South Africa

The South African government spent about $24 million on “security upgrades” to President Jacob Zuma’s private estate, Nkandla. Those “security upgrades” included a swimming pool, a chicken run, and a football pitch. In 2014, Public Protector Thuli Madonsela investigated the expenditure and found some of it improper, and directed the president to pay back some—not all—of the public money spent on the estate. President Zuma refused, and was supported by his cabinet minister and the governing African National Congress (ANC) majority in parliament. Zuma has long been accused of corruption, and the two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) actively campaigned for Zuma to follow the direction of the public protector. The EFF staged unruly demonstrations on the floor of parliament. In early February, President Zuma proposed a settlement by which he would pay back some of the money, but the amount would be determined by the auditor general and the finance ministry. It is widely thought that Zuma’s settlement offer was motivated by his weak political position. He was wounded politically by his efforts to change the finance minister, the fall in commodity prices, and a decline in the value of the national currency. His ANC faces important local government elections this year. However, the opposition parties refused to accept the offer. Instead, they are proceeding with a suit in the Constitutional Court. The purpose of the suit appears to be to strengthen the hand of the public protector. Zuma and his allies had claimed that the public protector’s findings were only advisory, and not binding. The Office of the Public Protector is established by the Constitution of South Africa. Its mandate is to investigate misconduct in any aspect of state affairs and all spheres of government. It is a so-called “Chapter 9” body—entities established by the constitution to protect citizens from bad governance and human rights violations. Chapter 9 institutions are part of a system of checks and balances designed to limit the power of the executive and the legislature. As such, it is independent of government. If the Constitutional Court finds that the public protector’s findings are binding in the Nkandla case, all Chapter 9 institutions will be strengthened, and the authority of parliament and the presidency reduced. Many in the ANC see parliament as the most important institution in a democracy. The opposition parties, on the other hand, are concerned more about the rule of law which Chapter 9 institutions promote. The DA is a center-right party associated with South Africa’s racial minorities; it is trying to attract support from the black majority. The EFF is a radical, left-wing party that uses anti-white rhetoric and has, among other things, called for the expropriation of white-owned property. The two parties are strange bedfellows, but both want to get rid of Zuma and both want to strengthen the hand of the public protector. Julius Malema, the EFF chieftain, was once a political ally of Zuma. Since their falling out, and Malema’s expulsion from the ANC, the latter’s animus against the president is palpable and personal. It is likely that the EFF hopes that the Constitutional Court will rule that by not implementing the public protector’s findings, President Zuma violated his oath of office: to uphold the constitution. Should that happen, the EFF and most of the other opposition parties are likely to demand Zuma’s impeachment. That almost certainly will not happen because the ANC retains a large majority in parliament. But, the effort will further wound Zuma and the ANC in the run-up to the local elections.

Led by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, the African Union (AU) voted by a huge margin in favor of a proposal for withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the aftermath of the vote, President Jacob Zuma reiterated his threat that South Africa would withdraw from the ICC’s jurisdiction: “Our strongly held view is that it is now impossible, under the circumstances, for South Africa to continue its participation…” The AU chairman, Chadian President Idriss Deby, repeated the regular criticism that the ICC is biased against Africa: “Elsewhere in the world, many things happen, many flagrant violations of human rights, but nobody cares.” The current ICC trial of the former president of the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo, has raised the court’s profile. Among many African elites, there is sensitivity about how many ICC cases involve Africans. At present, there are ICC probes underway in Kenya, Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, and Mali. Overlooked by critics is that many ICC prosecutions have been undertaken at the request of African governments. Moreover, many Africans, especially human rights advocates, support the ICC. The Nairobi newspaper Daily Nation, summed it up in an editorial: “It is far better for member states to stay in the court and advocate reforms, rather than bolting and leaving millions on the continent unprotected by an international court which can step in when national institutions fail.” Opposition to the ICC is led by many of Africa’s more disreputable leaders: Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, Kenya’s Kenyatta, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, and Chad’s Deby. Some African heads of state have personal axes to grind. Kenyatta was indicted by the court for allegedly directing violence in conjunction with Kenya’s 2007 elections; prosecutors eventually gave up the case, saying that the Kenyatta government not only failed to cooperate, but that there was also intimidation of witnesses. Kenyan Deputy President Willliam Ruto is still under ICC indictment. Zuma faced fierce criticism in South Africa when he failed to hand over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, under ICC indictment for genocide and other crimes in Darfur. The AU vote has little practical consequence. Participation in the ICC is a matter for an individual state. South Africa’s departure from the ICC would be especially difficult, despite Zuma’s rhetoric. The founding statute of the ICC, the Treaty of Rome, has been incorporated into South African law. Withdrawal would require a vote by parliament. If Zuma were successful, the parliamentary vote would be challenged by the opposition parties in the court system, ultimately the Constitutional Court, which is independent of any administration.

