South Africa

The African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the 1994 transition to “non-racial democracy,” traditionally eschewed identity politics. Though its electoral support was overwhelmingly Black, the party recruited its leadership from all races, which included many Whites and Asians. Nelson Mandela’s emphasis on racial reconciliation was very much in the spirit of the ANC. He particularly emphasized that there was place for Whites in post-apartheid South Africa. Famously, he attended a rugby championship match, the subject of the film Invictus. (Rugby is a White, mostly Afrikaner sport). As problems of black poverty remain seemingly intractable, black identity politics is on the upswing. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters argues for the wholesale expropriation of white land. Within the ANC, especially under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, the party has become more ‘African,’ even more Zulu, in character. (Zulu speakers are the largest linguistic group in South Africa.) The new generation of ANC leaders appears to include a smaller percentage of non-blacks. In some areas, ANC local governments have replaced Afrikaner or Dutch place names with those from African origin. At historically white universities, black students have demonstrated successfully for the removal of statues and other symbols from the past, and for the replacement of Afrikaans by English as the language of instruction. Some also call for the replacement of “colonial” curricula with a “liberation” one. Perhaps inevitably, there is a white, especially Afrikaner, backlash. Eve Fairbanks profiles the explosive growth of AfriForum, a movement dedicated to white, especially Afrikaner, advocacy. AfriForum’s primary concerns are on alleged attacks of white farmers, the preservation of the Afrikaans language (especially in historically white educational institutions), and the preservation of Afrikaner names for locations and institutions. In a country with perhaps the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, with the second highest GINI coefficient in the world, the emergence of identity politics was probably inevitable. The process was probably accelerated by the decline of the ANC and the identification of its leadership with corruption. However, in a highly fractured society such as South Africa, identity politics can hurt the poorest and most vulnerable. Whites control the economy and most of the nation’s wealth, and wealthy Whites can retreat into gated communities and private schools. The police function in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg already has, in effect, been privatized. These security companies provide a level of community safety lacking in black townships. It is to be hoped that identity politics does not lead to the wholesale withdrawal of Whites from hitherto public institutions, such as traditionally Afrikaans speaking high schools and universities.

On January 7, The Economist published a short analysis of the poor state of education for most – not all – South Africans. On various league tables, South Africans are near the bottom in educational achievement. However, there is a huge gap between the educational opportunities for white South Africans and everybody else. The Economist notes that of two-hundred black students starting school only one will do well enough to study engineering. The equivalent figure among white students is ten. With the end of apartheid, a school system based on race has been replaced by one based on geography, and, therefore, as in the United States, by social class. Schools in poor areas receive more funding, but schools in richer areas may charge fees. Though virtually all are integrated racially, most white students attend schools of good quality, while few black children do, and they represent over 80 percent of the population, while whites are less than 9 percent. The problem is not one of funding. South Africa spends 6.4 percent of GDP on education; in the European Union, it is 4.8 percent. As I discussed in my recent book, Morning in South Africa, education is one of the largest parts of the national budget. At over 15 percent of the national budget, it is significantly larger than the allocations for defence, public order, and safety. But black educational achievement is much lower than in other African countries. For example, The Economist cites that 27 percent of South Africans who have attended school for six years cannot read, compared with 4 percent in Tanzania and 19 percent in Zimbabwe. For The Economist, the chief culprit is the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), closely tied to the governing African National Congress and riddled with ill-discipline and corruption. The Economist cites other factors as well, ranging from the challenges of overcoming the heritage of apartheid to poor teacher training. But, the focus is on SADTU and the solutions are largely concerned with getting around the union by means of private and “collaboration” schools, the latter funded by the government but run by independent operators. Indeed, The Economist’s Criticism of SADTU recalls that of teachers’ unions in the United States. The Economist does not address the language issue. South Africa has eleven official languages, and English is spoken as a first language by only an estimated 9 percent of the population—mostly white South Africans. By contrast, Zulu is the first language of perhaps a quarter of the population. Yet, English is the international language of business and commerce, not Zulu. This creates its own issue. Because South Africa’s primary education is conducted in eleven different languages, many Zimbweans, educated in English, are more competitive for jobs in South Africa. Language is central to ethnic identity, and in democratic, non-racial South Africa, English is not privileged over Zulu, or Afrikaans for that matter. Language and education policy, like so much else in South Africa is seen through a racial and ethnic prism. Politics is as much at play as educational policy. Yet, only when primary education is conducted in English, the language of commerce, will the majority of South Africans be prepared to work in the modern economy.

