Nigeria

Abductions of hundreds of students in northwestern Nigeria are the latest examples of a common tactic among criminal and jihadi groups, underscoring that Boko Haram is far from the government’s only problem in the north.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 19 to December 25, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 19: Five Nigerian soldiers and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Mafa, Borno. December 19: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Kauru LGA and two deaths in Lere LGA in Kaduna. December 19: Bandits kidnapped eighty students and four teachers in Dandume, Katsina but police officers repelled the attack and rescued the victims. December 19: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. December 20: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped one in Rafi, Niger State. December 20: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Rogo, Kano. December 20: Cult clashes resulted in nine deaths in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. December 21: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Danmusa, Katsina. December 22: Bandits killed seven and kidnapped three in Chikun, Kaduna. December 22: Kidnappers abducted twenty-one in Batsari, Katsina. December 23: Two vigilantes, five civilians, and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed during a clash in Giwa, Kaduna. December 23: Gunmen killed two naval officers at a checkpoint in Okene, Kogi. December 23: Soldiers killed three robbers in Mangu, Plateau. December 23: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Batagarawa, Katsina. December 24: Boko Haram killed eleven and kidnapped seven in Chibok, Borno. December 24: Boko Haram killed eight and kidnapped eleven in Gombi, Adamawa. December 24: Six bandits and two civilians were killed in clashes in Sanga and Lere LGAs in Kaduna. December 24: Gunmen killed three police officers and two civilians in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 24: Bandits kidnapped five in Shiroro, Niger State. December 24: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Ukum, Benue. December 24: Suspected Boko Haram militants kidnapped forty loggers and killed three in Ngala, Borno. December 25: Bandits killed two police officers in Garki, Jigawa. December 25: Police officers killed two civilians at a concert in Oturkpo, Benue.

There are signs that as the Nigerian army and the police continue to fail to meet the security needs of the Nigerian people, they will turn toward repression. In November, Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai called on all troops to put themselves in a “war mode.” An internal army communication obtained by the media exhorted Nigerian soldiers to treat all individuals in the region where Boko Haram is active as suspected jihadis until they are “properly identified.” The door is opening to yet more human rights abuses by the security services. Fears that the Buhari government may revive shelved legislation that would seek greater control over social media—including the death penalty for spreading “fake news,” as defined by the government—are also surfacing. Meanwhile, the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG), a civil society organization that focuses on the welfare of northern Nigerians, is calling on local communities to defend themselves against Boko Haram and “bandits” because the Buhari government is failing to protect them. Last week, before the resolution of the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolboys at Kankara, CNG’s national coordinator said “northern Nigeria has been abandoned at the mercy of various insurgents, bandits, kidnappers, armed robbers, rapists, and an assortment of hardened criminals,” with a “huge vacuum in the political will and capacity of government to challenge” such violent actors. Around the country, numerous state governors are organizing and supporting more-or-less informal militias, ostensibly in support of the army and the police. In the current climate, such groups are likely now acting independently more often than in conjunction with security forces. Some evidence suggests that security service abuses contribute to the alienation of the population from the government, helping drive jihadi recruitment. With the growth of militias, the Nigerian state is losing an attribute of sovereignty: a monopoly on the legal use of violence. The government is also failing to fulfill its obligation to provide security for its people.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 12 to December 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 12: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 12: Twenty Boko Haram militants and one soldier were killed during a clash in Askira/Uba, Borno. December 12: Kidnappers abducted one and killed one soldier and one other in Ibadan, Oyo. December 12: Boko Haram killed thirty refugees in Diffa, Niger. December 13: Three escaped prisoners were killed after a prison break in Calabar, Cross River. December 13–December 14: Kidnappers abducted twenty-two in Rafi, Niger State. December 15: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Oshimili South, Delta. December 15: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed three in Makurdi, Benue. December 15: Following a police killing of a commercial motorcyclist on December 15, protestors burnt down a number of police stations in Aguata, Anambra; during the violence, one police officer and one civilian were killed. December 16: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. December 16: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 17: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. December 17: Bandits killed seven in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. December 17: Amotekun officers killed two civilians in Ibadan, Oyo. December 17: Kidnappers abducted five in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. December 18: Gunmen killed eight during an attack on the Zamfara Emir's convoy in Funtua, Katsina. December 18: Boko Haram killed five and abducted thirty-five travelers during a highway attack in Konduga, Borno. December 18: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three others in Konduga, Borno.

