South Africa

On March 27, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas were on an investor road show to the United Kingdom and the United States when they were abruptly ordered to return to South Africa by President Jacob Zuma. There was media speculation that Zuma was about to reshuffle his cabinet, removing from office the well-regarded finance minister and his deputy. (There is much speculation that former ESKOM CEO Brian Molefe will replace Gordhan.)The Rand (ZAR), South Africa’s currency, swooned, losing 3 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. Foreign investor confidence in South Africa, which had been on the upswing, fell. Zuma’s power within the ruling African National Congress has been eroding ever since he tried and failed to replace the well-regarded Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene with one of his inner circle in December 2015. Since then, he has suffered severe political reverses because of court rulings, and his party is looking toward its leadership election in December 2017. Intra-party factionalism has been increasing even as Zuma’s star has been waning. It is likely that Zuma’s recall of the finance minister is part of intra-party maneuvering rather than presaging Gordhan’s removal. Indeed, parts of the ANC have already expressed their displeasure with the idea. Enoch Godongwana, the ANC’s head of economic policy was quoted by Bloomberg as saying that if Gordhan was fired “it would be tragic and damaging for the local economy, which has struggled with poor growth levels.” The president might, indeed, carry out a cabinet reshuffle, not least to include in his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, the just-returned former Africa Union Commission chair. Zuma has signaled that she is his candidate to succeed him as party leader in December. But, Gordhan has substantial support within the ANC, as well as among the business community, civil society, and the media. A cabinet reshuffle does not mean that he would go.

Helen Zille is the premier of the Western Cape and a former leader of South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). A former journalist and anti-apartheid activist of German descent, she is famous for being one of those who exposed the murder of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko at the hands of the apartheid security services. Zille has actively sought the transformation of the DA into an opposition party that could win significant support from South Africa’s majority black population. In addition, she was one of those who engineered the selection of Mmusi Maimane, a black politician from Johannesburg, as party leader. She is well known for her outspoken criticism of the dominant African National Congress (ANC). Earlier in March, Zille released a series of tweets asserting that South Africa’s colonial heritage was not all negative; after all, it included, “our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water, etc. Would we have had a transition into specialized health care and medication without colonial influence? Just be honest.” The tweets caused an uproar, with the DA launching an investigation into whether Zille had violated party policy with regards to social media. Maimane tweeted, “Let’s make this clear. Colonialism, like apartheid, was a system of oppression and subjugation. It can never be justified.” In response, Zille has apologized: “I apologize unreservedly for a tweet that may have come across as a defense of colonialism. It was not.” What is going on here?  If there is any truth to Zille’s comments, it is that South Africa’s independent judiciary and largely first-world infrastructure are indeed part of the colonial legacy. This controversy has shed light on enduring racial tensions in divide in the post-apartheid era. For Maimane and many other South Africans, the “logic of colonialism” culminates in apartheid, a crime against humanity. Hence, Zille’s seeming “defense” of colonialism is deeply offensive and, undermines the DA’s effort to broaden the party’s appeal to the black majority who make up about 80 percent of the population. South African whites generally have a different reading of the country’s history (even when, like Zille, they have impeccable anti-apartheid credentials). As in other areas, there are parallels here with the United States. The historical perceptions of British colonization and westward expansion amongst members of the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Sons of the American Revolution are in stark contrast to those of Native or African Americans. However, unlike in South Africa, the national narrative of the latter has been the dominant one, though this may be changing slowly.

In February, the Ibrahim foundation announced that, yet again, it would not be awarding it’s famed Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. Mo Ibrahim, a British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, established the award in 2006. It is probably the richest international prize in the world. It awards laureates $5 million over ten years, then $200,000 per year for life. In addition, laureates may apply for an additional $200,000 per year for their own philanthropy. The prize appears to have been designed to recognize and encourage African leadership of the highest quality and also to free them from post-presidential financial burdens. The selection committee, numbering seven, is of outstanding quality: it includes former president of Ireland Mary Robinson, former first lady of both Mozambique and South Africa Graca Machel, and former president of Bostwana (and laureate) Festus Mogae. Though it can be awarded annually, the selection committee has only come across a suitable candidate on four occasions. Recipients of the award include Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique (2007), Festus Gontebanye Mogae of Botswana (2008), Pedro De Verona Rodrigues Pires of Cabo Verde (2011) and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014). In 2007 the foundation awarded the honorary prize to South Africa’s Nelson Mandela who had left office seven years before the prize was established (because of this he did not meet all of the eligibility criteria). Hence, selected laureates are extraordinary examples of outstanding African leadership. In honor of his leadership and contributions, Archbishop Tutu was also awarded a one off prize from the Mo Ibrahim foundation, though he is not considered a laureate. For some observers, the inability of the committee to find each year suitable laureates is a condemnation of the overall quality of African presidential leadership. When announcing that the prize would not be awarded this year, Prize Chair Salim Ahmed Salim (former secretary general of the organization of African Unity and former prime minister of Tanzania), tried to soften the implied criticism: “We recognize and applaud the important contributions that many African leaders have made to change their countries for the better. But the prize is intended to highlight and celebrate truly exceptional leadership, which is uncommon by its very definition.” Nevertheless, the committee has awarded the prize only four times over the past eleven years, and it is hard to make the case that it overlooked eligible candidates. Some Nigerian observers had hoped that former President Goodluck Jonathan would be awarded the prize given that he was democratically elected and did not contest his defeat in 2015 by opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari. Had he contested the 2015 election results there might have been civil war. But, in the face of rampant and accelerating corruption on his watch, the raging Boko Haram insurrection, widespread security-service human rights abuses, it is hard to see him as having “demonstrated exceptional leadership.”  