The African National Congress (ANC) celebrated the 105th anniversary of its founding on January 8 in Johannesburg. (The ANC is one of the older of the democratic world’s governing parties.) Last year was a bad year for the party. National president and ANC leader Jacob Zuma was tarred by credible accusations of personal corruption and that of close associates. He met judicial and political reversals. The economy grew very slowly. In a party that values unity, factionalism increased, centered mostly on Zuma himself. In the August local government elections, the ANC faced its most severe reversal since it came to power in 1994. Accordingly, at the anniversary celebrations the emphasis was on party unity and the acknowledgement (even by Zuma himself) that the party had made mistakes that threatened to isolate it from its core constituencies. The coming year will also be challenging for the party. By December 2017, the party must choose a new president and National Executive Committee. Though not formally prohibited, there is little sign of party support for a third Zuma term as  leader and there is widespread expectation that he will be out by the end of the year. However, his term as president of South Africa lasts until 2019. There is no precedent for a president to remain in office once he is no longer party leader (Zuma’s predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, stepped down as president of South Africa after his removal from party leadership). However, Zuma may try to stick it out. But, absent his party leadership position, he would be politically weak. If he resigns, the interregnum would be filled by the current deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa. Traditionally, the ANC distrusts internal, factional political competition. But, it will face factionalism in 2017. Already, the Congress of South African Trade Unions  has endorsed Ramaphosa for party leader. During the anniversary celebrations, the ANC Women’s League endorsed Zuma’s ex-wife and current head of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The ANC secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, refers to such endorsements as manifestations of ill-discipline. Factional competition for power is perfectly normal in most democratic parties. The ANC’s bias against it – as manifested by Mantashe – appears to be a vestigial remnant from its earlier iteration as a clandestine movement rather the democratic party it has become.

In general, the economies of the United States and South Africa are based on the “Washington Consensus” of free markets to encourage economic growth. Both countries are characterized by growing inequality, with South Africa’s GINI coefficient (a measure of inequality) the worst of any large country in the world. Similarly, in some ways, social problems in South Africa resemble those in the United States. However, because South Africa is smaller and poorer than the United States, the issues are clearer. Johannesburg’s affordable housing crisis recalls similar phenomenon in high-cost American cities like New York, San Francisco, or Washington, D.C. But in Johannesburg the housing crisis is starker and more visible. Following the end of apartheid, rural dwellers flocked to South Africa’s cities looking for work. Johannesburg, the center of South Africa’s modern economy, has been a particular magnet. In the late apartheid period, white South Africans abandoned Johannesburg in droves for the suburbs–even the Johannesburg stock exchange moved to suburban Sandton. In the downtown area, crime flourished and there was severe neglect of the housing stock. Much the same pattern could be seen in American cities. Now, Johannesburg is undergoing a wave of gentrification recalling what is underway in newly-popular American neighborhoods. Downtown living in Johannesburg is attractive again, especially among black South Africans with a foot on the ladder into the middle class who need to live close to where they work. Gentrification and urban development by the private sector has long been encouraged by Johannesburg municipal government policy. Gentrification is benefitting the young and employed but is displacing the very poor who had been living in derelict buildings without basic utilities. When the private sector clears derelict buildings for redevelopment of increasingly valuable land, the municipal government steps in to provide housing. Development leads to more government revenue, but it is insufficient to provide the decent housing required by those displaced augmented by continued arrivals by the poor from rural areas or other parts of South Africa. South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) lost control of the municipal government of Johannesburg in the August 2016 local government elections. The city is now governed by a coalition led by the national opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA is known as the ‘good government’ party, and has been notably successful in Cape Town, which it has controlled since 2006. The future political consequences of the housing crisis for the DA-led coalition government in Johannesburg are unclear. Poor resentment of bad housing may lead to increased votes for the ANC in the next local elections. On the other hand, the city is manifestly growing richer, and many of the very poor do not participate in politics–even to vote. Again the pattern is similar in big American cities.

