South Africa

At a rugby stadium in Pretoria on May 25, Cyril Ramaphosa was sworn in as South Africa’s fourth democratically elected president since 1994. Citing government austerity measures and perhaps as a sign of the administration’s new dispensation, Ramaphosa’s inauguration will cost about half as much as the 2014 ceremony to swear in Jacob Zuma.  The U.S. presidential delegation to the inauguration was headed by Kimberly A. Reed, the president of the Export-Import Bank. The other members of the delegation included Bonnie Glick, deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Andrew Olmem, deputy assistant to the president for economic policy, Jessica Lapenn, the charge d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Pretoria, and Cyril Sartor, the senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council.  More than two years into the Trump administration, there is still no U.S. ambassador to South Africa. Hence, the embassy is headed by a charge. According to the White House statement, no member of Congress was included in the delegation, nor were any business people. In the past, the presidential delegation to South African inaugurations have included prominent figures, such as First Lady Hillary Clinton in 1994 and Attorney General Janet Reno in 1999, though no delegation was sent to the discredited Jacob Zuma’s inauguration in 2014.  But this year’s presidential delegation was workman-like. All of its members would be directly involved in building the U.S.-South Africa bilateral relationship. There also may have been a trade and investment tilt to the delegation. If so, that would be appropriate. Attracting foreign investments had been one of Ramaphosa’s principal goals since he became president in early 2018. Even if the political and security dimensions of the bilateral relationship over the past decade have been frosty, the economic relationship has continued to develop. 

Under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, the African National Congress (ANC) improved its performance in the 2019 national elections. The ANC won about 58 percent of the vote, up from 54 percent in the local government elections of 2016, though still a decline from the 62 percent in won in 2014 national elections. It lost seats, but it seems to have, for now, arrested the Zuma-era decline.  By the beginning of 2018, the ANC had removed from office the scandal-plagued Jacob Zuma as ANC party leader and president. The party then elected Ramaphosa, who had orchestrated Zuma’s departure, as its leader and as South Africa’s president. He launched a reform program, “New Dawn,” that promised the renewal of the party, an emphasis on party unity, an end to corruption, and national economic policy designed to address the poverty of the black majority through accelerated economic growth. “New Dawn” was the ANC’s campaign theme in the national elections, though Ramaphosa faced push-back from the still powerful party forces aligned with Zuma. In democratic South Africa, elections matter, and Ramaphosa’s success has consequences. It has led to a realignment within the party in Ramaphosa’s favor. A party instrument, the Integrity Commission (IC), is charged with vetting candidates on the ANC’s electoral lists as to their moral and overall suitability for office. Frequently criticized as “toothless,” nevertheless the IC has accused Deputy President David Mabuza and others associated with Zuma as having “prejudiced the integrity of the ANC.” Accordingly, Mabuza and others so accused have declined to be sworn-in as MP’s until they are able to answer the accusations. Observers had expected that Ramaphosa would reappoint Mabuza as deputy president for the sake of party unity and also following the adage of “keep your friends close and your enemies closer.” He could still do so—the president may appoint up to two ministers, including the deputy president, from outside parliament—though he is more likely to take the opportunity to appoint a different personality less compromised by allegations of corruption. One possibility is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who narrowly lost a vote for party leader after Zuma, her ex-husband, was pushed out. While she is usually counted in the Zuma camp, she is a formidable politician in her own right, and the ANC emphasizes the importance of gender equality. For Ramaphosa, as deputy president she, too, would fit the adage of “keep your enemies closer.”  The bottom line of this political maneuvering is that Ramaphosa’s hand within the party has been strengthened by the election results, granting him greater freedom to pursue his agenda. We can expect him to continue to renew the ANC and begin to address South Africa’s social and economic problems that were exacerbated by the disastrous nine-year tenure of Jacob Zuma. The Zuma faction is still formidable, but for friends of South Africa, this is good news.

