South Sudan

The civil war and associated humanitarian disasters in South Sudan is reawakening Congressional interest and concern for South Sudan. A bipartisan group of seven congressmen have introduced a bill, HR 2989, “to encourage the warring parties of South Sudan to resolve their conflicts peacefully.” The congressional sponsors are Thomas Rooney (R-FL), Michael Capuano (D-MA), Michael McCaul (R-TX), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Maxine Waters (D-CA), James McGovern (D-MA), and Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE). The bill recalls the involvement of the United States in South Sudan coming to independence. It then chronicles the dreary history of the fighting that started in late 2013 between President Salva Kiir and his former vice president Riek Machar, and the resulting humanitarian disaster. It also recalls the numerous efforts to broker a peace, especially by South Sudan’s African neighbors. The bill calls on the Department of State to develop a South Sudan strategy and would require the department to report regularly to Congress on developments in South Sudan. Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have now both signed a peace agreement that would involve power sharing between their two factions and a cease-fire. Both parties, however, are already claiming that the other has broken the cease-fire. While friends of South Sudan can only hope that this peace agreement will stick, the numerous failures in the past provide little ground for confidence that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar are committed to making it work. Hence, in part, the revival of Congressional interest that HR 2989 represents. The events leading up to the 2011 separation of South Sudan from Sudan were a focus of intense American popular interest. The “lost boys of Sudan,” orphans of the fighting between the South Sudan liberation forces and the Khartoum government of Omar al-Bashir, became a focus of humanitarian concern and congressional engagement. Since South Sudan’s independence, however, U.S. popular interest in South Sudan has waned, and the most recent congressional hearing took place in February 2014. It is too early to say what the future of HR 2989 will be. As yet, no hearings have been scheduled. However, the bill’s introduction with bipartisan sponsorship is a sign of congressional reengagement.

The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) released a report on June 29, detailing human rights atrocities in South Sudan. The litany of abuses has now become familiar: gang rape, torture, killing, and the destruction of villages. The UN reports that the military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), launched a major offensive in northwestern Mayom County that resulted in the displacement of over 100,000 people. Survivors claimed that women and girls were burned alive after being gang raped by soldiers in nine separate incidents. There are also reports of similar atrocities by rebels, including the recruitment of child soldiers. The SPLA denies UN agencies access to sites of the alleged atrocities, and it has not commented on the June 29 report. The current civil war started in December 2013, with a falling-out between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar. A subsequent cycle of retaliatory killings has morphed into what resembles an ethnic conflict, broadly between Kiir’s Dinka and Machar’s Nuer. Since the fighting started, it is estimated that there are at least 1.6 million internally displaced persons in South Sudan.There are other conflicts between herders and farmers and over water use that are not reducible to ethnicity. There is now an overlay of warlordism. The “legitimate” government in Juba hardly appears to function, and lacks legitimacy from a significant part of the South Sudanese population. Given the intractable bloodshed, continued human rights abuses, and the apparent unwillingness or inability of Salva Kiir, Riek Machar, and the South Sudanese elites to stop the violence, there needs to be serious consideration of the revival of something like the old UN Trusteeship Council, by which an outside body could supervise the administration of South Sudan until it is fully ready for independence. Such an entity could impose an end of the killing and nurture the establishment and development of institutions of governance. This body could also be of use in other countries coping with protracted conflicts, such as the Central African Republic. Ideally, such a body would be created by a regional, multilateral institution, such as the African Union (AU). However, the AU might lack the capacity to undertake such a task. In that case, the burden reverts to the UN Security Council. There will be objections from the donors as to the cost and duration of the mission. But, the international community has already spent billions of dollars on South Sudan, apparently to no avail.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Earlier this week, after thirteen months of civil war, South Sudan’s warring factions signed an Agreement on the Establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity. President Salva Kiir and his rival, former vice president Riek Machar, recommitted to a cease-fire. The two factions also agreed to a transitional power-sharing government that will rule for thirty months beginning in July 2015, and they approved the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a judicial body to investigate and address human rights abuses. The particulars of the transitional government, such as the identities of the executive leadership and the proportion of government positions each side will receive, will be negotiated throughout February, and a final peace deal is expected by March 5. South Sudan descended into conflict in December 2013 when President Kiir accused Vice President Machar of plotting a coup and dismissed him and eleven other senior political figures. Machar interpreted Kiir’s actions as a bid to consolidate political power and created an opposition movement to counter him. This elite political division