South Africa is a notoriously divided nation. There are eleven legal languages and four races with degrees of legal recognition (Indian/Asian, Black, Coloured, and White). Though Black Africans are about 80 percent of the population, they are divided into numerous ethnic groups, of which the Zulus are the largest, about a quarter of the population. South Africans sometimes say that there is no “majority” or “minority” in the country, with an overall, encompassing national identity as Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Rainbow Nation. Coloured’s are mostly Afrikaans speaking and Dutch Reformed in religion, but the ‘Cape Coloured’s” are a Muslim minority. Among Whites, the division is between Afrikaans speakers and English speakers, with the former the majority. White Afrikaners sometimes identify themselves as the “white tribe." The South African constitution recognizes the freedom of legal and cultural self-determination, including the possibility of establishing an ‘ethnic homeland.” In terms of wealth, Whites have done better in post-apartheid South African than any other group, especially those that are English-speaking. White numbers have stabilized at just over 4.5 million (out of a total population of over fifty-four million), about the same as at the end of apartheid. White unemployment is dramatically lower than that of other racial groups; they are the racial group least likely to be the victims of crime. Social and economic statistics of Whites, both Afrikaner and “English,” are the best of any group. But the apartheid-era safety next for whites is gone. Because of this, there are now poor Afrikaner inhabitants of shanty towns. As in Europe and perhaps in the United States, ethnic identification is strengthening among South Africans. For example, President Jacob Zuma strongly emphasizes his Zulu identity and seeks political support from African traditional rulers, while his predecessors Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela chose not to emphasize their Xhosa heritage. Among some Afrikaans-speaking Whites there is concern that their unique culture is fading under the pressure of the overwhelming Black majority and globalization. CNN carries a fascinating story about Orania, an Afrikaner response. CNN’s report is based on the work of Swedish journalist, Kajsa Norman, who is writing a book on the Afrikaners. Orania is an Afrikaner homeland restricted to Whites who are Afrikaans speaking and Afrikaner in culture. In effect, it is whites-only. Coloureds, who are usually Afrikaans speakers and Afrikaner in culture, are excluded. Orania is located on the edge of a desert in territory nobody else wanted. Its residents are embarked on building a new state-within-a-state based on self-imposed racial and cultural segregation. (As Norman notes, the Afrikaners in Orania have essentially created their own Bantustan.) CNN reports that its population is about 1,300 and is growing at the rate of 10 percent per year. The economy is based on agriculture, with unemployment at only 2 percent. As CNN reports, Orania is becoming something of a haven for Afrikaner down-and-outs, including recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, now that the apartheid state no longer exists. Some settle permanently, others come to dry out and then move on. Since the seventeenth century, the Dutch settlers in South Africa who evolved into Afrikaners have often seen themselves as God’s chosen people, set aside from the rest of the population. This was a premise of the racial segregation that evolved into apartheid. Orania is, apparently, a return to that ideal. Orania is predicated on a vision of society that is far from the racially and ethnically integrated ideal of Nelson Mandela and the “Rainbow People of God.” It is easy to imagine that many of its residents are white supremacists. But, its emphasis on ethnic identify also recalls that of Jacob Zuma’s Zulu identity. Whites-only Orania is entirely legal under South African law, as was affirmed by a 2000 high court decision. Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma have both visited; CNN reports that some Orania residents feel that Zuma, with his strong Zulu identity, understands what motivates their separation.

Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the public does not vote directly for the president. Rather it is parliament that votes for the president. Because of the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) huge parliamentary majority, since the end of apartheid, parliament has always selected its party leader as head of state. The ANC will choose its next party leader no later than December 2017. (Incumbent party leader Jacob Zuma has said that he will not run for a third term, as is party tradition.) South Africa’s next national elections will take place in 2019. In theory, Zuma could remain as president of South Africa after he leaves office as party leader. However, precedent is that the president resigns his office when he is no longer party leader. Within the ANC there is a tradition against early politicking for high office. Candidates are often coy about their political ambitions. Hence, up to now, while there has been much speculation, no ANC figure has publicly announced his candidacy for the presidency. However, on December 16, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa threw his hat in the ring: “It would be very humbling to get into a key position like that, to lead. I am available to stand.” Ramaphosa has significant support from a number of trade unions and the South African Communist Party. He is likely to win the support of the business community (he is a millionaire many times). He was a lead ANC negotiator of South Africa’s 1994 transition to non-racial democracy and the creation of the country’s constitution; hence, he is likely to be supported by those who fear that the Zuma government has sought to undermine the constitution. It is by no means certain that a deputy president becomes the president through a natural order of succession. His negatives include a sophisticated lifestyle far removed from the party’s township and rural base, and his association with the company involved in the 2012 massacre of workers at the Marikana platinum mine. (A commission of inquiry exonerated him.) Conventional wisdom is that he is far more popular in business circles in London and New York than he is among ANC voters. At present, his chief competitor is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, at present the chairperson of the African Union Commission. She is Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife, and they had four children together. Her support includes Jacob Zuma and his political allies, including the ANC Women’s League, the ANC Youth League, the MK Veterans Association (participants in the armed struggle against apartheid), and the premiers of three provinces. She is a Zulu, South Africa’s largest ethnic group, and a major source of electoral support for the ANC. (Ramaphosa comes from the much smaller Venda ethnic group.) She has held numerous ministerial portfolios, including health and foreign affairs. However, her tenure at the African Union has been lackluster. Her supporters play the feminist card. There will be other candidates. Frequently mentioned as a possible compromise between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma is the ANC’s party treasurer, Zweli Mkhize. A Zulu and a former premier of KwaZulu-Natal, he is seen as a reconciler who would promote party unity. Another possible candidate is the speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete. She is also a former deputy president and has been active in the ANC Women’s League. Whoever emerges as party leader will be the result of an internal ANC party political process that does not rule out a dark horse. Stay tuned.

In October 2016, the New Zealand government withdrew the visa waiver arrangements for South African passport holders. It said the decision resulted from the number of South African visitors who used the visa waiver to visit family and friends in Zealand, rather than traveling to New Zealand for business or tourism. It also said that some South African visitors were overstaying the three month visa waiver limit or did not return to South Africa. The New Zealand government also cited the number of visitors who presented counterfeit South African passports and were denied entry by the New Zealand authorities. In December 2016, the South African government announced that it was in turn withdrawing the visa exemption for New Zealand passport holders. The home affairs minister said that South Africa’s visa waiver policy was based on reciprocity. South Africa and New Zealand are both members of the Commonwealth; white South Africans have long looked at New Zealand as a possible immigration destination. According to the 2013 New Zealand census, 54,279 or 1.36 percent of the country’s population had been born in South Africa. South Africa was the fifth largest source of New Zealand immigrants: ahead of it was the United Kingdom, China, India, and Australia. Over 90 percent of South African immigrants have arrived in New Zealand after the end of apartheid. The majority of whom are white. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in absolute numbers the white population of South Africa is larger now than it was at the end of apartheid. Though, whites at about 8.3 percent of the population are a smaller proportion of the total population than in 1991 (according to the last census prior to the end of apartheid whites represented 11.7 percent of the population ). Whites continue to immigrate to South Africa, notably from the U.K. The tit for tat withdrawal of the visa exemption by the two governments does not appear to have larger significance beyond New Zealand’s effort to eliminate visa abuse. South Africa’s action appears to be purely reciprocal.