This is a guest post by Benjamin Silliman, research associate for Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations and Payce Madden, researcher in African development. South Africa’s 2019 elections are over and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) kept its majority, but by its smallest margins yet. Political graft and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises like Eskom, the indebted utility which supplies over 90 percent of South Africa’s power, is likely behind some voters’ disillusionment with the ANC. In the months before the elections, major blackouts were rolling across the country leading to an estimated loss of 1.1 percent of economic growth for the year. Although Eskom was eventually able to stem the blackouts before Election Day, underlying technical, financial, and management problems will continue to plague the governing ANC party as it struggles to show South Africans that it can sustain economic growth. At the root of Eskom’s recent service problems are technical faults in South Africa’s Kusile and Medupi power stations, which led to the loss of nearly 17,000 megawatts (MW) of generation capacity. At the same time, electricity imports from Mozambique were stopped by Cyclone Idai, creating another loss of 1,100 MW of electricity that Eskom relies on to power its grid. These faults forced Eskom to begin load-shedding — the deliberate interruption of electricity supply — to prevent putting more demand on the grid than it could supply. At the height of the crisis, South Africans had their power interrupted twelve times in a four-day period for two hours at a time affecting commercial, industrial, and residential entities. To manage blackouts, many South African businesses and individuals have backup diesel generators. However, due to Cyclone Idai’s disruption to diesel imports, the cost of using diesel generation rose as a result of the fuel shortage and higher demand. Even without disruptions, diesel generators are rarely an efficient solution to supply electricity: in many African countries where backup generators are used to supplement or support unreliable electricity grids, the cost of electricity can be up to three times higher than it would be if the grid were reliable due to individual fuel and maintenance costs for the generator. A severe lack of financing options for Eskom has many worried that the Kusile and Medupi power plants could be offline for more than a year. The government, looking for quick options to resolve the crisis, has suggested it will restructure the utility by breaking it into three separate entities. However, this solution would do little to manage Eskom’s massive debt of nearly thirty billion dollars, which is continuing to increase as the utility undertakes repairs on the down power plants. Restructuring also does little to address some of the most basic issues facing the county’s electric system: severe lack of financing, poor planning, and negligent maintenance of central generating units. For a growing nation, access to a reliable power supply is essential. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), South Africa’s electricity generation grew by 51 percent between 1990 and 2016. 82 percent of this growth came from centralized coal power plants, while nuclear power accounted for 8 percent of the growth, wind energy 4 percent, and solar photovoltaic energy only 3 percent. In total, wind and solar power only account for 2.5 percent of South Africa’s electricity sources. Increasing electricity generation will be vital for South Africa’s continued economic growth and development. Already, South Africa has the highest electricity consumption per capita of any African country, and demand is likely to increase: although population growth is only slightly above the world average, South Africa, like much of the continent, is rapidly urbanizing. Johannesburg alone is projected to host more than ten million inhabitants by 2030. South Africa’s reliance on coal power to fuel its electricity capacity growth is problematic since the country faces poor financing options for large capital to build centralized power plants. Investment from development banks, including the African Development Bank’s New Deal on Energy in Africa, remains insufficient to meet energy financing needs. While financing for electric power has risen globally, investment in sub-Saharan Africa’s electrification decreased from 2013-2014 to 2015-2016. About a quarter of global investment in 2015 and 2016, or eight billion dollars per year, was for grid-connected fossil fuel plants, with China providing a fifth of this fossil fuel expansion financing. In South Africa, China has previously provided loans to Eskom to finish construction of the Kusile power plant. The exact terms of these loans have been kept secret, but the additional debt burden could have major implications for South Africa, which is already at risk of reaching a threshold level of debt-to-GDP. Despite these risks, Chinese lending remains an attractive — and, in some cases, the only — option to fill the financing gaps left by development banks and other major lenders. Distributed energy sources could offer South Africa a distinct advantage when building up their generation capacity, as they do not require single large loans, but rather an aggregation of smaller sources of capital, many of which may already exist around the country. Eskom currently supports interconnection, with energy export credits for high-voltage industrial power consumers. By owning their own generation capacity, industrial consumers would not only not only reduce the risk of loss of production due to power failure, but may also reduce their normal energy expenses by providing power to the grid when the plant is not operating at full capacity in exchange for credits. Bringing micro-grids to these power-heavy industries should be top priority for South African policymakers who are looking