South Africa

South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeals has overturned a lower court verdict and convicted Oscar Pistorius of murder. The celebrated para-Olympian was initially found guilty of manslaughter in the killing of his live-in girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, in 2012. Using a high-powered weapon, he fired four shots through a bathroom door, killing Steenkamp. He claimed he thought there was an intruder and that he felt his life was threatened. The minimum sentence for murder is fifteen years, though judges have some discretion in sentencing. Pistorius who after being released from prison has been under house arrest for the lessor charge must now return to prison. Pistorius is twenty-nine years of age; he could be forty-four when his sentence ends. South African media expects that his athletic career is over. The presiding judge, Eric Leach, characterized Pistorius’s downfall as “a tragedy of Shakespearian proportions.” Few will disagree. South Africa has no jury system. Trials at all levels are by judge or a panel of judges. The prosecution as well as the defense can appeal a verdict from a lower court to a higher one. The Supreme Court of Appeals is the highest court dealing with criminal matters. Pistorius could appeal to the Constitutional Court, but only in the unlikely event that he could demonstrate that his constitutional rights have been violated, and that is unlikely. There are twenty-four judges on the Supreme Court of Appeals. The Pistorius case was reviewed by a panel of five, and their verdict was unanimous. The five judges were multiracial and included one woman; the presiding judge is white. The lower court judge who convicted Pistorius of manslaughter, Judge Thokorzile Mosipa, is black. The Supreme Court ruled that she did not correctly apply the legal principle of “dolus eventualis,” whether Pistorius knew that death would be a likely result of his actions. In his statement announcing the verdict, Judge Leach paid due respect to Judge Mosipa: “The trial judge conducted the hearing with dignity and competence that is a credit to the judiciary of this country. The fact the appeal has succeeded is not to be seen as a slight on the trial judge.” The Pistorius case has periodically roiled South Africa since 2012. Now, it appears to be over. For many South Africans, the case became an emblem of many of the country’s social problems: high levels of domestic violence, especially violence against women; the ubiquitous presence of fire-arms; and the frequency of home invasions that often result in murder. Women’s groups argued that Pistorius’s initial sentence on the basis of manslaughter meant that he, literally, “got away with murder.” South African media is welcoming the Supreme Court’s ruling as serving justice and as a reaffirmation that no one is above the law. Beyond its tragic and soap opera dimensions, the Pistorius case is a reaffirmation of the independence of the South African judiciary and the primacy of the rule of law.

Since the 1994 transition to “non-racial” democracy and Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as president, South Africa has been governed by “the triple alliance.” This alliance is made up of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, SACP and COSATU candidates ran only on the ANC’s electoral list. They did not have separate lists. Negotiations among the three entities, usually behind closed doors, determine where on the consolidated list a candidate might be placed. As in other proportional representation systems, the higher up the list, the more likely a candidate would win office. This triple alliance has come under increasing attack, often from veterans of the South African liberation struggle. The latest critic is Kgalema Motlanthe, a member of the inner circle of the ANC who has served as vice president and, briefly, as South Africa’s president. In an interview with Business Day, he criticized COSATU for expelling its general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, and its largest union, the National Union of Metal Workers. He went on to say that internal democracy within the ANC is “impaired,” and that the party is driving young activists toward Julius Malema’s more radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Motlanthe’s criticism recalls that of Frank Chicane and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Though the latter was never a member of the ANC, the archbishop was an icon of the liberation movement. In recent years, Archbishop Tutu has criticized the Zuma government for denying the Dalai Lama a visa, calling the ANC as bad as the old National Party of apartheid days. Insider criticism of the ANC and its partners reflects concern about over-centralization, isolation from its popular base, and a retreat from the idealism associated with Nelson Mandela and the achievement of non-racial democracy. Many South Africans expect a realignment of political parties that will reflect issues with which South Africans confront, now a generation after the coming of “non-racial” democracy. Motlanthe’s criticism is a sign of movement in that direction.