Standard & Poor (S&P), the international credit rating agency, left its assessment of South Africa’s foreign-currency debt unchanged. It remains at the same level as Italy’s and India’s. However, it did lower South Africa’s local-currency rating, which remains above “junk.” On the S&P news, the South African currency, the Rand, rose 1.6 percent against the U.S. dollar, and yields of rand-denominated government bonds fell nine basis points to 9.02 percent. S&P warned that Zuma government interference in economic reform could damage investor confidence, affect exchange rates, and lead to a future downgrade: “Political events have distracted from, growth-enhancing reforms, while low GDP growth continues to affect South Africa’s economic and fiscal performance and overall debt stock.” Within the governing African National Congress (ANC), there is a struggle over the successor to Jacob Zuma, who must step down as party leader by December 2017, and the future direction the party will take. The party has been roiled by credible charges of corruption involving the Gupta brothers, confidants of the president. An S&P downgrade of South African debt to “junk” status had been widely anticipated, and such a move could have provided the occasion and excuse for President Jacob Zuma to reshuffle his cabinet and remove the highly regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Gordhan is usually numbered with those ministers that are seeking Zuma’s ouster by the party, the most recent failed effort being within the ANC National Executive Committee on December 3 and 4. The S&P move is probably contrary to Zuma’s goal of restoring his power within the party and strengthens the hand of the “reformers” within the cabinet. Nevertheless, Zuma as president retains the power to remove Gordhan, though should he do so the markets would react badly.

Thursday, December 1, is World AIDS Day, a fitting occasion to call attention to an HIV vaccine clinical trial that has started in South Africa. The vaccine being tested is based on one used in a Thailand trial in 2009 which had a protection rate of about 30 percent, reports the BBC. Results from the South Africa trial will be known in about four years. The study is code-named HVTN 702. It is led by Glenda Gray, a South African university research professor and the head of the country’s Medical Research Council. The study is sponsored by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. South Africa has been the world’s ground zero for HIV/AIDS. One estimate is that by 2015 seven million South Africans were HIV positive, including approximately 19 percent of the country’s adult population. The HIV/AIDS disease burden is carried disproportionately by blacks. A 2012 study found that 15 percent of black South Africans tested HIV positive, while only .3 percent of whites tested positive. There have, however, been successes. Under the current minister of health, Aaron Motsoaledi, the Zuma administration’s approach to the disease has been vigorous, with public education programs, widespread condom distribution, and male circumcision campaigns. On World AIDS Day 2014, the government broke the record for the number of people tested for HIV/AIDS. Minister Motsoaledi in 2016 said that mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS was down below 2 percent. Overall mortality rates, driven by HIV/AIDS and associated diseases such as tuberculosis, is also down. Nevertheless, other statistics from the credible South African Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) indicate that the fight is far from over, with a resurgence of new cases and much of the population still unaware how the disease is transmitted.

