Sudan

Omar al-Bashir is in China to observe a huge military parade commemorating the end of World War II. He is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, which has issued warrants for his arrest. Parties to the Treaty of Rome, which established the Court, are obligated to arrest Bashir. That nearly happened earlier in the year when the Sudanese president went to South Africa for a summit of African Union heads of state. However, China is not a party to the Treaty of Rome. According to Reuters, when a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman was asked about the “irony” of inviting a chief of state indicted for war crimes when so many were committed during World War II, she replied that was “overthinking.” She went on to say: “The people of Africa, including Sudan, made an important contribution in the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War. China’s invitation to President Bashir to the commemoration activities is reasonable and fair. While he is in China we will give him the treatment he should get.” According to the media, the Chinese government has been associating the victory parade with atrocities carried out by the Japanese in China during World War II. Western representation at the parade, which will feature 12,000 troops marching through Beijing, will be low-level. Chinese president Xi Jinping welcomed Bashir as an “old friend.” Indeed, Khartoum and Beijing have long been close. China is Sudan’s largest trading partner and source of foreign investment. Sudan’s oil production has largely been in Chinese hands, and Sudan imports a wide range of goods from China. Historically, China has pursued a “non-interference” policy with respect to Sudan, including Khartoum’s human rights abuses. However, more recently China has been playing a positive role in the search for a solution in South Sudan and supplies some 700 peacekeepers to guard the oil fields. It has cut back significantly its arms sales to Khartoum.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs candidate at the University of Toronto. Canada’s reputation as a country that offers safe resettlement to refugees is in sharp decline. From 1961 until the early 2000s, Canadian immigration policy welcomed both immigrants and refugees, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa. However, Stephen Harper’s conservative government has made it increasingly difficult for refugees to resettle in Canada over the past decade. Nevertheless, in the lead up to the October 19 federal elections, immigration policy has not been the subject of public debate and most candidates have remained relatively silent. The timing of Canada’s refugee restrictions couldn’t be worse—in June, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the largest number of people ever recorded, around 60 million, were now displaced. Of these, over a quarter hail from sub-Saharan Africa. As highlighted by the Mediterranean refugee crisis, many are willing to take extreme risks to escape their countries of origin. In the past, Canada has been receptive to refugees fleeing crises in the Horn of Africa. Canadians originating from Somalia make up the largest percentage of immigrants and refugees of African origin, at 26 percent. Worldwide, the UNHCR estimates one million Somalis are now refugees, and 1.1 million are internally displaced. Half a million Horn of Africa refugees have fled conflict in South Sudan, and 1.3 million South Sudanese who are displaced internally. There are now 350,000 refugees fleeing violence and repression in Eritrea, out of a total population of just six million. Kenya and Ethiopia, both coping with their own challenges of internal displacement, economic decline, and poor infrastructure, are hosting the majority of the Horn’s refugees. The Canadian High Commission in Nairobi processes the majority of applications for Canadian refugee resettlement by people fleeing violence and persecution in East, Central, and the Horn of Africa. Given the severity of civil conflicts occurring across the region, notably in South Sudan and Somalia, this office should be one of the most efficient in terms of processing visas. Instead, wait times for refugees from these countries are triple those from other regions. The average wait time for an individual fleeing persecution in Eritrea, or ethnic violence in Sudan, or the civil conflict in Somalia can expect to wait approximately 3 years for processing, with no guarantee they will be granted refugee status. By comparison, those seeking refugee resettlement from all other regions wait an average of nineteen months. Right now, about 12,000 refugees are admitted to Canada per year, a number the UNHCR has said falls short of Canada’s capacity to absorb refugees. Its hospitality towards refugees has drastically diverged from 1986, when the UNHCR bestowed upon the Canadian people its highest honor for services in support of the forcibly displaced, the Nansen Refugee Award. Human rights observers have condemned new legislation couched in Bill C-51, Canada’s controversial “anti-terror” omnibus, which would ease the government’s ability to detain and deport refugees, and suspend eligibility for social services for several months after arrival. Canada is also one of the few countries that has adopted Australia’s draconian policy of indefinite detention for some refugees who have entered irregularly, which has been internationally criticized. Under the Harper government, Canada has turned its back on refugees fleeing civil conflict in Africa and elsewhere. For many Canadians, compassionate refugee policy is not only necessary given the scale of the world’s refugee crisis—it’s a question of Canadian identity. Yet, thus far, refugee and immigration policy hasn’t featured as an issue in the upcoming elections.