Tokyo Sexwale, ex-freedom fighter, ex-Robben Island inmate, ex-premier, ex-cabinet minister, and multi-millionaire businessman has confirmed that he is a candidate for the presidency of the scandal-ridden FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association). Sexwale, said to have his eye on the South African presidency, helped organize South Africa’s successful bid for the 2010 World Cup and played a significant role in its success. Universally known as ‘Tokyo,’ his full name is Mosima Gabriel Sexwale (the ‘Tokyo’ moniker is based on his youthful enthusiasm for karate). By most accounts, Sexwale has been exceptionally successful at pretty much everything to which he has turned his hand. (In 2009, he said that his wealth, based on oil and diamonds, amounted to two-hundred million dollars.) Soccer, called ‘football’ in most of the world, is overwhelmingly popular in Africa in general and South Africa in particular. Issa Hayatou, of Cameroon, is the current acting president of FIFA. Especially in the aftermath of FIFA scandals, there will be strong African sentiment for an African FIFA president. Sexwale has a successful history with FIFA, he has been a member of their fair play committee and an organizing committee board member, he is also the lead on FIFA’s Monitoring Committee for Israel and Palestine. Sexwale’s candidacy for the FIFA presidency is thoroughly credible. South Africa is sports-mad. Because of this, South Africans are very, very good at sport. Their exceptional athletic success contributes to a common national identity and pride right across the racial rainbow. But, like other areas of national life, sport is deformed by the consequences of apartheid. Soccer is typically a ‘black’ sport. White players are rare. One of the best known is Matthew Booth, called the “White Knight” because he was at one time the only white player on the South African national squad. Similarly, rugby is a “white sport,” with relatively few black or coloured players. The 2015 South African World Cup squad had twenty-three white players and eight “of colour” in a country that is 80 percent black, 9 percent coloured, and perhaps 8 percent white. (Unlike in the United States ‘coloured’ is not a pejorative label in South Africa.) Other sports where South Africa has an international reputation include tennis (Kevin Anderson), golf (Gary Player, Louis Oosthuizen), and swimming (Chad le Clos, Cameron van der Burgh). These athletes are mostly white. In this environment, Tokyo Sexwale has perhaps a qualification for the FIFA presidency that may not be internationally known. Through a foundation he has established, he is part of an international effort to break down racial boundaries in sport. On October 28, he said to the BBC:  “With this initiative we are giving a red card to racism in sport. Not just football. We are saying don’t throw bananas at players and do not make derogatory comments about the Williams sisters.” (The last is a reference to the celebrated American tennis players, Venus and Serena.) Other countries in addition to South Africa would benefit from de-racializing sport.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, a journalist and adjunct professor at the Columbia Business School. Twenty-five years ago South Africans sought global assistance to create an inclusive democracy. As of yet it has failed to achieve that goal. South Africa continues to sit economically as it does geographically, at the nexus of the first and third world. It’s a nation of people from developed and developing countries, and of rich and poor. It is plagued by inequity between, and within, its black and white neighborhoods. Economic opportunity is limited, social cohesion remains fragmented, and the country has devolved into bouts of identity violence with foreign populations often the victims. This is especially the case in economically vulnerable areas where there is competition for housing, education, employment, and ultimately for survival. Even though South Africa signed a twenty-six-nation free trade pact this summer creating a common market spanning from Cape Town to Cairo, it is experiencing its worst violence toward immigrants since 2008. It wants to promote pan-African commerce, but not pan-African community within its borders. Seven people have died, thousands more were arrested or displaced and yet there has been only limited action to quell the strife. President Zuma has denounced the violence but also railed against neighboring countries saying, “As much as we have a problem that is alleged to be xenophobic, our sister countries contribute to this. Why are their citizens not in their countries?” Other half-hearted government measures include relying upon law enforcement and creating a parliamentary committee to study the violence. But, the police have limited tools and the committee, suffering from rampant absenteeism among its members, has failed twice to submit its report due in August. News leaks intimate that its recommendations will be benign, amounting to promoting increased dialogue between impacted parties and ensuring that foreigners have proper documentation. These measures don’t address the underlying problems: a lack of shared economic prosperity and a spate of misguided citizenship policies that contribute to xenophobia. Unemployment was 24.3 percent in 2014 (35 percent including discouraged job seekers). In 1995, a year after transitioning to democracy it was recorded at 15 percent. Unemployment is near 50 percent among eighteen to twenty-four year olds, and 64 percent including discouraged youths. Structural factors explain some of the difficulty: low education levels, especially among blacks, as well as some geographic factors from the apartheid era that physically separated the population by race, creating pockets of poverty and wealth. With growing inequality, there is increased mistrust as disenfranchised South Africans note that foreigners are prospering despite stiff odds. Unlike European countries, South Africa doesn’t provide social assistance; immigrants have to fend for themselves. Still, the foreigners, mostly Somalis residing in the townships, have proved to be savvy entrepreneurs. Given nothing, many have become traders, running small shops that stay open longer and charge less than local stores. They undercut prices by forming buying clubs, with several families pooling money together. Simon Fraser University sociologist Heribert Adams surveyed South Africans in the townships asking why they didn’t copy the foreigners. Many responded, “We don’t trust one another.” Yet, even so, while they won’t share their burdens with one another, they trust that their government will shoulder their hardships and enshrine their opportunities, thereby making it seem as if their problem stems from foreign competition. Indeed the government has increasingly enacted policies that create a zero-sum environment where citizens have rights and foreigners have none, sending a message of mistrust. These rules misguidedly create an expectation that citizen rights trump human rights. New visa regulations make it harder for foreigners to obtain a general work visa by forcing employers to not only explain why a citizen or permanent resident could not fill the position but offer proof of its efforts to do so, and even target foreign families, forcing them to carry copies of unabridged birth certificates. Too, a proposed new land bill would bar foreigners from owning agricultural land. Even South Africa’s teachers union is exclusionary, prohibiting foreigners, despite some being better equipped than locals. But by narrowing the definition of who belongs and who has entitlements, by passing ever-more exclusionary rules, the government is breeding divisiveness. It’s also sending a message to its poor that they need the government’s protection to prosper. Foreigners in South Africa know that’s not true.

