South Africa | Council on Foreign Relations

South Africa

Dlamini-Zuma at Top of the ANC Table

On May 14, South African president and African National Congress (ANC) party leader Jacob Zuma endorsed his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for party leadership. The ANC party elections will be held in December. Currently, opposition to Zuma within the ANC is coalescing around Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, a millionaire businessman, and one of the leaders of the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy. Zuma’s term as president of South Africa runs until 2019. However, under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the ANC can “recall” him from the presidency should it choose to do so. If Dlamini-Zuma wins the party leadership, his recall is unlikely; should Ramaphosa win, the chances would increase. Dlamini-Zuma is a former minister of health, of foreign affairs, and she was the first female chairperson of the Africa Union Commission. However, many outside observers see her achievements in office as mediocre. If she wins in December, she will be the first female head of the party, and she will be well placed to become the national president in 2019. Critics hostile to Zuma maintain that his support for his ex-wife is driven by desire to preserve his wealth for their children and to avoid prosecution for corruption once he is out of office. Meanwhile, over the weekend that Zuma announced his support for his ex-wife, there were widespread demonstrations against him and against the Gupta family, who are widely seen as beneficiaries of Zuma’s position. The Guptas are regularly accused of “state capture,” using their influence over Zuma to win lucrative government contracts. Zuma appears to retain control of the ANC party machinery, and, for that reason, Dlamini-Zuma must be seen as the favorite in the December race. Ramaphosa has the support of the ANC’s major partners: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (his background is in the trade union movement), the South African Communist Party, and the business community. (That the communists and big business support the same horse is indicative of the unconventional nature of South African politics.) Ramaphosa’s party strength is to be found in the urban areas, especially Johannesburg; Zuma’s core support is among the rural areas. However, continued division at the top of the ANC provides greater space for a third, “compromise,” candidate to contest in December, ANC Party Treasurer Zweli Mkize is frequently mentioned. Popular anger against Zuma and the ANC party machine appears to be genuine and growing. A Dlamini-Zuma victory in December could be pyrrhic if the voters exact revenge in 2019 and vote for the opposition in the national elections. However, it is unclear which political grouping would most benefit: the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, is widely perceived as a “white” political party; and, the third largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, is radical in rhetoric, and has a leader, Julius Malema, who loathes the Zuma’s. It is also possible that there will be a significant secession movement from the ANC that might contest the 2019 elections on its own, opening the door to coalition politics.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 18, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

The ANC Leadership Table: Who is in the Race?

For junkies of South African politics, Ranjeni Munusamy has put together a list of likely candidates for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) at the upcoming party convention in December. She sees nine primary candidates and five “secondary players.” She discusses each of the candidates in two or three sentences, with a brief on where their support rests within the party. Her primary candidates, more or less in order of strength, are: Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife is the former minister of health, foreign affairs, and chairperson of the African Union Commission; Cyril Ramaphosa, the current deputy president; Baleka Mbete, speaker of the National Assembly; Zweli Mkhize, treasurer of the ANC; Lindiwe Sisulu, minister of human settlements; Jeff Radebe, minister in the presidency and head of ANC policy; Gwede Mantashe, national chairman of the ANC; Matthews Phosa, former premier of Mpumalanga province; and, Tito Mboweni, former governor of the South African Reserve Bank and ally of former President Thabo Mbeki. The top four would appear to be the strongest candidates, but dark horses are a distinct possibility in December because the ANC is so divided. Additionally, Munusamy’s provided a list of “secondary players” looking to make moves within ANC party ranks: David Mabuza, current premier of Mpumalanga, he is said to want to be deputy president Elias Sekgobelo “Ace” Magashule, current provincial ANC chairperson and premier of the Free State; Paul Mashatile, current provincial ANC chairperson of Guateng who allegedly wants to be secretary general of the ANC; Senzo Mchunu, former ANC provincial chairperson in KwaZulu-Natal; Nathi Mthethwa, minister of Arts and culture and former ANC Chief Whip in the National Assembly. Munusamy closes her list with the observation that incumbent Jacob Zuma could technically be re-elected as ANC president; she dubs him the “outside” candidate. In my view, Munusamy includes all of the major players in the upcoming party elections, and all will be worth watching. I agree with her observation that the numerous candidates are a healthy phenomenon in that they are opening the political process.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 5, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

The End of South African Electricity Load Shedding and the Prospects of a Nuclear Deal

