South Africa

South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) has long been a big tent, with its membership united by opposition to apartheid and, less salient, support for “nonracial” democracy. Conventional wisdom has seen the ANC membership, policy, and electoral support as revolving around four poles or tendencies:  the "democrats," devoted to Nelson Mandela’s vision of nonracial democracy and the protection of human rights; the South African Communist Party (SACP), in many ways a Marxist party of a generation ago in Western Europe, but also devoted to a nonracial state; the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which promotes the interests of the country’s “labor aristocracy” rather than the unskilled unemployed; and the “Africanists,”  those who want a redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks and an assertion of black identity that recalls the Black Power movement in the United States. (Many of them would drop the nonracial modifiers of democracy.) Depending on the issue, support varies for each of these “tendencies,” and there is substantial overlap. In any event, however sliced and diced, the ANC is likely to remain intact to contest the August provincial and local government elections. Though this analytical model may be losing its relevance, spurred by accelerated change within the party that is crystallized by an effort to get President (and party leader) Jacob Zuma out of office. The SACP has diminishing influence, is dependent on other parts of the ANC for its funding, and no longer serves as a link to the former Soviet Union. COSATU is no longer a monolith, with the largest trade union in the country, the National Union of Mineworkers, having withdrawn from the federation. However, the “democrats” and the “Africanists” have staying power in South Africa’s evolving political world. Leaving aside the SACP and COSATU, within the ANC it is perhaps more useful to see the fissures as between the urbanists, whose power base is in the cities, and the countryside: Zuma’s power base. This division also corresponds to a rift between the “modernists,” those in favor of “good government,” with close ties to big business and international markets on the one hand, and, on the other, the rural poor, the very poorest of South Africans, dependent on government allowances and patronage. This latter population is most concerned about getting from today to tomorrow rather than “good governance.” With good reason, the rural poor often feel left behind in the “new” South Africa. South Africa is rapidly urbanizing. An estimated 60 percent of the population is now urban. Those left behind in the countryside are relatively poorer than in the past, even if a system of family allowances alleviates the worst poverty. In the countryside, unemployment in some areas probably exceeds the rate of 50 percent (among males) in the townships. As under apartheid, the rural population is disproportionately female youths. The ANC, often using teachers from the grossly underfunded schools, has built powerful patronage networks. As in Mayor Curley’s Boston or Mayor Barry’s Washington, D.C., participation in these patronage networks is an important means of survival. The ANC is challenged in the rural areas by Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), now the third largest party in parliament, though with only 6 percent of the vote. The EFF’s signature political position is expropriation of white wealth (including land) without compensation. The EFF is probably pushing the ANC toward the left, despite the latter’s close ties with big business. Zuma, for example, in a recent visit to a rural town in KwaZulu, called for black South Africans to vote as a bloc. According to the media, he said that was the only way they could recover the land stolen from their ancestors. This is not a message that will be pleasing to the ANC’s big funders. But, if they have the money, the rural ANC machine has the votes.

In the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s unanimous ruling that President Zuma and the National Assembly failed to uphold the Constitution over Nkandla, there are signs that the grassroots of the governing African National Congress (ANC) is losing patience. (Nkandla is Zuma’s private estate on which the public protector ruled public money was improperly spent; the presidency and the National Assembly stonewalled the public protector, actions which the Constitutional Court ruled unanimously violated the Constitution.) The ANC used its huge parliamentary majority to block an April 5 effort to impeach Zuma, but prominent ANC leaders are saying that Zuma must go. Zuma’s departure has some urgency. There is concern that if Zuma remains in office during the June-August local government elections, the opposition parties will score significant gains. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, believes it stands a good chance of capturing the local governments of Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Bay). Should that happen, local ANC officials in those jurisdictions will lose their jobs. On April 6, an ANC branch in the greater Johannesburg region sent a letter to ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe saying that Zuma had to go. According to South African media, the local branch proposed three options: the National Executive Committee should ask Zuma to resign and allow Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa to act in his place until the party’s next conference in 2017. (This is essentially the path the party followed when it removed Thabo Mbeki from the positions of party and national president in 2009.) if Zuma refuses to resign he should be arraigned before the party’s integrity committee or the national disciplinary committee. While that review is underway, the president should be suspended from office so that he cannot influence the disciplinary proceedings. the party should hold a special national conference on how to move forward. These options are all credible. Yet, the ANC is unlikely to move on any of them until after the local government elections, and only then if the ANC does badly. That is by no means certain. Racial identity continues to play an important role in electoral politics. The ANC is the party of the black majority, 80 percent of the population. And Zuma, South Africans like to say, is a cat with nine lives.