Citing a sole source, the Turkish Anadolu News Agency, Nigerian media is reporting that the Buhari government is hiring about 250 personnel and equipment from Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP), the South African mercenary company that was engaged by then-president Goodluck Jonathan for his push against Boko Haram before the March national elections. The news agency cites an anonymous source within the Nigerian Defense headquarters. A presidential spokesman, Garba Shehu, flatly denies the report. According to Nigerian media, he said: “Since coming into office, this government did not have any engagement with mercenaries of any kind and there are no plans to do so.” During the presidential campaign, then-candidate Muhammadu Buhari characterized then-president Jonathan’s use of South African mercenaries as “shameful.” It is widely assumed that the South Africans are drawn from the apartheid era South African Defense force. A spokesman for the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) said that there are no South African troops in Nigeria, but that he could not say if private mercenaries were there. President Buhari has given the military a December deadline to end the Boko Haram insurgency. There are signs that the Nigerian military is preparing a major campaign. The Chief of Army Staff in a message to the military last week said, “Our ability to stand and defeat the Boko Haram terrorists in the next few weeks will determine the future of our country.” He also said, “Our sovereignty as a nation is threatened.” In the context of the Chief of Army Staff’s remarks, the rehiring of South African mercenaries is plausible, but by no means certain. A likely hypothesis is that bringing back the mercenaries is an option under consideration within the Defense ministry and/or the Nigerian military. But, there is as yet no sitting Minister of Defense to make a final decision or even a recommendation to the president. Over the past month, Boko Haram has been especially active, and the geographic range of its operations has increased, at least for the moment. This mercenary flap may be an indication of growing anxiety within the Nigerian military about its ability to meet President Buhari’s December deadline.

The Oscar Pistorius murder case has everything a tabloid junkie could ask for. A celebrated athlete who overcame a severe physical disability to win an Olympic medal is accused of the murder of his beautiful girlfriend. Convicted of “culpable homicide,” the equivalent in the United States of manslaughter, he was sentenced to five years in jail. After serving one year, Pistorius has been released on parole. The girlfriend’s family is protesting that the sentence is too lenient, and the prosecutors are appealing the judge’s finding of “culpable homicide” rather than murder. (Prosecutors as well as defendants may appeal in South Africa.) Meanwhile Pistorius is staying at his uncle’s luxurious residence in an expensive Pretoria suburb. The episode provides insights into contemporary South Africa. The country is notorious for violent crime, and especially for violence against women, often by their domestic partners. South Africa has one of the highest levels of rape in the world. There is no dispute that Pistorius killed his girlfriend, yet was sentenced to only five years and was released on parole after serving one year. However, the story is a bit more complicated than the famous-athlete-gets-away-with-murder narrative. Pistorius and his late girlfriend are white. So, too, were the prosecuting and defense attorneys. (There is no jury in South Africa). The judge was a black female. Only twenty-one years after the end of apartheid, the judge’s race and gender attracted little or no comment in the South African media. Pistorius’s release after serving one year is in accordance with standard South African practice. A person convicted and sentenced to jail for five years or less is eligible for parole on good behavior after serving one-sixth of his/her sentence. Corrections policy in South Africa is to encourage paroled prisoners to work. The South African Olympic committee is reported by the media as saying that Pistorius is not prohibited from training and competing. There is also media speculation that Pistorius may work with handicapped children. The corrections department mandates that Pistorius undergo “psychotherapy” while paroled. So, in a country with high levels of violence against women, the corrections regime is remarkably enlightened. That conclusion assumes, of course, that Pistorius is guilty of “culpable homicide,” and not murder.

