United Nations General Assembly

COLEMAN: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m Isobel Coleman and it is my great pleasure to be here this afternoon with the minister of foreign affairs from the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Excellency, Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir, who really needs no introduction. So many people who speak here don’t, but in this case, anyone who has followed anything about Saudi Arabia for the last decades knows His Excellency extremely well. He has studied in the United States, began his diplomatic career in Washington, D.C., became the Saudi ambassador to Washington for nearly a decade, and, in April of 2015, became the country’s foreign minister. So welcome. AL-JUBEIR: Thank you. COLEMAN: Thank you for joining us here today. AL-JUBEIR: Thank you. Great to be here. COLEMAN: I thought I would start with an easy question. Yemen. (Laughter.) AL-JUBEIR: Yes. Very easy. COLEMAN: Very easy. The war has been going on for some years. Some are saying that it has become a quagmire. There is growing consternation at the U.N., broadly among human rights groups, even among those—some in the American Congress about the direction of the war, concerns about U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Has it become a quagmire? How are you thinking about the war in Yemen? What are your next steps? AL-JUBEIR: Yeah. I don’t believe it’s a quagmire and this is a war that we didn’t choose. This is a war that we didn’t want. This is a war that was imposed on us. People forget that Saudi Arabia was instrumental in bringing about a transition in Yemen from President—former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to the transitional government. We brought Yemenis from all walks of life in what is called the national dialogue. They discussed the future of Yemen. They came up with a vision of Yemen that would be a federal system and they plotted out their future, and then they chose a group to write the constitution, and then the Houthis struck. They moved from Sadah to Amran, and they took over Sana’a in a coup, and they declared themselves in charge of Yemen. The president of Yemen was imprisoned in his house. He was able to escape and go to Aden and called for support, and we responded based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. There was no way that we were going to allow a radical militia allied with Iran and Hezbollah, in possession of ballistic missiles and an air force, to take over a country that is strategically important to the world and that is our neighbor. And so we responded to reverse the coup that the Houthis staged, and over the past three and a half years, four years—almost four years—the Houthi control of Yemen has shrunk from eighty percent to twenty percent. The Houthis have lobbed 197 ballistic missiles at our cities and they have fired more than two hundred ballistic missiles at Yemeni cities, and I don’t see outrage. The Houthis have laid siege on towns and villages and stopped food and water from coming into those villages. As a consequence, people starve. We get blamed. The Houthis prevent the World Health Organization or delay their entry into areas controlled by them to vaccinate people with cholera vaccine that we paid for, and when cholera breaks out people blame us, and I don’t see outrage at the Houthis. The Houthis use boys who are eight, nine, ten, eleven, put them into battle. We capture them, we rehabilitate them, we send them back to their families, and we get blamed. The Houthis randomly plant mines all over the country and people lose life and limb, and nobody says anything. We get blamed for it. When we have operations that—where a mistake is made and we think a mistake is made, we investigate, we announce the results of the investigation, and we pay compensation, which is what you do according to international humanitarian law. The Houthis, none of this. They assassinate political leaders, including the former president. No outrage. The Houthis have made more than seventy agreements and they haven’t fulfilled or lived up to any of them, and we get blamed. We support the U.N. political process. We support the U.N. envoy, whether it was Ismail Ould Cheikh or whether it’s Martin Griffith(s). The Houthis talk one thing and nothing happens, and we get blamed. So I tell people, before you rush to judgment and accuse us of something, what other option did we have. Do we want a Hezbollah-controlled country on our southern border? No. Not going to happen. Do we want a Hezbollah-controlled country controlling access to the Red Sea where more than ten percent of the world trade takes place? No. Do we want to give Yemen to the Iranians? No. Ten percent of the Yemeni population, as we speak, lives in Saudi Arabia. We have incredible ties with Yemen historically—familial ties and political ties—and we expect that once this war is over, and it will be over, that we will be able to go back and reconstruct Yemen and turn them into a good partner of ours. We have provided Yemen with $13 billion in humanitarian assistance in the—since the war began, which is more than the rest of the world combined. We have set aside $10 billion that we will increase to twenty billion (dollars) for a fund for the reconstruction of Yemen. We have an office that’s already looking at what projects to do in Yemen and how we can fast track them once the war comes to an end, and we hope that the Yemenis will—that the Houthis will accept a political solution, because we have said from the very beginning that the solution to this problem is a political solution, not a military one, based on the outcome—based on the GCC initiative, the outcome of the Yemeni national dialogue, and U.N. Security Council 2216. Very simple. The Houthis have every right to be part of the Yemeni political system. But they have no right to dominate the country. And we’re hoping that as the military pressure continues to build on them that they will come to the negotiating table and make a deal that they could have made three years ago. And so it took an international coalition of more than sixty countries including the world’s great powers—the U.S. and France and Germany and England and Australia and you name them—five years, if not six, before they were able to turn the dial against ISIS in Syria. So when people say it’s been three-and-a-half years or so—this has gone on too long—what about the fight against ISIS in Syria, of which we were a founding member? So these things take time, and you hope that your opponent or enemy would be wise enough to recognize that it’s better to make a deal than to keep on fighting. So we’re not against a political settlement. We’ve supported every initiative for a political settlement. It’s the Houthis who have said no. Now, we lost the communications battle from the beginning and that’s why people—that’s why the— our reputation has taken a big hit. That’s why there’s a lot of public pressure on governments, from NGOs, and from media and so forth about this war. But I think people are not realistic in looking at this picture, and my question is usually what other option did we have. There was no other option. COLEMAN: You mentioned the need for a political resolution. The Houthis walked out of the U.N.-led talks in Geneva a couple of weeks ago. AL-JUBEIR: Yes. COLEMAN: The UAE has said that they would reengage in a political process. I assume Saudi Arabia is ready to—always ready to engage on that process. Do you see a U.N.-led political process having any viability in the medium term—near to medium term? AL-JUBEIR: Yes. Yes. I’m optimistic. I’m an optimist. I always tell people that if your job is to solve problems you have to be an optimist. If you’re a pessimist, you can’t be a diplomat. You should be a journalist—(laughter)—with all due respect to journalists, because you can write things—you can express your pessimism. But if, as a diplomat, I am pessimistic, why am I doing this job if I don’t think a problem can be solved? Why am I even tackling it? So, yes, I believe the U.N. process is the only viable process for a resolution of this. We have great respect for Martin Griffith(s). I think he’s approaching it the right way. We have great respect for Ismail Ould Cheikh. And I think he—with continued perseverance, I think we will get there. COLEMAN: Thank you. Well, you mentioned Syria so let’s turn to that hotspot. Assad is still in power. The Iranians seem to be coming more entrenched. The Trump administration is making noises about removing troops. What do you see happening in Syria? How does Saudi Arabia intend to protect its interest there? AL-JUBEIR: I think— COLEMAN: As you’ve noted, that has been a very long war. AL-JUBEIR: Yes. No, and Syria is very tragic. It could have ended much, much sooner had there been more robust support for the moderate opposition in the beginning of the conflict. But there wasn’t. I think drawing a red line and then not enforcing the red line was a huge strategic mistake that emboldened the Assad regime and its allies. And then when the—when Russia intervened, it tipped the balance and that’s when the military option was no longer viable, and our view is we need to work on a political settlement based on the Geneva 1 declaration and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a political process, constitutional committee, and then referendum, and then elections, and the—Staffan de Mistura has been working on this. We worked in 2015 to bring the Syrian opposition, unify them at the Riyadh conference, and we succeeded, so now we had one grouping. Last summer, we worked on getting the Syrian opposition to—again, to Riyadh 2 conference last fall—sorry—where they adopted the position that they will go into political negotiations without preconditions so that the idea that Bashar al-Assad has to leave at the beginning of the process was no longer a precondition. The political process will take place and it will evolve, and whatever the Syrian people want in the end of it is what they get. There were the talks in Astana with regards to de-escalation zones that have been somewhat successful and somewhat not. There were discussions at Sochi where the concept of a constitutional committee was adopted where the opposition would nominate fifty, the regime would nominate fifty, and the U.N. would select fifty from NGOs and other groups. Those people have been selected. There’s still some give and take a little bit with regards to the ones selected by the U.N. envoy. I think the regime wants to have more of people who are closer to it and Staffan de Mistura has been resisting this. So I think we’re hoping that we’ll move towards a political settlement. There is no option other than that. The military situation will come to an end. But then you have to deal with reconstruction, and you can’t have reconstruction absent a credible political process. And if you don’t have reconstruction, the situation will become much worse because Syria will continue to be a magnet for extremism and terrorism, which is a danger to all of us. So that’s where we are in Syria. COLEMAN: Syria is a place where your interests quite closely align with those of Israel. How are you coordinating with Israel with respect to Syria? AL-JUBEIR: We’re not. COLEMAN: Not at all? AL-JUBEIR: No. (Laughter.) We have no relations with Israel. I think in Syria we have—our interests are aligned also with Jordan, with other Arab countries. We are working within the Arab world of trying—of mobilizing a group of countries in order to have some influence on the political process in Syria. COLEMAN: OK. Maybe we can turn to the peace process, or maybe the lack of a peace process. I think from the administration’s view—the U.S. administration—there seemed to be hope that Saudi Arabia would bring the Palestinians along, and from New York it doesn’t look like there’s much going on. Do you want to talk a little bit about where that resides right now? AL-JUBEIR: I think we do not bring the Palestinians along. We support the Palestinians and we advise the Palestinians. But, ultimately, the decisions are those for the Palestinians. Our position is that a political settlement is the formula we all know. It’s two states. It’s ’67 borders with minor mutually-agreed-to adjustments to incorporate most of the settlers into the—into Israel—East Jerusalem, Palestinian capital, West Jerusalem, Israeli capital—the old city, special arrangements so that both sides have sovereignty over their holy sites. And then we have the issue of refugees was already settled in terms of the formula for dealing with it. The issue of security—the plan was developed by General Allen in 2000. It’s probably sitting on a shelf somewhere at the NSC—can be updated, and everything else is in place. The formula is there. Our advice to every administration since the Bush administration was you have to take a plan. The two sides cannot come together because it’s too difficult. You have five issues to deal with—forget the order—borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, security. If the leaders agree on one, it becomes very difficult to agree on the second. If they get to the second and they start to think about the third, the rug gets pulled out from under them and it goes nowhere. There’s distrust between the two sides. We know that most people want a two-state settlement. But they don’t trust each other. So our advice is put the package together and put it on the table and mobilize the international community to support it and give the two parties the confidence to move forward. And this still remains our position. So the Palestinians—we have tripled our support for the Palestinians in terms of monthly support for the Palestinian Authority. We have provided $150 million for the—for the Islamic trusts in Jerusalem. We have—we have added $50 million to our contribution to UNRWA to reduce the gap from the U.S. cutbacks. The Emiratis and the Kuwaitis also joined us in putting $50 million each so we can reduce the gap further and we have said to the Palestinians that this is a process that you drive. So this idea that we will deliver, we don’t deliver. We support. COLEMAN: Was the U.S. decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem and to cut off funding for UNRWA, which supports the Palestinian refugees, was that a mistake? AL-JUBEIR: I think the decision to move the embassy was a mistake that we disagreed with vehemently. We thought the—we believe that Jerusalem is a final status issue that should be decided at the end of the talks. We believe that it violates the principle of not taking unilateral actions that jeopardize the final status talks, and this is what happened. Now, the administration has said that the final borders of Jerusalem are subject to negotiations so that didn’t really recognize East Jerusalem as being part of Israel, and they said that the status of the holy sites remains as is so that means they didn't recognize Israeli sovereignty of the holy sites. So what have they done? Inflamed the passions of 1.5 billion Muslims, and in the process, it led to a deterioration in the relationship between the U.S. and the Palestinian Authority, which makes it more difficult to engage and to try to talk about peace. The issue with UNRWA is tragic because UNRWA is responsible for the education of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children and it’s responsible for running schools for refugee camps. It’s responsible for providing milk for kids. It’s responsible for—that’s what it does. And if we don’t support UNRWA, the misery in the camps goes up, the potential to recruit extremists goes up, and violence goes up. So it’s—I hope that the U.S. will find a way to reverse that decision or to find other means to support institutions that provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in the refugee camps. COLEMAN: Thank you. So last month, the Canadian foreign minister issued a tweet calling for the release of two activists who had been detained in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi reaction was fierce. AL-JUBEIR: Yes. COLEMAN: Tom