South Africa

South Africa’s general malaise owes much to its very slow recovery from the international economic crisis that began in the United States in 2008. The country’s gross domestic product growth rate has declined from a usual 3 percent to 1.5 percent in 2014. Weaker commodities prices have also slowed an economy that still includes a large mineral export sector. Unemployment is a major cause of South African poverty. It peaked in the first quarter of 2015 at 26.4 percent, according to Statistics South Africa, the national statistical service of South Africa. The rate is even higher among blacks, who constitute about 80 percent of the population. It is estimated that unemployment among black youth in the townships is around 50 percent. It is also high in rural areas. Hence it is good news that in the second quarter of 2015, unemployment dropped to 25 percent, according to the latest reports by Statistics South Africa. Very high levels of unemployment are a characteristic of the South African economy. According to Bloomberg, South Africa has the second highest jobless rate of the 62 countries that it tracks. There are now 5.23 million South Africans without jobs, which marks a healthy decline of about 305,000. The South African government estimates that economic growth will be 2 percent in 2015. This is better than 2014, but still not at pre-2008 recession levels. The South African government’s aspirational National Development Plan looks to cut unemployment to 14 percent by 2020 and 6 percent by 2030. While slow economic growth certainly contributes to high unemployment, there are also important structural issues. Trade unions, allied to the governing African National Congress, keep wages high. Government policy has not promoted the creation of low-skilled, low-paying jobs. Yet, in part because of the shortcomings of the educational system, a large percentage of the population is unskilled. In many African countries, the informal sector of the economy absorbs unemployment. South Africa, however, appears to have the smallest informal sector of any large African country. This, in part, is the baleful heritage of apartheid, which restricted black enterprise and mobility. Moreover, there are numerous other structural and technical drivers of high unemployment. Measuring levels of poverty in South Africa (and elsewhere) is difficult given the variety of technical and definitional issues. However, the Daily Maverick, a respected South African publication, concludes that 21.7 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. That means they do not have enough money to pay for the food necessary to meet their nutritional requirements. An additional 37 percent are unable the purchase both food and meet other necessities, such as transport and fuel. So, more than half of the country’s population is poor, and a high percentage of the poor are unemployed. Over the past decade, the percentage who are unemployed in South Africa has fluctuated in the mid-twenties. The most recent drop in unemployment is a welcome sign, but is unlikely to be the harbinger of long-term trends. Until the structural roots of high unemployment are addressed in South Africa, serious progress on reducing poverty cannot be made.

Numerous organizations and publications rank universities around the world. The value of the exercise is inherently controversial, and by definition it has winners and losers. Nevertheless, rankings always command a large audience. One ranking that focuses on Africa is Journals Consortium. According to its website, it offers scholarly publishers web applications that provide technical, marketing, and editorial support “critical to the success of their journals in the e-publishing environment.” It has compiled a rank-order list of the one hundred top universities in Africa. Its stated criteria is research publications, scholarly citations, and visibility on the internet. In this ranking, African universities are competing only against other African universities, rather than with institutions outside the continent. The top ten universities, according to Journals Consortium: 1.    University of Cape Town (South Africa) 2.    Cairo University (Egypt) 3.    University of Pretoria (South Africa) 4.    University of Nairobi (Kenya) 5.    University of South Africa (South Africa) 6.    University of the Witswatersrand (South Africa) 7.    Stellenbosch University (South Africa) 8.    University of Ibadan (Nigeria) 9.    University of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) 10.  Ain Shams University (Egypt) The list is dominated by South Africa, which has six of the top ten universities. Egypt has two, while Nigeria and Kenya each have one. Of the remaining ninety, thirteen are also in South Africa. (The University of Johannesburg, at number eleven, just missed the top ten.) Nigerian media have commented on the country’s poor showing, especially given its disproportionately large population of 183 million, which is greater than that of the Russian Federation. Under apartheid, five of these six South African universities in the top ten were “white” and well funded. The exception was the University of South Africa, an “open” university; Nelson Mandela took its courses while imprisoned on Robben Island. All are now racially integrated, with all but one having a student body that is majority non-white. Journals Consortium’s list, whatever its validity as an indicator of relative academic quality, highlights a South African paradox. The country has world-class institutions, but most students at all levels are still educated in institutions challenged by apartheid’s legacy of poor education funding for the majority of the population.

