South Africa

Following its series of articles on corruption within South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC), the New York Times published an editorial on April 23 accusing the party of “a betrayal” of its ideals. That being said, the Times acknowledges that corruption elsewhere in Africa and the world is worse than it is in South Africa, and that corruption was heavily associated with ex-president Jacob Zuma. However, the Times points out that the new party leader and state president, Cyril Ramaphosa, became rich partly through his party connections. It therefore questions whether he is capable of using “the democratic tools to combat the blight of corruption,” but nevertheless acknowledges that those tools exist and provide a means of overcoming it. The ouster of Zuma was an important first step in that regard. The Times correctly points out that since independence, little has been done to address the gross inequality of South African society, in which most white South Africans enjoy a high standard of living while most black South Africans—eighty percent of the population—have social and economic statistics characteristic of the developing world. Indeed, the white minority is wealthier compared to the black majority now than it was in 1994 when Mandela was inaugurated president, notwithstanding a tiny black elite that has grown rich largely through government connections.   The Times goes on to associate enduring black poverty with Nelson Mandela’s “grand bargain” with “the white minority.” However, it inadequately acknowledges the circumstances surrounding the transition to non-racial democracy. It is true that while the deal gave the black majority control over politics, the economy—and wealth—remained in the hands of whites. But Mandela had little choice. The ANC and other liberation movements had far from defeated the apartheid state; they could render ungovernable some of the townships some of the time, but never seriously threatened to overthrow the entire system. For the ruling-white minority, the economy was stagnating, the intellectual underpinnings of apartheid had been destroyed, and they felt acutely their international pariah status. Hence, the 1994 coming of “non-racial democracy” was not a liberation movement victory over apartheid; instead, it was a bargain in which whites yielded political power to predominately-black liberation movements in return for the preservation of their economic privileges and an end to international condemnation—and sanctions. (That is not to say that the liberation movements did not earn their spot at the table or to diminish their role.) The apartheid state, led by President F. W. de Klerk, together with the liberation movements, led in part by Nelson Mandela, concluded that neither could prevail outright and that continuation of the status quo raised the specter of a race war. So, for better or worse, they made a deal that prioritized the expansion of civil rights and democracy rather than the equitable distribution of wealth and economic opportunity.   

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition to the governing African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa’s parliament. It is the second largest party in the country in terms of electoral support, and it is the only party to have increased its share of the vote in every election since 1999. It holds 89 of 400 seats in parliament. It controls outright the provincial government of the Western Cape and governs in coalition Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. Of South Africa’s largest cities, only Durban is still governed by the once-dominant ANC. With strong links to civil society, the DA played a crucial role in driving from power former president Jacob Zuma and for keeping alive the criminal proceedings against him. The DA regularly presents itself as the party of good governance, the rule of law, and support for the constitution. Its new party leader, Mmusi Maimane, is young, articulate, charismatic, and black. He made an excellent impression during a recent visit to Washington DC. Yet the party faces a troubled future. Electoral politics in South African continue to be very largely a racial census. About 9 percent of the population is white, 9 percent “coloured,” and perhaps 2 percent of South Asian origin. The overwhelming majority of the population—some 80 percent—is black African. The DA’s electoral support mostly comes from racial minorities that tend to be much wealthier than the black majority. The DA is seeking to broaden its appeal to the black majority, especially among the “born frees,” those that came of age after the end of apartheid, and among the black urban middle class. However, among the former, voter participation is low, as it is among that age group in most electoral democracies. The black middle class is smaller than the amount of media attention it receives would indicate, and so far, the DA has had limited success in attracting its votes. The DA is certainly trying to attract black support, but control of the party largely remains in white hands, despite Mmusi Maimane’s leadership. On the burning issues of the day, such as service delivery in the townships, land redistribution to poor blacks, or meaningful reform of education in rural areas, the DA’s policies appear to be underdeveloped and largely unappealing. Among many black South Africans, the DA remains a “white” party; some in the townships even think, incredibly, that it aims to restore apartheid. While he was president, Jacob Zuma was “the gift that kept on giving” for the DA. With his ties to corruption, his reputation for sexual predation, his multiple wives, and his efforts to undermine institutions of government, he provided a focus for DA opposition and a rallying cry for electoral support. Now he is gone, replaced as president and ANC party leader by the urbane and skillful Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the post-apartheid constitutional settlement. His moves against corruption risk stealing the clothes of the DA and have engendered confidence among financial institutions. Further, the DA’s reputation for good governance has been marred by the water crisis in Cape Town, fights with coalition partners in Port Elizabeth, and a generally disappointing performance in Johannesburg. The DA is also burdened by the ineptness of some of its leaders. Former mayor of Cape Town, current premier of the Western Cape, and former DA party leader Helen Zille is notorious for her insensitive tweets. For example, she ignited a firestorm in 2017 when she said that the legacy of colonialism was not all bad. Faced with the possible discipline by the party, she apologized. Even if what she said objectively is true—she cited South Africa’s superior infrastructure—such comments only set back DA efforts to attract black voters in racially wounded South Africa. Other racially insensitive comments by whites associated with the DA also attract wide attention. If it is to break out of its white and “coloured” electoral ghetto, the DA will need leaders, political style, and policies that speak to the concerns of the poor, black majority. Thus far, its progress has been disappointing, despite Mmusi Maimane.