Friedman called it an absurd overreaction. Others have said it was quite out of—out of line. The Saudis—you pulled your students from Canada, people receiving medical treatment. Diplomats froze airlines. It’s been a deep freeze between the two countries. Chrystia Freeland, the foreign minister, was here yesterday and said you two have been talking. I just wonder if you could comment on where you see that dispute, how it’s evolving, how it will be resolved, and also talk about human rights in Saudi Arabia, which she’s not the only one to have raised concerns about crackdowns on activists, broadly. AL-JUBEIR: Yes. Two things—the students are in Canada until we can find a place to move them. So we didn’t pull out the students. The patients—we don’t have patients in Canada. I believe there are only two. COLEMAN: OK. AL-JUBEIR: So that’s exaggeration. We stopped new investment in Canada and we stopped new Canadian investment in Saudi Arabia, and we stopped airline traffic to Canada, and we asked Canada to take their ambassador back and we recalled our ambassador. We didn’t cut relations. It is outrageous, from our perspective, that a country will sit there and lecture us and make demands—we demand the immediate release. Really? We demand the immediate independence of Quebec. We demand the immediate granting of equal rights to Canadian Indians. What on earth are you talking about? You can criticize us about human rights. You can criticize us about women’s rights. America does. The State Department issues reports every year. British Parliament does. European Parliament does. French Parliament does. German government does. Others, too. That’s right. Let’s—you’re right. We can sit down and talk about it. But we demand the immediate release? What are we, a banana republic? Would any country accept this? No, we don’t. You do this, you play into the hands of the extremists who are opposing our reform process. If we don’t take steps, it means that we’re weak. If we take steps, we damage a relationship with a friendly country. We didn’t do this. You did. Fix it. Fix it. You owe us an apology. You can talk to us about human rights anytime you want. We’d be happy to have that conversation like we do with all of our allies. But lecturing us? No way. Not going to happen, and enough is enough. We don’t want to be a political football in Canada’s domestic politics. That’s what we became. Find another ball to play with, not Saudi Arabia. And that’s where—that’s why the reaction in our country was so strong. Very easy to fix. Apologize. Say you made a mistake. We had the Canadian ambassador. He met with our public prosecutor, who explained to him what the charges are and said to him this is not about rights. This is about national security. These were individuals who are accused of taking money from governments, accused of recruiting people to obtain sensitive information from the government and passing it on to hostile powers, accused of providing—raising money and providing it to people who are hostile to Saudi Arabia outside of Saudi Arabia. Some of them were released as the investigation proceeded. Others will go to trial, and the evidence will be revealed to the world. So the Canadians knew this was not about rights. This was about national security. And then for a tweet like this to come out in this manner, from our perspective, is outrageous. COLEMAN: Thank you. In your role as foreign minister, you travel around the world and meet with many leaders in the business community and, undoubtedly, top of the agenda is Saudi Arabia’s reform initiatives. Do you hear concerns from members of the business community about capital flight, which we read about, and also due process in Saudi Arabia with people who have—business leaders in the country who have been—we all read about the roundup in the Ritz-Carlton last fall—just concerns about rule of law and how that affects investment? AL-JUBEIR: I think the concern we had in Saudi Arabia was about corruption. I think we—not I think—I know that we tried to deal with it from the bottom up. It didn’t work. So you take drastic measures and you take dramatic action and you deal with it from the top down, and you then settle with people and if—those who don’t want to settle they end up going to trial. And most of them have settled. Some of them will go to trial. That was the most effective way to deal with this issue, and it sends a message that we will not tolerate people looting from the public treasury. We will not tolerate people providing sweetheart contracts to their friends in exchange for a percentage of those contracts. And so this was a powerful message that was sent to people and I think it’s a reassuring message that if you want to do business in Saudi Arabia you don’t have to worry about paying kickbacks. That’s on the one hand. In terms of reassuring investors in Saudi Arabia, we have upgraded our commercial laws. We’re upgrading our legal system. We’re making it more efficient, we’re making it more transparent, and I think this will enhance investor confidence in Saudi Arabia. We’re opening up the country to—or new sectors for investment like mining, like entertainment, like recreation, in terms of renewable energy, in terms of infrastructure, and we’re seeing investors coming in to look at these projects. We have—we’re trying to build a society that’s based on innovation and technology, renewable energy, because we think that’s where our strength is. We want to reduce our dependence on oil. Our income from—the percentage of our GDP from oil is shrinking and we want to reduce it further. We can produce oil for a hundred years, but the world may not need it in twenty years or thirty years. I hope they use it for a hundred years or they find other uses for it. But we can’t—we have to move away from that and move towards a more diversified economy and that’s why our Vision 2030 plan—that’s the objective it’s trying to achieve and so far things are moving in the right direction. I expect that things will keep accelerating at a faster pace. Last year, we had almost zero economic growth. This year, the numbers were revised twice by the IMF upwards and we’re looking at close to two percent growth. We expect more next year and I think that’s—as the changes—the structural changes begin to kick in, you will see—expect to see more accelerated economic growth. COLEMAN: Do you think that the rise in GDP growth and the rise in the price of oil takes some of the pressure off of the urgency for the reform agenda in Saudi Arabia? AL-JUBEIR: No. No. We looked at the Saudi—I’m not an economist so I speak about this second hand—we looked at the Saudi economy. We said we’re a country that has no debt. We expect to have X amount of deficits. We should raise some debt because—it’s domestic debt as well as external debt—because domestic debt is good. It gives banks something to invest in. And so we’ve assumed that over a period of X number of years we will close the deficit and we will have been able to cover the gap in spending during the ensuing years from a combination of borrowing, bonds, and our financial reserves, and then we will end up without cutting back on spending so that you keep spending constant. It doesn’t impact the quality of services you provide to your population. It doesn’t impact on the projects that you’re engaged in. But you just cover the gaps combination of borrowing, bonds, and reducing from your deficit. And so we have been ahead of projections in part because of the increase in the—in the—in the price of oil as well as the amount of oil being produced. But that doesn’t change what the—what the objective is. The objective is to go full speed ahead with the reform plan and the objective is to not let any changes in the price of oil have an impact on us. Whether the price goes down, whether the price goes up, we have to go through this process in order to achieve our objectives. COLEMAN: I’d like to turn now to our members and take questions from you. If you could, please, stand, wait for the microphone, state your name and affiliation, and just a reminder that this is on the record. We’ll start in the back—this woman right here. Thank you. Q: Thank you. Mina Al-Oraibi, the National newspaper. Your Excellency, I wanted to ask you about Iraq. We saw an opening up of relationships with Iraq. But things seem to have slowed down. Is it a wait and see with what happens regarding the government and how much of that is part of the wider regional push in facing off with Iran? Thank you. AL-JUBEIR: Yeah. No, there hasn’t been a backing off. Quite the contrary. We’re moving forward very robustly in our relationship with Iraq. We have now—we have more frequent travel between ministers from Saudi Arabia to Iraq and from Iraq to Saudi Arabia. We set up a consultative council between the two countries that includes more than ten different ministries. We have increased investments in Iraq. We are looking at more investment in Iraqi infrastructure. We have—we have—we’re trying to—we have opened up the border crossing with Iraq. We have started commercial airline business between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. So we—the relationship in the last year and a half has grown by leaps and bounds. Trade between our countries is exploding. We are looking at more ways of improving this relationship. We have had virtually all of Iraq’s leaders come to Saudi Arabia and we have, I think, what you—what may be confusing people is Iraq has gone through an election and then Iraq is in the process of forming a new government, and so the focus tends to be on that rather than on the—on the—on the other issues. We’re committed to having the best ties with Iraq. Iraq is an Arab country with a rich history. Iraq is an important part of our history in terms of the Abbasid dynasty and it’s a neighbor of ours. We have geographic links with Iraq. We have tribal links with Iraq. We have familial links with Iraq. We’ve had many, many people from the Arabian Peninsula migrate to Iraq over the centuries and many of them have come back and become among our merchant elite, and we have a lot of people from Iraq who have moved to Saudi Arabia. So it’s a very, very strong relationship. We—that was complicated by a military dictatorship that was not very friendly to us. But on the people-to-people level, the relations with Iraq are as strong as they are with any of the other Gulf States. And so we are committed to having the best ties with Iraq and we look forward to continuing to build this relationship. COLEMAN: Right here. Roland. Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, my name is Roland Paul. I’m a lawyer. I’ve been in the U.S. government a couple of times. Could you say a few words about the falling out, on the one hand, of Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other? Are you moving toward a resolution of that situation? AL-JUBEIR: It’s not a falling out. It’s just we don’t want to have anything to do with them. (Laughter.) The Qataris, since the mid-’90s, have been sponsoring radicals. They have been inciting people. They have become a base for the leadership for the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood, you have to keep in mind, is the—is what begot us Takfir wal-Hijra which begot us al-Qaeda which begot us Al-Nusra. The Qataris allow their senior religious clerics to go on television and justify suicide bombings. That’s not acceptable. The Qataris harbor and shelter terrorists. That’s not acceptable. And, nationally, the head of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2000 entered Saudi Arabia on a Qatari passport. We captured al-Qaeda types coming in to Saudi Arabia with Qatari passports. The Qataris know this. The Americans know this. The world knows this. The Qataris are funding dissidents in the Emirates and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait in order to cause problems for those governments and to create instability. Why would you do this? The Qataris pay ransom to terrorist groups, including $500 million to Hezbollah in Iraq, $50 million to Qassem Soleimani, according to text messages between the Qatari ambassador to Iraq and the foreign minister of Iraq, including I don’t know how much to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is not acceptable. If we gave $1 to Hezbollah in Iraq, we’d be sued in a court down the street. And so the Qataris use their media platforms to spread hate. The Qataris send weapons to al-Qaeda-affiliated militias in Libya. The Qatari emir was conniving with Gaddafi on how to overthrow Saudi Arabia. The Qataris connected Gaddafi with a Saudi dissident in London who they fund, who connected the Libyans with this group in Mecca with the objective of assassinating the then crown prince, later king, of Saudi Arabia. Is this acceptable? We have phone conversations that the Libyans gave us after they overthrew Gaddafi where the then emir of Qatar is telling Gaddafi how he’s recruiting princes and tribal leaders and military officers and members of the royal family to cause mischief and destabilize Saudi Arabia, and predicted that within ten years there would be no royal family in Saudi Arabia. Is this acceptable? They do the same thing in Bahrain and in Kuwait and in the Emirates. So in 2012, we cut off relations with them—the same countries—and a year later they came back and agreed that they will end all of this nonsense and they signed an agreement, and nothing happened. So this time, we said, you know what—we’re not going to deal with you until—unless you change we will not allow you. There’s a list of terror financiers that the U.S. puts out, the U.N. puts out, and a number of them are living openly in Qatar raising money and giving it to bad people. Is this acceptable? It shouldn’t be. Why do the Qataris get away with it? Because I think people see a young country, young leadership. They buy fancy buildings. They have a nice airline, and they think, wow, these guys are really modern. But we have to deal with the dark side that I just explained. And so that’s why we said until, unless you change, we’re not going to deal with you. Now, what happened since we took this action? They signed an MOU with the U.S. on terror financing that they had refused to sign before. They changed their laws to allow the introduction of evidence provided by a foreign government. They reduced their support for Hamas, which opened the door for reconciliation among the Palestinians. All of these are good things. Now we’re waiting for them to continue to implement all the things that they promised to implement. They refuse to engage in a dialogue about implementing these issues and we refuse to talk to them. And so, for us—and we’ve said this to them—we’ve taken the steps that we took. No dealing with Qatar. You can’t overfly our airspace. You can’t import things from our market. You—we will not—the military cooperation is still ongoing because that’s a GCC issue and with the U.S. so we do that. But the other stuff is all frozen until they change, and I hope they change. And if they don’t change, we’re patient people. We’ll wait for ten, fifteen, twenty years, fifty years. How long did it take you with Castro in Cuba? We can do the same with Qatar. We have no issue. It would be nice of them if they acknowledge that they have a problem and then they can fix the problem, and the problem with the Qataris is they’re still in denial and we need to move them from denial to introspection so they can fix the problem. We have no hostility towards Qatar. We just vehemently oppose their behavior, which is very dangerous to us and has endangered our citizens and has endangered our security, and that’s why we took the steps we took. COLEMAN: Ambassador Indyk. Q: Martin Indyk, Council on Foreign Relations. AL-JUBEIR: Hi, Martin. Q: Adel, it’s very good to see you here. AL-JUBEIR: Thank you. Q: I wonder if you could do a kind of balance sheet for us of how the Iranians are doing in terms of their efforts to establish their hegemony in the region. They seem to be, notwithstanding all your efforts, more ensconced in Yemen. They seem to be well on their way to