Sub-Saharan Africa

South Africa

South Africa’s GNU: New Era or Ever More Difficult Slog?
South Africa has formed a governing majority; whether they can successfully govern remains to be seen. 

Blog Post by Michelle Gavin Jun 20, 2024

The Destructive Drive in African Politics
The descent into normlessness in various African countries calls for a new scholarly and policy approach.

Blog Post by Ebenezer Obadare Jan 2, 2024

Mutual Suspicion Grates U.S.-South Africa Relations
Tensions in the U.S.-South Africa relationship only heighten as both countries head towards national elections. 

Blog Post by Michelle Gavin May 3, 2024

  • South Africa
    Right-Wing White Party Releases Election Manifesto in South Africa
    In 1994, retired South Africa Defense Force general and Afrikaner tribal leader Constand Viljoen threw his support behind the move to replace apartheid with non-racial democracy. Had he opted otherwise, South Africa’s history would likely have been different. At the same time, he created a political party, the Freedom Front, to provide a political home for white, conservative Afrikaners in the new, non-racial South Africa. (The party’s name and structure has evolved; it is now called Freedom Front Plus.) In the 1994 elections, South Africa’s first conducted without racial qualification, the party won 424,555 votes, or 2.2 percent of the vote. In 2014, the party won 165,715 votes, or 0.9 percent of the total votes. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, that translated into four seats in parliament. Viljoen’s goal has been achieved: conservative, white Afrikaners have a voice in contemporary South African politics, if very small.  Looking to the May 8 elections, the party rolled-out its election manifesto in early March. Party leader Pieter Groenewald’s speech was mostly in Afrikaans and sounded themes to be found on the white and coloured right. (‘Coloured’ is not a pejorative term in South Africa; coloureds regard themselves as a separate, not mixed, race. They are mostly Afrikaans-speaking, and many are members of the Dutch Reformed Church.) Among the points Groenewald made: Whites (and, presumably, coloureds) are not asking for special treatment. They are asking for equal treatment. Minorities are bullied. "Affirmative action" and "black economic empowerment" disadvantage whites and coloureds. Neither is any longer necessary because there are now more black university graduates than whites, and black economic empowerment has benefited only a tiny elite.  He urged party supporters to vote. Under proportional representation, every vote counts. Groenewald’s criticism of affirmative action and black economic empowerment is shared by many South Africans across the political spectrum. He apparently did not address the persistence of black poverty, white wealth, and the inequality between the two, a persistent blind spot among the Freedom Front and white groups on the right. Instead, he tapped into an Afrikaner sense of grievance—if whites in general have done well in post-apartheid South Africa, English speakers have done better than Afrikaners. It is difficult to imagine that the Freedom Front Plus will increase its share of the vote in the May elections. However, if it does so, it is likely to be at the expense of the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, which is the electoral home of most white and coloured South Africans. Perhaps the real significance of the Freedom Front Plus is that it is a vehicle for a tiny, largely disaffected minority to participate in South Africa’s post-apartheid democracy.
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 28, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    ANC Power Broker Arrested Prior to Elections in South Africa
    South Africa’s national elections will take place on May 8. Looking toward that event, the African national Congress (ANC) and its leader, state president Cyril Ramaphosa, is working to improve the party’s image, much besmirched by corruption and mafia-style assassinations. In March, a major power broker of the African National Congress (ANC) in Kwazulu-Natal, Mluleki Ndobe, was arrested for the murder of a rival ANC politician and whistleblower. The deceased, Sindiso Magaqa, had spoken out against public corruption in KwaZulu-Natal. Before he was eventually killed in July 2017, two of those who had supported him speaking out were also murdered. Others who have spoken out are sometimes forced into hiding. The former ANC leader and South African president, Jacob Zuma, is associated with corruption, called “state capture,” and general incompetence, for which he was forced out of power.  Why is Ndobe's indictment so late? Some South Africans speculate that other power brokers within the ANC protected him. In any event, Cyril Ramaphosa, is attempting to reform the party and to marginalize those associated with Zuma. The indictment advances that agenda. But thus far, he has enjoyed only limited success: Zuma’s power base is among the poor and the rural, while Ramaphosa’s is urban and includes the small black middle class. If the ANC does well in the upcoming elections, Ramaphosa’s hand will be strengthened. But, if ANC electoral support declines, the Zuma faction may be resurgent.  Though anti-corruption efforts may sometimes dominate politics, the elephant in the living room is that, since apartheid ended, social and economic change for most South Africans has been disappointing. The white minority still largely controls the economy, while the black majority remains poor; though visible, the black middle class remains small. That reality makes the ANC and Ramaphosa vulnerable and provides the basis for Zuma’s enduring support.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell March 20, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    Southern Africa’s Leaders Walking Anti-Corruption Tightrope
    Several southern African states are in the news for anti-corruption efforts. In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa has established a special tribunal to expedite state efforts to track down ill-gotten gains. In Mozambique, the former chief of the intelligence service and the former president’s son have been arrested in connection with a multi-billion dollar corruption scandal. In Angola, which also witnessed the arrest of a former president’s son last year, two sitting members of National Assembly from the ruling party were recently indicted on charges relating to corruption. These headlines are cheering to good governance advocates. However, in all three cases, the same party that held the reins of government when alleged corrupt practices occurred remains in power today. Southern Africa’s ruling parties are contorted in knots as they try to simultaneously protect their privileged position in the political and economic landscape while addressing the corruption that has corroded their popularity and integrity. The balancing act falls heavily on the shoulders of the region’s presidents, who must constantly calibrate how far to go in holding senior members of their own party to account, and to anticipate the invisible lines that, if crossed, would split the party or loosen their own grips on the party’s top spot. Thus, President Ramaphosa’s special tribunal will deal with cases brought by the Special Investigating Unit, which in turn investigates those cases referred by the president. It is all part of a web of authorities that allows the president considerable discretion in determining who will and will not be held accountable for past misdeeds. It remains to be seen whether the Mozambique arrests were merely responses to international pressure, useful theater before October’s elections, or whether they will lead to convictions and, finally, a full accounting for the hidden loan scandal first exposed in 2016. Many of Angolan President João Lourenço’s reforms can be understood as moves to consolidate his power and break the hold of former President José Eduardo dos Santos’s old guard—whether the state will operate in a fundamentally more transparent way going forward remains an open question—although there are some encouraging signs. Because the internal balancing act is so difficult, and so urgent, it is likely to consume most of the energy, attention, and political will of these leaders and their governments, with potentially far-reaching implications. Managing an anti-corruption drive as an internal party affair may mean missing an opportunity to strengthen democratic accountability in a country overall. Equally, as the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s tepid response to crisis in Zimbabwe and fraudulent elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo suggests, this delicate internal work leaves little appetite for bold strokes or clear regional leadership in foreign affairs.
    Blog Post by Michelle Gavin March 6, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    The Economic Freedom Fighters, South Africa's Enfant Terrible
    On February 2, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) unveiled its election manifesto with spectacle and fiery rhetoric characteristic of its leader, Julius Malema. It reiterated its positions on land and mine ownership, called for the doubling of social grants (welfare payments), and for increases in spending on educational infrastructure and healthcare. It reached out to traditional leaders, such as tribal chiefs, who are powerful among the rural poor. However, the manifesto says little about how these reforms would be paid for. On this issue, EFF rhetoric rarely moves beyond “soak the rich.” Indeed, the manifesto largely ignores the imperative of economic growth. The EFF receives exaggerated media attention because of its radical economic policies and its use of anti-white dog whistles and sometimes overtly racist rhetoric. In the 2014 national elections, the party’s first ever, it received about 6 percent of the vote, and in the municipal elections in 2016, over 8 percent. While the governing African National congress (ANC) and the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) are in disarray, most observers doubt that it will break ten percent in the upcoming May 2019 national elections.  Nevertheless, the ANC at times appears terrified of the potential for the EFF to win over hitherto supporters of the ruling party in black townships and rural areas. The concern is well placed, as the EFF is likely to increase its share of the vote at the expense of the ANC. Accordingly, the ANC has adopted policies associated with the EFF that probably damage its own efforts to attract foreign investment. In particular, an EFF rallying cry has been “expropriation without compensation,” a reference to the government’s seizure of white-owned farmland and mines. Accordingly, the ANC supports a constitutional amendment that would allegedly make state confiscation of private property easier. Such rhetoric has the potential to “spook” private investors, both foreign and domestic, that are considered necessary for the resurgence of the economy. The EFF manifesto is largely coherent, internally consistent, and bound to be attractive to the many black South Africans who are disappointed in the current government’s perceived inability to deliver on its promises.  Poverty in South Africa remains overwhelmingly a black phenomenon, while whites have done well since the end of apartheid. Traditionally, the party of blacks has been the governing ANC, though it has always been nominally nonracial. Riddled with corruption and appearing increasingly incompetent, the ANC may well lose votes, though it is likely to retain its parliamentary majority (it currently holds 62.5 percent of seats in the National Assembly). The DA has failed to make itself relevant to the black majority, and it is hard to see it earning much more than the 22.2 percent of the vote it won in 2015. Hence the EFF could be the only party of the three to increase its share of the vote and gain seats in the National Assembly. With respect to local government, the EFF has already played a kingmaker role in some areas by shifting its support back and forth between the ANC and the DA. 
