Sub-Saharan Africa

South Sudan

  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Sudan’s Al-Bashir on the Way Out?
    Al-Bashir’s regime is in trouble. It has lost seventy-five percent of its revenue with the independence of South Sudan, creating a huge budget deficit. Of its remaining revenue, the press estimates seventy percent goes to fighting in Darfur and the disputed border regions with South Sudan. Salaries of Khartoum’s senior state officials have been cut, and the bureaucracy downsized. Student-led protests over the end of the fuel subsidy and escalating prices are continuing and may be gaining momentum, with a specific focus on the country’s economic travails and calls for al-Bashir to go. There are rumors – always denied – that the families of senior ruling party officials are leaving the country. Meanwhile, Nigerian UN peacekeepers in Darfur are threatening mutiny over non-payment of their wages by the Nigerian government. Al-Bashir looks desperate. He is closing down newspapers and arresting opposition leaders and activists. On June 25, he fired nine advisors and the regional governments resigned – except those of South Darfur which refused to do so. An Arab spring? Not yet. More likely is that al-Bashir is losing the support of the ruling National Congress Party. If he is removed from office, essentially the ruling party would be rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Most of the same people would remain in charge and continue largely isolated from the Sudanese people. But there really is no credible opposition ready to step in. The grievances of the protestors over elimination of the fuel subsidy and the devastating price hikes will remain, absent al-Bashir. That leaves open the possibility of a subsequent Arab spring.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Sudanese Return Home – with International Assistance
    One of the major unresolved issues from South Sudan’s split from Khartoum has been the citizenship status of Sudanese of southern origin living in the north, and those of northern origin living in the south. Optimists had hoped that the citizenship issue would be amicably resolved and that most people involved would stay in place. Alas, in the context of the increasingly bitter divorce between Khartoum and Juba, it looks like a folk migration of southern Sudanese back to the south is underway. When South Sudan voted for independence, Khartoum revoked the citizenship of all South Sudanese. In response to concern voiced by the international community, Khartoum allowed a nine-month grace period, which ended in April, for South Sudanese living in the north. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) on May 8 stated that 376,226 people have returned home since October 2010. It estimates that half a million South Sudanese remain in Sudan. Of these, up to fifteen thousand have been stranded in Kosti waiting for barges to take them down the Nile to South Sudan. According to the press, Khartoum is saying they are stranded because the Juba government has diverted the barges for military use. IOM’s response is to return the refugees to Khartoum and then fly them to Juba. IOM negotiated the necessary arrangements with the local authorities and with Juba. On May 14, the flights started, with four hundred people arriving in Juba. The belongings of the returnees are being transported by road, according to the Juba ministry of information. Each returnee is restricted to twenty kilograms of baggage. IOM is moving the refugees from Kosti to its Khartoum transit camp by bus. At the camp, IOM provides medical checks and prepares the manifests. It then flies the refugees to Juba, where they are housed in a camp operated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. According to the press, after the returnees arrive in Juba, they will be dispersed to their place of origin. This episode illustrates the crucial role of IOM, an international organization headquartered in Geneva, in large refugee movements. With 146 member states, and 98 observers, it spent US$1.3 billion in 2011. Its funding comes primarily from member states.
  • Sudan
    How to Defuse Sudan Conflict
    Sudan and South Sudan appear to be on the brink of war. The United States and China must press both sides to return to the negotiating table, says CFR expert Jendayi Frazer.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Sudan: Not Looking Good
    Despite reports that fighting is ebbing between Sudan and South Sudan, the situation is troubling. Last week, Sudan (Khartoum) president al-Bashir escalated his rhetoric against South Sudan (Juba) in the aftermath of the latter’s forces occupying an oil-rich region, Heglig, inside Sudan’s borders. Al-Bashir has characterized the Juba government as an "insect," and he appears to be repudiating the independence of South Sudan. The press reports him as saying, "Either we end up occupying Juba or you (South Sudan) end up occupying Khartoum but the boundaries of the old Sudan can longer fit us together, only one of us has to remain standing." He said that his Sudan Armed Forces will teach South Sudan "a lesson in jihad and patriotism," according to press reports. On April 17, Thabo Mbeki’s African Union (AU) mediation team and UN Special Envoy to the two Sudans Haile Menkerios briefed the UN Security Council. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice is quoted in the press as saying that the two characterized Juba and Khartoum as locked "in a logic of war." The UN Security Council is considering sanctions against both states with the goal of ending hostilities. On April 18, the U.S. Department of State spokesman said, "We continue to call for an immediate and unconditional cessation of violence by both parties, and that means we want to see the immediate withdrawal of South Sudanese forces of Heglig and we want to see an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of South Sudan by the Sudanese armed forces." The spokesman said that U.S. special envoy Princeton Lyman has been meeting with both governments. And, most recently, the AU  issued demands that the two sides resume negotiations. Al-Bashir’s reference to ’jihad’ is particularly provocative given Khartoum’s history of trying to Islamicize Christian and animist South Sudan before the latter’s rebellion and independence. Al-Bashir’s comments will confirm for many South Sudanese their doubts as to his commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Accords that led to Juba’s independence last year. For now, Juba and Khartoum do, indeed, appear to be locked "in a logic of war." It remains to be seen whether they will back down in the face of international opinion as expressed by the UN Security Council and the African Union.