establishing a pro-Iranian government in Iraq. In Syria, despite all the efforts, they seem to be well entrenched there as well and, of course, in Lebanon with Hezbollah. So I wonder how you see it from Riyadh, whether the efforts to contain and pressure them are actually working yet. AL-JUBEIR: I have no doubt that they—that they’re working and that they will continue to work. In Yemen, they’re losing. In Iraq, their position is not what it was a few years ago. In Syria, over the long run they will lose, and in Lebanon, Hezbollah is going to change. No doubt about it. The Iranians are going to face tremendous pressure—economic pressure and political pressure—as a consequence of the sanctions that are being placed on them. We see their currency dropping incredibly. We see inflation up tremendously. We see budget deficits. We see an inability to sell oil and we see rising discontent inside Iran. That’s not a nice picture. If you go beyond the Middle East, the Iranians—the Iranian position in Africa is a skeleton of what it was three or four years ago. Iran is isolated in the Islamic world. Their position in places like Bangladesh and Malaysia and Indonesia a fraction of what it was three years ago. And so I think the pressures are tightening. In the Middle East, like I said, you have the four spots. We’re dealing with it. And it took them thirty-five years or so to entrench themselves. We will work on pushing them back and I have no doubt that in the end we will succeed. The Iranian position is not sustainable. You have two visions for the Middle East. You have a vision of light and progress and modality and moderation and innovation and taking care of your people, and you have the vision of darkness, which is about sectarianism and terrorism and murder and domination, and that’s the Iranian model. It will not prevail over the long run. It just—history shows us that that model is doomed to failure and I have no doubt the same will happen to Iran and I hope that Iran can have a government that is responsible, that is a member of the community of nations in good standing so that the Iranian people, who have a great history and a great past, can lead normal lives. COLEMAN: Down here. Q: Thank you. Raghida Dergham, Beirut Institute. On the short term—immediate term—how do you expect Iran to react to the pressures by the administration, particularly in Yemen and Syria? Some people are afraid of revenge. Some people are afraid that they are not going to curb back their expansionism but, in fact, you know, use other methods. And what conversation are you having with the Russians in terms of using their influence with the Iranians to pull back in Syria and in Yemen in particular? Do you have any leverage with the Russians? AL-JUBEIR: On—the Iranians are already doing all the things you’re saying. A hundred and ninety-seven ballistic missiles launched at Saudi Arabia, manufactured in Iran, operated by Hezbollah—how much—what else can you do more than this? Trying to destabilize countries. Every day we—people are captured trying to send explosives and weapons into Bahrain. They’re trying to recruit citizens in order to commit terrorist attacks. I mean, they’re threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. OK. What else can the Iranians do? And if we’re going to base our policy based on fear of what the Iranians may or may not do, they’re already doing all the bad stuff and they have been for thirty-five years and they’ve been relentless, and, if anything, it’s accelerated, not slowed down, and especially after the signing of the JPCOA (sic; JCPOA). I can’t—I haven’t read about one road, one hospital, one school that Iran built since they had access to billions of dollars. But I have seen missiles go to the Houthis, explosives smuggled into Bahrain, and money going to fund the war in Syria, at the expense of the Iranian people. So the issue is Iran is responsible for the position it’s in. Iran is the world’s chief sponsor of terrorism. Iran is the one that is trying to dominate the region. Iran is the one that is sending its Quds Forces and Revolutionary Guards into other countries to destabilize them, and that has to stop. That has to stop. Now, with regard to Russia, we have conversations with Russia. We don’t talk to people about talking to the Iranians. Our view is Iran has no role in the Arab world. Our position is that Iran has no role in the Arab world other than to get out. And with Russia, our conversations are about the general situation in the region and it’s about moving Syria towards a political process. It’s about our common interests in terms of energy. It’s about the peace process. It’s about fighting extremism and terrorism. It’s about the unacceptability of interfering in the affairs of other countries. So we have a good dialogue with Russia on this. And I think that in the long run in Syria the Iranian position is not tenable, and so we’re working in that direction. COLEMAN: Back here. The woman here. Q: Thank you for coming to speak today. AL-JUBEIR: You’re welcome. Q: Brooke Goldstein of the Lawfare Project. You mentioned that Saudi Arabia was going to supplement the funding to UNRWA. So I’m wondering what, if anything, are you doing to ensure that the funding isn’t going towards, you know, producing textbooks that teach martyrdom or funding Hamas, who has come in through al-Qudlah (ph)/al-Islamiya and recruited children? Because that was the primary reason why we did cut our funding. And also, if you could speak a little bit about the hate education that’s been reported about by Freedom House and by Human Rights Watch about Saudi textbooks as well. AL-JUBEIR: Yes. On UNRWA, we are talking to our partners—the other donors of UNRWA—about restructuring how the operations of UNRWA so we can focus on the essential items, because the Palestinian refugee population is going to grow and which means expenses are going to need to increase, and we want to look at the programs that are essential and the programs that are—that contribute to the well-being of the Palestinian people and focus on those. So this issue, I believe, will be dealt with. In terms of the hate speech in Saudi Arabia, I believe that’s a legacy issue. Not I believe; I know it’s a legacy issue. We have revamped our educational system over the last fifteen years three times. We have introduced new teaching methods. We have new textbooks. We have new curriculums. We teach a national baccalaureate. We have reeducated public school teachers and private school teachers. And we have adopted the policy of zero tolerance, whether it’s in the schools or whether it’s in the mosques. But people still go back to issues in the past and say, oh, it’s still continuing. But we are dealing with this very firmly. You cannot have a normal country if you have extremism. That’s why the openness of our society, the empowerment of women, the empowerment of youth, introducing recreation, introducing entertainment, introducing openness, introducing tourism, promoting our historic sites. All of this is part of the process of having people in Saudi Arabia—normal people living normal lives. You can’t have this if you’re promoting extremism or if you allow any kind of extremism to take place. We have purged imams from our mosques, several thousand of them, and we’ve made it very clear that our policy on extremism is zero. We have jailed a number of Islamist—a number of so-called Islamic scholars and we were attacked by the very same people who criticize us, like Freedom House. Oh, my god, you’re taking away their freedom of speech. OK. Explain to me—when they speak you tell us they’re preaching hate. When we put them in jail, you tell us, why did you stop them from preaching—you took away their freedom of speech. It’s a damned if we do, damned if we don’t situation. Which one do you want to do? And but our view is—our policy is zero tolerance. We will not allow anyone to preach extremism or hate because that undercuts our ability to move our country forward and improve the standard of living for our people. COLEMAN: Right here. Q: Thank you, Mr. Minister. Zach Virden (ph), Princeton University. Over the last three years, there’s been a remarkable surge in Gulf State engagement across the Red Sea and into the Horn of Africa and the region, more broadly, with political, economic, strategic impact. Could you comment on both the opportunities, which we’ve already seen, but also the risks as some of the aforementioned rivalries play out on a wider chessboard? Thank you. AL-JUBEIR: Thank you. The—let me take a step back. People focus on the conflicts in the region. We have been looking at the Red Sea and we see great opportunity. We worry about the environmental impact because what happens on one side of the Red Sea can impact the other side, which is us. We have some of the most fragile and beautiful corals in the Red Sea along our coast and we don’t want to see them disappear. We want to build tourism destinations there but on less than twenty percent, and keep the other pristine so that we maintain the environment. So we have an environmental need to work together. As we develop the Red Sea, especially in the north, it’s important that that development be aligned with what Jordan does, with what Egypt does, with what Sudan does, so that we don’t—we don’t have either congestion or we have something that benefits all of us in the Red Sea. So there’s that element. There’s an economic element that I just mentioned. There’s a security element—smuggling, whether it’s drugs, whether it’s human trafficking—that is important—and piracy issues, of course. So unless we work on this cooperatively, it’s not—if we work on it cooperatively, we all benefit. If we don't, we all lose. And so we proceeded to try to work on bridging the divide between Eritrea and Ethiopia and we were able to succeed in getting them to sign a peace agreement after twenty years of conflict. We worked on bringing together the president of Djibouti with the president of Eritrea in a historic meeting after ten years of boycotting. So that opens the door for reducing the conflict. We worked with Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia on seeing how they can work together in order to help stabilize the situation in Somalia. So that’s still a work in progress, and our sense is if we end these conflicts the economic opportunities are tremendous, whether it’s in the field of agriculture, whether in the field of power generation, whether in the field of infrastructure, and we all stand to benefit. It helps us with our food security. It helps us with our investments. It helps us with calm in the region. It helps us with all the criminal elements—aspects that take place, especially towards the southern part of the Red Sea. We have a lot of people who get trafficked across the Bab al-Mandab into Yemen and then they smuggle them into Saudi Arabia. And so that’s a concern of us that we want to—we have concern about radicalization in the Horn of Africa because of the instability in Somalia. So we want that resolved. So we’ve now—we’re moving towards a more cooperative approach and we’re talking to the other countries along the Red Sea and we’re talking to our friends in the Gulf to see how all of us can move this region from conflict to stability and then move it towards development. We all benefit if this happens. So that’s actually one of the bright spots in our region. Q: Yes. Sy Sternberg, New York Life. You spoke earlier today about the Palestinian-Israeli solution requires two states for two people. How, if that’s the case, can you reconcile the situation of right of return where the Palestinians return to Israeli side of the border as opposed to the Palestinian side of the border, creating a de facto second Palestinian state? AL-JUBEIR: I believe the right of return was dealt with at—to some extent at Camp David in 2000 and a few weeks later at the Taba negotiations in 2002. The thinking was that Palestinians would have Palestinian passports and they have a right to return to the state of Palestine or go wherever else. There would be a fund set up to pay compensation and, if my memory is correct, a certain number who were born in Palestine before the state of Israel was established can go back to their homes and that number was—I don’t know what their final range was—thirty, forty, seventy thousand, one hundred thousand over a number of years, and that’s how you—that’s how you deal with the right of return and I think that’s the understanding that the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed to at Taba. The sticking point was the issue of acknowledgement of guilt. I don’t know what the exact term called. I’m getting old so my memory is fading. But it was the issue of acknowledging wrongdoing. And then the Israelis wanted an acknowledgment that something was also done wrong to the Jewish populations who left Arab countries. And the—then there was—it was some esoteric argument. But the formula for the right of return, I think people have made too big an issue out of it. It’s a matter of principle, but it’s not about this idea that six million Palestinians will go to the state of Israel. COLEMAN: Henry. Q: Henry Siegman. AL-JUBEIR: I know you. Q: Good to see you back here. On my way here to this meeting, I caught a news flash on my telephone that at the United Nations the—our president said to Bibi—told Bibi that he is back now in his own thinking that a two-state solution is necessary and that Israel will have to make certain accommodations to that. So my question to you is since the Kushner team has been consulting with your own leadership probably more so than any other leadership in the area, is this something that you think in terms of your take on the president’s thinking on this subject? Is this something that we should take as seriously as all of his other pronouncements or should we take it seriously? AL-JUBEIR: I mean, I think anything the president—anything that a president says is serious. The administration has always said if the two parties want a two-state solution we’re for it, and then—and now the president today said that he’s in favor of a two-state solution. I think everybody is. The issue really is how do we move towards it and how do we come up with a package that is—that is realistic and that has a high probability of success. As I mentioned in the beginning of our conversation, the formula, we know, it’s in the marketing and it’s in the providing cover for both sides to make the painful decision to move towards peace. And our hope is that—and we’re prepared to play a role in this. But, ultimately, the two sides have to make that decision. And so I—the president expressing his support for a two-state solution I think is a positive statement. COLEMAN: We are, sadly, about out of time right now. So I apologize for those questions I couldn’t get to, and I just want to say thank you so much to Ambassador al-Jubeir, and I think it’s obvious why he’s considered to be one of Saudi Arabia’s great diplomatic assets. So thank you for speaking with us. AL-JUBEIR: Thank you. My pleasure. COLEMAN: So I will—(inaudible). AL-JUBEIR: Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.) (END)

Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad discusses his return to political power, Malaysia’s continued development, and its foreign policy within Southeast Asia and with the United States.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez discusses the new Spanish administration’s domestic agenda, Spain’s role in the European Union, and U.S.–Spain relations.

President Moon Jae-in discusses the current situation on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea’s alliance with the United States.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, and International Trade Diversification Minister Jim Carr discuss Canada’s global outlook, including the government’s perspective on the future of multilateralism, the importance of economic growth that benefits everyone, gender equality and women’s empowerment, fighting climate change, and restoring confidence in democratic and international institutions.