incited fighting among the security forces and escalated into an all-out armed conflict, which soon took on an ethnic tinge, pitting ethnic Dinkas who supported Kiir against ethnic Nuer who backed Machar. The war is estimated to have killed upward of 10,000 and displaced over one million people. The United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as special envoys from the East African Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD), played an instrumental role in facilitating the independence of South Sudan. Given their protracted involvement, some have placed the blame for South Sudan’s swift descent into chaos on their shoulders. While they bear some responsibility, U.S., European, and African partners have expended considerable time, effort, and resources on trying to repair the political rift between Machar and Kiir. They brokered a ceasefire agreement in January 2014 and hosted several rounds of peace talks, all of which failed to stop the fighting. Peacemaking efforts have been continually impeded by Kiir and Machar. Ultimately, only South Sudanese leaders can put an end to the deadly conflict that has ravaged their country since late 2013. This recent agreement is a step in the right direction. Given the history of failed negotiations between Machar and Kiir, skepticism abounds over whether it will lead to a sustained peace. It is not merely a question of Machar and Kiir’s political will, but also whether these two leaders can convince their armies, unaffiliated militias, staunch advocates, and political allies to honor a peace agreement. Yet, IGAD and South Sudan’s other international partners are determined to help achieve a final resolution on March 5. To incentivize good behavior, the United Nations, African Union, and IGAD have threatened sanctions against anyone who undermines the peace process. Whether sanctions or a desire to alleviate civilians’ suffering will compel South Sudanese leaders to sign a final deal by March 5 will remain to be seen.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Ten years ago today, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended twenty-one years of civil war in Sudan. The internationally brokered accord between the governing National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and the southern rebel forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A, later SPLM) was hailed as a tremendous achievement at the time. However, a decade later, an independent South Sudan is mired in civil conflict, political tensions and rebel violence are rife in Sudan, and the CPA has failed to establish peace and stability. Given the long history of failed negotiations between the NCP and the SPLM/A, the signing of the CPA in January 2005 was welcomed by northerners, southerners, and foreign governments alike. The CPA introduced an interim constitution for Sudan, which established power sharing between the NCP and SPLM/A at the national government level, provided for a semi-autonomous regional government in the south under SPLM/A leadership, elaborated a formula for dividing oil revenues, and committed the state to holding a self-determination referendum in the south in 2011. The CPA signatories and the international interlocutors who facilitated the agreement saw the period leading up to the referendum as an opportunity for the ruling NCP to initiate democratic reform, and thus demonstrate the benefits of Sudanese unity and incentivize southerners to vote against South Sudanese independence in 2011. The initial implementation of the CPA was promising: a national unity government integrating southerners was formed, SPLM/A leader John Garang was appointed as first vice president of Sudan, and the regional government of the south was transitioned into the hands of the SPLM/A. Yet, it was not long before the cracks began to show. Vice President Garang died in a helicopter crash weeks after taking office and was replaced by Salva Kiir, who later became president of South Sudan. Unlike Garang, Kiir and other SPLM/A leaders were not invested in a united Sudan, and rather than facilitating Sudanese unity, they worked to lay the foundations for an independent South Sudan. At the same time, the NCP did not make the necessary political reforms to create an inclusive, democratic unity government and integrate the SPLM/A. Given that neither party made Sudanese unity a viable, attractive option, it was no surprise that southerners voted for secession in the 2011 referendum. Despite the promise of the CPA, conflict abounds in Sudan and South Sudan today. The South Sudanese have been locked in a year-long civil war, sparked by a power struggle between President Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. In the north, conflict rages on in the states of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile as the central government continues to disregard rebels’ grievances of political disenfranchisement and economic marginalization. The responsibility for the current situation lies squarely with the political elites in Sudan and South Sudan. Certainly, there are valid criticisms of the CPA, including its neglect of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states, its inadequate treatment of the border regions between Sudan and South Sudan, and its exclusion of other political parties and rebel groups.Nevertheless, the CPA was not designed to be a panacea for Sudan’s problems. By halting the civil war and establishing a six-year interim period, the agreement provided the SPLM/A and NCP an opportunity to embark on the political transformation necessary for long-term peace, stability, and unity in Sudan. Not only did these parties squander this political opportunity, but they have prolonged violence and conflict, to the detriment of all Sudanese.