The 2017 Taco Kuiper Award for Investigative Journalism went to a group of three media outlets that investigated and reported on the Gupta brothers, cronies of Jacob Zuma and widely accused of exercising improper influence or “state capture.” The three were News24, The Daily Maverick, and the amaBhungane Center for Investigative Journalism. News24 is an online news publication company, the Daily Maverick is a daily online newspaper, and amaBhungame is a non-profit. Even under the assaults of the Jacob Zuma administration, South Africa was characterized by constitutionalism, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law. Strong civil society, a free media, a sophisticated parliamentary opposition, and judges who regularly ruled against the government played interdependent roles in protecting South Africa’s democratic institutions. The media publicized corruption to the general public, civil society did not hesitate to sue the administration in the courts, and the formal parliamentary opposition was able to delay or block unfavorable parliamentary initiatives put forth by Zuma. Taco Kuiper, a wealthy publisher and businessman, established the Valley Trust before he died in 2004. Its purpose is to develop investigative journalism. South African media estimates that it is worth more than 70 million rand. The trust is closely associated with the School of Journalism at the University of the Witwatersrand (“Wits”) where it funds a chair of investigative journalism. It makes available up to 350,000 rand annually for print journalists or print publications seeking help to investigate and report on issues of public interest and awards the Taco Kuiper award each year. The award is an example of the close relationship between civil society and the media. The Valley Trust and amaBhungame are in some way both civic and media organizations. News24 and the Daily Maverick are for-profit media outfits. The Taco Kuiper Award statement focused on the close collaboration among the three organizations in their investigation of and reporting on the Guptas and their influence on the South African government.  

On March 29, the New York Times reported that for the first time, a white woman was convicted, sentenced, and jailed for the use of racial slurs. The woman’s rant, which occurred in February 2016, lasted some minutes and was directed at black and white police officers who responded after her car had been burglarized. The episode was captured on video and went viral on social media, producing outrage in the majority black country. The court sentenced the woman, Vicki Momberg, to three years in jail with one suspended for her words. The judge refused to grant her bail while she appeals, observing that she had shown no remorse. The rant included the woman’s use of “kaffir” some forty times. The word is all but unknown in the United States, but its origin, apparently, is Arabic and refers to “unbelievers.” In South Africa, the word is a slur against black people and is regarded as even more demeaning than the “n-word” in the United States. In the media, the word is rarely written or said out-loud, but instead referred to as the “k-word.” Like the “n-word,” kaffir is redolent of white supremacy and apartheid. With its use, the woman was being as personally insulting as possible in South Africa. So much so that a white policeman who joined the episode, while trying to calm her, is reported to have said, “I am not going to allow you to insult my colleagues like that.” There has been backlash among white South Africans. Some have argued that she was upset after having just been robbed (this was part of her defense in court as well), while others have complained that black insults and threats to whites—especially by political figures—have gone unpunished. The episode shines a light on an enduring South African reality: the persistence of racism, especially among some whites. I have written previously about an episode in 2016 in which a white woman in seaside Durban characterized black beach goers as “monkeys,” though she later apologized. The recent court decision illustrates once again the complexities of managing racial issues in a democratic country with a predominately black population and black government but in which most of the wealth and privilege is in white hands.  