    Blog Post by John Campbell February 5, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    Zondo Commission Witness Details State Capture in South Africa
    In January 2018, Ramaphosa appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into “state capture,” the label commonly used in South Africa for government corruption. The head is Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. He is assisted by five other commissioners. The “Zondo Commission” holds hearings that are open to the public and broadcast live.  Of late, South Africans have been transfixed by the testimony to the Zondo Commission of Angelo Agrizzi detailing the extravagant bribes paid by companies to the highest level of the governing African National Congress (ANC), mostly in return for highly lucrative contracts. Agrizzi was the chief operating officer of Bosasa, a logistics company purchased by a white South African, Gavin Watson, who was celebrated for playing rugby with black Africans during apartheid in the 1970s. He used his “liberation” credentials to develop contacts with the ANC leadership. The granularity of Agrizzi’s testimony about the size and scope of the bribes Bosasa allegedly paid is titillating. He said bribes ranged from cases of expensive scotch to luxury automobiles to large sums of cash. While Zuma was named in Agrizzi's testimony, President Ramaphosa is also being investigated in connection with the corruption associated with Bosaso. Agrizzi claims that he received multiple offers of large sums of money if he would keep quiet. He did not. Subsequent to his cooperation with investigators, an audio recording surfaced in which he used insulting and racists languages when referring to South Africa's black majority. For some, this might invalidate Agrizzi's testimony. However, Raymond Zondo, while deploring the racist remarks, said, “What I heard there is extremely offensive but that does not mean I will not examine your evidence to figure out where you’re speaking the truth and where not.”   Ramaphosa and Zuma are still locked in a struggle for dominance in the ANC, with Ramaphosa slowly consolidating his position. Nevertheless, Zuma retains substantial ANC support, especially in the rural areas. Testimony from the Zondo Commission is unlikely to significantly erode this base of support. As of now, South Africa's elections are scheduled for May. The chief opposition to the ANC comes from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The DA is the official opposition and the second largest party in parliament. A DA victory will probably require a coalition with minor parties and even part of the ANC, should it split. The EFF is radical in its economic policy and pushes, among other things, for the expropriation of white-owned land without compensation. It is noisy, but it is unclear whether its support will reach double-digits. The DA is trying to exploit politically the testimony emerging from the Zondo commission, but it is still widely perceived as the “white” party despite its black leader, Mmusi Maimaine. It has its own internal conflicts and a history of ineptness in appealing to an overwhelmingly black electorate. At the January 2019 World Economic Forum in Davos, South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa was blunt about corruption in South Africa: “We’ve gone through a challenging number of years, nine years to be exact, where we seemed to lose our way, where we deviated from the path that you traditionally would have expected us to traverse.” He was clearly referring to the Jacob Zuma presidency. However, the Agrizzi's testimony alleges that corruption preceded Zuma and implies that it continues under Ramaphosa.  It seems unlikely that the results of the Zondo Commission will influence significantly the May elections, but even so, the public aspect of the hearings is highly positive in terms of establishing a political culture of accountability and transparency, however disconcerting it might be for the ANC leadership at the moment.
    Blog Post by John Campbell February 1, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    Reconciling the South African Military’s Mission With Its Budget
    Todd Johnson has written in the Daily Maverick an insightful oped on the mismatch between what the government asks and expects the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) to do and the amount of money allocated to them. The SANDF budget declined again for this fiscal year and stands at around 1 percent of GDP. (By contrast, the budget for education is just under 5 percent of GDP.)  The SANDF deploys as part of UN and African Union peacekeeping missions across the continent, most notably in Central African Republic, where, in 2013, three hundred SANDF personnel held off thousands of Seleka rebels in what came to be known as the Battle of Bangui, and Democratic Republic of Congo, where UN peacekeepers have the “unique mandate to conduct preventative combat operations.” The SANDF also helps police South Africa’s borders and participates in Pretoria’s anti-poaching operations. In addition, Pretoria asks the military to do a number of things not usually associated with the armed forces. For example, military personnel were sent to control a pollution outbreak in the Vaal River. The government also deploys units of the SANDF to areas in South Africa experiencing jumps in crime. Johnson’s ire is not just that the budget is low per se, but that the South African government continues to ask more from the SANDF while at the same time reducing its budget year after year. President Cyril Ramaphosa has indicated that he will seek to realign and reinvigorate South Africa’s foreign policy after it lost its way under former President Jacob Zuma, but to do so, he will need to match those ambitions with what he is willing to budget for the SANDF. In addition to budget woes, the SANDF also faces issues regarding unsustainably high personnel costs, politicization of military operations, and the responsibility for the health care for veterans (as of 2011). The SANDF is commonly regarded as the best trained and best supplied military force in southern Africa, though both have slipped, especially during the Zuma presidency. Nevertheless, the SANDF retains the potential for being a force of stabilization in the region. South Africa is democratic and conducted according to the rule of law. Unlike elsewhere in Africa, the government, dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), is responsive to public opinion. Despite the wealth of the white minority, a few black oligarchs, and an emerging but still weak black middle class, most South Africans see themselves as poor. For many, perhaps most, health, housing, and educational opportunities for their children are much greater priorities than the SANDF or a reinvigorated foreign policy. This is a reality that constrains Ramaphosa’s foreign policy ambitions and the SANDF funding necessary to support it. 
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 11, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • Ethiopia
    David Pilling's African Year in Review
    David Pilling has written a review of what he sees as some of the most important African events of 2018 for the Financial Times, a highly influential paper with respect to Western perspectives of Africa, published in London. He recalls the popular challenge now underway against Omar al-Bashir’s rule in Sudan; the deaths of Kofi Annan, the first African secretary General of UN, and Winnie Mandela, a flawed leader of the South African liberation movement; the highly positive emergence of the reform-minded Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian prime minister; and the international attention to Congolese surgeon Denis Mukwege, who won a Nobel Peace prize for his work with rape victims. He notes a continent-wide growth rate of 2.7 percent that was highly uneven: disappointing in Nigeria and South Africa, while among the highest in the world in Ghana, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Senegal and Tanzania.  His “five things that shook Africa in 2018,” and my comments: The African Continental Free Trade Area: I agree with Pilling’s characterization of it as a “step in the right direction.” Over time, and in concert with other factors such as infrastructure development, it has the potential for transforming African trade and therefore development. It is to be hoped that the big hold-out, Nigeria, will eventually sign-on. South Africa, the other hold-out, already has. Abiymania: Prime Minister Ahmed’s political reforms in Ethiopia are remarkable so far. I wholeheartedly endorse the enthusiasm for Ahmed and the new possibilities he has created domestically and internationally, such as the rapprochement with Eritrea. Zimbabwe’s flawed election: I do not believe that it was realistic to expect much change given the ZANU-PF’s continuing grip on power. Mugabe’s departure was just that, and little else. Bobi Wine: The Ugandan rapper is challenging the hold of autocrat Yoweri Museveni. While encouraging, it remains to be seen how much staying power he has at the moment. It is definitely something to keep an eye on. The China debt scare: I believe that it is much exaggerated, and I generally agree with Pilling’s point that, irrespective of the actual seriousness of African debt to China, it has certainly drummed up a lot of interest in Africa, and, for better or worse, was a central theme in the Trump administration's rhetoric around the new Africa strategy, if not its substance. Instead of Zimbabwe’s flawed elections, the rise of Bobi Wine, and the China debt scare on Pilling’s list, I would add: The change of leadership in South Africa: Removing Jacob Zuma and replacing him with Cyril Ramaphosa, all done according to party procedure and the rule of law, is no small feat. President Ramaphosa’s turn-around of governance in South Africa, especially his efforts to dismantle the corruption networks associated with former president Jacob Zuma, is encouraging. Though there is much to be done, Ramaphosa has deftly managed a divided ANC. Boko Haram’s resurgence: It poses a serious challenge to President Muhammadu Buhari’s reelection and could further destabilize the Giant of Africa, threatening the stability of its neighbors and the lives of millions of those displaced by the violence. Ebola’s resurgence in eastern Congo: Ebola appears no longer to be episodic but is now becoming endemic. By itself, it poses a major challenge to public health, if not of the same magnitude as HIV/AIDS. The real issue is that the outbreak, now present in some urban areas, is occurring in a highly-populated conflict zone near international borders during election season.  But, Pilling’s bottom line is right: “the continent took baby steps towards a brighter future.”  For what it is worth.