In early August, the Sudanese UN envoy stated that Sudan President al-Bashir plans to travel to New York to speak at the upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA). Al-Bashir is under indictment by the International Criminal Court. Countries that are signatory to the Rome Statute are required to apprehend those indicted and to hand them over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). That almost happened earlier in the summer when al-Bashir attended an African Union summit in South Africa. A South African superior court ordered the Zuma administration to arrest him. In that case, al-Bashir, perhaps with the connivance of the Zuma administration, left before the court’s order could be carried out. (The Zuma administration’s failure to arrest al-Bashir is still before the South African courts.) The United States is a signatory of the Rome Statute, but the senate has never ratified it. Nevertheless, U.S. policy has generally been supportive of the court. Under the host country agreement between the United States and the United Nations, which dates from the establishment of the UN headquarters in New York, the U.S. government is obliged to issue visas to those coming to UN meetings. There is provision for rare exceptions where the individual would constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, the Obama administration does have legal grounds to deny al-Bashir a visa. On the other hand, the Obama administration could issue al-Bashir a visa, and then promptly arrest him upon arrival in New York. It would then hand him over to the ICC for trial, as called for by the Rome Statute. That is the course recommended by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the ICC from 2003 to 2012, in a column in the August 24, 2015, New York Times. Moreno-Ocampo argues that U.S. law (the American Service-Members’ Protection Act), authorizes the executive branch “to bring to justice” those accused of atrocities. Under the Nuremberg Charter, the genocide convention, and the ICC statute, heads of state have no immunity from charges before international tribunals. Ocampo-Moreno credibly argues that a U.S. arrest and handover would be legal. But, would such a course be in the U.S. interest? Opponents of an al-Bashir arrest might cite Sudan’s cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the region. Sudan also has an important role to play in resolution of the ongoing civil war and humanitarian disaster in South Sudan. Ultimately, the Obama administration would face a political choice, not a legal one. One can well imagine that at least some in the Obama administration hope the problem will go away; that al-Bashir will not seek to come to New York. But, should al-Bashir come, Ocampo-Moreno claims that his arrest would provide the Obama administration the opportunity to reject impunity for crimes of genocide. The political and security costs of an al-Bashir arrest and handover might be relatively low. Khartoum is something of a political snake pit. Many Sudanese with political ambitions might be happy enough with the removal of al-Bashir. Cooperation on terrorism and the search for a solution in South Sudan might well continue after an initial period of vituperation. More problematic is the African Union, now under the presidency of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, himself accused of massive human rights abuses. It is conceivable that AU member states might renounce the Rome Statute, which most of them have signed, given the perception that the court disproportionately targets Africans. There might be a gesture of solidarity with al-Bashir in the context of the UN General Assembly. However, the UNGA is arguably the most important forum for African leaders, and they are unlikely to sabotage it for long. Few will deny that al-Bashir’s hands are covered with the blood of innocents.

