South Africa

The scandal-plagued leader’s removal could set the party of Nelson Mandela on a path toward reestablishing South Africa as a role model for the rest of the continent.

The impending departure of Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa was expected following the defeat of his preferred candidate in the African National Congress’s (ANC) elections for party leader. A Council Expert’s Brief provides an analysis of Zuma’s departure from office and the way forward for the ANC. In the meantime, readers may find helpful an updated chronology and primer as the drama continues to unfold. Note that the ANC’s highest decision-making body is the National Executive Committee (NEC), which numbers 107. It strives to make decisions by consensus rather than by majority votes. When the NEC is not sitting, party affairs are in the hands of the National Working Committee (NWC). The Top Six, the senior-most party leaders including the party’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, is part of the NEC and the NWC. It normally handles day-to-day party business. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) is, like a U.S. president’s state of the union address, a major South African parliamentary calendar event. It precedes the president’s presentation of the budget, which is scheduled for February 21. The timeline indicates that the ANC “recalled” Zuma (directed him to resign the presidency) on February 13, and that he has refused. Now he faces a vote of no-confidence in parliament or possible impeachment. Resignation is a more dignified exit from the presidency than recall or losing a no-confidence vote. Impeachment would imply criminal behavior and strip Zuma of his pension rights. It has become clear that, while Zuma may have agreed to resign in principal as early as February 6, he requested to remain in office for another three to six months. This was refused, resulting in the present stand-off. Thursday, February 1 Speaker of the House Baleka Mbete insists that SONA will go ahead as planned on February 7, in response to speculation that the speech would be postponed to allow President Zuma to resign the presidency.   Friday, February 2 At the request of Julius Malema, head of the left-wing opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party, Speaker Baleka Mbete agrees to schedule debate for a motion of no-confidence vote in the Zuma administration on February 22. The opposition parties make a united call that “anyone but Zuma” should deliver the SONA. Sunday, February 4 The Top Six meets with Zuma to pressure him to resign. He refuses. Monday, February 5 The NWC meets at ANC party headquarters, Luthuli house, in Johannesburg. The press speculates that the NWC was preparing for a NEC meeting which would recall Zuma from the presidency. Tuesday, February 6 Speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete postpones the SONA, contrary to what she said on February 1, citing numerous, unspecified  “threats to the event.” EFF leader Malema tweets, “[Zuma] will resign anytime from now.” Democratic Alliance (center-right opposition) leader Mmusi Maimane demands that Zuma be impeached. Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, and party secretary general Ace Magashule meet at Genadendal, the president’s official Cape Town residence. According to the media, Zuma agrees to resign as soon as a list of unspecified preconditions have been finalized. Further, the two agree to postpone the NEC meeting scheduled for the next day until February 17. Wednesday, February 7 Ramaphosa and Zuma attend “routine Cabinet Committees [sic] meetings in Cape Town.” Ramaphosa tweets confirmation that they discussed Zuma’s eventual departure. Ramaphosa said that Zuma’s fate will be announced “in the coming days.” Opposition parties (DA, EFF, Congress of the People, African Christian Democratic Party, and Freedom Front Plus) meet to discuss a way forward, particularly the EFF’s proposed motion of a parliamentary vote of no confidence and the election of a new president should it succeed. In a joint statement, opposition parties complain that the country “cannot grind to a halt to allow for a compromised ANC to fight their internal battles.” Ramaphosa and Zuma hold another round of talks. Thursday, February 8 According to anonymous reports from MPs who attended a February 8 ANC caucus meeting, Ramaphosa promised that he was not negotiating a deal that would protect Zuma from prosecution. Ramaphosa also reportedly said that it was a “matter of days” before the transition talks would be concluded. According to the same MP, Ramaphosa said specifically that it was a matter of days before Zuma “goes.” Friday, February 9 Ramaphosa, followed later by members of the Top Six, pulls out of a scheduled public event scheduled for the day to focus on “pressing matters.” The Top Six is scheduled to meet on Saturday, February 10. Monday, February 12 The NEC holds a meeting regarding the fate of Zuma. It is reported that he agreed to step down, but the details are unclear. It later emerges that Zuma had agreed to go unconditionally after three or six months Opposition leaders hold a joint press conference, renewing calls to hold the motion of no confidence. They also called for the dissolution of parliament and national elections, which are currently scheduled for 2019, to be held early. After a nine hour meeting of the NEC, Ramaphosa and Magashule drive to Zuma’s