Moody’s Investors Service kept South Africa’s credit rating at investor grade, though it is still only one notch above junk, and changed its outlook for the country to stable. For comparison, Moody’s rating for South Africa is about the same as its ratings for Romania and Indonesia. Still, Moody’s narrative is positive, reflecting its “view that the previous weakening of South Africa’s institutions will gradually reverse.” It sees “significant growth potential” for the economy, though it cautions that the Ramaphosa administration is “still to be tested.” Moody’s also praised the cabinet and personnel changes made by the new president. Essentially, Moody’s is applauding the end of former President Jacob Zuma's administration and its erratic economic and fiscal policies. The ANC, led by Ramaphosa, removed Zuma from the presidency in January, and in a cabinet reshuffle, the new president replaced many of Zuma’s crony appointments with seasoned professionals. Zuma’s most notorious associates, the Gupta brothers, are now subject to prosecution. Since 2014, South Africa’s economic growth has not reached 2 percent. Improved investor confidence in the Ramaphosa government, it is to be hoped, will encourage more domestic as well as foreign investment, resulting in higher levels of growth. For now, at least, the signs are favorable. The rand is continuing to climb, reaching 11.84 per U.S. dollar today. Yields on the nation’s local-currency government bonds due in December 2026 were steady at 7.9 percent, according to Bloomberg, though the stock market was down at the start of the week.  Still, Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene cautioned against complacency. The S&P’s rating is due on May 25 and South Africa will have to show tangible improvements if it is to maintain or improve its credit rating.   

Recently-appointed Minister of Public Enterprises Pravin Gordhan is moving quickly in South Africa. He is seeking to rationalize the financial commitments of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and promising large personnel changes: “Virtually every entity that we are supervising, or are responsible for, is going to have changes as far as the board is concerned.” Ramaphosa has also suspended the commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) because “its leadership had lost all credibility.” He replaced him, at least temporarily, with Mark Kingon, who has had more than thirty years of experience at SARS. Critics of former President Jacob Zuma’s administration saw SOEs, ranging from the national power company to the flag carrier South African Airways, as nests of corruption. Complaints that the Gupta brothers, notorious Zuma cronies, had “captured” the state often focused on the mismanagement of SOEs and the suspicion that the brothers were benefiting from corrupt contracts. Soon after becoming leader of the Africa National Congress and president of South Africa, Ramaphosa promised to clean up SOEs. From that perspective, his appointment of Gordhan as minister of public enterprises is encouraging. Gordhan has held many high offices in government and served twice as finance minister. His international reputation for competency was on display when Zuma replaced him with a less competent crony and the Rand’s value fell dramatically in response. The hallmark, at least thus far, of Ramaphosa’s appointments has been a focus on competence, a clear departure from those in his predecessor’s later years. The international financial rating agencies may start to react positively as soon as March 23, when Moody’s will issue its next credit rating, which is currently one notch above junk status.   

Shaun Abrahams, the national director of public prosecutions at the National Prosecuting Authority, announced on March 16 that Zuma will face sixteen charges of corruption and money laundering. The governing African National Congress (ANC), which Zuma dominated during his years as party president and state president of South Africa, has restricted itself to affirming its confidence in the South African judicial system in its official statements. The Rand, South Africa’s currency, remained steady following the announcement. Prosecution follows nine years of legal efforts by Zuma, at the taxpayers’ expense, to get the charges set aside. They date from an arms deals in the 1990s, and the prosecuting authority set them aside in 2009 shortly before Zuma was elected state president. In 2016, the High Court reinstated the charges and Zuma lost his legal battle to overturn that ruling. Now, Abrahams says that prosecution will proceed, and that “there are reasonable prospects of a successful prosecution.” Abrahams has widely been seen as a political ally of Zuma, with critics claiming that Zuma irregularly appointed him director of public prosecutions to forestall his own prosecution. In the end, the courts sided with the critics and required current President Ramaphosa to appoint a new director within sixty days of its ruling. That time period has not yet lapsed, so Abraham remains in office. His replacement will be responsible for the prosecution of Zuma, but it is not yet clear who Ramaphosa will appoint.  That Abrahams is proceeding with prosecution shows just how far Zuma has fallen and how few allies he apparently still has within the ANC. Critics will likely question whether Abraham has made some sort of deal with the new Ramaphosa administration. Prosecution of Zuma is a double-edged sword. South African civil society widely believes that Zuma is corrupt and that he should therefore be tried. Time after time, South Africans have reaffirmed their support for the rule of law and an independent judiciary. For his part, Ramaphosa, one of the architects of South Africa’s constitution, has always been a staunch supporter of the law. Not to try Zuma would be viewed by many as evidence that the Ramaphosa administration had “sold out,” that corruption has no consequences, and that he is willing to compromise on the rule of law for political ends. On the other hand, Zuma remains popular in his native KwaZulu and among the Zulus, South Africa’s largest ethnic group. Ramaphosa has therefore sought to treat Zuma with dignity, but also cannot be seen as favoring Zuma in the impending prosecution. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Zuma’s trial will expose the corrupt behavior of other ANC politicians still in office and how this affects party unity. For the time being, however, most South Africans across the political spectrum are likely to support the decision to prosecute.