For the past decade, the narrative of “Africa Rising” has been dominant. In hindsight, it was largely the product of high prices for Africa’s export commodities, especially oil, the continent’s rapid urbanization, an over-estimation of the growth of a middle class, over-reliance on dubious statistics, and more than a dollop of wishful thinking. “Africa Rising” was also a useful marketing tool for those seeking to raise capital for investment on the continent. With the collapse of oil and other commodity prices, the slow-down in China’s economy, and second thoughts about urbanization without the necessary infrastructure, especially electric power and schools, the pendulum is swinging the other way. The risk is that overoptimism will be replaced by undeserved pessimism, especially in the United States, where the economic links with Africa are less developed than those with Europe and Asia. Norimitsu Onishi makes the point that excessive pessimism can be as misleading as overoptimism in his thoughtful “African Economies, and Hopes for a New Era, Are Shaken by China,” in the January 25 New York Times. The current economic woes of Nigeria are largely the result of falling oil prices, the inability of the government to tax the non-oil wealth of the country, and structural corruption. In South Africa, falling commodity prices exacerbate the effects of the region’s worst drought in many years, itself perhaps a consequence of climate change. However, South Africa has a robust institutional and economic infrastructure, and its economy is likely to recover relatively quickly, especially with the return of rain. Onishi also makes the point that East Africa is likely to weather the current economic downturn better than other regions because its economies are not dependent on a single commodity such as oil. The point is that sub-Saharan “Africa” is a region of countries that no more lends itself to generalization than any other part of the world. In big countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, there are huge regional differences as well, with plenty of economic opportunites even if the “Rising” narrative is discredited.

On January 24, in London, UK Prime Minister David Cameron honored Nelson Mandela’s three surviving co-defendants at the 1964 Rivonia trial. They were Denis Goldberg, Ahmad Kathrada, and Andrew Mlangeni. Cameron also honored their suriviving defense attorneys, Lord Joel Joffe and George Bizos, who succeeded in avoiding the death penalty for their clients, though not twenty-six years of imprisonment. Goldberg was a member of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). At Rivonia, he was convicted of armed resistance to apartheid. Among the ten men convicted at the Rivonia trial, the most famous being Mandela, Goldberg was the only white man. In a January 24 BBC interview, Goldberg publicly called for the current leaders of the governing ANC to be replaced due to widespread corruption. However, he also cited the huge gains South Africa has made since the coming of “non-racial” democracy in 1994, when Nelson Mandela was sworn-in as president, especially with respect to education, health care, economic growth, and the transformation of the civil service. Other liberation icons have made the same point. Progress in democratic, non-racial South Africa is real, but in their view the ruling ANC has lost its way, and its leadership must be replaced. Though Goldberg named no names, for many South Africans President Jacob Zuma and his close associates will immediately come to mind.

For most Americans, their first exposure to South African comedy has been Trevor Noah, the host of Comedy Central’s “The Daily Show.” Noah’s January 20, riff on Sarah Palin’s endorsement of Donald Trump is an example of South African standup comedy at its best, with the added dimension of an African “seeing us as others see us.” One example is his comment that America is such a great place because “…presidents might have term limits but Sarah Palin is forever.” In fact, comedy has been an instrument of popular protest and social transformation since the anti-apartheid movement, and it is becoming even more influential in contemporary South Africa. It flourishes in an environment of near-absolute freedom of speech. Lyn Snodgrass, the Head of the Department of Political and Conflict Studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, argues that a new generation of South African comedians is increasingly popular, and, in their search for laughs, provide a biting social and political critique during a particularly unsettled political period. She argues that South African comedians – often outrageous – are “hallmarks of a robust democracy.” Snodgrass cites Pew Research Center research that talk show hosts and comedians are a significant source of political information in the United States—particularly among Millennials—and that the same is true in South Africa. Snodgrass focuses on young, black comedians. However, there are comedians from nearly all racial groups and permutations. Trevor Noah is of mixed race. Nic Rabinowitz is described as “the world’s leading Xhosa-speaking Jewish comedian,” and his impersonation of national icon Archbishop Desmond Tutu is far from “politically correct.” The political establishment within the governing African National Congress (ANC) should pay attention to comedians, as their constituents certainly are. And, often the target of comedic barbs, President Jacob Zuma should be worried.