Nelson Mandela’s South Africa was one of the founders of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As an early signer of the Treaty of Rome the widespread view within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was that the ICC was a means of holding accountable dictators and other heads of state for criminal behavior. The ANC government even incorporated the Treaty of Rome into South African law. Hence, violation of the Treaty of Rome is also a violation of South African law. Since its establishment, the ICC shoe has pinched the toes of a number of dubious heads of state, notably Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta. At the request of the then-Kenyan government, the ICC investigated crimes committed at the time of the 2007 Kenyan elections and subsequently indicted Uhuru Kenyatta, by then president of Kenya, and his vice president William Ruto. However, Kenyatta’s Kenyan government refused to cooperate with the ICC and prosecutors accused it of intimidating witnesses, who withdrew their testimony. The cases collapsed, and Kenyatta launched a campaign for African states to withdraw from the ICC. He and others accuse the ICC of bias against African states, and many claim that the ICC’s jurisdiction should not extend to heads of state or governments. There is also resentment that certain Western countries, notably the United States, support the ICC but have declined to sign the Treaty of Rome and therefore are not under its jurisdiction. There is anger in some quarters that the ICC could not indict members of the George W. Bush administration for perceived crimes during the war in Iraq. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, too, has fallen afoul of the ICC. Under the Treaty of Rome, if a person indicted by the ICC falls into the hands of a signatory state that state is obliged to hand him over to the court. Sudan’s chief of state Omar al-Bashir has been so indicted by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur. Al-Bashir visited Pretoria in 2015 for an African Union heads of state summit. Zuma not only failed to detain Bashir, he facilitated the latter’s hasty departure from the country when South African courts were moving toward ordering Bashir’s arrest, following suits filed by South African civil organizations. Subsequently, the Zuma government has joined the quit ICC bandwagon by notifying the United Nations of South Africa’s intention to withdraw. At its January summit, the African Union heads of state voted in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for its members to withdraw from the ICC. However, on February 22, the South African High Court ruled in favor of the opposition Democratic Alliance suit that the government’s announced departure was “unconstitutional and invalid.” Because the Treaty of Rome is incorporated into South African law, only parliament could change it so that South Africa could leave ICC jurisdiction. In response to the ruling, the Zuma administration has reiterated its intention to leave the ICC and is considering its options. Zuma’s ANC has a majority of over sixty percent in parliament. The BBC concludes that at the end of the day, parliament is likely to approve withdrawal; but such a projection is premature-still. The ANC is badly fractured with pro and anti-Zuma factions. The party is scheduled to elect a new leader in December 2017. Many South Africans, including some in the ANC, see the ICC as part of the Mandela legacy of “non-racial” democracy and the rule of law. Shedding ICC jurisdiction, by contrast, is associated with Zuma, who is discredited among some for alleged corruption. Hence, it is by no means certain that parliament would do Zuma’s bidding on this issue anytime soon.