Last week, the Constitutional Court ruled that President Jacob Zuma and the National Assembly had violated the constitution with respect to the use of public money on the president’s Nkandla private estate and their collective failure to implement the ruling of the public protector. In the wake of that decision, Mmusi Maimane, leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), tabled a motion on the National Assembly to impeach the president. National Assembly Speaker Baleka Mbete scheduled debate on the impeachment motion for today, April 5. Conventional wisdom that the ANC’s overwhelming majority in the National Assembly would protect Zuma from impeachment proved correct, and the motion was defeated. Preliminary analysis indicates that all or almost all of the votes against impeachment came from the ANC. Despite today’s vote, the Constitutional Court’s ruling has weakened the president within the ANC. Trevor Manuel, the retired, highly respected finance minister and a long-time leader of the ANC, today added his call for Zuma to step down. Bloomberg, citing the South African newspaper Rapport, reports that on April 3, five ANC leaders called on Zuma to ask him to resign. (Rapport is a weekly Afrikaans-language newspaper that claims to reach 20 percent of that language’s demographic; it appears on Sunday.) According to Bloomberg, Rapport, citing unidentified sources, reports that Zuma refused, and the group concluded that Zuma would go only after the local government elections later this year. The five are ANC heavy hitters. They are Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe, Deputy-Secretary General Jessie Duarte, ANC Treasurer Zweli Mkhize, and National Assembly Speaker Baleka Mbete, who is also ANC chairwoman. Ramaphosa was a lead negotiator of the transition to non-racial democracy and is said to have been Mandela’s personal choice as his successor; the ANC, however, preferred Thabo Mbeki. Ramaphosa stepped aside and went into private business. He remains close to big business and is a multimillionaire. While he is frequently mentioned as a possible successor to Zuma, he is more popular in London and New York business circles than among ANC party members. Mantashe, a former chairman of the South African Communist Party, has in the past rejected calls for Zuma to step down, but he has also opposed the powerful role of Zuma cronies like the Gupta brothers. He recently accused the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria of working for “regime change” through its exchange programs. Jessie Duarte was Nelson Mandela’s personal assistant after his release from prison. Zweli Mkhize, a medical doctor, has been accused—but not convicted—of misusing public funds. As speaker of the National Assembly, Baleka Mbete was directly involved in the vote to set aside the ruling of the public protector. The DA is calling for her to resign, too. She has refused to do so, and she did not recuse herself from the April 5 debate over the motion to impeach Zuma. “The gang of five” that visited Zuma on Sunday, now joined by Trevor Manuel, would seem to indicate that the president’s position within the party is eroding rapidly. As for the markets, they do not seem to be happy that Zuma stays, at least for the time being. The national currency, the rand (ZAR), dropped up to 2.6 percent on the news of the vote. Eyes are on the upcoming local elections, especially in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. Of the three, the ANC seems especially vulnerable in Johannesburg. More generally, at least some South Africans are seeing a parallel between Zuma’s current travails and Richard Nixon’s last days as president.