  • China
    South Sudan and the Chinese
    The International Crisis Group (ICG) has just issued a must-read analysis of China’s new initiatives in South Sudan. "China’s New Courtship in South Sudan" is a cogent, credible analysis of the tightrope Beijing must walk between Khartoum and Juba in the aftermath of the Sudan split. Most of China’s oil investments in the former Sudan are in the south, and Chinese companies are also salivating over the possibility of participating in the the construction of South Sudan’s now almost absent infrastructure. The ICG reminds its readership that the number of Chinese in the South Sudan has spiked over the past year. But, China has been a close ally of Khartoum in the past, and the memory of that reality is a factor in Juba and likely a brake on Beijing’s ambitions. Nevertheless, despite its pro-Western orientation, Juba is open to Chinese commercial proposals, and President Salva Kiir is visiting China for the first time since South Sudan’s independence. Given the ongoing, poisonous relationship between Khartoum and Juba that periodically threatens to morph into open warfare and produces fresh humanitarian disasters, there is the hope that China can play a more positive role than it has in the past. But the ICG includes a salutary caution that Chinese influence over the behaviors of Khartoum and Juba can be overestimated. And China always faces the risk of being caught in the middle of disputes between Khartoum and Juba, especially over oil. Nevertheless, I think a Chinese commercial relationship with Juba may raise new, positive possibilities -- so long as Salva Kiir’s government manages it carefully.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Khartoum Opposition to President Bashir
    Even as Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir escalates his rhetoric against the United States and mobilizes paramilitary forces against insurgencies within Sudan, opposition parties in Khartoum are calling for him to step down. While the opposition seems too weak and fragmented to pose a serious threat to al-Bashir for now, its statements are a reminder that al-Bashir must watch his back. On March 3, al-Bashir urged the Sudanese to mobilize for war and to deploy the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces against multiple insurgencies. In a ceremony, the PDF pledged its undying loyalty to al-Bashir and ascribed the insurgencies to American imperialism, international Zionism, and resurgent colonialism. In response, on March 5, the opposition Umma Party, the Communist Party, and the Popular Congress Party (PCP) said that al-Bashir’s mobilization call was issued not in the interest of the Sudanese people but rather for the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The three parties called for the Sudanese people not to respond to al-Bashir and for the president to step down from office. The political secretary for the PCP called for a transitional government. He called on the Sudanese people to overthrow the NCP. The leader of the Umma party accused the NCP of making war against its own citizens in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, an approach, she said, that earlier resulted in the secession of South Sudan. A spokesman for the Communist Party called on the Sudanese people to reject "the policy of war." Strong stuff in a country where the the regime shows itself capable of exceptional brutality in Darfur and in the contested border regions in the South. Yet, al-Bashir apparently calculates that it is not in his best interests to initiate all-out repression against his opposition. Or, perhaps he does not feel himself strong enough to be able to do so.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Sudan and South Sudan: Some Hopeful Movement on Border Issues
    Delegations from South Sudan (Juba) and Sudan (Khartoum) have announced they will meet immediately to demarcate the border between the two countries. The goal is for the talks to be completed within three months. However, this round of negotiations will not address five disputed areas, about which talks will continue. In another border issue, the Khartoum press reports that the two countries have signed an agreement to monitor border areas and to open ten crossing points along the 2200km border. The border between the two states, along with the division of oil revenue and questions of nationality for those from the North who now live in the South and vice versa are among the vexatious issues that were not addressed before South Sudan became independent. Meanwhile both Khartoum and Juba accuse the other of supporting rebel groups. There are also difficult ethnic and land-use issues. Both migratory and agricultural people living in the disputed territories and along the border have been subject to nearly unspeakable atrocities, perpetrated especially by Khartoum ostensibly to suppress rebel groups, and to famine. (Khartoum denies access by international assistance organizations to many border areas.) Nicholas Kristof, in a New York Times February 23 op-ed, describes clandestinely visiting areas in the Nuba mountains, an area regularly subject to Khartoum bomb attacks. His conclusion: “This is a mass atrocity that has attracted little attention: a government starving its people, massacring them, raping them, and bombing them – in hopes of crushing a rebel movement.”
