Nigeria

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 21 to November 27, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   (Last week, November 20: Bandits killed five and kidnapped forty at a mosque in Maru, Zamfara.) November 21: Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants killed seven soldiers and one militia member in Gubio, Borno.  November 21: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Bama, Borno.   November 21: Nigerian troops killed approximately seven bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara.  November 21: Nigerian troops killed six bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  November 22: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Zurmi, Zamfara.  November 22: Gunmen killed two vigilantes in Udu, Delta.  November 22: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Kokona, Nassarawa.  November 22: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  November 23: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. November 23: Airstrikes killed sixty-seven bandits in Faskari, Katsina. November 23: Airstrikes killed fifteen bandits in the Ajjah Forest in Zamfara. November 24: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped three in Ajaokuta, Kogi.  November 24: Airstrikes killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  November 24: Nigerian troops killed two ISWA militants in Gwoza, Borno. November 25: Boko Haram killed three and kidnapped one in Koza, Cameroon.  November 26: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. November 27: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped one Chinese engineer in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti.  November 27: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno.  November 27: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala LGA, two Boko Haram militants in Gwoza LGA, and one Boko Haram militant in Damboa LGA in Borno. 

Two weeks ago, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, the Nigerian novelist celebrated for her Half a Yellow Sun, was awarded the Women's Prize for Fiction as the author of the best book to win the annual prize over the past twenty-five years. This is a one-off prize, designed to highlight the best of the best. Adichie won the annual prize in 2007. Her novel is set in Biafra at the end of the 1967–70 Nigerian civil war. The “half of a yellow sun” recalls the Biafran flag. The book has been extraordinarily popular throughout the English-speaking world and has been made into a film. Adichie joins Chinua Achebe (Things Fall Apart), Wole Soyinka (Death and the King’s Horseman), Ben Okri (The Famished Road), Teju Cole (Open City), and many other Nigerian novelists and poets in achieving worldwide acclaim. In music, architecture, and painting there has been similar international recognition of Nigerian talent. Yet Nigeria faces security and economic challenges that are seemingly accelerating.  Adichie, Achebe, Soyinka, and Okri are indisputably African artists. Yet, they live or lived much of the time outside of Nigeria: Achebe and Soyinka taught in the United States; Teju Cole was born in Kalamazoo, Michigan to Nigerian parents; Okri lives in the United Kingdom. The reasons for their expatriation are no doubt highly individual and complex. But artists from other countries have also chosen expatriation: examples include the Americans who flocked to Paris post-World War I or the luminaries of the Irish renaissance who often lived in the United Kingdom, France, or the United States.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 14 to November 20, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 14: Kidnappers abducted three in Zaria, Kaduna. November 14: Police officers killed two civilians in Kano, Kano. November 14: A cult clash resulted in seven deaths in Ughelli, Delta. November 14: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. November 14: Kidnappers abducted nine in Ose, Ondo. November 15: Bandits killed two and abducted nine in Kachia, Kaduna. November 15: Kidnappers abducted two and killed one in Kajuru, Kaduna. November 15: Troops killed three bandits in Malumfashi, Katsina. November 15–16: Communal violence resulted in two deaths in Bekwarra, Cross River. November 16: Bandits killed eleven in Igabi, Kaduna. November 16: Kidnappers abducted five tax officials in Vandeikya, Benue. November 17: Bandits killed two in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. November 17: Bandits killed two and kidnapped "some" (estimated at five) in Giwa, Kaduna. November 17: Gunmen killed three vigilantes in Chikun, Kaduna. November 17: The military killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Kagarko, Kaduna. November 17: Kidnappers abducted eight in Esan South-East, Edo. November 18: Bandits killed one police officer and kidnapped fourteen in Mariga, Niger State. November 18: Airstrikes killed seventeen bandits in Danmusa, Katsina. November 18: Boko Haram allegedly shot down a UN helicopter, killing five in Bama, Borno; the Nigerian Air Force denies this claim. November 19: A clash between customs officials and smugglers resulted in the deaths of one soldier, one customs officer, and one civilian in Ibarapa Central, Oyo. November 