On March 31, the eleven justices of South Africa’s highest judicial body, the Constitutional Court, ruled unanimously that President Jacob Zuma and the National Assembly had violated the Constitution. The president, the court ruled, had improperly spent public money on his private estate, Nkandla. The National Assembly had improperly defended the president by refusing to implement the ruling of the public protector, a constitutionally mandated official, when she concluded that the expenditure had been improper. In his public statement, the chief justice, a Zuma appointee, said, “The president failed to uphold, defend and respect the constitution.” He characterized the public protector as a “Biblical David” fighting against the “Goliath of corruption.” The Constitution and the rule of law, he continued, was a “sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity from its stiffened neck.” He also said that “ours is a genuine and vibrant constitutional democracy capable of self-correction and self-preservation.” The two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters, took the Nkandla case to the Constitutional Court. The ruling highlights the effectiveness of opposition parties even though Zuma’s African National Congress (ANC) has a large parliamentary majority. The ruling also illustrates the independence of the judiciary, and reaffirms constitutional entities designed to protect citizens from abusive state power, such as the public protector. The DA is saying that it will seek Zuma’s impeachment and hopes that many ANC parliamentarians will vote with the opposition. Over the past several months, disenchantment with Zuma has grown within the ANC. It is also possible that the ANC will “recall” Zuma as party leader, as it did Thabo Mbeki. If it does so, under South Africa’s proportional system of parliamentary representation, Zuma would be required to resign the presidency, as Mbeki did. Such a step might be attractive because it would forestall impeachment. However, it is also possible that the ANC might rally around Zuma, at least through this summer’s local and provincial election. For now, however, South Africans appear ebullient over the Court’s ruling. South Africa’s currency, the rand (ZAR), hit a nearly four-month high against the U.S. dollar following the ruling.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) met March 19-20. Among issues discussed was President Jacob Zuma’s relationship with the wealthy Gupta family, which critics accuse of “state capture,” that is, exercising undue influence over presidential, high level appointments and government contracts for their own benefit. For many in South Africa, the relationship between President Zuma and the Gupta family has become the face of corruption. Concern about corruption is a major political issue in the run up to local and municipal elections that will take place between May 18 and August 16. Indeed, according to South African media, the NEC also discussed the upcoming elections in Johannesburg and Pretoria, where the ANC faces stiff competition from the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which has also called for Zuma’s resignation over corruption. Following the NEC meeting, party secretary general Gwede Mantashe said that there had been “frank and robust discussions” of the Guptas. But, he continued, “The appointment of ministers and deputy ministers is the sole prerogative of the President of the Republic, in line with the Constitution. To this end, the ANC continues to confirm its full confidence in our president.” In what might be seen as a damning comment, he also said that the NEC had not discussed Zuma standing down from the presidency. At its weekend conference, the NEC directed the ANC to investigate the relationship between the president and the Guptas. It also issued an invitation to party members to present to Mantashe’s office evidence of any Gupta family impropriety. Meanwhile the Office of the Public Protector, the constitutionally-mandated government ombudsman, has requested additional funding from the Treasury to investigate the Guptas. The involvement of the Public Protector has been requested by the Roman Catholic Dominican Order and DA leader Mmusi Maimane. The Public Protector earlier demonstrated her political independence from the ANC and the administration by finding that Zuma had improperly authorized public money to be spent on his private estate. The South African Communist Party (SACP), closely allied to the ANC, is also weighing-in. In a speech on March 21, the SACP second deputy general secretary, Solly Mapila, publicly called for the president to end his ties with the Guptas and welcomed the ANC investigation. According to the Daily Maverick’s Ranjemi Munusamy, Mapila characterized the relationship as “contaminated.” The Oliver and Adelaide Tambo Foundation, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation–the memorials to the heroes of the anti-apartheid struggle–have sent a joint letter to the NEC expressing “deep concern” about “state capture.” According to the Daily Maverick, an ANC spokesperson characterized the conversation with the foundations as “cordial, frank, and robust. He also said that there would be follow up conversations. As  Munusamy comments, that would indicate that the foundations are not going to let the issue go away. Munusamy also notes that the NEC mandated investigation gives the ANC a means to deal with the Gupta issue which, up to now, it has largely ignored. She also observes that the enhanced scrutiny of the president makes a cabinet reshuffle less likely. Like a cat with nine lives, Zuma has survived challenges ranging from credible rape charges (he was acquitted) to being fired by a sitting president. He may yet survive the Guptas. If the ANC does better than it currently expects in the upcoming elections, he may recover his political footing.