A cause of South African malaise since 2010 and beyond has been the shortage of electricity. This shortage transcended more than just social divisions (rich and poor, influential and powerless), it also had a direct impact on the most sophisticated economy in Africa – one that is highly dependent of uninterrupted power. This was the backdrop to President Jacob Zuma’s nuclear cooperation deal with Russian company Rosatom in 2013, with a further agreement in 2016. Zuma’s government has also had conversations with potential nuclear suppliers in South Korea and the United States. Throughout, Zuma’s nuclear initiative has hardly been transparent, and Zuma’s critics saw the likelihood of contract “irregularities” that would benefit Zuma’s cronies, the Gupta brothers, and perhaps Zuma himself and his family. However, at present there is no longer a power shortage, and load shedding has stopped. The new power abundance appears to be as a result of new generating plants coming on line and a static, possibly declining, demand for power associated with the lack of economic growth. Meanwhile, the Western Cape High Court has ruled that Zuma’s Department of Energy’s deals with “foreign governments” did not follow legal procedures- yet another example of the independent South African judiciary stopping Zuma dead in his tracks. Even during the period of power shortages, many South Africans were dubious about a nuclear energy program. There was concern about its costs and its safety. Though it was the opposition parties that were most vocal, there was significant anti-nuclear sentiment within Zuma’s African National Congress, a reminder that the governing party is hardly monolithic. Further, renewable sources of power are becoming cheaper–and the end of load shedding has made nuclear power less compelling. The court ruling addressed the process by which Zuma was seeking a nuclear agreement with the Russians, not the issue of nuclear power in general. So, the Zuma government could continue to pursue a nuclear agreement through methods that would pass legal muster. However, it is unlikely that one can be achieved before the ANC’s 54th National Conference in December, where the betting is that Zuma will be replaced as party leader. Hence, under these circumstances, there is a reasonable chance that Zuma’s ambitious and expensive nuclear power initiative will cease to exist.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 4, 2017 Africa in Transition

South Africa

ANC Leadership Contest Heating Up

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa all but announced his candidacy to succeed Jacob Zuma as the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) at a speech on April 23. The party’s election will take place at the 54th ANC National Conference in December. Ramaphosa’s speech, at an event sponsored by the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the Eastern Cape, was his first since Zuma sacked well-regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan (which resulted in multiple international credit rating agencies downgrading South African credit to junk status). Prevalent themes of Ramaphosa’s speech included: the need to address the “rot” within the party, the need to “root-out corruption,” and concern over outsiders unduly influencing government policy. All of these points were thinly veiled attacks on incumbent President Jacob Zuma. At the same event, Ramaphosa’s political ally, former Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, dismissed Zuma’s populist rhetoric for radical economic reform as “radical economic looting.” Ramaphosa has support within the SACP and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Such support for Ramaphosa, a millionaire businessman, demonstrates that ANC internal politics should not simply be seen as left vs. right in conventional terms. Despite the drama around Zuma’s removal of Gordhan, the electoral landscape within the ANC has changed little. Ramaphosa represents the urban areas (especially Johannesburg where Zuma is deeply unpopular), advocates for reform and “good government,” and an open political process. He is also popular among the domestic and international business communities. Zuma’s chosen replacement candidate appears to be his ex-wife and mother of some of his children, former minister of health, of foreign affairs, and chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma. She appears to have considerable support within party structures, especially the ANC Women’s League and the ANC Youth League. She also has support within the ANC in the poorer, rural regions. Over the past year, the ANC has become increasingly factionalized and disunited. Accordingly, the rhetoric of ANC politicians of all stripes emphasizes unity. As Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma are each clearly identified with a faction, the party may well settle on a third, “unity” candidate or an arrangement that accommodates both. One possibility might be to make Ramaphosa the party leader and Dlamini-Zuma his deputy. A “unity” candidate might be ANC Treasurer-General Zweli Mkhize, who cultivates ties with all factions. The December elections are to be held internally within the ANC–they are not popular elections, which will occur in 2019. With respect to intra-party candidates for office, the ANC is uncomfortable with open campaigning, perhaps a hold-over from the “democratic centralism” of the days when the ANC was a clandestine movement influence by Marxist-Leninism. Hence, the indirection of much of the candidates’ rhetoric. The Ramaphosa faction is acutely aware that the ANC’s popularity is slipping and that the party is increasingly identified by corruption and cronyism. This is indicative of the need for reform if the party is to retain its majority status in the 2019 elections.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 25, 2017 Africa in Transition
Financial Markets

Politics in Jacob Zuma's South Africa

In this episode of Africa in Transition, John Campbell and Allen Grane catch up with Simon Freemantle, senior political economist at Standard Bank Research. Recorded days before President Jacob Zuma's removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, the podcast addresses the complex factors at play in South African politics.