For this outsider, the parliamentary and judicial response to the Zuma administration’s failure to detain Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and turn him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides a window in to the state of South African democracy. To me, it is clear that the Zuma government broke both South African and international law by not only failing to hold al-Bashir, though specifically ordered to do so by the South African judiciary, but also facilitated his clandestine departure. South African law is relevant because the South African government at the time incorporated the ICC treaty into its own legal system. Neither the judiciary nor the parliament is taking the Zuma administration’s violation of the law quietly. The Pretoria high Court has “invited” the National Director of Public Prosecutions to look into how South Africa violated a court order to hold al-Bashir. Judge President Dunstan Mlambo said, “A democratic state based on the rule of law cannot exist or function if the government ignores its constitutional obligations.” The parliamentary debate was raucous. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), stated that the Zuma government was in contempt of both the South African court and the ICC. A DA parliamentarian, Steven Mokgalapa said, “The African National Congress (ANC) government, led by Zuma has committed a crime of assisting a wanted man to run from the law.” Congress of the People (COP) leader Mousiuoa Lekota is quoted by the media as saying, “You lied to us. You said you will uphold the constitution, uphold the law and be an example. You have misled the people of our country and now we are ashamed before the nations of the world.” (“Terror” Lekota – his nickname comes from soccer – is a Robben Island veteran and was once an ANC stalwart; a former Minister of Defense, he broke with the ANC when it removed Thabo Mbeki from the party leadership.) The ANC defense boils down to the propositions that heads of state are immune from the ICC. (The Rome Statute specifically says that heads of state are subject to ICC jurisdiction.) Further, that al-Bashir was attending an Africa Union summit, rather than making an official visit to South Africa. However, some ANC leaders are roundly attacking the ICC and calling for South Africa to withdraw. In what is likely to be a swipe at the United States, ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe said on local radio that the ICC “is a tool in the hands of the powerful to destroy the weak and it is a court that is focusing on Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.” He said South Africa should consider leaving the ICC: “If I was in government, I would give notice, get out of that, it was not what was envisioned.” Justice and Constitutional Development Deputy Minister John Jeffrey is quoted as saying that the ICC “has diverted from its mandate and allowed itself to be influenced by powerful non-member states. We signed up for a court that was going to hold human beings accountable for their war crimes – regardless of where they were from. We perceive it as tending to act as a proxy instrument for those states who see no need to subject themselves to its discipline, to persecute African leaders, and effect regime change on the continent.” The al-Bashir episode provides a muddled picture of South African democracy. The government appears to have acted illegally. The judiciary and the legislature have reacted vociferously. But, nobody seems to expect that anything will happen.

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a populist , far-left “revolutionary” political party led by Julius Malema is now the third largest in South Africa’s National Assembly under the system of proportional representation, though it received only about 6.35 percent of the votes in the 2014 elections. It has issued a statement on the Emanuel Church massacre in Charleston, South Carolina. It will have credibility, especially to those unfamiliar the United States. After expressing its condolences to the families of the victims, the EFF statement advances the argument that what happened in Charleston was “an anti-black racist killing.” Few would quarrel with that conclusion. The statement goes on to say that, “The African-American community in the United States of America has been under racist attack by the policing system which continues to treat them as sub-citizens without the full protection of the law. Black people under the U.S. criminal system, purely because of the color of their skin, are permanent crime suspects whom the police harass and kill with impunity.” For most observers of the American scene, this is a gross over-statement. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the highly publicized police killings in Ferguson, Missouri, and Staten Island, New York, the reluctance of grand juries to indict police, and the disproportionate size of the black U.S. prison population, the EFF overstatement has credibility, especially with an African audience. The statement reaches the conclusion that “…America is light years from attaining a human face. It remains the breeding ground for racist whites even after both Mandela and Obama.” The EFF statement then goes on to harness the Charleston tragedy to its political agenda, including the removal in South Africa of apartheid and colonial symbols “because they continue to inspire white supremacy.” After invoking the universality of the black diaspora, it calls on the African Union to “…promote and support African-Americans because they are clearly not safe under Obama and will never be under all the successive governments of the U.S.” The EFF statement is a reminder that for many Africans, the image of the United States is too often inseparable from white supremacy, racism, and violence. This is at least part of the basis for the assertions by many African intellectuals that the United States is hypocritical in its advocacy of human rights and its criticism of African “big men” and corruption. Within a South African context, the strident anti-white tone of the Charleston statement may foreshadow more radical EFF rhetoric. The statement even includes what might be a threat against American whites: “As Africans in Africa we want to send a strong message to white America that we are watching the continuing brutal murder of our brothers and sisters and we must not be pushed to a place where we will have to respond.”