It is unduly gloomy in sunny South Africa. The national currency, the rand, is falling; the economy is hardly growing at all; the Zuma administration appears mired in corruption and mismanagement. There has been an upsurge in racist rhetoric. Hence the South African surprise and delight at the announcement that two of the richest South Africans, Allan and Gill Gray, are essentially giving away their wealth to their family foundation. The Daily Maverick says, “The total value of this endowment is currently unknown, but it will run into billions of rands, and is certainly to be the largest philanthropic foundation established by any South African in history." The gift is seen as a ringing endorsement for the future of a democratic South Africa—and the future of South African business Another Gray foundation already funds hundreds of high school and university scholarships. Gray and his wife have also endowed a Center and a Chair in Values-Based Leadership at the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business. Allan Gray is #1226 on the Forbes 2015 list of world billionaires and #7 in South Africa, with an estimated net worth of 1.4 billion dollars. His investment management firm, Allan Gray Ltd., is the largest privately owned asset manager in South Africa, overseeing 40 billion dollars, according to Forbes. Patrice Motsepe, the richest black person in South Africa with a Forbes net worth of 2.2 billion dollars, in 2013 took the Warren Buffett and Bill Gates pledge to give to charity one half of his wealth. Gray and Motsepe are also reminders of the enormous wealth in South Africa, and its concentration.

Penny Sparrow, age sixty-nine, a white real estate agent in Durban and a member of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), in a Facebook post characterized black beach goers over New Year’s as “monkeys." (For many years, young black South Africans living inland have gathered on Durban’s beaches to celebrate New Year’s.) At about the same time, a bank economist tweeted about “majority (black) entitlement” as a barrier to economic growth. Others, evidently also white, on-line have expressed admiration for certain apartheid and pre-apartheid era political figures, including P.W. Botha and Cecil Rhodes. Black social media response has been fierce, including calls to take action “against all white people to end racism.” These racist comments have been condemned by the political parties and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. DA party leader Mmusi Maimane has expelled Sparrow and reaffirmed that there is no place for racism in South Africa. His rhetoric was strong: “As a human being, and the leader of the Democratic Alliance, I’m angry. Recently you called me a monkey. In your argument you said that there were some blacks you could tolerate, but those at the beach that day who littered, were monkeys. This angers me.” The Human Rights Commission says that it will investigate all complaints about racism from whatever source. The episode brings home to many South Africans that racism remains entrenched. Azad Essa, in a thoughtful post on The Daily Vox (Johannesburg) refers to “a toxic mix of race and class that pervades the way South Africa is structured.” He goes on to say, “The message of post-1990 South Africa is loud and clear... It’s okay to be racist but only in private. It’s okay to be condescending, so long as it’s subtle. It’s okay to be patronizing so long as you provide employment.” Social media provides a forum whereby outrageous statements are widely publicized and amplified. So, too, may be the similarly outrageous response to them. That is a challenge to the management of South Africa’s complex brew of race and class and the enduring poverty of too many South Africans who are black. This episode may also have a political context. The DA, long associated with whites, has been seeking black electoral support. It hopes to capture Gauteng province (Johannesburg) in elections later this year. However, its chances of success are nil if it is identified with white racism. Polling data has indicated that a significant number of young blacks believe that the DA’s “secret agenda” is restoration of apartheid. This, of course, is spurious, but the comments of Sparrow and other whites feed it. In his response to Sparrow, Maimane also said: “Our project, in case you thought otherwise, is to build a non-racial organization. A party for all South Africans. Our party is to create a movement of people from different races who are committed to Nelson Mandela’s dream, and are bound by the values of freedom, fairness, and opportunity.”