Podcast April 19, 2017 Africa in Transition
Politics and Government

No Confidence Vote Postponed in South Africa

Speaker of the South African National Assembly Baleka Mbete has postponed the date for a vote of no confidence in the government of Jacob Zuma from April 18 to early May. The delay was caused by the request to the Constitutional Court from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) that the vote be by secret ballot. The court has agreed to review the case, but has not yet made a decision. The speaker, who agreed to wait on the courts decision, is a political ally of President Jacob Zuma and is the national chairperson of his African National Congress (ANC). The no confidence motion initiated by the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has the support of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and nearly all of the opposition parties. However, the ANC numbers 249 of the 400 members of the National Assembly, and a successful no confidence vote must gain over 50 percent of the parliamentary vote. To have any chance of success, the motion must be supported by about fifty ANC ‘rebels.’ If the vote is not secret, the ‘rebels’ would be subject to party discipline, virtually guaranteeing that all ANC members would vote against the motion. There would appear to be two issues for the Constitutional Court: whether the speaker could opt for a secret ballot (she says she could not) and whether the Constitutional Court could order the speaker to conduct the vote by secret ballot. The legal issues are explored by Pierre de Vos in the Daily Maverick. The Constitutional Court is known for its independence, and it has regularly ruled against the government. Nevertheless, it is likely to be reluctant to intervene in the procedures of the National Assembly, a co-equal branch of government. However, even if there is a secret ballot, ANC party discipline is so strong that it is unlikely that there would be fifty ANC 'rebels.' The delay in the vote of no-confidence means that as an issue it will not go away quickly and it allows public sentiment against Zuma to grow. For example, there was a protest demonstration in Pretoria led by the EFF on April 12 that numbered up to 120,000 participants. Even if the ANC defeats a May no-confidence motion, as is expected, this episode is likely to increase popular disenchantment with the party.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 18, 2017 Africa in Transition

Politics and Government

South Africa Prepares for Zuma No Confidence Vote

The National Assembly will vote on April 18, on a motion of no confidence in the African National Congress' (ANC) Zuma administration. The motion has been put forward by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and is supported by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The occasion of the vote is Zuma’s earlier cabinet reshuffle which is perceived by many as having opened the flood gates to cronyism and corruption. The ANC has 249 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly. The two largest opposition parties are the DA, with eighty-nine seats, and the EFF, with twenty-five. The seats of all the other opposition parties together number thirty-seven. The ANC party leadership seems to have rallied around Zuma, and it must be expected that the motion will fail. While such a failure is probable, there are new developments that indicate the direction in which South Africa is moving. Today, April 12, there have been mass demonstrations against the Zuma government (on, of all days, his seventy-fifth birthday). Of the thirteen opposition parties, all save two are supporting the demonstrations. This is an exceptional showing of opposition unity. The two that did not support the demonstrations are the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). The PAC favors wholesale expropriation of white-owned land. Its spokesman said that there is little to choose between Zuma and his supposed successors within the ANC as both are in the hands of capitalists and are corrupt. (The PAC’s one member of the National Assembly will abstain on the April 18 vote.) The FF+ is a fringe Afrikaner political party. Its spokesman said that it would vote for the motion on April 18, but not participate in the April 12 demonstrations because they are likely to be counterproductive. (The party has four seats.) All the rest of the opposition parties will participate in the demonstrations and will vote for the no-confidence motion. So, there are likely to be 150 opposition votes for the motion. To be successful the motion will require fifty or so ANC defections. The prospect of substantial ANC defections is unlikely. Zuma is notorious for his vindictiveness, and the political career of an ANC defector would almost certainly be at an end. However, a small opposition party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), led by anti-apartheid veteran Bantu Holomisa, has applied to the South African Constitutional Court for an order that the ballot be secret. A secret ballot may well encourage some ANC MPs to support the no-confidence measure. (The UDM also has four seats.) Meanwhile, respected elder statesman Thabo Mbeki, in an op-ed, is urging members of the National Assembly to vote “for the people of South Africa,” rather than for a political party – an invitation to disaffected ANC representatives to vote for the motion. It is hard to see how the Constitutional Court might mandate a secret ballot in the National Assembly. That would constitute intervention in the internal procedures of another branch of government. Further, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party have not supported demonstrations against the Zuma government up to now, and there is no sign of participation in today's protests. Both want Zuma out, but they want his exit to be the result of internal deliberations within the ANC rather than through a political process in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, South Africa’s notoriously fragmented opposition has come together in a new way. Politics in South Africa are churning as ANC predominance fades.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 12, 2017 Africa in Transition
Politics and Government