The predominance of white ownership of land [PDF] is taken by many—perhaps most—South Africans as emblematic of the persistence of apartheid injustice. Hence, there have long been calls for the expropriation of white-owned agricultural land without compensation. That was a central tenant of the Pan-African Congress, a liberation-movement rival of the now-governing African National Congress, and of the Economic Freedom Fighters, at present the third largest party in parliament. (It has 25 seats compared to 89 for the Democratic Alliance and 249 for the ANC.) At its December 2017 party convention, the ANC also supported expropriation without compensation and on February 27, 2018, parliament overwhelmingly voted to begin a process that would amend the constitution to allow for expropriation of without compensation. The persistent poverty of much of its black majority is the greatest challenge to South Africa’s democratic government. Inequality of wealth largely follows racial lines. In 2015, more than 55 percent of South Africans were poor. According to Statistics South Africa, less than 1 percent of the total white population was poor, while 63 percent of black people, 37 percent of coloured people, and 7 percent of Indian/Asian people were poor. The nine percent of South Africa’s population that is white holds the lion’s share of the country’s wealth. Most blacks see their poverty as the direct consequence of apartheid. While it is true that since the transition to non-racial democracy the small black middle class has grown and a few oligarchs have emerged, wealth inequality among blacks is now much greater than that between whites and blacks. Many may be asking whether South Africa is going down the road of Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe seized white-owned agricultural land and helped destroy the economy. The short answer is no. For a start, South Africa is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy, which means that the constitution limits what parliament can do. More to the point, it specifically guarantees the right to private property, meaning that expropriation without compensation would be immediately challenged in the courts. Therefore, the constitution must be amended. This vote has begun that process, but it is difficult and time-consuming.  Cyril Ramaphosa, state president and leader of the governing ANC, publicly supports expropriation without compensation, but also stresses that commercial agriculture and the country’s food security must be protected. A businessman and an oligarch, he is also committed to growing the economy to address poverty; that requires the confidence of foreign and domestic investors that their property rights will be respected. Therefore, white-owned farms, which dominate commercial agriculture, will likely be protected in the interest of the economy. South Africa is now about 60 percent urban, and urbanization is proceeding rapidly. Further complicating forced expropriation is the fact that African small-scale farming is not popular. Of those South Africans compensated for apartheid-era expropriation of their land, nearly all of them chose financial compensation rather than the return of their land. Of the land that has already been redistributed by the state, a credible estimate is that 70 percent of it is no longer in production. Nevertheless, land reform is an emotional and symbolic issue, especially in rural areas, and it is easily exploited as an issue by populist politicians. Where the practical need for land reform is most pressing is in urban and suburban areas, where there is substantial pressure from people leaving rural areas to look for work. Hence the emergence or expansion of informal settlements, mostly on government-owned land. State-owned land and tribal trust lands provide a possible venue for land redistribution without an impact on investor confidence or agricultural production. By and large, however, tribal chiefs would not like that approach because their control of tribal lands is basic to their local power. These chiefs were an important political constituency of former president Jacob Zuma, whom Ramaphosa has driven from office. This could spell an end to vetoes on land redistribution by tribal chiefs.