This is a guest post by Diptesh Soni, a consultant in the Johannesburg office of Dalberg Global Development Advisors. Diptesh is a former CFR Africa program intern. Across the world, there is an inescapable sense that the machines are coming, and they’re going to take our jobs. This fear is not new. From the cotton gin, to the tractor, to the assembly line and beyond, jobs have, and will continue to face threats from technological advances. But throughout these disruptions, large-scale unemployment has typically been avoided: either machines could not do many of the innately human things people could do, or technology so drastically brought down costs that new markets were unlocked, in turn requiring more workers to serve new customers. Today, both these factors are playing out across sub-Saharan Africa. Africa commands a meagre 1.5 percent share of the world’s total manufacturing output, and the low number of jobs available in manufacturing is, in part, leading to the growth of service-based employment. Technology is rapidly reducing the cost of serving consumers across industries as diverse as financial services, transportation, and hospitality. This is allowing products and services that were traditionally only accessed by the privileged few, to reach a wide pool of new customers. Greater internet and mobile penetration, the development of online market places, and changes in user and consumer behaviour are creating technology-enabled business models across the continent. It is precisely at this juncture where technology can be used to create job opportunities for Africa’s burgeoning youth population. With youth unemployment in major African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria reaching upwards of 50 percent, new forms of working are required to meet the needs of a worryingly inert labour force. As traditional jobs become scarcer in increasingly competitive job markets, the digital economy can support the livelihoods of entrepreneurial individuals seeking to provide services to new customers in new ways. A growing body of evidence is highlighting the job-creation potential of the digital economy. Since mid-2013, Uber has created over four thousand economic opportunities for driver-partners in South Africa. The firm states that one thousand such opportunities were created in both Nigeria and Kenya since launch around two years ago, and it forecasts over three thousand more for Nigeria in the next year. Giraffe, an on-demand recruitment app in South Africa, has attracted over two-hundred and fifty thousand jobseekers since launching in 2015, placing thousands of them with hundreds of South African businesses. E-retail is also set to boom: an estimated 90 percent of internet users in Nigeria either currently shop online or expect to do so in the near future, with 60 percent of Kenyan and 70 percent of South African users reporting the same sentiment. But such work is not without its risks. Workers in the digital economy typically lack the job security and stability that comes with full-time employment, making their livelihoods more flexible but also more fragile. Uber has come under public and regulatory scrutiny in many Western countries for undermining the labour rights of its driver-partners, who are technically independent but oftentimes rely solely on the platform for their incomes. Despite these risk, for the millions of struggling work seekers throughout sub-Saharan Africa, perfect employment should not be the enemy of a good living. As smartphones and data become more affordable, and more people become digitally literate, the growth of digital livelihoods across Africa is inevitable. Eliminating various tech and non-tech barriers is crucial to making the digital economy more inclusive. For example, zero-rating job sites so users aren’t charged for data costs, as Vodacom has done for Giraffe in South Africa and Facebook’s Free Basics has done with Jobberman, makes job seeking and applying cheaper. Free Wi-Fi initiatives, such as Project Isizwe in South Africa and Rwanda’s Smart Kigali initiative, can also help. Municipalities can help online workers avoid challenges of poor connectivity and unreliable power by creating and supporting business and tech hubs for digital entrepreneurs. Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and a host of other African countries are building these ecosystems with increasing government support. Relevant content and greater emphasis on digital literacy and language skills would help increase local demand, while also allowing users and online workers alike to better utilize digital applications. The development of world-class platforms such as Jobberman in Nigeria, SweepSouth for domestic workers, and IDWork for construction artisans in South Africa are exemplifying the calibre of local innovation and how technology can solve tangible local problems in the labour market. Coupled with reliable, secure, and inclusive payment systems, lower transaction costs can expand opportunities for un- and underbanked groups. And affordable financing can help workers acquire tangible productive assets such as phones, computers, and cars. For workers and policymakers alike, there are good reasons to worry about the impact of technology on jobs. Yet if history is any guide, harnessing the power of new technology to reach new consumers will present tremendous opportunities for digital work and entrepreneurship. But to realize these opportunities our conception of work must change, if the work itself is to follow suite.