South African Demonstrations Unlikely to Move the ANC and Zuma

Over the Palm Sunday weekend, there were large demonstrations in South Africa’s urban centers against President Jacob Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) in the aftermath of last week’s cabinet reshuffle. The largest demonstrations took place in Cape Town and Pretoria, where, according to the media, demonstrators numbered in the tens of thousands. Elsewhere, demonstrations were much smaller. The demonstrations received extensive media coverage internationally and in the United States, however, they will certainly have no impact on Zuma’s position or the ANC in the short term. For his part, Zuma accused the protestors of being racist. It is always difficult to judge the measurable impact of demonstrations on political change. For example, it is hard to link the demonstrations across the United States against the Vietnam War and then-President Richard Nixon to specific policy changes. Similarly, large demonstrations the day after President Trump’s inauguration in the short term appear to have effected little. That being said, large-scale public protest may have an impact over the longer term. Such nation-wide rallies contributed to the paranoia of the Nixon administration and helped establish a context for his eventual departure from office. In South Africa, if nothing else, the demonstrations over the past weekend should bring home to the ANC leadership (if not President Zuma) the apparent growing alienation of South Africa’s urban centers; at present, the party only governs one of these urban centers, Durban. The ANC risks becoming more rural as the country becomes more urban – estimates are that roughly 60 percent of South Africa is considered urban. For the time being, the ANC has firmly nailed its colors to Jacob Zuma’s mast, deeply unpopular though he is. These realities will play a role in the elections of 2019.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 11, 2017 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

