Nigeria

Protests that initially called for the disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), an elite police unit credibly accused of rampant human rights abuses, now seem less focused—but are accelerating. In Lagos, "security services" have fired on "peaceful protesters." Exactly how many have been killed is unknown, but media, citing the reliable Amnesty International, report at least ten deaths as of October 20. The governor of Lagos State has set a twenty-four-hour curfew, with markets and banks shut. Governors in Ekiti and Edo States have taken similar steps. In Edo, a jailbreak led to the flight of over 1,900 prisoners, described by the state governor as "criminals," some of whom were awaiting execution. Meanwhile Nigerian celebrities in the diaspora (e.g., Manchester United footballer Odion Ighalo) and Black entertainers (e.g., Beyonce and Rihanna) are denouncing the violence against protesters. So, too, have U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and 2016 Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton.  Social media is having a field day and the rumor mill is in overdrive, but much is unknown: how many have been killed? Who are the "security services" doing the killing? The army denies it was even present at the Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos, site of at least some killings, and myriad private security services operate in Lagos. How long can a twenty-four-hour curfew be sustained in Lagos? People must buy food, and Lagos has an estimated population of more than twenty million. And who exactly are the demonstrators? Initially, reports were that the protesters were predominantly young, peaceful, and often equipped with laptops and cellphones, making them part of a Westernized or modern youth elite: their focus appeared to be SARS. Now, however, Babajide Sanwo-Olu, governor of Lagos State, is saying that the protests have been hijacked by criminal gangs that are taking advantage of the general breakdown to loot. The governor's charge cannot be dismissed as implausible. Gangs and criminal groups—"area boys“—have long been active and contribute to the high levels of violence in Lagos even in normal times.  The bottom line is that for the time being, in some places things are breaking down. Nevertheless, it remains too soon to say whether the protests pose a threat to the Buhari administration or to the broader political economy. Though reports show demonstrations in Kano and Abuja, the phenomenon still seems most widespread in the more developed and Yoruba part of the country with social media playing a key role. If there have been significant protests in the oil patch, they have not caught media attention. The demonstrations appear largely inchoate and spontaneous without a centralized leadership or a charismatic figurehead. President Muhammadu Buhari has been silent since announcing the disbandment of SARS. The military leadership appears to be firmly behind the administration. But there has been violence, and that lets the genie out of the bottle. All this on top of COVID-19, low oil prices, and radical Islamist groups bent on destroying the state—Nigeria was in trouble even before the SARS demonstrations. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.      

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 10 to October 16, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 10: Kidnappers abducted twenty-four people in Kuje, FCT.  October 10: One person was killed during protests against the Special-Anti Robbery Squad (SARS) in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 10: Gunmen killed nine in Giwa, Kaduna.  October 10: Gunmen killed two in Bauchi, Bauchi.  October 11: Soldiers killed two during a curfew protest in Sanga, Kaduna.   October 11: Bandits killed eight in Faskari, Katsina.  October 11: Three people were killed during protests against SARS in Ogbomosho, Oyo.  October 11: Gunmen killed a mobile police officer in Okpe, Delta. October 12: One police officer and one civilian were killed during protests against SARS in Surulere, Lagos. October 12: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Rafi, Niger State. October 12: Boko Haram killed fourteen farmers in Maiduguri, Borno. October 13: Vigilante members killed eleven herdsmen in Kurfi, Katsina. October 13: A military airstrike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Batsari, Katsina.  October 15: Armed robbers killed a mobile police officer in Warri, Delta.  October 15: Gunmen killed three at a mosque in Koton Karfe, Kogi.  October 15: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA members in Abadam, Borno.  October 16: Communal violence led to nine deaths in Isoko South, Delta.  October 16: Two people were killed during protests against SARS in Oredo, Edo.  October 16: ISWA killed fourteen soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  October 16: Boko Haram killed three people and kidnapped five children in Oudal, Cameroon. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.