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s new cabinet is a significant improvement over his predecessor's and will reassure domestic and international investors. Restoring confidence in South Africa’s government and economy is a crucial first step to achieving the higher rates of economic growth needed to reduce poverty among the black majority.  Notably, Nhlahna Nene, the erstwhile finance minister under Zuma has been reappointed to the post by Ramaphosa. Widely respected by the financial community, he was inexplicably fired by former president Jacob Zuma. Pravin Gordhan, another respected former finance minister and casualty of Zuma’s administration, has been appointed minister of public enterprises. He will be responsible for state-owned enterprises like South African Airways and the national electric company. Under Zuma, public enterprises were nests of corruption and inefficiency. Gordhan is seen as having the energy and ability to clean up the mess, and oversaw an ANC-led effort to combat corruption in Port Elizabeth. As the new minister for energy, Jeff Radebe is expected to end the Zuma administration’s ill-considered nuclear energy program. Gwede Mantashe will be in charge of mineral resources and therefore oversee the country’s mining sector, which remains a central part of South Africa’s economy. He comes out of the labor movement and served as general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and has a reputation as a tough but trusted negotiator. The new minister of education, Naledi Pandor, is a close ally of Ramaphosa and will have to deal with an education system whose failures are partly to blame for the high levels of black unemployment. There are holdovers in the cabinet from the Zuma administration. Most notably, Zuma’s ex-wife and his candidate to succeed him as party leader, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. She is a former foreign minister, former minister of health, and former chairwoman of the African commission, but her new appointment as minister for planning and evaluation is far inferior in power and prestige. Among reformers, however, the greatest concern must be the appointment as deputy president of David Mabuza, governor of Mpumalanga. His shift of support from Dlamini-Zuma to Ramaphosa was crucial to the latter’s victory in the race for party leader. While he has a reputation for thuggery and corruption, Ramaphosa can fence Mabuza off from power and authority if he wishes to do so. The new foreign minister is Lindiwe Sisulu. Born in 1954, she is the daughter of liberation icons Walter and Albertina Sisulu. She has a PhD from York University in England and has been in the cabinet continuously since 1994. Her focus has been on domestic issues, with her byword being “poor first.” Broadly speaking, her political approach appears similar to that of the left wing of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. It remains to be seen whether she has any interest in improving the official bilateral relationship with the United States, which is now no more than “correct” and “cordial.”  

Dr. Cedric L. Suzman was the founding executive vice president and program director of the World Affairs Council of Atlanta. He retired in 2015. The ascendancy of Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency of South Africa has been greeted with a mix of enthusiasm, relief, and skepticism. It comes as South Africa prepares to celebrate the centenary of Nelson Mandela’s birth and it is worth remembering that Ramaphosa was Mandela’s first choice as his deputy, even though he was persuaded by the party to accept Thabo Mbeki. The country faces daunting challenges and Ramaphosa has only a slim majority of support in the National Executive Council of the African National Congress (ANC).  In his State of the Nation Address, corruption, jobs, and education stood out as the issues in need of immediate attention. President Ramaphosa addressed all three in some detail, but in trying to strike an optimistic note, he understandably glossed over many difficulties. He gave prominence to rooting out corruption, which all agree is his most urgent task. It has corroded the effectiveness of government at all levels, from the cabinet down to the lowest ranking municipal or city official. “State Capture” involving Zuma and the Gupta family is only the most visible issue. Being a loyal ANC cadre became the sole criterion for selection to any official position, without regard to competence. Any service or contract inevitably resulted in kickbacks to those involved, artificially inflating prices. The result has been a deterioration in productivity and government effectiveness, and a steady decline in the overall growth of the economy since 2011. Per capita GDP growth was negative between 2012 and 2016, placing South Africa in the bottom twentieth percentile for the continent, just above Zimbabwe. Given this depressing picture, Ramaphosa needs to not only address corruption at the top of government and state enterprises, but throughout the ranks of the ANC down to the provincial and local government levels.   President Ramaphosa also focused on the need to provide jobs by restoring economic growth and development. Unemployment is over 36 percent and youth unemployment is even higher. About a third of the population is now receiving monthly social grants to keep them from poverty. Optimism and business confidence in Cyril Ramaphosa’s considerable abilities will only go so far. Renewed foreign direct investment will help to drive growth in the relatively sophisticated industrial sector, but will not do much for the large numbers of unskilled and poorly educated job seekers. Large-scale capital investment projects have up to now not been successful and real gross fixed capital formation is just above 18 percent, well below the government target of 30 percent. Large increases in government expenditures are constrained by the growing budget deficit, which now exceeds the apartheid-era high. Mr. Ramaphosa recognized this constraint in the budget just announced by finance minister, Malusi Gigaba, raising the VAT tax from 14 to 15 percent, the first increase since 1993, as well as increasing the income tax. Export-led growth will also be difficult to achieve with an unproductive, low-skilled, but relatively well-paid unionized workforce.  