Sudan

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir. Aala is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. On September 22, Sudan’s government announced the lifting of fuel subsidies as part of an IMF-backed strategy to restabilize the economy. Protests broke out the next day in Wad Madani and spread to several other cities, including the capitol Khartoum. President Omar al-Bahsir defended this latest austerity measure as a necessary step to prevent the total collapse of Sudan’s economy, which has been teetering since South Sudan seceded in 2011 and took with it three quarters of oil profits, which accounted for 48 percent of Sudan’s government revenue. In the two-hour press conference announcing the subsidy cuts, al-Bashir failed to acknowledge his government’s role in precipitating the country’s current economic crisis. Al-Bashir’s government helped incite a large-scale armed conflict in 2011 when it refused citizens’ demands for inclusive governance in the Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states. Moreover he glossed over his government’s failure to reach an oil sharing agreement with South Sudan, leading to military skirmishes along the border and halting oil production for over a year since 2012 (with brief resumption). This colossal mismanagement of bilateral relations with South Sudan and costly internal contlict has drained government coffers and stunted Sudan’s meager economic growth prospects, which the IMF had forecast at 1.2 percent with sustained oil production. Fuel prices doubled overnight after the subsidy cuts went into effect. The cost of transportation, food, clothing, and other basic goods spiked, intensifying preexisting economic hardships for Sudan’s beleaguered population, almost half of which lives in poverty and subsists on a monthly minimum wage of 450 Sudanese pounds (U.S.$102). Since the outbreak of protests last week, the government has been slow to address economic grievances. It promised to raise minimum wage retroactively for salaries since January 2013, and offered a one-time handout of 151 Sudanese pounds (U.S. $21) to half a million poor families. But these conciliatory gestures have not pacified protesters. Many are incensed by the government’s repressive measures to shut down demonstrations, including its implementation of a “shoot to kill” policy that has resulted in over two hundred deaths and eight hundred arrests. To further silence protesters, the government is trying to control the country’s media outlets, suspending publication of major national newspapers and shutting down the internet for part of last week. Public ire over the country’s untenable economic situation has mingled with both frustration over these repressive tactics and a general sense of political disenfranchisement, prompting calls for the dissolution of the current government and sustaining protests into their second week. Political opposition parties, fed up with the government’s exclusive grip on power, have echoed the public’s call. Even some senior officials of al-Bashir’s own party signed a memo last week urging the president to cancel the subsidy cuts and stop the crackdown on protesters. On Wednesday, the spokesman of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which partnered with al-Bashir’s government in 2011, resigned. These developments threated al-Bashir’s reign and intensify the sense of political uncertainty, and perhaps opportunity, in Sudan. If protests continue, al-Bashir will have few cards left to play, especially if his political allies do not stand behind him. Oil talks with South Sudan are at a standstill, and there are limited options for international borrowing due to the country’s bulky external debt and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Therefore, the government will not be able to immediately ease the economic pressures on citizens. Instead, al-Bashir will have two likely options: cede some political ground and opt for inclusive political reform, or intensify government repression.

Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, is under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has a warrant out for his arrest. He briefly attended a July 13-14 African Union (AU) health summit in Nigeria, but left when Nigerian human rights groups called for his arrest. The ICC justices in The Hague also issued a statement reminding Nigeria of its obligation to “honor its warrants” and hand over Bashir. A Sudanese government spokesman was quoted by the New York Times saying that Bashir’s departure had nothing to do with fear of arrest but that “he had matters to attend to in Khartoum.” Reuben Abati, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan’s press spokesman, said that Nigeria had not invited Bashir to come. Rather he was present for an AU event and that “Nigeria is not in a position to determine who attends an AU event and who does not attend.” This Day, a Nigerian newspaper, reported that the Abuja government was not even aware that Bashir would be attending until a few days before the conference. While President Jonathan had personally invited some of the other African leaders, Bashir was not one of them. Moreover, if Nigeria had stopped Bashir from attending, it may have risked losing the honor of hosting the summit altogether. According to Bashir’s spokesman, while in Abuja Bashir met with the presidents of Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, is also under ICC indictment. However, the court has not issued a warrant for Kenyatta’s arrest because he is cooperating with the court–unlike Bashir. The ICC is awkward for the AU. Two of its chiefs of state are now under indictment. But, the court is unpopular among many Africans who think that it unfairly targets Africa for its prosecutions. The U.S. position on the ICC is not straightforward; U.S. policy is to support the court, and the United States signed the founding Treaty of Rome. But no administration has ever sought Senate ratification of it. There has been some speculation that Nigeria’s welcoming of Bashir was somehow intended to distance itself from the United States. I think that is highly unlikely. Bashir’s visit seems to have posed quandaries for the Jonathan government, which must be mindful of its relationship with the AU. Nigeria has provided the largest number of peacekeepers in Sudan’s Darfur. Like Charles Taylor, the former Liberian warlord, Bashir is also deeply unpopular among many in Nigeria, not least because of his alleged human rights violations in Darfur and South Sudan. Under these circumstances, I find Abati’s explanation credible: Nigeria admitted Bashir because he had been invited by the AU to its summit that Nigeria was merely hosting. I also find it credible that Bashir bailed out essentially without notice because he feared being arrested.

This is a guest post by Tiffany Lynch, a senior policy analyst at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The views expressed are her own and may or may not reflect the views of the Commission.  While speaking with reporters in Addis Ababa during the 50th Anniversary of the African Union, Secretary of State John Kerry said this about the ongoing conflict in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states: “In South Kordofan and Blue Nile you have people who for a long time have felt that they want their secular governance and their identity respected.” This is true, but not limited to just the south. Debates over secular or Islamic government have troubled the entire country of Sudan since its independence in 1956. For almost thirty years thereafter, a diverse coalition of movements resisted efforts to turn Sudan into an Islamic state, including South Sudanese, secular political parties, and other Muslims. These groups fought for democracy and equality of all citizens, regardless of religion. In September 1983, in an effort to remain in power, then-dictator Jafar al Numeri strengthened his ties with the growing Islamic movement and officially implemented sharia. Within months, sharia courts and judges were installed; hudood punishments were implemented for murder, thefts, and adultery, and for violating behavioral norms related to dress and alcohol; and apostasy became a capital offense. While Islamists welcomed the introduction of sharia, it helped fuel Sudan’s twenty-year north-south civil war when southern Christians and animists, as well other Sudanese nationwide, rebelled against the Islamization and Arabization of the country. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom where I work documented these abuses and has continued to monitor the decline in rights in Sudan. The debate over secular or Islamic government continues to divide the country, even after the secession of the south. In anticipation of South Sudan’s 2011 secession (and a dramatic decline in the number of Christians living in Sudan), the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) thought this debate would be finished. In December 2010, President al-Bashir stated that Sudan’s new constitution would be based on sharia law and will not include specific provisions recognizing Sudan’s religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. This and subsequent similar statements by al-Bashir and other NCP officials continuously draw robust criticism from Sudanese opposition parties and women’s and other human rights groups who want a constitution with strong religious freedom protections. In January, more than thirty Sudanese political parties and civil society groups signed the “New Dawn” charter, which calls for separation of religion and state and full equality of all citizens regardless of religion. While some of the Islamic parties who signed the charter have since distanced themselves due to NCP pressure, the charter demonstrates how central the debate between Islamic versus secular governance is to Sudan’s future. And this debate will continue to dominate Sudanese politics as a new constitution is drafted. Who drafts that constitution and by what process will determine the role of sharia in Sudanese governance and the future of religious freedom.