This post originally appeared on the Council on Foreign Relations Net Politics Blog and is written by Chenai Chair and Broc Rademan, researchers at Research ICT Africa, a public-interest research organization that examines information and communication technology policy in Africa. You can find them @RIAnetwork. According to the International Telecommunication Union, roughly 75 percent of Africans are not connected to the internet. This dismal statistic has turned the continent into a laboratory to test innovative public policy- and market-based solutions to improve connectivity. Installing free Wi-Fi hotspots has emerged as a promising solution to overcome the challenges of coverage, cost and network quality in South Africa and other countries across region. However, it will take more than just free Wi-Fi to significantly increase connectivity. Fixed broadband networks (e.g. laying cable) are too expensive to install and operate for African internet users. Mobile technologies can be deployed more quickly and cheaply and increase mobile phone ownership. However, the cost of communicating is still relatively expensive. A digital readiness assessment study in the Western Cape province found on average citizens spend 20.1 percent of their individual income on mobile service that is voice, SMS, data and any monthly mobile subscriptions. Unlike data plans, free public Wi-Fi is just that for the end user: free. That makes the provision of public Wi-Fi attractive to public authorities looking to improve internet access, especially given the growing penetration of smartphones across Africa. Data suggests that there were roughly 226 million smartphone users in 2015 and is expected to rise to 720 million by 2020. Governments have begun to require the provision of Wi-Fi as a condition of public network investment and infrastructure upgrades. For example, the Western Cape government requires Neotel, an internet service provider, set aside a portion of bandwidth to be allocated for a local Wi-Fi hotspot at the public buildings it is contracted to connect. Similarly, the cities of Tshwane (Pretoria) and Cape Town have required that new government buildings establish a functioning Wi-Fi hotspot with free uninhibited access to anyone in the vicinity. In both cities, schools, libraries, health facilities, parks and squares now offer free Wi-Fi. The business models for free Wi-Fi are varied, but overall, the local authorities end up subsidizing a daily data cap to be used by anyone with a Wi-Fi-enabled device to do with as they please. Having government subsidize internet access is risky. Will people use their newfound access to browse cat videos or something more productive? Recent research we undertook in South Africa suggests that individuals availing themselves of free Wi-Fi were doing so for job seeking, student assignments and information inquiries more than any other activities. Nevertheless, there are still some problems facing the African users of public Wi-Fi. First, the Wi-Fi is provided in mostly urban areas, and therefore exclude rural populations. Second, many public spaces in urban and peri-urban areas are unsafe at night, making internet access a daytime affair. Third, Wi-Fi-enabled devices are not the most affordable devices on the market, which limits the accessibility of feature phone owners and those who have no device at all. Fourth, the sustainability of publicly-funded Wi-Fi projects is uncertain given the dynamic nature of the sector and budgetary constraints in developing economies. This threatens the longevity of such operators as well as the health and competitiveness of the private sector. There are also challenges beyond technology that affect internet accessibility and use in Africa. Mozilla recently funded research conducted in Nigeria, Kenya, and Rwanda. According to the study, digital literacy remains a challenge as some individuals, particularly in rural areas, do not have the skills to navigate the internet. Apart from the lack of devices and digital know-how, public perceptions of the internet also hinder access. Some users shy away from internet use given the nature of some online content, particularly fake news or malicious content. Non-users also express a general mistrust of the internet, which may be attributed to a lack of understanding of what the internet is. Gender disparities can also hinder online participation, especially in rural areas where women have described their partners restricting them from going online. Providing free public Wi-Fi is an innovative and affordable way to improve connectivity in Africa. However it is by no means a silver bullet. More evidence-based research could identify the full extent of the limitations of free public Wi-Fi and identify strategies to improve internet accessibility in Africa. Some of this research will come later this year, once we complete household and individual surveys in nine African countries to better understand internet usage and accessibility.

Rosettenville, a suburb of Johannesburg, was the site of the February 11-12 burning of buildings alleged to have been used by “prostitutes and drug dealers.” These “prostitutes and drug dealers” have been  popularly identified as “Nigerians.” In the aftermath of the fires, the mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, bitterly criticized the South African government for failing to secure South Africa’s borders. (Mashaba is a prominent leader of the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition to the African National Congress government of Jacob Zuma.) Though many of its residents are poor, Rosettenville is far from being a “township slum.” Over time, waves of immigrants have settled there before moving on. Initial migrants to Rosettenville included eastern and southern Europeans who were followed by Portuguese settlers from Europe and former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Most recently, immigration into this suburb has been from African countries north of the Zambezi River. This includes Nigerians. As elsewhere in urban South Africa, residents complain to outsiders about crime and the inadequacies of law enforcement. In general, crime is a major preoccupation and focus of government criticism by South Africans across all racial lines. Much like other countries on the continent, the police are national rather than local, and there is significant demand for private security services (particularly in wealthy Johannesburg suburbs). South African immigration and refugee law and policy is among the most generous in the world. For example, while their cases are being reviewed, asylum seekers are permitted to work and move across   the country freely. Adjudication of asylum cases can take years, but, once approved, refugees have most of the rights of South African citizens. The extrajudicial killings of up to 116 Nigerian nationals over the past two years is indicative of the rise in xenophobia in South Africa. This has been fueled in large part, by popular rhetoric labeling illegal immigrants and refugees as criminals. The unrest is damaging to South Africa’s reputation across the continent, especially as the Nigerian government has expressed growing concern over the dangers faced by its nationals in South Africa.