to better balance the demand for electricity and expand current renewable energy programs. Eskom currently does not support net metering for lower-voltage residential and commercial markets, reducing the incentive for residences and small businesses to provide their own power. Despite this, rooftop solar has gained some traction in South Africa with the Mall of Africa unveiling its new solar roof, the tenth largest in the world. A primary motivation for the installation was to reduce power demand on South Africa’s central grid system. This move mirrors a trend in developed countries around the world where policymakers are analyzing the potential for buildings to provide some of their own power, and at times even act as power plants. In the United States, power produced from buildings has already been relied upon during hot days when abnormal consumption put excessive demand on the grid. Both California and New York have begun implementing plans for energy-producing buildings, while the EU and Japan have issued goals to promote zero — or close to zero — energy buildings. Large residential and commercial buildings have one thing in common: they are often well-financed and have the incentive to pursue distributed energy options, especially given the long-term unreliability of South Africa’s energy infrastructure. To motivate more widespread development, South African policymakers should consider pushing Eskom to develop a policy on lower voltage net metering. Reducing demand or even supplying power to the grid could vastly ease the country’s growing pains. South Africa already has a robust policy model for renewable energy integration for dedicated power producers that it can use as a model for future development. South Africa maintains a target of 17,800 MW of low carbon capacity by 2030. In 2011, South Africa started its major policy initiative to promote low carbon sources, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP.) The REIPPPP holds competitive auctions for renewable energy sources, capped at certain capacities depending on the source type. Winners of the auction are given a twenty-year power purchase agreement (PPA) with the utility and a feed-in tariff to improve economic competitiveness. According to the World Bank, as of 2014, fourteen billion dollars were already committed to the program. Prices for renewable energy have dropped significantly since the beginning of this program, with solar falling 68 percent and wind falling 42 percent. In the midst of an energy crisis, the government should consider expanding upon this central program to not only offer PPAs to dedicated power producers but also shorter-term contracts with large commercial or industrial entities or real estate developers. To reduce the utility’s massive infrastructure costs, an interconnection fee could be negotiated as part of the PPA. Capacity ceilings for the REIPPPP should also be expanded to more rapidly grow energy capacity and to encourage more companies to become involved. This solution is not technically easy to implement. Integrating distributed energy systems is a challenge for even robust electric utilities, but software and hardware solutions have become available to ease integration of intermittent, distributed energy sources into the grid. For example, better forecasting systems have allowed utilities to model demand with much more granularity, allowing the utility to better plan around consumer power production, and smart meters can accurately provide detailed two-way electric exchanges between a building and the grid. Battery storage technology to reduce the strain of intermittence has also become much more available, with prices continuing to decline. Given the immense challenge of securing financing to build and repair large central power generation, money spent on grid modernization efforts may be more fruitful. The greatest challenge, however, may be managing Eskom’s finances. The utility will not benefit from the departure of some of its largest customers as they reduce their dependence on the grid. This could potentially create two dangers: that Eskom could develop revenue problems limiting the growth needed to repay debts, and that many infrastructure, operating, and financing costs could be passed off to those who cannot afford alternate energy sources in the form of higher electricity prices. The process of promoting distributed energy must be well managed by the government to ensure that the electricity system does not break down as heavy consumers reduce their reliance on the grid. South Africa could explore more options for state financial support, with, for example, tiered electricity prices based on consumption to keep electricity costs low for less affluent consumers. They could also explore interconnection service fees where a percentage of energy savings for those off the grid are paid back to the utility for infrastructure costs, as is being tried in the state of New York. While South Africa will not be able to build sufficient distributed capacity fast enough to avoid the repairs needed for the two offline power plants, it may reduce the need for Eskom to invest in future centralized power plants. Avoiding the construction of more costly central power plants could provide Eskom some relief in the future given the limitations of current financing from development banks and other major lenders and the risks of accruing debt from lenders such as China. Already a leader in renewable energy policy in the continent, South Africa could prove to be an important model for how to integrate distributed energy resources in countries around the world. However, until significant changes are made, many South Africans may continue to stay in the dark.

The African National Congress, which has governed since the end of apartheid, won again in May’s national election. But a growing opposition will watch to see whether it can revive the economy and curb corruption.