office around midnight and reportedly deliver an ultimatum: resign in forty-eight hours or face a recall. The pair then returns to the NEC meeting. The meeting eventually adjourned at 3:00 a.m. February 13. It later emerges that Ramaphosa and Magashule tried to convince Zuma to reduce the time frame he provided, but that the attempt failed. Tuesday, February 13 ANC secretary general Ace Magashule and his deputy Jessie Duarte personally deliver the recall letter to Zuma at his official residence in Pretoria. In a press conference, the Magashule announces that the ANC’s NEC has formally asked Zuma to resign, but does not give a deadline, instead saying that they gave him “time and space” to make his decision. During the press conference, Magashule says, “We did not take these decisions because Comrade Jacob Zuma has done anything wrong.” He added, “It is obvious that we want Comrade Ramaphosa to come in as the president of South Africa. We respect him.” He also added, “There is no need to…humiliate [Zuma].” The ANC releases a statement on the recall, detailing Zuma’s proposal to resign in three to six months and the ANC’s efforts to shorten the timeframe, which Zuma refused. Zuma reportedly refuses the ANC’s recall. The drama’s next act will be a parliamentary no-confidence vote, unless Zuma changes his mind and resigns in the meantime. (Last updated 2:30pm ET, February 13)

The impending resignation of Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa was not necessarily unexpected following the defeat of his preferred candidate in the elections for African National Congress (ANC) party leader in December. However, it is happening more quickly than many observers predicted, including this one. A Council Expert’s Brief will soon appear on the resignation. As we go into the weekend, readers may find helpful a chronology of events to get a handle on the past week. Note that the ANC’s highest decision-making body is the National Executive Committee (NEC), which numbers at least eighty. It strives for decision by consensus rather than by votes. When the NEC is not sitting, party affairs are in the hands of the National Working Committee (NWC). The Top Six, comprising the party's most senior leaders including the party's president, Cyril Ramaphosa, is part of the NWC and the NEC. It normally handles day-to-day party business. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) is similar to a U.S. president’s state of the union address and therefore a major South African parliamentary calendar event. It likely must precede the announcement of the budget, scheduled for February 21. The timeline indicates that Zuma agreed to resign the presidency on February 6 in the face of his likely recall from the presidency by his own party at a NEC meeting, the possibility that he would lose a no-confidence vote in parliament, and a move to have him impeached. Resignation is a more dignified exit from the presidency than recall or loss of a no-confidence vote. A no confidence vote would apply to Zuma's whole cabinet, Ramaphosa included, and impeachment would imply criminal behavior. The latter would also force Zuma to lose his pension and other emoluments of office. Zuma has also has a set of unidentified “preconditions” for his resignation. Thursday, February 1 Speaker of the House Baleka Mbete insists that SONA will go ahead as planned on February 7. This is despite speculation that SONA would be postponed to allow President Zuma to resign the presidency. If Zuma did resign, Cyril Ramaphosa would deliver the address as acting president.  Friday, February 2 At the request of Julius Malema, head of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party, Speaker Baleka Mbete agrees to schedule debate for a motion of no-confidence vote in the Zuma administration on February 22. While praising the speaker’s decision to hold the vote, opposition parties criticize the decision to hold it after SONA, and issue a united call that “anyone but Zuma” should give the address. Sunday, February 4 The Top Six and Zuma meet, during which the Top Six pressure Zuma to resign, but he refuses. This is later confirmed by media reports on remarks given by the ANC party treasurer. Monday, February 5 The NWC meet at ANC party headquarters, Luthuli house, in Johannesburg. The press speculates that the NWC was preparing for a NEC meeting scheduled for February. It is reported that the ANC would recall Zuma at the scheduled NEC meeting. Tuesday, February 6 Speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete postpones the SONA, contrary to what she said on February 1, citing numerous “threats to the event,” likely referring to reports of an opposition boycott. Shortly afterwards, Malema tweets, “He [Zuma] will resign anytime from now." The Democratic Alliance (center-right opposition) leader Mmusi Maimane demands that Zuma be impeached after learning that SONA had been postponed.  Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, and party secretary general Ace Magashule meet at Genadendal, the president’s official Cape Town residence. The meeting begins around 4:00 p.m. Magashule eventually leaves, and Zuma and Ramaphosa meet alone. According to the media, Zuma agrees to resign as soon as a list of preconditions have been finalized. Further, the two agree to postpone the NEC meeting scheduled for the next day (at which it was reported that Zuma would be recalled) until February 17.  