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. This article was originally published on SSA Frontiers.  On May 18, 2000, Congress signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, commonly known as AGOA, into law. AGOA is a trade program meant to establish stronger commercial ties between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. The act establishes a preferential trade agreement between the U.S. and selected countries in the sub-Saharan region. Initially approved for fifteen years, AGOA was reauthorized for ten years on June 25, 2015, by the Obama administration. In its current form AGOA will last until September 30, 2025. It is important to emphasize that AGOA is a preferential trade agreement and not a free trade agreement. A free trade agreement is a treaty between two or more countries to establish a free trade area where commerce in goods and services can be conducted across their common borders, without tariffs or hindrances. A preferential trade agreement is a trade pact between countries that reduces tariffs for certain products to the countries who sign the agreement. While the tariffs are not necessarily eliminated, they are lower than countries not party to the agreement. It is a form of economic integration. The U.S. Department of Commerce describes AGOA as the “most liberal access to the U.S. market available to any country or region with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement.” AGOA in part was meant to establish a route for the U.S. to develop free trade agreements with certain African markets; however, this has yet to happen. What is AGOA’s purpose? Within certain sectors, AGOA is often looked at as a form of aid to developing countries. The U.S. government’s website says that it is “helping millions of African families find opportunities to build prosperity.” However, this image of trade as a form of aid is not entirely accurate. When needed, AGOA has provided the U.S. with preferential access to valuable commodities such as oil. AGOA has also served as a bargaining chip for the United States. The trade relationship between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa has nearly always been skewed one way: the U.S. imports far more than it exports. AGOA didn’t change this. If anything, it increased the scale. U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa peaked in 2014 at $25.49 billion. The numbers for American imports are much higher, they peaked at $86 billion in 2008. (U.S.-Africa trade of products under AGOA reached its pinnacle in 2008 when it hit $66.3 billion.)     Those import numbers directly reflect American commodity needs. At the peak of American imports, between 2007 and 2008, the U.S. imported over one million barrels of oil a day from Nigeria alone. This is in direct contrast to the drastic drop in oil imports by 2015, when there were periods that the U.S. imported no oil from Nigeria. This trend affected other sub-Saharan oil producing countries as well. (The period between 2014-2015 represents the only time that the trade balance between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa was nearly even.) AGOA is also a very useful negotiating tool. The U.S. president has the ability to rescind access to AGOA to any country if he were to determine that it is not working toward certain goals. In essence, the U.S. president has the ability to cancel the AGOA relationship with any partner nation if he feels that it doesn’t benefit the United States. Most recently, AGOA was used as a negotiating tool just prior to its reauthorization in 2015. At the time, the South African government refused to let American chicken farmers export chicken products to South Africa. Accused of “dumping” low quality chicken products, the United States had not been allowed to export chicken to South Africa for over fifteen years. The South African argument was that American exports would destroy its local poultry industry by undercutting prices. On the American side, it was argued that this ban was a barrier to U.S. trade and investment. It was also argued that South Africa, with its advanced economy (though stalled), didn’t need a preferential trade deal (this goes back to the development side of AGOA). The renewal of AGOA, and South Africa’s inclusion in the renewed act, became questionable due to this one sticking point. In the end, the South African government conceded and allowed the U.S. to export 65,000 tons of chicken products to South Africa. Trade with the United States was too important for South Africa to risk losing over chickens, especially as the U.S. is South Africa’s largest export market. (South African exports to the U.S. in 2015 were valued at $9.1 billion. They consisted mostly of manufacturing materials, metals, and minerals.) AGOA under the Trump Administration? Based on the Trump administration’s largely anti-trade stance, there has been some worry that AGOA may possibly be on the chopping block. This, however, is highly unlikely. AGOA was passed originally by a Republican congress in 2000, and was just reauthorized in 2015. It still maintains broad support across party lines, and even if targeted by the Trump administration, it is unlikely that Congress would approve its repeal. AGOA is also not likely to be targeted for repeal because it is not a free trade agreement. While certain African goods are given preferential deals that reduce tariffs, sub-Saharan countries do not operate with blanket free trade and zero tariffs. In fact, the deal provides the U.S. with access to African goods and commodities that help drive the U.S. economy. Additionally, it would be foolish of the Trump administration to give up a tool that provides the U.S. with so much negotiating leverage. As evidenced by the South African chicken trading incident, the U.S. government is able to use access to American markets to dictate trade opportunities in Africa. Countries like Kenya have already expressed worries that trade access through AGOA could be restricted. Traditionally, sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has critical problems with intra-state trade that increases dependency on large foreign trade partners. This regional trade gap provides greater leverage for the United States when participating in trade negotiations. While it is doubtful that AGOA will be repealed, I would not be surprised if the new administration were to use the threat of removal from AGOA as a negotiating tool. Presidents have removed nations from the AGOA agreement before. The Trump administration doesn’t mean the end of AGOA, but it may mean that certain trade relationships are reevaluated.  