The freeing of perhaps 344 boys kidnapped from a boarding school at Kankara in Katsina state is unalloyed good news. However, the foiled attempt to kidnap another eighty school children, at Dandume in the same state a few days later on December 19, highlights the iniquitousness of criminal gang activity. As for the now-freed Kankara victims, many questions remain. Just how many were kidnapped, how many escaped, how many were released, and how many (if any) are still in captivity is unclear. The perpetrators of the Kankara crime appear to have been three criminal, locally based gangs known to the state government of Katsina. The state government negotiated their release. The governor's denial of having paid ransom is hardly credible, given usual Nigerian practice. Media is saying credibly that the gangs and the state government have a longstanding relationship, with the latter paying the former protection money. Such "peace agreements" frequently go sour. That might be the background to this kidnapping—gang pressure on the state government.  Alternatively, the kidnapping could have been "commissioned" by Boko Haram, perhaps the reasoning behind Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau's claim of responsibility. Media reports that the three gangs have long been associated with Boko Haram, to which it sells stolen weapons and other illicit material. However, the gangs retained control of the kidnapped boys, rather than turning them over immediately to Boko Haram, making possible bargaining. At Dandume, the perpetrators were also involved in cattle rustling. According to the media, quick action by the police and a local militia freed the children and recovered the cattle from a local hideout. Both episodes highlight the role of criminal gangs in the north and their interrelationship with governments, jihadi groups, and local militias. "Ungoverned spaces" are controlled by a kaleidoscope of elements ranging from the purely criminal to jihadi. What about the people? The popular support or acquiescence enjoyed by criminal gangs and jihadi groups is hard to judge. But exploited and marginalized people everywhere have turned to criminal gangs and religion since the days of Robin Hood and "evil" King John.

On December 8, Amnesty stated that at least ten thousand civilians have died in Nigerian military custody since 2011. The report cites Giwa Barracks, a particularly sordid prison in Maiduguri. Previous reports of civilian deaths by non-governmental organizations have received extensive coverage from Western media. Anecdotal evidence [PDF] suggests that abuses by Nigerian security services—including the army—against civilians have been an important Boko Haram recruitment tool. However, bad prison conditions probably contribute far more deaths than deliberate security service abuse. Prisons are underfunded, understaffed, and often grotesquely overcrowded—in part because of the sclerotic justice system. As elsewhere in the world, a high percentage of prisoners have not been charged—let alone convicted—of any crime because a judicial process can drag on for years. Many prisoners survive because family members provide food, water, and medicine. If family members are absent, however, that safety net disappears. Prisoners die from disease and a lack of water and food. Western nongovernment organizations that highlight security service abuses and bad prison conditions, such as Amnesty, are widely disliked by Nigeria's elites, who routinely accuse Western NGOs of "double standards." Then, too, the popular Nigerian perception of the purpose of imprisonment is often that it serves to punish, not rehabilitate. Capital punishment, anathema to many Western NGOs, is widely popular. So, too, is vigilante justice.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In May 1966, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Nigeria’s first military head of state—also known as Johnny Ironside for his exploits in a peacekeeping mission in the Congo—promulgated the infamous Decree No. 34 of 1966, the “unification decree.” The decree effectively did away with the federal system of government practiced by Nigeria since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960. In its place, the general instituted a unitary system of government as a way of discouraging “tribal loyalties and activities which promote tribal consciousness and sectional interests and which must give way to the urgent task of national reconstruction.” The decree suspended aspects of the Nigerian constitution and, with it, the military government arrogated to itself wide discretionary powers. Unknown to the general, the effects of this decree would reverberate well into Nigeria’s sixtieth year