GAVIN: Well, hello, everyone. Welcome. I am so pleased to welcome President Masisi to the Council on Foreign Relations and to welcome all the members to today’s Darryl G. Behrman Lecture on Africa Policy. I’m Michelle Gavin. I’m a senior fellow for Africa policy here at the Council. And it gives me tremendous pleasure to introduce President Mokgweetsi Masisi, who became the fifth president of the Republic of Botswana earlier this year after many years as a parliamentarian and as a minister, earlier in his career as an educator and an expert in education policy. I had the pleasure of serving as the United States ambassador in Botswana a few years ago and I came to know him as an extraordinary leader, one whose passion for Botswana is perhaps matched only by his work ethic, and really as a tremendously thoughtful and engaging partner when our countries had shared interests to pursue. So Botswana, as most people in this room know, is small but mighty. At the bottom of nearly every development index at independence in 1966, in less than fifty years it became an upper-middle-income country and has been a stable, peaceful democracy in the midst of a very turbulent region, and sometimes a lonely but courageous voice when its national values and principles put the country at odds with regional consensus. It’s truly a fascinating example of what is possible in the world and of how much governance matters. And so, with that, President Masisi, the floor is yours. MASISI: Thank you. Thank you for your kind introduction. I feel a little spoiled. (Laughter.) But good afternoon, everybody. As Michelle said, I am Mokgweetsi Masisi, the fifth president of the Republic of Botswana, being a beneficiary of an automatic succession clause in our constitution. So I was a lucky guy. I became president because of that. But our term of office as a government ends next year. So come next year October, I’m on my own, as they say. We face an election, and the election will happen, and a new leader will be elected or new leader, I would hope. And then we go on for five years and then hold another election. But be that as it may, it’s important that we share what we are with you, persons who make this a vibrant foreign relations institute work so well. Botswana has many, many values that it shares with the United States of America. We are a constitutional democracy, Westminster-styled democracy, parliamentary democracy. And we subscribe to the fundamentals as understood by yourselves too. The rule of law is critical for what we believe in. We believe in free enterprise, though we have a mixed economy. We believe in the—we have rights included in our constitution and they are protected. We believe in zero—we have zero tolerance on corruption. And we as a country have held a very firm foreign policy stance. And essentially, our foreign policy evolved out of a firm conviction of doing what is in the best interest of Botswana, and therefore began by looking at the world through the lens of Botswana. And, informed by our domestic policy, we then articulated how we saw the world. So the ideals of democratic dispensation are some things that we hold dearly, and so our foreign policy is premised on recognizing, promoting, applauding, encouraging democratic practice and behavior. We are a nonviolent country, and so that is why we took so long in the eyes of some to actually put together an army. Our army was only set up in 1977, and that was after very many years of provocation, abuse, bullying by the then-white minority ruled, racist regime of apartheid in South Africa. But despite that, we were very firm in our conviction and (ordealized ?) our conviction as we were—you know, we abhorred racial discrimination and that which came with South Africa. We’re very strong on private-sector commitment. And so this young, nascent government, a government of one of the twenty-five poorest nations in the world, soon after the discovery of diamonds in the late ’60s came together to the table to knock out an agreement with a giant mining company, De Beers. And thank goodness to our diplomatic efforts, we had with Canada three Canadians who advised the Botswana government, and the outcome of those discussions resulted in the formation of a joint partnership between De Beers and the Botswana government, fifty-fifty owned. And it is that company that got the license to mine. But we took our time to learn about diamonds, for we had no trained personnel in diamonds. So we reposited our faith in the De Beers partner and we used mineral revenue to send our able citizens to school all over the world—here, the U.K., Canada, all over—and they learned the ways of mining. And it’s now resulted in a real benefit for ourselves because out of the agreement—we had a fifty-fifty partnership—the proceeds we earn as a government amount to about eighty percent and De Beers remains at twenty percent. And they are still very happy and mining. So I say this because I want to draw to a close so that I give Michelle a chance to fire a few questions at me. (Laughter.) Around all this, which is extremely, you know, critical for us, is the conviction, the application of good governing principles. So none of these things would have happened if we did not have the leadership we had, if we did not put in the frameworks we had, if we did not put in the institutions that we had, and if we did not have the friends that we have all over the world. So our commitment to being global citizens has been very beneficial to us. GAVIN: Thank you so much, Mr. President. Can I just follow up on that? Because Botswana does have an extraordinary story, and one of the questions I’ve always asked myself is, how does a leader make Botswana not just right in many of its decisions, but influential? How does a country with just a bit over two million people exercise influence in the region? MASISI: You know, when our foreign policy was first articulated for documentation, the first president of the Republic of Botswana put it really, really aptly. And he said we know who we are; we are Botswana. And he quoted the figure of our population at the time. We’re small and unimportant. Even when we speak, however hard you believe in what we do, we don’t make the world shake. So we’re pretty circumspect of who we are. However, you know, in this day and age, we are convinced that our track record, our example, when matched with what we say about it, would carry some weight of influence. If we speak of, you know, anti-corruption, if we speak of good governance, if we speak of the rule of law, if we speak about the inalienable protection of private investment, they can come to Botswana and, you know, put us to the test. There are so many instances we can cite and draw on our literature to exemplify that. So we are convinced that our influence bears more out of our track record than our might in economics or military, which is hardly any might. GAVIN: So there is a debate raging here in the United States and around the world about whether or not democracy is in decline. And Botswana comes in for both praise and criticism when people—when the conversation turns to democracy. It is clearly a place where people exercise their franchise. Free and fair and credible elections occur regularly. People are free to criticize the government, and do, to voice their opinion. But at the same time, the same party has controlled Botswana’s government since independence. And there are, as you pointed out, some structural advantages to incumbency. And so what I want to ask you is, I know that of course you are a loyal and enthusiastic member of the BDP, but I ask you in your capacity as president of Botswana: Can you ever envision a day in which the BDP is not the ruling party of Botswana? Or is that idea anathema to you? MASISI: No, it’s—I can well imagine it. And that what’s motivates me to work harder. I can imagine how disastrous it will be, but—(laughter)—I still do imagine it. GAVIN: Sure. MASISI: And I—and I hold conversation with my political opponents about it. But, you know, truth be told, if we were to lose an election, there will be nothing that changes. The sun will continue rising in the east and setting in the west, and Botswana will remain. Botswana is much more important than anybody’s ego. So if it was me that was leading the government and the party when that fateful occurs, I will hand over power. And if they call me back to go and show them many other (draw ?), I’ll do it. I’m not going anywhere. I’ll be home. And then I’ll get to do what I really like to do much sooner than I had intended. (Laughter.) GAVIN: Well, we can talk about what that might be, but— MASISI: So I don’t lose sleep over that, so. GAVIN: (Laughs.) I’m not so sure that everyone feels the same way in the neighboring country of Zimbabwe. So recent elections there were marred by some post-election violence. There were some problems in the pre-election climate. There were some ominous remarks about the military’s role. But you also have newly-installed President Mnangagwa working hard to deliver a message about a new direction for the country, a clear desire to turn around the economy. So, given Botswana’s commitment to democracy, past record of speaking out against repression in Zimbabwe, and the fact that Botswana plays host to many Zimbabweans who have fled their country due to economic collapse and in some cases political violence, what do you believe is the right role for Botswana to play as Zimbabwe’s neighbor now? MASISI: We share a very long border with Zimbabwe. We share a very long history with Zimbabwe. And Zimbabwe has gone through a bitter, long, tragic history prior to being Zimbabwe particularly, as Rhodesia. This tragedy has played itself out, and the people who now play a leading role in Zimbabwe have been the victims of a lot of that. And it has—have to have some effect. They went through a very painful liberation war. And we watched in, you know, pure anxiety as developments in Zimbabwe unfolded leading up to the resignation of President Mugabe and the installation of President Mnangagwa. And then they didn’t—told us that they were going to have elections, and they were going to be free and fair. And thankfully, they said they are going to have observers invited from everywhere, anywhere. So we sent a team of observers as a country, and we obviously contributed to those who were part of the SADC observer mission. The AU sent observers. The EU sent observers. And God knows how many others sent observers to Zimbabwe. And, frankly speaking, in terms of conduct of the elections, the reports we got from our observers is that they went pretty fairly and well. At least in any abrogation there were of the rules, they were not sufficient to have declared them not free and fair expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. But then there was a contest. There was a challenge to that. And what we were thankful and we’d like to commend the Zimbabwean government for is that they resorted to the court system as prescribed in the constitution within the time limits. As to the arguments and the outcome, I am not an expert in that, but apparently it was a unanimous decision by the highest court of the land to declare President Mnangagwa the winner. And so an invitation was issued for us to attend the inauguration. I was among those. And one of the reasons I went was to try and get a sense and feel for myself in there how it was. And it was celebratory and some of the opposition party leaders came. And clearly, the main opposition party did not come, the MDC. And we had a chat with President Mnangagwa, briefly as it was, but he pledged to us, the leaders from the neighboring countries around him who were there, that we would not need to worry for it would all calm down, particularly that some people had, I think, rioted or acted out and there were some incidents. And some investigation commission has been appointed to do that. No, the diplomacy of calling out on your neighbor when you think they have done something terribly wrong, we don’t do that way anymore. We have stuck now, chosen to stick to a regular diplomatic engagement because we have diplomatic relations. If you have relations with somebody, you talk to them. And if they become too bigheaded or stubborn, then you get on the (loud hailer ?) and you tell the world. And we’ll do that, we have no worries about that. But so far, we’re engaging very meaningfully. GAVIN: I wanted to be sure to ask you about recent reports of poaching in Botswana. Of course, it’s been in the headlines here, a very alarming uptick in elephant poaching that was reported by Elephants Without Borders, and some link this to your decision to disarm the department of wildlife’s antipoaching unit. So I was hoping you could comment on the facts as you know them and on your vision for ensuring that Botswana continues to be a leader, as it has been for so many years, in conservation. MASISI: Well, let me begin from where you ended. It’s true Botswana is a leader in conservation. And I can rattle out a few facts in case they are unknown. We are the only country in the world that has deployed all our security forces on antipoaching duty—the only. We have the police, we have the army, we have the intelligence services, we have the prison services, and we have the antipoaching unit of the ministry of environment. All of them are armed in various ways. All of them are armed legitimately and in accordance with the law. And that takes me to my next point. It wasn’t a disarmament, it’s correcting a wrong. The department of wildlife has an antipoaching unit for whom certain arms have been prescribed. And then there’s a particular act that stipulates what arms are to be borne by who, which is under the custodianship of the Botswana police. And then it was found out by myself when I inquired around May that the department of wildlife antipoaching unit had in its possession weapons that they should not in law have. And like I said earlier on, we are a stickler to the rule of law. There is no way as president I could ignore that. And so I instructed the minister of justice, under whom the police fall, to write to his counterpart—call him first, you know, be nice—and then let him know that he’s going to write to him and tell him that the police commissioner is going to use his inventory list to collect for safe deposition the arms that the antipoaching unit should not have in law. And that was done quite seamlessly. And I think for adventurists, they thought that disarming the antipoaching unit—they still have arms. And these were deposited in the armory. And the instruction to the ministry of environment and the wildlife department is, in the event that they really badly need arms of that nature, they must follow the due process as established in government to acquire those. And what it is, is you raise the issue internally, your ministry, you document it, it’s escalated to cabinet and cabinet takes a position on it. And once a position is taken, in this case, it may well result in an amendment of the law or the promulgation of new legislation which enables them, empowers them, legalizes the possession of such kind of weapons. Now, the reason I am very firm on this is, in the event, for instance, Michelle, if an officer out of due commitment to duty used one of those weapons on a poacher—and we often use weapons on poachers in Botswana—if we use one of those weapons on a poacher and the family of the poacher came and sought redress, the government of Botswana would have no leg to stand on. Why would we then tell the world we are addicts of the rule of law? So, for me, it was a clear, simple compliance issue. But compliance would not be compromised or undertaken and leave a gaping hole in our security for our wildlife. Now, if you have an old army—I know the BDF is not too big, but clearly it’s big enough to cover the ground around where elephants occur. We have the army and all the other agencies to take care of that. Now, coming to the issue of the alleged poaching, we are the most committed of countries to antipoaching, to conservation. And the reason why we have up to more than seven, eight times as many elephants as we should have, given the ecosystem, is because it is we who looked after them. We looked after them so well, Michelle. The cousins as they traversed borders told the others, you know—(laughter)—the Angolan elephants, the Zambian elephants, the Zimbabwean elephants, come over here, it’s much nicer here. (Laughter.) GAVIN: It’s true. MASISI: And you wouldn’t believe this. If you went to the border, the elephants know where to go sleep as the sun sets. Now, that’s a measure of success, you know? And so when this allegation that there was mass poaching, despite all these efforts, broke, we were totally shocked and alarmed. So we deployed all these forces I’m talking about, sent out helicopters, planes. And one of the things we did, we went to the author of the report and asked him to accompany those who were in search of those carcasses to establish the truthfulness of this, and indeed they did go. On the first day, they found ten carcasses and the second day they found nine. And every small minority suggested there had been poaching. And one of the suggestions of poaching is that they would cover the carcass with branches to try and conceal them. A number of the elephant carcasses had their tusks still intact, a number of them had them removed. A number of them were old cases that had been reported. We report, we document our elephant mortality that we see in the duty of patrolling, course of patrolling, every single day. And they report to me every week. So we tried that and so we would know when the trend is getting offhand, but this was