This post originally appeared on the Council on Foreign Relations Net Politics Blog and is written by Mailyn Fidler. Mailyn is a Marshall Scholar studying international relations at the University of Oxford. You can follow her on Twitter @mailynfidler. This September, African civil society, business, and government leaders gathered at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa to debate Internet issues at the African Internet Governance Forum. I attended the Forum to interview participants for research I am conducting on the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection. In the months before the global Internet Governance Forum (IGF) held this year in Brazil, most world regions host their own version of the forum to incubate positions to take at the global IGF. The IGF system was a compromise outcome of the UN-backed World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005, which sought to address inequalities in Internet infrastructure and governance between countries. Although important Internet-related issues are addressed at the forums, they have no binding decision-making power. The ten-year review of the outcomes of WSIS will happen this December, and the agenda of the African IGF largely mirrored issues that will also be addressed then, including Internet governance, Internet access, cybersecurity, and human rights online. The report from the African IGF is available here. The 2015 African IGF was marked by excitement about increased participation by high-level African government officials. In the past, only Nigerian and host country officials had attended. This year’s event in Addis saw high-level officials from South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria participate. Speakers noted this phenomenon repeatedly, excited by a sense that governments were taking the gathering, which held its first meeting in 2012, seriously and not writing it off as a civil society echo chamber. Despite their participation, the government representatives were not entirely supportive of the IGF’s guiding concept. IGFs are committed to multistakeholder ideals, giving equal voice to government, civil society, and business. The representatives expressed concern about this approach, stating the need to prioritize government views. Specifically, one representative raised concerns about a draft document prepared for the ten-year review of WSISoutcomes that endorsed multistakeholder principles. At the panel titled “Enhancing Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation,” a representative from the African Union repeated these concerns, drawing the biggest applause of the forum, trumping the clapping for a young Nigerian woman who challenged an Ethiopian bureaucrat over the questionable detention of bloggers and journalists. These reservations about multistakeholderism reflect the positions African states have taken on Internet governance in other forums. In perhaps the most prominent example, all but three African state attendees at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) voted in favor of a proposal for updated International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) that would support a more government-centric Internet governance approach. Another hotly debated issue at the forum was the interplay between zero-rating and net neutrality. The prime zero-rating example is Facebook’s Internet.org, where the social media company works with providers to offer Facebook and select other websites at no cost to users. Attendees debated whether zero-rating was an appropriate approach to expanding Internet access in Africa. Human rights representatives championed the development as a boon for the least well off, while attendees from the African tech sector resisted it, concerned about having to compete with free Western services. Ebele Okobi, head of public policy for Facebook Africa, sought to highlight Facebook’s recent efforts to include more and locally developed websites on its free platform. Attendees also debated whether zero-rating violated the principle of net neutrality, and if, when, and how African states should legislate to preserve net neutrality. The first event I attended at the forum opened by urging attendees to remember, “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” Concerns about making sure Africans are “at the table” resonated throughout the event. I spent coffee breaks with younger attendees, listening to their concerns that the structure and style of the event would resign the African IGF and African perspectives on these issues to obscurity. I watched civil society walk the fine line between welcoming increased government participation, which could give the forum increased seriousness, and resisting increased government influence, which could shut out crucial African voices. I watched the forum grapple with the disparity between the increased willingness and ability of African states to “be at the table” on Internet matters and the limitations the external world still places on African participation. At the same time, attendees also recognized that many African countries still must make huge strides in government, civil society, and technological capacity before having a consistent, firm, and informed seat at the table, despite incredible progress. A strong African voice on Internet matters at international events may come with decreased inclusiveness. The greater number of African government officials who attended the African IGF, gathered in the Chinese-built hall of the African Union, may well determine such a tradeoff is worth it.