Minister of Tourism Derek Hanekom appears to have been the initiator of the African National Congress’s (ANC) November 27-29 in-house debate over whether to recall Jacob Zuma as party leader. (Zuma survived, but is further weakened politically within the ANC by the episode.) Hanekom, who is white, is a useful reminder that the ANC remains a multi-racial party, though its electoral base is overwhelmingly black. In the aftermath of the ANC’s Zuma debate, some black political officials that backed the president accused Hanekom of “racism,” but others defended him as a full member of the movement, even though he is white. Hanekom and his wife were imprisoned for three years under apartheid. In the post-apartheid Mandela government, he was minister of agriculture (he was a farmer). Subsequently, he has held numerous positions in the ANC government, including minister of science and technology. He has been minister of tourism since 2014. He is at the very center of the ANC party power structure, and he has served on the National Executive Committee, its highest governing body, since 1994. He was the chair of the party’s National Disciplinary Committee that in 2012 was instrumental in the expulsion of bad-boy Julius Malema, who went on to found the Economic Freedom Fighters, a party that now challenges the ANC from the left. He also reflects the liberal social and democratic views of the Mandela generation. For example, in April 2016, he was the keynote speaker at the global convention of the International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association in Cape Town. There he said, “There is a huge economic value in LGBT tourism and it can help our country to get more visitors to come and stay here and spend money in our restaurants and accommodation. We have to change attitudes and break down stereotypes.” Diversity within the ANC extends to policy as well as ethnicity. South Africa is the only African country that permits gay marriage, the result of a court case based on the country’s constitution. Though it and a gay lifestyle is deeply unpopular with the party’s base, the ANC has made no move to amend the constitution to prohibit it.

Over the weekend of November 27, Jacob Zuma faced his greatest political challenge to date, a vote of ‘no-confidence’ from within his own party, the African National Congress (ANC). He had previously survived three no-confidence votes in parliament, where the party rallied around him. This time, however, the challenge, orchestrated by four ministers, was within the National Executive Committee (NEC), the highest governance body within the ANC. The motion of no confidence was introduced by Minister of Tourism Derek Hanekom. According to the media, it was supported by Health Minister Aaron Motsoledi, Science and Technology Minister Naledi Pandor, and Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi. All four are commonly known to have deep political roots and run their ministries well. The issues were, essentially, credible accusations that Zuma is corrupt with unusually close ties to an influential business family, the Gupta’s. The Gupta family itself is accused of “state capture” in search of lucrative government contracts. The backdrop was the ANC’s significant losses in the August local government elections. Despite media anticipation of a vote, none was taken. Instead there was a three-day discussion of whether the party should “recall” Zuma as the leader of the party. If it had done so, under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, he would likely have resigned as president; current Vice President Cyril Ramaphosa would then become chief of state. According to the media, the debate was fierce and emotional. Zuma has survived, and in public statements the ANC is calling for party unity. But, the episode has likely further weakened Zuma politically within the party. The opposition Economic Freedom Fighters has applied to the speaker of parliament for yet another urgent vote of no confidence. Its spokesmen suggest that there is enough support within the ANC for Zuma’s ouster that, in combination with all of the opposition parties, the vote might succeed. While this is unlikely, even a small number of ANC votes for a no-confidence motion would be yet another indication of Zuma’s declining political power. The danger that Zuma might successfully suborn South Africa’s constitution and tradition of the rule of law for the financial benefit of himself, his family, and close associates such as the Gupta’s seems to be receding.