For this outsider, the parliamentary and judicial response to the Zuma administration’s failure to detain Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and turn him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides a window in to the state of South African democracy. To me, it is clear that the Zuma government broke both South African and international law by not only failing to hold al-Bashir, though specifically ordered to do so by the South African judiciary, but also facilitated his clandestine departure. South African law is relevant because the South African government at the time incorporated the ICC treaty into its own legal system. Neither the judiciary nor the parliament is taking the Zuma administration’s violation of the law quietly. The Pretoria high Court has “invited” the National Director of Public Prosecutions to look into how South Africa violated a court order to hold al-Bashir. Judge President Dunstan Mlambo said, “A democratic state based on the rule of law cannot exist or function if the government ignores its constitutional obligations.” The parliamentary debate was raucous. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), stated that the Zuma government was in contempt of both the South African court and the ICC. A DA parliamentarian, Steven Mokgalapa said, “The African National Congress (ANC) government, led by Zuma has committed a crime of assisting a wanted man to run from the law.” Congress of the People (COP) leader Mousiuoa Lekota is quoted by the media as saying, “You lied to us. You said you will uphold the constitution, uphold the law and be an example. You have misled the people of our country and now we are ashamed before the nations of the world.” (“Terror” Lekota – his nickname comes from soccer – is a Robben Island veteran and was once an ANC stalwart; a former Minister of Defense, he broke with the ANC when it removed Thabo Mbeki from the party leadership.) The ANC defense boils down to the propositions that heads of state are immune from the ICC. (The Rome Statute specifically says that heads of state are subject to ICC jurisdiction.) Further, that al-Bashir was attending an Africa Union summit, rather than making an official visit to South Africa. However, some ANC leaders are roundly attacking the ICC and calling for South Africa to withdraw. In what is likely to be a swipe at the United States, ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe said on local radio that the ICC “is a tool in the hands of the powerful to destroy the weak and it is a court that is focusing on Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.” He said South Africa should consider leaving the ICC: “If I was in government, I would give notice, get out of that, it was not what was envisioned.” Justice and Constitutional Development Deputy Minister John Jeffrey is quoted as saying that the ICC “has diverted from its mandate and allowed itself to be influenced by powerful non-member states. We signed up for a court that was going to hold human beings accountable for their war crimes – regardless of where they were from. We perceive it as tending to act as a proxy instrument for those states who see no need to subject themselves to its discipline, to persecute African leaders, and effect regime change on the continent.” The al-Bashir episode provides a muddled picture of South African democracy. The government appears to have acted illegally. The judiciary and the legislature have reacted vociferously. But, nobody seems to expect that anything will happen.

The media’s take on the failure of South Africa’s Zuma government to hold Sudanese President al-Bashir is that it is a slap in the face of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The press drama is focused on al-Bashir and the credible charges of genocide that he faces before the ICC, and the many African objections to the way the court operates. If less dramatic but of greater significance to the governance of South Africa, the Zuma administration’s connivance with al-Bashir to facilitate his departure flouts a South African high court decision that he could not leave the country pending further judicial review. The Zuma administration’s actions would appear to be in contempt of court and thereby a threat to the legal and constitutional basis of South African governance. The independence and integrity of the judiciary has been a bedrock of South African democracy based on the rule of law. Arguably, the administration’s actions challenge neither. What it did do, however, was challenge the authority of the high court. South African law is clear. The Pretoria High Court is a superior court. A decision made by such a court may only be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal or even the Constitutional Court, both of which are primarily appellant courts. Absent such an appeal, the high court’s ruling stands. The Zuma government filed no appeal in the al-Bashir case. The High Court was clear: South Africa is a signatory to the treaty establishing the ICC, and as there is an ICC order for al-Bashir’s arrest, the High Court directed that al-Bashir could not leave the country pending its ruling. Moreover, South Africa’s 2002 International Criminal Court Act created a domestic legal imperative for the country to comply with ICC arrest warrants. The ICC clarified and reiterated South Africa’s legal obligation to hold al-Bashir in an official decision issued on June 13. The Zuma government apparently conspired to move al-Bashir’s private airplane from the Johannesburg civil airport to a military base near Pretoria, and then facilitated its departure from South Africa. Officials within the Zuma government would appear to be in contempt of court. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has issued a strong statement condemning the Zuma government. It says that “The DA is in consultation with our lawyers as to what means we have at our disposal to ensure that the government not be allowed to sidestep accountability.” It also said, “We will pursue all avenues available to us to ensure that the  government is not allowed to blatantly disregard the laws of this country or its obligations under international law.” Civic organization have also raised the possibility of legal action against specific persons within the government for contempt of court. The Zuma administration’s apparent contempt of court is only the most recent and most blatant of a string of actions that weaken the judiciary and other constitutional limits on the executive. How the DA and civil society respond in this instance will be an indication of the strength of popular support for the rule of law and whether the country’s legal and constitutional institutions are, indeed, under threat.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Last month, Sudan held national elections, and Omar al-Bashir secured another presidential term. Though expected, many commentators are focused on the illegitimacy of al-Bashir’s victory. The election’s results are indeed disappointing, but the real challenge facing Sudan is its uncertain future. The country is struggling with an economic crisis, ethnic conflict, and political gridlock. These must be the focus of politicians and analysts alike if Sudan is ever to regain stability. Nothing about the April election was surprising. As promised, major opposition parties boycotted, making the election largely uncompetitive. With few options on the ballot, voter turnout was low, forcing Sudan’s National Elections Commission to keep the polls open an extra day to attract more citizens. Still, less than half of the 13 million registered voters cast ballots. The African Union estimates 30 to 35 percent turnout, while Sudan’s National Elections Commission estimates 46 percent. As anticipated, al-Bashir garnered 94.5 percent of votes. While the African Union and Arab League electoral observer missions have certified the election as legitimate—free of vote-buying and fraud—questions remain over the National Congress Party’s (NCP) mandate to govern, given that half of the voting public abstained. Indeed, the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway released a joint statement saying that Sudan’s election does not represent a credible expression of citizens’ will, as did Canada. While legitimate support for al-Bashir may well be anemic, the election results are only the beginning. For the NCP and the country, there are several demanding challenges to confront. The economy remains in dire straits since South Sudan seceded in 2011, taking with it three-quarters of oil production and half of fiscal revenues. Conflict rages in the east and south as fighting between government and rebel groups continues in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, resulting in massive casualties and displacement. Just since the beginning of 2014, over 450,000 people have fled Darfur. And the political landscape is exceptionally fractured. NCP efforts to bring together Sudan’s political opposition—which has been kept out of government since the NCP took power in 1989—have been half-hearted at best, further alienating opposition parties and leading them to boycott the recent elections. Without merging these disparate political factions, stabilizing the country and uniting its populace will remain impossible. For years now, Sudan’s political leaders have ruthlessly pursued their own interest, ignoring not only the needs of their 37.9 million constituents but also the looming political, economic, and ethnic crises. Rather than remaining short-sighted and plundering a sinking ship—whether through illicit business contracts or unfettered access to state coffers—the NCP should work to keep Sudan afloat. With another five years securely under their belt, the ruling NCP has the time and opportunity to change course: offer opposition parties a seat at the table; make peace with rebels in the east and south; rein in state corruption; reduce profligate military spending; and, invest in profitable sectors like agriculture. It would be foolish to pretend that the NCP will adopt this agenda—which is so contrary to its near-quarter century of regressive policies—out of altruism. Yet perhaps the political, economic, and societal stability ushered in by these reforms and the potential resulting growth will be enough to convince them otherwise.

The 2014 Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership has been awarded to the Namibian president, Hifikepunye Pohamba. He is set to leave office later this month. Mo Ibrahim, British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, established the prize in 2006. It may be awarded annually to an elected African head of state who promoted good governance and left office in accordance with the constitution. The prize comprises of $5 million, spread over ten years, followed by $200,000 a year for life. Among other things, it is intended to free African leaders from the financial concerns that have led some of them to cling to power. Pohamba is the first person to have received the prize since 2011. It has been awarded only three times previously: to Mozambique’s Joaquim Chissano (2007), Botswana’s Festus Mogae (2008), and Cape Verde’s Pedro Verona Pires (2011). Other years, the selection committee found no qualified candidate. The lack of laureates is commonly taken to be an indictment of the quality of African leadership. The committee has made two exceptional awards, to Nelson Mandela in 2007, who left office as president of South Africa before Ibrahim established his prize, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, then archbishop of Cape Town and a founder of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a part of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to “non-racial” democracy. Pohamba is hardly a household name in the United States, nor is Namibia, which has as grim a history as any other African state. Both deserve to be better known. Namibia was a German