Wednesday, February 7 Ramaphosa and Zuma attend “routine Cabinet Committees meetings in Cape Town.” Ramaphosa tweets confirmation that they discussed Zuma’s eventual departure. While no date is set, Zuma’s official diary is reportedly planned out until Sunday, raising the possibility that his resignation will take place soon after. Ramaphosa said that Zuma’s fate will be announced “in the coming days.” Opposition parties (DA, EFF, Congress of the People, African Christian Democratic Party, and Freedom Front Plus) meet to discuss a way forward, particularly plans for a scheduled meeting on Monday, February 12, where they will address the EFF’s motion of no confidence and the election of a new president should it succeed. In a joint statement, opposition parties complain that the country “cannot grind to a halt to allow for a compromised ANC to fight their internal battles.” Ramaphosa and Zuma hold another round of talks after hosting routine cabinet meetings earlier in the day.  Thursday, February 8 According to anonymous reports from MPs who attended an ANC caucus meeting on February 8, Ramaphosa promises that he was not negotiating a deal that would protect Zuma from prosecution. Ramaphosa also reportedly said that it was a “matter of days” before the transition talks would be concluded. According to the same MP, Ramaphosa said it was a matter of days before Zuma “goes. The annual Ubuntu Awards are postponed until further notice Friday, February 9 Ramaphosa, followed later by other members of the Top Six, pulls out of a scheduled public event for the day to focus on “pressing matters.” The Top Six are also scheduled to meet on Saturday, February 10. Zuma and Ramaphosa will reportedly conclude talks before the end of the weekend, and the discussions are focused on logistical and legal concerns, like support for his family and some of Zuma’s legal issues. According to ANC General Secretary Ace Magashule, Zuma will not resign until after the NEC meets on February 17. "We can’t expect any decision before the NEC [meeting]", Magashule said. This contradicts Ramaphosa's comments that the issue would be resolved in a "matter of days." (Last updated 4:00pm ET, February 9)

Crispian Olver, a former senior South African government official, long-time ANC activist, and author of the new book How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay, joins me to discuss the pervasive corruption in South Africa known as "state capture" and the state of the African National Congress. Ahead of the 2016 local elections, Crispian Olver was tasked by the ANC and the central government to clean up the municipal administration in Port Elizabeth. What he uncovered was in many ways an illustration of what has been happening elsewhere in South Africa. The intervention he orchestrated, as well as the local election campaign in which he was deeply involved, offer insights on corruption and politics in South Africa.  You can listen to the podcast here.

According to some South African media outlets, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the African National Congress (ANC) determined over the weekend that President Zuma must resign the South African presidency before the annual state of the nation address, which is scheduled for February 8. If Zuma leaves the presidency, current deputy president and leader of the ANC Cyril Ramaphosa would become acting president until the 2019 national elections. However, it is unlikely that the NEC has made a definitive decision so soon after the December party convention. Indeed, the party’s secretary general and close ally of Zuma, Ace Magashule, is insisting that the NEC has not yet made a decision on Zuma’s departure. The NEC is the ANC’s highest decision-making body between party conferences. It numbers more than eighty, and usually reaches a decision through consensus, rather than by voting. South African media has been reporting that Cyril Ramaphosa has consolidated his authority within the NEC in the aftermath of his close victory over Zuma’s favored candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in the December party leadership race. Media is also reporting that the party’s Top Six, made up of the most senior party officials, has been charged with telling Zuma that he must leave office or that he will be forced out. However, many in the NEC will be reluctant to move quickly against Zuma. They value “party unity,” which implies keeping his supporters under the ANC's big tent. Further, Zuma has made it clear that he will not go quietly. In the past, he has said that he has compromising information on his opponents as well as his friends that he is prepared to use. There will be the temptation to treat him with kid gloves. Hence, it is unlikely that the NEC has determined that Zuma must go before February 8, though Ramaphosa will attempt to progressively marginalize him. Ramaphosa is attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this week, where he is likely to signal that his government is open to increased foreign investment and is serious about tackling corruption. That message becomes more plausible if Zuma, with his reputation for cronyism and corruption, is on his way out as head of state. Zuma’s departure from the presidency is a matter of when, and when the party leadership communicates to him that he must go, he is likely to resign “voluntarily.” That would preserve his various emoluments of office, including his presidential pension.