The government will need to develop creative new programs to address the problem of unemployment. President Ramaphosa outlined a number of suggestions in his address, including a Jobs Summit to explore practical solutions, infrastructure projects such as the installation of solar water heaters and the war on water leaks, the Employment Tax Incentive, and the Youth Employment Service Initiative, which will place unemployed youth in paid internships in companies across the economy. Other examples not mentioned include investment in labor intensive projects in low skilled sectors and a major emphasis on technical schools.  The third challenge is addressing the failure of primary and secondary education. South Africa is particularly weak in math and science, even when compared to other developing countries. The poor educational system is not a result of a lack of funding, but largely due to systemic problems. It starts with a lack of accountability at the administrator level, inadequate teacher training, and teacher unions that make holding teachers accountable for their performance (and even presence) in the classroom more difficult. As with corruption and job creation, addressing the education problems will take new initiatives and time for the results to work their way through to the next generation of work seekers. Most importantly, literacy and basic education programs are urgently needed for those currently unemployed who left school early and still lack a basic education. Unfortunately, Ramaphosa's speech focused on the modest improvement in high school graduation rates and the politically charged issue of free university, not on primary education. All these initiatives will require time and strong leadership to implement—resources that are in very short supply. Of more immediate concern for the ANC are the 2019 national elections. Ramaphosa will have to prove that the party is serious about addressing corruption, joblessness, and education if they hope to capture over 50 percent of the vote. While there is good reason for optimism and faith in the resiliency of the country and its institutions, skeptics would be forgiven if they still have their doubts.   

A historic dry spell has severely affected Cape Town's water supply, and global climate patterns suggest that other cities may face the same fate.

This is a guest blog post by Anthony Carroll. Anthony is founding director of Acorus Capital, a private equity fund investing in Africa, and a vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, an international business advisory firm. He has over forty years of experience working with Africa and is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last Friday’s State of the Nation Address by newly-elected South African President Cyril Ramaphosa outlined many of the challenges that confront his country nearly a quarter of a century after the end of apartheid. These include economic inequality, unemployment, decaying social conditions, and corruption. His forthright remarks represent a paradigm shift in that country’s governance and governing principles and provides an opportunity for the United States to reengage with a strategic ally after nearly two decades of eroding relations. It is only fitting that Mr. Ramaphosa usher in this new era. Once the favored protégé of Nelson Mandela, Ramaphosa was the chief negotiator for the ANC during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process that effectively dismantled the odious system of apartheid. The institutions established at that time, including a much admired constitution, have flexed their muscles in the past few months exorcizing the corrupt and incoherent eight-year reign of Mr. Ramaphosa’s predecessor, Jacob Zuma. The coming months will reveal the depths of corruption that marked the Zuma era and, as the Truth and Reconciliation process salved the wounds of apartheid, provide South Africa an opportunity to set a new course. The United States should extend its hand to Mr. Ramaphosa and contribute when requested and where it can, not only for some ideal but for its own strategic self-interest. This process will not be easy. After the bloom of the post-apartheid process faded and Nelson Mandela relinquished power, U.S.-South Africa relations began a downward arc. Among the irritants included dismay over President Thabo Mbeki’s policies on HIV/AIDS, differing positions on Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and Libya, South Africa’s preferred embrace of fellow BRICS countries (most concernedly Russia) and myriad disagreement on trade relations starting with a scrapped regional free trade agreement and more recently, disputes on U.S. chicken exports. While this trend occurred in both Republican and Democratic administrations, it has been especially fractured during the later years of the Zuma administration. The symptoms included a compulsive attention to protocol over substance, limited access to government decision makers in Pretoria, thinly veiled opprobrium by U.S. diplomats, and an eroded civil discourse that included allegations by high level ANC officials that the United States was intent on fomenting regime change. Well, regime change did occur, and the United States had nothing to do with it. Rather, it was South Africa’s independent media, civil society, parliament, and judiciary that waltzed Zuma and his cronies out the door.  