Nielsen’s “Africa’s Prospects: Macro Environment, Business, Consumer and Retail Outlook Indicators” of February 2016 rank orders sub-Saharan Africa’s nine leading markets. The list represents 71% of the region’s GDP, and half of its population. Ivory Coast is ranked first, Kenya second, Tanzania third, and Nigeria is fourth. It ranks Zambia as fifth, Cameroon as sixth, South Africa as seventh, Uganda as eighth, and Ghana brings up the rear. Nielsen cites Ivory Coast’s growing economy and political stability. Nigeria, ranked first in 2015, declined because of “deteriorating macroeconomic indicators” and declining consumer confidence. A recent report from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics notes that the inflow of capital into the economy stood at $9.6 billion, a 53 percent drop from the previous year. Nigeria has been hard hit by declining oil and gas prices, while Ivory Coast’s primary export commodity, cocoa, has not declined. Nigeria faces the challenge of the Boko Haram insurrection that has resulted in some three million internally displaced persons. It remains to be seen whether the March 13 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack at an Ivorian resort signals that Abidjan will face a sustained terrorist threat that could have an impact on investor confidence. Nielsen is a S&P 500 company. It provides a wide range of measurement services that are highly respected. Nielsen’s “Africa Prospects,” some twenty-six pages in length, includes a wide range of economic and consumer data. For example, it compares the price of a basket of commonly consumed items in various countries. Such a basket costs $34 in Angola, $27 in Ghana, but only $15.33 in South Africa. Nigerians—alongside Angolans and Ghanians—are facing rising prices due to inflationary pressures.

South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has often been accused of corruption. But, until recently his hold on the governing African National Congress (ANC), with its huge parliamentary majority, has ensured that he could weather political storms. However, his recent missteps have eroded his support within the party. There is speculation that the party could remove him as party leader which would likely result in his resigning the presidency. While such speculation is premature, he is certainly politically damaged. The greatest threat to Zuma’s political future is now from within his own political party, rather than from the opposition. Zuma’s current round of troubles began in December 2015 when he abruptly fired his well-regarded finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, and appointed a non-entity in his place. South African financial markets swooned, and Zuma was forced to back down, fire his newly appointed choice, and appoint Pravin Gordhan, who had previously served in that position. In February 2016, after months of insisting that public expenditure on his private estate, Nkandla, were justified on the grounds of national security, he reversed himself during legal proceedings before the Constitutional Court, South Africa’s highest. But, his reversal came after the ANC had defended him for months in parliament. Earlier this month, the High Court ruled that the Zuma government acted improperly in failing to enforce warrants against Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir when he was in South Africa, raising the possibility that the president is in contempt of court. Finally, Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, has gone public saying that three brothers of Indian origin—the Guptas—offered him the finance minister position before Zuma fired Nene. There are additional accusations that the Gupta brothers have been involved in high-level and para-statal appointments, that, in effect, Zuma has allowed them to “capture the state.” Jonas’ revelation would appear to be the “smoking gun.” Presumably, the Guptas will claim that they were acting on Zuma’s behalf. With respect to ministerial appointments, the South African president may appoint to his cabinet anybody he pleases, with no requirement that he consult. So the Guptas’ involvement with the finance minister position is not illegal. However, it does violate ANC policy and regulation, and as a party member Zuma is subject to party discipline. High level appointments are within the purview of the ANC deployment committee. So, Zuma is in trouble because the Gupta brothers usurped party functions. The three Gupta brothers and their families migrated to South Africa from India just before and after the 1994 transition to non-racial democracy. Their seemingly enormous wealth is based on Sahara Computers and Oakbay Investments, the latter of which includes significant interests in mining, real estate, and media. A prominent business partner is Duduzane Zuma, President Zuma’s son. The Gupta brothers are very close to the president, even on one occasion using a military airport for their private purposes. The media reports that they asked for South African diplomatic passports because they travel so frequently with the president. Thus far, President Zuma has refused to explain his relationship with the Gupta family, though he has acknowledged they have helped his son. Jonas’ revelation ties the Gupta brothers to the firing of Nene, an act that at the time seemed inexplicable. The South African media speculates that the Gupta brothers embarked on “state capture” to ensure favorable access of a variety of government contracts. Whether true of not, the story is widely believed, and many South Africans see the Gupta brothers as the face of Zuma government corruption. The ANC’s National Executive Committee meets March 19-20. It is no longer in Zuma’s pocket. Its agenda will include the president’s relationship with the Gupta family, according to the South African media. The credible Daily Maverick, citing unnamed sources, reports that within the ANC there is sentiment for a wide ranging discussion of the president’s conduct and his breach of constitutional duties. This discussion would include possible ANC disciplinary action and whether parliament should impeach him. Others believe that such consideration should be delayed until there is a final ruling by the Constitutional Court on Nkandla. Of the two scenarios, the latter is the more likely.