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Allen is currently an officer in the Army National Guard. His interests are in Africa, conflict, and conflict resolution. In March, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the international organization that represents east African nations, announced plans to deploy a stabilization and protection force to South Sudan by mid-April. As of April 1, IGAD also announced that peace talks between the warring factions in South Sudan were suspended for a month. There is no update on the development of the stabilization force. This is not a good sign. Despite a peace agreement the conflict in South Sudan continues and IGAD has not only been unable to call up troops to deploy they have also failed to develop a mission mandate. This must be done in conjunction with the AU and the UN, who already have a force in South Sudan. The question now is, when does IGAD plan to deploy troops? The current delay may have something to do with threats from Riek Machar, the former vice-president of South Sudan and leader of the rebel forces. Machar is strongly opposed to any international deployment including an IGAD force. He has stated that, “if [IGAD] wants to colonize us we will fight them.” Machar appears to have plans of his own. Despite the peace agreement between his forces and the government he announced plans to seize the Paloch oil fields in the north of the country. Since the beginning of the conflict oil production in South Sudan has fallen from 240,000 to 150,000 barrels a day. These oil fields are in danger despite the UN forces in the region as they are preoccupied with displaced peoples, and their mandate does not specifically cover the protection of facilities. The South Sudanese government understands how important oil production is to their success. Just last week an article in Businessweek discussed the South Sudanese government’s plans to raise oil output and develop diesel refineries in Unity state. However, after heavy fighting over the last two days the rebel forces claim to have seized oil fields near Bentiu, Unity state. It is still unclear who instigated the fighting in the region. If Machar is able to seize the oil fields in Paloch the country’s oil production will fall even more drastically. As oil accounts for approximately 98 percent of South Sudan’s revenue, Machar would essentially have a strangle hold on the country and its resources. Machar would be left holding all the chips in the negotiation process. The government, led by President Salva Kiir would either be forced to capitulate to Machar’s demands or respond with military force. I believe the government would choose the latter option. As such the mission and goals of IGAD’s stabilization and protection force could change drastically if it takes too long to respond. Currently, IGAD would be able to move to protect many of the country’s oil fields and prevent conflict over control of South Sudan’s greatest resource. However, if Machar is able to take control of the Paloch oil fields before this happens, IGAD may have to decide whether they are willing to send their forces into what could possibly be an active war zone.

Medicines sans Frontiers (MSF –“Doctors Without Borders”) issued a detailed criticism of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for its alleged failure to improve conditions at the Tomping displaced persons camp in Juba. UNMISS is trying close the camp and remove the displaced persons elsewhere. This will pose logistical challenges during the rainy season, now underway. MSF is a highly distinguished international humanitarian agency that has cooperated closely with UN agencies and plays a major humanitarian role in South Sudan. The New York Times reports that the overt criticism of UN agencies by MSF is unusual. This episode highlights the humanitarian challenges that endure in South Sudan, even if international attention has waned following the political and security crises that began in December last year. The bottom line is that humanitarian and UN agencies working in South Sudan require much higher levels of international funding. Otherwise, an even greater humanitarian tragedy than what we have already seen becomes all but inevitable.

The New York Times and other media report that South Sudan president Salva Kiir and ex-vice president Riek Machar, and their respective forces, have signed a cease-fire in Addis Ababa. The civil war, which started in December 2013, has left thousands dead and estimates are that at least a half a million South Sudanese have been displaced in what under the best of circumstances is one of the poorest countries in the world. Any cease-fire must be welcomed. However, thus far there is little indication that the political, economic, and social problems that underpinned the fighting are being addressed. The cease-fire has the appearance of a deal between two warlords responding to outside pressure to stop the killing. On so many grounds the fighting in South Sudan has been a disaster. But, one is the negative impact it likely will have on how some (or many) Americans regard Africa. Africa is usually far from American concerns, except in specialist circles. With the arguable exception of Liberia, the United States has never had a colonial relationship with the continent, and the trade and investment relationship is small. Popular U.S. involvement has generally been related to security issues, such as when there were African proxies for East and West during the Cold War, or the current jihadis in the Sahel, or natural or man-made humanitarian disasters. South Sudan’s struggles were different. The Khartoum regime’s repression of the Christian and animist south struck a chord among Americans who had previously paid little attention to Africa. The “lost boys” of Sudan–orphaned by Khartoum’s brutality–were a cause taken up by parishes and congregations across the United States and encouraged by Hollywood figures such as George Clooney and human rights activists. South Sudan’s achievement of independence in 2012 was popularly welcomed in the United States, though with little appreciation of the obstacles still to be overcome. Now, South Sudan’s promise, its dream, has been besmirched. My concern is that at least some Americans who engaged with Africa for the first time over the South Sudan crisis will turn away from the continent. That would be bad for the United States and bad for Africa.