The governing African National Congress (ANC) won its smallest percentage of votes for national office ever in the 2019 elections, which took place on May 8. It won 57.51 percent over the vote, while the Democratic Alliance won 20.76 percent and the Economic Freedom Fighters won 10.79 percent; the remaining forty-five parties together won 10.94 percent, though most of them did not win enough to earn a seat.   The ANC’s vote share peaked in the 2004 national elections, when it received 69.69 percent of the vote, but it dropped to 65.9 percent in 2009 and to 62.15 percent in 2014. While the trajectory would appear to maintain its negative course through the 2019 national elections, the ANC’s showing in the most recent elections, the municipal elections in 2016, was just 53.9 percent. In those elections, the ANC lost Johannesburg and Pretoria for the first time since the end of apartheid. The 2016 ANC losses have been largely attributed to the failed leadership of Jacob Zuma, then leader of the ANC and president of South Africa, whose administration was mired in corruption and scandal. The elections of 2019 therefore represent an improvement for the ANC. Municipal elections still follow South Africa’s system of proportional representation, where voters vote for a party, not a candidate, hence they are still referenda on the parties. Further, the ANC won a slight majority in Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria), South Africa’s largest and richest province, despite predictions that it would fall below 50 percent. The improvement in the ANC’s results over 2016 strengthens the hand of Cyril Ramaphosa, party leader and South African president, as he seeks to reform the ANC internally and address corruption, especially within state owned enterprises. Reflecting party anxiety over the erosion of its support at the polls, at the end of 2017, the ANC removed Zuma from the party leadership and, in 2018, from the presidency, a move orchestrated by Cyril Ramaphosa, then Zuma’s deputy president. However, bolstered by his populism and his patronage network, Zuma and his allies remain a powerful element within the ANC. Since Zuma’s removal, they have been actively engaged in seeking to block Ramaphosa’s reforms. Though Ramaphosa has moved to restore the integrity of government institutions undermined by Zuma and his allies, nobody has yet to go to jail for corruption. The improvement in the ANC election results under Ramaphosa’s leadership should strengthen his hand in the intra-party fight with Zuma. And perhaps those guilty of corruption will start to go to jail.

Today, South Africans will vote for national and provincial assemblies, who in turn will form national and provincial governments. Polls open at 7:00 a.m., and close at 9:00 p.m., though those in line at the closing will be able to vote. South Africans will choose between parties, not candidates, under South Africa’s system of proportional representation. Counting begins immediately, and final results are likely to be released by Saturday, May 11.  The media is focused on the elections as a referendum on the governing African National Congress (ANC) and its reformer leader Cyril Ramaphosa. At the beginning of 2018, he orchestrated the ouster of the scandal-ridden ANC leader and state president, Jacob Zuma. There is particular interest in how the ANC will do in Gauteng. It is the most populous and richest of South Africa’s nine provinces and includes Johannesburg and Pretoria. The media is also focused on the black middle class as the key to the fortunes of the ANC in Gauteng and perhaps the country in general. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is also seeking black middle class support, while the third major party, the left-wing radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is pitching to the urban poor. ANC support in Gauteng has been declining over the past decade. This time, the ANC could be frozen out of the provincial government, or forced to enter into a coalition to form a provincial government. The ANC has long since lost to the DA in the Western Cape—the second wealthiest and most developed province—including in the city of Cape Town. Loss of Gauteng risks the ANC becoming a party with an overwhelmingly rural base. At election time in South Africa, the media frequently “discovers” a voter demographic and exaggerates its political importance. In the local government elections of 2016 it was the “born frees,” blacks born after the end of apartheid in 1994, whose political behavior was anticipated to be “different.” However, that demographic, like others of that age in most western democracies, failed to vote in large numbers and by and large had little impact on the outcome of the elections. This year it is the “black middle class,” which is “growing.” A story in the New York Times states that blacks are 90 percent of South Africa’s population. However, that number would include Coloureds, identified by outsiders as of mixed race, by some others as “black,” but often by themselves as a separate race. In any event, their electoral behavior is very different from black Africans; Coloureds usually support the opposition DA, while blacks have overwhelmingly supported the ANC. Further, the black middle class is unlikely to be monolithic in its voting preferences.  The Unilever Institute for Strategic Marketing at the University of Cape Town estimates that the size of the black middle class is 5.6 million out of 58 million South Africans, or just under 10 percent of the population. Other estimates are substantially lower, but all such estimates involve definitional issues—what is “middle class” and who is “black,” for example. But, taking the Unilever figure at face value, the “black middle class” is small compared to the black Africans that live in townships and rural areas. It may be large enough to be significant in Johannesburg, though even that can be questioned, but it is unlikely to be so elsewhere in the country.  