colony, also known as German Southwest Africa, established in 1884. The second colonial governor was Ernst Heinrich Göring, father of one of the leading Nazi politicians, Hermann Göring. The German repression of the native Herero and Namaqua (Nama) peoples was so dire that it has been cited by some as a dress rehearsal for the Holocaust. Even though Namibia only became a trusteeship of South Africa after World War I, it felt the full rigors of apartheid when the system was established in 1948. Namibia achieved full independence in 1990. Today, it has a population of about 2.2 million. The largest ethnic group is the Ovambo, who comprise half the population. The Kavangos make up 9 percent of the population, the Herero and Nama account for 7 and 5 percent of the population respectively, and whites are about 6 percent of the population. Under Pohamba, Namibia has become something of a poster child for what can be accomplished through constitutionalism, the rule of law, and good governance. The Mo Ibrahim Index of Good Governance ranks Namibia sixth on the continent, trailing after Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, and the Seychelles. The Ibrahim leadership prize committee noted Pohamba’s respect for the constitution, the rule of law, media freedom, and human rights. It also noted his active efforts on behalf of racial reconciliation. On Pohamba’s watch, Namibia also enjoyed significant economic growth, and a small but successful land reform program, in which mostly unused white-owned land was purchased by the government and distributed to poor blacks, was implemented.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Ten years ago today, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended twenty-one years of civil war in Sudan. The internationally brokered accord between the governing National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the southern rebel forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A, later SPLM) was hailed as a tremendous achievement at the time. However, a decade later, an independent South Sudan is mired in civil conflict, political tensions and rebel violence are rife in Sudan, and the CPA has failed to establish peace and stability. Given the long history of failed negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/A, the signing of the CPA in January 2005 was welcomed by northerners, southerners, and foreign governments alike. The CPA introduced an interim constitution for Sudan, which established power sharing between the NCP and SPLM/A at the national government level, provided for a semi-autonomous regional government in the south under SPLM/A leadership, elaborated a formula for dividing oil revenues, and committed the state to holding a self-determination referendum in the south in 2011. The CPA signatories and the international interlocutors who facilitated the agreement saw the period leading up to the referendum as an opportunity for the ruling NCP to initiate democratic reform, and thus demonstrate the benefits of Sudanese unity and incentivize southerners to vote against South Sudanese independence in 2011. The initial implementation of the CPA was promising: a national unity government integrating southerners was formed, SPLM/A leader John Garang was appointed as first vice president of Sudan, and the regional government of the south was transitioned into the hands of the SPLM/A. Yet, it was not long before the cracks began to show. Vice President Garang died in a helicopter crash weeks after taking office and was replaced by Salva Kiir, who later became president of South Sudan. Unlike Garang, Kiir and other SPLM/A leaders were not invested in a united Sudan, and rather than facilitating Sudanese unity, they worked to lay the foundations for an independent South Sudan. At the same time, the NCP did not make the necessary political reforms to create an inclusive, democratic unity government and integrate the SPLM/A. Given that neither party made Sudanese unity a viable, attractive option, it was no surprise that southerners voted for secession in the 2011 referendum. Despite the promise of the CPA, conflict abounds in Sudan and South Sudan today. The South Sudanese have been locked in a year-long civil war, sparked by a power struggle between President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. In the north, conflict rages on in the states of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile as the central government continues to disregard rebels’ grievances of political disenfranchisement and economic marginalization. The responsibility for the current situation lies squarely with the political elites in Sudan and South Sudan. Certainly, there are valid criticisms of the CPA, including its neglect of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states, its inadequate treatment of the border regions between Sudan and South Sudan, and its exclusion of other political parties and rebel groups.Nevertheless, the CPA was not designed to be a panacea for Sudan’s problems. By halting the civil war and establishing a six-year interim period, the agreement provided the SPLM/A and NCP an opportunity to embark on the political transformation necessary for long-term peace, stability, and unity in Sudan. Not only did these parties squander this political opportunity, but they have prolonged violence and conflict, to the detriment of all Sudanese.