The African National Congress (ANC) wants South Africa to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Obed Bapela, a deputy minister in the presidency, said that the ICC “has lost its way.” According to the media, the Minister for International Relations (foreign minister) Maite Nkoana-Mashabane indicated that the process would be orderly and not hasty. South Africa will place the issue of its withdrawal on the agenda for November’s Assembly of States Parties meeting attended by all ICC members and it would table it at the January African Union (AU) summit, she said. The ANC will bring the issue to parliament for debate. The ANC government of President Jacob Zuma is no doubt smarting from the domestic and international criticism that followed its failure to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he was in Johannesburg for an AU heads of state summit. Bashir is under ICC indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The South African High Court has ruled that the government acted unconstitutionally when it failed to arrest Bashir, and the ICC has asked for an explanation. Other factors are likely at play in the ANC decision. There is resentment that the United States, among others, supports the ICC but does not accept its jurisdiction. Bapela referred to a handful of powerful countries which refused to be ICC members, yet they still had the power to refer matters to the court.” He went on, “They would rather put their own interests first than the world’s interest.” There is also within the ANC an “Africanist” trend which seeks to align South Africa more with other African states. Many of these states object to the ICC as essentially employing a “double standard” by which Africans are prosecuted but others are not. While not unchallenged within the party, the “Africanists” appear to be growing in strength. Some of their spokesmen are highly critical  of the United States as being ”unilateralist” with little respect for African sensitivities. South Africa under Nelson Mandela was one of the founding supporters of the ICC. The Court continues to have strong support in South Africa among the opposition parties in parliament and among civil society. South Africa’s court system is strong and independent. Despite the ANC’s large majority in parliament, it is by no means certain that South Africa’s departure from the ICC will occur.

South African President and African National Congress (ANC) party leader Jacob Zuma is complaining that the ruling ANC is losing members. At a party policy forum in early October he announced that party membership had fallen to 769,000 from some 1.2 million three years previously. Zuma said that the party is failing to recruit new members and that some local ANC officials discourage new members from joining so that they are unchallenged in their particular satraps. The ANC has always regarded itself as a mass liberation movement and the vanguard of the struggle against apartheid. Hence, a decline in membership is a blow to its collective self-esteem. Predictably, the party’s response has been defensive. Some party officials are claiming that membership has not declined, but has increased. They say that the decline cited by Zuma reflects those who have not paid their dues or have not registered on the party’s system. Others, however, ascribe the drop to “people serving their own interests.” As a mass liberation movement, the party’s self-image has been that power flows from the grassroots upward. But, there is anecdotal evidence that many local party structures have atrophied, and that patronage-clientele networks more interested in government contracts than in the welfare of the people are taking over parts of the party, especially at the local and provincial levels. The media speculates that the decline is a consequence of the party’s failure to create jobs and improve housing and services, especially the delivery of water and electricity. Infighting within the party also hurts its image. In 2017, if not before, the ANC will elect a new party leader to succeed Jacob Zuma. Leading candidates are deputy party leader Cyril Ramaphosa, chairwoman of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (the president’s ex-wife), party chairwoman Baleka Mbete, and party treasurer Zweli Mkhize. The party has been in power since the transition to “non-racial” democracy in 1994. Though firmly multi-racial in its ideology, its electoral support comes overwhelmingly from the eighty percent of South Africa’s population that is black. Its initially multi-racial leadership is increasingly black. The party’s share of the vote in the elections of 2014 declined to 62.15 percent from 65.9 in 2009. Meanwhile, party politics appear to be opening up. The share of votes for the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) increased from 16.66 percent in 2009 to 22.23 percent in 2014. Traditionally the party of whites and coloureds, the DA is beginning to attract black voters. The latter may have accounted for as much as 15 percent of the DA’s vote in 2014. The DA has selected a black party leader, Mmusi Maimane, as part of its effort to attract black electoral support. The party already governs the Western Cape and the city of Cape Town. Mmusi Maimane’s political base is Johannesburg. A DA party goal is to win the 2016 Johannesburg city elections, and many observers believe this is possible. On the left, Julius Malema’s radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party is also attracting some who formerly voted for the ANC. The largest and richest trade union in South Africa, the National Union of Metal Workers, appears to be moving toward the establishment of an additional party on the left. It has the potential to attract voters from both the ANC and the EFF. Party political pluralism is a healthy development for South African democracy.