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Al Jazeera’s Investigative Unit has released a new documentary titled The Poacher’s Pipeline. The report documents the illicit supply chain of rhinoceros horn from South Africa to China and Vietnam. The report associates South Africa’s minister of state security with an admitted trafficker, and it alleges that Chinese officials that traveled to South Africa with Secretary General Xi Jinping participated in the illicit trade. Minister of State Security David Mahlobo has denied all claims that he has participated in the illicit trade. In the documentary, self-confessed criminal Guan Jian Guan brags about his personal connections with senior members of the South African government, providing a picture of himself with Minister Mahlobo. The minister has claimed that he had no knowledge of Guang’s criminal enterprises, and that he knew Guang only through his legitimate business, a spa that Mahlobo frequented. While Mahlobo himself may not be guilty, the case does underlie the fear of many conservationists in South Africa that rhino poachers are well connected politically. However, if Mahlobo was aware of Guang’s criminal activity, it would be damning as the Ministry of State Security is responsible for South Africa’s intelligence services. The documentary’s allegations of Chinese official participation in the illicit trade of rhino horn (and also ivory) is based on interviews with members of South Africa’s Chinese community who helped the officials procure the animal products. If the stories are true, it would not be the first time officials traveling with Xi Jinping have been accused of procuring illegal animal products. Officials were accused of going on an ivory ‘buying spree’ when visiting Tanzania in 2014. Officially the Chinese government has promised to end the trade in ivory products, but these stories show how difficult it will be to overcome the popularity of the trade. The Poacher’s Pipeline does an excellent job of illustrating the scale and complexity of the rhino horn trade. Indeed, based on current numbers, if poaching is not abated African rhinos could go extinct in the next fifteen to twenty years. Also clearly demonstrated is the need for government will and action to address the problem and save the two African rhino species.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn. Cheryl is an adjunct professor at Columbia Business School. Burundi, Gambia, and now South Africa have all recently announced their intentions to withdraw from what they deride as a “biased” International Criminal Court (ICC). The permanent tribunal responsible for investigating crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes that was created in 1998. It’s the latest indignity to the court that has been weakened not only by misaligned incentives that enable it to bring cases globally and yet rely mostly upon member states to enforce its actions, but also by the cozy relationship that has emerged between the ICC’s members and its cases. Thirty-four of its 123 members are African states and all thirty-one individuals that the office of the prosecutor has charged with crimes since the ICC began operating in 2002 are African. Since the court doesn’t have a police force, its supranational mission has fallen largely to its African member states to execute, meaning that the ICC needs those countries to carry out arrests even as they need, as sovereign nations, to conduct foreign policy initiatives that may involve the individuals being accused of a crime. That’s proven to be an unrealistic expectation. A year ago President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan, whom the ICC indicted for charges of crimes against humanity and genocide related to the Darfur conflict dating back to 2003, attended an African Union summit in South Africa, where he could have been arrested–and indeed a South African high court judge forbid him from leaving the country pending a hearing on whether to hand him over to the ICC. But back in 2015, South Africa’s President Zuma visited Sudan to reinforce political, economic, and social relations between the two countries which already have sixteen bilateral agreements in a number of fields including trade, agriculture, defense, policing, arts and culture, social development, and scientific cooperation. Result: Bashir was let go. South Africa is not alone in shirking enforcement duty for the ICC. Bashir has evaded arrest for years; in 2013, ICC-member Nigeria also declined to arrest Bashir when he attended a conference there. But again, Sudan and Nigeria have had a long history of economic, cultural and social ties. Sudan was offering scholarships for Nigerian students to study at its universities back then, but now ties are even closer. In August they announced that they’d work together to diversify their economies away from being so dependent upon oil revenues, partnering to build capacity in the film industry. More than five million Nigerians live in Sudan today. The court’s predicament is further complicated by its inefficiency, only five individuals have been tried in fourteen years. Yet by some estimates, the court’s activities have cost at least $1.5 billion. Thus the ICC doesn’t just suffer from the fact that major countries like the United States, China, and Russia have refused to subject themselves to the ICC’s jurisdiction. There are endemic problems in supranational bodies that must rely upon member nations to behave uneconomically in order for the organization to function. Yes, of course not all decisions should be made based upon economic factors–especially those related to genocide and war crimes–but evidence suggests that the ICC is having a hard time operating in its current form. Incentives drive behavior and when an incentive is behaviorally salient, organizations, like countries, are responsive to incentive-based cues. What may make the African nations change their behavior? As of now, it appears that the answer is nothing, for they’ve decided the value proposition of belonging to the ICC isn’t strong enough and so they’ve decided to drop out and move on.

