South Africa

The African National Congress’s (ANC) party convention will take place from December 16 to December 20 in Johannesburg. It meets every five years to elect a party leader and members of the party’s National Executive Committee. The new party leader is likely to become the president of South Africa following the 2019 national elections if the ANC wins the most votes. (In South African national elections, voting is for a party, not an individual candidate.) For a discussion of the two front-runners, see my recent blog post. Each one of the 3,830 local ANC branches submits its nomination for party leader in advance of the December party convention. As of this Tuesday, 773 braches out of 3,830 had nominated Cyril Ramaphosa, while 410 nominated Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma. With those numbers in mind, parts of the South African media are concluding that Cyril Ramaphosa is the leading candidate. While he may be now, there are still roughly 2,600 branches that have yet to nominate a candidate, 63 percent of which are in parts of the country that are likely to go for Dlamini-Zuma. Hence, it is too early to call. Dlamini-Zuma at one time or another served as minister of health, minister of foreign affairs, and as chairperson of the Africa Union Commission. Ramaphosa is currently the deputy president, a millionaire businessman, and was a chief negotiator of South Africa’s transition to non-racial democracy in 1994. Dlamini-Zuma is favored by the current party leader and president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, who is also her ex-husband.  At the convention, about 90 percent of the voting delegates will come from the 4,000-odd branches mentioned above. The other 10 percent will come from the ANC’s Women’s, Youth, and Veterans leagues, whose leadership largely favors Dlamini-Zuma. The number of branch delegates to the convention will be 4,723, bringing the total number all delegates to about 5,248. The distribution of delegates among provinces is determined by party membership, so each party branch with at least 100 members is entitled to send at least one delegate. On October 6, ANC party secretary general Gwede Mantashe announced the number of delegates for each province, the distribution of which strongly favors rural provinces. This reflects a gradual shift in the ANC’s base of support since the end of apartheid from urban to rural areas. Gauteng, made up of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the Rand, is highly urban, educated, and the center of the South African economy. It includes about a quarter of South Africa’s population and has a delegate allocation of 508, and has seen a decline in ANC membership. The Western Cape, also urban, educated, and no fan of the ANC, has an allocation of only 197. Rural Mpumalanga, on the other hand, has an allocation of 736, rural Limpopo of 643, and the rural Northwest of 538. The largest allocation, of 870, goes to KwaZulu/Natal, a Zuma stronghold in the past but whose support for him is now uncertain. Conventional wisdom is that the rural areas are likely to support Dlamini-Zuma (the KwaZulu ANC leadership openly supports her) and the more urban and educated areas will support Ramaphosa (Gauteng’s party leadership openly supports him). It is important to note that each delegate casts a single, secret ballot in the vote for party leader at the convention, allowing them to break with their provincial party leaders. Therefore, a the professed support of regional leadership will likely not translate into corresponding votes from all of its branch members. Further, the names on the ballot are still fluid and there is a discussion of a possible compromise candidate that could bridge the Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma wings of the party.

South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, worth over $20 million, is widely regarded as corrupt, a sexual predator, and a facilitator of “state capture” by his cronies, the Gupta brothers. The economy is in the doldrums, and the Rand continues to lose value. Yet, as of now, the candidate likely to succeed him as African National Congress (ANC) party leader is his chosen successor, Nkosanza Dlamini Zuma. Her rival for the position is the powerful Cyril Ramaphosa, the current deputy president, worth an estimated $700 million, and an architect of the country’s transition to non-racial democracy. A brief review of the way both South Africa’s constitutional democracy and the ANC work is needed to explain how someone attached to the publicly toxic Jacob Zuma could be the front-runner to succeed him. Jacob Zuma is both the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and the president of South Africa. At an upcoming December convention, the ANC will choose a new party leader. Not until 2019, however, will there actually be national elections, which will ultimately decide the new president. Under South Africa’s constitutional system of proportional representation, voters vote for a party, not a particular candidate. Behind the scenes and out of the public eye, parties rank-order their candidates. So, if a party wins thirty seats, then the first thirty names on the party’s rank-ordered list go into parliament. If a party wins a majority of votes, as the ANC always has since the end of apartheid, the first name on its list (usually party leader but not necessarily so) is elected president by the ANC majority in parliament.  Within the ANC, the party leader position takes precedent over the president. Hence, if the president is deposed as party leader, the expectation is that he will resign the presidency. Thabo Mbeki resigned the presidency after being defeated for party leadership in 2007, and the deputy president became acting president until national elections in 2009. This is not a matter of law, but one of party practice. It is conceivable that a defeated or retired party leader might try to retain the presidency. The assumption is that, should he try to do so while not party leader, he would lack the necessary support of a majority in parliament and thus could not function politically. That being said, if Dlamini-Zuma, his political ally, ex-wife, and mother of four of his twenty-odd children, wins the contest for party leadership, he could very well decline to step down from the presidency, and he would be completely within his rights. At least in theory, she would be able to muster enough support for him to function as president. Importantly, Zuma will face 700-plus indictments for corruption once he leaves the presidency (sitting presidents are apparently immune from prosecution), whether that is in December 2017 or in 2019. South Africa’s judiciary has proven itself independent time and time again. As party leader, Dlamini-Zuma might be able to provide Zuma crucial cover from the judiciary. If he is confident she is able to do so, Jacob Zuma might feel comfortable enough to resign, given the poor state of his health. Suffice to stay that the personal stakes in December are high for the sitting president. On the other hand, if another candidate not well disposed toward him wins, like Cyril Ramaphosa, then it becomes likely that he will step down because he will not command a majority in parliament. In that case Cyril Ramaphosa as deputy president would then become acting president. Even if Ramaphosa does not win, Dlamini-Zuma could allow Ramaphosa to stay on as deputy president—and, therefore, acting president until the 2019 elections—to keep the party together.  As the discussion above shows, political parties under South Africa’s system of proportional representation are much stronger than they are in Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. If a member of parliament leaves his party, he must resign his seat. Particularly striking for an American observer is the subordination of the state to the party. Within the ANC, the subordination of the presidency to the position of party leader recalls and perhaps reflects the Marxist-Leninist practice of its years in exile and during its armed struggle.   