On October 3, Thomas Piketty, the French economist and best-selling author of Capital in the 21st Century, said in his prestigious Nelson Mandela lecture that South Africa’s “…black economic empowerment strategies… were not successful in spreading the wealth.” He said that 60 to 65 percent of the country’s wealth is held by 10 percent of the population, compared with 50 to 55 percent in Brazil and 40 to 45 percent in the United States. He made the point that out of the wealthiest 5 percent of South Africans  up to 80 percent are white. That South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of distribution of wealth, and that the 9 percent of the population that is white holds a disproportionate share of that wealth is well-known. It is a reality that various black economic empowerment strategies were designed to address and have failed to do so. Piketty in his Mandela lecture made certain suggestions: a national minimum wage, workers on corporate boards, and accelerated land reform. In a comparison of the history of inequality in France and South Africa, Piketty addressed the race factor: “The difference of color of skin is also important because when everybody is white in France, you can sort of forget a couple of generations later who comes from what group, which is more difficult with the color of skin.” There appears to be a consensus in South Africa that “something must be done” about inequality and that formal programs such as the current Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) are not working. But, there is no consensus about what to do. According to the South African media, former finance Minister Trevor Manuel after Piketty’s speech suggested the issues are political not economic: “We’ve got the framework in place but I think the problems are not in the economics: it is not even in the tax law. Our problems are in the leadership and how we convene society to understand we’re in this together.” From news reports, Piketty does not appear to have addressed the greatest driver of poverty: very high levels of unemployment, which approaches 50 percent in some demographics. That in turn reflects the dearth of unskilled jobs where official trade union and government policy has long promoted a highly-skilled “labor aristocracy.” Paradoxically, there are labor shortages because the poor primary education available to the mass of the population does not prepare them to enter the workforce. Meanwhile, elites benefit from the best academic institutions in Africa, and among the best in the world.

Jacob Zuma’s anger and poor understanding of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya apparently still shapes his approach to the West. On September 15, President Zuma briefed the foreign diplomatic corps accredited to South Africa on the country’s foreign policy. According to the South African media, the speech was prepared by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (the foreign ministry). But, the South African media reports that at one point Zuma departed from the text to say, inter alia, “Before the Arab Spring and before the killing of Gaddafi there were no refugees flying or flocking to European countries. It was all quiet….Things were normal in the north of Africa…. Those who were part of destabilizing that part of the world don’t want to accept refugees. It is their responsibility. They caused it. They must address it.” Zuma appears to be mixing together the migration from and through Libya with the much larger flow of migrants from countries like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Eritrea. Zuma has long been angry at NATO and the west about what happened in Libya. He argues that NATO exceeded its UN Security Council mandate to protect innocent civilians to bring about “regime change” by destroying the Gaddafi regime. He resents the NATO and the west’s ignoring an African Union (AU) “roadmap” for a solution to the Libya crisis. He particularly resents NATO’s decision instead to work with the Arab League during the Libya crisis rather than the AU. He shares the widespread sentiment among African leaders that North Africa is an area of responsibility for the AU and not a part of the Middle East. In light of Zuma’s comments about the flow of migrants to Europe, it is ironic that South Africa has been dealing with an immigrant crisis of its own, mostly from other African states, which has led to widespread xenophobic violence. The South African government has been working with the Southern African Development Community to deal with this crisis. But, contributing to the crisis has been the policy of successive South African administrations to tolerate the policies pursued by Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe government that has generated a flow of migrants from that country.

Jacob Zuma’s term as president of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) ends in 2017; his term as South Africa’s president ends in 2019. Zuma’s successor as ANC president will almost certainly be South Africa’s next president, unless there is an electoral upset of an enormous magnitude. Among foreign observers, the leading candidate for succession within the ANC has been Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the 1994 transition from apartheid to “non-racial democracy.” Ramaphosa was close to Nelson Mandela and has subsequently become a highly successful and internationally respected businessman. At present he is the deputy of both the ANC and the national government. But, there has long been speculation that Ramaphosa is falling out of favor with Zuma. The view is widespread that Zuma’s primary succession concern is to protect himself against prosecution for alleged corruption and to protect the wealth he has accumulated for the benefit of his children. According to Africa Confidential (August 28, 2015, vol. 56, no. 17), Zuma has concluded that Ramaphosa cannot or will not do this. Accordingly, Zuma is behind the recent ANC Women’s League declaration that the next president of South Africa should be a woman. Two women often seen as potential future presidents of South Africa are Baleka Mbete, the speaker in the National Assembly and current chairperson of the ANC, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the chairwoman of the African Union Commission. Mbete briefly served as deputy president of South Africa under former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Dlamini-Zuma is the former minister of health in the Mandela government (she is a medical doctor.) She was also foreign minister in the Mbeki government. She is Jacob Zuma’s former wife and remains close to him politically. The Zuma government mounted a serious campaign to secure her election as chairwoman of the African Union Commission. As president of the party and the nation, presumably she would look out for the interests of the by-then former president and their children. Mbete and Dlamini-Zuma are both plausible candidates if the party leadership is to go to a female. Of the two, Dlamini-Zuma would appear the stronger candidate because of her ministerial and African Union background. Baleka Mbete has never held a ministerial position. However, neither would appear to be as strong as Ramaphosa. Dlamini-Zuma was minister of health during the early days of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and her chairmanship of the AU Commission thus far has not been particularly noteworthy. Mbete in her position as speaker has appeared weak in the face of the parliamentary antics of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters. Dlamini-Zuma is a Zulu, the largest ethnic group in South Africa, and campaigned extensively for the ANC and Jacob Zuma in KwaZulu Natal during the 2014 election campaign, even though she was chairman of the African Union Commission at the time, and Jacob Zuma faced little opposition among his fellow Zulus. Her campaigning may have been an early effort to strengthen her credentials as the future president of the ANC and of South Africa.