On May 8, South Africans will vote in national elections for the sixth time since the end of apartheid and the transition to “non-racial” elections in 1994. Most observers judge the quality of South African elections as on par with those in Japan and the United States. Hence, issues about the conduct of elections are not about the possibility of rigging or voter fraud. Rather they are similar to those in the United States, such as transparency around campaign finance and concerns about declining voter turnout. Proportional Representation The constitution mandates a proportional system of parliamentary representation. Voters will cast ballots for parties at the national and provincial levels, not individual candidates. There are four hundred seats in the National Assembly. Each party’s leadership draws up a list of candidates and then rank orders them by name. If, say, a party wins 25 percent of the vote, it wins one hundred seats in the National Assembly, and the first hundred names on the list of candidates take seats in the National Assembly. If a minor party wins 1 percent of the vote, it would still get four seats in parliament, and several did so in 2014 and are likely to do so again on May 8. This system is designed to promote party unity and concentrate power in the party leadership, who rank-orders the party’s candidates. Moving up the rank order list requires a candidate to be in good graces with the party leadership. If a MP breaks with their party, they must resign their seat; voters did not vote for them, but for the party to which they belonged.  While voters vote for a party, not an individual, the party leader is the “face” of the party. Ballots in fact have a small photograph of the party leader as well as the party symbol by each box that a voter would check. Once new members of the National Assembly are in place, they elect the president. If one party has a majority of seats, it will elect as president the first person on its electoral list.  While there are forty-eight political parties contesting, only three have a reasonable chance of forming a government. They are the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). But proportional representation provides for representation of very small parties, so an additional seven might win up to three or four seats each.  South Africa is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy. Therefore, while the ANC has had a large majority in the National Assembly since 1994, and each president has been the party leader, South Africa’s constitution limits what the National Assembly and the state executive can do.  The African National Congress The ANC is the party of Nelson Mandela and is seen as the leader of the anti-apartheid struggle. It is an umbrella coalition, comprising the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). They field parliamentary candidates that run on the ANC electoral list. The SACP is a clandestine organization, so it does not publish the names of its candidates. However, many of them are widely known. Where their candidates are placed on the ANC electoral list is the result of horse-trading.  In theory, the ANC is a non-racial party, and its leadership includes a few whites (mostly from the SACP) and a few more Asians. But its electoral support is overwhelmingly black. It is centrist on economic policy, despite the SACP and COSATU component. Much of its senior leadership is suspicious of the United States, seeing it as a fundamentally racist society. Race is the greatest predictor of how a South African will vote. About 80 percent of South Africans self-identify as black—hence the ANC’s substantial margin of victory in every national election. However, by no means all blacks vote for the ANC. In the last elections it won 249 seats with 62.15 percent of the vote. The party leader and state president is Cyril Ramaphosa, a close colleague of Nelson Mandela. Within the ANC he is opposed by the supporters of the former party leader, Jacob Zuma, who presided over a semi-criminal government until he was removed by the ANC from office in 2018 in a move orchestrated by Cyril Ramaphosa. The Zuma wing is populist in rhetoric and makes successful use of patronage to retain power even after Zuma’s departure. Ramaphosa is trying to reform the party and state-owned enterprises (SOE), such as South African Airways and the electricity utility Eskom, but faces serious pushback from Zuma’s allies dependent on SOEs for patronage. According to polls, Ramaphosa is the most popular of the party leaders, and because he is the “face” of the ANC, that will benefit the governing party. Nevertheless, because memories of the Zuma administration’s poor governance are fresh, most observers think the ANC’s percentage of the vote will decline, perhaps to the mid-50s. The Democratic Alliance The official opposition is the DA. Formerly a party of whites, its electoral support comes from the racial minorities: whites, Coloureds (not a pejorative label in South Africa), and Asians. It is seeking to shed its predominantly white image and appeal to blacks, especially those that are urban and middle class. Its party leader is Mmusi Maimane, a black African and former member of the Johannesburg City Council. However, thus far, the DA does not appear to be successful in its racial rebranding. That effort has been set-back by episodes of blatant white racism from individuals who identified with the DA. The party is center-right in economic policy and strongly emphasizes the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and good government. It governs the Western Cape (including Cape Town), generally regarded as the best governed province in the country. The DA is viscerally pro-American. In 2014, it won 22.23 percent of the vote, or 89 seats. Most observers—including this one—think it will get about the same number of votes on May 8, while others predict a DA electoral collapse if the EFF surges.  