as an independent nation. Since 1966, Nigeria has had several constitutions, each giving broad—and exclusive—powers to the central or federal government, to the detriment of its constituent units. In many countries with federal systems of government, the central government retains some exclusive powers as is necessary to enable uniformity in governance. For example, in the United States, the federal government retains the powers of the treasury, the military, and immigration. In the Nigerian case, the exclusive powers retained by the central government go beyond ensuring uniformity. Successive federal governments have maintained the stranglehold on power, justified by the aim of providing a political solution to the disunity and deep divisions that have existed since the unification decree was passed. The result has been the creation of a gargantuan political entity with a concentration of powers at the center and underdeveloped states. The method by which Nigeria allocates revenue between the central government and states impedes the development of a truly federal polity. The 1963 constitution granted regional governments control over natural and human resources found within their territories as well as broad powers to use these resources to fast-track local development. Consequently, big strides were made in areas such as education and agriculture. The oil boom of the 1970s, however, led to an overdependence on oil revenues and the relegation of the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors. The growing preeminence of the Supreme Military Council led to the creation of a mono-economy, whereby states became—by no choice of their own—addicted to monthly grants from the central government, leaving them incapable of addressing their deficient infrastructure. As states' autonomy gradually eroded under decades of military rule, little local competency was left that could offset the poor administration and profligacy of successive military governments. This problem continues despite the return to civilian rule: the 1999 constitution perpetuated the lopsided system in which real power lies in Abuja. Another victim of Nigeria’s problematic federal system is the security sector, especially in the area of policing, where the federal government has exclusive powers. The constitution continued the practice of operating a highly centralized police structure—a relic of British colonialism. The inflexibility inherent in the policing system has led to an ineffective force, dogged by issues of poor funding, a history of human rights violations, and unqualified allegiance to the central government—all to the detriment of the people. Many experts have called for reforms to the Nigerian police, while others have insisted on dismantling the current centralized system, reestablishing it as a decentralized entity that conforms to international policing standards. These calls have been left unheeded by successive administrations. Consequently, Nigeria is left with unmotivated, undertrained police officers that resort to bribery and extortion to make up for salary shortfalls. Revealingly, the Nigeria Police Force currently sits at the bottom of the International Police Science Association’s World Internal Security and Police Index ranking. In the energy sector, Nigeria continues to suffer the effects of its flawed federalism. Although the constitution allows both the state and the federal governments to legislate on this sector, it restricts states from making laws that clash with federal legislation. The upshot is that the federal government maintains an effective monopoly with regard to the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, relegating the states to legislate on areas not covered by the national grid. The result is a dependence on an antiquated, expensive central grid system and insufficient electric generation capacity, sapping the economy of much-needed growth. Against this backdrop, various quarters have called for a restructuring of the country. While some of these calls are colored by politics, what is apparent is that as long as the federal government maintains its range of exclusive powers, the country’s structural problems will remain. At present, a gradual reversal is taking place, with increasing pushback for state-controlled police forces and pressure for greater devolution to the states, as illustrated by a constitutional amendment being considered in the National Assembly. To construct a more effective federal system, Nigeria should ditch its unitary preoccupation and equitably distribute power to the states, leaving with them the fiscal autonomy needed to catalyze economic growth—thereby improving prospects for peace and development.