This is a guest post by Kyle Benjamin Schneps; a dual master’s degree candidate at Columbia University specializing in international security policy and global health initiatives. He is currently completing a graduate internship with the Africa Studies program at Council on Foreign Relations. In February 2011, an international summit in Bonn, Germany officially approved the building of a pan-African Great Green Wall (GGW) in support of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The GGW initiative plans to strategically plant swaths of trees roughly nine miles wide and over four thousand miles long. The central idea is for this belt of forest to serve as a barrier against desert winds and thus revitalize soil to protect against land degradation. It will stretch across Africa, passing through eleven  countries—namely, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan. They have all enacted, or plan to enact, the first stages of the program. The GGW initiative, originally envisioned by African leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, is a global response to the encroachment of the Sahara desert into the savannas and farmlands of sub-Saharan Africa. Desertification, which now affects 40 percent of Africa, has been further exacerbated by climate change in recent decades. Many of the continent’s most vulnerable communities living in threatened areas rely on healthy ecosystems to support livelihoods dependent on agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. They now find their livelihoods endangered. The World Food Program has warned that some ten million people risk starvation due to desertification in West Africa’s Sahel alone. Such problems are further compounded by poorly managed land and water resources. Desertification also increases civil conflict among populations vying for arable land. Nomadic groups are constantly at odds with sedentary farmers, who often take up arms to prevent unwanted grazing. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Nigeria’s Middle Belt; Fulani herdsmen and Berom farmers have descended into an unprecedented spiral of sectarian violence over increasingly scarce land. In fact, the Nigeria Security Tracker estimates that sectarian violence results in more deaths than the northern insurgency “Boko Haram.” There are initial  signs of success in the GGW initiative. In Senegal, rural villagers in Widou Thiengoli have reported better harvests and more vitamin-enriched diets due to increased vegetable and fruit production. This is not the first time that such an initiative has been undertaken. Mongolia and China began similar efforts to combat the encroachment of the Gobi Desert in 2006. Furthermore, Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated successful Shelterbelt programs in the 1930s, using strategic planting of foliage to combat the land degradation caused by the Dust Bowl on the American high plains. The U.S. Shelterbelt initiative, however, was successful because it supplemented its “green wall” policies with monetary incentives for farmers who changed their techniques to more ecologically sound production methods. The GGW initiative in Africa must be careful to similarly alter the behavior of land users, and not simply alter the land.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been active in sub-Saharan Africa. Seven investigations have been launched in Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, and Mali. Four prominent Kenyan politicians are due for trial in The Hague in April 2013. One of them, Uhuru Kenyatta, is a leading candidate in the upcoming Kenya presidential elections. Should he win, the new Kenyan head of state would start his term under ICC indictment. About half of sub-Saharan Africa accepts ICC jurisdiction. The United States does not. Many Africans resent the ICC as a “foreign” entity and accuse it of bias against the continent. They express concern that all present ICC indictments involve Africans–there are none from any other part of the world, though there have been in the past. Hence African interest in enlarging the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights so that it can try individuals for the mass crimes over which the ICC currently exercises jurisdiction. Many hope that such an African court would eventually replace the ICC. Yet, some Africans are wary about whether an African court would show the willingness of the ICC to try and convict African leaders in light of the longstanding tradition of African leaders protecting each other. Others are concerned about the costs of establishing a new tribunal, especially in face of the ICC’s own current financial difficulties. Still others are exploring the possibility of an African court that would supplement, but not replace, the ICC. But, it remains unclear whether there is sufficient support for the establishment of an African alternative. The issue will likely fester for some time to come. Of the current serving ICC judges, seven are from Western Europe, six are from Africa, five from Latin America, three from Asia, and three from Eastern Europe. The position of prosecutor is high-profile.  The current prosecutor is Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, who succeeded Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina last year. Bensouda’s first formal investigation was launched to look into atrocities committed in northern Mali over the past year.  