Tyler McBrien is a research associate for education at the Council on Foreign Relations.  On January 9, President Jacob Zuma announced the appointment of a long awaited judicial commission of inquiry into allegations of state capture. The phrase, plucked from a 2000 World Bank paper and popularized by a 2016 report by South Africa’s then Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, describes a widespread system of political corruption where the powerful Gupta family influences state decision-making through its close ties with President Zuma and his affiliates. “It is of such serious public concern that any further delay will make the public doubt government’s determination to dismantle all forms of corruption‚ and entrench the public perception that the state has been captured by private interests for nefarious and self-enrichment purposes,” said President Zuma of the allegations in a public statement. In a swell of optimism and surprise, some in the South African media have labeled President Zuma’s announcement as a concession, a shift in power, or a miraculous reversal of his comments just two months ago that state capture was “all fake and political, just to paint black a particular family and individuals.” Others have reserved celebration, as the announcement came on the heels of a December 14 court order forcing President Zuma to approve such a commission within 30 days. Skeptics also view this as a signature political parry of the “Teflon president,” pointing to the timing of the announcement, which occurred on the eve of a meeting of high-level African National Congress (ANC) officials widely speculated to be debating President Zuma’s recall. The state capture commission, coupled with his free higher education plan revealed last month, demonstrates President Zuma’s particular skill for throwing water on the fire the very moment before he is engulfed in flames. Just like the complex nature of state capture itself, with its dizzying web of corruption propped up by esoteric procurement laws, the devil of Zuma’s commission announcement is in the legal details. In the “commission capital of the world,” debate abounds as to whether or not these costly productions actually achieve what they set out to do. Commission findings often take much longer than anticipated, and the state has no obligation to act on them. Plus, the effectiveness of commissions of inquiry depends upon their terms of reference, or investigative scope. Too narrow, and the commission lacks the authority to investigate widespread wrongdoing. Too broad, and the commission gets bogged down in an excess of information. To reach an effective Goldilocks equilibrium, the terms of reference should draw on the public protector’s recommendations and the suggestions laid out in the impressive work done by researchers and activists in South Africa’s vibrant civil society. However, with President Zuma’s appeal of last month’s court decision still pending, some have argued that he still retains the ability to set the terms of reference, which he would no doubt set in his favor.   This important aspect of the commission has not escaped notice from President Zuma’s enemies. On January 18, members of the Democratic Alliance, one of South Africa’s leading opposition parties, demanded that President Zuma release the terms of reference by Friday and adhere to Public Protector Madonsela’s recommendations, a provision that newly elected ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa has also endorsed. In the likely event that this commission of inquiry into state capture falls victim to the shortfalls of commissions past, the recent announcement will prove to be just one more deft move in President Zuma’s political dance of survival.

On December 29, South Africa's Constitutional Court ruled that the parliament had failed in its constitutional obligation to hold President Jacob Zuma accountable for illegal expenditure of public money on his private compound, Nkandla. Zuma has survived a number of no confidence votes and has denied wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court gave parliament six months to put in place a mechanism for removing the president. In response to the court’s ruling, a parliamentary subcommittee is developing a draft procedure for removal that would then be voted on by parliament. South African social media is speculating that the mandated development and review of procedures will increase the pressure on Zuma to resign the presidency. Following the African National Congress’s (ANC) convention vote, he is no longer party leader. ANC policy is that the party leader should also be the country's president so as not to divide authority between president of the country and the president of the party. Media is also speculating that Cyril Ramaphosa, who defeated Zuma’s preferred candidate, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, will be trying to force Zuma out of the presidency to clear the way for reform of the party, which is suffering erosion of electoral support. Zuma, however, retains allies at the top of the party machinery, and his removal is by no means a sure thing. Nevertheless, the episode illustrates once again the power and independence of the South African judiciary. South Africa is not a parliamentary democracy, but a constitutional democracy. The constitution, interpreted by the judiciary, is sovereign, and all branches of government are subordinate to it. Hence, in the face of the December 29 ruling, parliament is moving to establish clear procedures for the removal of a president.   