20: Kidnappers abducted fourteen in Oredo, Edo. November 20: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped one in Igabi, Kaduna. November 20: A police officer accidentally shot and killed another police officer while trying to quell a protest in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. On October 20, 2020, Nigerians watched in horror on social media as men suspected to be members of the military opened fire on peaceful #EndSARS protesters—a movement responding to a litany of abuses by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a special police unit—in Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city. For more than a decade, Nigerian civil society groups have trained members of public security forces regarding the inviolability of human rights. Despite such training, Nigerian security agencies still follow the all-too-familiar path of perpetrating violence against the very people they have sworn to protect. Nigeria has had a complex existence since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960—a complexity perhaps more pronounced than in other countries considering the country’s highly diverse population of over two hundred million. Consequently, governing the strikingly heterogeneous country—and addressing the deep-seated grievances of its many groups—can be difficult. Unfortunately, a recurring theme throughout Nigeria’s postcolonial history has been security forces’ propensity to use force to suppress unrest. Deployment of security forces to deescalate potential or actual violent situations is not in itself a wrong practice; preventing the destruction of lives and properties is a prerequisite for a functioning state. In the case of Nigeria, however, security forces routinely use disproportionate force on civilians in gross violations of human rights, such as in Odi, Gbaramatu, Zaria, Zaki Biam, and other instances. This “shoot first, ask questions later” approach poses various dangers to the Nigerian state. First, it does not address the initial cause of escalating violence and is ultimately counterproductive. In many instances, it reinforces the positions of aggrieved groups and improves public perceptions of those groups.  This pattern is currently playing out across Nigeria, as many conflicts have persisted despite—or perhaps because of—the deployment of security officials. For example, Biafran separatist groups, such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), continue to command a large following in the South East region after the civil war fought more than fifty years ago. Various military exercises and the Nigerian government’s designation of IPOB as a terrorist group have done little to diminish its influence. Another danger of the violence-first approach is that it encourages a violent response from already aggrieved groups, especially in the absence of platforms for peaceful, constructive dialogue. This has led to increasing radicalization of individuals and groups who see violence as the only means to get the government’s attention. For example, in the Niger Delta, years of nonviolent agitations led by prominent activists such as Ken Saro-Wiwa were met with repression from the Nigerian military. This pushed many young men in the region toward a violent insurgency featuring attacks on oil and gas facilities, resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue for the government. To stop the violence, the federal government declared an amnesty program, offering stipends to repentant militants in exchange for peace. Similarly, many scholars focused on Boko Haram agree that the group’s radicalization—it previously proselytized through largely non-violent means—followed a government clampdown in 2009, in which some eight hundred of its members were killed. The group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was later killed in police custody. Returning to a familiar playbook, the government has commenced a controversial amnesty program for repentant Boko Haram members, effectively sending a message that violence pays. The Nigerian government needs to change its approach of immediately responding to conflict with military might. One fundamental shift should be to understand conflict as the evidence of a struggle against systemic oppression. When viewed from this lens, conflict becomes an opportunity for the government to understand the myriad structural issues bedeviling its people and work together with aggrieved groups to address those issues. This sort of understanding also lessens the temptation to escalate tensions each and every time grievances arise, or to resort to paying for peace without addressing the origins of unrest. The Nigerian government should also set a standard of accountability for security officials and use it to pursue those involved in human rights violations. To date, no one has been held responsible for atrocities committed in Odi, Zaria, and Gbaramatu; with the Nigerian army denying much of what unfolded at Lekki Toll Gate on October 20, it appears this pattern of impunity is set to continue. As long as security officials involved in human rights violations are not held accountable, they will continue to perpetrate violence on those they are called to protect.