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The devastating yet disorganized fury and violence over the past eighteen months in the Central African Republic (CAR) has caused the collapse of the state and defied traditional conflict labels and international quick-fixes. A new report from Thierry Vircoulon at the International Crisis Group is therefore a welcome call to address the causes of the current crises, not the symptoms. The crises are complex and multilayered, but most draw from a single source. In the words of Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign strategist James Carville: “It’s the economy, stupid!” Vircoulon identifies two aspects in particular that led to the current crises: a predatory state and an illegal economy. Numerous Central African governments have developed the state institutions, such as they were, toward a single purpose: self-enrichment and perpetuation of power. Gaining access to the diamond economy became the main motivation for seeking and holding political power. The timber, ivory, and gold sectors were also lucrative, but controlling the diamond trade was crucial to holding power. Central Africans outside the elite political circles turned to illicit economies, black markets, and smuggling routes—often under the overall management of government ministers or family members, or nascent rebel warlords—to survive. Many of the Seleka commanders who swept to prominence during Djotodia’s short presidency had long had control of parts of the diamond mines in the northeast and management of the poaching and smuggling corridors between Sudan, Chad, and northern CAR. Once in power, they moved quickly to consolidate control over the mines, forests, and game parks in the south and west. These had traditionally been under the control of the southern-based president and his networks. Seleka extended smuggling and poaching networks across the nation, connecting their own northern networks with existing networks in the south and west. In the capital, shipments of ivory tusks, illegally harvested timber, and illicit diamonds seized by ministers either disappeared entirely or resurfaced later, resold on the black market. Vircoulon identifies the current transitional government under President Catherine Samba-Panza as a fleeting but golden opportunity to restructure the CAR’s institutions and economy so the country can move forward as fundamentally more stable. Samba-Panza seems to genuinely want fundamental reform, and she cannot run in the elections she’s tasked to organize, which removes her, at least slightly, from the patronage influences. Neither keeping or creating peace on the ground, nor elections will end this crisis, but, Vircoulon advocates, a peacekeeping operation with the correct mandate, clear stabilization strategy, adequate resources, firm UN leadership, and a long term agenda could be the tool through which the country reinvents itself. This mission should be a series of interventions structured around an “ethical reconstruction project” whereby the transitional government concentrates on combating official predation activities and institutional structures that allow and even encourage it, while the international organizations and allied nations secure the natural resources, and stabilize and reconstruct the nation. Focus should be on ensuring that the nation’s natural resources are secure, regulated by the government, but used for national benefit rather than remaining under the control of private hands and small groups. Simultaneously there needs to be job creation with a focus on infrastructure, agriculture, and livestock so the CAR can sustainably develop and feed itself in the future.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Allen is currently an officer in the Army National Guard. His interests are in Africa, conflict, and conflict resolution. The situation in South Sudan has failed to improve despite a second peace agreement signed on May 9. As the conflict between the government and rebel forces continues, the country is also facing a collapsing economy, a massive increase in internally displaced persons and refugees, possible famine, and a cholera outbreak. So far the South Sudanese government has proven incapable of dealing with any of these issues on its own. The country’s economy has fallen drastically in recent months. This is due in large part to its reliance on oil, which accounts for nearly 98 percent of South Sudan’s revenue. Since the start of the conflict South Sudan’s oil output has dropped by a third from nearly 250,000 to 160,000 barrels of crude oil a day. In order to bolster the economy the government has looked to foreign investors and has taken over $200 million in loans from oil companies. As the conflict rages in South Sudan the United Nations and neighboring countries have been burdened with the responsibility of helping the South Sudanese people. The UN now plans to build new camps for displaced civilians in Juba, Bor, Malakal, and Bentiu states. Over 133,000 refugees from the conflict have flooded camps in western Ethiopia. In Norway, on May 20, international donors committed over $600 million to help prevent famine in South Sudan. The UN, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization have also been working to help prevent the spread of the recent cholera outbreak. Now, due to human rights violations of the conflict, such as the recruitment of over nine thousand child soldiers by both sides, the UN Security Council voted to change the UN mission in South Sudan from one of nation building to civilian protection. To this end, the UN Security Council also approved the deployment of three battalions of peacekeepers from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda. Even China has commited to sending a battalion of peacekeepers in order to help protect the people of the world’s newest nation (along with its oil assets). The South Sudanese government is failing in its responsibilities to its citizens. In fact, it seems that it is counting on international institutions, outside governments, and even businesses to provide for the well being of its people. However, despite all of the outside help, none of these pending crises will be resolved if the conflict continues. As of June 11, leaders on both sides, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, agreed to establish a transitional government in order to bring peace to South Sudan. The nation’s future success or failure depends upon whether they are able to commit to this new government and control their respective military forces.