a shocker. So we went all over the place and couldn’t find any more than nineteen at different places, some as old as two years old. I mean, just, you know, old bones around there. And so we asked the officials to plead for further assistance and reinforcement to look for the others. In no way in the searches, aerial and land, did we find that number alleged, nor did we find any significant number next to near some century. And we contacted the other researchers in the area, other actors. CARACAL (ph) from Wisconsin University has a big operation in Chobe, and they all confirmed this was the biggest hoax of the twenty-first century. So I can sit here with, you know, a lot of comfort and say that, yes, there is some poaching, we do our very best to avert it. We, you know, investigate and in some instances we actually arrest and prosecute. And like many people and many executives that complain about the judiciary, we also do, right? We think they just—they’re not firm enough, but they also say we do a bad job of investigation and evidencing, et cetera. The fact is there are very concerted efforts, coordinated efforts to deal with the poaching. And so rest calmly, not in Botswana. We will continue to have challenges, particularly that we are, you know, bringing in rhino where it didn’t occur. And clearly, as the poachers who are highly experienced and apparently use performance-enhancing drugs of any kind, they would have finished the animals in areas where they traditionally poach, and they will have to test us. But you know, if you come across a poacher, warn them not to come to Botswana, they may not leave. That’s a simple fact. GAVIN: Thank you for that and for that clarity. At this time, I’d like to open up the discussion to members, but first a few quick ground rules. Please remember that this meeting is on the record, unlike some meetings at the Council, so this is not your moment to be indiscreet. We are on the record. Please wait for the microphone, speak directly into it. Please state your name and affiliation. And finally, if I could please have your cooperation, it is so rare to get an opportunity to interact with a head of state like this, so please help us all make the most of it by keeping your questions concise and limiting yourself to one question. Tony? Q: Tony Carroll with Manchester Trade. Ambassador, tectona (ph), dumela. MASISI: Dumela. Q: Actually, as it turns out, I just came back from the Okavango with a team from the University of Wisconsin. And obviously, as equal threat, maybe even a greater threat to elephant populations, is water availability. Concerns have been expressed about the up waters of the Okavango and even a Delta Act was passed in Congress to try to, shall we say, put some more structure into the idea of preserving the Okavango. Just wondering about your thoughts on the Okavango and its longevity and international compacts that will preserve this wonderful resource of the Okavango. MASISI: Shall I go? GAVIN: Please. MASISI: Well, the Okavango us extremely precious to us. It’s part of our national heritage. We are the ones who are motivated for it to be listed. It happens to be the one-thousandth world heritage site. And what we can promise the world—and you, Tony—the Okavango is there to stay. To confirm that even more, we have agreements with our neighbors. There’s a KAZA arrangement involving Namibia and Angola, Zambia to protect the Okavango. I don’t think it would be appropriate for me to talk about the performance of each of us with respect to their compliance with that, but I can tell you for a fact, soon after I became president, when I went on an introductory tour in the region, at every of those station states that I went to, which had a link to Okavango, I mentioned and talked about it. And I got from them a promise that they, too, cherish Okavango, it shall remain. And even as recently this morning, because President Lourenco spoke just before I did, we talked about it in the waiting room as we were waiting to speak. And he’s fully committed to it. He’s about to come on a state visit, he’s promised us one, and one of the activities we’re going to get into is fly over the Okavango and pass fly through Namibia and Angola. So the highlands of Angola where the source is are very important to us. It’s a rare, rare, you know, formation, the largest delta in the world. We have 11.3 billion cubic liters of water, freshwater, flows and disperses into an oasis in the desert. And the reset is magic. You need to come out there and see it. GAVIN: I can endorse that. Please. Q: Hi. I’m Rachel Robbins. I’m an independent director for Atlas Mara. And it’s a pleasure doing business in your country. There are some very exciting things happening in Africa in digital technology, mobile banking, and other areas. Could you talk about the opportunities that you see for foreign private investment, not only in Botswana but in neighboring countries, over the next few years? MASISI: Thank you. I think there are plenty of opportunities for investment, plenty. What you obviously would be looking out for would be security of investment, legislative and institutional. I need hardly say any more than we have it in Botswana, for one. So in the event that you want to invest in another country that will remain nameless and you’re not so sure about that, come put your headquarters in Botswana and then, you know, keep your money there and we’ll look after it. (Laughter.) And then do what you have to do there. But, you know, we have serious infrastructure deficits. We have serious digital deficits. We have serious challenges with systems to make more efficient operations, either of government or even the private sector. There is an awful lot that needs to be done to take us to the next level. And there is investment opportunities in the resources required to create that. In the tourism and leisure industry, huge opportunities. I just wish—we can have a private conversation after this and then, you know, we just catch up. There is so much, because we are not industrialized, most of us. And, you know, in case you are a little wary and you think it’s going to be OK to do it where you’ve been doing it, I mean the manufacturing and all that, it just won’t happen for too long because there are lots of others who are looking at the unit cost of production and distribution, and ours is getting lower and lower as efficiencies improve, education skills come about, electricity becomes available. So don’t get there when it’s too late. That’s my advice to you. GAVIN: Please. Q: I’m Reed Kramer from AllAfrica. My question is about trade. The Continental Free Trade Agreement is moving forward. Southern Africa has been a leader in regional cooperation through the Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community. Botswana has a strong economy, but you’re next-door to a bigger economy. Does free trade work for a country like Botswana? MASISI: I heard you had President Cyril Ramaphosa here. I wish he were here to help me answer this one. (Laughter.) It works more for them than us. (Laughter.) That’s a frank answer, all right? And it’s almost inevitable when you have a big, big neighbor next to you and you free the highway of trade, they will outcompete you on many fronts. But we have provisions for the protection of nascent, infant industries. So that we attempt to do. But we are committed to, you know, growing through trade, but fair trade. GAVIN: Thank you. In the back there. Q: Thank you very much. Mr. President, my name is Kuseni Dlamini. I’m chairman of the Massmart Group. Massmart Walmart in Africa. We (own the game ?) stores in Botswana and the build (us with our ?) stores. Botswana is one of the favorite places in which to invest. I can concur with you in many respects. And I also want to commend the efforts you’ve made in conservation. I was chairman of South African National Parks for six years. When we were facing the scourge of rhino poaching in South Africa, we looked to Botswana to assist. And the cooperation that we got from your government was very commendable indeed. The question that I have is that when you became president there was a lot of excitement in terms of the energy and the passion that you bring, a sense of renewal, a sense of a new dawn as we refer to it in South Africa. I just want to ask a simple question: What legacy do you want to leave as president of that great country? (Laughter.) GAVIN: Very simple question. (Laughter.) MASISI: You know, I want to leave a legacy of profound transformation. I would like to look back hopefully ten years later from the time I assumed office and objectively be able to say and evidence that there were great leaps going forward. Of course, that depends on a whole number of factors. So I am committed in my term to unlock any locked door, to remove barriers, to energize, but more than anything else to put my own citizens, people, at the center of what we do. So there’s no way I’m going to leave them behind. And success for me will be measured by there are just changes in the quality of their lives. GAVIN: Can I follow up on that, Mr. President? Because, as you allude to, there is a—there’s a great deal of economic inequality in Botswana. The government makes laudable investments in health and in education, tremendous amounts of the budget that are invested. It’s one of the top in the world on those indicators. But the HIV/AIDS pandemic that has hit Botswana so hard is in some ways hard to see these days, because your government has done such an extraordinary job of getting those who need antiretroviral drugs those drugs. And I think you’re second to none still in stopping mother-to-child transmission; it’s amazing. But the cost—the cost to Botswana of that much of your population on these drugs for the rest of their lifetimes, when I used to look at the out years, it’s pretty crippling. So how are you going to do all the things you want to do for economic diversification, empowerment, inclusive growth, while you have this constant drain on the national budget that is commendable and laudable, but really hard to get out from under? How does Botswana turn the page on that? MASISI: Do you know, it’s going to take a lot of hard, renewed reinvigoration and effort on everybody’s part. I was just chatting with the coordinator of NACA when I was on my way here, and we were arguing about the meaningfulness of the drop in the incidence rate. He seemed a little more, you know, hopeful than I. It’s dropped, I think, from 1.5 to 1.3 percent. And for a country that is a Third World, developing, relatively poor country, that for me is still way too high, and particularly that we do not manufacture drugs. We don’t supply anybody with drugs except cattle drugs; I mean, you know, for foot and mouth, or as you call it here hoof and mouth. And so this is a constant drain on our resources. And the best thing that a developing country can do is not so much the biomedical route in the long term; it’s prevention. And efficacy development, getting new ways of arming persons with the information carried right through to their behaviors, is what we’re going to need more of because, you know, it’ll be a transition over the ages. As more and more people are born and remain HIV-negative, that should reduce the cost to us. In the interim, we just got to, you know, come to grips with the manufacturers of these drugs and use our budget and plead for assistance. And I must publicly thank the American people here because I went to Texas Children’s Hospital before I came here, and I just brought buckets full of thank yous to them because, you know, if had no been what President Mahaya (ph) did, and the response came from Bristol-Myers Squibb and Texas Children’s Hospital, et cetera, and the Harvard AIDS people, I may not even be here as your president, I mean as the president of Botswana. Sorry, not—I’m not trying to—(laughter)— GAVIN: Big legacy. (Laughs.) MASISI: Please, let this stay in this room only. (Laughter.) But we were a country faced with a real possibility of going extinct. And I thank you for your humanity in that. But then, when you have been given a second chance, it’s only proper that we all act responsibly and are much more efficacious going forward. GAVIN: Thank you. Jeffrey. Q: Jeff Laurenti. First, Mr. President, I suspect at least a few people here might be willing to make the switch you just hinted at. (Laughter.) And since you’re in New York for the U.N. General Assembly session, let me ask a U.N.-y kind of question. The International Criminal Court has been castigated by some in a well-orchestrated campaign as too focused on African alleged atrocities and war crimes and such, and right next door the now-ousted president of South Africa had initiated a process of South African withdrawal. And just this month the Trump administration’s national security adviser denounced once again the International Criminal Court and saddled up his old hobby horse to eradicate it. Is this something that is so far removed from Botswana’s concerns or Botswanans’ interests that it really doesn’t matter—or, for that matter, the Human Right Council that the Trump administration has walked out on—or are these part of a structure of a more peaceful and just and working world order that you all feel somewhat strongly about? MASISI: Do you know, we as Botswana feel very strongly about the ICC and the Human Rights Council. Our commitment to those values and virtues are sacrosanct. And the simple question I have is, what’s your motive in not wanting the ICC? If you are a leader, the best way to show your disdain for the ICC is just don’t abuse power. Just don’t abuse power. And why would you want to be protected? Why would you want anybody protected when they abuse power? You know, I don’t have my sympathies in the assertions that it is just for a certain group of people. It is just a set of values that these ones have subscribed to. If you have a fight with it, come in and let’s talk as member states. We would subscribe to that. But, no, Botswana is committed to the ICC. And through our bilateral engagements, we will engage those who have difficulties with it. But you know, your guess is as good as mine as to why some might not want them. So we will stick with the ICC. GAVIN: Thank you. Laurie. Q: Welcome, Mr. President. Laurie Garrett. Thanks for being here. I want to follow on from that very smart question because the Third World War was fought in Congo and its neighboring areas in ’98-’99, and millions lost their lives. There’s great instability in that region again, and Kabila is in no hurry to step out of office though his term is long over. How grave do you see—when you look north, how grave do you see the possibility of a renewal of a kind of 1998-99 scale of war in DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, that whole—I mean, there were twelve countries involved last time. MASISI: No, I’m not convinced it’s going to—it’s going to break out like it did in ’98 and ’99, for one, because the leaders in those countries neighboring the DRC all seem to be so committed to ensuring that it’s contained, for one. But we were at a SADC—SACU summit—no, SADC summit in Windhoek, Namibia, and President Kabila came along, and he came to say goodbye. And he communicated this to use even in private session, that he will not be the candidate. And he actually told us and introduced us to the man who would be a candidate, one of his ministers in his party. But, you know, the challenges of the DRC are much more complex than a single Kabila. It’s a very complicated country. And I think, you know, we will all do ourselves and do the world a favor by coming close to understanding this. There are so many external very powerful forces at play, actively causing a lack of peace in DRC. They are much more powerful than the nation-states of Southern Africa, way beyond our reach, and there’s an awful lot of money to be made from DRC. DRC, if it were working orderly, is probably the richest country in the world, and everybody has their hand in the kitty there. That’s what the problem is. The ordinary Congolese are really ordinary people who are struggling to find sleep, struggling to find food, things they should not be struggling to find, electricity. Their, you know, capacity of generating power even from hydroelectric is in excess of five thousand megawatts. And that’s a place that should really be a test case of the U.N. to sort out and sort out properly. If there are other urgent provocateurs, I want them to come to the table. GAVIN: Thank you. Q: Jonathan Klein. I have a number— GAVIN: Can you wait for the microphone? Thank you. Q: (Comes on mic.) Jonathan Klein. I have a number of associations, but the hat I’m wearing for this question is The Global Fund against AIDS, TB, and malaria, so I’d like to go back to that issue. The fact remains that your country as a percentage of population is in the top—or bottom, depending on how you look at it—for countries in the world in terms of incidence. The only part of the world, including your country, where the incidence in HIV is going up is amongst adolescents. The question for you, and when you think about your legacy, is: What level of priority do you give to this issue, given all the other matters that you and your government are juggling? MASISI: You know, we—one of the bigger goals that we have and priorities we state frequently is our commitment to youth unemployment, right. But when you unpack it further, unemployment is compromised by disease burden or infection. We prioritize the youth in our other programming. And one of the things we’re going to be dealing with NACA as we sort out the structure again—it had been compromised somewhat—is for there to be very