The Economic Freedom Fighters The EFF is headed by Julius Malema, who left the ANC when he split with Zuma in 2012, largely the result of personal rivalries. He formed the EFF shortly after to contest the 2014 elections, in which it won 6.35 percent of the vote. The party bills itself as radical and left wing. It advocates expropriation of white wealth without compensation and its distribution to blacks and Coloureds. It calls for a greatly expanded role of the state in almost everything. It views itself as the advocate for the very poor, especially in the townships and urban areas. The party has used anti-democratic tactics on the floor of the National Assembly, and its stock-in-trade is anti-white rhetoric. Some observers characterize it as Afro-populist. The irony is that despite the feud between Malema and Zuma, their policies and approaches to governance have similarities. Malema, however, does like to say that he “loves white people.” Other than Malema’s support for Zimbabwe’s former dictator, Robert Mugabe, it does not seem interested in foreign affairs. Most observers think the EFF will increase its parliamentary representation—the question is by how much. The EFF tried to make land expropriation without compensation a central issue of the campaign, but despite domestic and foreign media hype, the effort has apparently largely failed. Instead, the issues appear to be corruption, jobs, and crime. Election Outcomes Opinion polling in South Africa is not strong, and moreover polling results are not consistent. For example, polls from different organizations predict outcomes in some cases ten percentage points apart. Nevertheless, a plausible hypothesis is that the ANC will win 56 percent of the vote, the DA about 23 percent, the EFF about 11 percent, with the remainder divided among the minority parties. That outcome would mean that the ANC could govern without coalition partners. Most observers think that about 70 percent of eligible voters will go to the polls. This may be overly sanguine. In the recent Nigerian elections, only 35 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Nigeria is of course different from South Africa, but in both countries a substantial part of the electorate, especially the youth, are disaffected from the political system and, as in Nigeria, many South African youth may stay away.  Despite media hype that these elections are potentially “transformative,” they are unlikely to change dramatically the South African political landscape. Nevertheless, if the EFF gets more than 10 percent of the vote, if the DA gets 20 percent or less, and if the ANC percentage falls to near 50 percent, there will be apocalyptic headlines, even though the ANC will continue to govern. It is expected that new EFF votes will likely be at the expense of the ANC. If the EFF “does well,” receiving between 12 and 15 percent, Ramaphosa’s critics within the ANC will be emboldened to move against him, and his reform program will likely be set back.  Twenty-five years after the end of apartheid, poverty in South Africa is still mostly black and Coloured—who together make up almost 90 percent of the population—and they are the electoral target of the EFF. Yet in the townships and rural areas, there appears to be skepticism about the EFF’s ability to govern, and the ANC is given credit for the system of welfare payments that have greatly reduced extreme poverty. There has been no erosion of the economic privilege of whites, who are about 9 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the country does not appear to be close to a revolution, even at the ballot box. Racial minorities will continue to vote for the DA, while blacks will continue to make up the bulk of the ANC’s support, and virtually all of the EFF’s.  

A theme of commentary on South Africa’s May 8 elections is that many voters will be motivated by anger at corruption and growing economic and social inequality, particularly the continuing poverty of the black majority. Commentators are also noting the low levels of voter registration among young people. There is speculation that such factors will lead to an erosion of support for the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the transition to “non-racial” democracy in 1994. At present, it is anticipated that the principal beneficiary of a decline in ANC support will be the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and, less likely, the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA). While polling shows that President Cyril Ramaphosa, who is the ANC party leader, is much more popular than the EFF’s Julius Malema or the DA’s Mmusi Maimane, under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, voters vote for a party, not an individual. In the run-up to the elections, the BBC has done a service by presenting statistical data on how South Africa has changed since 1994. The data is drawn from Stats SA, the official statistics office, and think tanks. South African statistics, official and non-official, are credible. The BBC’s selection of statistics shows greater social progress since the end of apartheid than the current political debate would indicate, but that poverty remains mostly black and coloured. (Coloureds often regard themselves as a separate race, not of mixed race.) Between 2006 and 2015, poverty declined across all races. For blacks, it declined from 76.8 percent to 64.2 percent; for coloureds, from 56.1 percent to 41.3 percent; for Indians/Asians, from 20.9 percent to 5.9 percent, and for whites from 1.4 percent to 1 percent. It is worth noting that much of this progress was achieved between 2006 and 2011, at which point the declines stalled or even reversed. Hence, for some, progress has not been seen or felt for eight years.  Other data also shows some improvement. For example, in 1996, 58.2 percent of households had access to electricity and 60.8 percent had access to piped water; in 2016 it was 90.3 percent and 83.5 percent, respectively. Despite improvement since the end of apartheid, poverty and unemployment remain high. It can be politically dangerous for a government in power when a positive trajectory is interrupted, as poverty reduction among Blacks and Coloureds has been. South Africa’s rate of economic growth has also been low. The country has recovered only slowly from the global recession of 2008, and the prices of some South African export commodities have fallen. Further, the poor governance and bad economic policies of the 2009–2018 administration of President Zuma undermined domestic and foreign investment necessary for growth. All of that said, voting behavior is still largely determined by race, and the ANC has been the political party of blacks, and is institutionally robust. It may not perform as badly as the pundits predict on May 8. 