Nicholas Kulish, writing in the January 9 New York Times, reported that the International Crisis Group estimates the number of dead from the current round of fighting that started December 15 in South Sudan is nearly 10,000. This is much larger than the December 26 estimate by UN Special Representative for South Sudan Hilde Johnson of 1,000 killed. Fighting has intensified since December 26, no doubt resulting in more casualties. As Herve Ladsous, the under secretary for Peacekeeping Operations said, “We are not able to provide final figures. We know it will be very substantially in excess of the 1,000 figure.” In sub-Saharan Africa, where there is fighting, it is often difficult to get an accurate handle on casualty numbers. Rarely are there morgues and much of the fighting is usually dispersed over large areas. Then there are the casualties, usually civilian, from disease and hunger that results from the movement of displaced persons. Over the years, many NGO researchers working on the ground in conflict areas have suggested to me that to get a realistic figure, it was necessary to multiple official figures by at least five. That makes the International Crisis Group estimate, if not exact, then at least indicative of realities on the ground.

South Sudan president Salva Kiir and ex-vice president Riek Machar have sent delegations to the African Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa to try to negotiate a ceasefire to the recent outbreak of hostilities. In the meantime, a humanitarian crisis looms, with hundreds of thousands displaced persons. There are fears that the conflict is spiralling down into a civil war. What is going on here? Salva Kiir claims that the crisis was provoked by an attempted coup by Machar. Machar denies there was a coup attempt, and claims that Kiir has been moving against his supporters. Machar is demanding that Kiir step down. Commentators are seeing the conflict as one between the Dinka and the Nuer, the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan. Salva Kiir is a Dinka, while Riek Machar is a Nuer. Perhaps the focus should be on Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). This was the liberation movement that led South Sudan’s separation from Sudan’s Khartoum government. It included Salva Kiir and Riek Machar and Dinka and Nuer in a context of constantly shifting alliances and betrayals. But the SPLA was a liberation movement, not a political party. Beyond independence and "development," it has no coherent political program. With little capacity to absorb it, the country is awash with cash from oil and development assistance, and corruption is reported to be ubiquitous. Against this background, and with separation from Khartoum achieved, the SPLA appears to be degenerating into something approaching warlordism, with warlords appealing to ethnic identities. Many, including other African nations, enthusiastically supported the independence of South Sudan from Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist and racist Khartoum government. Yet, beyond getting out from under Khartoum and with a nominally Christian majority, South Sudan has little internal coherence. Perhaps it is a misnomer to call it a nation-state. What might be the next steps forward? First, of course, must be an end to the fighting. That will require patching up relations between Kiir and Machar, perhaps involving some type of power sharing arrangement. There are signs that African leaders are prepared to bring pressure to achieve this. Once a ceasefire is in place, the international community must move to address the horrific humanitarian consequences of this latest round of fighting. Over the longer term, allies of the young nation should prepare themselves for extended involvement with South Sudan, with many bumps in the road as it seeks to transform itself into a nation, a process likely to take generations and made no easier by oil riches.