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Another Humanitarian Crisis Brewing in South Sudan?
    United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) deputy executive director Ramiro Lopes da Silva announced yesterday that his agency will assist eighty thousand people in South Sudan’s Jonglei state, who are victims of escalating ethnic conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Murle. He also warned that the conflict in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, in Sudan, could lead to the flight of half a million people to South Sudan if Khartoum continues to deny access to the area by humanitarian agencies. The two crises are separate. Conflict between the Lou Nuer and the Murle predates the Sudanese civil war and the independence of South Sudan. Over the years, as now, it involves cattle theft, kidnapping, and revenge. There is evidence that neither group surrendered all of their weapons to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army when South Sudan became independent, as they were required to do. Though the fighting and resulting internally displaced population appears to be confined to South Sudan, the two peoples also live in adjacent countries, and there must be concern that it could spread. By contrast, the conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan is directly related to Sudan’s division last year into two states. The boundary between Sudan and South Sudan is not fully demarcated and border territories are disputed by various groups with links to Juba and Khartoum. Establishing the frontier between the two states is one of the serious, unresolved issues left over from what was hardly a velvet divorce. Khartoum and Juba accuse each other of supporting rebel groups and militias in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Khartoum continues to deny access by humanitarian agencies to large areas ostensibly because it fears that food aid will reach the pro-Juba rebels. Large numbers of people need assistance. In addition to the eighty thousand displaced because of Lou Nuer and Murle fighting, Lopes da Silva said that during the past week, a thousand people crossed the border into South Sudan. He observed that this number was comparable to the rate of people fleeing Somalia into Kenya during last year’s famine in the Horn of Africa. The international community should take Lopes da Silva’s warnings as a wake-up call and start to prepare for what could be a major humanitarian operation that will likely require additional resources for UNWFP and other humanitarian agencies.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    South Sudan-Kenya Oil Pipeline in the Works
    An unresolved issue between Juba and Khartoum has been how to divide the revenue from oil that is essential to the finance of both South Sudan and Khartoum. According to the press, South Sudan is now producing 470,000 barrels of oil per day. But the infrastructure and principal port for its export is in Sudan. The two governments have not been able to reach agreement on fees, tolls and other payments that Juba would make. The South Sudan government alleges that Khartoum has seized up to $815 million worth of oil.  This week Juba announced that it will stop exporting oil stop exporting oil through Sudan, even as talks continue. South Sudan president Kiir and Sudan president al-Bashir are supposed to meet today. Given these hang-ups, many in South Sudan have sought an alternative export route for their oil. And maybe they have found one. On January 25 South Sudan and Kenya announced an agreement whereby Juba would construct an oil pipeline and a fiber optics cable from its oil fields to the Kenyan port of Lamu. While the pipeline would be owned by Juba, it would pay fees to the Nairobi government. For Kenya, the pipeline would be part of an elaborate infrastructure development program that would include railways, super highways, airports, and tourist resorts as well as new port facilities at Lamu. Some may see the agreement as part of Juba’s effort to pressure Khartoum. But, given the host of unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan, including border disputes that are resulting in low-level warfare, the political arguments for Juba to acquire a new outlet to the sea appear to be strong. It remains to be seen how the pipeline will be financed or how long it will take to build it. But, even in the unlikely event that Juba and Khartoum reach an oil agreement today or tomorrow, the construction of the pipeline will probably proceed.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Large Scale Agricultural Investment: A Silver Bullet for Development?