The euphoria among South Africa’s friends over the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president of the governing African National Congress (ANC) was followed by disappointment, if not despair, at the election of three members of the president Jacob Zuma/Dlimini-Zuma camp to the “Top Six” of the party leadership. The hope had been that Ramaphosa and a new ANC leadership would clean out the corruption and cronyism that so disfigured the years of Zuma government. Many South Africans saw the billionaire Ramaphosa as so rich that he would be above personal corruption. They hoped that a Ramaphosa administration and a revived ANC could restore an economic growth trajectory and end the (failed) assaults on the media and civil society characteristic of the Zuma administration. Despite the disappointment, Ramaphosa is president of the party, and his victory shows the strength of the reform faction within the ANC, even if it is not absolutely predominant. It is likely that some of the Zuma faction will defect to Ramaphosa, even in the short term. The “Top Six” are not all equal. As president, Ramaphosa will have the largest voice on issues of cabinet and other appointments. Indeed, if Zuma is forced out of the presidency, it will be Acting President Ramaphosa who will be responsible for cabinet and other senior level appointments.  It is on matters of personnel that a Ramaphosa presidency of the party (and perhaps acting presidency of the country) can make his mark most easily. Especially toward the end of his administration, Jacob Zuma’s appointments appeared to be the consequence of cronyism and perceived short-term political interest. Post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki had been characterized by talented cabinet ministers, especially at treasury and the central bank, as well as sound administration. State-owned enterprises were an exception, seemingly enduring nests of corruption. Ramaphosa is likely to return to that pattern. He is much better educated than Zuma, knows the outside world, and knows that solid financial institutions are vital to attracting the investment he believes South Africa needs. Ramaphosa also understands the need for efficient administration—something that Zuma subordinated to short-term political goals. A Ramaphosa administration may make South Africa once again Africa’s best administered state.  Nevertheless, the popular drivers of Zuma-style populism and tolerance for corruption remain: a society that is one of the most unequal in the world, where a small minority of white people live in the First World and the huge majority of black people live in poverty. Ramaphosa proposes to address this reality through economic growth rather than by redistribution, which would almost certainly make everybody—black and white—poorer. Yet accelerating economic growth takes time as well as political skill, and Ramaphosa will need to be lucky as well as politically adept. 

On December 21 the results were announced of the election of the African National Congress’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Between national conferences, it is the highest decision-making body in the party. For example, it was the NEC that determined that responsibility for the party’s reverses in the local elections of 2016 was collective, not Jacob Zuma’s, though he was the party leader. The NEC has eighty members, half of whom must be female. The outcome of the December 21 NEC elections appears to be an even split between the Ramaphosa and the Zuma/Dlamini-Zuma factions. At this stage, the party leadership as a whole appears to be split down the middle, with the Top Six (the six most senior party officials) also equally divided between the two factions. Should that persist, the party would be paralyzed. The balance however, might change. Within the Top Six, there is a serious challenge in the courts to the election of pro-Zuma Ace Magashule (premier of the Free State). He defeated the pro-Ramaphosa former premier of KwaZulu/Natal Senzo Mchunu for party secretary general by only twenty-four votes. Already some among the pro-Ramaphosa faction are predicting that the balance among the Top Six will shift in favor of Ramaphosa by four to two. In addition, there are signs that Deputy President and Mpumalanga premier David Mabuza may be shifting from Zuma to Ramaphosa. If that were to happen, only Jesse Duarte, the party deputy secretary general, would be left as pro-Zuma among the Top Six. The ANC loves a winner—and Cyril Ramaphosa won the presidency. The possibility of defections to the new president should not be discounted. The next major issue for the party may well be forcing Jacob Zuma to resign as state president. Already the veterans’ caucus in the party is calling for it. The NEC may take up the issue at its January 5 meeting. A South African journalist saw a list circulating at the electoral convention of potential Ramaphosa cabinet appointments, possible only if Zuma is out. While any such list must be hypothetical and tentative, it illustrates the talent available to Ramaphosa. Names on the list include Zweli Mkhize to finance, Pravin Gordhan to public enterprises, Blade Nzimande to higher education, and Lindiwe Sisulu to international affairs. Mkhize made his reputation as the party’s treasurer, Gordhan as internationally-respected minister of finance (until he was fired by Zuma). Nzimade, with a PhD, has been deeply concerned about education reform and has previously served as minister of education. Lindiwe Sisulu, daughter of liberation icons Walter and Albertina Sisulu, has also held a number of cabinet portfolios. As a group, they have distinguished backgrounds:  Mkhize is a medical doctor, Sisulu holds a DPhil from the University of York (UK), and Gordhan was the chair of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which hammered out the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy. Ramaphosa played a leading role in CODESA as paramount ANC negotiator. Gordhan’s subsequent ministerial career in finance earned the confidence of international investors. Nzimande’s PhD is in sociology from the University of Natal, a distinguished university. 