How the Trump Administration Can Help Combat Kleptocracy in Africa

Introduction Kleptocracy—a type of corruption in which government or public officials seek personal gain at the expense of those being governed—undermines U.S. interests across sub-Saharan Africa. By promoting poor governance, kleptocracy weakens democracy and security. Popular anger and despair over corruption often fuel radical movements and insurgencies that are profoundly antagonistic to the United States and challenge the growth of democracy and the rule of law in countries that are actual or potential U.S. partners. A policy of combating kleptocracy across sub-Saharan Africa would strengthen the national security of the United States, and the Donald J. Trump administration should start with Nigeria and South Africa. They are Africa’s two largest economies, and each country is ostensibly democratic, though some institutions are still fragile. The two countries’ often rival regional leadership roles are widely acknowledged elsewhere in Africa. Reflecting the importance of both countries to the United States, President Trump telephoned Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and South African President Jacob Zuma during his first fortnight in office, making Buhari and Zuma the only sub-Saharan African leaders with whom he has been in personal contact. Domestic anticorruption campaigns are underway in both countries, led in Nigeria by Buhari’s government and in South Africa by the political opposition and civil society, including the media and anticorruption nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Trump administration now has a special opportunity to help these two regional hegemons combat corruption on the African continent. Background Nigeria and South Africa are both challenged by kleptocratic corruption, but there are differences in the nature and scale of the problem. Kleptocracy has historically dominated the political economy of Nigeria. In South Africa, kleptocracy is less institutionalized and less likely to distort politics. Nigerian kleptocracy has deep, precolonial roots, and successive regimes and administrations have used it as an instrument of political control. After the 1967–70 civil war, those in government—both military and civilian—appropriated for their personal use oil revenue that under law belonged to the Nigerian people. The leaders of Nigeria prioritized the oil industry over other industries and centralized control of oil revenue, allowing senior officials to steal billions. This rooted a tradition of state theft that has lasted to this day. Nigerian kleptocrats have moved much of this stolen money out of the country through the international financial system, including South African financial institutions. Popular despair engendered by kleptocratic corruption has undermined confidence in governments and has been a driver of popular acquiescence or support for Boko Haram and other jihadist movements. Buhari is the first Nigerian candidate not from the ruling party to be elected president through credible elections, and he has strong support from the public (if not from the political classes) for his unprecedented effort to end governance by kleptocrats. South Africa’s institutions are based on the rule of law and provide a prophylactic against the worst domestic consequences of corruption. Still, kleptocracy drags down the economy and undermines democratic legitimacy. Through its advanced communications and financial infrastructure, South Africa also serves as an enabler of illicit financial transactions from other African countries, including Nigeria. The failure of some local authorities in South Africa to deliver promised services while stealing public funds has sparked township protests and contributed to the decline in support for the governing African National Congress (ANC). Large-scale kleptocratic corruption is especially associated with the Zuma administration. It has become a partisan issue; opposition parties harp on the alleged corruption of the president, his personal associates, and the upper reaches of the ANC. Zuma has been censored by constitutionally established institutions and the courts for spending public money on his private estate, Nkandla. He also faces repeated allegations from his political opposition and the media of facilitating or ignoring the corruption of his inner circle. At times, the kleptocratic link between Nigeria and South Africa is overt. Corrupt Nigerian politicians have found a haven in South Africa and keep substantial assets there, and many rich Nigerians have homes in Johannesburg suburbs. In turn, some South Africans profit from providing sophisticated financial services that facilitate the illicit financial flows out of Nigeria. For example, between 2014 and 2015, in two episodes South African border officials intercepted approximately $15 million in cash from Nigeria. Buhari’s administration credibly alleges that this money was part of a scheme by the former national security advisor and others to steal billions intended for Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram. The stolen cash was likely en route to be laundered through South Africa’s financial system. Anticorruption initiatives are at the center of the political discourse in both countries. In Nigeria, the Buhari administration leads the effort. In South Africa, it is the political opposition, independent judiciary, free press, and civil society that keep corruption at the forefront of the national dialogue, while the Zuma administration does little more than pay lip service to anticorruption. Buhari has appealed for international assistance. So, too, have some parts of South African civil society and some members of parliament. However, as elsewhere on the African continent, the beneficiaries of corruption characterize anticorruption initiatives as neocolonial enterprises that impose Western values on Africans. Recommendations The Trump administration should make countering kleptocracy an interagency priority as part of its security platform, and should reinvigorate the administrative and legislative tools it already has at its disposal. In Africa, the Trump administration should start these efforts with Nigeria and South Africa, employing tactics that reflect the differences in corruption in the two countries. In Nigeria, the United States should partner with the Buhari administration as it seeks to recover stolen assets from abroad and, over the long term, transform the country’s political culture. In South Africa, where corruption is both less embedded and more associated with particular individuals, the United States should support the efforts of civil society groups and political parties working to expose and punish corruption through the courts. The National Security Council should establish an interagency working group to make full use of the U.S. anticorruption policies and procedures that are already in place to pursue country-specific strategies in Nigeria and South Africa. First, the working group should ensure that an anticorruption strategy is shared by the whole government, including the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Such an approach should use anticorruption tools such as the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which provide the U.S. executive and judicial branches jurisdiction over illicit money that passes through the U.S. financial system, no matter its origin, destination, or beneficiaries. The working group should collaborate closely with the Buhari administration as it seeks to repatriate stolen funds that are sheltered abroad. In South Africa, the working group should make its expertise on prosecuting money laundering and other white collar crimes in a sophisticated financial environment available to anticorruption NGOs, the courts, and members of parliament. The working group should ensure that U.S. efforts in the two countries are coordinated but reflect the important national differences; a one-size-fits-all approach should be avoided. With guidance from the working group, the U.S. Embassies in Abuja and Pretoria should revoke the visas of corrupt Nigerians and South Africans. The purpose of this action would be to underscore that corruption has personal consequences even for those in the previously protected political classes. To that end, the Trump administration should work to speed up the slow and inefficient visa revocation procedure. U.S. embassies in both countries should publicize the policy of revoking the visas of those credibly suspected of criminality. (U.S. privacy law precludes identifying by name those individuals whose visas are revoked.) Identification of those whose visas should be canceled will be easier in Nigeria, where corruption is widespread and open. In South Africa, where corruption is smaller in scale and more sophisticated, the country’s free media and active civil society can help identify perpetrators. The Trump administration should be prepared to accept blowback from powerful political officials—in Nigeria, where a significant part of the political class could be affected, and in South Africa, where at least some of the alleged perpetrators are close to President Zuma. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs should encourage African governments, starting with Nigeria and South Africa, to enforce the pan-African multilateral anticorruption protocols to which they have already agreed. Thirty-four countries have ratified the African Union’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The United States should assist the African Union in holding its members accountable. This should include outreach to nongovernmental organizations, such as bar associations, and facilitating exchanges with U.S. nongovernmental anticorruption organizations. A Trump campaign against kleptocracy in Nigeria and South Africa would support democratic interests, reduce domestic acquiescence or support for insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa, and counter international criminal networks. It would also strengthen and spread a pan-African culture of anticorruption, thereby encouraging a long-term sustainable regional commitment to good governance and the rule of law.