Following a press briefing by Nigerian Defense Minister Mansur Dan-Ali, Nigerian media are saying that South Africa is joining the fight against Boko Haram, the radical jihadist movement that has killed over twenty thousand and displaced internally up to three million people over the past six years. The briefing took place following the defense minister’s meeting with his South African counterpart, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nquakula. (South African President Jacob Zuma is in Nigeria on a state visit.) However, there has been no confirmation from the South African side. Further, South African boots-on-the-ground in Nigeria is highly unlikely, as Simon Allison writes in the March 8, Daily Maverick. Allison notes that the South African defense ministry spokesman knew nothing about the deal: “There is no such decision to send any military elements by the RSA [Republic of South Africa] to assist with the fight against Boko Haram.” Allison notes the reduced capacity of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The current finance minister has slashed its budget, and there are only an estimated one hundred South African Special Forces commandos in active service. Allison quotes John Stupart, editor of African Defence Review, as saying, “We don’t have the budget, we don’t have the capacity, and frankly we don’t have the experience in training forces to fight 21st century terrorism. The American, British or even French have operational experience in this. It’s more just a case of too much talking at the diplomatic level and too little understanding or acceptance of the scarce resources in the SANDF that we actually have.” Allison cites Jasmine Opperman, Africa director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, as warning that SANDF involvement could make South Africa, or, more likely, its interests elsewhere in Africa, a Boko Haram target. South Africa has a big economic stake in Nigeria: President Zuma commented during his state visit that there are more than one hundred South African companies present in Nigeria, with a special concentration in telecommunications. The absence of SANDF involvement does not preclude Nigeria’s use of South African mercenaries, as the Jonathan administration employed during its 2015 push against Boko Haram. Serving as a mercenary is against South African law, but prosecution is difficult and rare.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a federation of labor unions, played a crucial role in the struggle against apartheid. It provided much of the personnel that mobilized voters for the African National Congress (ANC) from the country‘s first “all-race” elections in 1994 up to now. COSATU, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the ANC form the coalition that governs the country. COSATU and SACP contest elections as part of the ANC. Conventional wisdom holds that the leadership of COSATU is increasingly distant from the laboring and unemployed masses, just as is President Jacob Zuma and the top ANC political leadership. (Unemployment in South Africa is variously estimated in the range of 25 to 50 percent, depending on the demographic.) The unions that make up COSATU are increasingly white-collar and based in the public sector, rather than blue-collar employees of private enterprises. By and large, the unions do not advocate low-wage, low skill policies that might reduce the very high levels of unemployment that drive poverty. COSATU is internally divided because of personal rivalries, but also over principle. The most salient division of the latter is between those in the federation that want closer ties to the ANC and SACP political leadership, and those who want to maintain greater distance. In general, those who favor distance want a more radical and aggressive labor movement. Here, as is often true elsewhere in South Africa, the SACP and the ANC political leadership are essentially conservative in outlook. Zwelinzima Vavi, a former General Secretary of COSATU who lost an internal power struggle and was fired in 2014, has announced that he will lead a “workers summit” in March, to be followed by the organization of a new federation in May that will rival COSATU. According to the media, current COSATU affiliates that are likely to join the new federation include the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)--usually identified as the largest and richest trade union, the Food and Allied Workers Union, the South African Football Players Union, and the Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa. Vavi is saying that the new labor federation will not be affiliated with any political party. However, there has been speculation that a new, “responsible” left-wing party based on trade unions such as NUMSA, will emerge before the national elections of 2019. It would challenge the ANC and also the Economic Freedom Fighters—a radical party that on occasion uses non-democratic methods, such as the disruption of the sitting of parliament. A new labor federation might generate such a “left-wing but responsible” political party. The emergence of two, rival labor federations at best will contribute to the general opening up of South African political life, so long dominated by the ANC and the politics of racial identity. However, it could also result in more labor militancy with consequences difficult to foretell.