South Africa and the United States share certain similarities. Both are non-racial democracies with a history of white exploitation of indigenous and black peoples. The historical symbols related to that exploitation can be both contentious and divisive. For example, student protests in South Africa led to the removal of the statute of British imperialist Cecil Rhodes from the grounds of the University of Cape Town. In the United States, the Confederate battle flag has recently become the symbol of modern white supremacy. What to do about state flags that incorporate Confederate symbols—the flags of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi still do this—and monuments to Confederate heroes erected on public property can become a major issue. In the gubernatorial campaign now underway in Virginia, the issue is statues to Confederate heroes; some Democrats oppose retaining them while most Republicans favor keeping them. President Trump’s chief of staff, John Kelly, has weighed into the debate with a defense of Confederate general Robert E. Lee.  In South Africa, the latest issue is the national flag of the apartheid era. Its alleged appearance at a “Black Monday” demonstration against violent crime and the alleged killing of white farmers by blacks has been condemned by the governing African National Congress (ANC) as “divisive.” (It is not clear whether the demonstrators in fact used the apartheid flag; media photographs of it are, apparently, several years old.)  It is widely believed within the South African white community that white farmers are disproportionately the targets of murder. There is now a “white lives matter” movement that protests the killing of white farmers and it rallies behind apartheid-era symbols. For the ANC, protests focused on the grievances of a racial group is anathema, especially of whites, who remain as a whole multiple times richer than other racial groups in South Africa. ANC spokesmen point out that black farmers as well as white farmers are killed and that the government has a strategy targeted at these crimes. Interestingly, the party has made a point to emphasize that "all lives" matter rather than just white lives, consistent with its stated goal of creating a "non-racial society" following apartheid. Protests focused on white farmers, from the perspective of the ANC, are just more examples of whites demanding privileged treatment.  Changes in the murder rate over time and the racial mix of victims are difficult to ascertain with precision, though some conclusions can still be drawn. A researcher at the credible Institute for Security Studies’ crime and justice hub has concluded that whites as a whole (not just farmers) are less likely to be murdered than blacks or ‘coloureds’—those of mixed heritage who consider themselves a separate race. Further, a study of murder dockets in 2009 showed that the victims were black in 86.9 percent of the cases and white in only 1.8 percent of the cases, though whites made up 8.85 percent of the population at the time. As in the United States, in South Africa contention over flags and statutes will not go away soon, reflecting profound differences over the understandings of the past, as well as the present. Apartheid and Jim Crow, and their antecedents, have much in common and overlapped in various forms for hundreds of years. In both countries, as William Faulkner said, “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.”   