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South Africa’s national elections on May 8 are likely to be dominated by the governing African National Congress (ANC) and the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA). However, the third largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is likely to continue to benefit from outsized media attention because of its economic radicalism and its anti-white stance. In the national elections in 2014, its first election after being founded in 2013, it won 6 percent of the vote, and in local government elections of 2016, it won 8 percent.  Most observers think that EFF’s will hit a ceiling of around ten percent of the vote. Among other factors, it does not have the grass-roots organization and funding that the ANC and the DA enjoy, nor does it have access to the patronage that does so much to sustain the ANC. On the other hand, its leader, Julius Malema, has charisma, and he is popular in the townships. The ANC is widely perceived as corrupt, while the DA is yet to overcome the perception that it is the political party of whites. Some South Africans see the EFF as providing the left-wing alternative that the country’s poor need. But, Malema’s behavior can be erratic and unpredictable, and EFF policies are little more than populism with an anti-white coloration. The EFF is also largely untested in the rural areas, the bulwark of ANC support. Further, its disruptive tactics that include the threat of violence and intimidation on the floor of parliament are seen by at least some South Africans as antithetical to parliamentary democracy. If, contrary to most predictions, the EFF exceeds ten percent of the vote on May 8, the ANC, in response, would likely move in a more radical direction. That could jeopardize Cyril Ramaphosa, now the party leader and chief of state. He is seeking to revive the economy through increased investment and other reforms in the context of free market capitalism, but he continues to face significant opposition within the party associated with the ousted Zuma. With a significant increase in parliamentary seats, the EFF could even contemplate displacing the DA as the official opposition sometime in the future, especially if the latter falls significant below the 22 percent of the vote it achieved in 2014. However, under even the most optimistic scenarios, the EFF is unlikely to be able to displace the ANC as the ruling party anytime soon.  If, however, the EFF’s results on May 8 are disappointing, internal pressure within the party to merge with the ANC is likely to increase. Julius Malema is a former leader of the ANC Youth League. He broke with Jacob Zuma in 2012, then the ANC party leader and chief of state, ostensibly because Zuma was not “radical” enough, that is, Zuma was not moving to redistribute wealth from the white minority to the black majority. Malema founded the EFF soon after and apparently received a subvention from Robert Mugabe, then president of Zimbabwe and known for expelling most of that country’s white farmers. But, there was also an important personal dimension to the Zuma-Malema quarrel, and Malema would go on to lead the chorus of those opposed to Zuma’s corruption and the “state capture” by his cronies. Now that Zuma is out, however, at least some of the original rationale for the split is gone. Should a merger happen, the EFF would likely constitute the new left wing of the ANC, further to the left than the South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), both of which run candidates under the ANC umbrella as part of a parliamentary Triple Alliance. It is unclear whether the SACP and COSATU would remain in the Triple Alliance should the EFF merge with the ANC, especially if Malema’s influence were to increase. It is also unclear whether the EFF, merged with the much larger ANC, would retain much coherence beyond loyalty to Malema.

The African National Congress (ANC) has governed South Africa since the end of apartheid and the transition to “non-racial” democracy in 1994. It has won more than 60 percent of vote in every national election since, though its share of the vote has been steadily declining. In a country fractured by race in which blacks—about 80 percent of the population—are much poorer than whites—about 9 percent—race is the largest factor in voting behavior. The ANC is now the black political party, despite its multiracial origins. The formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), is white in origin but is seeking to build multiracial support. The third major party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), calls for expropriation of white property without compensation. It is entirely a black party. South Africa’s other racial minorities, specifically coloureds (who regard themselves as a separate race, not a mixed race) and those of South and East Asian origin, tend to support the DA or one of the many minor parties.  During the 2009–2018 presidency of Jacob Zuma, the ANC became increasingly corrupt. Service delivery to the poor declined, and economic growth slowed to all but a standstill. Disillusioned blacks by and large did not vote for other parties. Rather, they did not vote at all. Then Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and reformers within the party finally managed to dislodge Zuma from the party leadership in 2017 and from the presidency soon after in 2018. However, Zuma and his “populist” wing of the party continues to control significant amounts of patronage and enjoys substantial support among the rural poor. The Zuma faction occupies a significant number of the higher places on the ANC electoral list, and it continues to control important aspects of the party’s machinery. This faction has successfully thwarted many of Ramaphosa’s intended reforms.  