There has long been speculation about how Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations are funded. Some funding clearly comes [PDF] from criminal activity, with kidnapping particularly lucrative, and from bank robberies. Presumably, protection rackets also play a role. At some times and in some places, Boko Haram has been able to impose "taxes" on the local population. Boko Haram has also been involved in trading, especially in the Lake Chad Basin. Weapons—a major expense—appear often to come from government armories, sometimes because "the back gate was left unlocked." In southern, predominantly Christian Nigeria, it is often assumed that northern "big men" provide funding for Boko Haram. Most of this is speculation. It also appears likely that Boko Haram's brand of terrorism is cheap; the organization does not require the levels of funding characteristic of terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East or Europe. Significant, therefore, that the Federal Court of Appeals in the United Arab Emirates, which sits in Abu Dhabi, has sentenced to jail six Nigerians for transferring $782,000 from Dubai to Boko Haram in Nigeria. Two were sentenced to life imprisonment, four to ten years—all for violation of UAE anti-terrorism laws. Two "Boko Haram agents" in Nigeria received the funds, according to media based on court proceedings. One was a "Nigerian government official" who also funneled "government money" to Boko Haram, according to Nigerian media. The defendants did not deny that they transferred to money but claimed that doing so was not illegal. Media accounts are sketchy and incomplete. The defendants could have maintained that the recipients were not Boko Haram. Claims that the UAE court was corrupt are absent from media reporting. The sentences were relatively light. Those sentenced to life imprisonment could have received the death penalty. The amount of money transferred seems large, but no indication of the source of the money is given. Claims that Nigerian government officials were conniving with Boko Haram are common and should not be taken at face value. On the other hand, after more than a decade and often murderous splits, Boko Haram is still far from defeated, implying that it still enjoys support.

In Nigeria and the Nation-State, John Campbell explains what makes Nigeria different from other countries in Africa, how it works, and why understanding it is vital if we are to avoid the mistakes the United States made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as U.S. security and economic relations with Africa intensifies.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 7 to November 13, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 7: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Kuzo, Kaduna (Local Government Area unknown). November 7: Kidnappers abducted six in Chikun, Kaduna. November 8: Boko Haram militants attacked Gwoza, Borno but were repelled by Nigerian troops who killed one would-be Boko Haram suicide bomber. November 8: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno. November 8: Troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Gujba, Yobe. November 8: Troops killed two bandits in Tsafe, Zamfara. November 8: Bandits killed three and kidnapped thirteen in Sabuwa, Katsina. November 9: Gunmen killed two police officers and one other in Igueben, Edo. November 10: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. November 11: Police officers killed four bandits in Mashegu, Niger State. November 11: Bandits killed one and abducted approximately three in Anka, Zamfara. November 11: Troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ladantar, Borno (LGA unknown). November 12: Cultists killed two in Ikpoba-Okha LGA and two in Egor LGA in Edo. November 12: Troops killed "several" bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. November 13: Cultists killed seven in Oredo LGA and one assistant commissioner of police in Ikpoba-Okha LGA in Edo. November 13: Troops killed one bandit in Faskari, Katsina.

Human rights advocates in Nigeria and abroad are concerned that the Buhari administration is adopting a policy of repression following the demonstrations against abuses by the police’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). The October demonstrations ignited in Lagos and later spread to other cities. The centerpiece was the police killing of a dozen demonstrators at the Lekki Toll Gate on October 20. Initially, the Buhari administration promised to abolish SARS, as had some of its predecessors. Vice President Osinbajo said that the government accepted responsibility for police brutality and affirmed that dialogue was the way forward. Thus far, however, there has been no public accounting for the Lekki Toll Gate killings or, more broadly, for police human rights abuses. Nor is there a public dialogue. Whether SARS has been disbanded or merely rebranded is unclear. The demonstrations, the largest since 2012, have fizzled out; how and why is not clear and would require studying. A strong law-and-order response, or repression, has played a role. According to Nigerian media, the bank accounts of twenty activists have been frozen for 180 days, pending "an investigation." The passport of at