Following nationwide demonstrations—first against the elite Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and then the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit, its successor—the Buhari administration has abolished the former and promised wide-ranging reforms of the police. On October 18 the inspector general of police (IG) announced that the International Committee of the Red Cross would provide training in humanitarian law and human rights issues with respect to the use of force in arrest and detention. The IG also said that other “development partners” will be providing additional training, but he did not name them or provide details. Demonstrations have taken place in Lagos, Abuja, Warri, Enugu, and Makurdi; all except Abuja are in the predominantly Christian south. There have been no reports of demonstrations in Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, or Maiduguri, all located in the predominantly Muslim north. The authorities have closed some roads in Lagos, leading to some factory closures. The media is reporting two deaths in the Yoruba state of Osun in conjunction with an attack on the motorcade of the governor during #EndSARS protests on Saturday. While the police remain the principal focus, demonstrators are also protesting Nigeria's bad governance. The demonstrators, according to Western media, cite grievances ranging from poor educational opportunities to electricity shortages. There also appears to be an age dimension: most demonstrators are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. Indeed, at least some of the protesters are pushing back against Nigeria's deeply conservative social norms. Social class plays a role as well—many demonstrators have access to laptops and social media. They claim that the police single out young people with laptops and label them as criminal "yahoo boys," a popular term for cyber fraudsters in Nigeria. For many—perhaps most—of the accused, this is a misnomer: SARS has been known to target those working in Lagos’ fast-growing (licit) tech scene. Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey and Google’s Africa team have come out in support of the protesters. Has the “Arab Spring” come to Lagos? If the demonstrations are owned by relatively cosmopolitan, urban young people that enjoy the benefits of technology and a modicum of Western education, they are likely to fizzle out. A reality of Nigeria is that it is profoundly conservative across its religious and ethnic divisions. Up to now, the security services have been restrained with the demonstrators. However, the Nigerian army has already said publicly that it will defend the state against demonstrators if necessary. Security service violence against demonstrators, should it happen, could make the current unrest much worse. Learn more about John Campbell's upcoming book, Nigeria and the Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World, out in early December 2020.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In 2017, Nigerian youths adopted a campaign against brutality from the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). The objective was to catalyze mass action against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a unit of the NPF set up to respond to armed robberies. The campaign, which adopted a mix of online and offline strategies, was popularly known on social media as #EndSARS. Over ten thousand Nigerians signed a petition and submitted it to the National Assembly calling for the unit’s disbandment, citing various abuses against Nigerian youths. Although efforts were made by the National Assembly, the National Human Rights Commission, the police chief, and even the vice president, not much changed. Nigerian youths are once again on the streets protesting against SARS. On social media, many young Nigerians recount gory stories of their encounters with the squad, with some reporting cases of brutality, abduction, extortion, extrajudicial killings and false imprisonment. These stories corroborate a 2016 Amnesty International report [PDF] detailing patterns of human rights violations committed by SARS. A common feature of SARS operations is officers’ penchant for patrolling in plain clothes, carrying assault weapons and using gestapo-like tactics against supposed suspects. While SARS is notorious for its brutality, human rights abuses by security forces are not confined to the NPF. In 2015, Amnesty International published a report which detailed a series of atrocities committed by the Nigerian military. Human rights violations by security forces date back to Nigeria’s military dictatorships, when security agencies such as the police were established to safeguard military regimes rather than to protect and serve communities. Notwithstanding the advent of democratic rule in 1999, this mindset remains deeply ingrained. Police officers and military personnel have been deployed to intimidate peaceful protesters as well as arrest journalists and other critics of government. A major driver of human rights abuses committed by SARS and other security operatives is the lack of accountability for their actions. In many situations, security operatives who violate human rights are shielded by the police hierarchy; victims are afraid to speak out for fear of being targeted again. A June 2020 Amnesty report [PDF] stated that the government has failed to prosecute a single SARS operative since the National Assembly passed the Anti-Torture Act of 2017 [PDF]. Another factor is that the enabling legislation for the NPF, the Police Act [PDF], is obsolete. The act, which was adopted in 1943, leaves broad discretionary powers in the hands of police officers. These allow officers to perform warrantless searches and make arrests based on mere suspicion of guilt—or even an intent to commit an offence. This is the crux of many allegations against SARS: victims’ phones have been seized without a warrant, while others have been arrested for their tattoos or dreadlocks. Last month, President Buhari signed the New Police Act into law to provide a more effective and well-organized police force, with transparent operational standards and measures to hold wayward officers accountable. However, critics argue the new act retains some of the discretionary powers that enable human rights abuses. Several remedies are available to victims of human rights abuses in Nigeria. Victims can petition the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which was established to assist victims of rights violations. The NHRC’s powers are limited, however, in that the commission can only make recommendations, which the government can then choose whether to implement (or not). Another option is for victims to defend their rights in court. Unfortunately, many afflicted by police violence cannot afford a lawyer to help navigate the long, expensive judicial process. Sometimes cases drag on for years and even when damages are awarded, the police seldom pay. Although the Legal Aid Council provides free legal assistance and representation to disadvantaged citizens, the council is poorly funded and its lawyers are often overburdened. The Nigerian government should listen to the millions of voices calling for police reform and see an opportunity to transform relations between police and communities. Although the inspector general of police gave an address on October 11 disbanding SARS, the establishment of a new tactical unit to replace it has ensured protests continue. Protesters also insist the government needs to back its declarations signaling reform with action, such as prosecuting officers involved in brutality. All over Nigerian social media, new stories are surfacing that show police putting down protests by force. As the protests continue across Nigeria and spread worldwide, the government will need to recognize that coercion cannot address the issue. President Buhari should accede to protesters’ demands. Negotiations between protesters and the government are about more than police brutality.  Young Nigerians are crying out for wholesale reforms in governance and the justice system. Efforts to reform the system are necessary and overdue. Only once meaningful reforms are implemented can the rights of citizens be truly guaranteed.