    Blog Post by John Campbell January 10, 2019 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    South Africa's New Director of Public Prosecutions
    President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa selected Shamila Batohi to the new national director of public prosecutions (NDPP) for a single ten-year term. As NDPP, Batohi will head the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which, as its name implies, determines who to prosecute and who not to prosecute on behalf of the state.  The NPA is accountable to parliament with the Minister of Justice (who sits in parliament) having final authority over prosecutions. Contrary to the spirit of the constitution, the office has been a political football, and no national director has ever remained in office for a full term. Especially during the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–2017), state-linked corruption escalated, with accusations that the president’s cronies were complicit in “state capture.” Zuma ensured that the NDPP was sympathetic to him and his supporters, but the Constitutional Court determined that Zuma’s final appointment to chief prosecutor, Shaun Abrahams, was illegal, and he was forced to step down. Hence, President Cyril Ramphosa had the opportunity to fill the position. The president of South Africa may appoint a NDPP under his or her own authority. Ramaphosa, however, as a first step to de-politicize the NPA appointed a selection panel to vet applicants in a public process. The panel then submitted a short list to Ramaphosa, from which he selected Batohi. Batohi has a distinguished resume. She has been a senior advisor to the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague since 2009, where she remained untouched by Zuma-era scandals. Earlier, she served as the director of public prosecutions for fifteen years in KwaZulu-Natal. According to the Indian media, she is of Indian origin. Zuma and his allies have never hesitated to play the race card, and they are doing so now with respect to the Batohi appointment, though apparently to no effect. More seriously, the NPA will likely address in the near future numerous cases involving members of the former Zuma administration and his supporters still in office. Ramaphosa ran as a reformer against Zuma’s preferred candidate for leader of the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party since the end of apartheid, but Ramaphosa was himself Zuma’s deputy president and thus a central part of the Zuma administration. Hence the position’s sensitivity. Nevertheless, this episode illustrates certain characteristics of South Africa and the Ramaphosa administration, at least thus far. The first is that South Africa has a depth of internationally-recognized legal talent that other African states can only envy. The second is the strength and independence of the court system: it was the constitutional court that found illegal Zuma’s NDPP appointment of a close political ally. The third is that the process of removing one NDPP and the appointment of another was done entirely according to the law.  Of course, it remains to be seen if the new chief prosecutor will aggressively pursue corruption cases, especially within the ruling ANC, of which Ramaphosa is the head. However, Batohi’s background and previous performance is encouraging.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 11, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    Mandela Anniversaries Marked by Star-Studded Global Citizen Fundraiser
    Nelson Mandela was born on July 1, 1918, and passed away on December 5, 2013. So, this year marks the centenary of his birth and December 5 the fifth anniversary of his death. At the huge FNB Stadium in Johannesburg on December 2, more than one hundred thousand people participated in the Global Citizen Festival: Mandela 100, sponsored by the Motsepe Foundation. The event raised some $7 billion in commitments for the relief of poverty across the African continent, from big corporations, governments, and small donors. Performers included Beyonce, Jay-Z, and Usher, and speakers included a variety of South African political, economic, and traditional leaders, as well as Mandela’s family. In the audience was Oprah, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and numerous other heads of state. The event, hosted in part by South African comedian Trevor Noah, showed that Nelson Mandela’s international appeal is undiminished. Within South Africa, Nelson Mandela remains the national icon and a unifying figure in a society fractured by race and class. Nevertheless, criticism of him persists and is growing, especially among radical political figures. Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe dictator deposed by his deputy and military in November 2017, has been especially vocal in his criticism. He, along with some South African critics, argued that during the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy, Mandela conceded too much to the white minority and preserved their white privilege. They note that the gulf between the wealth of white people and everybody else is greater now than it was under apartheid. (The event itself was marred by numerous muggings as the crowd broke up to go home.) The persistence of black poverty and the slow pace of social change fuels criticism of Mandela. Among these critics, there is little understanding of the limits imposed by political and power realities at the time of the transition: the apartheid state retained full control of the security services and was far from defeated. The transition was therefore a negotiated settlement in which the apartheid government, led by the National Party's F.W. de Klerk, ceded political power to the black majority while preserving white economic power. Some years after their death, national heroes often face critical reappraisals which take historical realities little into account. With respect to Mandela, that process has started in South Africa, but the dominant narrative remains that Mandela’s achievements in bringing South Africa to non-racial democracy in the context of the ideals of racial reconciliation were extraordinary. 
    Blog Post by John Campbell December 4, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    South Africa National Elections Scheduled for May 2019
    The South African Independent Electoral Commission has announced that national elections will occur on a Wednesday between May 7 and the end of the month in 2019. The three leading parties will be the governing African National Congress (ANC) led by current state President Cyril Ramaphosa; the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) led by Mmusi Maimane; and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema. The ANC, the party of Nelson Mandela, has been the governing party since the 1994 transition from apartheid to “non-racial” democracy. Ideologically, it is a broad church. It has been the party of the black majority, which comprises about 80 percent of the population. However, it is tarnished by corruption and poor governance associated with the former party leader and state president, Jacob Zuma. The DA is center-right, and in South Africa’s racial calculus, has been the party of whites, coloreds, and, increasingly, Asians. It is aggressively seeking black electoral support, and its leader Maimane is black. The EFF has radical economic and social policies; among other things, it calls for the expropriation of white-owned property without compensation. At the last parliamentary elections in 2014, of the 400 seats in parliament, the ANC won 249; the DA won 89; the EFF won 25. Six other parties also altogether hold the remaining seats, a reflection of South Africa’s system of proportional representation.  As he looks to the national elections in 2019, Ramaphosa is still seeking to consolidate his authority within the ANC in the aftermath of a bitter fight for its leadership. That effort will be helped if the ANC exceeds expectations in the 2019 elections, even if the number of seats it wins is fewer than in 2014. However, if the ANC performs below the expectations of the moment, Ramaphosa will be weakened and perhaps even exposed to possible removal. To become a credible party of government, the DA will need to expand its electoral appeal beyond racial minorities that altogether are only about 20 percent of the population. Its leaders are looking to make inroads among hitherto black middle-class support for the ANC. Despite its frequent media coverage, which is largely due to its fiery rhetoric, the EFF remains on the fringe.  This far in advance of the 2019 elections, predicting the outcome is a mug’s game. Many scenarios are possible, including a merger or alliance of the EFF with the ANC. (Julius Malema was once in charge of the ANC’s youth league until he had a falling out with Zuma.) Moreover, if the DA, EFF, and the minor parties increase their share of the vote, and if the ANC’s drops below 50 percent, then coalition scenarios become possible. Nevertheless, as in most democracies, incumbency is an advantage, and the ANC also benefits from being the party of the black majority. In South Africa, race is likely to continue to be the greatest predictor of electoral behavior, if perhaps less so than in the past.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell November 14, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    South African Voters: Results Matter More Than Party
    For many South Africa watchers, it can be difficult to conceive of the state as a separate entity from the ruling African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is so closely associated with the long struggle against apartheid, the birth of a democratic state, and the founding leadership of modern South Africa that it can seem fundamental to the country’s identity. Notwithstanding some opposition parties’ important gains in local elections in recent years, many analysts and journalists cover the ANC’s internal debates and power struggles as if they were synonymous with national political contests—and for good reason, because to date they largely have been. For obvious reasons, the blurring of lines between the party and the state raises concerns about the extent of corruption in South Africa, as well as questions about the strength and resilience of South Africa’s democracy. But, South African voters may have a much easier time envisioning a South Africa that is not governed by the ANC than is typically assumed. Recently released polling from Afrobarometer suggests a meaningful decline among South African voters with a strong sense of party loyalty, particularly among young, educated urban voters. For the first time in eighteen years of polling, over half of respondents considered themselves nonpartisan. For these voters, their own sense of identity does not overlap with party affiliation. They are unlikely to be moved by nostalgic campaign appeals based on liberation credentials. They are dissatisfied with their government, wish to enjoy more personal and economic security, and are likely to cast their votes for any party they believe can deliver on these core issues. In fact, the Afrobarometer survey found a solid majority would forfeit fundamental democratic rights if they could be assured of strong government performance on service delivery, which suggests that the country’s fundamental national values may be far different from the way they are conventionally described and understood.  The numbers suggest that external and internal narratives about South Africa may be diverging, and that those genuinely trying to understand the South African state may need to consider a broader range of political possibilities going forward. They also underscore the challenge before new President Cyril Ramaphosa as he approaches next year’s elections. Ramaphosa will need to attract voters unmoved by the historic triumphs of the ANC and convince them that the same ANC that has so dissatisfied them can achieve the results they crave on employment, security, and housing—all while managing the fraught internal politics of the party itself.