From the perspective of the expectations of Nelson Mandela, South Africa has been treading water, if not worse, especially since the national elections of 2014. Economic growth remains an anemic 2 percent or less, thereby challenging Mandela’s assumption that poverty could be eliminated rapidly. Public concerns about corruption remain unaddressed. Parliament appears increasingly dysfunctional. Its procedures are under assault by Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters and stonewalling tactics by the Zuma government over corruption. All the while, the Zuma government appears to be consolidating executive power at the expense of the other, theoretically co-equal branches of government. It has twice kept out the Dalai Lama, apparently to keep Beijing happy, while it welcomed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with a red carpet to keep the African Union happy. Though wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide, the Zuma government forestalled Bashir’s arrest, which was required by South African law and mandated by the judiciary, by assisting in his clandestine departure. Once one of the strongest supporters of the ICC, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), now denounces it in neo-colonial terms similar to the denunciations by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta. Democracies often go through bad patches of governance. However, democratic institutions including an independent judiciary, civil society, and the rule of law provide a corrective mechanism. Up to now, all three have fulfilled this role in post-apartheid South Africa and have been a basis of optimism about the future of the country. The al-Bashir incident will be a test of the extent to which that optimistic conclusion is still valid. The bottom line appears to be that the Zuma government broke South African law by failing to arrest Bashir and undermined the judiciary by failing to implement its ruling. The courts are now demanding that the Zuma government provide an explanation in seven days for how Bashir entered the country, was not arrested, and then left, though there was a court order requiring the government to ensure that he not leave. Civil organizations are saying that they will likely sue the government for contempt of court, but will delay filing until the government responds to the courts with its explanation. The opposition Democratic Alliance has roundly denounced the government’s behavior. It can be anticipated that it will raise the issue in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the media, including social media, is expressing outrage over the Zuma government’s behavior. Nothing that happens in South Africa now will result in Bashir’s arrest and handover to the ICC. But the courts and civil society may be able to hold the Zuma government accountable. However, if they fail to do so, or are successfully thwarted by Zuma and the ANC, South Africa will have moved away from democracy conducted according to the rule of law. The next week or so could be significant for South Africa’s future.

The media’s take on the failure of South Africa’s Zuma government to hold Sudanese President al-Bashir is that it is a slap in the face of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The press drama is focused on al-Bashir and the credible charges of genocide that he faces before the ICC, and the many African objections to the way the court operates. If less dramatic but of greater significance to the governance of South Africa, the Zuma administration’s connivance with al-Bashir to facilitate his departure flouts a South African high court decision that he could not leave the country pending further judicial review. The Zuma administration’s actions would appear to be in contempt of court and thereby a threat to the legal and constitutional basis of South African governance. The independence and integrity of the judiciary has been a bedrock of South African democracy based on the rule of law. Arguably, the administration’s actions challenge neither. What it did do, however, was challenge the authority of the high court. South African law is clear. The Pretoria High Court is a superior court. A decision made by such a court may only be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal or even the Constitutional Court, both of which are primarily appellant courts. Absent such an appeal, the high court’s ruling stands. The Zuma government filed no appeal in the al-Bashir case. The High Court was clear: South Africa is a signatory to the treaty establishing the ICC, and as there is an ICC order for al-Bashir’s arrest, the High Court directed that al-Bashir could not leave the country pending its ruling. Moreover, South Africa’s 2002 International Criminal Court Act created a domestic legal imperative for the country to comply with ICC arrest warrants. The ICC clarified and reiterated South Africa’s legal obligation to hold al-Bashir in an official decision issued on June 13. The Zuma government apparently conspired to move al-Bashir’s private airplane from the Johannesburg civil airport to a military base near Pretoria, and then facilitated its departure from South Africa. Officials within the Zuma government would appear to be in contempt of court. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has issued a strong statement condemning the Zuma government. It says that “The DA is in consultation with our lawyers as to what means we have at our disposal to ensure that the government not be allowed to sidestep accountability.” It also said, “We will pursue all avenues available to us to ensure that the  government is not allowed to blatantly disregard the laws of this country or its obligations under international law.” Civic organization have also raised the possibility of legal action against specific persons within the government for contempt of court. The Zuma administration’s apparent contempt of court is only the most recent and most blatant of a string of actions that weaken the judiciary and other constitutional limits on the executive. How the DA and civil society respond in this instance will be an indication of the strength of popular support for the rule of law and whether the country’s legal and constitutional institutions are, indeed, under threat.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. At the end of May the Chinese government announced that following a one year ban on ivory imports, it will “strictly control ivory processing and trade until the commercial processing and sale of ivory and its products are eventually halted.” If the Chinese are able to follow through, this could be one of the most important actions taken to end the illicit trade of Ivory that is contributing to the decimation of elephant populations in Africa (China is the largest market for elephant ivory). However, as the Chinese point out, if the ivory trade is to end, other governments must commit to bans as well. As the United States is the world’s second largest market for ivory, it would be an equally important move if the U.S. government were to enact a ban on the trade of elephant ivory. It seems that this may at least be occurring at the state level. On August 2014, the New Jersey State government announced a complete ban on the sale and import of ivory (including rhinoceros horn). It was the first state to do so. Previously, New York passed legislation to limit the sale of ivory in the state (certain items viewed as ‘antiques’ are exempt). These are currently the only states with legislation restricting the trade. However, since New Jersey’s ban was announced ten more states have submitted bills to their legislature in order to restrict the trade of ivory. There have also been moves by the U.S. federal government to restrict the trade. As part of President Obama’s National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, the Fish and Wildlife Service has pushed for a near ban on the ivory trade. After recent reports that Mozambique and Tanzania have respectively lost 48 and 60 percent of their elephant populations due to poaching over the last five years, it would seem that now is the time for the U.S. federal government to clamp down on the ivory trade.

Herman J. Cohen, former assistant secretary of state for Africa, former ambassador, and former special assistant for African affairs to President Reagan, has written a fascinating and clear-eyed book on his “conversations with dictators, statesmen, and father figures.” His interlocutors, including more than sixteen African heads of state, range from Leopold Senghor to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. Cohen seeks to address the question of why fifty years after independence, African countries continue to do relatively poorly. His hypotheses are subtle and do not lend themselves to summary in a blog post. But, they involve leadership failures and the degree to which Africa “…to a great extent continues to be a prisoner of its cultural history.” The book is a great read – I did so in a single sitting because I could not put it down. Africa watchers will delight in Cohen’s subtle pen portraits of Africa’s big men. Through him, the reader feels he or she actually participates in conversations with personalities as variable as Congo’s Mobuto or Nigeria’s Babangida. Many American readers will be particularly intrigued by his francophone “big men,” with whom we are less familiar than the anglophones. The conversations all provide a feast of insights. My favorite: his conversation with Albertina Sisulu, the wife of the great anti-apartheid crusader Walter Sisulu, and herself a formidable personality, prior to South Africa’s transition to "non-racial democracy." Cohen raised concerns about white South African anxiety regarding the coming changes. Her response: “Why should they worry? We are all Christians.” Indeed, they were. Cohen concludes that South Africa is different from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa because of its longer exposure to Christianity. He suggests that a shared Christian culture may be why black and white South Africans could work together to establish the new, post-apartheid dispensation based on democracy and the rule of law. Cohen freely acknowledges that his hypothesis is based on conversation rather than academic research. It is likely to be unfashionable. Still, I think he is on to something.