So where to begin? We can start by maintaining our current programs of assistance in South Africa. While we have ongoing military and counterterrorism collaboration with South Africa, laudable U.S. initiatives in health programming like PEPFAR have benefited millions of South Africans. A second area of strength is in trade. South Africa has been the largest beneficiary of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by trading 141 items without duty, including automobiles and fine wines. Lastly, over 600 U.S. firms have offices in South Africa and provide a strategic and secure platform to grow U.S. commercial interests on the African continent. Using these as a base, here below are a few recommendations where the United States could advance Mr. Ramaphosa’s and its own interests. First, South Africa is a leader in medical research and life sciences in both the government and private sector. The United States could foster partnerships between U.S. educational institutions and bioscience organizations such as the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) that could address Africa’s vast unmet health needs. Second, South Africa is the logical platform for U.S. businesses to exploit the Africa continent. Indeed, South Africa’s fastest growing trade relations are with its African neighbors. American technical assistance and political capital can be leveraged to support the emergence of African regional integration, a process logically led by South Africa, the continents largest and most sophisticated economy. Additionally, South African financial institutions, including the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (the world’s fourth oldest exchange) can be a conduit for U.S. creative capital going into Africa. Last, with three consulates and Africa’s largest embassy in Pretoria, the U.S. government has the platform in which to respond to advise and technical assistance requests by the South African government, private sector, and civil society. 

Faced with losing a scheduled parliamentary no-confidence vote on February 15, Jacob Zuma resigned from the presidency of South Africa in a broadcast to the nation in the evening on February 14. The governing African National Congress (ANC) and its large parliamentary majority moved quickly to elect deputy president and current party leader Cyril Ramaphosa to state presidency. As Zuma said in his less-than-dignified address to the nation, he resigned only because the ANC turned against him and insisted on it. The party concluded that Zuma had become too great a political liability as it looked toward upcoming elections in 2019. Zuma’s administration had become a byword for corruption, cronyism, and bad administration. Despite his populist rhetoric designed to appeal to the poor, virtually nothing was done to ameliorate their lot. His nativist style as well as his bad governance increasingly repelled South Africa’s growing urban black middle class. South Africa’s international reputation went into free-fall under him. Investment dried up, and the value of the national currency fell. In a major wakeup call, the ANC lost control of all of South Africa’s major cities except Durban in the 2016 local elections. Without change, the party feared that it might lose its parliamentary majority in the elections of 2019. In the December 2017 party convention, the ANC therefore chose Cyril Ramaphosa as party leader, rather than Zuma’s preferred candidate, his former wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma. (ANC party rules apparently precluded Zuma from running again.) Thereafter, Zuma’s departure from the state presidency became highly likely: the tradition is that the party leader and the state president are the same person. To preserve ANC party unity, Ramaphosa sought to ease Zuma out in a dignified way. Zuma refused to cooperate and fought resignation until it became clear that he had lost parliament’s, and more importantly, the ANC’s, confidence. In that way only, Zuma’s departure resembled that of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who also refused to resign following a coup by his own party until the Zimbabwe parliament was about to impeach him.   As leader of the ANC and state president, Zuma governed through the creation of patronage/clientage networks greased by corruption. If South Africa’s constitutional institutions appeared to get in the way, he tried to circumvent them. However, he regularly failed. Such was the strength of South Africa’s constitutional institutions, its independent judiciary, the vigilance of the parliamentary opposition, and the activism of civil society, Zuma, in so many ways a disaster for South Africa, was a challenge, but never an existential threat, to the country’s democracy and rule of law. However, Zuma was a threat to the ideals of the ANC. His leadership through patronage/clientage networks, his cronyism, his self-centeredness, and his appeal to an atavistic Zulu tribalism seriously undermined the party’s founding principles of non-racial, non-sexist democracy. Hence, especially in urban areas, the ANC’s core constituency increasingly stayed home on election-day or drifted over to one of the opposition parties. Cyril Ramaphosa and other “reformers” within the ANC have a big job to restore national confidence in the ANC as a democratic movement devoted to the rule of law. Ramaphosa’s next step will be to deliver the state of the nation address, which resembles the U.S. state of the union address. Soon thereafter he will unveil his proposed budget. Because Zuma resigned office rather than being forced out by parliament, Ramaphosa inherits his cabinet but is free to make changes. South Africans anticipate that a Ramaphosa government will be technically far more competent than its predecessor, and organized around promoting economic growth. Ramaphosa is also expected to move quickly against the notorious nests of corruption. He nevertheless faces serious challenges. If South Africa’s democratic institutions have successfully weathered Zuma, gross economic inequality, largely parallel to racial divisions, remains. Most South Africans are poor, by some measures poorer than they were the decade that apartheid ended, though the small white minority is probably richer than it was when Mandela came to office. Ramaphosa seems to recognize the central importance of higher rates of economic growth as the way to address poverty. He also seems to understand that state redistribution of wealth, such as happened in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, would destroy Africa’s most sophisticated economy and condemn most South Africans to deeper poverty. The question remains whether he can persuade South Africans to be patient; up to now, they have been. That could be a source of encouragement.   