As the fight for the leadership of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) heats up, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa are attracting the most attention. Dlamini-Zuma, a medical doctor, is a veteran of ANC cabinets and was the chairwoman of the African Union commission. She is also the former wife of the largely-discredited but still powerful sitting president, Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa is the deputy president, a wealthy businessman, and an architect of the country’s transition to non-racial democracy.  South Africa’s foreign friends and observers should pay attention to a third personality, Zweli Mkhize, at present the treasurer-general of the ANC. The South African media is identifying him as a party unity candidate, a possible alternative to Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa, two polarizing prospects. Mkhize was born poor and rural within a decade of his better-known rivals. Like Dlamini-Zuma, he is a medical doctor, and, also like her, he spent the apartheid years in exile, first in Swaziland and then in Zimbabwe, where he practiced medicine. He went back to South Africa in 1991 after de Klerk’s government released Nelson Mandela from prison, signaling the approaching end of apartheid. Perhaps most importantly, like Dlamini-Zuma, he is a Zulu from KwaZulu-Natal, the province that now provides the most ANC votes. His wife, May Mashego, is also a medical doctor and a businesswoman.  Mkhize’s political career has been centered on KwaZulu-Natal. He was provincial health minister, leader of the ANC in the province, and provincial premier from 2009 to 2013. He stepped down when the ANC elected him treasurer-general. In September, he signaled that he was putting his hat in the ring for the ANC leadership position, set to be decided at the party conference in December.  Mikhize is a bridging figure within the ANC. He was long a supporter of Jacob Zuma, but broke with him over the firing of Nhlanhla Nene, the highly respected minister of finance. He is generally regarded now as closer to Ramaphosa politically. His policy positions tend to be cautious and circumspect and he is seen as competent and non-contentious. He does not inspire enmity nor is he associated with corruption. Importantly, he places a strong emphasis on party unity and therefore could be attractive to an increasingly divided ANC.

For those in South Africa and elsewhere devoted to the rule of law, the supremacy of constitutional institutions over individual personalities, and repelled by corruption, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma is odious. He has been credibly accused of being a sexual predator and has more than seven hundred outstanding indictments for corruption to his name. Repellent though he may be, he is capable of exceptional charm in personal interactions and incredible political skill. Among the right thinking, the sooner the governing African National Congress (ANC) shows Zuma the door, the better.  Hence, the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR) has performed an important service with the reminder that “Detractors Underestimate Master Tactician Zuma at Their Peril,” the title of its Monday op-ed in Business Day, a major South African newspaper with national circulation.   It argues that Zuma continues to hold the balance of power within the ANC and within the government, and he remains popular among ANC supporters, according to polls. His ex-wife and designated successor, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, also polls well. ANC sentiment for party unity benefits him, and, with his outstanding tactical skills, he may well be able to steer the ANC to victory in the national elections of 2019. IRR also makes the uncomfortable point that Zuma’s “system,” based on patronage, corruption, and populism (though the piece does not use those words) may outlive him. For that reason, IRR argues, the focus should be on institutions and systems, rather than personalities. For right-thinking people, Brexit was unimaginable. So, too, was President Donald Trump’s election, widely regarded as odious on policy and personal grounds in ways similar to President Zuma. Frans Cronje, CEO of IRR and author of the op-ed, reminds us not “to underestimate Zuma;” he and Madam Dlamini-Zuma may be around for a while.  

South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) chooses a new party leader in December. Jacob Zuma, the discredited incumbent, is no longer regarded as a credible option. Instead of running, he is supporting the candidacy of his former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, herself many times a cabinet minister and most recently the chairwoman of the African Union Commission. Her leading rival is Cyril Ramaphosa, currently the deputy president and seen as a reformer. Up to now a two-horse race, Zweli Mkhize, ANC treasurer general, has now said publicly that he would accept the nomination for party leader from party branches. Meanwhile, President Zuma has announced that Dlamini-Zuma will enter parliament. (Under South Africa’s proportional system of representation if there is party-held seat that becomes vacant, the party leader can fill it—without a by-election.) Rumors are circulating on social media that Zuma is also considering a cabinet reshuffle that would provide a place for Dlamini-Zuma. Both could boost her chances in the party leadership race. There are political downsides to Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa. The former has proved to be an aloof, ineffective campaigner that belies her ‘populist’ message, and she is hurt by her close ties to the discredited Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa is associated in the public mind with the police killing of strikers at the Marikana Platinum Mine in 2012. Further, he is the victim of a smear campaign involving alleged sexual indiscretions, though the claims appear to be baseless, and he has also become one of the richest blacks in South Africa, potentially alienating working-class voters. Hence Mkhize is an attractive alternative. He is associated with the “reformist” wing of the party, but has not cut his ties to Zuma. He has few political enemies with the ANC. Though Zuma may be out as party leader in December, he remains president until 2019, unless he resigns. That is what Thabo Mbeki did when he was defeated for the party leadership in 2008. Within the ANC, the assumption has been that the party leader and the president are the same person and that a defeated party leader resigns the presidency. Hence, the Mbeki resignation. But Zuma’s resignation is not required by law. Nevertheless, if Dlamini-Zuma wins in December, the chances are good that Zuma will resign the presidency, clearing the way for her presidential candidacy on the ANC ticket in 2019. But if Ramaphosa or Mkhize win, Zuma might try to hang on to the presidency until his term formally expires.  