The alarums and excursions over South Africa’s economy and economic policy do not stop. December saw the discreditable episode of President Jacob Zuma’s hiring and firing multiple ministers of finance in only a few days and a drop in the country’s estimated economic growth rate to perhaps 1.2 percent. The new year kicked off with an apparent standoff with the United States over trade that if unresolved would end South Africa’s participation in the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). But, a BBC news item that appeared New Year’s Eve highlights how South Africa’s commitment to the rule of law makes it well-prepared to weather the multiple crises of the moment. A South African traditional ruler, King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, reported to prison after his conviction and his appeals failed. The king was found guilty of kidnapping a woman and her six children, burning down their house, and beating four young men because their family members did not present himself before the king’s traditional court. (One of the young men died following his beating.) The king claimed he was innocent, that he was merely “disciplining” his subjects under customary law. The king is one of ten recognized monarchs in South Africa. They play a largely ceremonial role, but many control substantial amounts of tribal lands, and in rural areas often exercise arbitrary power over their often illiterate “subjects.” President Jacob Zuma has cultivated close relations with traditional rulers as part of his African populism. King Dalindyebo also is connected to national icon Nelson Mandela. He and the former president are both from the Thembu clan. Following the king’s trial, conviction, and failed appeals, the justice minister refused his request for a retrial on the basis that there was no legal justification. The king reported for jail after a judge refused to extend his bail. According to the BBC, at the sentencing, the Supreme Court of Appeal said of the king, “His behavior was all the more deplorable because the victims of his reign of terror were the vulnerable rural poor, who were dependent upon him. Our constitution does not countenance such behavior. We are a constitutional democracy in which everyone is accountable and where the most vulnerable are entitled to protection.” The BBC reports that during his protracted legal proceedings, the king left the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and joined the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA expelled him from the party following the Supreme Court of Appeal’s ruling. It also reports conflicting reports as to whether the tribal elders will replace Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo as king. In light of the earlier trial, conviction, and appeal of paralympian Oscar Pistorius BBC commentator Milton Nkosi rightly sums up the significance of the king episode: “South Africa has once again demonstrated that, despite its leadership problems, it upholds the rule of law, even if it means locking up a king and alienating some of his subjects ahead of crucial local elections next year.”

While western governments are currently transfixed on events in Iraq and Syria, it is important that they do not forget Africa. Boko Haram has become the world’s deadliest terrorist organization and Libya is increasingly becoming a base of operations for the Islamic State. Below, CFR’s Africa program outlines six African issues to watch in 2016. While they could certainly affect the lives of millions of Africans, these issues could also have serious implications for international politics. 1. President for Life?   This year violence broke out in Burundi over President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid to hold on to power in a third presidential term. Several other African presidents have recently followed his lead to try to hold on to power. Both Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame have taken the legal steps necessary to extend their time in office. Both countries have presidential elections in 2017 that could become violent. In 2016, we should also watch the Democratic Republic of the Congo where many in the opposition believe that President Joseph Kabila is pursuing a policy that would allow him to retain power after his current term ends in 2016. 2. Migration   With at least 2.5 million displaced persons in the Lake Chad region alone, there is the potential for a large wave of Africans to migrate. This could take the form of international migration, similar to the Eritreans who have fled to Europe, or to destinations elsewhere in Africa. Between 2006 and 2012, South Africa received the highest number of asylum seekers of any country in the world. It is possible that as conflicts continue and economies contract due to low commodity prices, there will be a wave of migration to wealthier African countries where they could face the risk of rising xenophobia. 3. Will Zuma Survive Politically?   Pressure on South Africa’s president has been increasing. Over the past year Zuma has battled allegations of corruption related to $20 million in public funds spent on upgrades to his private estate, Nkandla. Despite a police report stating that the upgrades were security features, including a swimming pool, the opposition continues to call for legal action. Zuma’s most recent faux pas, firing the minister of finance and replacing him with an unknown, has galvanized opposition to his administration within his own party, the African National Congress (ANC). It is possible that in 2016 the ANC could remove Zuma as their party leader and subsequently as president, just as they did with Thabo Mbeki in 2008. 4. Buhari’s Anti-Corruption Campaign   Since Muhammadu Buhari’s election as president of Nigeria, he has had a small number of high profile figures arrested for charges related to corruption. How far will this campaign go? Will it pursue high level leaders from the Jonathan administration, perhaps including the former first lady? If so, will Buhari politically overreach? As military head of state Buhari aggressively went after corruption. Many claim this is why the military abruptly removed him from office. 5. Expansion of Instability in the Sahel   With the attack on a hotel in Bamako, Mali, and continued jihadist operations in the country’s north, it is clear that jihadist activity in the Sahel is not over. In December, there was an attempted military coup in Niger. Boko Haram continues to be active in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, as well as in Nigeria. The Islamic State is strengthening its presence in Libya, and Boko Haram has sworn allegiance to it. Thus far, that relationship appears to be mostly one of rhetoric, but it could further develop. 6. Climate Change   Across Africa the effects of climate change are already visible. The shrinking of Lake Chad contributes to the large number of displaced persons in the region. Since 1963, the lake has shrunk to nearly a twentieth of its original size. Tanzania and Zambia have both been suffering from power shortages because of the impact of drought on hydroelectricity. In South Africa the government has declared disaster zones in five of nine provinces due to drought related to El Niño. Among other things El Niño is also the cause of massive floods that have left thousands of Somalians homeless. In 2016, we can expect to see more severe climate related issues, including migration, as the effects of El Niño are fully felt. This piece was co-authored by John Campbell and Allen Grane.