There is a yellow fever epidemic in Sudan, characterized by the press as the world’s worst in twenty years. The international community is assisting with vaccinations and laboratory support. With many Chinese nationals now working in Sudan, Beijing has ordered local health authorities to scan travelers arriving from Sudan for fevers, and is urging Chinese travelers en route to Sudan to be vaccinated. The Sudanese yellow fever epidemic and the Chinese response to it is a reminder of Africa’s disease burden. HIV/AIDS gets the most attention in the United States, and most of the beneficiaries of the multi-billion dollar President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) are in Africa. HIV/AIDS jumps borders, but slowly. Polio in northern Nigeria has the potential to spread internationally quickly–as it has before. Viruses that have established themselves in Africa, such as avian influenza, could mutate to be lethal to humans and spread rapidly within the continent and worldwide. With frequent travel across borders and increasing international aviation, we live in an inescapably inter-connected world. Infectious diseases in particular, make the distance between nations much smaller. Disease in Africa, and how to respond to it, should be higher on the political agenda in the United States.

The situation in the eastern Congo is no less obscure than before the regional leaders met for negotiations over the weekend. M23 stated they would leave the city of Goma, captured on November 20, by November 27. They are still there. Now they claim they will hold a handover ceremony and pull back to Rutshuru, their original stronghold, on Friday, November 30; but only so long as M23 troops remain at the Goma airport. And possibly, that their political wing remain in Goma itself. Rwanda and Uganda continue to vehemently deny that they back the M23 rebel group. This line becomes thinner each time they use it. Kris Berwouts provides a succinct analysis of the recent Rwandan/Congolese relationship. Another player in the arena however is the UN, who stood by after the Congo army fled and watched M23 rebels march into Goma. Many are asking why the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) doesn’t push the rebels out. After all, the Christian Science Monitor and the Economist estimate that M23 numbers in the range of only 1,000-1,500 while there are 19,000 UN troops supported by 3,800 civilian staff in Congo, including 6,700 troops in North Kivu, of which Goma is the capital. As the Economist says, “the UN…has once again been humiliated.” The answer is that pushing the rebels out is not MONUSCO’s mandate. Essentially, MONUSCO is supposed to support the Congolese army and protect civilians. But the Congolese army fled, and, apparently, M23 has not attacked civilians—thus far. The French foreign minister is calling for a “review” of MONUSCO’s mandate, noting, correctly, that future fighting could lead to civilian casualties. But, expanding MONUSCO’s mandate would require UN Security Council action. Rwanda is, at present, on the Council. I doubt that there is the political will among Security Council members to significantly expand MONUSCO’s mandate, and increase its personnel and budget. Previous humanitarian disasters, including Darfur (ongoing) and the Rwanda genocide are not hopeful precedents for greater international intervention; nor is Syria. So, the chances are good that the situation, and the violence, will continue to simmer in North Kivu. That is, unless Congo president Joseph Kabila and Rwanda president Paul Kagame do a deal that patches things up in the short term. Perhaps it will also involve Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni. On November 27, the State Department announced that Assistant Secretary John Carson would be leading a U.S./France/UK delegation to Uganda for talks with Museveni on eastern Congo.

The agreement between Sudan and South Sudan over oil pipeline fees opens the way for South Sudan to renew its oil production and ended an impasse between the two states that had threatened to lead to war.   While the New York Times, citing  Khartoum media, reports that South Sudan will pay $25.80 per barrel to transit the pipeline to Port Sudan from which the oil is exported, more recent reports have cited the agreement at close to $10 per barrel. During her visit to Juba, South Sudan’s capital, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had publicly urged the two states to reach an agreement.  President Obama issued a statement August 4 welcoming the agreement and also praising the African Union High-Level Implemention Panel, led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki “for its determined and skilled leadership in bringing about this agreement.”  In her own statement, Secretary Clinton said that it reflected “a new spirit of compromise on both sides.”  She also praised the “courage” of the Juba government. If implemented and the oil starts to flow, the financial problems of both Juba and Khartoum will ameliorate, and the ground may be prepared for agreement of other, outstanding issues, such as border demarcation.  However, there is a long history of failed or incomplete deals between Khartoum and Juba.  Khartoum has long insisted that a security deal must precede oil arrangements. This time, however, African Union and Obama administration involvement may make it more difficult for either side to walk the deal back.