In what is hopefully the twilight of the Mugabe regime, one weird episode follows another. On August 14, President Robert Mugabe publicly bragged that the murderers of twelve white farmers in Zimbabwe will never be prosecuted. Then his wife, Grace, beat a twenty-year-old South African model, Gabriella Engels, with an extension cord after Engels visited Mugabe’s two sons, twenty-five and twenty-one, at a luxury hotel in Johannesburg. According to the media, ten of Grace’s body guards looked on. From photographs posted on social media by the victim, the First Lady of Zimbabwe caused serious damage. The victim filed assault charges, but the South African foreign minister extended diplomatic immunity to Mrs. Mugabe, who has since left the country. Then, in an apparently unrelated episode, Zimbabwe blocked flights by South African Airways and British Airways in and out of the country in retaliation for South Africa suspending Air Zimbabwe’s landing rights for failing to pay fees.  It is hard to know the extent to which these episodes reflect either the criminal or the incompetent dimensions of the Mugabe regime. As for the murdered farmers, Mugabe bid goodnight to the rule of law many years ago. His regime continues to be propped up by often arbitrary violence. Grace Mugabe wants to be Robert’s successor as president of Zimbabwe and, in the meantime, she is his staunch defender and has even referred to him continuing his rule from beyond the grave, presumably channeling through her. She is used to getting what she wants, and is prepared to indulge in personal violence when embarrassed. Last year in Hong Kong, she assaulted a photographer for photographing her shopping at a luxury emporium during a time of near-famine in Zimbabwe. As in South Africa, her First Lady status ensured her diplomatic immunity, and she was not charged. These episodes would appear to be at the criminal end of Zimbabwe’s continuum. The blocking of South African Airways and British Airways from operating in Zimbabwe, by contrast, looks more like incompetence. Zimbabwe’s action left stranded foreign tourists, hardly a good marketing strategy for their tourism industry, which is an important source of foreign exchange for a country in economic paralysis. South Africa’s leaders, from Mandela through Zuma, have long indulged Mugabe’s antics. In part, this reflects Mugabe’s status as the grand old man of southern African liberation, but it also reflects South Africa’s limited options. The implosion of Zimbabwe and the huge refugee flows it is likely to engender is contrary to the interests of the states in the region. Hence, there appears to be a predisposition to prop-up the Mugabe regime. Critics of South Africa like to say that Pretoria could pull the plug on Zimbabwe’s electricity and thereby bring down the Mugabe regime. It is by no means clear that this is possible, and, even if it is, whether Mugabe’s successors would be any better. Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional and criminal governance will continue to besmirch unjustly the international reputation of its southern African neighbors, especially Botswana and South Africa, characterized by democracy and the rule of law.

President Jacob Zuma survived the August 8, opposition-instigated no-confidence vote in the National Assembly, this time by secret ballot and by a narrow margin. There were 177 votes in favor of the no-confidence resolution, and 198 against, with 9 abstentions.  (There are 400 seats in the National Assembly, with Zuma’s African National Congress holding 249.) In the short term, the Zuma government survives, but Zuma faces possible impeachment in September, and in any event he will leave the ANC presidency at the party conference in December. In the longer term, the vote is significant because it establishes the precedent of a secret ballot on a parliamentary measure of the highest importance, in this case whether an administration will survive. The genii cannot be put back in the bottle: MP’s both in the ANC and the opposition will in all likelihood increasingly call for more secret votes because of the political cover it provides. As the ANC has been losing voter support, South African politics has been opening up; the concern now must be that political fragmentation encouraged by these secret ballots not trump the accountability and transparency associated with open voting in parliament. South African parliamentary politics may well be haunted in the future by the precedent established by this secret vote. The ANC in Decline The ANC is bitterly divided internally over Zuma’s alleged corruption, “state capture” by his cronies, including the Indian-born Gupta family, and poor financial management, which has led to the downgrading of South African debt by international rating agencies. The hotly-contested struggle for party leader, who ultimately becomes chief of state, should be resolved at the party’s 54th National Conference in December. In addition, the ANC’s electoral support appears to continue to decline, reflecting a party increasingly out of touch with its grass roots. Civil society and opposition mass demonstrations against the Zuma government are now routine, and riots over service delivery in the townships are frequent. There is concern within the party that its share of the vote may fall below 50 percent in the national elections in 2019, likely resulting in a coalition government that may or may not include the ANC as the dominant partner. Nevertheless, as of now, Zuma still has control of the party apparatus, and he is vindictive toward those who flaunt party discipline or waiver in their loyalty to him. He is at the pinnacle of a party patronage and clientage network, and many MP’s owe him favors. His populism remains popular in the rural parts of the country. Once out of office, he likely and credibly fears formal prosecution for corruption. Hence, he will not voluntarily relinquish power any earlier than he must, and he is supporting the candidacy of his ex-wife and political ally Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma as his successor as party leader, to be chosen at the December party convention. The ANC has 249 of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. It is likely that up to fifty ANC MP’s want Zuma out, now. If they had voted for the no-confidence measure, and if the opposition had maintained its united front, Zuma and his cabinet would be out.   