have received the payment of royalties. And they have the royalties, they have the Chinese market presence; why are they accusing China of forcing them to transfer technology? There’s no such thing. If you think this is unfair and a forced technology transfer, you are welcome to bring it to the court. We have a specialized IPR court. I want to tell you that when foreign firms bring such cases to Chinese forums, eight percent cases are won by foreign firms. I think that also indicates that there is greater transparency and a level playing field in China. Many foreign investors are now entering into areas where wholly-owned foreign firms are possible. There are still a small number of sectors which are not yet fully open. That is something agreed upon by China and other countries when China joined the WTO. Even so, we are still easing market access for foreign investors. The number of areas where joint venture is required is coming down quickly, and ninety-six percent of the items involving foreign investment can just go through the simple funding process instead of applying for administrative approval. The process is open and transparent. There has been repeated accusation of Chinese firms stealing U.S. technologies. This is simply not true. We hope that such untrue accusations will stop. Thank you. RUBIN: State Councilor, let me ask a follow up, if I may. You had made a comment in your—or made the observation in your comments that there’s no legislation requiring the transfer of technology. But if you speak to American companies today, it is certainly their experience that in order to get access to the Chinese market in certain areas they are being required to enter into partnerships or transfer technology one way or another, and that I think is undermining business support for the American-Chinese relationship. What do you think would be a good—since there’s a different perspective, or at least you certainly express a different perspective than the experience that American companies report, what would be a good way to try to resolve these differences and reach a resolution that is satisfactory in China and also American companies think is fair to them? WANG: Well, if you look into a case each and every firm, I think most of the American companies are also happy with their businesses in Chinese market. But they may not speak up, and a small number of companies who are not so satisfied may speak up louder. But I don’t think they represent the majority of the companies in the Chinese market, although I’m not in charge in economic affairs. But I can tell you, all these companies, Chinese authorities will be open to hearing your complaints and they’re ready to address your legitimate concerns, and all these legitimate concerns will be seriously addressed. China has benefitted so much from opening up and we are determined to continue this opening up. We will continue to welcome foreign investment. And if that’s the case, we will certainly provide them with a better—(inaudible)—investment environment. We are now introducing across the country the management model of—(inaudible)—Negative List. And each year we will have a revised version of the Negative List, coming shorter every year. The investment environment in China will only get better, and we hope that the American firms will continue to have confidence in the Chinese market. RUBIN: Yes, sir. Back—yep. Q: Yes, good morning. Michael Blake, New York State Assembly member, new term member for CFR. Councilor, good to see you. So many people may not realize that in The Bronx we actually have the largest West African population in the world outside of West Africa, and so we’re very interested in understanding the substantial increase in investment of China into Africa, having a better understanding as it relates to what’s working and what’s not working. I believe there’s been an additional $175 billion proposed investment from China over the next ten years. So understanding that would be very helpful. Thank you. WANG: Both China and African countries are developing countries. We want to enhance our mutually beneficial cooperation. We believe that when there is better development of all developing countries, there will be more peace and harmony in our world. And that is also consistent with President Xi Jinping’s proposal for building a community with a shared future for humankind. So we are prepared to do what we can to help our brothers and sisters in Africa to enhance their development as part of South-South cooperation. We have our own traditional (independent ?) relations with African countries. First is no interference in African countries’ internal affairs and developing relations. And we will not go after our selfish interests (during ?) our assistance to African countries. It has no political strings attached. We consult with African countries instead of imposing our wish on them. We will also take into account the actual needs of the African countries themselves. Like, in the past what they needed most was poverty alleviation, and later it was infrastructure development. Nowadays, maybe going into the future, it’s industrialization. Hence, this cooperation has been moving forward as things further develop. In a recent forum on China-Africa cooperation summit in Beijing, President Xi Jinping announced eight major actions. The first is to help African countries develop their industrial system to turn your advantages in natural resources into your advantages in pursuing development in the industrial and other fields. That is what China has been doing with African countries, which has been welcomed and supported by the African countries. Some people say that that has created a debt trap because China is lending too much to the African countries. I want to tell you that China is still a developing country. We don’t have that much money to invest or lend. So each and every project needs to go through a rigorous feasibility study and evaluation to ensure it will be economically viable, it will deliver social benefits, it will suit the needs of the recipient countries. And through negotiations with them, we will provide needed financing support on favorable terms. The debt problem that some African countries face is not caused by China. It has a historical background. China’s loans actually account for only a small number of their debts. Because the issue has become more acute because of the price fluctuations in natural commodities and a certain policy adjustment on the part of the United States, and that has caused a temporary difficulty for these countries in paying off debts. So how do we respond to it? We have made it clear to African countries we are open to friendly consultations with them to find a way that works for both sides, and we will never allow it to get in the way of the African countries’ development. Thank you. RUBIN: State Councilor, yeah, thank you very much. This is a difficult time in this country in many respects, and it’s a difficult time in the way that we’re dealing with China in the view of many of us. And as Richard said to you earlier, hopefully you can use the Council as an institution that can help China in its engagement with our country and in working toward a better relationship. So we thank you enormously for having joined us and we wish you the best. (Applause.) (END)

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