It is no secret that bad leadership at the top has long been a brake on the economic, political, and social development of certain African countries. Many years the Mo Ibrahim Prize for leadership by an African president who leaves office at the end of his term goes unrewarded. There have been numerous, egregious examples of bad presidential leadership over the past few weeks. Yoweri Museveni was recently elected to another five-year term as Uganda’s president. Consequently, he will likely be in office until 2021; he came to power in 1986. The just concluded electoral process was marred by the harassment and arrest of opposition candidates and there are numerous charges of voting irregularities. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta promptly became the first head of state to congratulate Museveni. He was followed by Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza. Kenyatta successfully stonewalled an International Criminal Court prosecution for his role in the violence associated with the 2007 elections in Kenya; his vice president is still under indictment. Nkurunziza’s political machinations to remain in office form the backdrop to the current bloody crisis in Burundi. Kenyatta, Nkurunziza, and Museveni are an East African trio. They are joined by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, who appears to be trying to ensure that his wife, Grace Mugabe, becomes his successor as president. He celebrated his ninety-second birthday on February 21 lavishly, notwithstanding the drought that threatens famine. Posters proclaimed “Mugabe’s birthday is like that of Jesus Christ.” Meanwhile, Bloomberg is reporting that South African President Jacob Zuma’s son is a major shareholder in the firm buying a colliery from Glencore. Glencore has said the colliery cannot make a profit because of a coal supply arrangement with the state-owned power company, Eskom. Another big shareholder is Rajesh Kumar Gupta, a businessman whose family enjoys close ties to Duduzane Zuma. Both are widely thought to be corrupt, and their relationship is frequently described as the worst type of cronyism. The finance minister has, apparently, ordered a probe of Eskom’s coal supply contracts. Such behavior can always be excused, and much of the rhetoric in the current U.S. presidential primary season provides little basis for holier-than-thou criticism. After all, Museveni did have an election. African chiefs of state routinely congratulate each other. Mugabe’s tasteless lavishness pales in comparison with that of certain other chiefs of state, and Zuma’s son may have done nothing illegal. The fact remains that all too often Africans are ill-served by their leaders.  

On February 19, governing African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General Gwede Mantashe addressed a party march for “unity, democracy and non-racialism” in Pretoria. There are press reports of eighty-seven thousand participants. Reportedly, Mantashe’s central message was, “We must defend the revolution and defend every attack on the ANC structures.” He went on to say, “We are a majority, we should be able to take decisions and enforce them.” Unlike the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa is not a parliamentary democracy. In other words, parliament is not sovereign, as is the UK Parliament. Instead, South Africa is a constitutional democracy with some of the most extensive legal protections for minority rights in the world. That is, the powers of the executive and parliament are limited by a written constitution. The South African judiciary may, and does, reject legislation passed by parliament and signed by the president. When that happens, the affected legislation has no force in law. Against a background of very slow post-apartheid social and economic change, some on the left, such as Mantashe, regularly attack the judiciary as a roadblock to achieving true democracy and  meaningful social change. They—alongside others in the ANC—argue that parliament should be supreme in a democracy. However, at present, and for the foreseeable future, there appears to be little popular appetite for moving South Africa away from constitutionalism toward unfettered parliamentary supremacy. Mantashe is a former chairperson of the South African Communist Party. He comes out of the labor movement, and was the secretary general of the National Union of Mineworkers. Mantashe excoriated the judiciary’s decision that the Zuma government neglected its legal obligation to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during his 2015 visit to South Africa in response to a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The recent rumor of Barclays PLC’s potential sale of its African businesses has caused a stir in South Africa. While Barclay’s has yet to confirm any decisions, there is plenty of reason to suspect the rumors are credible. Barclay’s has recently had to pay large regulatory fines for illegally rigging the London interbank rate, they have cut back substantially in Asia, and, perhaps worst of all, economic growth has significantly decreased in Africa. If Barclays PLC were to divest of holdings in Africa, it begs the question of who would buy their shares in Barclays Africa, specifically South Africa-based ABSA, one of the country’s largest banks. Barclays PLC currently owns sixty-two percent of ABSA and, if the sale rumors are true, it is not clear whether Barclays PLC would sell ABSA in its entirety or only a part. No matter how much of ABSA would be up for sale, it is unclear who would want to buy the shares. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth across sub-Saharan Africa was 3.5 percent in 2015, down from 4.5 percent in 2014. While this is higher than in other regions, investors are still wary. Growth is not expected to increase in the coming years, and many companies are shy about entering sub-Saharan African markets with which they are unfamiliar yet are known for political volatility. One company that is not shy of these markets is the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) in South Africa. PIC Chief Executive Officer, Daniel Matjila, has said that PIC “would be keen to participate and increase our position (in ABSA).” PIC is already the second largest shareholder in ABSA with 5.44 percent of shares. However, there is a major limitation on a potential PIC purchase of ABSA. As a state-owned corporation, PIC is unlikely to receive regulatory approval for a majority share in an international bank (ABSA operates across Africa, including Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya). There is wider discussion in South Africa regarding the purchase of ABSA. There have been calls in South Africa for a large black-owned bank. Who or what organization would make this purchase is up in the air, but there has been hopeful speculation about black South African businessmen joining forces to purchase the ABSA shares and make this dream a reality. Barclays’ intentions are still unclear. Times may be hard, but there are still plenty of reasons for it to stay in Africa. Africa contributes about fifteen percent of the bank’s pre-tax revenue, and there are still several African countries that are expected to enjoy high GDP growth this year. It is possible that Barclays could also choose to divest of holdings in specific countries, thereby decreasing its shares by only a small margin. On March 1, when Barclays will announce its full year results, its intentions may become clear.

Resulting from negotiations between the British Empire and the defeated Boer republics that ended the second Anglo-Boer war and created the Union of South Africa were three capitals. Parliament meets in Cape Town, the former capital of the British Cape Province. The administration was based in Pretoria, the capital of the Boer republic of Transvaal, and the judiciary was based in Bloemfontein, the capital of the other Boer republic--the Orange Free State. At the time of South Africa’s 1994 transition to “non-racial” democracy, there were proposals to consolidate all functions of government in Pretoria or, alternatively, to build an altogether new capital city, following the model of Washington, D.C., Canberra, or Brasilia. The idea was especially popular within the governing African National Congress (ANC). Part of the appeal of a new capital was that it would be free of any vestiges or symbols of the hated apartheid regime. However, there were strong vested interests in favor of the status quo, and a general sense that the costs would be enormous at a time when the new government was seeking to address more pressing needs, such as housing, water, health, and education. But, the issue has never gone away, and continues to resonate within the ANC. (While the Supreme Court of Appeal continues to sit in Bloemfontein, the Constitutional Court—by far the most important—now sits in Johannesburg.) Cape Town and the province of the Western Cape are both governed by the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), and they are widely regarded as the best-administered entities in the country. In addition, race plays a role: the Western Cape is the only region in sub-Saharan Africa where black Africans are not the majority of the population. (“Coloureds” are the largest racial group.) South Africans will often say that Cape Town is “white,” Durban is “Indian,” and Johannesburg is “African.” Cape Town, one of the most beautiful cities in the world, is also a major tourist destination. It is no surprise that President Jacob Zuma in his recent state of the nation address asked parliament to consider “consolidating” government functions in Pretoria. His argument was that it would be cost effective. No doubt there was political motivation as well. Zuma’s administration is widely criticized for being financially profligate and the president himself has been excoriated for spending public money on his private estate, Nkandla. With provincial elections in six months, Zuma and the ANC would prefer to move the discussion away from their financial shortcomings to the “savings” of consolidating government functions. Brooks Specter, in a thoughtful discussion in the Daily Maverick, demolishes the money-saving argument. He notes the huge costs of building new capitals—as well as the juicy contracts that result. (There is widespread criticism of ANC corruption around government contracts.) He also raises the interesting suggestion that making better use of technology, especially video conferencing, would significantly reduce the inconvenience of parliament being in Cape Town with the executive in Pretoria.