Secret No-Confidence Vote There had been speculation that if the vote on the no-confidence measure were by secret ballot, many ANC dissidents would have been emboldened to support it, so great is the distaste for Zuma within a wing of the party. Following protracted judicial maneuvering, the courts ruled that Speaker Baleka Mbete had the power to determine whether the vote would be by secret ballot. She is a political ally of Jacob Zuma and has herself presidential ambitions. Hence, she might have leaned toward an open vote, thereby ensuring that ANC party discipline and some opposition from minor parties would guarantee its defeat. But, not allowing the secret ballot as requested by the two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), would have highlighted that she is in Zuma’s pocket and undermined her credibility and neutrality as speaker. Moreover, she probably calculated with good reason that even with a secret ballot, the measure would fail. In any event, she allowed the secret ballot to go forward.  Because the ballot was secret, the number of ANC dissidents who voted in favor cannot be known with certainty, despite rampant speculation.   ANC dissident motivation to vote against the measure appears to have been: Reluctance to support an opposition party move to force out an ANC government. The ANC instructed its MPs to vote against the measure. Though internally divided, ANC party discipline remained strong enough to deter just enough rebels even when the ballot was secret.  Race likely was a consideration: post-apartheid, the DA is the party of racial minorities, especially whites and “coloureds”, while the ANC has seen itself as the voice of the black majority. ANC dissidents were likely reluctant to participate in bringing down a black government at the instigation of the DA, even though the EFF, its partner in the no-confidence effort, also sees itself as a black party. This racial factor may have also played a role in the vote against no-confidence or abstention by some of the minor black parties.  A successful vote would have meant that the entire cabinet— not just the president—would be forced to resign. That would include those anti-Zuma members of the cabinet and those already campaigning for the party leadership election in December, such as Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. There is still an alternative way to get Zuma out quickly but leave in place the rest of the administration: impeachment. On September 5, the Constitutional Court is due to rule on the EFF application that President Zuma has violated his constitutional obligations. If it so rules, the many in the ANC will feel obligated to vote for impeachment, which would apply only to Zuma. The rest of the cabinet would remain, and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa would temporarily become chief of state until the party conference in December. Otherwise, the December party conference will likely see the exit of Jacob Zuma from the leadership of the ANC. Following typical ANC protocols, though not required by South African law, it is likely that he would resign as chief of state and the new party leader would succeed him. One way or another, Zuma is likely to be gone by the end of the year.  For many in the ANC MP rank-and-file, impeachment and the approaching party conference made a step as drastic as a no-confidence vote unnecessary.  Significance of the No-Confidence Vote The no-confidence vote occurred against a backdrop of ANC internal disarray and declining popular support. In the short term, the divisions within the ANC and its lack of direction has been further exposed, likely strengthening the credibility of opposition parties, especially the DA and the EFF, who stand to benefit in the 2019 elections. The no-confidence vote yet again became the occasion for rallies organized by civil society against the Zuma administration’s corruption and poor governance, and in support of South Africa’s formidable culture of the rule of law. But, in the long term, there is also a significant downside for South African governance: the episode has established the precedent of a secret ballot on matters of high political importance in parliament. In the future, there are likely to be measures before parliament that MP’s of all parties would prefer to vote for or against in secret.  A genius of South Africa’s system of proportional representation in a constitutional system is that in a racially divided nation, politics and political parties are not defined by formal racial quotas.  A shortcoming of the South African representation system, however, is that there are only weak links between MP’s and their constituencies. MP’s are beholden for election and re-election to their place on their party’s electoral list, not directly to their constituents. It is impossible for an MP to cross the aisle; a dissident MP has no choice but to resign until the next election, when he or she would be able to apply to be on the list of another party. Up to now, these arrangements have strengthened parties as institutions by facilitating party discipline. In the future, however, with secret ballots, MPs may reject their party’s discipline. If, as is likely over the next decade, South Africa moves to coalition governments, maverick MP’s in secret balloting could introduce a new level of instability without accountability.  