    A Sudanese farmer prepares his land for agriculture on the banks of River Nile in the capital Khartoum November 11, 2009. (Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Courtesy Reuters)   This is a guest post by Asch Harwood, Council on Foreign Relations Africa research associate. Follow him on Twitter at @aschlfod. Development agencies, multinationals, NGOs, private investors, and politicians regularly tout the potential of large scale agricultural investment for development and  food security--a point emphasized by the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report, “Agriculture for Development.” On the surface, this seems to make sense, particularly for Africa. Agriculture is already a central part of most developing economies. It accounts for around 34 percent of GDP and 64 percent of employment in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Bank. Further, agriculture has significant room for growth given the low rates of productivity and automation. However, multinational investments in agriculture in the world’s newest state of South Sudan are raising questions about the need to balance the interests of investors with the interests of communities where those investments are taking place. A  report last month by the Financial Times suggests that investments, not structured properly, could have the opposite effect envisioned by the World Bank, USAID, and other donors pushing agricultural investment. This FT article focuses on the example of Egyptian private equity firm Citadel Capital, which has leased 259,000 acres, and has made a twenty-four million dollar investment but so far has only employed sixty people, most of whom are Zimbabwean. The Oakland Institute and Norwegian People’s Aid both have published reports outlining a number of other deals. And both raise serious concerns. As the author of the NPA report notes, “While in theory, this influx of investment could provide development opportunities for rural communities, without the appropriate procedures in place there is a danger that it will serve to undermine livelihoods.” The next blog post will appear on January 3. Happy Holidays!
  • Wars and Conflict
    ICG Civil War Concerns in Sudan
    Internally-displaced people flee after heavy gunfire broke out in Damazin in the Blue Nile state September 7, 2011. (Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Courtesy Reuters) The International Crisis Group (ICG) has warned of escalating civil war in Sudan as fighting between opposition and Khartoum forces continues to spread beyond the disputed territory of Abyei into the states of South Kordofan and now Blue Nile on the Ethiopian border. The first is territory disputed by South Sudan and Khartoum. The latter two remained in Sudan following the secession, but contain armed opposition groups formerly allied with Juba. South Sudan’s secession has played a role in the escalating conflict. As the ICG notes, parts of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) were never addressed, including the integration of the armed factions of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N), which formally split from the Juba-based SPLM on September 8. Perhaps more notably, the ICG argues that the South’s successful succession weakened Bashir’s control over the National Congress Party, allowing hardliners to execute a “soft-coup” within the NCP. They prefer the “military option” as opposed to Bashir’s negotiations. Analysts at the ICG suggest that fighting in Sudan’s center constitutes civil war and fear that the various opposition groups fighting Khartoum may be coalescing. This in turn could “trigger a wider civil war for control of the country.” Read the report here. H/T to Asch Harwood
  • Sudan
    South Sudan: Far From a ‘Peaceable Kingdom’
    Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir waves to the military during his first visit to Kadogli capital of South Kordofan State August 23, 2011, since fighting broke out between Sudan's army and armed groups in early June. (Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Courtesy Reuters) Yesterday, the Satellite Sentential Project published evidence (pdf) of mass graves in South Kordofan, which should remind the international community that South Sudan’s independence has not stanched the bloodshed in the region. Some of the violence is caused  by unfinished business related  to South Sudan’s independence from Khartoum on July 9, such as contested territory along the still-undelineated frontier – about twenty percent of the total. In South Kordofan, for example, Khartoum is fighting the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).  A UN report issued recently states that Khartoum’s army and associated paramilitary forces have committed extrajudicial killings and attacks against civilians in that region. SPLM-N also accuses Khartoum of blocking the flow of international aid to South Kordofan. Earlier this week, Khartoum president Omar al-Bashir announced that foreign aid organizations will be denied access to South Kordofan. But, murder and kidnapping in nearby South Sudan can also be related to ethnic conflicts—and the appeal of  rustling, where cattle is a measure of wealth and is the currency of bride price and dowry. For example, on August 18 in Uror County in Jonglei state, rustlers reportedly killed over six hundred people. A further 861 were wounded, 208 children were abducted, and thirty-eight thousand cattle were stolen. Almost eight thousand houses were burned. Rustling activity accompanying inter-ethnic conflict is exacerbated by the ready availability of arms. The end of the war between Khartoum and Juba may also mean that more young men are seeking marriage – requiring more cattle to meet the bride price. NGOs and others are calling on the Juba government to address the underlying issues. But, ethnic rivalries, readily available weapons, and the cultural role of cattle are complex issues for the new government to address.