Zuma is not out yet, but he will be by February 15. Today, Speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete moved the motion of no confidence originally scheduled for February 22 to Thursday, February 15. The vote will not be by secret ballot, so the public will know if any MP votes for Zuma. Most, if not all, of the opposition parties will also vote for the motion, which is likely to be carried by a huge majority. Once passed, Zuma and all the members of his cabinet will be required to resign. The speaker will assume the presidency until the national assembly elects a new president. The African National Congress (ANC) has said that immediately after the no-confidence vote, it will elect Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency of South Africa. (Under the South African constitution, parliament elects the president, and the ANC still has an overwhelming majority of MPs.) Ramaphosa will then proceed to appoint his cabinet. In another clear sign that the Zuma era is finished, the South African police raided the Johannesburg residence of the Gupta family, closely associates of Zuma, business partners of his son, and widely linked with corruption, known as “state capture.” The motion of no-confidence that parliament will vote on is originally the product of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who proposed the motion on February 2. It was then tabled for a vote on February 22 by Speaker Mbete (a member of the ANC). Today, the speaker agreed to move their motion forward to February 15 and to incorporate ANC amendments that outline the governing party's reasons for Zuma’s removal. This jockeying for ownership of the motion represents the broader struggle between opposition parties and the ANC to be able to take credit for Zuma’s departure.  Pending a successful vote of no-confidence, Zuma will face the humiliation of being utterly rejected by the party to which he claims to have devoted his life. Of course, right up to when the vote is taken, Zuma could resign. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe only resigned when parliament was about to vote on his impeachment. Whether Zuma is toppled by a no-confidence vote or he resigns, he will keep his pension and the other emoluments of a former president. Nobody ever accused Jacob Zuma of being gracious. Many party leaders had hoped that the transfer of presidential power would be dignified and graceful, with Zuma voluntarily resigning the presidency after Ramaphosa defeated his preferred candidate (his former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) in the race for party leadership. ANC tradition is that the party leader is the state president; when Thabo Mbeki was defeated as party leader in 2008, he resigned the presidency following his recall by the party. Zuma’s dignified resignation would have helped the ANC move past the divisions apparent at the party conference in December, but Zuma prides himself on being a “fighter,” and has placed his personal interest ahead of his country and his party. He may believe that the patronage networks he has constructed may yet save him. Mbeki, Zuma’s predecessor, has had a distinguished post-presidential career as an African elder statesman; it is difficult to foresee Zuma in such a role. Instead of announcing his resignation in a February 14 radio broadcast (when many expected him to do so), Zuma whined that he had done nothing wrong and that the party leadership had never told him why he was being told to resign. The answer is quite clear to everybody else; something of a consensus has emerged in South Africa, including within the ANC, that Zuma is corrupt and that he was seeking to undermine the country’s democracy and its adherence to the rule of law. The ANC’s leadership concluded that unless it gets Zuma out quickly, there will be a popular anti-ANC backlash in the national elections of 2019. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the ANC leadership, long intimidated by Zuma, has ever spoken to him in such plain terms.