Since 1994, electoral politics in South Africa has been dominated by the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). (SACP and COSATU candidates for office ran under the ANC label as part of the so-called “Triple Alliance.) Not any more. Driven by the apparent incompetence and corruption of the Zuma administration, and by the ANC party leadership elections to take place in December, South African politics are more open than they have ever been. The Zuma administration will face a vote of no confidence on August 8. If successful, President Jacob Zuma and his entire cabinet would be forced to resign. There have been numerous such votes in the past that the ANC has weathered easily because of its huge parliamentary majority. This time is different. Opposition parties are calling for the no-confidence vote to be by secret ballot, no doubt in hopes that many ANC members of parliament will defect because they are fed up with President Zuma. The courts have ruled that the speaker of the National Assembly, a close ally of President Zuma, has the power to decide whether the ballot will be secret. Therefore, it is likely that she will opt for a public ballot and thereby discourage ANC defections, enabling Zuma and his cabinet to survive. Even with a secret ballot, moreover, ANC defections are unlikely to be enough to bring about the fall of the Zuma government, but the episode is contributing to the decline in  the ANC’s credibility.  Reputable South African media outlets are reporting that the faction in the ANC that supports Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa for the party leadership contest against Zuma’s preferred candidate, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma—a frequent cabinet minister, former chairwoman of the Africa Union Commission, and his ex-wife—has tabled a plan to offer President Zuma two billion Rand and amnesty for his alleged corruption if he resigns. The ANC is hotly denying the report, characterizing it as “fake news.” Nevertheless, the story—which on the surface appears credible—is yet more evidence of disarray within the ANC. There will be other candidates for party leader in addition to Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma. Lindiwe Sisulu, the current minister for human settlements and a member of a clan closely associated with Nelson Mandela, has been nominated by several ANC local entities for party leader and she has publicly said that she will run. With her background and connections, Sisulu may prove to be a formidable candidate. So, too, might ANC party treasurer Zweli Mkhize, frequently identified as a compromise between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma.  Finally, there are whispers that the SACP is considering withdrawing from the Triple Alliance and running its own slate of candidates. While this notion is still in its early stages, it is a further indication that the center of gravity of South African politics is on the move. Continued COSATU participation in the triple alliance is by no means certain. The opening up of politics is good for South African democracy, and, as it is taking place within a constitutional framework, it is also good for the rule of law. However, the ANC has been a big tent political party that, in terms of economic policy, has generally followed the market-based “Washington Consensus” advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A more open political process is likely to lead to more radical voices, especially as the post-apartheid rate of social and economic progress has been very slow: most blacks—80 percent of the population—remain poor, while most whites—8 percent of the population—are relatively well-off.      

Among some foreign observers, there has long been concern that South Africa could go down a similar path as Zimbabwe. More particularly there is anxiety that South Africa’s robust democratic institutions and the rule of law could give way to the abolition of minority property rights, especially those of white landowners, to benefit impoverished rural dwellers. The rural poor are an important constituency of the governing African National Congress (ANC). Over the past year, party leader and president, Jacob Zuma, has resorted to populist rhetoric, including references to “white monopoly capital” and the urgent need for land reform and redistribution, even without compensation to its owners.   Hence the interest in land reform during the recently concluded ANC National Policy Conference, even though no consensus emerged. The issue has been referred back to party branches for further discussion. Nevertheless, there were two general, if competing, perspectives in the discussion on land reform. One is that land reform should proceed rapidly without compensation to current owners, even if that requires amending the constitution. The other is that land reform should be accelerated, but broadly within the current constitutional and legal framework. An alternative perspective, articulated by President Zuma, was that the constitution already provides for expropriation without compensation “where necessary.” As a political issue, land reform is likely to become more important as the ANC’s electoral support declines and support for more radical parties, notably the Economic Freedom Fighters, increases. However, South Africa’s constitution and independent judiciary forecloses massive Zimbabwe-style expropriation of private landholdings. The fact that South Africa has a constitution based on democratic principles, as well as an independent judiciary, a lively parliamentary opposition, and a vigorous civil society, all of which Zimbabwe lacked to a certain extent, precludes Pretoria from taking the road of Harare.   

With almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament, the African National Congress (ANC) is South Africa’s ruling party. Under the country’s system of proportional representation, the party elects the chief of state, at present Jacob Zuma. In December, the party will hold a National Conference, where it will elect a new party leader and few expect Zuma will be re-elected. If not, the party could either recall him from the presidency or leave him in place until his presidential term expires. If the ANC chooses to recall Zuma, the deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, would be chief of state until the next scheduled elections in 2019. The party is rapidly losing electoral support, and the conventional wisdom is that it is increasingly isolating itself from its political base because of corruption and incompetence. Its challenge is to turn itself around or risk not continuing as the party of government.   At present, the two leading candidates for party leader are Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the former chairperson of the African Union and Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the current deputy leader. The principal policy buzzwords within the ANC are “radical economic transformation” and “white monopoly capital.” There is a general consensus on the need to broaden black participation and ownership in the economy, but little about how to do it—or what these buzzwords actually mean. From June 30 through July 5, the ANC is holding a National Policy Conference. Up to four thousand delegates will review nine policy documents. There are likely to be many amendments and rhetoric that at times may be scary to a western audience—such as references to ”external threats” to the party and to South Africa (read from the United States). The more extreme the rhetoric, the happier the media will be and the more attention it will attract. However, ANC policy documents somewhat resemble American political party platforms, and it is rare for ANC policy documents to become actual legislation. The real significance of the conference is that it will be another venue for the ongoing contest between Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa.  Dlamini-Zuma is closely associated with President Zuma, who still exercises considerable control over the party apparatus and the status quo. She is likely to useitionsharper anti-capitalist and “black power” rhetoric than the ANC has in the past.  Those who believe the party is facing a crisis of electoral confidence unless it reforms itself away from corruption and patronage are supporting Ramaphosa. Broadly speaking, the Dlamii-Zuma faction is associated with the rural poor and many traditional rulers, while the Ramaphosa faction is urban, Johannesburg-based. Ramaphosa and his supporters advocate economic policy more in tune with the convention wisdom of the “Washington Consensus” and international financial institutions. The Policy Conference could indicate the relative strength of these two factions. Between the National Policy Conference and the December National Conference there is time for a third candidate for party leader to emerge. This becomes more likely if it turns out the Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa factions are equally matched come December.