Holy Week was rough in Nigeria. On Saturday, April 12 “Boko Haram” invaded two villages in Borno, and killed thirty-eight people. On April 14, “Boko Haram” claimed responsibility for the bombing at the Nyana bus park in suburban Abuja that killed seventy people (official figures) or 500 (estimates from observers). A few hours later “Boko Haram” kidnapped over 200 girls from a school in Borno (the exact number is disputed). It also killed a policeman and a soldier during that operation. As of April 24, the majority of the girls have still not been found. On April 15, “Boko Haram” killed twenty in attacks on two villages in Borno; one of the victims was a traditional ruler. The same day “Fulani” herdsmen killed seven in the Middle Belt. The victims are likely to have been Christians. That incident was followed by the retaliatory killing of an additional eight (likely Muslims). On April 17, “thugs” attacked a Nigerian party congress, resulting in numerous hospitalizations but, apparently, no deaths. This carnage is the backdrop to a well-reasoned editorial in the Abuja quality newspaper, Leadership, “Our Stand-This State has Failed.” The editorial notes, inter alia, that a third of the Nigeria’s land mass has been under emergency rule for a year, and also in at least another third of the country there have been “…mass murders, kidnappings for ransom, daylight armed robberies, breakdown of law and order, and unrestrained stealing of public funds.” Leadership cites the Fund for Peace’s 2013 “Failed State Index,” which ranks the country 16th out of 178 countries. Nigeria’s ranking is slightly better than Somalia, Congo, the Sudans, Chad, and Afghanistan. “But, even in these other countries, innocent people and children don’t get killed with the reckless abandon we have seen lately in the country. And school girls don’t get kidnaped in the numbers we have been witnessing in Nigeria.” Leadership concludes, “the Jonathan regime has demonstrated a frightening incompetence in the handling of the state’s affairs. It is now beyond doubt that the regime is incapable of protecting the people.” Leadership is a respected newspaper published in Abuja but with a national audience. This editorial is another sign of the popular Nigerian loss of confidence in the Jonathan government.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir. Aala is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. After a year of collaboration with U.S. civil society groups and U.S. Department of State officials, members of Sudan’s civil society launched a campaign on January 20, 2014, to advocate that the U.S. government lift its technology sanctions on Sudan. The “Sudanese Initiative to Lift U.S. Technology Sanctions on Sudan” targets a subset of comprehensive sanctions originally issued by the United States in 1997 in response to the Sudanese government’s active connection to terrorist groups (notably harboring Osama bin Laden for several years) and numerous human rights abuses. The initiative aims to educate the Sudanese public and American policy-makers about the negative impacts of sanctions on free access to information communication technologies (ICTs) and Internet in Sudan. The initiative also aims to push policy-makers to consider issuing a license to authorize access to basic hard and software technology and associated services. In their inaugural video, the initiative emphasized the irony of sanctions. The video highlights that sanctions prevent access to Google Scholar and educational sites like Khan Academy; virtual mapping technology used to streamline crisis relief; crowd sourcing for humanitarian causes; and applications or software for professional, personal, or educational purposes. The victims of the technology sanctions are predominantly Sudanese democracy activists, human rights defenders, NGOs, educational institutions, and students. The New America Foundation’s recent report, “Translating Norms to the Digital Age,” helps contextualize the counterproductive effects of U.S. technology sanctions. It argues that these sanctions are outdated, and fail to incorporate technology’s new role in the digital age: enabling citizens to access information freely. The report notes that limiting availability of technology actually helps regimes limit citizens’ access to information. Recently, the U.S. government has revisited parameters of sanctions affecting Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. Exemptions were approved in 2010 by the U.S. Treasury for personal communications like email, Instant Messenger, and similar public services in some countries. In 2011, it authorized access to technology (cell phones, software, hardware, and services) to Iranians, in recognition that sanctions were inadvertently aiding the government’s censorship and surveillance regime. Like Iran, the Sudanese government employs comprehensive censorship policies. In addition to controlling print and broadcast media in the country, the regime has moved online, monitoring and limiting access to online forums, digital news outlets, and social media websites. It has arrested digital activists, bloggers, and journalists; and shut down the Internet for twenty-four hours to contain recent protests. Ultimately, both the Sudanese initiative and U.S. government are committed to making sanctions smarter. Indeed, the U.S. Treasury authorized certain academic and professional exchanges with Sudan in April 2013. And in an increasingly digitized and globalized world, lifting technology sanctions could transform Sudan, unleashing the pent-up energies of students, teachers, activists, and nearly eight million Internet users starved for more access to knowledge, information, and technology.