Among ANC voters, the May election is something of a referendum on Ramaphosa and his reforms. Bandied about are a number of possible scenarios. One, favored by Ramaphosa’s allies, is that if the ANC’s electoral decline is reversed and it increases its share of the vote, his hand will be strengthened against the Zuma faction. Another is that if the ANC loses electoral support, the Zuma faction will be weakened and Ramaphosa will be freer to proceed against it. Still others argue, however, that if the ANC share of the vote declines too much, the knives will be out for Ramaphosa within the party, and he could be replaced by a “populist” of the Zuma stamp. The magic number appears to be 60 percent. If the ANC’s vote share does not fall below that level, the ANC under Ramaphosa’s leadership would seem to be vindicated. If it does, the ANC will have suffered a significant defeat, and the consequences for Ramaphosa could be difficult. However, few observers now expect the ANC’s share of the vote to fall below 60 percent, and the expectation is that the ANC will form the next government; the majority of black voters will not desert the black political party associated with Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid. However, should it fall below 50 percent, then South Africa would experience coalition government for the first time. The DA would be the likely leader of such a coalition, which would also include minor parties. While possible, that scenario remains unlikely. Nevertheless, the ANC could face black swans, chief among them a precipitous drop in black voter turnout and greater-than-anticipated popular anger at ANC corruption, from which Ramaphosa is not immune. Ramaphosa, as deputy president under Zuma, must have known about the rampant corruption, even if he was not complicit in it.  South Africa’s constitution provides for proportional representation. Voters vote for a party, not a candidate. Each party rank-orders candidates of its list. When the ANC won 62 percent of the vote in the 2015 national elections, the top 249 candidates on its party list—62 percent of 400 total seats—received a seat in the national assembly. Outside experts rate the quality of South Africa’s elections as about the same as those in the United States and Japan. Because the voters choose a party, not a candidate, should a member of parliament leave the party on whose list he was placed, he must resign his seat. Hence, it is unlikely that the ANC would split once elections are completed.

In the run-up to South Africa’s national elections, the Democratic Alliance (DA) will receive a boost from the Good Governance Africa’s annual Government Performance Index. Good Governance Africa is a highly respected NGO that monitors government performance. Its latest report highlights the DA’s strong performance in municipal government, particularly in the Western Cape. The DA has led that provincial government since 2009, and it is better governed than any other province: twelve of its twenty-five municipalities are in the top twenty. The report also shows that KwaZulu/Natal and the Eastern Cape, provinces traditionally dominated by the ANC, are among the worst governed. South Africans will vote for members of the national assembly on May 8. (The index rated municipal governments, whose leaders will be elected in 2021.) Under the country’s system of proportional representation, voters vote for a party, not individual candidates. Since the end of apartheid and the transition to “non-racial” governance in 1994, the largest party in in parliament has been the African National Congress (ANC); its party leader has also been the chief of state. At present, it holds 249 seats out of a total of 400 in the national assembly. The party is almost entirely black in leadership and support. Especially in the aftermath of the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009 to 2018), the ANC is associated with corruption and poor service delivery. But, its support among blacks in rural areas remains strong, in part because of a system of welfare payments it established.  The formal opposition is the DA. Initially the party of whites and other racial minorities, it is trying to grow its support among black Africans. It is a pro-business party that emphasizes the constitution. It is also the “good government” party. Of the Government Performance Index’s top twenty, eleven are governed by the DA and an additional four are governed by coalitions that include the DA. Of the index’s twenty worst-governed municipalities, sixteen are led by the ANC, three by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a Zulu party, and one is a coalition between the ANC and IFP. Of the worst, nine are in KwaZulu/Natal, once dominated by IFP, now by the ANC. KwaZulu/Natal is the country’s second-largest province by population, and Zulu-speakers make up about a quarter of the population. Another seven are in the Eastern Cape, also long-dominated by the ANC.  Poor service delivery and ANC corruption are lively issues in the current campaign. Despite the index, the ANC is likely still to emerge from the elections as the largest party. Black Africans are about 80 percent of South Africa’s population, with minority races making up about 20 percent. They are significantly poorer than the racial minorities, and South Africa remains one of the world’s most unequal societies. Under these circumstances, most blacks who vote are likely to support the largely black ANC, though the end-of-apartheid-era sense of party loyalty could be wearing off. The ANC may well emerge with fewer seats than it did in 2015; should it fall below 50 percent—it currently holds 62 percent—of the seats in parliament, it would be forced to form a coalition government, drawing on the support of the country’s numerous minor parties that have seats in parliament under proportional representation. While that scenario is unlikely in 2019, if the ANC continues to erode, coalition government in 2023 becomes a real possibility.