This is a guest post by Owen Cylke. Mr. Cylke is a development professional and a retired senior foreign service officer with USAID. Despite some progress on improving security in Central Africa, the continuing smuggling of weapons and the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons continue to threaten the integrity of countries across the region. Less noted, but no less important, is the role that wildlife poaching plays in this perilous circumstance. Driven by growing demand from China and Asia, the illegal trade in ivory, rhino horn, tiger bone and other endangered species is skyrocketing. In Asia, seizures of tiger parts have quadrupled over the past decade - a figure that reflects increasing trade as much or more than it does improved law enforcement. Richard Carroll, vice president of Africa programs at World Wildlife Federation in the United States (WWF-US) notes “last year was the worst year for rhino poaching in more than a quarter of a century. And this year looks like it may shatter that dismal record.” With an estimated global value of at least $8 billion annually, the trade in endangered species has long been linked to organized, transnational crime. However, as demand escalates and prices rise, the poaching that supplies the trade has become militarized in ways that pose a serious security threat to weak governments, particularly in Central Africa. This was dramatically illustrated earlier this year when one hundred Sudanese raiders stormed across the border from neighboring Chad and methodically slaughtered as many as three hundred elephants for their ivory in Cameroon’s Bouda N’Djida national park. The Sudanese raiders were believed to be Janjaweed militiamen who, armed with automatic weapons and grenade launchers, were more than a match for unarmed park guards. Increasingly, militias, insurgents and even terrorist groups are using the easy money from wildlife crime to buy arms and fund insurgencies that claim lives, hurt economies, and sow instability in states that lack the military capacity to respond. According to a CRS report to Congress in 2008, elephant and rhino poachers in Somalia have been indirectly linked to terrorism through a local warlord who is believed to have given sanctuary to the al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the bombing of a Kenya hotel in 2002 and an earlier attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in 1998. Richard Carroll cogently points out that “poaching is not just a conservation crisis any more. Long linked to drugs and arms smuggling around the world, it now also now poses a growing threat to the stability of governments in Africa—one that requires a both regional and international response.”

Andrew C. Miller is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relation’s Center for Preventive Action. He can be found on Twitter @andrewmiller802. South Sudan just celebrated its first birthday, but in the words of one South Sudanese blogger, the nascent country is “screwed up.” Fears that the state’s institutions are already failing could be well-founded if the government doesn’t address systemic problems. No one factor explains the state’s fragility, but it’s widely recognized that corruption has eroded South Sudanese confidence in their government. Since 2005, state officials and government contractors have stolen an estimated $4 billion from treasury coffers—an amount equivalent to 30 percent of the country’s annual economic output. In a particularly egregious example, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning squandered millions of dollars as grain contracts, meant to stave off an anticipated food shortage, were awarded to shell companies. Although not as problematic as the high-level graft, it’s also not uncommon for court officials and other bureaucrats to solicit petty bribes. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir seems genuinely intent on cleaning up his government. He has offered amnesty to officials who return stolen assets and taken steps to repatriate funds hidden in foreign accounts. The moves have helped promote transparency. A senior official in Kiir’s party recently opened up her bank accounts for public scrutiny, and the justice minister will begin investigating the fraudulent grain contracts. But thus far only $60 million, or 0.015 percent of the stolen funds, have been recovered. What can the United States do to help? The U.S. experience in Afghanistan does not offer much hope that American officials, as outsiders, can address such a deeply-rooted problem. After years of focused coalition efforts, Afghanistan ranks near last on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Thankfully, however, South Sudan’s leadership seems willing to deal with corrupt officials unlike the Karzai administration. The U.S. Justice Department should back Kiir’s efforts by vigorously enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which outlaws U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials. The Justice Department can also work with the State Department to induce other countries to enforce their versions of the FCPA (if applicable) and international anti-corruption agreements. For dealing with petty corruption, the United States should help South Sudan implement creative approaches. Website such as ipaidabribe.com in India may be a helpful model. The site is an online forum where Indians can record bribes and learn how to resist solicitations. South Sudan’s lack of internet bandwidth and mobile phone coverage would, of course, hamper an online forum in the near future, but low-tech options could be pursued until adequate infrastructure is in place. In Kenya, for instance, the anti-corruption commission has set up school groups to imbue good governance at an early age. A similar program that teaches these values and provides practical steps for avoiding bribes might help in South Sudan. The United States should support these efforts, but ultimately only the South Sudanese can stop corruption from poisoning their state.