The current crisis in South Sudan escalated on December 15, when President Salva Kiir accused his long-time political rival former vice president Riek Machar of attempting a coup. Since then, there has been widespread fighting between the supporters of the two, with “thousands” killed and yet more thousands displaced. Foreign governments, including the United States, are evacuating their nationals, many of whom have fled to UN encampments. The fighting is likely to impact on South Sudan’s oil production, though thus far it does not appear to have spooked the international oil markets. Mostly Christian South Sudan’s struggle for independence from al-Bashir’s repressive, Islamist government in Khartoum has long been a popular cause, especially in the developed world but also in much of sub-Saharan Africa. In the two years since South Sudan’s independence, international donors has greatly expanded their assistance levels, and there are now significant numbers of expatriates working on various aid projects. Accordingly, there has been the usual handwringing and official statements by leaders of the UN Security Council and countries that have citizens on the ground in South Sudan calling for a cessation of this round of fighting. The European Commission is sending a special envoy, Alex Rondos, to South Sudan. He is scheduled to arrive on December 26. Also scheduled to arrive the same day is Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. The goal is to organize and facilitate negotiations between the two warring factions. However, Machar has said at various times that he will enter negotiations only after Salva Kiir releases the former’s supporters held captive. At other times, Machar insists on Salva Kiir’s resignation as a precondition. Getting genuine negotiations underway will likely be a challenge. In the meantime, on Christmas Eve, the UN Security Council voted to increase the number of UN peacekeepers from 7,000 to 12,500 and the international police in South Sudan from 900 to 1,300. The troops and the police, all from sub-Saharan African countries, will be pulled from UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Abeiyi, the territory disputed by Sudan and South Sudan. Commentators place the fighting in an ethnic context, conflict between the Dinka, led by Salva Kiir, and the Nuer, led by Machar. That there is now an important ethnic dimension to the killing is undeniable. However, Andreas Hirblinger and Sara de Simone, in “South Sudan: What is "Tribalism" and Why does it Matter,” places the ethnic struggle in a sophisticated context. They argue, inter alia, that “ethnicity provides a lens through which power struggles have been framed throughout most of South Sudan’s recent history.” They show how personal and factional rivalries within the presidential guard spread to the armed forces, and how the threat of ethnic conflict can further an often personal agenda. As external involvement in South Sudan intensifies, Hirblingier and Simone are essential reading. Their article appeared December 24 in African Arguments.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir. Aala is a research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. On September 22, Sudan’s government announced the lifting of fuel subsidies as part of an IMF-backed strategy to restabilize the economy. Protests broke out the next day in Wad Madani and spread to several other cities, including the capitol Khartoum. President Omar al-Bahsir defended this latest austerity measure as a necessary step to prevent the total collapse of Sudan’s economy, which has been teetering since South Sudan seceded in 2011 and took with it three quarters of oil profits, which accounted for 48 percent of Sudan’s government revenue. In the two-hour press conference announcing the subsidy cuts, al-Bashir failed to acknowledge his government’s role in precipitating the country’s current economic crisis. Al-Bashir’s government helped incite a large-scale armed conflict in 2011 when it refused citizens’ demands for inclusive governance in the Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states. Moreover he glossed over his government’s failure to reach an oil sharing agreement with South Sudan, leading to military skirmishes along the border and halting oil production for over a year since 2012 (with brief resumption). This colossal mismanagement of bilateral relations with South Sudan and costly internal contlict has drained government coffers and stunted Sudan’s meager economic growth prospects, which the IMF had forecast at 1.2 percent with sustained oil production. Fuel prices doubled overnight after the subsidy cuts went into effect. The cost of transportation, food, clothing, and other basic goods spiked, intensifying preexisting economic hardships for Sudan’s beleaguered population, almost half of which lives in poverty and subsists on a monthly minimum wage of 450 Sudanese pounds (U.S.$102). Since the outbreak of protests last week, the government has been slow to address economic grievances. It promised to raise minimum wage retroactively for salaries since January 2013, and offered a one-time handout of 151 Sudanese pounds (U.S. $21) to half a million poor families. But these conciliatory gestures have not pacified protesters. Many are incensed by the government’s repressive measures to shut down demonstrations, including its implementation of a “shoot to kill” policy that has resulted in over two hundred deaths and eight hundred arrests. To further silence protesters, the government is trying to control the country’s media outlets, suspending publication of major national newspapers and shutting down the internet for part of last week. Public ire over the country’s untenable economic situation has mingled with both frustration over these repressive tactics and a general sense of political disenfranchisement, prompting calls for the dissolution of the current government and sustaining protests into their second week. Political opposition parties, fed up with the government’s exclusive grip on power, have echoed the public’s call. Even some senior officials of al-Bashir’s own party signed a memo last week urging the president to cancel the subsidy cuts and stop the crackdown on protesters. On Wednesday, the spokesman of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which partnered with al-Bashir’s government in 2011, resigned. These developments threated al-Bashir’s reign and intensify the sense of political uncertainty, and perhaps opportunity, in Sudan. If protests continue, al-Bashir will have few cards left to play, especially if his political allies do not stand behind him. Oil talks with South Sudan are at a standstill, and there are limited options for international borrowing due to the country’s bulky external debt and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Therefore, the government will not be able to immediately ease the economic pressures on citizens. Instead, al-Bashir will have two likely options: cede some political ground and opt for inclusive political reform, or intensify government repression.