    Blog Post by Michelle Gavin November 9, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    South Africa Continues to Grapple With Zuma-Era Corruption
    Corruption has become a burning political issue in South Africa, particularly in the final years of Jacob Zuma’s abridged term in office. The faces of South Africa's Zuma-linked corruption were the three Gupta brothers: Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh. They immigrated from Uttar Pradesh in India in 1993, and the family has since become enormously rich; Ajay was commonly thought to be among the richest people in South Africa with a fortune of some $700 million. The Guptas were close to Zuma, whose son worked for them. They are accused of “state capture,” influence peddling, contract skimming, and numerous other white collar crimes.  For the past several months, the Zondo Commission has been investigating high-level corruption, including that allegedly perpetrated by the Gupta brothers. Amidst Zuma’s fall from power a house they owned was raided by police and warrants issued for their arrest. The Gupta brothers are currently based in Dubai. They have been at the center of controversy for many years, implicating in their alleged corruption consulting giants KPMG and McKinsey, and British public relations firm Bell Pottinger in 2017. Shortly thereafter, in October 2017, the Financial Times reported that the FBI had opened an investigation into the activities of the Gupta brothers’ nephews—American citizens living in Texas—and their links to the brothers. The UK government at the time was also probing ties to HSBC and Standard Chartered. The Guptas are declining to leave Dubai and return to South Africa to testify before the commission, but it is important to note that they have thus far been formally charged with little, convicted of nothing, and deny wrongdoing. Many or most South Africans believed that Zuma oversaw massive corruption as president, especially in state-owned enterprises. His administration is also judged by many as having badly managed the economy, in part because of personnel decisions influenced by outsiders for their own benefit. Zuma tried to move the government in an authoritarian direction, but he was largely blocked by the country’s independent judiciary, a lively parliamentary opposition, and a highly vocal civil society and free media. President Cyril Ramaphosa, then his deputy, successfully drove Zuma from office before the latter’s presidential term ended in the face of widespread popular distaste for Zuma and his association with corruption. Nevertheless, Zuma retains significant political support within the ANC, among the rural poor, and especially among his fellow Zulus, who are about a quarter of South Africa’s population.  Ramaphosa reportedly was initially reluctant for the commission to go ahead, but, in the end, he had no choice because of various judicial rulings and parliamentary pressure. Once the commission began its work, Ramaphosa’s allies (and perhaps Ramaphosa himself) hoped that the commission would illustrate that the ANC could clean up its own house. Instead, according to critics in the media, the commission has shown that corruption was pervasive within the party. It is too soon to say what the impact of the investigations into the Guptas and corruption elsewhere will be on the national elections, likely to take place in the first half of 2019. Though it is changing slowly, up to now, voting has largely been along racial lines. The ANC is officially "multiracial,” but it has been the party of choice for the eighty percent of the population that is black and mostly poor, and therefore, since 1994, has dominated the country’s politics. Even if the commission's findings do not translate into opposition votes, it will promote government transparency and the rule of law. 
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 24, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    South African Finance Minister Nene Resigns Amid Political Pressure
    On October 9, President Cyril Ramaphosa accepted the resignation of Nhlanhla Nene as finance minister. Critics are accusing Nene of lying about the frequency of his contacts with the notorious Gupta family, which is now being investigated for “state capture.” He is also accused of somehow facilitating a deal involving his son, a Mozambican refinery, and a state financing agency. For his part, Nene has apologized for understating the number and location of his meetings with the Guptas, but has denied any involvement in his son’s businesses. He has been not been charged with any wrongdoing so far.  While finance minister under former President Jacob Zuma, Nene countered successfully the erstwhile president’s efforts with the Guptas to fund a poorly conceived nuclear power initiative—from which it is likely they would have personally benefited. Further, Nene has provided devastating testimony about Zuma and the Guptas before the current Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, known as the Zondo Commission. Nene was regarded as a “white hat” during the dark days of Zuma's administration, and was eventually fired in 2015. But Ramaphosa’s enemies within the ANC, as well as in the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), put intense political pressure on Nene to go once he acknowledged the full extent of his meeting with the Guptas. It is unclear what effect this will have on the ANC’s chances in the upcoming elections. Ramaphosa has launched an initiative, “New Dawn,” that looks to rejuvenate South Africa’s economy and clean up corruption within the ANC and state-owned enterprises. He is arguing to the electorate that the ANC is able to “self-correct,” and Nene’s departure strengthens this position. The DA and the EFF counter, arguing that there is no “good” ANC and “bad” ANC, but only one ANC, and that it should be voted out of power. The accusations against Nene would appear politically to have undercut the credibility of Ramaphosa’s anti-corruption policies, even though Nene’s sins appear venial, if indeed they exist at all. Ramaphosa also faces opposition within the ANC. Zuma still has supporters within the party, reflecting at least in part his success in building patronage networks. Some of them stand to lose from Ramaphosa’s anitcorruption drive, and they likely applauded Nene’s departure. In Nene's place, Ramaphosa appointed Tito Mboweni as the new finance minister. He was the first black governor of the South African Reserve Bank, holding the post from 1999 to 2009. During his tenure, he increased South Africa’s reserves from $10 billion to $40 billion. He later worked for Goldman Sachs and served on various corporate boards. He is not expected to change Nene’s policies significantly, and business confidence in him is reflected in the recovery of the Rand after falling with Nene’s departure. Although Mboweni apparently supported Ramaphosa’s chief rival, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in the 2017 ANC leadership race, his presence in the cabinet is likely to strengthen Ramaphosa’s hand.  The Nene episode shows that Ramaphosa takes seriously attacks on the credibility of his reform program, especially as the elections draw nearer. Nene, a reformer himself, likely did not want to jeopardize Ramaphosa's efforts against corruption. Hence his resignation. (Especially under Zuma, ministers were fired rather than resigning.) Ramaphosa may well bring Nene back into his administration after the elections conclude.
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 10, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    Murders Within South Africa’s ANC Reflect Growing Divide
    The New York Times has published a long article on internecine murder within South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC). The victims are mostly local politicians, typically rivals of those entrenched in the party’s machinery and its corruption, and killings take place mostly in rural KwaZu-Natal. During the nine years that Jacob Zuma led the party and was chief of state, portions of the ANC increasingly came to resemble a criminal conspiracy. In some ways, the current round of killings resembles a feud among Mafiosi. Crispian Olver, once an ANC operative, in How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay, profiled ANC political corruption in Port Elizabeth, located in the Eastern Cape. KwaZulu-Natal is Zuma’s political base, and he remains active there. He reportedly has been seeking to sabotage his successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa. His fellow Zulus are about a quarter of South Africa’s population and a large majority of the population of KwaZulu-Natal. Zuma is especially strong in the rural areas, where he has allied himself with the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini. Zuma is increasingly the voice of traditional, nativist rural dwellers opposed to the de-tribalized, urban, and modern elements of the ANC led by Ramaphosa. KwaZulu, which was later incorporated into the province of Natal in 1994 to form Kwazulu-Natal, was a self-governing homeland under apartheid, and has long been violent. During the dismantling of apartheid and the run-up to the country’s first non-racial election in 1994, there was a veritable civil war in the homeland between the ANC, led by Zuma, and the rival Inkatha Freedom Party, led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and probably egged on by the apartheid security services. After the end of apartheid, Zuma and the ANC became dominant in the province and his new ally, King Zwelithini, was a rival of Buthelezi in Zulu politics. KwaZulu in some ways resembles Native American reservations. The land is under the control of a tribal trust that in turn is run by the obscurantist king. Within the tribal trust territories, there is no fee-simple ownership of land, and farmers have no security of tenure, reinforcing the political power of the king. Ending this system has long been a goal of those who advocate land reform, along with the push to increase black ownership of land. Despite the image of Nelson Mandela, internecine violence was also characteristic of the ANC during the struggle against apartheid. It was especially notable in ANC fighter camps outside of South Africa, where “apartheid spies” were murdered with no due-process and with the suspicion of trumped-up charges by political rivals. Jacob Zuma, chief of ANC intelligence in Zambia, has been linked to such murders, but he has never been tried or convicted.  Violence between members of the ANC in rural KwaZulu-Natal occurs far away from modern, sophisticated Johannesburg, Cape Town, and even nearby Durban. The internal politics within the ANC is therefore understandably very different in these urban areas from what goes on in rural areas. In so many ways, South Africa is a developed country with a modern infrastructure, the rule of law, and strong protection of human rights on the one hand, and a developing country on the other. For example, the constitution has sweeping guarantees of the equality of women, while King Goodwill tries to enforce patriarchy within his dominions. To an extent, Ramaphosa is caught in the middle as he prepares for elections in early 2019. To preserve its parliamentary majority, the ANC is dependent on its rural base—and on KwaZulu-Natal. Hence, his critics credibly claim, his reluctance to clamp down on the ANC there.  