As in the United States and many other countries, the rate of participation of those aged fifteen to twenty-five in South African politics is disappointing. Some observers had breathlessly anticipated that the “born-frees,” those born after the end of apartheid in 1994, would somehow improve political life in South Africa. The country’s fascination with the “born-frees” resembles America’s fascination with “millennials.” Like “millennials,” a high percentage of “born-fees” do not vote or otherwise participate in conventional politics. A research project, with funding from the University of Johannesburg and Rhodes University, asked young people what they think about politics. The study relied on focus groups and used participants from various geographical and class backgrounds. The full study should be published soon. The research results should come as no surprise to Americans. South African young people distrust formal politics. They engage politically outside of political parties, particularly through social media, but rarely vote, believing it makes no difference. They also tend to be more engaged at the local rather than national level, especially over issues that directly affect them, such as school and university fees.  The study provides insights into how at least some South African youth perceive the major political parties. From their perspective, the governing African National Congress (ANC) does not keep its promises, while the Democratic Party (DA), the official opposition, is for privileged white people. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters, a noisy party advocating radical redistribution from the rich (mostly white) to the poor (mostly black), is corrupt.  It is true that the ANC under the leadership of Jacob Zuma is increasingly detached from its natural constituency and is associated with corruption. Nevertheless, it has the opportunity to transform itself, starting with the party leadership election in December. The DA is, indeed, the party of racial minorities, but it is seeking to build a constituency among black voters, starting with its election of a black party leader in 2015, Mmusi Maimane. Julius Malema is notorious (or celebrated) for his over-the-top life style, yet he and his party continue to be the voice of the dispossessed in townships throughout the country. South Africa does have the ability to rejuvenate its formal politics, but the attitudes among its young people appear deep-seated and unlikely to change in the near future, according to the study. Formal political parties must build trust with the already politically energized youth; until then, voters in South Africa, as in other democracies, are likely to continue to be disproportionately middle-aged or elderly. 

The campaign is heating up for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s governing party. The two most prominent candidates are Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Dlamini-Zuma was most recently the chair of the African Union Commission, a former health minister and foreign minister, and a medical doctor. She has been endorsed by the party’s women’s league, its youth league, and the organization of ANC “struggle” military veterans. She has also been endorsed by Jacob Zuma, the largely discredited current party leader and head of state, and her ex-husband. Ramaphosa, an architect of the transition to “non-racial democracy,” is a prominent businessman and is currently the Deputy President. He has support within the trade union movement, of which he is a veteran, the business community, and among many senior officials within the ANC. If the two appear to be the leading candidates at present, there remains the possibility that another candidate may emerge, possibly a compromise between the two factions currently represented. In the campaign, Dlamini-Zuma is almost routinely referred to as Jacob Zuma’s “ex-wife” by her detractors. In an African context, “ex-wife” is often derogatory. An ANC Youth League party official, Thinta Cibane, has protested these ubiquitous references: “That view is patriarchal and we don’t live in a patriarchal society. Why don’t people refer to President Zuma as the ex-husband? It is unacceptable and insulting that Nkosazana is referred to as ex-wife as if she has no credentials of her own.”   Cibane has a point. It is also a reminder that the ANC has a proud history of supporting women’s rights and opposing sexism, patriarchy, and gender stereotyping.  