Jacob Zuma’s political power is based on his support by the African National Congress’s political apparatus – often called Luthuli House, after the party’s headquarters building in Johannesburg. With support of the party machinery, he has weathered numerous political and personal setbacks ranging from a rape trial to accusations of corruption. However, if the party turns against him, he will not long survive as party leader or chief of state. In 2008, Thabo Mbeki was removed from both positions by a party revolt. The same is possible for Zuma. In one four-day period in December, Zuma fired two finance ministers and hired a third. International and domestic markets signaled their disapproval: the Rand (ZAR) the South African currency plunged, as did the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The international credit agencies raised the possibility of rating South African bonds as “junk,” as they have (or are about to do) with Russia’s and Brazil’s. Zuma reversed course and appointed the well-respected Pravin Gordhan as finance minister. The Rand and the stock markets thereupon recovered some—not all—of their losses. End of episode? Perhaps not. The question is whether Zuma has been seriously wounded politically in the eyes of the ANC. There are signs that he may have been. Former finance minister Trevor Manuel in an open letter to Lindiwe Zulu, small business development minister and confidant of Zuma, said that the president’s actions “shook the trust of the Cabinet collective at its roots.” He went on to say that “the trust is not broken only with the Cabinet of course’ it is also broken with the ANC, with the broader South African electorate, with the markets and the entity you (Lindiwe Zulu) call business.” “The breach of trust was not the first but perhaps the last, straw that broke the camel’s back in the careless handling of a pivotal portfolio.” Zulu has declined to respond to Manuel. Manuel does not appear to be alone. Former cabinet minister Tokyo Sexwale in a BBC television appearance was asked whether Zuma’s grip on power is slipping. Sexwale did not respond directly but said that Zuma had learned a hard lesson: “it’s important that politicians should understand before they take decisions the consequences of the decisions because particularly in the markets, you take a decision of course it knocks off the country, you fall off your stool, the debt rises, inflation, and so on.” Public anger at Zuma is also widespread, one journalist quoted Nelson Mandela: “If the ANC does to you what the apartheid government did to you, then you must do to the ANC what you did to the apartheid government.” Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the party will move quickly against Zuma. Manuel, who is widely respected in South Africa as well as by the international financial community, is retired. Sexwale lost a party leadership contest with Zuma, who subsequently fired him from the cabinet. Up to now, Zuma has been able to ignore his critics in the party as well as the quality South African media, which dislikes him. However, if the party faces severe reversals in the local elections of 2016, Zuma might find himself very vulnerable.