Since 1994, South Africa’s constitutional institutions have strengthened, as has the independence of the judiciary, which now regularly rules against an increasingly discredited Zuma administration. The political parties are becoming more competitive, even as the country regularly holds credible elections. Corruption, especially in the inner circle of President Jacob Zuma and among his allies in the African National Congress (ANC), has probably increased, but it is challenged by the country’s free press and vociferous civil society. However, the parliamentary escapades of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) threatens the strength of South Africa’s parliament, one of the country’s most important institutions. Led by Julius Malema, once head of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the EFF has challenged the way that South Africa’s parliament functions. Malema and the EFF, still small but now the third largest party in parliament, view President Zuma as disqualified to serve as the country’s chief of state in the aftermath of court rulings related to presidential corruption. Indeed, EFF and Malema’s hatred of Zuma and his close associates appears almost visceral. (After a dispute, Zuma expelled Malema from the ANC.) Accordingly, the EFF has conducted demonstrations, some akin to riots, on the floor of parliament over the past two years. The Zuma administration’s response has been to tighten security in the parliamentary precincts to such an extent that the opposition parties complain about intimidation. But, it cannot control the behavior of EFF members of parliament on the floor. President Zuma delivered his annual State of the Nation Address to parliament on February 9. Once again the EFF disrupted the proceedings, the speaker, Baleka Mbete, could not control it and eventually she called in the security services to eject the protesting EFF members, who resisted. The South African parliament broke into a brawl. At that point, the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) withdrew in protest of the methods the security services were using. In the end, Zuma delivered his address—usually one of the most important on the parliamentary calendar—to those who remained, almost all of whom were members of the ANC. Some South Africans approve of EFF disruptions when the focus is on the highly unpopular President Zuma. But, that focus can change in ways that are unpredictable. We should anticipate that there will be more and more disruptive episodes on the floor of parliament, at least until the ANC party leadership contest in December, which may lead to Zuma’s departure. In the meantime, Speaker Mbete’s seemingly ineptness has seriously damaged her candidacy to succeed Zuma and become the first female leader of the ANC and likely chief of state. The progressive breakdown of parliamentary decorum may have lasting consequences. Once the downward spiral starts, it is hard to stop. Further, continued and possibly accelerating disruption of parliament carries the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the institution among people at large. Indeed, we Americans have seen a progressive decline in popular respect for the Congress as it has become more blatantly partisan and seemingly deadlocked while issues of importance go unaddressed.

Africa featured not at all in the U.S. presidential campaign, and the Trump administration has been silent about the continent since the inauguration. Hence, for American friends of Africa it was encouraging that President Trump spoke with the presidents of Africa’s two largest economies on February 13. However, there has been no White House explanation as to why the president chose the chiefs of state of those two particular countries: arguably, the United States has a closer security relationship with Kenya. As of February 14, the White House has released few details about the conversations, while there have been only brief reports from Nigerian and South African sources. This is not unusual: details of communications among heads of state are rarely made public. Both conversations must have been short. According to the White House schedule, the President talked to Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari at 9:45 a.m. and to South Africa’s Jacob Zuma at 10:30 a.m. Most of the remainder of President Trump’s day was involved with the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The February 13 focus on Africa telephone calls appears to follow a White House pattern of geographical consolidation. Over the weekend and earlier in the week President Trump or Vice President Pence talked to the heads of state of Colombia and Brazil. According to South African sources, the presidents talked about strengthening the ‘already strong’ diplomatic relationship, and President Zuma referred to the six-hundred U.S. companies at present operating in South Africa. (Few outside observers would characterize the bilateral relationship as ‘already strong.’) If Nigerian reports are accurate, the conversation between presidents Trump and Buhari was much more significant. According to a Nigerian presidential spokesman, “President Trump assured the Nigerian president of U.S. willingness to cut a new deal in helping Nigeria in terms of military weapons to combat terrorism.” The Obama administration and parts of the U.S. Congress had been reluctant to sell certain types of military equipment that the Nigerians wished to buy. It remains to be seen how the necessary generalities of the two presidents’ conversation translates into a policy change.