    Blog Post by John Campbell October 4, 2018 Africa in Transition
  • South Africa
    A Conversation With Cyril Ramaphosa
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    ALTMAN: Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to the Council and welcome to the David Rockefeller Lecture and in particular to some members of Mr. Rockefeller’s family who are with us today. Welcome especially to you. I’d like to remind everybody that this meeting is on the record. And please, if you haven’t already, turn off your mobile devices, all eight of them. (Laughter.) We are fortunate today to have with us President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa. Most of you in this room probably know that he has played a very central role in the evolution of a democratic South Africa. He was the chief negotiator for the ANC during the transition to democracy. He largely created and built up the biggest trade union in South Africa, the miners’ union, the mineworkers’ union. He previously served as deputy president for four years, beginning in 2014, and he became the fifth president of South Africa just this February. He also had a sterling business career, one of South Africa’s very most successful and wealthiest business leaders. So it’s my pleasure—(laughter)—he seems to be disagreeing with that characterization. (Laughter.) So it’s my great pleasure to introduce President Ramaphosa. He’s going to deliver just a few minutes of introductory comments, then I’m going to return to the stage and question him for twenty-five or thirty minutes, and then all of you here will have your opportunity to question him as well. Thank you, sir. (Applause.) RAMAPHOSA: Thank you, Program Director, the Rockefeller family, honored guests, and ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity, brief as it might be, to share with you some perspectives on the challenges and opportunities which I was asked to address on the global environment. As you would all be aware, this year South Africa, and indeed a number of our partners and friends in many countries, are celebrating the centenary of the founding father of our democracy, Nelson Mandela. And we have just come out of a United Nations celebration of two things. Firstly, we unveiled his life-size statue at the United Nations, which we were deeply humbled as South Africans to have been given this prime spot in the United Nations to have Nelson Mandela, with his fully stretched arms, adorning the precinct of the United Nations. We also had, and it is continuing, the Nelson Mandela peace summit in which many countries, represented by their heads of state and government, speaking about peace in the world. This celebration has provided us with an opportunity, not only as South Africans but all peace-loving people in the world, to reflect on the progress we have made with regard to ourselves as South Africans on our young democracy and the tasks that lie ahead. It has also reinforced the need for South Africa to unite, to build on the legacy of Nelson Mandela, in working towards a peaceful and just and prosperous world. Nelson Mandela has taught us many things, and we continue to draw wisdom and strength from the way that he worked and what he stood for in everything that we continue to do. We remain inspired by the role he played as a bridge builder and seek to follow his example in bringing together divergent views and perspectives. At this moment in global history, as we seek to navigate the challenges confronting the political, the security, and economic architecture that has evolved over the last 70 years, we are convinced that the value of Nelson Mandela’s approach to consensus-building and his way of resolving problems and difficult situations is instructive. This view is reinforced by a number of disturbing global developments. The resurgence of geopolitical rivalry, which has not been experienced since the Cold War era, has huge implications for international peace and security. There is a growing challenge to important multilateral arrangements, and indeed to the multilateral architecture of the world, which is characterized by the withdrawal from commitments made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, on issues such as climate change, financing for development, and in nuclear nonproliferation. The rise of trade protectionism also threatens the multilateral trading system that was agreed upon on Marrakesh in 1994, as well as in Doha in 2001. There appears to be little prospect for the resolution of intractable conflicts in the Middle East and in Africa, nor has the international community managed to effectively address growing political intolerance, acts of terrorism, and right-wing extremism. While globalization has brought many and huge opportunities and much progress, it has also contributed to growing inequality among states, as well as within states. These challenges are by no means insurmountable. However, they do require a return to what I would call a cooperative and inclusive approach to international relations. The idea that might is right is wrong. There is an opportunity for world leaders, international organizations, and civil society to find ways of working together to restore the primacy and the relevance of multilateralism. At the same time, we need to emphasize the importance of a more proactive approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. We can do that by paying particular attention to preventative diplomacy, which should be supported through closer coordination and partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations such as the African Union in the case of Africa, our continent. We need to strengthen the rules-based international trading system and move with speed to transform other multilateral institutions and global governance structures to be in line with the current realities of the 21st century. This should include reform of the U.N. Security Council, which is limited in its ability to respond to current security challenges by virtue of its structure and its composition and relative lack of accountability. For the global development agenda to succeed, we have to ensure the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its means of implementation, the climate change Paris Agreement, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development. To do so, we need to build meaningful partnerships between U.N. member states, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. I’ve just come out of a meeting of the Global Compact—the U.N. Global Compact—where more than ten thousand private-sector organizations have signed up to be part of the Global Compact. It’s wonderful to see how the private sector has signed up to assist the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. As South Africa, we are determined to use every means at our disposal, including our participation in global forums, to advance the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and to consolidate regional integration. We are working together with our fellow African countries to establish the Continental Free Trade Area, which would fundamentally transform Africa’s economies and consolidate the continent’s position in the global trading system. This dream of a single African market for goods and services has been made possible by sustained economic growth that many African countries have experienced over the past few years. They have also experienced greater political stability over the past few years, and we are now beginning to look forward to the dividend of peace and the dividend of having a common market. Despite the progress, however, there are still areas where instability and conflict on our continent continue to cause great misery and hardship to ordinary people. We are still confronting challenges in places like South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and areas on the Great Lakes, and a number of other countries in the Sahel region. South Africa will continue to play its part in conflict resolutions in these areas and in combating threats to region and international peace and security. South Africa will take up a non-permanent seat on the Security Council from next year to December 2020. We will dedicate our tenure on the Security Council to continue the legacy of Nelson Mandela, whose values of peace, reconciliation, and respect continues to inspire Africa and, indeed, the whole world. In line with the philosophy and practice of the Mandela years, South Africa continues to seek warm fraternal relations and strong economic ties with all countries of the world, regardless of size, influence, or alignment. We remain firmly committed to rules-based multilateralism as the most sustainable and effective approach to the management of international relations. And we will continue to advocate for the needs and interests of developing countries to be placed at the top of the international agenda. And we will continue also to advocate that South-South relations should be strengthened and should be advanced, as we seek all countries to develop and to prosper. I thank you. (Applause.) You want me to sit down here or to stand or to kneel. (Laughter.) ALTMAN: You know, this isn’t particularly a business audience or necessarily an entirely—certainly entirely one, but there’s probably nothing more reassuring to businesspeople than to have the newly minted leader of a major country like South Africa come here and talk about dividend policy. So that was very welcome. (Laughter.) I’m going to begin with a couple of questions about foreign policy from a South Africa point of view and then ask you a few questions on the domestic side. But you made some very, I thought, encouraging comments about the way you will think about your seat on the Security Council and your approach to multilateralism and the way you view some of the geopolitical tensions as you talked about from trade to climate to nuclear proliferation. Let me ask you about relationships with the United States. Our president said a couple of months ago that he wanted the State Department to look into issues of land seizure and the killing of farmers. And you responded rather sharply to the effect, I think it’s fair to say, that that was a South African internal issue. My question is, have you been able to clear this up with this administration? Or is this still a sore? RAMAPHOSA: Well, I regret to say that I think President Trump was ill informed about what is happening in South Africa. And I think if he had taken time to get better information from us, he would have been much better informed and his comments would have been better appreciated by South Africans. Now, we have sent clear messages to the State Department and indeed to the U.S. government about the process that we are involved in. We are involved in a process of consultation and broad discussion on the land issue. And I have often said that the land issue was the original sin that was committed in South Africa when colonialists came. When they came, they took land from the indigenous people of the country, and over the number of years, laws were passed to prevent black people from owning land. And they then took eighty-seven percent of the land for themselves, they appropriated that, and only allocated thirteen percent of the land to the indigenous majority people of South Africa. Now, that has remained a wound and a sore over the many years. And I’ve often said that the ANC, the party that I lead, was