There is little sense of national cohesion in Nigeria, and protests tend to be along ethnic and religious lines rather than national. Like the 2012 demonstrations against the Goodluck Jonathan administration's efforts to reduce the fuel subsidy, current protests against the police are exceptional in that they appear to be occurring across the country, bridging the usual ethnic and religious boundaries. They also appear to be strongly supported by the Nigerian diaspora, which is linking them to Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United States and Europe. The 2012 demonstrations collapsed in the aftermath of minor government concessions and the buying-off of certain trade unions. The coming weeks will show whether these demonstrations have any greater staying power. As in much of post-colonial Africa, police in Nigeria are widely hated for their brutality and corruption. (The Nigeria Police Service was a British colonial creation, used primarily to keep down the indigenous population.) The focus of the current demonstrations has been the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a plainclothes unit known for its abuses targeting young people. The demonstrations were triggered by the alleged SARS killing of a young man during an October 3 stop-and-search operation. Amnesty International has documented eighty-two cases of SARS extrajudicial killings and abuse over the past thirty months or so. President Muhammadu Buhari responded to the demonstrations by promising to disband SARS as a first step toward a thorough—and badly needed—reform of the police. The promise is viewed with skepticism by protestors, who have also taken aim at the new Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit, which Inspector General of Police Mohammed Adamu announced would replace SARS. A complication is that Nigeria is in the midst of a nationwide crime wave. SARS was initially established to counter criminal gangs operating in Lagos, the country's largest city, and later was deployed across the country. The diaspora, especially in the United States, appears to be playing a major supporting role. There have been diaspora-led demonstrations in Atlanta, Berlin, London, and New York that tie in Black Lives Matter protests. Social media is playing an important role in coordinating the demonstrations, in Nigeria and abroad. According to Western media, American rappers Chance the Rapper and Cardi B are calling attention to the demonstrations. It remains to be seen whether the demonstrations will become more significant abroad than at home.

The two finalists for the position of director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are Yoo Myung-hee, Republic of Korea, and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a Nigerian and (since 2019) an American citizen. The media is portraying Yoo Myung-hee as an international trade specialist and a WTO insider, while Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala describes herself as a WTO outsider; she combines, however, exceptional political and diplomatic experience with her economic training and subsequent career. She has been twice Nigeria's finance minister and once the foreign minister. During the Goodluck Jonathan administration she was also coordinating minister of the economy. The media sees both finalists as qualified, and both were supported by the European Union (EU). The WTO strives to fill the director general position by consensus; that process is now underway and is likely to be completed by the end of October—before the U.S. presidential election. Securing EU support is likely to be crucial.  The Trump administration has been highly critical of the WTO, seeing it as overly favorable toward China, and has called for its reform. It has not signaled which of the two leading candidates it favors, though Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala's reformist and outsider rhetoric would seem attractive to it. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was born in 1954 in southern Nigeria; her father was an Igbo traditional ruler and an academic. She graduated from Harvard and earned a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Her husband, also of Nigerian origin, is a medical doctor practicing in Washington, DC. For many years she was an economist at the World Bank, rising to become managing director (the number two position in the bank’s hierarchy). In 2011, she ran unsuccessfully for the top World Bank position. After the restoration of civilian government in Nigeria in 1999, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala returned to Nigeria where she served as financial minister under President Olusegun Obasanjo and, briefly, foreign minister. Under the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of Nigerian governance, she largely eliminated the country's Paris Club debt and instituted practical measures to increase financial transparency. She has published a book that charts her struggle against the country's endemic corruption. Despite her ministerial positions, she was not immune to the travails of life in Nigeria: her octogenarian mother was kidnapped and held in bad conditions. She was released, presumably after ransom was paid. (Paying ransom is illegal in Nigeria, so details rarely appear in the media.) Whichever candidate is chosen, the WTO will be led for the first time by a woman. If Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala gets the nod, she will also be the first Nigerian—and first African—to lead the WTO. By background she would appear to have the strongest reform credentials.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 3 to October 9, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     October 3: The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) killed a civilian in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 3: Gunmen killed a pastor in Ekiti West, Ekiti.   October 3: A police officer killed a civilian in Abuja, FCT.  October 3: Suspected Fulani bandits killed nine in Batsari, Katsina. October 3: Bandits kidnapped twenty in Jibia, Katsina.  October 4: One was killed in election-related violence in Akure, Ondo.  October 4: Troops killed two bandits in Kachia, Kaduna.  October 5: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Riyom, Plateau.  October 5: Troops killed a bandit leader and "some" others (estimated at five total) in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  October 5: Bandits kidnapped six in Maru, Zamfara.  October 6: Herdsmen killed two in Bassa, Plateau.  October 7: Kidnappers abducted three in Kuje, FCT. October 7: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 8: One police officer and one civilian were killed during an EndSARS protest in Ughelli North, Delta.  October 8: Police officers killed two robbers in Ikot-Ekpene, Akwa Ibom. October 8: Suspected herdsmen killed two in Afikpo, Ebonyi. October 8: Air strikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in Batsari, Katsina. October 9: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Ethiope East, Delta.  October 9: Police officers dispersed protestors with gunshots in Osogbo, Osun. October 9: Bandits killed three in Giwa, Kaduna.    Learn more about John Campbell's forthcoming book Nigeria and the Nation-State. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 26 to October 2, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. September 26: Kidnappers abducted four in Aniocha North, Delta.  September 26: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno.  September 27: Bandits killed one and kidnapped seven in Danko Wasagu, Kebbi.  September 27: Cultists killed one at a church in Oruk-Anam, Akwa Ibom.  September 28: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kajuru, Kaduna.  September 28: Two herdsmen were killed in Ivo, Ebonyi.  September 28: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers in Zeleved, Cameroon.  September 29: ISWA killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno.  September 29: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  September 30: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members killed one police officer in Oyigbo, Rivers.  October 1: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  October 2: Nigerian police officers killed six armed robbers in Uyo, Akwa Ibom. 