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. In April, South African Airways (SAA) announced that SAA Cargo, the company’s airfreight division, would no longer transport hunting trophies from rhinoceroses, elephants, tigers, and lions internationally. Shortly after, in May, Emirates Airlines announced that they would no longer transport the very same trophies. Both airlines have made the move in an effort to stem the illegal trade of animal products. In the case of SAA, the move was a direct reaction to an incident in April 2015 when an animal product cargo was misdeclared as “machinery spare parts” and the company was served with a notice that the Australian authorities had seized the shipment. The company spokesperson, Tlali Tlali, said that SAA “had to act swiftly to curb the problem of illegal transportation of animals.” The declarations from these two major airlines spurred conservationists to push for further bans by airlines. In response to the news, conservationists have taken the opportunity to petition other airlines to ban the transport of animal trophies. The focus of these groups’ attention seems to be on British Airways and Delta Airlines. (Delta Airlines offers the only nonstop flights between the U.S. and South Africa that are not operated by SAA.) The moves by SAA and Emirates Airlines could indeed hamper at least part of the illegal wildlife trade. According to Out of Africa, a report released by C4ADS and BornFreeUSA, two prominent non-governmental organizations, the airborne flow of ivory accounts for the majority of trafficking incidents. Of particular interest the report found that Johannesburg’s O.R. Tambo airport is one of the three largest hubs for the illicit trade of ivory in Africa, and that United Arab Emirates’ Dubai International Airport, along with Paris’s Charles de Gaulle, is one of two major choke points for ivory leaving Africa via airborne routes. The decisions made by SAA and Emirates Airlines, at some cost to their profit margin, may make a significant difference in stemming the wildlife trade.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, a journalist and adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has denounced the anti-immigrant violence racking his country while also promising to step up a crackdown on illegal immigration. It’s a tricky and dangerous high stakes game to play, one that does not address the nation’s underlying problems of unemployment and poverty, and that sadly puts South Africa’s stability at stake. The country is indeed at risk of destabilization. While President Zuma may claim that more South Africans have electricity, are connected to piped water, and have standard sanitation than one year ago, his record is dim on the economy as a whole. South Africa’s economic growth was 1.5 percent last year, representing the country’s second-lowest growth rate over the past sixteen years. The nation’s unemployment rate, at 25 percent, is one of the highest in the world. Unemployment is over 50 percent for those between 15-24 years old. These poor economic circumstances, coupled with Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini’s incendiary remarks in March that foreigners “should pack their bags and go” because they are taking jobs from South Africans, have incited violence against migrants. King Zwelithini now claims that journalists misquoted him. President Zuma’s call for tolerance and calm has been largely ignored. Indeed, the country is experiencing its worst violence against immigrants since 2008, when nearly 60 people were killed and some 50,000 were forced from their homes. Just this past weekend police arrested nearly 4,000 people, half of them allegedly illegal immigrants, in an effort to promote calm. In April, a clash between locals and immigrants in the port city of Durban left seven dead. Since then, nearly 2,000 foreigners from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other African countries have fled their homes for government-created refugee camps. A University of the Witwatersrand study estimates that 4 percent of South Africa’s population is made up of immigrants, divided about equally between legal and illegal immigrants. Zimbabweans comprise the largest group, and some analysts estimate they account for 23 percent of South Africa’s workforce. Human rights groups and African nations have condemned the attacks. Countries like Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are evacuating their citizens from South Africa. In Zambia, one radio station, QFM, has stopped playing South African music in solidarity with the victims. In Mozambique, there are reports that South African energy and chemical giant Sasol sent hundreds of South African nationals home after Mozambican employees protested their presence. So why are President Zuma’s pleas for peace going unanswered? He may only have himself to blame. He is sending conflicting messages about immigration and the value of immigrants. He’s called the violence “shocking” and said “many [immigrants] bring skills that are scarce that help us to develop the economy and are most welcome to live [in] our country.” Yet, Zuma has also said “there are socio-economic issues that have been raised which are being attended to. These include complaints about illegal and undocumented immigrants in the country, the increase in the number of shops or small businesses that have been taken over by foreign nationals and also perceptions that foreign nationals commit or perpetrate crime.” Such statements send mixed signals. So what can be done? First, President Zuma, who has known poverty and was once a migrant worker in Mozambique and Zambia, needs to denounce that he is a member of the emerging anti-immigrant wave washing from Marie Le Pen’s France, to the United Kingdom’s Independence Party, to the Greek rise of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Then he should fulfill the promises he made one year ago when his party won a decisive 62 percent of the nation’s elections. Back then he said in his acceptance speech, "This mandate gives us the green light to … promote inclusive economic growth and job creation."