serious, vibrant targeting of young persons. But because of the evidence we have, we’re going to need to also target those a little older than adolescents, because there’s a lot of intergenerational sex, because most of our HIV is heterosexual-driven. So I will try and convince my colleagues in parliament—you’ll help me guess this one, whether it’s a good idea to try and convince them to promulgate legislation to criminalize intergenerational sex, before an election or after an election? (Laughter.) I’m going to be in trouble when I get home. (Laughter.) But I am committed to making sure that we not only create the programmatic environment to protect young people from each other and from those outside their cohort, but also to penalize those who so do, just the act of it, irrespective of status. And that should go a long way in helping. Part of the other challenge is, with such levels of unemployment, youth unemployment particularly—because, you know, from our tertiary institutions, out of every ten thousand, only one thousand gets a job, right, because largely of the structure of economy and because you all haven’t gone to invest sufficiently enough. So you need to help us sort out that problem. You know, youth poverty is a real issue. And when they are weaned out of, you know, government assistance in the education or whatever it is, the risks they’re exposed to are extremely high. And unfortunately, much as we don’t like it, some do end up in the wrong hands. GAVIN: Seema, and then we’ll go to Chris. Q: Seema Mody with CNBC. Mr. President, I’d like to get your thoughts on China’s rising role across Africa and if you think China can continue to invest in countries like Botswana without getting too much political influence. MASISI: Well, China—we just came back from a very successful summit in Beijing. And I say successful; we as Botswana did not participate in the first round, I mean, in the 2015 round, when there was sixty billion (dollars) up for borrowing and some grant. So this time we went and we managed to, I think, secure some funding, well within our limits, as we’re allowed in our constitution, to borrow. So we’re frugal about where we borrow money from and what for. But China, I can attest to you, had a very successful summit in Beijing. Fifty-three of the countries in Africa were present—an overwhelming majority of those led by heads of state. And the report, which is the reason why I said it was successful, from expenditure since 2015 of the sixty billion (dollars), more than ninety-six percent success rate, right. Now, individual countries are the best place to state, you know, how that has worked for them. But clearly, with so much money going out, will come the capability of engaging politically in manners that are different from when the money wasn’t there. I mean, isn’t that—doesn’t that go for everybody? So if you call it political influence, sure, they’ll have it. It might increase. And bear in mind that China has also donated the AU headquarters building, a present from the people of China to the people of Africa. And what I’ve said to some of my American friends—and I have seen the ambassador, who’s just finishing his term in Botswana—before I came here I said, in my estimation, I think you’ve been slow, just to put it frankly. You’ve been slow. The way in which the Chinese organize with summits is second to none. And they let you set your priorities. So we set our priorities. And then you negotiate the terms of the deal. If it doesn’t work for us, we don’t take it. That’s period. So we’re in business here. We’re going to take cheap money. But it’s not tied to anything. GAVIN: Thank you. Chris. Q: Mr. President, thank you very much for your wonderful presentation. It’s so nice to meet you in person. And thank you and the people of Botswana for giving us Africans an opportunity to be very proud of one of our countries. My question is— GAVIN: Can you just identify yourself? Q: Oh. I’m Chris— GAVIN: I know who you are, but—(laughs)— Q: I’m Christopher Fomunyoh. I work for the National Democratic Institute based in Washington. I oversee Africa programs. My question is a follow-up to the China question, because that’s an issue that’s being debated in a lot of African circles. Some see a lot of challenges in the way in which these deals are structured, in ways that don’t really help African countries deal with the unemployment issues for youth, because a lot of the level is Chinese-driven. Some people are also afraid of the debt traps for African countries and the fact that, sooner or later, we may run into African countries being unable to service their debts. We know that some of your neighboring countries that may remain nameless are already facing that issue with regards to the possibility of servicing Chinese debts. Other people see opportunities. I would like to hear from you, Mr. President, where you come down on this issue, not just from the perspective of Botswana, but looking at the continent as a whole, and secondly, whether there are issues that other African countries could learn from the way in which Botswana dealt with its diamonds agreement with De Beers and the way in which they structured their deals with the Chinese. Thank you. MASISI: Thank you; quite a number of questions there. GAVIN: Yes. Take what you can, because— MASISI: All right; time. Well, you know, I can speak with greatest authority on Botswana. I’m not circumstanced to talk in detail about other African countries. But I can give you a perspective of what I think. When money gets laid out there to be loaned to entities—countries, in this case—it’s a country’s sovereign right to determine how much they borrow. And it’s the responsibility of the lender to determine if there is viability in that loan, right. So one would assume that there are structures in place to ensure that the burden does not get too overwhelming. But in the world of borrowing and lending, mistakes happen. We all know that. And so if there were defaults, as you say, in some countries near to Botswana, which shall remain nameless, it would not be the first time that countries default. They’ve defaulted when they were borrowed money by others before. And they would have to know what to do. I mean, it’s like having an irresponsible neighbor, you know. But I—speaking from the perspective of Botswana, I am comfortable in what we have borrowed from China. It’s only 10.2 billion pula, about one billion USD; not—it’s not going to break the bank for us. And we’ll work the terms so that we can actually pay it off. As for jobs, it’s a balancing act. There may be some instances where the technology to be used demands a certain level of proficiency to use it, and therefore reduce the number of jobs available locally, and depends on the skill level of the person’s domestic economy, what they can bring to it, or if it’s designed to take a long time and part of it is to train people. It’s all to be structured. But countries look out for themselves. But finally, you know, rich countries, countries that can borrow money, have a moral duty and obligation to ensure a safe, sustainable world, even in the financial sector, because if you don’t, you become part of the problem too. GAVIN: Well, I think you’ll all agree with me that this has been just an extraordinary and wonderful opportunity to hear from such a thoughtful and unscripted and real head of state. And it’s nice to come away from a session feeling hopeful. I don’t know about you. I haven’t been feeling too hopeful these days. So thank you. MASISI: Thank you. (Applause.) (END)

ALTMAN: Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to the Council and welcome to the David Rockefeller Lecture and in particular to some members of Mr. Rockefeller’s family who are with us today. Welcome especially to you. I’d like to remind everybody that this meeting is on the record. And please, if you haven’t already, turn off your mobile devices, all eight of them. (Laughter.) We are fortunate today to have with us President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa. Most of you in this room probably know that he has played a very central role in the evolution of a democratic South Africa. He was the chief negotiator for the ANC during the transition to democracy. He largely created and built up the biggest trade union in South Africa, the miners’ union, the mineworkers’ union. He previously served as deputy president for four years, beginning in 2014, and he became the fifth president of South Africa just this February. He also had a sterling business career, one of South Africa’s very most successful and wealthiest business leaders. So it’s my pleasure—(laughter)—he seems to be disagreeing with that characterization. (Laughter.) So it’s my great pleasure to introduce President Ramaphosa. He’s going to deliver just a few minutes of introductory comments, then I’m going to return to the stage and question him for twenty-five or thirty minutes, and then all of you here will have your opportunity to question him as well. Thank you, sir. (Applause.) RAMAPHOSA: Thank you, Program Director, the Rockefeller family, honored guests, and ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity, brief as it might be, to share with you some perspectives on the challenges and opportunities which I was asked to address on the global environment. As you would all be aware, this year South Africa, and indeed a number of our partners and friends in many countries, are celebrating the centenary of the founding father of our democracy, Nelson Mandela. And we have just come out of a United Nations celebration of two things. Firstly, we unveiled his life-size statue at the United Nations, which we were deeply humbled as South Africans to have been given this prime spot in the United Nations to have Nelson Mandela, with his fully stretched arms, adorning the precinct of the United Nations. We also had, and it is continuing, the Nelson Mandela peace summit in which many countries, represented by their heads of state and government, speaking about peace in the world. This celebration has provided us with an opportunity, not only as South Africans but all peace-loving people in the world, to reflect on the progress we have made with regard to ourselves as South Africans on our young democracy and the tasks that lie ahead. It has also reinforced the need for South Africa to unite, to build on the legacy of Nelson Mandela, in working towards a peaceful and just and prosperous world. Nelson Mandela has taught us many things, and we continue to draw wisdom and strength from the way that he worked and what he stood for in everything that we continue to do. We remain inspired by the role he played as a bridge builder and seek to follow his example in bringing together divergent views and perspectives. At this moment in global history, as we seek to navigate the challenges confronting the political, the security, and economic architecture that has evolved over the last 70 years, we are convinced that the value of Nelson Mandela’s approach to consensus-building and his way of resolving problems and difficult situations is instructive. This view is reinforced by a number of disturbing global developments. The resurgence of geopolitical rivalry, which has not been experienced since the Cold War era, has huge implications for international peace and security. There is a growing challenge to important multilateral arrangements, and indeed to the multilateral architecture of the world, which is characterized by the withdrawal from commitments made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, on issues such as climate change, financing for development, and in nuclear nonproliferation. The rise of trade protectionism also threatens the multilateral trading system that was agreed upon on Marrakesh in 1994, as well as in Doha in 2001. There appears to be little prospect for the resolution of intractable conflicts in the Middle East and in Africa, nor has the international community managed to effectively address growing political intolerance, acts of terrorism, and right-wing extremism. While globalization has brought many and huge opportunities and much progress, it has also contributed to growing inequality among states, as well as within states. These challenges are by no means insurmountable. However, they do require a return to what I would call a cooperative and inclusive approach to international relations. The idea that might is right is wrong. There is an opportunity for world leaders, international organizations, and civil society to find ways of working together to restore the primacy and the relevance of multilateralism. At the same time, we need to emphasize the importance of a more proactive approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. We can do that by paying particular attention to preventative diplomacy, which should be supported through closer coordination and partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations such as the African Union in the case of Africa, our continent. We need to strengthen the rules-based international trading system and move with speed to transform other multilateral institutions and global governance structures to be in line with the current realities of the 21st century. This should include reform of the U.N. Security Council, which is limited in its ability to respond to current security challenges by virtue of its structure and its composition and relative lack of accountability. For the global development agenda to succeed, we have to ensure the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its means of implementation, the climate change Paris Agreement, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development. To do so, we need to build meaningful partnerships between U.N. member states, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. I’ve just come out of a meeting of the Global Compact—the U.N. Global Compact—where more than ten thousand private-sector organizations have signed up to be part of the Global Compact. It’s wonderful to see how the private sector has signed up to assist the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. As South Africa, we are determined to use every means at our disposal, including our participation in global forums, to advance the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and to consolidate regional integration. We are working together with our fellow African countries to establish the Continental Free Trade Area, which would fundamentally transform Africa’s economies and consolidate the continent’s position in the global trading system. This dream of a single African market for goods and services has been made possible by sustained economic growth that many African countries have experienced over the past few years. They have also experienced greater political stability over the past few years, and we are now beginning to look forward to the dividend of peace and the dividend of having a common market. Despite the progress, however, there are still areas where instability and conflict on our continent continue to cause great misery and hardship to ordinary people. We are still confronting challenges in places like South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and areas on the Great Lakes, and a number of other countries in the Sahel region. South Africa will continue to play its part in conflict resolutions in these areas and in combating threats to region and international peace and security. South Africa will take up a non-permanent seat on the Security Council from next year to December 2020. We will dedicate our tenure on the Security Council to continue the legacy of Nelson Mandela, whose values of peace, reconciliation, and respect continues to inspire Africa and, indeed, the whole world. In line with the philosophy and practice of the Mandela years, South Africa continues to seek warm fraternal relations and strong economic ties with all countries of the world, regardless of size, influence, or alignment. We remain firmly committed to rules-based multilateralism as the most sustainable and effective approach to the management of international relations. And we will continue to advocate for the needs and interests of developing countries to be placed at the top of the international agenda. And we will continue also to advocate that South-South relations should be strengthened and should be advanced, as we seek all countries to develop and to prosper. I thank you. (Applause.) You want me to sit down here or to stand or to kneel. (Laughter.) ALTMAN: You know, this isn’t particularly a business audience or necessarily an entirely—certainly entirely one, but there’s probably nothing more reassuring to businesspeople than to have the newly minted leader of a major country like South Africa come here and talk about dividend policy. So that was very welcome. (Laughter.) I’m going to begin with a couple of questions about foreign policy from a South Africa point of view and then ask you a few questions on the domestic side. But you made some very, I thought, encouraging comments about the way you will think about your seat on the Security Council and your approach to multilateralism and the way you view some of the geopolitical tensions as you talked about from trade to climate to nuclear proliferation. Let me ask you about relationships with the United States. Our president said a couple of months ago that he wanted the State Department to look into issues of land seizure and the killing of farmers. And you responded rather sharply to the effect, I think it’s fair to say, that that was a South African internal issue. My question is, have you been able to clear this up with this administration? Or is this