On February 9, President Jacob Zuma will deliver South Africa’s annual State of the Nation speech in parliament. The substance of the speech is likely to be a mixture of policy stability with calls for “radical” transformation of ownership of the economy. Few expect that the speech will really break new ground or that it will presage “radical” change. Rather, his remarks will be shaped by concern for his legacy and the leadership succession fight within the governing African National Congress (ANC). The ANC will choose a new party leader at its 54th National Conference in December. This will basically be a vote for the next president of South Africa. Zuma is unlikely to run for re-election, or, if he does so, he will likely fail. The South African president is elected by parliament, not directly by the electorate. As the ANC retains a huge parliamentary majority, the presidency is practically guaranteed to its party leader. Under South Africa’s system of parliamentary proportional representation and historical precedence, once Zuma is no longer party leader, the expectation is that he will resign the presidency of South Africa, though his term runs until 2019. (Technically, the ANC would “recall” him from the national presidency and thereby make his successor as ANC party leader also the chief of state.) Hence, Zuma must be personally concerned about whom the party chooses as his successor. Once, out of the presidency, he is liable to prosecution on hundreds of counts of corruption. Many of his critics see his ex-wife and mother of several of his children, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, as his best insurance policy and hence his preferred candidate. After Zuma speaks in parliament on February 9, he will proceed to Cape Town’s Grand Parade where he will address an ANC rally that may number up to 10,000. That speech will likely be more radical in tone than his parliamentary address and have a clearer partisan political dimension. The opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has threatened to disrupt the state of the nation speech, as it has done in the past when Zuma has spoken in parliament. The EFF argues that Zuma is “unfit” to deliver the address in light of the Constitutional Court’s 2016 decision that he improperly used public funds on his private estate, Nkandla. In response, Zuma has ordered the deployment of 440 members of the South African Defense Force (SADF) to supplement the police. As constitutional expert Pierre de Vos and numerous opposition spokesmen are arguing, such a deployment is almost certainly illegal. It is the police, not the military, who are charged with maintaining domestic order. Further, the activities of the police, let alone the military, within parliamentary precincts are strictly constrained by law. In defiance to the deployment of the SADF, the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the EFF are once again on the same side of an issue, even though they are at the polar ends of the South African political spectrum. The EFF’s radical rhetoric includes advocating the expropriation of white-owned property without compensation, while the DA firmly supports private property and popularly is still associated with the wealthy white minority. Nevertheless, the two parties are already coalition partners in some local government areas. Immediate opposition to the ANC and especially Jacob Zuma outweigh ideological differences. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And both want Zuma to go.

At the end of the recent 28th African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa on January 31, a recommendation emerged that collectively member states should withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The AU is not a party to the Treaty of Rome, which established the ICC, and its recommendation cannot compel individual states to withdraw. According to the media, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania opposed the AU recommendation and other states declined to commit themselves. In the aftermath of the recommendation, on February 1, Nigeria publicly reiterated its intention to remain within the ICC. The most vocal advocates for withdrawal have been Kenya, Burundi, and South Africa. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto were both indicted by the ICC for crimes connected to their 2007 elections. Both cases collapsed, with the Kenyan government declining to cooperate with the ICC and, possibly, tampering with witnesses. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has been widely censured for his failure to hand over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir when he visited South Africa in 2015 for an AU heads of state summit. Al-Bashir has been indicted by the ICC. As a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, South Africa was obligated to hand him over for trial. Zuma failed to do so and even helped facilitate al-Bashir’s travel back to Sudan. This is apparently a violation of both the Treaty of Rome and South African law. As such, there is currently a case against him still making its way through the South African courts. The Burundian government took steps to withdraw from the ICC following a credible UN investigation of systematic human rights abuses, including the discovery of mass graves. However, in Kenya legislation to bring about withdrawal from the ICC has lapsed. Similar legislation has not been introduced in South Africa. Further, according to Deutsche Welle, both the Kenyatta and Zuma governments appear to be exploring possible amendments to the Treaty of Rome – which implies their continued membership. Nevertheless, sentiment in sub-Saharan Africa is widespread that the ICC “unfairly” has focused on the continent, and ignored abuses elsewhere. Some African intellectuals complain that the ICC has ignored the human rights abuses committed by western nations, including those alleged against the George W. Bush administration with respect to Iraq. African nations often cite the United States as an example of why they should not be beholden to the ICC: the U.S. position is that it supports the ICC while declining to sign the Treaty of Rome. On the other hand, African elites also recognize that there is at present no alternative to the ICC for holding the chiefs of signatory states accountable. Most of the ICC cases brought against Africans have been at the request of African governments at the time, including those involving Kenyatta and Ruto.