Africa has had many secessionist movements in the post-colonial period. Only South Sudan and the Republic of Somaliland have so far been successful, and the latter lacks international recognition. Some secessionist movements never really go away. Katanga, currently the southernmost province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), established itself as a state separate from the rest of the former Belgian Congo in the years immediately after independence, allegedly with Belgian connivance. Even after it was forcibly re-incorporated into what is now called Congo-Kinshasa, it has retained a separate consciousness and there have been recurring secessionist movements. The province is relatively wealthier and has better social statistics than the rest of the country, largely because of its mineral resources. Now, an armed group called Mai-Mai Kata-Katanga is campaigning for provincial autonomy, claiming that the province has not benefited from its mineral riches. Estimates are that the group has displaced some 340,000 people. “Kata Katanga” means “cut off Katanga,” while “Mai” means water and refers to a magic potion with which they spray themselves for immunity from bullets, according to the media. In March, the insurgents attacked Lubumbashi, the provincial capital, armed with AK-47s and various traditional weapons. They were defeated by the Congolese armed forces and surrendered to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission. According to the press thirty-three were killed and sixty were wounded. Now, at least one Katanga provincial politician is calling for talks between the Mai-Mai and the Kabila government in Kinshasa. There never has been a credible political process in place to address the grievances that feed insurgencies like Mai-Mai. Meanwhile, President Kabila has removed the military commander based in Lubumbashi for “grave dereliction of duty.” The leader of another pro-autonomy group observes that Congo-Kinshasa is “a repository of unresolved conflicts, where dissatisfaction and despair have become entrenched and the most effective and sustainable solution is in the reconstruction of the entire state structure.” If he is right, the Mai-Mai group may go away, but it will likely be replaced by another group in a continuing cycle until Congo-Kinshasa’s profound issues of governance are addressed.

Andrew C. Miller is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relation’s Center for Preventive Action. He can be found on Twitter @andrewmiller802. South Sudan just celebrated its first birthday, but in the words of one South Sudanese blogger, the nascent country is “screwed up.” Fears that the state’s institutions are already failing could be well-founded if the government doesn’t address systemic problems. No one factor explains the state’s fragility, but it’s widely recognized that corruption has eroded South Sudanese confidence in their government. Since 2005, state officials and government contractors have stolen an estimated $4 billion from treasury coffers—an amount equivalent to 30 percent of the country’s annual economic output. In a particularly egregious example, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning squandered millions of dollars as grain contracts, meant to stave off an anticipated food shortage, were awarded to shell companies. Although not as problematic as the high-level graft, it’s also not uncommon for court officials and other bureaucrats to solicit petty bribes. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir seems genuinely intent on cleaning up his government. He has offered amnesty to officials who return stolen assets and taken steps to repatriate funds hidden in foreign accounts. The moves have helped promote transparency. A senior official in Kiir’s party recently opened up her bank accounts for public scrutiny, and the justice minister will begin investigating the fraudulent grain contracts. But thus far only $60 million, or 0.015 percent of the stolen funds, have been recovered. What can the United States do to help? The U.S. experience in Afghanistan does not offer much hope that American officials, as outsiders, can address such a deeply-rooted problem. After years of focused coalition efforts, Afghanistan ranks near last on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Thankfully, however, South Sudan’s leadership seems willing to deal with corrupt officials unlike the Karzai administration. The U.S. Justice Department should back Kiir’s efforts by vigorously enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which outlaws U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials. The Justice Department can also work with the State Department to induce other countries to enforce their versions of the FCPA (if applicable) and international anti-corruption agreements. For dealing with petty corruption, the United States should help South Sudan implement creative approaches. Website such as ipaidabribe.com in India may be a helpful model. The site is an online forum where Indians can record bribes and learn how to resist solicitations. South Sudan’s lack of internet bandwidth and mobile phone coverage would, of course, hamper an online forum in the near future, but low-tech options could be pursued until adequate infrastructure is in place. In Kenya, for instance, the anti-corruption commission has set up school groups to imbue good governance at an early age. A similar program that teaches these values and provides practical steps for avoiding bribes might help in South Sudan. The United States should support these efforts, but ultimately only the South Sudanese can stop corruption from poisoning their state.