still a sore? RAMAPHOSA: Well, I regret to say that I think President Trump was ill informed about what is happening in South Africa. And I think if he had taken time to get better information from us, he would have been much better informed and his comments would have been better appreciated by South Africans. Now, we have sent clear messages to the State Department and indeed to the U.S. government about the process that we are involved in. We are involved in a process of consultation and broad discussion on the land issue. And I have often said that the land issue was the original sin that was committed in South Africa when colonialists came. When they came, they took land from the indigenous people of the country, and over the number of years, laws were passed to prevent black people from owning land. And they then took eighty-seven percent of the land for themselves, they appropriated that, and only allocated thirteen percent of the land to the indigenous majority people of South Africa. Now, that has remained a wound and a sore over the many years. And I’ve often said that the ANC, the party that I lead, was founded in 1912 around the land issue. The founders of the ANC got together and said we want to get our land back. And they engaged in negotiations and deputations to try and get a portion of the land back. And over time, they even crafted a charter through which they said the land must be shared amongst those who work it, meaning that there should be sharing of the land as there should be sharing of the wealth. And they were sending a very clear message to those who had abrogated onto themselves the majority portion of the land of South Africa. And throughout the years, the message was never heeded and it led to an armed struggle. But fortunately, we had a great leader and many other leaders, like Nelson Mandela, who then finally led the country to a peaceful resolution. And that peaceful resolution sought to deal with the land issue. And over the past twenty-four years, the skewed ownership of land has continued, and a greater problem of it is that land being a great economic asset has not really been exploited as much as it should have in the hands of the majority of the people so that we can help to grow our economy. And what people have been saying is that we want access to land, and they have then said that let us then move towards having land being given to the majority of the people of South Africa. This, then, went to an ANC conference, which passed a resolution and said let us use a method of expropriating land. But we then said that should only happen—that should only happen in terms of our constitution, in terms of the rule of law. And that then started a process of—the parliamentary process of consulting our people. Up to now we’ve had 650,000 submissions and proposals that are now being currently considered by our parliament, and our parliament will come up with a report on what should be done. Part of the process could well be you amend the constitution to allow land to then be portioned out to the majority of our people, or you leave the constitution as it is and then utilize laws to do it, to achieve this objective. And we have said whatever finally happens, everything will be done in terms of the law. There will not be any land grab allowed in South Africa. We will follow—we’ll do it in terms of our constitution. We will also do it if—and obviously, we want to grow the economy of our country, to enhance the economic growth of our country, to increase agricultural production, and also to increase food security. And part of it is also to enable people to get pieces of land to build their houses because in the apartheid years that, too, was prevented. People were not allowed to live wherever they wanted. So what we are involved in is a wholesome process where we are listening to all our people. And some of the proposals that are coming forward are most exciting proposals. A number of companies that own land are coming forward and saying we want to give land away; we realize the injustice that was done in the past; we would like to participate in the resolution of this problem; so we have huge tracts of land to give away. We’ve got state-owned enterprises that are also going to be able to give land away. The state also owns land. That is also going to be in the pot of giving land away to our people. So we’ve got a number of solutions that are now coming to the fore. And with that—and forgive me for taking one more minute—with that, we believe that a solution is in hand. Now, we are doing all this relying on what I call our South African DNA. The DNA that is inbuilt in the way we do things is that which we were taught by Nelson Mandela. Nelson Mandela taught us that rather than resolve problems, however intractable they might be, through war/violence, resolve them through talking to one another. And we were able to resolve the apartheid nightmare through—which many people thought was intractable—we were able to resolve it by talking to one another, and we found a solution. Similarly, on this question of land—which, by the way, reared its head in 1996, when we drafted our constitution. We were then able to find a solution, and that solution has been found not to have been thorough enough. And now we are seeking to find a better way to resolve this problem. And I can assure you we are going to find a solution. We are going to put this problem to bed. We are largely going to be able to do so because proposals are coming to the fore, the bagful of proposals from a number of people, including landowners, including white landowners, who says we want to be part of the solution because we realize that this must be solved to secure stability for the country going forward. So our view is we need to manage this risk, and all of us as South Africans are united in our resolve to resolve this risk, to find solutions. And the solutions are coming to hand and we will be able to resolve this problem and move forward, as we did in 1994 and once again in 1996, when they drafted our constitution. So be rest assured, we are going to resolve it. And if Mr. Trump was here, I would have told him, Mr. Trump, be rest assured this problem is going to be solved in the typical South African way, because we’ve been able to solve our problems in the past. Thank you very much. ALTMAN: He is not a member of the Council. (Laughter.) Theoretically, my time as questioner is already almost up. (Laughter.) But let me turn the question or my attention to a couple of domestic issues. And let me start with the economy. RAMAPHOSA: Yes. ALTMAN: Just this past Friday you unveiled a seven-part economic-stimulus program— RAMAPHOSA: Yeah. ALTMAN: —and obviously an important step from the point of view of your administration. Step back for a moment and tell us how you view the South African economy right now. It appears to be in recession. What do you think it takes to get the South African economy growing at a level that you’d like, including the way this stimulus program will work? And just walk us through that, if you would. RAMAPHOSA: Well, when we got into power, we inherited an economy which was structurally aligned toward serving the interests of the minority. The majority of the people of South Africa were not owners, controllers, or managers of the economy. So you had an economy that was skewed, from a structural point of view, toward serving just a minority. And the majority people were just like bystanders; if not bystanders, just laborers. And it was constructed in that way for a particular purpose. The purpose was to perpetuate white-minority control. And when we got into office, we sought to manage this economy. And we managed it in a way where we said we are going to transform the economy. We’re going to transform it so that the economy serves the interests of all the people of South Africa. We are going to try to promote black economic empowerment so that black people should feel that they are participants in the economy, they own the economy as well, and they also get into leadership and management roles in the economy. That has been proceeding. But at the same time, the structure of our economy has proceeded in a way where even the IMF, looking at our economy, said this economy is dominated. Dominance of the major corporations in this economy impedes it from operating at its maximum level, because the concentration of ownership and control is just quite big. And it is an economy that was structured in a way where it was more extractive. It was based more on the extraction of minerals and selling minerals to international customers. And so it was based more on the minerals-extraction type of complex. And the manufacturing base was quite low, and over the years it has been going down most of the time. So with this type of economy, we then had to make means to see how best we can grow it. Over time, with the global economy being what it is, our economy has not been growing at the level that we expected to serve the interests of the people as a whole. And as a result, the government has had, particularly in the past few days, as our economy has entered what we call a technical recession—over two quarters it hasn’t shown growth—we’ve had to take steps as the government to try to give impetus to the economy by pumping money into the economy. But we are also constrained because our debt levels are very high and we’re servicing debt at a much higher level, and so our borrowing capacity is quite limited. So we’ve had to reprioritize our budget or our fiscal position with a view of finding money and pumping money into the economy. But we’ve also come up with an innovative idea of focusing on infrastructure as being one of the key drivers of our economy. So we’re going to be setting up an infrastructure fund in which we will pump up to four hundred billion rand to inject growth in the economy. That, we hope, will stand our economy in good stead. And we hope that it will increase spending from ordinary people and we will see more manufacturing picking up and our exports also going up. Our position—the strength of the rand has also been a bit of a problem. With the increase in the oil price, our position has not been greatly improved. But with the measures that we have put in place now, we are hoping that we will be able to return our economy to growth. At the same time, we will continue with the restructuring of our economy to enable black people to become active participants in the economy of our country. ALTERMAN: A question about corruption. You’ve talked about corruption regularly, and I watched an interview you gave just after announcing your stimulus program in which you talked about it again as an impediment at a lot of levels to South African progress. How do you think you can make changes in that? RAMAPHOSA: Well, we’ve been beset by corruption quite extensively over the past few years. Corruption started seeping into our body politic in our state-owned enterprises and a number of other government institutions. And that has led to a number of investors feeling that corruption is debilitating their enthusiasm to invest in our economy, together with other policy positions that had become inconsistent and uncertain. And we have now started, as part of this stimulus process, to reform, to embark on a number of reforms, reforms that are going to have an impact on our policy positions to make them more certain and more consistent as to be able to attract investment into our economy. But the other major issue that we’ve embarked on is to clean up, to clean up state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises account for about thirty percent of the economy of our country. And a number of them have been subjected to a number of malpractices and corrupt activities that were being perpetrated in quite a number of them at management level and at board level. So we’re cleaning that up. We’re changing boards where it is necessary, and we’re removing those managers who have been complicit in all this, and they are going to be charged and they are going to have to be accountable through our criminal justice system. So cleaning up our institutions is part of a major project that we have embarked upon, which we hope and trust and believe is going to reposition our country, particularly our economy, in a way where we will become much more attractive to investors. And that is a process that I as president am firmly focused on to show that those who are complicit should be accountable and those who are found to have done wrong should be able to face the might of the law. Once we clean up our act in a number of state-owned enterprises as well as government departments, I think that will reposition South Africa. It will make South Africa much more attractive as an investment destination. We are going to be moving to an investment conference in October, where we are hoping to raise a hundred billion dollars over a five-year period. And this is the story that we’re going to put forward. We’re going to put forward a story of South Africa that is reforming, a story of South Africa that is being repositioned as to be able to be attractive once again to not only the international investing community, but also to the South African investing community, because a number of our own corporates had stopped investing or had gone slow on investing, and that repositioning effect is going to make South Africa much more attractive for investment. So we are focused on cleaning up, repositioning our country and our economy. And by the way, let me say one other thing. The corruption has not only been the preserve of the public sector, it’s not only been the preserve of government, state-owned enterprises, or government institutions. We’ve also found quite a lot of corruption in our corporates. A number of international companies have been complicit in the corruption that has permeated a number of our state-owned enterprises in our economy, and some of them have been involved in gigantic scandals of corruption that have led, I’m sad to say, to billions of rands being lost to pension funds, to insurance companies, and that has actually been quite a horrendous story that our country has gone through. So our clean-up act is both at public sector level as well as private sector level. And in the next few months, I’m sure that our state, our criminal justice system is going to be very busy in dealing with this matter. At the moment, we’ve got a commission of inquiry. That’s what we call it in our country. It’s an investigation body. But it’s busy dealing with what we call state capture, where certain individuals in certain companies sought to capture the state and perpetrate their corrupt activities. So it is investigating all that, and bringing it to the fore. And thanks to the existence of a free press in our country, we’ve been able to benefit from their investigative journalism, which has brought all this to the fore. And with this, I think we’re going to be able to clean up our act as a country and move forward with greater determination, knowing that we’ve dealt with the problems that have debilitated growth in our country. Thank you. ALTMAN: One last question from me before opening up to questions from the members. You’re also president of the ANC. RAMAPHOSA: Yes. ALTMAN: Just say a word or two about the way you look upon the party, the standing of the party with the public, whether you intend to pursue serious reforms in terms of the party, and that question.