Report by John Campbell and Allen Grane April 10, 2017 Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program
South Africa

The Morning After in South Africa

For now, Jacob Zuma has succeeded in defeating his rivals for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and an upcoming parliamentary vote of no-confidence will likely fail. The intra-party show-down has followed on the heels of his dramatic cabinet reshuffle. Zuma carried out this reshuffle without consultation within the ANC or with its partners in government, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have called for a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. It has been scheduled for April 18. To be successful, the vote would require the defection of fifty to sixty of the ANC’s 249 members. (The National Assembly has four hundred seats; almost all of the opposition members will vote for the motion.) However, the ANC collective party leadership has now rallied behind Zuma, making such defections highly unlikely. South Africa operates according to a “closed list” system of proportional representation. The electorate votes for the party, not an individual. Before each election, a party leadership prepares a list of candidates: it determines the place on the list of each candidate. Those at the top of the list are usually assured a seat; those at the bottom are not. Hence, any party has a whip-hand over its members in the National Assembly. For an ANC member to vote against the party is political suicide – unless the party leadership splits. Even though three of the “top six” leaders of the ANC were publicly critical of the reshuffle, and the SACP and COSATU called for Zuma’s removal from office, it has not. Rather, the party has publicly rallied behind Zuma. The removal of Gordhan, a steady hand on the economy and dyke against public corruption, has given investors pause. S & P Global has downgraded South Africa’s credit rating to junk status and the currency has fallen about 11 percent in value. Economic growth, already anemic, will likely stall as domestic and foreign investment dries-up. So long as Zuma stays in office, this trend is likely to continue. Between now and the December ANC vote for a new party leader, Zuma is likely to seek to consolidate support for his hand-picked successor. Though he is flying high now, it is by no means certain that he will be successful in December, especially as the economy deteriorates. The faction fighting should not be seen in left vs. right or radical vs. conservative terms. Zuma’s critics included Cyril Ramaphosa, a black oligarch as well as deputy president and aspirant for the presidency, and the ostensibly left-wing SACP and COSATU. Nor should it be put in a pro-west vs. anti-west context. Zuma is no friend of the west and appears attracted to a closer relationship with Russia. But, Gwede Mantashe, at one stage a Zuma critic, has leveled the ridiculous charge that the American embassy in Pretoria is plotting “regime change” in South Africa. However, there is an urban vs. rural and reform vs. tradition dimension to the faction-fighting. Broadly speaking Zuma’s critics within the ANC are urban and seek better to position South Africa in the modern world; Zuma’s core support is rural, and he has cultivated relationships with traditional rulers. Increasingly, that is where the ANC’s electoral support is to be found. The party now governs only one of South Africa’s large cities, Durban. Over time, the party’s rural base is a wasting asset as the country is urbanizing rapidly. But, for now, the party’s leadership structure favors rural areas where its votes are, and Zuma has cultivated effective patronage/clientage networks among them that this week was crucial to his defeating the challenges to his authority. This episode leaves the ANC a shambles. Its factional divisions are there for all to see. The upcoming no-confidence vote is lose/lose for the party. It will likely win the vote, demonstrating that the party has no way of responding to Zuma’s bad governance and dubious friends. On the other hand, should the vote succeed through circumstances difficult now to foresee, then the party will be exposed as a paper tiger. However, as I argue in Morning in South Africa, this entire episode is an illustration of the strength and maturity of South African democracy, nothing that has occurred has been illegal or extra-constitutional.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 7, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