Everybody loves a horserace among political personalities. South Africa is no different. The December 2017 African National Congress (ANC) leadership contest is commonly seen as a race between Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, the a reformer with an urban constituency, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, President Zuma’s ex-wife and potential protector of his patronage networks. A possible dark horse is Zweli Mkhize, ANC party treasurer, who has been identified as a likely compromise candidate. There are also suggestions of compromise arrangements, such as Ramaphosa accepting Dlamini-Zuma as deputy president of the party or vice versa. In a thoughtful piece, Stephen Grootes suggests that the ANC leadership race is more than a matter of personalities, and fall out from it poses a threat to the ANC continuing in its present form. He observes that each time there has been a leadership struggle within the party – in 2009 and 2014 – some of the losers left the party. In 2009, the vanquished supporters of Thabo Mbeki organized the Congress of the People. In 2014, opponents of Jacob Zuma led by Julius Malema organized the Economic Freedom Fighters. Grootes raises the specter that the December 2017 party election might result in much larger secession of defeated leaders, because the stakes are much higher. Ramaphosa is seen as the candidate of ‘good government’ and ‘reform.’ Dlamini-Zuma is the candidate of the status quo – a patronage-driven political system. Grootes accurately notes that for many ANC operatives, politics and the resulting patronage is all they have ever known. A Ramaphosa victory could leave them out in the cold and Jacob Zuma subject to prosecution for corruption. That faction will do anything to stop Ramaphosa. On the other hand, a Dlamini-Zuma victory would accelerate voter disaffection from the party – and the party knows that. Grootes suggests that should she win, Dlamini-Zuma is by personality is simply incapable reconciling the “losers.” Ramaphosa, however, might have the political skills to do so. Given the realities, Grootes suggests that the possibility of a compromise is “actually rather small.” Though, if a compromise is reached Mkhize is often seen as a middle ground candidate. Many outsider’s view him as in the same cloth as Rampahosa, and a possible ‘good government’ candidate. However, he also appeals to much of the ANC voter base as he is a Zulu, like the Zuma’s. That ethnicity is about a quarter of South Africa’s population and has been a crucial part of the ANC voter base, though it is unclear whether that is still true. Observers have long seen the possible splintering of the ANC as leading to a restructuring and realignment of South African domestic politics. Many see electoral politics emerging from such an alignment as similar to that of European and other democracies, with one cluster of parties on the right, one in the center, and one on the left. However, other alignments are possible. One might be a cluster of parties that represent urban interests, and another that is based in the rural areas.

South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a voice of radical causes, including the expropriation of white-owned land without compensation. It is led by Julius Malema, former head of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). Malema later broke with ANC party leader Jacob Zuma and was expelled from the party. He then organized the EFF as a rival party, which won over 6 percent of the vote in the 2014 general elections and more than 8 percent of the vote in the 2016 national municipal elections. Malema had long been open in his admiration for Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, ninety-two, who in effect seized all of the white-owned land in Zimbabwe without compensation and has followed other radical policies that ruined the economy, the education system, and the rule of law. He did this all in the name of ‘liberation.’ Mugabe became an arch-typical African “big man.” Nevertheless, Mugabe is widely regarded as a ‘liberation hero’ throughout Africa, despite his association with murderous domestic politics. It is credibly said, without definitive proof, that Mugabe has subsidized financially Malema and the EFF. Hence, the current rhetorical spat and likely definitive break between Malema and the EFF and Mugabe is something of a surprise. Malema and the EFF are calling on Mugabe to leave office. In an official statement, the EFF said “President Mugabe’s occupancy of the position of president is not good for the radical African political program. He is a bastion of the reactionary phenomenon of ‘lead to the death’ that has crippled the image and praxis of post-colonial Africa.” The EFF accuses Mugabe and “the cowards” around him of fomenting a cult of personality, among other bad things. In response, Zimbabwe’s information minister, Christopher Mushohwe, characterized Malema as “a loud-mouthed Gucci revolutionary” and “a shrunken, talkative joke.” Psychology Maziwisa, a Zimbabwean politician, according to South African media said that Malema was a “little irrelevant man who is trying desperately to gain political mileage in South Africa by insulting a great man in Zimbabwe.” As Zimbabwe under Mugabe continues its downward spiral, the EFF is clearly seeking to distance itself from its former ally. Whether intended or not, a break with Mugabe will bolster the EFF credibility with at least some South African voters. But, breaking with Mugabe makes the EFF no less radical than it has been in the past. Some potential investors, foreign and domestic, have feared, without much evidence, that South Africa was going down the same path as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and that the EFF was Mugabe’s catspaw. The break between the EFF and Mugabe may mean that they will sleep a bit better at night, even if the EFF leopard has not changed its spots.