With the drama of the horse race between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the presidency of the governing African National Congress (ANC), it is easy to overlook the other senior party offices that were also contested. They are called the “Top Six,” a bow toward the ideal of collective party leadership. In addition to the president, they are the deputy president, the treasurer, the secretary general, the deputy secretary general, and the national chairperson. Three of those elected on December 18 are allies of Dlamini-Zuma while two are close to Ramaphosa. In effect, the composition of the “Top Six” reflects power-sharing between the two principal factions of a badly divided party.  The newly-elected deputy president is David Mabuza. He is the premier of Mpumalanga (formerly part of the Transvaal and the location of Krueger National Park). He has long been a supporter of Jacob Zuma as a member of the so-called “premier league.” The new secretary general is Ace Magashule, premier of the Free State, also a supporter of Zuma and a member of the “premier league.” Jessie Duarte remains deputy secretary general. She was a founder of the ANC Women’s League, an assistant to Nelson Mandela, and remained a strong supporter of Zuma when others in the then-“Top Six” were falling away. She is the only woman in the Top Six. All three were also advocates of “party unity,” which was often a code word for support of Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma, but it is also a widely held aspiration within the party. All three have been linked to the Gupta brothers and their “state capture,” face accusations of corruption, and were part of Zuma’s clientage network. National Chairperson Gwede Mantashe and Treasurer Paul Mashatile supported Ramaphosa. Mashatile is the Gauteng (Johannesburg/Pretoria) provincial ANC chairperson; the ANC in Gauteng opposed Jacob Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma and supported Ramaphosa. Mantashe, a member of the South African Communist Party, was highly critical of Jacob Zuma’s efforts to consolidate personal power. The  two factions appear broadly satisfied with what amounts to a power-sharing arrangement among the Top Six. The presence of Mabuza, Magashule, and Duarte increases the likelihood that Zuma will be eased out of the presidency with his dignity and pension intact, if not his reputation. Ramaphosa’s victory increases the likelihood that the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, by the end hostile to Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma, will remain in an electoral alliance with the ANC. The markets also approved the outcome as the Rand has soared against the U.S. dollar. The final stage of the ANC electoral convention is the election of eighty members of the National Executive Committee, the highest organ of the party. How those votes break will be a further indication of the relative strength of the two factions within the party. 