ANC Rallies behind South Africa’s Zuma

The African National Congress’s (ANC) National Working Committee (NWC) decision to back South African President Jacob Zuma in the face of his widely unpopular cabinet reshuffle makes it unlikely that there will be sufficient ANC defections for a no-confidence measure to pass the National Assembly. It remains to be seen how the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will respond to the NWC decision. At present, it appears that any genuine unity within the ANC over a future sense of direction is absent. It is likely that until December, the ANC government will, in effect, be paralyzed. Such stagnation with regards to leadership and the decision making process in the South African government could produce incoherent economic policy, and further political influence and intrusion from the infamous Gupta brothers. These circumstances will be to the chagrin of the international financial markets. Standard & Poor’s downgrading of parts of South Africa’s sovereign debt may be followed by similar actions by the other rating agencies. There is a high probability that short-term investment in the economy could be stifled, as will economic growth. The national currency, the Rand (ZAR) has fallen by more than 11 percent. However, shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange rose – this was driven by shares in gold-mining companies and the weakening Rand. It remains to be see whether these trajectories will persist. Following Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle last week, and his decision to fire well regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, the party leader and chief of state has been under intense pressure from all quarters of the government. The ANC’s political partners, the SACP and the COSATU have called for his resignation because he did not consult with them over the cabinet reshuffle. The absence of any consultation, as well as the dubious quality of certain members of his cabinet picks, has spurred division amongst the highest level of leadership within the ANC. The backstory to the current political crisis includes issues of “state capture,” corruption, the preservation of the unity of the ANC, and the upcoming election of a new ANC leadership in December. Zuma is widely perceived to be corrupt, and his cronies, the Gupta brothers, are seen as exercising undue influence over the administration – otherwise known as “state capture.” The discord over Zuma within the ANC leadership, is a direct challenge to party cohesion, its principle of decision making by consensus, and to never “wash dirty laundry in public.” At least two, perhaps three, of the six most influential members of the ANC have aspirations for the party leadership in December. Zuma is seeking the election of his own outside candidate in December, most likely his ex-wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to forestall prosecution for corruption when he is out of office. Taking these circumstances together, the ANC is opting for party “unity” – at least until December. Hence, on April 4 the party’s NWC affirmed that it would not support Zuma’s removal from the party leadership now, and that it would strongly oppose a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly. There was mild criticism of Zuma for his failure to seek consultation over the cabinet reshuffle but also of those within the party who were publicly critical of him – a further display of party disunity. The bottom line for the ANC leadership is that Zuma, and his new cabinet picks, are locked-in until December. However, his opponents at higher levels of party leadership have maintained opposition to him. As yet, there is no sign of meaningful party unity.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 5, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

South Africa’s Cabinet Reshuffle Reflects Leadership Crisis

President Jacob Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle has exposed growing fissures within the ruling African National Congress, writes CFR’s John Campbell.

Expert Brief by John Campbell April 5, 2017 Africa Program
South Africa

Uncertainties Mount Whether Zuma’s Presidency Will Survive

Voices calling for President Jacob Zuma to resign or to be removed from office are getting louder in the wake of his cabinet reshuffle and removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Within his African National Congress (ANC) the Integrity Commission – intended as an internal corruption watchdog but often toothless – has announced that at an April 9 meeting with the president, it will ask him to resign. Powerful ANC figures including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Treasurer General Zweli Mkhize have disassociated themselves from the reshuffle, though they have not publicly called for Zuma to go. The Mandela Foundation and the Kathrada Foundation, keepers of the liberation movement flame, have done so, as has former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Even the ANC’s political allies are calling for a change. The South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have both expressed their concern regarding the abrupt cabinet reshuffle. On April 4, COSATU called on Zuma to resign. The SACP has posted at the top of its web site its call for the ANC to remove him from the presidency. Meanwhile, the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are asking for a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Civil-society is mobilized and has led demonstrations in the larger cities. The focus of anger increasingly appears to be Zuma’s failure to consult the ANC leadership and that of its communist and trade union allies before his cabinet reshuffle. The Integrity Commission summarizes this point of view: Zuma “disregarded the principle and tradition of collective leadership, both within the ANC and with our alliance partners” (SACP and COSATU). COSATU never liked Gordhan, and there is anger on the South African left at Standard & Poor’s downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status; COSATU spokesmen have characterized that act as “intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa.” But, seemingly, everybody can agree on Zuma’s lack of consultation. So, will Zuma go? It is by no means certain. The National Assembly is on Easter recess. To consider a motion of no confidence, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete, would have to call it back early. She is generally regarded as a Zuma ally. More generally, Zuma has built up a formidable patronage/clientage network within the ANC that may not be prepared to abandon him just yet. The ANC is set to choose a new national leader in December. ANC politicos, including Ramaphosa, are jockeying for position. For many in the ANC, it may be tempting to leave Zuma in place until a later date, rather than engage in a messy internal fight now.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 4, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