founded in 1912 around the land issue. The founders of the ANC got together and said we want to get our land back. And they engaged in negotiations and deputations to try and get a portion of the land back. And over time, they even crafted a charter through which they said the land must be shared amongst those who work it, meaning that there should be sharing of the land as there should be sharing of the wealth. And they were sending a very clear message to those who had abrogated onto themselves the majority portion of the land of South Africa. And throughout the years, the message was never heeded and it led to an armed struggle. But fortunately, we had a great leader and many other leaders, like Nelson Mandela, who then finally led the country to a peaceful resolution. And that peaceful resolution sought to deal with the land issue. And over the past twenty-four years, the skewed ownership of land has continued, and a greater problem of it is that land being a great economic asset has not really been exploited as much as it should have in the hands of the majority of the people so that we can help to grow our economy. And what people have been saying is that we want access to land, and they have then said that let us then move towards having land being given to the majority of the people of South Africa. This, then, went to an ANC conference, which passed a resolution and said let us use a method of expropriating land. But we then said that should only happen—that should only happen in terms of our constitution, in terms of the rule of law. And that then started a process of—the parliamentary process of consulting our people. Up to now we’ve had 650,000 submissions and proposals that are now being currently considered by our parliament, and our parliament will come up with a report on what should be done. Part of the process could well be you amend the constitution to allow land to then be portioned out to the majority of our people, or you leave the constitution as it is and then utilize laws to do it, to achieve this objective. And we have said whatever finally happens, everything will be done in terms of the law. There will not be any land grab allowed in South Africa. We will follow—we’ll do it in terms of our constitution. We will also do it if—and obviously, we want to grow the economy of our country, to enhance the economic growth of our country, to increase agricultural production, and also to increase food security. And part of it is also to enable people to get pieces of land to build their houses because in the apartheid years that, too, was prevented. People were not allowed to live wherever they wanted. So what we are involved in is a wholesome process where we are listening to all our people. And some of the proposals that are coming forward are most exciting proposals. A number of companies that own land are coming forward and saying we want to give land away; we realize the injustice that was done in the past; we would like to participate in the resolution of this problem; so we have huge tracts of land to give away. We’ve got state-owned enterprises that are also going to be able to give land away. The state also owns land. That is also going to be in the pot of giving land away to our people. So we’ve got a number of solutions that are now coming to the fore. And with that—and forgive me for taking one more minute—with that, we believe that a solution is in hand. Now, we are doing all this relying on what I call our South African DNA. The DNA that is inbuilt in the way we do things is that which we were taught by Nelson Mandela. Nelson Mandela taught us that rather than resolve problems, however intractable they might be, through war/violence, resolve them through talking to one another. And we were able to resolve the apartheid nightmare through—which many people thought was intractable—we were able to resolve it by talking to one another, and we found a solution. Similarly, on this question of land—which, by the way, reared its head in 1996, when we drafted our constitution. We were then able to find a solution, and that solution has been found not to have been thorough enough. And now we are seeking to find a better way to resolve this problem. And I can assure you we are going to find a solution. We are going to put this problem to bed. We are largely going to be able to do so because proposals are coming to the fore, the bagful of proposals from a number of people, including landowners, including white landowners, who says we want to be part of the solution because we realize that this must be solved to secure stability for the country going forward. So our view is we need to manage this risk, and all of us as South Africans are united in our resolve to resolve this risk, to find solutions. And the solutions are coming to hand and we will be able to resolve this problem and move forward, as we did in 1994 and once again in 1996, when they drafted our constitution. So be rest assured, we are going to resolve it. And if Mr. Trump was here, I would have told him, Mr. Trump, be rest assured this problem is going to be solved in the typical South African way, because we’ve been able to solve our problems in the past. Thank you very much. ALTMAN: He is not a member of the Council. (Laughter.) Theoretically, my time as questioner is already almost up. (Laughter.) But let me turn the question or my attention to a couple of domestic issues. And let me start with the economy. RAMAPHOSA: Yes. ALTMAN: Just this past Friday you unveiled a seven-part economic-stimulus program— RAMAPHOSA: Yeah. ALTMAN: —and obviously an important step from the point of view of your administration. Step back for a moment and tell us how you view the South African economy right now. It appears to be in recession. What do you think it takes to get the South African economy growing at a level that you’d like, including the way this stimulus program will work? And just walk us through that, if you would. RAMAPHOSA: Well, when we got into power, we inherited an economy which was structurally aligned toward serving the interests of the minority. The majority of the people of South Africa were not owners, controllers, or managers of the economy. So you had an economy that was skewed, from a structural point of view, toward serving just a minority. And the majority people were just like bystanders; if not bystanders, just laborers. And it was constructed in that way for a particular purpose. The purpose was to perpetuate white-minority control. And when we got into office, we sought to manage this economy. And we managed it in a way where we said we are going to transform the economy. We’re going to transform it so that the economy serves the interests of all the people of South Africa. We are going to try to promote black economic empowerment so that black people should feel that they are participants in the economy, they own the economy as well, and they also get into leadership and management roles in the economy. That has been proceeding. But at the same time, the structure of our economy has proceeded in a way where even the IMF, looking at our economy, said this economy is dominated. Dominance of the major corporations in this economy impedes it from operating at its maximum level, because the concentration of ownership and control is just quite big. And it is an economy that was structured in a way where it was more extractive. It was based more on the extraction of minerals and selling minerals to international customers. And so it was based more on the minerals-extraction type of complex. And the manufacturing base was quite low, and over the years it has been going down most of the time. So with this type of economy, we then had to make means to see how best we can grow it. Over time, with the global economy being what it is, our economy has not been growing at the level that we expected to serve the interests of the people as a whole. And as a result, the government has had, particularly in the past few days, as our economy has entered what we call a technical recession—over two quarters it hasn’t shown growth—we’ve had to take steps as the government to try to give impetus to the economy by pumping money into the economy. But we are also constrained because our debt levels are very high and we’re servicing debt at a much higher level, and so our borrowing capacity is quite limited. So we’ve had to reprioritize our budget or our fiscal position with a view of finding money and pumping money into the economy. But we’ve also come up with an innovative idea of focusing on infrastructure as being one of the key drivers of our economy. So we’re going to be setting up an infrastructure fund in which we will pump up to four hundred billion rand to inject growth in the economy. That, we hope, will stand our economy in good stead. And we hope that it will increase spending from ordinary people and we will see more manufacturing picking up and our exports also going up. Our position—the strength of the rand has also been a bit of a problem. With the increase in the oil price, our position has not been greatly improved. But with the measures that we have put in place now, we are hoping that we will be able to return our economy to growth. At the same time, we will continue with the restructuring of our economy to enable black people to become active participants in the economy of our country. ALTERMAN: A question about corruption. You’ve talked about corruption regularly, and I watched an interview you gave just after announcing your stimulus program in which you talked about it again as an impediment at a lot of levels to South African progress. How do you think you can make changes in that? RAMAPHOSA: Well, we’ve been beset by corruption quite extensively over the past few years. Corruption started seeping into our body politic in our state-owned enterprises and a number of other government institutions. And that has led to a number of investors feeling that corruption is debilitating their enthusiasm to invest in our economy, together with other policy positions that had become inconsistent and uncertain. And we have now started, as part of this stimulus process, to reform, to embark on a number of reforms, reforms that are going to have an impact on our policy positions to make them more certain and more consistent as to be able to attract investment into our economy. But the other major issue that we’ve embarked on is to clean up, to clean up state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises account for about thirty percent of the economy of our country. And a number of them have been subjected to a number of malpractices and corrupt activities that were being perpetrated in quite a number of them at management level and at board level. So we’re cleaning that up. We’re changing boards where it is necessary, and we’re removing those managers who have been complicit in all this, and they are going to be charged and they are going to have to be accountable through our criminal justice system. So cleaning up our institutions is part of a major project that we have embarked upon, which we hope and trust and believe is going to reposition our country, particularly our economy, in a way where we will become much more attractive to investors. And that is a process that I as president am firmly focused on to show that those who are complicit should be accountable and those who are found to have done wrong should be able to face the might