least one human rights lawyer was seized. A few days later, it was returned without explanation. Support for the demonstrations could have been weaker than appeared at the time. The demonstrations were concentrated in the south, especially Lagos, and among youth who adopted the rhetoric and style of the Black Lives Matter protests in the United States. At least at first, the demonstrators appeared to be relatively privileged. (Poor people in Nigeria do not have bank accounts that can be frozen.) The Nigerian diaspora, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, vocally supported the demonstrations. However, SARS is not as hated in other parts of the country as it is in Lagos and the south. Demonstrations in the predominantly Muslim north were not extensive. Over time, broader support for the demonstrators appears to have melted away. The demonstrations had no designated leaders and no equivalent of a politburo. Demonstrations started spontaneously and were coordinated by social media. This decentralization at first appeared to be a source of strength: the movement had no leaders that the authorities could pick off. However, over time, it could have inhibited the sustainability of the protests much beyond a relatively narrow demographic. The Buhari administration is already being accused of repression. Muhammadu Buhari was among the military offices that overthrew the civilian government of Shehu Shagari and he was military chief of state from 1983 to 1985, when he, in turn, was overthrown in another military coup. As military chief of state, he was known for his "war against indiscipline," which many Nigerians, especially in Lagos, found repressive. Even after he was elected civilian president a generation later in 2015, some Nigerians are suspicious that he remains authoritarian at heart.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 31 to November 6, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 31: U.S. forces killed six suspected bandits during a rescue mission for a kidnapped American citizen around Illela, Sokoto. October 31: Police officers killed a journalist in custody in Agege, Lagos. November 1: Boko Haram killed twelve and kidnapped nine in Chibok, Borno. November 1: Kidnappers abducted four in Calabar South, Cross River. November 2: A Boko Haram landmine killed nine Nigerian soldiers in Abadam, Borno. November 2: The Civilian Joint Task Force killed "scores" (estimated at twenty) of Boko Haram militants in Nganzai, Borno. November 3: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped one in Igabi, Kaduna. November 4: One bandit and two civilians were killed during a clash in Kaura-Namoda, Zamfara. November 5: Gunmen killed one Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps officer and one vigilante, and kidnapped two students in Yola, Adamawa. November 5: Nigerian troops killed five bandits and lost one soldier in Faskari, Katsina. November 5: Gunmen abducted sixteen in Owo, Ondo.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 24 to October 30, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 24: Approximately two security forces and three armed civilians were killed during a clash in Oredo, Edo. October 24: Security forces killed ten looters in Calabar, Cross River. October 24: Stampeding from looters killed six in Jalingo, Taraba. October 24: Six Boko Haram militants and one police officer were killed during a clash in Tarmuwa, Yobe. October 24: Boko Haram killed eight farmers in Konduga, Borno. October 24: Suspected bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Faskari, Katsina. October 24: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Giwa, Kaduna. October 24: Nigerian soldiers killed two Boko Haram militants in Abadam, Borno. October 25: Suspected bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Faskari, Katsina. October 25: Hoodlums killed one police officer in an attack on a police station in Ibadan, Oyo. October 25: Soldiers killed four looters in Jos North, Plateau. October 25: Suspected bandits kidnapped five in Maru, Zamfara. October 25: Twenty-two Boko Haram militants, one civilian, and five soldiers were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno. October 25: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped four in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. October 26: Bandits killed one customs officer in Ringim, Jigawa. October 26: Hoodlums killed one police inspector in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. October 27: Bandits killed one civilian and kidnapped three, and police officers killed five of the bandits in Safana, Katsina. October 27: Gunmen kidnapped seventeen at a mosque in Toto, Nassarawa. October 27: Gunmen kidnapped four in Lafia, Nassarawa. October 28: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Ado, Benue. October 29: Bandits killed thirty in Dandume, Katsina. October 29: Bandits killed four in Maradun, Zamfara. October 29: Bandits killed one and kidnapped fifteen in Maru, Zamfara. October 29: Soldiers killed three Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri, Borno. October 29: Nigerian troops killed three bandits and lost one soldier in Faskari, Katsina. October 30: Kidnappers abducted three in Akoko North-East, Ondo.