In early August, the Sudanese UN envoy stated that Sudan President al-Bashir plans to travel to New York to speak at the upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA). Al-Bashir is under indictment by the International Criminal Court. Countries that are signatory to the Rome Statute are required to apprehend those indicted and to hand them over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). That almost happened earlier in the summer when al-Bashir attended an African Union summit in South Africa. A South African superior court ordered the Zuma administration to arrest him. In that case, al-Bashir, perhaps with the connivance of the Zuma administration, left before the court’s order could be carried out. (The Zuma administration’s failure to arrest al-Bashir is still before the South African courts.) The United States is a signatory of the Rome Statute, but the senate has never ratified it. Nevertheless, U.S. policy has generally been supportive of the court. Under the host country agreement between the United States and the United Nations, which dates from the establishment of the UN headquarters in New York, the U.S. government is obliged to issue visas to those coming to UN meetings. There is provision for rare exceptions where the individual would constitute a threat to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, the Obama administration does have legal grounds to deny al-Bashir a visa. On the other hand, the Obama administration could issue al-Bashir a visa, and then promptly arrest him upon arrival in New York. It would then hand him over to the ICC for trial, as called for by the Rome Statute. That is the course recommended by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor for the ICC from 2003 to 2012, in a column in the August 24, 2015, New York Times. Moreno-Ocampo argues that U.S. law (the American Service-Members’ Protection Act), authorizes the executive branch “to bring to justice” those accused of atrocities. Under the Nuremberg Charter, the genocide convention, and the ICC statute, heads of state have no immunity from charges before international tribunals. Ocampo-Moreno credibly argues that a U.S. arrest and handover would be legal. But, would such a course be in the U.S. interest? Opponents of an al-Bashir arrest might cite Sudan’s cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the region. Sudan also has an important role to play in resolution of the ongoing civil war and humanitarian disaster in South Sudan. Ultimately, the Obama administration would face a political choice, not a legal one. One can well imagine that at least some in the Obama administration hope the problem will go away; that al-Bashir will not seek to come to New York. But, should al-Bashir come, Ocampo-Moreno claims that his arrest would provide the Obama administration the opportunity to reject impunity for crimes of genocide. The political and security costs of an al-Bashir arrest and handover might be relatively low. Khartoum is something of a political snake pit. Many Sudanese with political ambitions might be happy enough with the removal of al-Bashir. Cooperation on terrorism and the search for a solution in South Sudan might well continue after an initial period of vituperation. More problematic is the African Union, now under the presidency of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, himself accused of massive human rights abuses. It is conceivable that AU member states might renounce the Rome Statute, which most of them have signed, given the perception that the court disproportionately targets Africans. There might be a gesture of solidarity with al-Bashir in the context of the UN General Assembly. However, the UNGA is arguably the most important forum for African leaders, and they are unlikely to sabotage it for long. Few will deny that al-Bashir’s hands are covered with the blood of innocents.