On December 10, President Jacob Zuma fired Nhlanhla Nene, the well regarded finance minister, and replaced him with the unknown and inexperienced David van Rooven. Though Zuma is not required by the South African constitution to consult with anybody on cabinet appointments, the fact that he did not inform his cabinet or provide public explanation for his removal of Nene and appointment of van Rooven may have been the last straw. South Africa already has been buffeted by the fall in commodity prices, uncharacteristically low growth rates, and fears that the widely anticipated U.S. Federal Reserve’s increase in interest rates will attract investor funds from emerging markets. The Rand, the South African currency, plunged, the Johannesburg Stock exchange indexes swooned, and government borrowing costs jumped. Business commentary was uniformly hostile to Nene’s firing, with dire predictions that the new appointment foreshadowed an end to South Africa’s hitherto prudent macroeconomic policy. The governing African National Congress’s (ANC) two partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were also not informed of the move and criticized it. The general public did not like the move either. In South Africa #ZumaMustFall became the top Twitter hashtag. Four days later, Zuma reversed himself and appointed the highly regarded Pravin Gordham as finance minister, a position he held from 2009 to 2014. The Rand and the stock markets recovered (if not completely). Opposition to the Nene firing from within the ANC is likely the reason for Zuma’s reversal. If Zuma shows little understanding of how a modern economy works (he has almost no formal education), plenty of ANC leaders not only understand it, but are personally invested in it. As has been the case in the past, the South African political economy has once again self-corrected with the appointment of Gordham, who has successfully steered South Africa through its only recession since the coming of “non-racial” democracy in 1994. The South African media is now reporting that Zuma and his political allies within the ANC have been politically wounded. The ANC faces local elections in 2016 and an internal fight in 2017 over Zuma’s successor as ANC leader. The opposition parties, especially the center-right Democratic Alliance and the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, are visibly strengthening as public disillusionment with Zuma grows: the South African media reports that 66 percent of the public distrusts the president. At this point, the party leadership race appears to be between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma’s former wife and his candidate of choice, and Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the 1994 “non-racial’ democratic settlement and the candidate of business. The South African media is also speculating that the ANC could remove Zuma as party leader soon. As of December 14, #ZumaMustStillFall had replaced, #ZumaMustFall. Only the ANC can remove its party leader and, in effect, the president. That has happened before; in 2008, the party removed Thabo Mbeki as party leader and forced him to resign the presidency a few months later. As a practical matter, Zuma could be removed by a majority vote of the National Assembly or by a motion of no confidence. The ANC holds 62 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. How ANC members vote would be largely determined by the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Zuma has appointed most NEC members to government posts. If Zuma were to fall, many or most of them would lose their jobs and salaries. Hence, at this stage, it is unlikely that the NEC will turn against Zuma. However, this episode has probably weakened the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma to be his successor as party leader and enhanced the position of Cyril Ramaphosa. Perhaps the significance of the past five days is that once again South Africa’s political system has demonstrated an ability to self-correct within a democratic political framework and an economy largely conducted according to free-market principles.

Byron Holland is the CEO of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, which manages the .ca domain. A decade ago, a landmark summit was held in Geneva and Tunis to discuss how the digital divide between the developing and developed world could be bridged. This week representatives from more than 190 nations are meeting in New York to assess the progress made since the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and those discussions could influence Internet governance for the foreseeable future. A lot has changed in the past ten years. The number of Internet users has tripled to more than three billion; the Internet is now estimated to contribute $4 trillion to the world’s top twenty economies each year. It has become the catalyst for revolutions and radically changed the ways in which many of us communicate with each other. However, the digital divide that the WSIS was intended to address persists. Sixty percent of the world’s population still do not have access to the Internet and are therefore excluded from the tremendous economic and social benefits that come with it. It incumbent upon all of us, governments, the private sector and civil society, to work together to shrink this divide. However, how to do so, and who gets to make those decisions, continue to be points of contention. The historically unparalleled growth of the Internet is, as I and many others would argue, in large part due to the bottom-up, organic approach inherent to the governance model employed to manage its global development. Underpinned by the principles of inclusiveness, collaboration, openness, and transparency, the multistakeholder model has been the foundation of the Internet’s success. The multistakeholder model ensures that all organizations that have an interest in the Internet’s success have an equal voice at the table when decisions about its development are made, a necessity for an entity as complex as the global Internet. It has facilitated the development of the greatest driver of positive economic and social change humankind has seen in centuries, and it has the power to accelerate the flow of knowledge, education, communication, and wealth globally. While the Tunis Agenda, the output of the WSIS in 2005, called for a lightweight, multistakeholder approach to Internet governance, there have been numerous attempts by certain governments to exert their authority over critical Internet resources over the past ten years. A multilateral approach, one that