The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolboys from the Government Science Secondary School in Kankara, located in Nigeria's northwestern Katsina state, recalls Boko Haram's 2014 kidnapping of Chibok schoolgirls, of whom more than one hundred are still in captivity. The Kankara school had an enrollment of over eight hundred students—perhaps more than 1,200, according to some reports. Like Chibok, it is a state-run boarding school. According to the Katsina state governor, 333 students are still unaccounted for. Unlike at Chibok, security forces responded quickly to the attack, facilitating the escape into the bush of many of the boys. Abubakar Shekau, the chief of a Boko Haram faction, allegedly is claiming responsibility for the kidnapping. However, in the past, when Boko Haram factions attacked schools, it enslaved the girls and murdered the boys. At Kankara, no boys were killed, and one boy who escaped told the media that he heard an organizer order that none were to be. Boko Haram factions, up to now, have not been active in Katsina state. Criminal gangs, however—called “Fulani” in the media—are ubiquitous and frequently carry out kidnapping for ransom. Hence, the likelihood remains that the kidnapping was carried out by criminal gangs rather than a Boko Haram faction. Katsina is the home state of President Muhammadu Buhari, who has denounced the kidnapping. Yet Kankara residents are complaining to the media that the state, in failing to protect its citizens, has shown itself to be of little value. Beyond the personal tragedy, that may be the significance of Kankara: it further undermines confidence in the Nigerian state.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 5 to December 11, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 5: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. December 5: Bandits killed four people in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. December 6: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Makurdi, Benue. December 6: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Magumeri, Borno. December 7: Kidnappers killed two and abducted two in Karim-Lamido, Taraba. December 7: Kidnappers abducted three teachers in Uvwie, Delta. December 7: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. December 7: The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) killed ten Nigerian soldiers and took one hostage in Damboa, Borno. November 23–December 7: Cult clashes resulted in twenty deaths in Ijebu-Ode, Ogun. December 8: Gunmen killed two in Oredo, Edo. December 8: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. December 8: Bandits killed sixteen in Dambatta, Kano; police officers claim the deaths were due to a road accident. December 8: A cult clash resulted in two deaths in Warri South, Delta. December 9: Kidnappers abducted a Taraba lawmaker in Jalingo, Taraba. December 9: A land dispute led to five deaths in Isoko South, Delta. December 9: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. December 9: Bandits kidnapped twenty-five in Sabuwa, Katsina. December 9: Kidnappers abducted two Indian foreign nationals in Ibadan, Oyo. December 9: ISWA abducted two aid workers in Konduga, Borno. December 10: Police officers killed two civilians in Obio/Akpor, Rivers. December 10: Kidnappers abducted five in Rafi, Niger State. December 11: Gunmen killed one police officer in Uvwie, Delta. December 11: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. December 11: Herdsmen killed four in Makurdi, Benue. December 11: Bandits may have killed three people and kidnapped up to six hundred students at a school in Kankara, Katsina. December 11: Communal violence resulted in two deaths in Akure, Ondo.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 28 to December 4, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 28: Boko Haram killed 110 people in Jere, Borno.   November 28: Gunmen killed two in Jos South, Plateau.  November 29: Unknown attackers killed eight in Jema'a, Kaduna. November 29: Cultists killed three in Ughelli North, Delta. November 29: Cultists killed three in Ezza North and one in Ezza South in Ebonyi.   November 29: Gunmen killed four in Wukari and two in Jalingo in Taraba.  November 29: Troops killed one bandit while the bandits killed two people in Chikun, Kaduna.  November 30: Pirates killed one and kidnapped two in Okrika, Rivers.  November 30: Troops killed one bandit in Igabi, Kaduna.  November 30: Bandits killed seven farmers and abducted thirty in Sabuwa, Katsina.  November 30: Bandits killed one traditional ruler and kidnapped eight in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  November 30: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno.  November 30: ISWA abducted one aid worker and two local officials in Kaga, Borno.  November 30: Bandits killed four at a market in Mashegu, Niger State; the villagers killed one bandit in retaliation.   December 1: Suspected Fulani militias killed three and kidnapped two in Jos South, Plateau.  December 1: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  December 2: The assistant commissioner of police was killed in Calabar, Cross River.  December 3: Electoral violence resulted in two deaths in Bakura, Zamfara.  December 3: A land dispute resulted in two deaths in Akure North, Ondo.  December 3: Kidnappers killed three and abducted ten in Uhunmwonde, Edo; vigilantes killed one of the kidnappers.  December 3: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Alimosho, Lagos. December 3: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped two in northern Cameroon.  December 3: Villagers kidnapped four police officers and three vigilantes in Ijebu North, Ogun.  December 4: Police officers killed two bandits in Tambuwal, Sokoto.  December 4: Robbers killed four at a market in Oredo, Edo.