of the law. Once we clean up our act in a number of state-owned enterprises as well as government departments, I think that will reposition South Africa. It will make South Africa much more attractive as an investment destination. We are going to be moving to an investment conference in October, where we are hoping to raise a hundred billion dollars over a five-year period. And this is the story that we’re going to put forward. We’re going to put forward a story of South Africa that is reforming, a story of South Africa that is being repositioned as to be able to be attractive once again to not only the international investing community, but also to the South African investing community, because a number of our own corporates had stopped investing or had gone slow on investing, and that repositioning effect is going to make South Africa much more attractive for investment. So we are focused on cleaning up, repositioning our country and our economy. And by the way, let me say one other thing. The corruption has not only been the preserve of the public sector, it’s not only been the preserve of government, state-owned enterprises, or government institutions. We’ve also found quite a lot of corruption in our corporates. A number of international companies have been complicit in the corruption that has permeated a number of our state-owned enterprises in our economy, and some of them have been involved in gigantic scandals of corruption that have led, I’m sad to say, to billions of rands being lost to pension funds, to insurance companies, and that has actually been quite a horrendous story that our country has gone through. So our clean-up act is both at public sector level as well as private sector level. And in the next few months, I’m sure that our state, our criminal justice system is going to be very busy in dealing with this matter. At the moment, we’ve got a commission of inquiry. That’s what we call it in our country. It’s an investigation body. But it’s busy dealing with what we call state capture, where certain individuals in certain companies sought to capture the state and perpetrate their corrupt activities. So it is investigating all that, and bringing it to the fore. And thanks to the existence of a free press in our country, we’ve been able to benefit from their investigative journalism, which has brought all this to the fore. And with this, I think we’re going to be able to clean up our act as a country and move forward with greater determination, knowing that we’ve dealt with the problems that have debilitated growth in our country. Thank you. ALTMAN: One last question from me before opening up to questions from the members. You’re also president of the ANC. RAMAPHOSA: Yes. ALTMAN: Just say a word or two about the way you look upon the party, the standing of the party with the public, whether you intend to pursue serious reforms in terms of the party, and that question.— RAMAPHOSA: The ANC was formed in 1912. It’s 106 years old, and has gone through moments of great growth and great glory. But it has also gone through moments of great weakness. We have just emerged from a conference, the 54th conference of the ANC, where I was elected, together with my colleagues, where the ANC admitted that over the past few years it had lost quite a lot of its positioning in the sense where it had become distant from the people, where people had lost confidence in it. And this was clearly demonstrated in the past elections that we had where the support of the ANC went down. And through that, it went through a cathartic moment of baring its chest and its soul to the people of our country. And at that conference it resolved that it must renew itself—in other words, clean up its act. It must unite itself, but it must also rid itself of corrupt activities, both inside the party and also in the government that we lead. So that decision has become the lodestar for me, from a policy point of view, of what needs to be done in the ANC. We are now in the process of renewing ourselves. We’re also in the process of uniting the ANC. And naturally, after a conference, people—particularly where one candidate and a few others won, naturally there will always be moments where you still need to piece everyone together. And this is where we are now. We’re continuously uniting our party, pulling everyone into what we call (“one call” ?) in South Africa, making sure that we look in the same direction. And that is beginning to bear fruit. And the party is renewing itself in the way that it functions, in the way that it finds ways of appealing to our people once again. The spirit of renewal, of what we call the new dawn, is spreading in the country. And people are feeling a lot more enthusiastic about the ANC’s position. And those who had become disillusioned are coming back as individuals, but a number of other organizations that the ANC used to work with are also coming back. Religious organizations and many others are gravitating more and more towards the ANC once again. So the ANC is finding traction once again. And I’m confident that it should be able to win the next elections quite easily, which will be held next year, before May of 2019. So we go to those elections renewed, united, and feeling much stronger than we have in the past. So the ANC is getting back its mojo, if one can say that; is getting back its strength. And it’s getting back its commitment to serve the people of South Africa, because that is what the ANC was formed to do. So the mojo is coming back. (Laughter.) ALTMAN: Let us please have some questions from the members. I just would like to remind everyone, President Ramaphosa is the only one speaking here today, so please ask questions. Reverend Jackson. Q: I think it’s fair to say that, because real leadership and (constituent ?) labor in the height of South Africa’s crisis, your own integrity and abilities is a breath of fresh air for the country. And we all thank you very much for those committed to the proposition. Secondly, how long will peace without the land issue being resolved be possible? Secondly, the view of this administration toward South Africa and Africa generally in terms of health care and trade and investment and land, where is the U.S. on that proposition? It referred to Africa as an s-hole. How does it really see you now? Lastly, out of the South African part of it, other African countries are not waiting for us. They’re really into China. Take a country like Guinea, for example. RAMAPHOSA: If you could raise your—yeah. Q: Take a country like— RAMAPHOSA: I think people are struggling at the back to hear you. Q: —a country like Guinea, for example. Do you relate to all countries at some level? So on a scale to five, and A being beginning, and graduate toward full relations, or do you just leave an all-or-nothing position on not relating to an African country? Because if you take all or nothing, there won’t be enough countries to relate to the continent. Do you follow me? Back up. While we are—while we are— ALTMAN: Can he answer what you’ve already asked first? Is that all right? Q: While we are both—(inaudible)—that makes it impossible for relations with other African countries as a nation, while we are dillying on that, China is investing, building roads and bridges, and we’re not. What can we do to expand our effort and influence in Africa? RAMAPHOSA: I struggled to hear some of those questions. ALTMAN: Well, I think you can—you can—it’s OK if you’re—if you answer those questions selectively, that’s just fine. (Laughter.) RAMAPHOSA: Well, maybe let me start with the one that you started with, how long will peace continue without the land question being resolved. It is imperative that the land issue be addressed and be resolved. I have no doubt in my mind that we will be able to resolve this question and we will come out with a solution that could lead to win-win outcomes for all, for current landowners and for those who do not have land, just as we did when we resolved the apartheid problem, because we resolved it between those who had the vote and those who did not have the vote. We were able to resolve it and find practical—a practical solution. Similarly, on this one, given as I was saying the number of proposals that are coming to the fore, the solutions to me are beginning to become more apparent. And I’m also encouraged and guided by what was set out in our Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter, which as I said was the lodestar document that led—got us to prosecute the struggle as we did, said on the land issue the land shall be shared amongst those who work it, period. And this is going to help inform the approach that we are also going to have on the land question. And the solutions that are being put forward by a number of South Africans—and let me immediately say there hasn’t been an issue that has involved and evoked such a broad-spectrum debate in South Africa since 1994, when we crafted our constitution. When we crafted our constitution, we went around the country and got submissions from 1.2 million South Africans who contributed to what our constitution is today. And today we’ve had 650,000 South Africans who have contributed to a possible solution to this. And already I can see a solution on the horizon because the determination of many South Africans is there. So can there be stability without resolving the land question? That is the real question. We all want stability. We all want progress in our country collectively as South Africans. And that stands out as the most important issue that all are seeking to achieve. So in order for us to achieve that stability, we’ve got to resolve this problem, and we are going to resolve it without any doubt. And once we do so, we will then be able to embark on a land reform project that is going to be all-encompassing. And maybe you can pause for a while and remember in your history studies that land has always been a big challenge in many, many countries around the world. Wars have been fought around land. People have died around—on the land issue. And what we are seeking to do is to find a happy medium—a happy medium that is going to avoid all those horrible outcomes. And we will do it. We are South Africans. We are Nelson Mandela’s children. We will do it in the way that he guided us and taught us to find a solution. That has been a lasting solution over the past twenty-four years. It has held together. The democracy that he bequeathed us has held together, and this too we’ll find a solution for and we will be able to chart a way forward. On the issue as I heard it, Reverend Jackson, the issue of the Chinese coming into Africa and all that, yes, we are members of BRICS. BRICS is composed with Brazil, China, Russia, and India, and South Africa. And we’re the smallest in all these big, important countries, and we’re treated as an equal partner. We participate together. And China clearly has embraced Africa in a way where it says we want to contribute to your growth, but obviously as a country they also want to trade with Africa. They want to spread their goods in Africa. And as they do so, as African countries, we have to deal with China in a way where we are equals. And China has insisted that, yes, we would like to deal with all of you as equals. But at the same time, there are quite a number of other countries that have dealings with Africa. A number of countries hold forums and conferences with African countries, and bring them