In a period of economic challenges and political scandals, South Africa’s constitutional and democratic institutions provide an essential rudder. Among those institutions are the opposition parties, chief among them the Democratic Alliance. The official opposition since 1999, its electoral support has grown rapidly, from 16.7 percent of the vote in 2009 to 22.2 percent in 2014. It currently holds 89 of the 400 seats in parliament, while the governing African National Congress (ANC) holds 249. The antecedents of the DA are the predominately white, liberal, and English-speaking parties that were the opposition during apartheid, which was sponsored by the now defunct National Party. Like these early opposition parties, the DA is strongly supportive of the constitution and the rule of law. It is moderately conservative on economic and social policy, and in townships it is perceived as a “white” party. The DA now commands the electoral support of most racial minorities in South Africa. It is the party of government in the province of the Western Cape and Cape Town, the only part of sub-Saharan Africa where blacks are not a majority. (The largest racial group is the ‘coloureds,’ who usually self-identify as a separate, not mixed, race and tend to support the DA.) To become the party of government in the rest of the country, the DA must win support from some of the black majority, which comprises 80 percent of the population. In order to broaden its appeal, it has selected as party leader Mmusi Maimane, a former member of the Johannesburg city council, and in some local governments, it has formed a tactical alliance with the Economic Freedom Fighters, a radical, black party The DA effort to breakout of its racial minority straitjacket is the context for a contretemps involving Helen Zille, former journalist, anti-apartheid activist, the former DA party leader, and currently the premier of the Western Cape. In tweets this spring she said, in essence, that the heritage of colonialism was not all bad, and she rejected the identification of apartheid with the Holocaust. During the ensuing uproar, she declined to apologize. There were calls within and without the DA to expel her from the party, remove her from all party offices, and even eject her from the premiership of the Western Cape. Some within the EFF threatened to end their tactical alliance with the DA. Zille, never prepared to go quietly, raised the specter of lawsuits to preserve her party position. Mmusi Maimane has since negotiated a compromise. Zille has publicly apologized and given up her party offices. She retains her party membership and her position as premier of the Western Cape, where she remains very popular. Though not certain, there is a good chance that the Zille issue will now go away, to the relief of the DA leadership as they look towards the 2019 elections. For an American observer, ‘Zillegate’ is curious, akin to “political correctness” gone mad, for Zille has impeccable anti-apartheid credentials. In fact, she was one of the journalists who broke the story of the murder of anti-apartheid icon Steve Biko by police. What she tweeted would appear to be obvious: colonialism was not all bad, and it cannot be compared to the Holocaust. However, a fundamental reality is that democratic South Africa remains a deeply wounded country, by no means having recovered from the consequences of apartheid. Racial identity remains a primary political driver and social and economic change has been glacial. Most of the black majority remain poor, while the 9 percent of the population that is white is mostly middle class or wealthy. Hence anger among blacks at the Zille tweets, and fears over the danger it poses to the DA strategy of broadening its electoral appeal. The question remains why Zille felt it necessary to share her opinions on what surely she knew was a hurtful subject. Some of her critics ascribe it to simple arrogance and insensitivity to the feelings of most of her fellow South Africans.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the African National Congress (ANC) did not recall Jacob Zuma from the presidency at its meeting over the weekend of May 27. However, it was not the Zuma victory that it might appear. In fact, Zuma continues to lose support within his party, deepening internal divisions that are hurting the ANC’s ability to respond to shifts in the political mood among voters. The ANC, reflecting its “struggle” roots, conducts party business behind closed doors, emphasizes party unity, and rarely acknowledges internal division. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe briefed the media on May 28 on the NEC weekend meeting. True to form, he emphasized party unity, but he also acknowledged that there had been an internal debate over whether Zuma should go. Further, he said that the NEC directed the president to appoint a commission to investigate “state capture,” which Zuma and his cronies, the Gupta brothers, have been accused of. He also acknowledged that the campaign is underway for the party leadership elections in December. The ANC is usually uncomfortable with the idea of open campaigning for party leadership posts, preferring instead to avoid intra-party rivalries and create consensus among ANC leaders. Preceding the investigative commission announcement at the NEC, a May 18 report issued by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) listed “state capture” as a greater concern than “corruption,” shining a harsh spotlight on President Zuma’s relationship with the Guptas. The SACC, comprising thirty-six member churches from across the country, holds strong moral authority in what is a deeply Christian nation. Adding to the controversies surrounding Zuma, on May 28, South African Sunday papers published a leaked letter from President Zuma to the crown prince of Abu Dhabi in which the president referred to looking forward to making the United Arab Emirates his “second home.” Many South Africans are interpreting this as a part of Zuma’s advance planning should he need to leave South Africa abruptly. Meanwhile, the erosion of ANC electoral support continues. In a recent local government by-election in Nqutu, a municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, the rival Inkatha Freedom Party won 58 percent of the votes cast. Despite campaigning by ANC political stars, including Zuma himself, the party saw its share slide from 43 percent in the previous election to 33 percent. While Nqutu is one of a small number of municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal that do not support the ANC, this result may be an early warning of eroding ANC support. Across the country in the Western Cape, a stronghold of the official opposition, voter turnout was up 13 percent as the Democratic Alliance increased its share of the vote from 47 percent to 57 percent in a by-election for local government in Beaufort West. This erosion of electoral support has already led to the ANC losing all major metro areas but one, Durban in KwaZulu-Natal.