— RAMAPHOSA: The ANC was formed in 1912. It’s 106 years old, and has gone through moments of great growth and great glory. But it has also gone through moments of great weakness. We have just emerged from a conference, the 54th conference of the ANC, where I was elected, together with my colleagues, where the ANC admitted that over the past few years it had lost quite a lot of its positioning in the sense where it had become distant from the people, where people had lost confidence in it. And this was clearly demonstrated in the past elections that we had where the support of the ANC went down. And through that, it went through a cathartic moment of baring its chest and its soul to the people of our country. And at that conference it resolved that it must renew itself—in other words, clean up its act. It must unite itself, but it must also rid itself of corrupt activities, both inside the party and also in the government that we lead. So that decision has become the lodestar for me, from a policy point of view, of what needs to be done in the ANC. We are now in the process of renewing ourselves. We’re also in the process of uniting the ANC. And naturally, after a conference, people—particularly where one candidate and a few others won, naturally there will always be moments where you still need to piece everyone together. And this is where we are now. We’re continuously uniting our party, pulling everyone into what we call (“one call” ?) in South Africa, making sure that we look in the same direction. And that is beginning to bear fruit. And the party is renewing itself in the way that it functions, in the way that it finds ways of appealing to our people once again. The spirit of renewal, of what we call the new dawn, is spreading in the country. And people are feeling a lot more enthusiastic about the ANC’s position. And those who had become disillusioned are coming back as individuals, but a number of other organizations that the ANC used to work with are also coming back. Religious organizations and many others are gravitating more and more towards the ANC once again. So the ANC is finding traction once again. And I’m confident that it should be able to win the next elections quite easily, which will be held next year, before May of 2019. So we go to those elections renewed, united, and feeling much stronger than we have in the past. So the ANC is getting back its mojo, if one can say that; is getting back its strength. And it’s getting back its commitment to serve the people of South Africa, because that is what the ANC was formed to do. So the mojo is coming back. (Laughter.) ALTMAN: Let us please have some questions from the members. I just would like to remind everyone, President Ramaphosa is the only one speaking here today, so please ask questions. Reverend Jackson. Q: I think it’s fair to say that, because real leadership and (constituent ?) labor in the height of South Africa’s crisis, your own integrity and abilities is a breath of fresh air for the country. And we all thank you very much for those committed to the proposition. Secondly, how long will peace without the land issue being resolved be possible? Secondly, the view of this administration toward South Africa and Africa generally in terms of health care and trade and investment and land, where is the U.S. on that proposition? It referred to Africa as an s-hole. How does it really see you now? Lastly, out of the South African part of it, other African countries are not waiting for us. They’re really into China. Take a country like Guinea, for example. RAMAPHOSA: If you could raise your—yeah. Q: Take a country like— RAMAPHOSA: I think people are struggling at the back to hear you. Q: —a country like Guinea, for example. Do you relate to all countries at some level? So on a scale to five, and A being beginning, and graduate toward full relations, or do you just leave an all-or-nothing position on not relating to an African country? Because if you take all or nothing, there won’t be enough countries to relate to the continent. Do you follow me? Back up. While we are—while we are— ALTMAN: Can he answer what you’ve already asked first? Is that all right? Q: While we are both—(inaudible)—that makes it impossible for relations with other African countries as a nation, while we are dillying on that, China is investing, building roads and bridges, and we’re not. What can we do to expand our effort and influence in Africa? RAMAPHOSA: I struggled to hear some of those questions. ALTMAN: Well, I think you can—you can—it’s OK if you’re—if you answer those questions selectively, that’s just fine. (Laughter.) RAMAPHOSA: Well, maybe let me start with the one that you started with, how long will peace continue without the land question being resolved. It is imperative that the land issue be addressed and be resolved. I have no doubt in my mind that we will be able to resolve this question and we will come out with a solution that could lead to win-win outcomes for all, for current landowners and for those who do not have land, just as we did when we resolved the apartheid problem, because we resolved it between those who had the vote and those who did not have the vote. We were able to resolve it and find practical—a practical solution. Similarly, on this one, given as I was saying the number of proposals that are coming to the fore, the solutions to me are beginning to become more apparent. And I’m also encouraged and guided by what was set out in our Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter, which as I said was the lodestar document that led—got us to prosecute the struggle as we did, said on the land issue the land shall be shared amongst those who work it, period. And this is going to help inform the approach that we are also going to have on the land question. And the solutions that are being put forward by a number of South Africans—and let me immediately say there hasn’t been an issue that has involved and evoked such a broad-spectrum debate in South Africa since 1994, when we crafted our constitution. When we crafted our constitution, we went around the country and got submissions from 1.2 million South Africans who contributed to what our constitution is today. And today we’ve had 650,000 South Africans who have contributed to a possible solution to this. And already I can see a solution on the horizon because the determination of many South Africans is there. So can there be stability without resolving the land question? That is the real question. We all want stability. We all want progress in our country collectively as South Africans. And that stands out as the most important issue that all are seeking to achieve. So in order for us to achieve that stability, we’ve got to resolve this problem, and we are going to resolve it without any doubt. And once we do so, we will then be able to embark on a land reform project that is going to be all-encompassing. And maybe you can pause for a while and remember in your history studies that land has always been a big challenge in many, many countries around the world. Wars have been fought around land. People have died around—on the land issue. And what we are seeking to do is to find a happy medium—a happy medium that is going to avoid all those horrible outcomes. And we will do it. We are South Africans. We are Nelson Mandela’s children. We will do it in the way that he guided us and taught us to find a solution. That has been a lasting solution over the past twenty-four years. It has held together. The democracy that he bequeathed us has held together, and this too we’ll find a solution for and we will be able to chart a way forward. On the issue as I heard it, Reverend Jackson, the issue of the Chinese coming into Africa and all that, yes, we are members of BRICS. BRICS is composed with Brazil, China, Russia, and India, and South Africa. And we’re the smallest in all these big, important countries, and we’re treated as an equal partner. We participate together. And China clearly has embraced Africa in a way where it says we want to contribute to your growth, but obviously as a country they also want to trade with Africa. They want to spread their goods in Africa. And as they do so, as African countries, we have to deal with China in a way where we are equals. And China has insisted that, yes, we would like to deal with all of you as equals. But at the same time, there are quite a number of other countries that have dealings with Africa. A number of countries hold forums and conferences with African countries, and bring them altogether. The U.K. does, France does, and a number of others. And so, Africa, as a growing continent, clearly, in dealing with its various partners, has to advance its own interests, but advance its own interests without sacrificing its own sovereignty. Various countries, in dealing with any country in the world, would love not to sacrifice their own sovereignty. Certainly, that is the case with us South Africans. And whatever we do from a foreign policy point of view, we seek to protect our interests and to advance those interests and not to sacrifice our sovereignty. So we’re going to be very careful in dealing with any country in the world. But if it leads to us progressing, developing, and we do so on an equal basis, then of course we are prepared to have dealings with such countries and trade with them, and invest in each other’s economies, and all that. ALTMAN: Yes, ma’am. Q: Thank you, Mr. President, for joining us at the Council today. My name is Laurie Garrett. I’ve worked for many years in your country and elsewhere on the HIV/AIDS problem. And I know that your country is committed to trying to be independent of external funding to tackle HIV/AIDS. But you also have the highest rate of HIV infection on the planet, and a youth culture that is getting younger and younger, and a rising tide of drug-resistant HIV that’s like a ticking clock. So can you make that deadline? Can you beat that disease? Can you have a generation come up without HIV? RAMAPHOSA: Yes, we carry the biggest and the highest burden of HIV prevalence in the world, unfortunately. The fortunate thing is that we’ve got partners in the world who are assisting us to tackle this challenge, and the U.S. is one of those partners that we have. A number of other institutions in the U.S. also help us. The Bill Gates and Melinda Gates Foundation help us. The Global Fund also helps us, and the U.S. government also helps us, and a number of other partners in Europe, and indeed, also on the continent. They are assisting us to tackle this. And recently, we have found that the infection rate has started to plateau and is going down, and largely because of the assistance and the support that we are getting from our partners in terms of spreading the prevention message, in terms of treatment as well. We’ve got some 4.3 million people on antiretrovirals, currently the largest program in the world. The infection rate in our country is much higher than that, and we’re seeking to get more and more of South Africans to get on treatment. But the good thing is, as I was saying, the infection rate is going down. And we’re focusing on the youth, that the youth should be more conscious and aware of the dangers of HIV, the disease. And we’re seeing some progress in that regard. When it comes to drug resistance, we’re also beginning to pioneer in the way of research. And a number of our scientists leading vaccine development, as well as treatment development. Of course, we are also benefiting from our collaboration with other scientists and developers in the world. So we’ve always seen the HIV challenge as being a global one. The U.N. helps us. The World Health Organization helps us. The UNAIDS system also helps us. It has to be seen as a global challenge, and we are enjoying the assistance or welcoming, rather, the assistance that we are getting. Are we going to see an era when HIV will be behind us, when we will see its shadow? We are hopeful that we will and we are working towards that. I used to be the chairperson of the South African National AIDS Council, which we call SANAC. It’s a body that brings together government, business, sports organizations, and civil society, and medical community—the broadest, you know, if you like social partners’ collaboration that is dealing with this challenge. And all those partners are united, fiercely united, in trying to curb the spread of this disease and to make sure that we find the treatment for it, the vaccines. And those are being developed. We are making a great deal of progress thanks to the partnership that we enjoy, particularly from the United States. And once again, I say: U.S., thank you very much for being our partner on this. Thank you very much. ALTMAN: This meeting is being livestreamed to members of the Council on Foreign Relations around the world, and I have a question that’s been submitted from a member of the Council who is in Johannesburg. And his question is: Do you intend at any point to seek electoral reform in South Africa, including the system by which members of parliament are chosen? RAMAPHOSA: This issue of electoral reform has been on the cards for quite a while. There was a report that was submitted by Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert, who was the leader of the opposition some years ago. He has since, sadly, passed away. And it proposed a mixed system. Right now we have what we call proportional representation, and we opted for proportional representation when we came out of the nightmare of apartheid. We felt that we needed to have a unified system of government or legislative entities where there would not be a winner past the post, a single winner past the post, where all parties, as many parties as possible who would have achieved a particular threshold, would be represented in our parliament. That has served us very well because it means that even the smallest parties, as soon—as long as they can get a particular or demonstrate a particular level of support, are able to get representation in parliament. Currently, we have some twenty-three or so parties in our parliament. And those competed and there are little fewer who finally succeeded—twenty-three competed and fewer then succeeded. But they’re all represented, those who succeeded to pass the threshold. And that has contributed to having what I call a wholesome representative parliamentary system. Others have felt that you need to have, you know, a constituency-based one where a winner takes all. And we felt that winner-takes-all, in our embryonic stage of our democracy, would not serve us so well. We needed to have inclusivity. Yes, those proposals are still on the table to have a combined system where you could possibly combine constituency-based and proportional representation. That is something that is continuously on the table and will be considered. But for now, because we are involved in a task to unite the nation, to make everyone feel included rather than excluded, we have believed that it’s best to have the system that we have. ALTMAN: Yes, sir, in the back. Q: Ben Bartenstein from Bloomberg News. President Ramaphosa, thank you so much for joining us today. I have a follow up actually to Roger’s last question. Mr. President, you said that you expect the ANC to quite easily win elections next year. RAMAPHOSA: yes. Q: I’m curious, how do you sell your bold economic overhaul to voters at a time when business confidence is at a one-year low, the rand is the fourth-worst-performing currency in the world, and your own central bank says that your initial three percent target for economic growth this year, that growth will actually be much lower than that? And on the final point, I’m just curious what your new economic estimate is for growth this year and next. Thank you. RAMAPHOSA: Business confidence has been down—and sometimes it goes up, sometimes it goes down—and has been down because there’s been quite a lot of uncertainty, as I was saying earlier, and they have also complained about consistency. The uncertainty has been giving rise to, for instance, our policy positions on a number of areas, like, for instance, the mining charter. They have said you have had—you have proposed a mining charter in the past year or so, which would have prevented investments from taking place in South Africa, so they held back. We’ve now consulted extensively on the mining charter and we’ve resolved that to the satisfaction of a large portion of the mining industry. Who did we consult? Business, labor, communities, and a number of other regulators as well. So they’ve been consulted. We’ve crafted a mining charter which is much better than what we had in the past and which is, in our view, much more conducive for investment. So that has been done and dusted, solved. They complained about not releasing the telecommunications spectrum. And we’re now in a process of doing that. The telecommunications people or potential investors here, we have now addressed that. That also is going to be done and dusted in a week or so. The visas to enable people to come to our country, particularly businesspeople, were also a huge headache. And they have raised that continuously with me as I’ve been engaging with businesspeople that they are not able to bring their executives to look after their investments in the country. We’ve now addressed that, done and dusted. We’re just finalizing a few negotiations with a few countries. And we’re now resolving quite a number of issues, including things like our electricity prices have been among the highest in the world, which we call administered prices. We’re resolving—going to be resolving that so that we can attract those companies that use a lot of electricity in their operations. And so one after the other of issues that businesspeople have raised with us we are addressing. We are being very proactive and being very, very positive and constructive because we want South Africa to, once again, be an attractive destination for investment. So what will that do? It’ll boost business confidence. Yes, the rand has been one of those basket of currencies that has not been performing well. I would say it’s not been the only one, a number of other currencies have not been performing as well as, I think, those countries would have expected. With the increased confidence in our business community and us resolving the policy issues, we expect that the rand will respond and be a lot better. Our central bank, yes, they have revised their growth prospects. They have revised them in view of, one, the global, you know, economic situation and the exposure that we have to it and the way our economy is performing. Demand has been relatively low in South Africa. And with the reform that—reforms that we are embarking on, I believe that, you know, there will be more growth in our economy. The injection that we are putting in, particularly on infrastructure, which I believe is a key driver of economic growth, we will be able to see more economic activity and more confidence in our economy. And the other important part is that the reforms or the stimulus that we have put out is not only aimed at, you know, your hardcore issues, they are also aimed at impacting on the social life of people. For instance, we are focusing on how our local government is run and the infrastructure projects, how they are manifested at local government level. So all that is going to contribute to strengthening our economy. Am I able to give you an estimate now on how the economy will perform? No, not today. (Laughter.) Try me next week, maybe I’ll be able to give you. ALTMAN: It’s my duty as moderator to end this meeting on time, and we’ve already run over. I apologize to everyone who wanted to ask questions and wasn’t able to. But please join me in thanking President Ramaphosa for being with us today. (Applause.) RAMAPHOSA: Thank you, you were difficult. ALTMAN: (Chuckles.) (END)

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