would put governments in the role of decision-maker, has been preferred by a number of states (primarily from the BRICS group). The negotiations leading up to this week’s meeting has seen the debate over ‘who should run the Internet’ brought to the forefront once again. I was therefore pleased to see that the latest draft of the outcome document—the text that will form the basis of the discussions this week at what is known as WSIS+10—recognizes the value of the multistakeholder model. It attaches “great importance to multistakeholder implementation at the international level” and goes as far to say that “building an inclusive development-oriented Information Society will require unremitting multistakeholder effort.” Those are strong words of support for a model of governance that is sometimes represented as the antithesis of the multilateral approach symbolized by the United Nations. While there are many sections of the text that remain problematic, I see this as progress. Of course, negotiated text is one thing. Actions can be, and often are, something completely different. While the outcome document borders on the self-congratulatory for the UN’s commitment to the multistakeholder model in the WSIS process, I’m afraid the reality tells a very different story. Yes, there have been open consultations with non-state actors leading up to the high-level meeting (often held with less than a week’s notice) and yes, the outcome document has been posted for public comment (the last time for less than 72 hours). However, this is not meaningful multistakeholder participation. Putting aside the very real challenges of travelling to New York for an open consultation with minimal notice, or providing meaningful input to the draft outcome documents in very short order, the process to get to this point has been stacked in the favor of governments. The real work of drafting the outcome document has taken place behind closed doors at the UN, with the technical community, civil society and the private sector largely shut out of the process. I would argue that it does not live up to the spirit and intent set out by the Tunis Agenda a decade ago. In this context, the multistakeholder model may be best defined by what it is not, as opposed to what it is. ‘Consultation’ with stakeholders is not multistakeholder; it is a multilateral approach with input from affected parties. A true multistakeholder approach sees all affected parties come to the decision-making table with equal opportunity for input. Moving forward, the multistakeholder model will become increasingly important in addressing the digital divide. Recognizing the importance of the Internet to development in the global south, the UN’s recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for universal and affordable access to the Internet by 2020. The degree to which the SDGs are linked to the global adoption of information and communications technologies cannot be overestimated. Achieving these lofty goals will require an approach that includes full multistakeholder participation. I applaud the United Nations on its recognition of the value of the multistakeholder model for Internet governance in the WSIS+10 outcome document. However, given the process leading up to next week’s meeting, I am skeptical that it is any more than high-minded rhetoric and empty gestures.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Last week, South African High Court Judge Francis Legodi ruled against the Zuma administration moratorium on the country’s domestic trade in rhino horns. As it is possible to harvest a rhino’s horn without killing the animal, there is discussion about the potential for a regulated trade in rhino horns. In light of the dramatic increase in rhino poaching, the argument that legalizing trade in rhino horn could help save the species has been gaining steam. The high court ruling is a reflection of this thinking. However, the decision from the judge may not actually mean much. Legodi’s decision is based on due process. He found that in 2009, when the moratorium was imposed, the then minister of environmental affairs did not give adequate notice of plans to impose the moratorium or allow proper public participation in the process. In the past, rhino farmers have argued that their right to sale rhino horn is guaranteed by the South African Constitution and its bill of rights which promises the “…use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.” The rhino breeders who brought the case before the court argue that rhino horn is a renewable resource, as a rhino that is dehorned will grow the horn back (rhino farmers are able to harvest several horns in a rhino’s lifetime). And, because the South African government has long allowed people to ‘own’ rhinos, the breeders do have property rights to the animals. The South African Water and Environmental Affairs Ministry quickly announced its intention to appeal the decision. This action effectively suspends the High Court’s ruling, meaning the domestic rhino horn trade is still not legal in South Africa. The court’s decision, and the recent headlines it has made, may prove more significant than the domestic trade. Indeed, the demand for rhino horn within South Africa is relatively low, and rhino breeders (and the South African government) do not stand to profit much from a domestic trade. The largest markets for rhino horn are in Asia, where rhino horn can go for as much as $65,000 a kilogram. Many view the petition by rhino breeders as a way to convince the UN’s Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) to legalize the trade internationally. It is not a coincidence that the next meeting of CITES will be in South Africa next year. In light of the upcoming CITES meeting, the South African government has already formed a committee to determine the viability of a legalized trade. As rhino horn is renewable, this committee is meant to research whether or not a legal trade will alleviate the current pressure on rhino populations from poaching. It is believed that this committee’s recommendations will influence the South African governments decision whether to appeal to CITES for a legal international trade in rhino horn. Critics of this plan say that legalizing the trade would make the market for rhino horn larger, while proponents argue that by legalizing the trade the supply will increase and reduce the extravagant prices that currently drive rhino poaching. Both sides of the argument have merit. While the High Court’s decision may or may not stick, the end result may be a harbinger of what’s to come on an international scale.