Inhumane sharia punishments, including flogging, amputations, and stoning, have long embarrassed the federal government of Nigeria. That is happening now, with the 120-month prison sentence handed down by a Kano sharia court to a thirteen-year-old boy, Omar Farouq, and the death sentence handed down by the same court, again for blasphemy, on a twenty-two-year-old musician, Yahaya Sharif, for a song he shared on social media. A third, Mubarak Bala, a self-proclaimed atheist, has disappeared in police custody. These cases have attracted attention in the international press and in Nigeria. The director of the Auschwitz-Birkenau holocaust museum, Piotr Cywinski, has appealed to President Buhari to secure the boy's release, and has recruited 119 volunteers worldwide, each of whom is willing to serve one month of the boy's sentence. (President Buhari has visited Auschwitz.) With respect to musician Yahaya Sharif, eighty-five thousand have signed a petition to save his life. Those signatories presumably are mostly Nigerian.  Thus far, there has been no comment from President Buhari's office, while the Kano governor's office has said, "the position of Kano state government remains the decision of the sharia court," according to Western media. According to the constitution, Nigeria is a secular state with guarantees of freedom of religion and free speech. But in twelve predominately Muslim states in the north of the country, Islamic law, sharia, operates in the criminal as well as the religious domain, though only Muslims are supposed to be subject to it. Sharia is not uniform and varies from state to state, though blasphemy appears to be a capital crime in all of them.  Under Nigeria's constitution, federal law is superior to state law including sharia. Federal authorities prevent the implementation of inhumane sharia sentences and have voided sharia decisions that are contrary to federal law. In fact, a sharia court has carried out only one death sentence since 1999, as far as is publicly known. However, for the federal authorities to intervene they must know about the case. If the defendant has a lawyer or access to the media, that happens. If, however, the defendant cannot afford a lawyer and has no media access, his fate may well be determined by the full rigor of sharia. Sharia and its punishments often command popular support: a mob burned down the house of musician Yahaya Sharif after his arrest, with no consequences. However, there are Nigerian qadis (sharia court judges) that are seeking to reform sharia punishments, arguing the most inhumane are imported from the Middle East and are not congruent with true Islam.   The context of these accelerating episodes involving sharia is the declining power of the federal government and the concomitant growth in the authority of governors and local rulers. For example, the police are supposed to be national, but formal and informal militias are becoming increasingly powerful. Sharif was arrested by what the media describes as "Islamic police." It is likely that he was arrested by the Hisbah, a vigilante force that enforces sharia regulation, especially with respect to dress. The Hisbah often has recognition from the state in which it operates, but not the federal government.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 19 to September 25, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 19: Bandits kidnapped forty-two people in Maru, Zamfara.  September 19: Police officers killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger state.  September 19: Communal violence led to four deaths in Awka South, Anambra.  September 20: Nigerian soldiers killed three civilians in Andoni, Rivers.  September 20: Boko Haram killed seven Nigerian soldiers in Damboa, Borno while "many/scores" (estimated at twenty) of Boko Haram militants were killed.  September 20: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Guma, Benue.  September 20: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one police officer while two of the attackers were killed during a clash in Ukwa West, Abia.  September 22: Military air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 23: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  September 23: Communal violence led to two deaths in Izzi, Ebonyi.  September 24: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Jos South, Plateau.  September 24: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one bandits and lost three soldiers in Faskari, Katsina.  September 24: Chadian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Barkalam and Bilabrim, Chad.   September 24: Air strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. September 25: Air strikes killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  September 25: Boko Haram killed twelve police officers, five soldiers, four militia members, and nine civilians in Kukawa, Borno.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two kidnappers in Nasarawa, Nasarawa.  September 25: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 12 to September 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 12: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 12: Bandits killed two in Okene, Kogi.  September 13: A military air strike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  September 14: Bandits killed two Federal Road Safety Corps officials and kidnapped ten in Karu, Nassarawa.  September 14: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Safana, Katsina.  September 14: Bandits killed one and abducted one in Faskari, Katsina.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Takum, Taraba.  September 14: Nigerian troops killed four militants in Bade, Yobe.  September 15: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Gboyin, Ekiti.  September 15: Military strikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 15: ISWA killed eight in Kaga LGA and three in Konduga LGA in Borno.  September 16: Kidnappers abducted eight in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 17: Bandits killed two police officers and kidnapped two civilians in Tangaza, Sokoto.  September 17: Police killed two robbers in Suleja, Niger.  September 17: Boko Haram killed ten Chadian soldiers in Lake Chad. September 17: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Maru, Zamfara.  September 17: Boko Haram killed three in Magumeri, Borno.  September 18: Bandits killed five farmers in Malumfashi, Katsina. September 18: Gunmen kidnapped seven in Igabi, Kaduna.  September 18: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped three in Dekina, Kogi. September 18: Kidnappers abducted two in Chikun, Kaduna. 