Al-Bashir’s regime is in trouble. It has lost seventy-five percent of its revenue with the independence of South Sudan, creating a huge budget deficit. Of its remaining revenue, the press estimates seventy percent goes to fighting in Darfur and the disputed border regions with South Sudan. Salaries of Khartoum’s senior state officials have been cut, and the bureaucracy downsized. Student-led protests over the end of the fuel subsidy and escalating prices are continuing and may be gaining momentum, with a specific focus on the country’s economic travails and calls for al-Bashir to go. There are rumors – always denied – that the families of senior ruling party officials are leaving the country. Meanwhile, Nigerian UN peacekeepers in Darfur are threatening mutiny over non-payment of their wages by the Nigerian government. Al-Bashir looks desperate. He is closing down newspapers and arresting opposition leaders and activists. On June 25, he fired nine advisors and the regional governments resigned – except those of South Darfur which refused to do so. An Arab spring? Not yet. More likely is that al-Bashir is losing the support of the ruling National Congress Party. If he is removed from office, essentially the ruling party would be rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Most of the same people would remain in charge and continue largely isolated from the Sudanese people. But there really is no credible opposition ready to step in. The grievances of the protestors over elimination of the fuel subsidy and the devastating price hikes will remain, absent al-Bashir. That leaves open the possibility of a subsequent Arab spring.

This is a guest post by Asch Harwood. Asch is the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program research associate. The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have released their 2012 Failed States Index. Fourteen of the twenty states listed as “critical” are found in sub-Saharan Africa. Among the highest scores (bad) are Somalia, DRC, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. How predictive is the index? Well, it depends on how you define state failure. If you mean coup, clearly it’s not 100 percent accurate. Mali ranked number 79, which means that it is in danger, but not critical. And yet the country has been struck by interrelated crises—the coup in Bamako, Azawad’s secession and occupation, Tuareg mercenaries, jihadist camps—that fulfill most definitions of state failure. (Jay Ulfelder argues it is indeed possible to assess the likelihood of a coup, which could be considered one definition for state failure.) But if you identify state failure not as a single incident but as a continuum of insecurity, alienation, and poverty, the Failed States Index provides a useful model. The United States, therefore, might benefit by testing its foreign policy against the index’s findings, particularly for any "cognitive dissonance" between the USG’s image of a country that underpins that policy and the reality on the ground. For example, such cognitive dissonance may be present when it comes to Nigeria, although this may be changing. The Failed States Index puts Nigeria in critical condition since the country struggles with Boko Haram in the North, MEND in the South, and sectarian violence in the middle belt—while Abuja’s finances dwindle. Yet, at least publicly, our stance does not always reflect this reality. (It does reflect Nigeria’s strategic importance to the United States, including oil.) However, this dissonance becomes more troubling when you consider who is responsible for state failure. Daron Acemoblu and James Robinson write “these states collapse because they are ruled by what we call ‘extractive’ economic institutions, which destroy incentives, discourage innovation, and sap the talent of their citizens by creating a tilted playing field and robbing them of opportunities. These institutions are not in place by mistake but on purpose. They’re there for the benefit of elites who gain much from the extraction …at the expense of society.” That sounds like what Nigerian critics say about their own elites. It is to be hoped that U.S. policymakers make use of sources such as the Failed States Index as they shape the bilateral relationship.