altogether. The U.K. does, France does, and a number of others. And so, Africa, as a growing continent, clearly, in dealing with its various partners, has to advance its own interests, but advance its own interests without sacrificing its own sovereignty. Various countries, in dealing with any country in the world, would love not to sacrifice their own sovereignty. Certainly, that is the case with us South Africans. And whatever we do from a foreign policy point of view, we seek to protect our interests and to advance those interests and not to sacrifice our sovereignty. So we’re going to be very careful in dealing with any country in the world. But if it leads to us progressing, developing, and we do so on an equal basis, then of course we are prepared to have dealings with such countries and trade with them, and invest in each other’s economies, and all that. ALTMAN: Yes, ma’am. Q: Thank you, Mr. President, for joining us at the Council today. My name is Laurie Garrett. I’ve worked for many years in your country and elsewhere on the HIV/AIDS problem. And I know that your country is committed to trying to be independent of external funding to tackle HIV/AIDS. But you also have the highest rate of HIV infection on the planet, and a youth culture that is getting younger and younger, and a rising tide of drug-resistant HIV that’s like a ticking clock. So can you make that deadline? Can you beat that disease? Can you have a generation come up without HIV? RAMAPHOSA: Yes, we carry the biggest and the highest burden of HIV prevalence in the world, unfortunately. The fortunate thing is that we’ve got partners in the world who are assisting us to tackle this challenge, and the U.S. is one of those partners that we have. A number of other institutions in the U.S. also help us. The Bill Gates and Melinda Gates Foundation help us. The Global Fund also helps us, and the U.S. government also helps us, and a number of other partners in Europe, and indeed, also on the continent. They are assisting us to tackle this. And recently, we have found that the infection rate has started to plateau and is going down, and largely because of the assistance and the support that we are getting from our partners in terms of spreading the prevention message, in terms of treatment as well. We’ve got some 4.3 million people on antiretrovirals, currently the largest program in the world. The infection rate in our country is much higher than that, and we’re seeking to get more and more of South Africans to get on treatment. But the good thing is, as I was saying, the infection rate is going down. And we’re focusing on the youth, that the youth should be more conscious and aware of the dangers of HIV, the disease. And we’re seeing some progress in that regard. When it comes to drug resistance, we’re also beginning to pioneer in the way of research. And a number of our scientists leading vaccine development, as well as treatment development. Of course, we are also benefiting from our collaboration with other scientists and developers in the world. So we’ve always seen the HIV challenge as being a global one. The U.N. helps us. The World Health Organization helps us. The UNAIDS system also helps us. It has to be seen as a global challenge, and we are enjoying the assistance or welcoming, rather, the assistance that we are getting. Are we going to see an era when HIV will be behind us, when we will see its shadow? We are hopeful that we will and we are working towards that. I used to be the chairperson of the South African National AIDS Council, which we call SANAC. It’s a body that brings together government, business, sports organizations, and civil society, and medical community—the broadest, you know, if you like social partners’ collaboration that is dealing with this challenge. And all those partners are united, fiercely united, in trying to curb the spread of this disease and to make sure that we find the treatment for it, the vaccines. And those are being developed. We are making a great deal of progress thanks to the partnership that we enjoy, particularly from the United States. And once again, I say: U.S., thank you very much for being our partner on this. Thank you very much. ALTMAN: This meeting is being livestreamed to members of the Council on Foreign Relations around the world, and I have a question that’s been submitted from a member of the Council who is in Johannesburg. And his question is: Do you intend at any point to seek electoral reform in South Africa, including the system by which members of parliament are chosen? RAMAPHOSA: This issue of electoral reform has been on the cards for quite a while. There was a report that was submitted by Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert, who was the leader of the opposition some years ago. He has since, sadly, passed away. And it proposed a mixed system. Right now we have what we call proportional representation, and we opted for proportional representation when we came out of the nightmare of apartheid. We felt that we needed to have a unified system of government or legislative entities where there would not be a winner past the post, a single winner past the post, where all parties, as many parties as possible who would have achieved a particular threshold, would be represented in our parliament. That has served us very well because it means that even the smallest parties, as soon—as long as they can get a particular or demonstrate a particular level of support, are able to get representation in parliament. Currently, we have some twenty-three or so parties in our parliament. And those competed and there are little fewer who finally succeeded—twenty-three competed and fewer then succeeded. But they’re all represented, those who succeeded to pass the threshold. And that has contributed to having what I call a wholesome representative parliamentary system. Others have felt that you need to have, you know, a constituency-based one where a winner takes all. And we felt that winner-takes-all, in our embryonic stage of our democracy, would not serve us so well. We needed to have inclusivity. Yes, those proposals are still on the table to have a combined system where you could possibly combine constituency-based and proportional representation. That is something that is continuously on the table and will be considered. But for now, because we are involved in a task to unite the nation, to make everyone feel included rather than excluded, we have believed that it’s best to have the system that we have. ALTMAN: Yes, sir, in the back. Q: Ben Bartenstein from Bloomberg News. President Ramaphosa, thank you so much for joining us today. I have a follow up actually to Roger’s last question. Mr. President, you said that you expect the ANC to quite easily win elections next year. RAMAPHOSA: yes. Q: I’m curious, how do you sell your bold economic overhaul to voters at a time when business confidence is at a one-year low, the rand is the fourth-worst-performing currency in the world, and your own central bank says that your initial three percent target for economic growth this year, that growth will actually be much lower than that? And on the final point, I’m just curious what your new economic estimate is for growth this year and next. Thank you. RAMAPHOSA: Business confidence has been down—and sometimes it goes up, sometimes it goes down—and has been down because there’s been quite a lot of uncertainty, as I was saying earlier, and they have also complained about consistency. The uncertainty has been giving rise to, for instance, our policy positions on a number of areas, like, for instance, the mining charter. They have said you have had—you have proposed a mining charter in the past year or so, which would have prevented investments from taking place in South Africa, so they held back. We’ve now consulted extensively on the mining charter and we’ve resolved that to the satisfaction of a large portion of the mining industry. Who did we consult? Business, labor, communities, and a number of other regulators as well. So they’ve been consulted. We’ve crafted a mining charter which is much better than what we had in the past and which is, in our view, much more conducive for investment. So that has been done and dusted, solved. They complained about not releasing the telecommunications spectrum. And we’re now in a process of doing that. The telecommunications people or potential investors here, we have now addressed that. That also is going to be done and dusted in a week or so. The visas to enable people to come to our country, particularly businesspeople, were also a huge headache. And they have raised that continuously with me as I’ve been engaging with businesspeople that they are not able to bring their executives to look after their investments in the country. We’ve now addressed that, done and dusted. We’re just finalizing a few negotiations with a few countries. And we’re now resolving quite a number of issues, including things like our electricity prices have been among the highest in the world, which we call administered prices. We’re resolving—going to be resolving that so that we can attract those companies that use a lot of electricity in their operations. And so one after the other of issues that businesspeople have raised with us we are addressing. We are being very proactive and being very, very positive and constructive because we want South Africa to, once again, be an attractive destination for investment. So what will that do? It’ll boost business confidence. Yes, the rand has been one of those basket of currencies that has not been performing well. I would say it’s not been the only one, a number of other currencies have not been performing as well as, I think, those countries would have expected. With the increased confidence in our business community and us resolving the policy issues, we expect that the rand will respond and be a lot better. Our central bank, yes, they have revised their growth prospects. They have revised them in view of, one, the global, you know, economic situation and the exposure that we have to it and the way our economy is performing. Demand has been relatively low in South Africa. And with the reform that—reforms that we are embarking on, I believe that, you know, there will be more growth in our economy. The injection that we are putting in, particularly on infrastructure, which I believe is a key driver of economic growth, we will be able to see more economic activity and more confidence in our economy. And the other important part is that the reforms or the stimulus that we have put out is not only aimed at, you know, your hardcore issues, they are also aimed at impacting on the social life of people. For instance, we are focusing on how our local government is run and the infrastructure projects, how they are manifested at local government level. So all that is going to contribute to strengthening our economy. Am I able to give you an estimate now on how the economy will perform? No, not today. (Laughter.) Try me next week, maybe I’ll be able to give you. ALTMAN: It’s my duty as moderator to end this meeting on time, and we’ve already run over. I apologize to everyone who wanted to ask questions and wasn’t able to. But please join me in thanking President Ramaphosa for being with us today. (Applause.) RAMAPHOSA: Thank you, you were difficult. ALTMAN: (Chuckles.) (END)
    Event with Cyril Ramaphosa and Roger C. Altman September 24, 2018 David Rockefeller Lecture