  • Sudan
    In the New Sudans, History Dies Hard
    The flag of South Sudan (C) flies after the United Nations General Assembly voted on South Sudan's membership to the United Nations at UN headquarters in New York July 14, 2011. (Shannon Stapleton/Courtesy Reuters) This is a guest post by Payton Knopf, a foreign service officer at the U.S. Department of State currently serving as an International Affairs Fellow in Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed herein do not represent those of the U.S. government or the U.S. Department of State. With euphoria from its newly won independence still hanging over South Sudan’s capital, Juba, relations with Khartoum are already being tested by the increasingly tense situation along their shared border. In South Kordofan, a northern state that borders the South, a stalled political process and subsequent northern military offensive against the forces of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader Abdulaziz Hilou has left tens of thousands--if not hundreds of thousands--displaced. To the east, rumors abound that northern troops will launch a related campaign in Southern Blue Nile, another northern state governed by SPLM leader Malik Agar, within days. And to the west, the conflict in Darfur still simmers. North Sudan President Omar Bashir’s boasts that a peace agreement signed Thursday in Doha with one Darfur rebel faction rings hollow, as that group lacks both political legitimacy and military relevance. The potential for an anti-Khartoum alliance among Hilou, Agar, and the only Darfur rebel movements with true military might—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the newly reconstituted Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) of Minni Minawi and Abdulwahid al Nur--are high, which could lead to a war stretching across nearly the entire length of the days-old border between North and South Sudan. Such a development would significantly complicate the already shifting political landscape between North and South resulting from the latter’s secession. The northern leadership appears to be in disarray as it absorbs the loss of the South, with Bashir having disavowed a political framework for addressing the situation in South Kordofan that his hard-line advisor, Nafie Ali Nafie, had signed only days earlier. The northern military is furious at being thrust into the campaign with little preparation, which may account for credible reports of significant defections to Hilou’s forces (many of whom are from Hilou’s Nuba tribe) as well as his large territorial gains in recent days. South Sudan President Salva Kiir is also in a difficult position.  Having emphasized in his independence day address his country’s desire to live in peace with its northern neighbor, Hilou and Agar are key members of the SPLM, which led the struggle for southern statehood, and Kiir will find it difficult not to come to their aid. Worryingly, international access to South Kordofan has been reduced to nearly zero, leaving the scale of the humanitarian need unknown.  We can expect the same in the event of a military escalation in Southern Blue Nile.  In the wake of the tectonic political shift of July 9, trouble looms in the “new south” of North Sudan, and sustained international focus, particularly that of the United States, will be crucial to monitor and shape events in the coming days. For more information on Sudan’s state of affairs, see my recent CFR Expert Brief, "How to Secure Peace in South Sudan."
  • Sudan
    How to Secure Peace in South Sudan
    The process that led to South Sudan’s independence offers lessons for avoiding a new, devastating conflict in the region and underscores the importance of sustained and vigorous U.S. diplomacy, writes CFR’s Payton Knopf from the new country’s capital.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Understanding Sudan
    South Sudan's President Salva Kiir (L) and Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir walk at Juba airport July 9, 2011. (STR New/Courtesy Reuters) I recently received a request for some reading recommendations on Sudan and South Sudan. The literature is massive, so I thought I would share some resources I’ve found personally helpful in illuminating and demystifying a highly complex African conflict. Here, I focus on north-south relations, oil, Darfur, Khartoum politics, and the conflicts in Abyei and South Kordofan. Sudan: Assessing Risks to Stability (PDF), (Center for Strategic and International Studies) Authors Richard Downie and Brian Kennedy provide a comprehensive analysis of “key stress points” challenging stability in Sudan and South Sudan within a historical context. South Sudan Country Profile (The Fund for Peace) This is a brief country assessment outlining basic statistics and various improvements and challenges to watch in bullet form. Darfur in the Shadows (Human Rights Watch) Human Rights Watch documents rising insecurity in Darfur, a region that has largely been forgotten by the western media in light of the euphoria around the South Sudan independence referendum and the conflicts in Abyei and South Kordofan. Divisions in Sudan’s Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country’s Stability (International Crisis Group) As the title implies, this ICG report provides an analysis of the often underreported divisions within the Sudan president Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party and how those may contribute to instability. The Politics of Resources, Resistance and Peripheries in Sudan (South African Institute of International Affairs) Author Petrus de Kock goes deeper into Sudan and South Sudan’s many localized conflicts, rooted at least partially in competition not only for oil but subsistence resources, that often escape the attention of western media. Negotiating Peace in Sudan (the Cairo Review of Global Affairs) United States Special Envoy to Sudan Princeton Lyman writes about the difficult process that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the unresolved challenges. A few organizations and websites with extensive resources: Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Satellite Sentinel Project Relief Web Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Finally, I did a few brief video interviews available online: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow96-qXZ-iM& http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OU1Nmmgm0sA