Up to now, radical jihadi activity in West Africa has been centered in Mali—with spillover to adjacent parts of Burkina Faso and Niger—and the Lake Chad Basin. The two locales are now increasingly bridged by jihadi activity in northwest Nigeria, where resurgent struggles over land and water with a cast of ethnically aligned fighters and flourishing criminality provide them with new space. Jihadi movements in all three regions are fractious, subject to bloody internal rivalries, and overlap with criminal elements. They do share a declared goal of establishing polities based on Islamic law—sharia—and the destruction of the fragile, postcolonial secular states in the region. (National borders, established by the former colonial powers, are largely meaningless for most local people, as well as for criminals and jihadis.) Were they to be successful, however, it is by no means clear that they could establish coherent territorial governance much above the village level. No charismatic leader such as Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Osama bin Laden, or even Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged to impose unity on the various jihadi groups now active from the Lake Chad Basin to the western Sahel. More likely would be decentralized regimes of warlordism led by Islamist and criminal opportunists. Criminally inflected chaos and a humanitarian disaster are more likely than a resurrected, unified Islamic State. France has the most modern military force countering the jihadis—Operation Barkhane numbers some 4,500 soldiers—and supports most of the weak militaries of francophone West Africa. The United States provides France with limited logistical and intelligence support from its drone base in Niger. It also trains small numbers of soldiers drawn from local militaries. Jihadi forces at present are resurgent throughout the region. Were the French to leave, jihadis would likely overrun Mali and adjacent territories even if they could not govern them. In the Lake Chad Basin—mostly in Nigeria but also in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger—the jihadis are primarily factions of Boko Haram, some with links to the Islamic State, others to al-Qaeda. (Observers are divided as to the tactical or strategic significance of those links.) Nigeria has taken the lead in attempting to coordinate its efforts with those of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Other than in Niger, the United States has no significant security presence in the Lake Chad region or the western Sahel. Across the region, the jihadis, far from defeated, appear to be strengthening. Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin have a much larger population and, accordingly, the humanitarian disaster associated with fighting is much greater than in the western Sahel. (The United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and other international donors already provide significant humanitarian assistance right across West Africa, including the Sahel.) These two centers of jihadism are separated by northwest Nigeria. That region is increasingly plagued by conflicts over water and land use, exacerbated by human and cattle population growth, climate change, and poor governance. A borderland between the Sahara, the Sahel, and better-watered lands to the south, the region has long been a center of smuggling as well as trading. With a harsh and variable climate—as in the rest of the Sahel—population movements have been a constant. So, too, have been waves of Islamic religious revival, which influence present-day jihadi activity. Jihadi groups are taking advantage of a general societal breakdown in certain areas. The Nigerian government has responded by seeking to crush the jihadis and the bandits through military and police methods, so far to no avail. Government-sponsored proposals, some fanciful, prescribe reorganization of the cattle industry. None address the huge population increase, climate change, and poor governance that provide jihadis and criminals with oxygen. A different strategy is possible. Much of northwest Nigeria is included in the domains of the Sultan of Sokoto and his subordinate emirs. (The sultan is the preeminent Muslim traditional ruler in Nigeria, and his domains stretch into neighboring countries.) Muslim rulers provide traditional justice that often commands greater popular confidence than that handed down by the government in far-off Abuja. Their agents sometimes have a good understanding of what is happening on the ground—the local drivers of conflict. Jihadis despise these traditional rulers as heretics and seek to kill them whenever possible. In the northeast, for example, Boko Haram was nearly successful in killing the Shehu of Borno, generally regarded as second only to the sultan in the traditional hierarchy that jihadis seek to destroy. Were Abuja to cooperate more closely with traditional rulers that command popular confidence, its confrontation with the jihadis could be more successful.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 17 to October 23, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 17: Three #EndSARS protestors were killed in Osogbo, Osun. October 17: One #EndSARS protestor was killed in Abuja, FCT.  October 17: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos.  October 18: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno.  October 19: Six #EndSARS protestors were killed in Abuja, FCT. October 19: Six were killed when a prison in Benin, Oredo, Edo was broken into. October 19: Four #EndSARS protestors were killed in Etsako West, Edo.  October 19: Six Chadian soldiers and ten Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash on the Chadian side of Lake Chad. October 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  October 20: Two police officers and six others were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo. October 20: Six civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Abuja, FCT. October 20: Two police officers and three protestors were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Orile, Ikeja, Lagos.  October 20: Police officers killed two #EndSARS protestors in Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos. October 20: Police officers killed fifteen #EndSARS protestors in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. October 20: Bandits killed twenty-two in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. October 20: Four civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Kano, Kano. October 20: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Aba, Abia. October 20: Three civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Jos, Plateau. October 20: Seventeen were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mushin, Lagos. October 20: Four were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Epe, Lagos. October 20: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oredo, Edo. October 20: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. October 21: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Port Harcourt, Rivers. October 21: Three police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Oyigbo, Rivers. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Enugu East, Enugu. October 21: Bandits kidnapped a family of four in Katsina, Katsina. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Njaba, Imo. October 21: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Mbaitoli, Imo. October 21: One police officer and one civilian were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. October 21: Two civilians were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ikorodu, Lagos. October 21: Police officers killed three #EndSARS protestors in Ondo, Ondo.  October 22: One police officer was beheaded in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra. October 22: Three were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Onitsha, Anambra. October 22: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Ibadan, Oyo.  October 22: Two were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Akure, Ondo. October 22: Kidnappers abducted two pastors and one church member in Aniocha South, Delta.  October 22: Police officers killed five looters in Alimosho, Lagos. October 23: Five were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Calabar, Cross River. October 23: One customs officer and one aggressor were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Illorin, Kwara. October 23: Two police officers were killed in #EndSARS-related violence in Nnewi, Anambra.