The New York Times and other media report that South Sudan president Salva Kiir and ex-vice president Riek Machar, and their respective forces, have signed a cease-fire in Addis Ababa. The civil war, which started in December 2013, has left thousands dead and estimates are that at least a half a million South Sudanese have been displaced in what under the best of circumstances is one of the poorest countries in the world. Any cease-fire must be welcomed. However, thus far there is little indication that the political, economic, and social problems that underpinned the fighting are being addressed. The cease-fire has the appearance of a deal between two warlords responding to outside pressure to stop the killing. On so many grounds the fighting in South Sudan has been a disaster. But, one is the negative impact it likely will have on how some (or many) Americans regard Africa. Africa is usually far from American concerns, except in specialist circles. With the arguable exception of Liberia, the United States has never had a colonial relationship with the continent, and the trade and investment relationship is small. Popular U.S. involvement has generally been related to security issues, such as when there were African proxies for East and West during the Cold War, or the current jihadis in the Sahel, or natural or man-made humanitarian disasters. South Sudan’s struggles were different. The Khartoum regime’s repression of the Christian and animist south struck a chord among Americans who had previously paid little attention to Africa. The “lost boys” of Sudan–orphaned by Khartoum’s brutality–were a cause taken up by parishes and congregations across the United States and encouraged by Hollywood figures such as George Clooney and human rights activists. South Sudan’s achievement of independence in 2012 was popularly welcomed in the United States, though with little appreciation of the obstacles still to be overcome. Now, South Sudan’s promise, its dream, has been besmirched. My concern is that at least some Americans who engaged with Africa for the first time over the South Sudan crisis will turn away from the continent. That would be bad for the United States and bad for Africa.

Simon Allison published an article on December 15 in South Africa’s Daily Maverick entitled "Africa for Optimists: 2013 in Review." He picks five of the “most encouraging” African stories from 2013 and provides links to read more about them. They are: 1)      The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Allison points out is both an infrastructure and a political and diplomatic achievement. Sudan and Egypt–always concerned about the upstream diversion of water from the Nile, such as the Grand Renaissance Dam involves–have now come to the table to discuss the dam’s construction and to ensure equitable management of the Nile’s water. There is an intergovernmental committee to plan for any negative impact. Allison concludes that, “managed sensibly, there is plenty of water to go around.” 2)      There has been a decline in piracy off the Somali coast. Ships are better equipped with armed guards. The European Union’s flotilla has had an impact, and local Somali communities are less supportive of piracy. 3)      Madagascar, which is in many ways still a mess, has successfully held elections. They were supported by the Southern African Development Community, which has improved the security situation. 4)      The defeat of the M23 rebel group in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Allison attributes the defeat of this particularly vicious rebel group to the improved performance by the Congolese army and to the UN’s innovative peacekeeping force, which is made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. Unlike other UN peacekeepers, it has the mandate to go on the offensive. 5)      Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote is planning to construct an oil refinery in Nigeria. Not only would this reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported oil, but it would also create jobs. To me, some of these achievements are of greater magnitude than others. The defeat of M23 and a new mandate for UN peacekeepers seems to me to be unalloyed good news. So, too is the decline of piracy off Somalia, though as Allison observes, it is balanced by an upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. As for the Ethiopian Dam, I think it is too soon to tell whether the concerns of Egypt and Sudan have been permanently allayed, though for the time being, the news is positive. With respect to Madagascar, there is still a runoff election to be held. And the oil refinery to be built in Nigeria by Dangote, “Africa’s richest man,” will cost an estimated U.S.$9 billion. Dangote has found U.S.$3.3 billion so far for the project, which is a good start. Allison’s list is an important contribution, not least because it highlights how much is going on in Africa that fails to receive sustained American media attention. It is also a rebuke to overly simple narratives, whether they be “Africa Rising” or “Africa the Hopeless Continent.”