The African National Congress’s (ANC) electoral support is slowly eroding. Its share of the national vote has declined to 62.2 percent in 2014 from its high water mark of 69.7 percent in 2004. Its leader, President Jacob Zuma, is much more unpopular than the party, and outside his Zulu core constituency, many see him as corrupt and incompetent. The ANC remains South Africa’s largest political party, in part because of its crucial role in the struggle against apartheid but also because of its education, health, and housing policies. In addition, more than 16 million of South Africa’s 53 million citizens receive government allowances that have reduced the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty, tieing those recipients to the ANC. Nevertheless, after twenty-one years in power, discontent with the ANC is growing, and the party is seen in some quarters as increasingly out of touch. The party’s leadership is also aging: President Zuma is seventy-three; National Chairman Baleke Mbete is sixty-five; Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is sixty-two. By contrast, the leadership of the two opposition parties, Mmusi Maimane of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), are both thirty-four, a generation younger. With the slow waning of the ANC, the official opposition, the DA, is moving to broaden its electoral base beyond whites, coloureds, and Asians. It has enjoyed some success; in the 2015 elections it increased its vote share to 22 percent, and perhaps 20 percent of its voters were black. Now, it has selected Mmusi Maimane, a black man born in Soweto, as its new party leader, succeeding Helen Zille, who is white. Maimane ran for mayor of Johannesburg in 2011. Defeated by the ANC candidate, he has served as the leader of the DA on the Johannesburg city council. He has been leader of the DA in the National Assembly since May 2014. In the 2016 municipal elections, Maimane is targeting Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth, in addition to Cape Town, which the DA already controls. Maimane has a BA in psychology from the University of South Africa, a MA degree in public administration from the University of the Witwatersrand, and a MA in theology from the University of Wales (Bangor). A business consultant, he preaches at a protestant church in suburban Johannesburg, though he was raised a Roman Catholic. His church, Liberty Church – Roodeport, appears to be multiracial, and, based on its website, is evangelical, even Pentecostal in its style of worship. (Pentecostal worship styles are growing very rapidly among black South Africans.) Some critics of the DA charge that the party seeks to bring back racial segregation, an ironical accusation as it is the direct descendant of white liberals who fought against apartheid. Critics will accuse the DA of cynically trolling for black votes by acquiring a veneer of black leadership while the real power rests with whites. University-educated Lindiwe Mazibuko, the former DA leader in the National Assembly, was regularly accused of being a “coconut,” white on the inside and black on the outside. With his multiple academic degrees, a background in business, a preacher to an apparently multi-racial congregation, and with a white wife, Maimane is also accused of not being black “enough.” (Interracial marriage between whites and blacks in South Africa is relatively rare, of about the same magnitude as in the United States.) Breaking the racial box of South African politics will be difficult. There is anecdotal evidence that middle-class blacks disillusioned by the ANC still cannot bring themselves to vote for the “white” DA. So, they support the EFF, which advocates policies directly contrary to their presumed economic interests. However, South African politics are opening up in that they are no longer the exclusive purview of the ANC. Before the national elections in 2019, it is widely anticipated that the National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa’s largest and wealthiest trade union, will establish a “responsible” left wing party that might deprive the EFF of its oxygen. The day may not be too far distant in which South African politics become multivalent, with the DA on the right, the ANC in the middle, and a social democratic party on the left. When that day comes, political identification is likely to owe much less to racial identity than it does now.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. This year rhino poaching has increased significantly in South Africa and Namibia, part of a worsening trend. Since 2007 there has been a 10,000 percent increase in poaching in South Africa alone. An average of twelve rhinos were poached in South Africa between 2000 and 2007 per year; that number ballooned to 1,255 in 2014. Africa is home to two of the five rhino species: the white rhino and the black rhino. The white rhino, which conservation organizations deem as threatened, has an estimated population of 20,000, while the critically endangered black rhino numbers around 5,000. Including the three other species of rhino there are approximately 29,000 rhinos worldwide. With an estimated 20,000 black and white rhinos, South Africa is home to almost 70 percent of all rhinos. The remainder of Africa’s rhinos are scattered throughout southern and east Africa. Just since January, 393 rhinos have been poached in South Africa—an 18 percent increase from the same time period in 2014. In neighboring Namibia, alarmingly, sixty rhinos have been poached since January (only twenty-four were poached in 2014). The rhino population in Zimbabwe is believed to have decreased by nearly 30 percent in the last three years, having lost two hundred rhinos since 2012. Meanwhile, Mozambique, the country blamed for much of South Africa’s poaching problem, saw its reintroduced rhino population disappear in 2013. If this trend continues, African countries will lose one of their most iconic animals and a keystone species. Indeed, if poaching continues at an 18 percent increase in South Africa, the number of poached rhinos in 2015 will reach 1,480, and will far exceed the number of rhinos being born. Fortunately, governments and local NGOs are taking steps to address the increase in rhino poaching. The group Rhinos Without Borders plans to move one hundred rhinos from South Africa to Botswana, they have already relocated ten. As Botswana has seen a sixfold increase in its rhino population over the last ten years, going from 26 to 153 animals, it seems to be one of the few safehavens left for rhinos in Africa. Botswana has been successful at protecting its animal populations because the government has prioritized its conservation programs, going so far as to deploy its military to protect its rhino population. In search of other ways of keeping the rhino population safe, others have suggested more radical solutions. In fact, a conservation group recently proposed to move a thousand rhinos from South Africa to Texas. Though criticized by many conservationists as impractical, and seen by some as a move spurred by big game hunters, the Texas proposal does highlight the need for a drastic response. However, the best way for African governments to save the rhino is through prioritizing conservation efforts that include education and community outreach. While not all African governments have the resources to commit their military to the protection of these animals, they can emphasize the biological, ecological, and financial costs that losing the rhino population would have on local communities. African governments can only stop the poaching crisis once their communities are committed to the fight against poaching.