The African National Congress (ANC) is a big tent. Politically, under that tent is the Congress of South African trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Both run candidates for office as ANC, not under their own label. The Secretary General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, is also a former chairperson of the SACP. The relationship between the ANC and the South African state can be ambiguous. Some within the ANC see the two as essentially coterminous, as was the case with the Communist party and the former Soviet Union. Others, however, see the two as separate, just as governing parties in other democracies are separate entities, and a ruling party of today can be the opposition tomorrow should the electorate so choose. Especially among the opposition parties, civil organizations, and the non-ANC media there has long been concern that South Africa is too much governed from Luthuli House, the ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg, rather than the administrative seat of government, Union Buildings, in Pretoria. Yesterday’s blog post discussed Mantashe’s accusation that the U.S. embassy in Pretoria was engaged in trying to bring about “regime change” through exchange programs and the highly effective response by the U.S. ambassador using humor and sarcasm. To no surprise, the Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa said on February 23 that the ANC was not happy with the ambassador’s response to Mantashe. She said that if the situation had been reversed, “I would go to the Luthuli House of the U.S. and have a discussion. As the ANC leadership we are going to do that. We are going to have engagement to clarify these things. It will still happen, but at the right time.” (There is, of course, no American equivalent of Luthuli House.) As her reference to Luthuli House indicated, she went on to say that the Mantashe episode is a ruling party issue – not the governments. She went on to say that from the government’s perspective, “our relations with the U.S. are going well.” At least two other ministers have also pointed out Mantashe’s accusation had come from the ANC, not the government. The telecommunications minister characterized Pretoria’s relations with Washington as “very cordial.” The Zuma government appears to be distancing itself from Mantashe’s ludicrous accusations while not alienating elements within its ruling coalition. More broadly, this episode may indicate that as the ANC weakens, so too may Luthuli House.

African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General Gwede Mantashe is accusing the United States and its embassy in Pretoria of plotting “regime change” in South Africa. In public remarks on February 19, Mantashe referred to “clandestine meetings” at the American embassy that “are about nothing else other than mobilization for regime change. We’re aware of a program that takes young people to the United States for six weeks, brings them back and plants them everywhere.” Following up, the ANC spokesman Keith Khoza said that the U.S. government must clarify the “irregular activities” of its diplomats, asserting “We believe the matter will be pursued using the proper channels going forward. At this stage there is nothing more we can say on the matter.” U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Patrick Gaspard denied the allegations and affirmed his support for his embassy personnel: “I’m incredibly proud of the work my U.S. Embassy colleagues do every day to partner with South Africans on health, education, and job growth, and I will fiercely defend their honor and non-partisan integrity. And I might even employ sarcasm as a tool to do so.” And so he has, with good effect, to judge from the South African social media response. Ambassador Gaspard tweeted that if he ever tried to organize a coup, “it would look like Mardi Gras,” with singing and dancing. He also observed that Mantashe knew about the Nelson Mandela Scholars program to which the secretary general was apparently referring, because he had approached Mantashe some months ago for nominations of ANC members. South Africans joined the fun on Twitter, for example asking the ambassador to appoint them “Minister of Sport” or “Minister of Breweries” once the “coup” was over. Do Mantashe and Khoza actually believe there is a U.S. plot to bring about “regime change” in South Africa? It is unlikely. But the governing ANC is under pressure. The Zuma presidency is in disarray, the national currency has declined, economic growth rates are near zero, and the party is likely to be challenged in provincial and local elections later this year. Under these circumstances, ludicrous accusations deflect attention from unattractive realities. However, South African social media indicates that the accusations have backfired. (The United States is far more popular among South Africans generally than it is among ANC operatives.)