Eric G. Berman, director of the Small Arms Survey from 2016 to 2019 and formerly with the United Nations, has published widely on African peace and security issues. His current research focuses on arms flows in the Lake Chad Basin region. On September 2, Boko Haram (ISWA) militants reportedly killed 10 Nigerian soldiers in Borno state. Such bloodshed has become so commonplace that it often fails to garner much interest. International news outlets spilled little ink to report the incident. Nevertheless, the failures of the region's militaries—as well as the Lake Chad Basin Commission's Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—to combat Boko Haram merit greater attention from policymakers and the international community.  The widespread and persistent human rights abuses Boko Haram routinely metes out against civilians is covered as routine. Indeed, readers of this blog will be familiar with CFR's ambitious multiyear Nigeria Security Tracker project. Most of the nearly 10,000 entries since 2011 refer to incidents of Boko Haram attacks. The International Crisis Group has issued numerous in-depth reports of Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria as well as in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Reporting on Boko Haram's arsenal and modes of acquisition exists, but is comparatively thin and largely anecdotal.   Boko Haram's strikes on the MNJTF and co-deployed national armed forces have been numerous and successful. Boko Haram has no shortage of targets. The MNJTF comprises thousands of troops from four LCBC member states: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria (Benin, not a LCBC member, also contributes). Soldiers from these countries—in much larger numbers—supplement this peacekeeping force and are co-deployed in the same sectors. An ongoing, partial review of open-source reporting on more than 100 attacks on armed forces personnel since 2015 reveals that Boko Haram has overrun fixed sites of companies and battalions in all four countries.  The true scale and scope of materiel Boko Haram has seized is very difficult to ascertain. Boko Haram has reason to inflate its military successes, and governments from the region have little incentive to publicize their losses. Reporting is imprecise. It is difficult to know strengths that correspond to “patrols,” “convoys,” “companies,” and “battalions.” There are persistent reports that soldiers lack proper levels of ammunition with which to defend themselves. Crew-served materiel as well as armored vehicles at fixed sites are often in disrepair and number below what military doctrine requires. What is not in doubt is that these attacks have netted Boko Haram millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of assault rifles and assorted firearms, and hundreds of military vehicles, including armored tanks and self-propelled artillery. The seizure of non-lethal materiel, such as petrol, communications gear, and uniforms, also occurs on a sizeable scale and has important ramifications. Insurgent groups' attacks on peacekeepers and co-deployed military units and confiscation of lethal materiel is a long-standing and widespread phenomenon. But the success that Boko Haram has enjoyed is deeply worrisome.  Better understanding the full extent of the problem is an important first step. A study that moves past anecdotal accounts will enhance the prospects for accountability and facilitate security sector reform, which is of fundamental importance due to credible reports of poor morale and leadership. Enhanced stockpile management and record-keeping is also needed. Fortunately, existing arms control measures—many of them legally binding—already exist. But international and regional actors too often pay them lip service despite largely footing the bills. Arms export policies need to be reassessed given how much materiel is being lost to unintended recipients. This list is indicative and not exhaustive. States and organizations that contribute troops, military equipment, money, and political support for ongoing efforts to counter Boko Haram need to reassess their current approaches to combatting the threat. The United States has an important role to play as a strategic partner to states in the region and a generous funder of small arms management and destruction initiatives. Current efforts arguably empower and embolden the very target they seek to neutralize.