It is conventional wisdom that South Africa has a very high rate of domestic abuse. (Exact rates are unknown due to irregularities in South Africa’s statistics, combined with the fact that gender based violence is vastly underreported worldwide.) Oscar Pistorius is a celebrated South African athlete who competed in the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, using prostheses (his legs were amputated as a child). In 2014, he killed his live-in girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, a South African model. At the trial, he said he believed she was an intruder. He was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter before a black, female judge, Thokozile Masipa. (The race and gender of the judge caused little comment.) She found that the prosecution failed to prove intent, necessary for a murder charge. The trial was the occasion for much South African soul-searching, not least about domestic abuse and gender-based violence. Judge Masipa sentenced Pistorius to six years in jail. Under South African law, having served one-sixth of his sentence, he may be released under house arrest. That was to occur on August 21. However, under South African law, the prosecution as well as the defense may appeal. The prosecution has now done so. In the meantime, the Progressive Women’s Movement of South Africa, a civil organization with ties to the governing African National Congress (ANC) has asked the minister of justice to keep Pistorius in jail pending the outcome of the prosecution’s appeal. The ANC Women’s League welcomed the delay in the release of Pistorius. According to the media, the Women’s League said, “The ANC Women’s League remains convinced that judge Thokozile Masipa handed down an erroneous judgment and an extremely lenient sentence to Pistorius, setting a bad precedent in cases involving gender-based violence, especially in instances where women die at the hands of their partners.” It has also roundly criticized the presiding judge for her sentence, which, it maintains, was too lenient. The minister of justice has agreed to the request. However, it is widely expected in South Africa that he will be overruled by the courts. Pistorius’ supporters see this gambit as ANC grandstanding on the issue of violence against women. On the other hand, many, including the victim’s family, do feel that the original sentence was too lenient and the result of sloppy police work. The Progressive Women’s Movement doesn’t appear to be very active at present. The promptness with which the ANC Women’s League supported its call raises questions about its independence from the ruling party. However, the fact that it circulated a successful petition against Pistorius’ release signifies gender based violence is an issue South Africans care about. But the South African judiciary is independent and tough. Observers predict that Pistorius will, in fact, be transferred to house arrest in the near future, if not by August 21. While prosecutors may appeal a judgment and a sentence, the success rate is not high. The sloppy police work cannot be undone. Is there anything worth saying about this episode? Yes. It illustrates once again the independence of the judiciary, both from the government of the day but also from public opinion. It also illustrates the complexity of race and politics. Pistorius and Steenkamp are white Afrikaners. The judge and the attorney general are black, as are most members of the ANC Women’s League. So, too, are most of the victims of gender based violence. Yet it is the Women’s League that is criticizing by name the presiding judge in the Pistorius case as having been too lenient in a case of gender based violence. A Steenkamp family spokesperson thanked the Progressive Women’s Movement, and specifically Jacqui Mofeteng, the first black Miss South Africa and a women’s rights advocate, for its intervention in favor of keeping Pistorius in jail. This episode highlights that issues of gender based violence cross South Africa’s conventional social divisions.

Julius Malema has been convicted of anti-white hate speech, and advocates the nationalization of white property without compensation. He has attacked the governing African National Congress (ANC) establishment, ranging from former president Thabo Mbeki to current president Jacob Zuma to possible future president Cyril Ramaphosa. He is the founder of a radical, populist political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which won 6 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections, making it the third largest party in parliament. The EFF has disrupted parliamentary sittings, notably in its protests against President Zuma’s alleged corruption with respect to his private estate, Nkandla. A populist, Malema represents himself as the voice of the marginalized in South Africa. His lifestyle is extravagant, and how he pays for his fast cars and large farm is unclear. (He was born into poverty in Limpopo, one of the country’s poorest provinces.) It is fair to say that Malema is the South African government and establishment’s most disliked, if not hated, political figure. Since 2012, Malema and four associates have faced charges of fraud, corruption, racketeering and money laundering in conjunction with road construction projects. He has consistently stated that the charges were politically motivated by Zuma because of Malema’s strident accusations that the president is corrupt. On August 4, the judge threw out the case against Malema. The judge said that three years was too long for an accused to await trial, and laid the blame for the delay squarely on the prosecutors. While Malema was “free to go,” the judge made no decision on the merit of the case, and has stated that the move should not be misinterpreted as an acquittal. Malema could be tried on the same charges in the future. The South African media is focused on the political fall-out from the dismissal, seeing it generally as a defeat for President Zuma and the ANC. However, perhaps its primary significance for outside observers of South Africa is that it is yet another example of the independence of the South African judiciary. The government’s recent failure to uphold a high court order to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir raised concern that the Zuma administration may be undermining the judiciary. President Zuma and much of the South African establishment likely would have been delighted to see Malema behind bars. That the High Court dismissed the case (on the basis that keeping an accused waiting three years for a trial was unjust) is evidence that South Africa remains committed to judicial independence. South Africa’s independent judiciary, along with its constitution and its guarantees of human rights among the most extensive in the world, is a major pillar of South African democracy.