Jacob Zuma’s Cabinet Reshuffle Bad News for South Africa

As part of a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle, President Jacob Zuma has fired highly respected Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, along with other long-time stalwarts of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Gordhan and Jonas had long opposed pet projects of the president, and Gordhan has become the symbol of reform and good governance even as the reputation of the governing ANC under Zuma’s leadership has declined into a miasma of charges of corruption and “state capture” by the president’s cronies. Many South Africans (including those within the ANC) will see Gordhan’s departure as a major setback for “reform” and the struggle against corruption. International investors already are not happy. The Rand fell dramatically yet again against the U.S. dollar. There is now a greater likelihood that the international credit rating agencies will downgrade South Africa’s sovereign debt to junk status. The ANC was already divided over Zuma’s successor as party leader; the party leadership vote is expected to take place in December. Zuma and his faction’s preferred candidate is his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma; a “reform” faction candidate is the well-regarded deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and there could be others. Looking toward December is part of the context of the cabinet reshuffle. Zuma apparently did not consult the traditional ANC party leadership over the reshuffle, an indication that it would have opposed him. It is still not clear whether Zuma has the support of his parliamentary partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); Gordhan has had considerable support among both. The South African opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has now tabled a motion of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma in parliament. If it is successful, Zuma would immediately lose the presidency. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) supports the motion. The other opposition parties will almost certainly support the motion. The parliamentary arithmetic is straightforward. Parliament has four hundred seats. A successful vote of no-confidence requires 201 votes. The ANC has 249 seats (COSATU and SACP MP’s vote as ANC). All of the opposition parties have 151. To oust Zuma a no-confidence motion would require the votes of about fifty ANC MP’s. Despite the outrage in the aftermath of the Zuma cabinet reshuffle even inside the ANC, it is unlikely that a DA motion of no confidence will succeed. In the past, when the DA has proposed such a motion, even when supported by the “radical” EFF, the ANC has closed ranks, protecting the party and ensuring Zuma’s position. Since the days of Nelson Mandela, the ANC has prioritized party unity. The DA continues to be perceived as the party of whites, other minorities, and the privileged in South Africa, while the ANC (despite its multiracial principles and history) is seen as “black,” “pro-poor,” and the leader of the successful fight against apartheid. (Black South African’s constitute about 80 percent of the country’s population, and most of it is poor.) The EFF is something of a wild card. Its “pro-poor” rhetoric goes beyond the ANC, but Malema’s personal hatred for Zuma is visceral and unabated. He is prepared to cooperate on occasion with the DA. Nevertheless, given the realities of racially based identity politics, a no-confidence vote will likely fail. Only if a significant portion of the ANC leadership concludes that keeping Zuma in the presidency is electoral poison might the no-confidence measure succeed. We may know soon; the party’s highest leadership body, the National Executive Committee may meet over the weekend of April 1-2. However, if such a meeting is postponed, or if it takes no significant action, Zuma’s short-term chances of weathering his current political crisis are improved.

Blog Post by John Campbell March 31, 2017 Africa in Transition
South Africa

An Independent Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Africa

Geoff Hill writes in a credible Daily Maverick (South Africa) op-ed that people across Africa want the rule of law, and they are demanding it more and more, often from their local judiciaries. But Africans at the same time remain critical, for good reason, of the behavior of judges. Hill reviews a series of court cases in South Africa that have led to reverses for the government of President Jacob Zuma. Notably, the Pretoria High Court’s determination that Zuma’s effort to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is unconstitutional. Hill cites other examples from around the continent, even including Zimbabwe, notorious for the tyrannical rule of Robert Mugabe. But, Hill also cites polling data that shows Africans are critical of the behavior of many judges. He reports that an Afrobarometer poll showed that 30 percent of respondents paid a bribe to court judges or officials. Sierra Leone was the worst, with 67 percent paying a bribe. Botswana was the best, with a bribe-paying score of zero. In South Africa, only 5 percent reported paying bribes. There were also complaints about the expense of going to court, and court delays. In Kenya, three quarters of respondents characterized court delays as “intolerable.” In Africa, democracy, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and economic development seem to advance hand-in-hand. Botswana probably has the highest per capita income in Africa, and the wealth (largely based on diamonds) is not totally monopolized by a corrupt elite. South Africa, with the largest diversified economy in Africa, has both an independent judiciary and a lively, fully-functioning democracy.

Blog Post by John Campbell March 30, 2017 Africa in Transition