Cyril Ramaphosa’s victory in the African National Congress (ANC) leadership race is good for democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the South African economy, at least in the short term. He is likely to become the state president following the 2019 elections, and he may force the corrupt and discredited Jacob Zuma to relinquish the presidency before then. Zuma’s chosen candidate in the ANC leadership race was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a medical doctor, multiple times a minister, a former chairwoman of the African Union Commission, his ex-wife, and the mother of four of his children. Her strong run benefited from Zuma’s patronage/clientage networks and his hold over the party’s machinery, but this control was not absolute. Ramaphosa’s victory in part was the result of that very same ANC machinery disqualifying certain delegates on technical grounds, many of whom would have supported Dlamini-Zuma.  The race reflected deep divisions within the party, partly over personality, but increasingly also over policy. An architect of the post-apartheid political settlement based on the constitution and rule of law, as well a billionaire businessman, Ramaphosa favors addressing the pervasive poverty of the black majority by growing the South African economy following market-oriented principles and creating a favorable investment climate. On the other hand, Dlamini-Zuma represents the populist wing of the party. In her rhetoric she favors redistribution of the country’s wealth from the white minority to the black majority with little attention to the concerns of the domestic and foreign investment community. She appeared sympathetic to her ex-husband’s attacks on the media, the courts, and the rule of law, all of which act as barriers to radical economic change. Jacob Zuma’s term as president lasts until 2019, unless he is impeached, removed from office because of court rulings, or resigns. Earlier in 2017, impeachment came closer to success than in the past, even though he still controlled the party. Under Ramaphosa, he no longer will. Court cases against him are likely to continue. As was the case with Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, resignation might become attractive to Zuma because he would retain his pension rights and the other emoluments of a former president. He might also be able negotiate an arrangement whereby he is able to hold on to his wealth, as Mugabe did. However, unlike in Zimbabwe, South African civil society is very strong and the judiciary is independent, and both could prevent Zuma from enjoying such a sweet deal. The populist wing of the ANC reflects the sclerotic pace of post-apartheid economic change in South Africa. Since it came to power in 1994 until the last years of Zuma, the ANC has largely followed the economic policies of the Washington Consensus associated with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Even Zuma’s deviation was more of one of rhetoric and cronyism than any real commitment to radical economic policies. Ramaphosa’s win is a victory for the Washington Consensus. Conversely, Dlamini-Zuma’s defeat may galvanize a radical faction within the ANC that advocates moving economic policy away from the Washington Consensus.  

South Africa President Jacob Zuma faces more than seven hundred charges of corruption in connection to an arms deal that occurred in the late 1990s, long before he became president. Those charges had been set aside by a lower court while he was president. However, in October the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a lower court that the charges could be reinstated now. The decision whether to prosecute rests with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), an independent, non-political body. However, after the October ruling, Zuma appointed Shaun Abrahams as chief prosecutor, who is seen as a Zuma ally. The High Court has now ruled that Zuma’s appointment is invalid: Judge Mlambo said, ‘”in our view, President Zuma would be clearly conflicted in having to appoint a national director of public prosecutions, given the background…and particularly the ever present spectre of the many criminal charges against him that have not gone away.” The court ordered the deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, to appoint a new chief prosecutor. The Zuma administration will probably appeal the high court ruling to the Constitutional Court. However, according to British media, the African National Congress (ANC) is saying that the parties involved should “reflect” on the opinion before deciding whether to appeal.  Next week, the ruling ANC will hold its national convention where it will choose a new person to succeed Zuma as party leader. The leading candidates are Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s choice candidate and his former wife, and Cyril Ramaphosa, Mr. Zuma’s current vice president. The race is close, and the court’s ruling will probably give Ramaphosa a boost. The way the court ruling against Zuma and Abrahams unfolded is illustrative of the rule of law in South Africa. Three civil society organizations sued in the courts, arguing that Zuma’s removal of the previous prosecutor so that he could appoint Abrahams was invalid. That suit brought the issue into the court system. As has happened many times in the past, South Africa’s strong and vigilant civil society groups sued against the government, and an independent judiciary found in their favor. The rule of law is more advanced in South Africa than elsewhere because of the independence of the judiciary combined with the strength of civil society and a free press which regularly highlights issues (such as the ties between Zuma and Abrahams) that the administration would prefer to remain in the dark.   