In the face of apparently soaring levels of crime and violence, the Nigerian government has launched a community policing initiative. Abuja has set aside N13 billion (about $35 million) to fund the launch and is recruiting some 10,000 constables, according to Nigerian media. The Chief of Police for Ekiti state is hinting that the new constables will be deployed in the areas from which they come. Locally based, the constables would develop ties with community leaders and, it is hoped, bring security closer to the people.  The Nigeria Police Force was established by the British colonial authorities. Unlike in the United Kingdom or the United States, the police were to be a national gendarmerie rather than locally-based. Police would be recruited nation-wide, and by policy they would not be assigned to where they came from. The concern of the British and Nigerian successive post-independence governments was that otherwise, police officers would favor those from their own ethnic group and religious affiliation. The police – this national gendarmerie – is often poorly trained, poorly paid (salaries are often in arrears), and associated with corruption. Many, perhaps most, Nigerians have as little to do with the police as possible. U.S. assistance to the Nigerian police is severely curtailed because of credible allegations of human rights violations by the latter.  In the face of mounting security threats – crime, Islamist insurgencies, quarrels over land and water, and disaffection in the oil patch – something like local policing has been emerging, contrary to long-standing policy. These entities may or may not have formal links to the police. Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF) operate in the north, ostensibly to assist the police. In the north, so-called Hezbollah units enforce sharia (Islamic law) with respect to public dress and behavior. In Yorubaland (southwest Nigeria) governors have joined together to establish a Yoruba constabulary, apparently with the approval of the federal Inspector General of Police.  It might appear that Nigeria is moving toward the American practice of state and local police, with only the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) being an arm of the federal government. If that is the intent, Nigeria has a long way to go. The national police service remains a powerful, if hated, interest. It also remains to be seen if ethnic and religious favoritism surfaces among locally-based law enforcement units. The current concept of 'police' in Nigeria is a colonial import. It reflects a Western legalistic definition of crime. Traditional societies in Nigeria tend to have a more nuanced view, with an emphasis on the context of the alleged crime or the dispute. Rather than a police force, traditional villages often had watchmen. If the new constables evolve in that direction, it might erode the pervasive distrust of law enforcement.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from September 5 to September 11, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     September 5: Sectarian violence led to one death in Irepodun, Osun.  September 5: Bandits killed one Nigerian Air Force officer in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  September 6: Herdsmen killed three and kidnapped seven in Kajuru, Kaduna.  September 6: Boko Haram killed seven and kidnapped two in Maiduguri, Borno.  September 6: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Guma, Benue.   September 6: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram/ISWA insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. September 6: Kidnappers killed one police officer, one Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) official, and one civilian whom they had previously abducted in Chikun, Kaduna.   September 7: Gunmen killed one police officer in Ohafia, Abia.  September 7: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Chikun, Kaduna.  September 8: A NSCDC officer killed one civilian in Obingwa, Abia.   September 8: Herdsmen killed one in Zangon Kataf LGA and one in Kauru LGA in Kaduna.  September 9: Bandits kidnapped three and killed one in Bungudu, Zamfara.  September 9: Herdsmen killed two in Keana, Nassarawa.  September 10: Gunmen kidnapped thirty in Gwagwalada, FCT.  September 11: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.  