There is widespread anger across Africa toward the current South African government for its inability to mitigate the current wave of xenophobic violence. At least eight people have been killed and more than 1,000 foreigners have been displaced from their homes and places of business in KwaZulu-Natal. African media is evoking the memory of the continent-wide assistance offered to the liberation movements, especially the governing African National Congress (ANC), in the anti-apartheid struggle. The xenophobic attacks were apparently ignited by remarks made in a speech by the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, which called on foreigners–that are purportedly taking jobs from black South Africans and causing high unemployment rates–to leave the country. The media has been blamed by some for ostensibly taking the king’s words out of context. Undeniably though, the king was playing with fire, and now has little, if any, control over the xenophobic violence, which he is now denouncing. The Zulu king is something of an embarrassment. He has a taste for expensive cars, has at least six wives, and there are questions about upgrades at public expense for the palaces of his wives. His hostile comments about gays—on which he backtracks—are no worse than those made in Uganda or Nigeria, but chafe in South Africa, which has outlawed discrimination based on gender and recognizes same sex marriage. He has been in trouble with the South African Human Rights Commission, and his participation in traditional animal sacrifices has been condemned by animal rights groups. But, the king has power. His position, like those of other traditional rulers, is recognized in the South African constitution, and the government pays his salary. Most important, he heads and controls the Ingonyama Trust, which owns some 32 percent of the land in KwaZulu-Natal. Ostensibly, the Trust holds the land on behalf of the welfare and well-being of the Zulu people. For the many Zulus that are mired in poverty and often illiterate, especially in the rural areas, the king’s power is an immediate reality. The reaction of South African President Jacob Zuma, a member or the Zulu ethnic group, has been less than effective. While saying that he does not want foreigners to leave, Zuma has also said that he is prepared to help them do so. Further, he has come close to excusing the xenophobia by blaming it on the poor social and economic conditions of many of South Africa’s blacks. Zuma’s lackluster condemnation of the xenophobic attacks may reflect his populist style of politics. KwaZulu-Natal has become Zuma’s power base, and is the home of his contentious, publically-funded estate, Nkandala (he is accused of misusing public money for its construction, much like the Zulu king). Zuma’s power base in KwaZulu-Natal has played a role in his successful defeat of challenges to his leadership within the ANC. The Zulu have votes, within the party and in national elections. They number roughly eleven million out of nearly fifty million South Africans, and are the largest ethnic group in the country. Zuma’s populist style of politics has included pandering to certain Zulu traditions, such as having multiple wives, which many South Africans find distasteful. Zuma’s need to preserve his Zulu power base and his ties with the Zulu king may account for his uncertain leadership in responding to the xenophobia unleashed by King Zwelithini.