The governing African National Congress (ANC) will hold its elective conference from December 16 to December 20 in Johannesburg. The conference meets every five years to choose a party leader and other senior officials. So long as the ANC has a majority, parliament is all but certain to elect the party leader to the South African presidency in 2019. (Voters vote for a party, not individual candidates, and then newly elected members of parliament elect the president.) Hence party leader Jacob Zuma is also the president of South Africa. Under the ambiguous ANC rules, he is probably ineligible to run for the party leadership at this elective conference; even if he could, he is so discredited by personal scandal that it is unlikely he could get enough votes. However, should his preferred candidate for party leader, his former wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, win the race, he might finish out his term as state president. Conversely, if current vice president Cyril Ramaphosa were to win the leadership race, the ANC might recall Zuma from the presidency before his term is up, as it did when Thabo Mbeki lost the party leadership in 2008 before his term as state president ended. Much media commentary represents the leadership contest as a two-horse race between Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa, who each head slates of candidates for other offices. Many in the ANC, however, are uncomfortable with slates that correspond to a certain party faction, and there are calls for "party unity." This would involve the election of candidates from the two slates as well as others not necessarily on a slate, creating a party leadership that is not binary by allowing many combinations and permutations. The draft program of the conference (which is not necessarily final) provides for nominations of candidates for the party's president, secretary general, chairperson, and treasurer on December 16. Voting will follow, and results are scheduled to be announced on the evening of December 17. Nominations for deputy president and deputy secretary general would open on December 17, followed by voting, and the results would be announced on December 18. Nominations and voting would thus take place after results are known from the first four contests. Under this scenario, the losers of the first round of voting could be accommodated in the second. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly unlikely that Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa, and their respective slates, would benefit from the winner-take-all practice of previous conferences. Ramaphosa has more pledged delegates than Dlamini-Zuma, but voting is secret so there is ample room for horse trading. Further, President Zuma has a formidable patronage/clientage network and in a political climate rife with corruption charges, “he knows where the bodies are buried.” A deal between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma would be attractive to many in the party. The most likely outcome, in my opinion, is that Ramaphosa will emerge as party leader and Dlamini-Zuma will become his deputy. The ANC is bitterly divided, though more over personality and style than policies. It has been sloppy in its procedures for delegate selection. Should a faction wish to derail the conference, it could do so by challenging the credentials of delegates. Similarly, if the party remains divided over the leadership question, the loser—either Ramaphosa, Dlamini-Zuma, or some other figure—could challenge the convention’s choice in the courts. Should the convention become derailed or its choice for party leader be challenged successfully in the courts, the ANC’s partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), might well withdraw from the Tripartite Alliance and set off on their own. The ANC itself might split. Many within the ANC are working to prevent such a scenario, and they are more likely to succeed than not. But, these are perilous time for the cause of ANC party unity.

Zimbabwe and South Africa are adjacent geographically and share a parallel history, but they are radically different polities. Not least, Zimbabwe is a tyranny, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. South Africa is a democracy conducted according to the rule of law. Nevertheless, there are similarities, particularly between the two heads of state. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe attempted to designate his wife, Grace, as his successor, while Jacob Zuma is sponsoring his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to succeed him as leader of the governing African National Congress (ANC) at the party’s national convention this month. In both cases, the choices appear to have been self-serving. Mugabe likely concluded that his wife could best protect his interests, and that of their children; in Zuma’s case, his critics plausibly view his motivation as avoiding criminal prosecution once out of office and protecting his considerable assets for his children. Both Mugabe and Zuma tried to insert their family members into the more or less mutually understood succession of a vice president to the presidency. In Mugabe’s case, his choice of Grace precipitated his removal from power by a military cabal within the governing movement, ZANU-PF. Will Mugabe’s downfall significantly influence the ANC party leadership race? It might. Mugabe had appeared invincible up until the moment of his resignation. Jacob Zuma, whose patronage/clientage networks and mastery of the internal politics of the ANC has enabled him to survive despite his deep unpopularity, has also seemed untouchable. But Mugabe’s fate shows that the fall can come quickly. Unlike ZANU-PF, the ANC has a significant, democratic dimension. Zuma’s successor will not be determined by a military cabal as Mugabe’s was, but rather by a party convention that will operate according to understood procedures. Zuma’s vice president and Dlamini-Zuma’s chief rival for the party leadership is Cyril Ramaphosa, who has significant party support. (It should be noted that Dlamini-Zuma is a significant political force in her own right.) Mugabe left office in the face of the threat of impeachment, which would have stripped him of his pension and all the other emoluments of a former chief of state. There are numerous grounds for impeachment of Jacob Zuma, which becomes a potential political reality if he loses control of the party. Like Mugabe, Zuma would probably resign in the face of likely impeachment, after which he would have to face the hundreds of charges against him. Will Zuma be able to continue his control of the ANC party machinery at the December party convention? If he can, then Dlamini-Zuma will probably win the party leadership, buying Zuma the ability to fill-out his presidential term, which ends in 2019. It is also likely that if the ANC wins the majority of seats in parliament in 2019, that Dlamini-Zuma will become the president. If however, deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa is elected party leader, Zuma will probably be required by the ANC to resign the presidency, though it might take some months for that drama to play out.