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.  For multi-national companies (MNCs) operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, doing business can be a daunting prospect. The problems are numerous, and many solutions have been offered and implemented with varying degrees of success across the nine Niger Delta states. In a context characterized by rising unemployment and underemployment above the national average, rising poverty levels, a growing youth population, a history of perceived marginalization, weak political and institutional governance, and an infrastructural deficit, MNCs operating in the Niger Delta must invest significant proportions of their profits in corporate social responsibility (CSR) interventions. They have come to understand that they must also secure the social license that allows them to operate in local communities. These CSR interventions take the shape of building health centers and schools, and construction of roads, bridges and other infrastructural projects.  Already operating in an environment with structural weaknesses and rising demographic pressures, MNCs also must confront these conflict dynamics. These include a mix of criminality, gang, election, ethnic, and communal violence, all of which feed into and are exacerbated by a culture of militancy. According to reports by the PIND Foundation, this conflict landscape is further defined by political patronage, ethnic rivalry, clashes between cult groups, and a general competition for resources – including land. All of these factors taken together drive conflict in the region. Some MNCs have responded to these systemic weaknesses and subsequent conflict risks by establishing and funding community structures to meet the infrastructural and welfare needs of their host communities. These strategies are intended to facilitate host community projects, and secondarily, also act as conflict management structures in an attempt to address drivers of insecurity. Unfortunately, in many instances, the indigenous actors that take up positions in these community structures are often the very same patrons or beneficiaries of various criminal networks that drive the conflict dynamics in the region to begin with. The implication of this is that the responsibility of maintaining “peace and security” in these communities is often left in the hands of conflict actors themselves. In other words, the mere presence of an MNC in local communities can actually be a source of conflict.  This then begs the question of: Whose business is it, anyway, to maintain peace? An argument can be made that MNCs as business enterprises are not responsible for building peace in the communities where they operate. To paraphrase Milton Friedman, the only social responsibility [there is] is to make profit. However, contemporary literature in the field of business and peace has evolved significantly since Mr. Friedman’s thesis. For one, the United Nations has reinforced the role of the private sector in contributing to the actualization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 16, which focuses on the building of strong and peaceful institutions. MNCs need to broaden their perspective of “peace,” and become more conflict sensitive. MNCs occupy a pivotal position as major contributors to the economy in a complex and dynamic context. They are faced with competing demands from communities and ethnic or socio-political groups, and cannot afford missteps that could characterize them as favoring one group over the other. MNCs need to improve their understanding of the socio-political context in which they operate, and based off of that understanding, develop relationships with local peace actors and invest in building their capacities for conflict mitigation, to better respond to emerging dynamics. For MNCs, contributing to a stable environment also has huge economic gains. It is beneficial in securing their assets from disruptions, ensuring the safety of their staff, and fostering cooperation with communities in addressing problems that could adversely affect the company. This is certainly good for the bottom line. There are rarely any “quick wins” for MNCs in fragile and conflict affected environments like the Niger Delta, but the long term benefits of investing with foresight and knowledge, and coming equipped with the proper tools and relationships, can have the long-term benefit of contributing to local and regional economies and potentially lifting millions out of poverty and insecurity. This is something worth investing in.