"Dr. Richard A. Joseph, professor emeritus at Northwestern University and previously of the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His 1987 book Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic has done much to shape academic analysis of Nigeria and, in this op-ed, he places Nigeria's current protest movement within a broader historical and comparative context. I owe an intellectual debt to Dr. Joseph in my upcoming book Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World." - John Campbell On March 21, 1960 in Sharpeville, South Africa, sixty-nine persons were killed and many wounded during protests at a police station against the detested pass laws. The massacre intensified the struggle against apartheid, but the heinous system persisted another three decades. During the Soweto Uprising of June 1976 against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, hundreds of student protesters were killed and thousands wounded. These tragedies were brought to mind by the October 20 atrocity in Lagos, Nigeria. A campaign against police brutality had endured for two weeks. After the largest demonstration in that city, as night fell, a barrage of live ammunition was unleashed by security forces against unarmed protesters. Nigeria’s governance system is oppressive, though it lacks an evocative name like apartheid. A small percentage of the population benefits from the country’s wealth while most citizens are condemned to lives of deprivation and penury. In his second book on Nigeria, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, former U.S. Ambassador John Campbell describes its essential features. Campbell contends that viewing Nigeria through the prism of the nation-state is a mistake. The federal government is largely sustained by income from petroleum exports. An “elite cartel” competes for, and controls access to, a significant part of this income. Whatever effective governance exists, he argues, is usually found in subnational states and associational groups. Leading scholars strain for terms to describe Nigeria. Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka once remarked that “it was too complex an entity.” Oxford scholar Wale Adebanwi entitled his book on the struggle to curb corruption A Paradise for Maggots. For the international edition, Adebanwi borrowed a milder title from a song by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti: Authority Stealing. In a similar vein, Harvard scholar Biodun Jeyifo entitled his collection of essays Against the Predators’ Republic. Four decades ago, I published my first essay on “prebendalism” in Nigeria. The concept concerns the treatment of state offices as “prebends” to be captured in a variety of ways. Their resources, or access to them, are primarily used for self-enrichment and the nurturing of clientelistic relations. This analytical framework provides the scaffolding for much subsequent analyses of Nigerian politics and government. The tragic episodes of brutality by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), while dismaying, are not new occurrences. Reports from human rights organizations are replete with details of violent abuses of state power. Traffic policing involves, to a significant degree, the extortion of bribes from road users. When soldiers or police are summoned to control public disturbances, excessive force often follows. As a consequence of the May 25 slaying of African American George Floyd, the Nigerian campaign against police misconduct had already attracted international attention. The October 20 atrocity has not only been shocking but raised alarms about what exactly is happening in Nigeria. In June 2018 the World Poverty Clock declared that Nigeria has the largest number of poor people in the world (i.e., exceeding India, which has a population several times greater). Protesters are shouting “we want change” and have expanded their complaints to “government corruption, economic mismanagement, and nepotism.” I have argued in several documents during the past year that Nigeria was confronting possible existential challenges. Commentators who use such expressions as “Nigeria is falling apart” or “burning to the ground” are not being alarmist. Here are further considerations: The multiparty democracy inaugurated in 1999, following fifteen years of military government, has stalled. The costs to maintain it are high while its output in development policies is meagre. Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s current president, was also its first military leader after the overthrow of the Second Republic on December 31, 1983. At seventy-seven years of age, and after many years in government leadership positions, he appears diminished in authority, vitality, and responsiveness. State excesses are reminiscent of abuses during the first Buhari era in 1984–1985. (SARS, held responsible for the early October killings, is reminiscent of a mobile police unit during the 1980s and 1990s nicknamed “Kill-and-Go”.) A respected former minister of education and World Bank vice president, Dr. Obiagele Ezekweseli, estimated in January 2013 that “$400 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenue has been stolen or misused since the country’s independence in 1960.” Over 80 percent of these revenues, she contended, “ended up in the hands of 1 percent of the population.” Moreover, “as much as 20 percent of the entire capital expenditure [of government] will end up in private pockets annually.” Tens of billions more have likely been diverted from government revenues since 2013. Landry Signé, of the Brookings Institution and Stanford University, and his colleagues argue that illicit financial flows are equivalent to two-thirds of foreign direct investments in Africa. Matthew Page has tracked the laundering of “fugitive funds” from Nigeria in substantial property holdings overseas. Violent conflicts in Nigeria are perennial: militant groups in the southern, oil-producing Delta; Boko Haram and other self-declared jihadis in the northeast; cattle raiders and teams of bandits in the northwest; and armed herders in the midwest now involved in conflicts with farmers in the upper southwest. Insecurity, accompanied by distrust of federal police and army units, is pervasive. Amb. Campbell calls, in Nigeria and the Nation-State, for a “rethink” of what is Nigeria. Nigerian public commentators contend that “the country is not working” and that a fundamental “redesign” should be contemplated. The October 21 declaration by novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in a New York Times op-ed that “Nigeria could burn to the ground” should be taken seriously. Amb. Campbell’s 2011 book, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, did not elicit an appropriate response, especially from Nigerian politicians and political analysts. The country has since fallen far from the “brink”. The brutal killings and wounding at the Lekki Toll Gate, after being thoroughly investigated, should not be ribbon-wrapped along with the enunciation of grand reforms. Such gestures are no longer adequate. A country of over 200 million is in distress. Moreover, several states in the region no longer enjoy legitimacy or effective capacity. The 2023 national elections are “in the beyond”. Party political gamesmanship, replete with the “underground” campaign (i.e., thuggery, vote-buying, and ballot-box snatching) cannot be relied on to get Nigeria out of the Dismal Tunnel. Calls for a “national conference” and “restructuring” have repeatedly been brushed off by government leaders. I have suggested concrete steps to finding an exit from the Dismal Tunnel: a national non-partisan government; distilling the values and practices in institutions of legitimate and effective governance; a multi-year campaign—similar to the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid, and anti-racism movements—to mobilize organizations across Nigeria, and its diaspora, to identify ways to transform destructive behaviors; and the deliberate nurturing of institutions of capacity and integrity in state and society. Nigeria, I suggested a decade ago, is a “toll-gate society”. (This expression refers to the bribery that occurs in everyday transactions and which impede economic growth and development.) These words have now acquired sacral meaning. The number who reportedly died on October 20 appears small compared to those who fell in Sharpeville, Soweto, Tiananmen Square, and Tahrir Square. But the manner in which they perished—in a hail of soldiers’ bullets, under the cover of darkness, while peacefully protesting—should shake this proud nation to its core. Never to be erased from memory is a police dog straining at the leash to attack a civil rights demonstrator in Birmingham, Alabama; or a Vietnamese girl, clothing stripped, screaming from burns caused by a napalm attack; or a single man standing in front of a line of tanks at Tiananmen Square. Although no pictures of the killing and maiming at the Lekki Toll Gate have surfaced, the horror was globally experienced. The atrocity of October 20, 2020 is a signal to rewind the Nigerian clock and redesign a polity whose agents can wantonly extinguish the lives of innocent citizens. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.

Western media is reporting that violence in Lagos—initially connected to protests against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a police unit—is intensifying. Lagos is under a twenty-four-hour curfew, and, for the first time, a state in the oil patch, Delta, has also imposed a curfew. Media also reports that in Lagos the violence has spread to Victoria Island and Ikoyi, upmarket neighborhoods. President Muhammadu Buhari addressed the nation on October 22, calling for protesters to consider “the various well-thought-out initiatives” his administration has put forth as an alternative to protests “being used by some subversive elements to cause chaos.” He, however, made no mention of those killed thus far—Amnesty International has documented at least twelve deaths in Lagos and fifty-six nationwide, but there really is no definitive number. On social media, fears are being expressed that the Buhari administration could move to severe repression. Many Lagosians, in particular, recall Buhari's brutality when he was military chief of state in the 1980s. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.