The current wave of violence and intimidation against African immigrants in South Africa started in Durban and has spread to Johannesburg and other parts of the country. Intimidation and fear mongering appears to be widespread, generating panic among African foreigners. There have been previous waves of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa that also were violent. What is going on in South Africa is unclear. However, South African xenophobia is in part a response to rampant poverty. Many black South Africans have seen little improvement in their lives in the twenty-plus years since Nelson’s Mandela’s inauguration as president of the “non-racial” South Africa. In terms of income and opportunity, South Africa remains one of the least equal countries in the world. While whites, many Asians, and a small black elite generally enjoy a first-world standard of living, much of the vast black majority remains mired in poverty and underdevelopment. South Africans perceive their society as one of the world’s most violent. Protests, sometimes violent, against poor service delivery in the townships is now almost a daily occurrence. Poor blacks have little political voice, and the governing African National congress (ANC) is increasingly remote from many township dwellers. (Only Julius Malema’s quixotic Economic Freedom Fighters seeks to speak for the poor majority.) As a result, many blacks South Africans are deeply angry. But the rage and violence associated with the waves of xenophobia is not directed toward whites or the small black elite. Instead, its victims are African immigrants who likely possess little more than their tormentors. Immigrants can readily be identified as “the other.” This is especially true of immigrants from francophone or lusophone Africa. Though, Anglophones, especially Zimbabweans and Nigerians, are also victims. Immigrants are also near at hand – they very often live in townships. Reflecting apartheid’s physical separation of the races, elites, white or black, often live at a considerable distance from poor blacks, with whom they may have little contact. One of the main drivers of anger seems to be that immigrants are competitors for scarce township jobs. Some immigrants, for example from Zimbabwe, have benefited from better primary schooling than most black South Africans. This has given them an advantage in obtaining jobs in township environments where unemployment can approach 50 percent. In some countries, xenophobia is tacitly condoned by the government as a way of deflecting opposition. This is not the case in South Africa. The government, the opposition, the media, and the South African establishment across racial lines has uniformly condemned the xenophobia. In many of the townships the local populations are divided, with many local residents seeking to protect immigrants, and there have been public protests against xenophobia. The government regards the violence against foreigners as criminal, and the police have made arrests. The authorities will likely bring the current wave of xenophobic violence under control. But, in so far as xenophobic violence is a manifestation of South Africa’s social and economic ills, it is likely to flare up again.

This is a guest post by John Causey, a private equity practitioner with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa transactions. On April 9, the University of Cape Town (UCT) removed the statue on its main campus of Cecil John Rhodes, one of the most important and contentious historical figures in Southern Africa’s history. This is not the first statue or name changing controversy in South Africa’s modern history. Who was Cecil John Rhodes? At his death, Rhodes was one of the richest men in the world. He amassed his incredible wealth from scratch and in a relatively short period of time. In addition to founding De Beers diamond mining and trading company in Kimberly, he was the seventh Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. Rhodes is directly and indirectly responsible for many development projects in Southern Africa, and in his estate bequeathed land for Kirstenbosch Gardens and the land on which UCT now sits. His sizable estate continues to fund numerous worthwhile initiatives, including the prestigious Rhodes scholarship. Given Rhodes remarkable achievements, why the controversy? A common refrain describes Rhodes as a colonizer, English imperialist, and oppressor of the black African population. This refrain is based in truth. The protestors are disturbed by the statue and say it is a reminder of unpleasant aspects of South Africa’s history. Their call for its removal was embraced by Max Price, UCT’s Vice Chancellor, who apparently led the charge on this matter for the administration. Seeking the middle road, he successfully advocated its removal and eventual relocation. The protests went on for weeks with varying degrees of civility. The protestors and UCT administrators achieved their aims with virtually no resistance. Although the status quo easily won the day, here are three lines of defense for maintaining the statue which were faintly mumbled in some quiet corners of the country. First, Rhodes should be appreciated as an important historical figure. Academics in Zimbabwe have not opted to adopt UCT’s approach to dealing with Rhodes’ legacy in Zimbabwe, and Robert Mugabe’s administration has actively blocked attempts to remove Rhodes’ remains from the Matopos Hills just outside Bulawayo in Matabeleland. Robert Mugabe is no advocate for the white African, yet he and other Zimbabweans show that there are more subtle ways to deal with uncomfortable historical events and figures. Second, no transformative figure in history is without fault and it’s not fair to view their deeds in isolation. Gandhi had a disdain of the black race and in particular black South Africans, Mandela was labeled a terrorist and had a proclivity towards communism, George Washington was a slaveholder, and Shaka Zulu brutally attacked the Xhosa and other peoples to name a few examples. It’s possible to be worthy of a statue without being perfect. Third, UCT’s actions aren’t occurring in isolation and will set a precedent. As the BBC asks, what if a future government wanted to knock down statues of Nelson Mandela? Already in April protests have ensued around a prominent statue of Jan van Riebeeck in Cape Town, a monument in Port Elizabeth to honor fallen horses and mules in the Second Boer War has been vandalized, and in Johannesburg a statue of Mahatma Gandhi has been defaced by a group calling for its removal.