The publication on November 2 of the South Africa Public Protector’s report on “state capture” by the president and his cronies, the Gupta family, would seem to indicate Jacob Zuma’s direct involvement in corruption. The publication has created a media stir, with the quality Western media devoting more extensive coverage to it than is usual. Yet, the report does not contain a “smoking gun,” but rather calls for an extensive (and well-financed) formal investigation. There is speculation that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is moving toward the removal of Zuma from office. Such speculation underestimates Zuma’s sources of strength within the security establishment, among certain provincial governors, and the persistence of his patronage network. Indeed, arguably the public protector’s report has generated more excitement abroad than at home, where its broad outlines were already known. Nevertheless, the report is yet another in a string of mostly legal reversals since December 2015 that have progressively weakened Zuma’s political strength. Zuma has lost the support of erstwhile allies ranging from at least some of the party apparatus, known as ‘Luthuli House,’ after the party’s headquarters in Johannesburg, the South African Communist Party, and some of the large trade unions. One ANC elder statesman after another has called on Zuma to resign or for his removal otherwise from the presidency. Even if subsequent investigations of Zuma do produce a “smoking gun,” which is entirely possible, his removal from office by impeachment in parliament is unlikely. The ANC, despite dramatic losses in the August 2016 local government elections, retains a huge parliamentary majority, and many of the MP’s are close to the president. He survived yet another close call today, November 10, 2016, when ANC parliamentarians refused to vote him out of office. The story appears to be different within the ANC. Many party chieftains view the August 2016 elections as a wake-up call, and see the party’s reverses as a lack of confidence in the Zuma administration. Others deeply resent the influence of the Gupta’s over the president, his appointments, and his policies. Others resent Zuma’s apparent corruption, still others are genuine democrats and resent his seeming assault on South Africa’s constitutional institutions. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the president is not directly elected. Instead, he (or she) is chosen by the victorious party, and is usually the head of said party. The party could, therefore, remove Zuma as the president of the ANC. Were it to do so, following the precedent of Thabo Mbeki who Zuma defeated as party president in 2007, he would be expected to resign the presidency. In effect, the party would recall Zuma from the presidency. A party effort to topple Zuma would most likely occur at the party’s national convention. The next is scheduled for December 2017. However, it could be moved forward. If that happens, the likelihood that Zuma will not finish his term increases.

The U.S. image in Africa has been based on more than trade and aid. Africans admire and seek to emulate U.S. rule of law and institutions of governance largely free of corruption. They seek to emulate American elections that are credible and accepted by winners and losers. U.S. ethnic and religious pluralism has long been admired. So, too, has been the American tradition of at least some civility in politics. With the ambiguous exception of Liberia, the United States was not a colonial power and public opinion (if not government policy) was generally hostile to colonialism. The success of American democracy and governance made U.S. criticism of “big man” and other sleazy governments credible to Africans. Alas, no more. It will take some time and considerable American effort to repair the damage to U.S. governance reputation in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. elections. The comments below are based on contacts in Nigeria and South Africa, though it is likely that their views are shared across the continent. For many Africans, Hillary Clinton‘s personal wealth and lack of transparency as illustrated by her use of private e-mail servers for public purposes smacks of the personal corruption with which they are all too familiar. As for Donald Trump, his anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric resonates negatively in a part of the world sending significant numbers of immigrants to the United States and in which perhaps half of the population is Muslim. Even more damaging are his claims that the political system is corrupt and that his defeat would be clear evidence that the voting is rigged. (His insensitivity to women resonates little in Africa, which is generally patriarchal in outlook.) For many Africans the current electoral cycle provides evidence that American democracy based on the rule of law is not what it once seemed to be. In addition, the elections must be seen against the backdrop of other issues about which African care deeply: the persistence of racism, as illustrated by Trump’s rhetoric against the backdrop of the “Black Lives Matter” movement and the police brutality that spawned it. White shootings of blacks, especially the Charleston church episode, also deeply resonate with Africans. So, for too many Africans the United States is no longer a beacon of freedom and democracy. Rather, it shares characteristics with most African states such as government corruption, weak institutions, ethnic conflict, and dishonest politicians. For we Americans the reality is, of course, much more nuanced. But nuance does not travel well. Restoring the American image in Africa may be the work of the next decade.