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In January 2006, a fledgling group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta People (MEND) kidnapped a group of oil workers, setting in motion a series of high-profile abductions of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities. Nigeria’s oil revenues fell, fomenting instability in the Niger Delta region. Militant groups under the platform of MEND unleashed coordinated attacks on Nigeria’s oil and gas infrastructure from 2006 to 2009. The pace of attacks fell after President Umaru Yar’Adua established an Amnesty Program that ostensibly included disarmament of militants, job training programs for ex-militants, and a system of payoffs that especially benefitted their leaders. When they were active, the Niger Delta militants were often enmeshed deep in the creeks of the region, in makeshift camps cautiously hidden from view to protect against possible aerial bombardment and attacks by the Nigerian military. From those hideouts, militants orchestrated attacks on oil facilities and kidnapped workers. In response, the Nigerian military chased them all over the creeks of the Delta—sometimes inflicting casualties, at others outwitted by a ragtag group with little formal training in warfare. According to a UN Development Program report, the difficult topography in the region “encourages people to gather in small communities—of the estimated 13,329 settlements in the region, 94 percent have populations of less than five thousand,” though the regional population is estimated around thirty million in total. In the Delta’s small settlements, “infrastructure and social services are generally deplorable.” The report highlights the paradox of an oil-rich region mired in poverty: “ordinarily, the Niger Delta should be a gigantic economic reservoir of national and international importance,” due to the scale of its resource wealth. However, “in reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.” This reality animates the various armed groups that have emerged in the region. MEND, the Niger Delta Avengers, and the Niger Delta Green Justice Mandate have all insisted that the federal government address issues of poverty, neglect, and environmental degradation. And because of the failure of successive governments to address these issues, armed militants remain active. These groups evade the military as they traverse the creeks and tributaries of the region to bomb oil facilities or abduct oil workers. In 2016 alone there were more than twenty attacks carried out on oil facilities in the region. Sometimes, these attacks are carried out with the knowledge and tacit support of local people. In October 2020, a group known as the Reformed Niger Delta Avengers issued a warning to the Nigerian government, threatening to resume attacks if their eleven demands are not met by the new year. The relationship between armed groups and the indigenous populations of the region is complex. Militants clearly employ techniques to attract local people and then lock them into a network of incentives. These range from persuasion to coercion, and are designed to control, corral, manipulate, and mobilize populations. Armed militants in the Niger Delta continually seek to legitimize their actions in the eyes of the local population. Residents of the region—particularly in the coastal communities where militant activities are rife—experience neglect, deprivation, and a lack of infrastructure. School buildings and health centers, already decrepit, are often times not operational because teachers and doctors do not want to travel to work. Abject poverty is widespread, with a teeming youth population that is either out of school, unemployed, or both. Delta residents feel a great sense of frustration at the almost total abandonment by successive federal and state governments, which receive huge sums from the oil drilled in the residents’ backyard. Armed groups tap into these frustrations frequently by projecting themselves as freedom fighters, supposedly risking life and limb to agitate the government for a better life in the Delta. People see the agitations of the armed groups as an expression of their internal frustrations and yearnings to hold federal and local governments to account for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. Of course, sometimes militants use fear to keep the people submissive. Yet, armed groups have also taken up the role of philanthropists, providing welfare to a people weighed down continuously by the burden of living in a paradox. Militant leaders have been known to utilize proceeds from oil bunkering activities to provide scholarships to students, build health centers and schools, and resolve disputes in their communities. By doing this, they seek legitimacy from the people, who are then willing to overlook—even excuse—their criminal enterprises. The federal government’s response to the issue of militancy has always been to deploy more soldiers to the region to restore calm. These deployments often result in heightened insecurity in the region. Human rights violations occur frequently; communities have been raided and in some cases bombed. And herein lies the problem: what is usually meant to be an operation to restore order takes the form of an occupation or invasion by a force that the people consider alien to them. Military activities erode further the trust deficit between the state and the people. To address sustainably the issue of militancy in the region, the government should do two things. It should first seek to delegitimize armed groups by building trust with the people. It can do so by asserting its authority—not through military might, but by providing basic services, such as education and proper health facilities. For many Niger Delta communities, the most visible signs of development are infrastructure built by international oil companies or former militant generals, while many of the waterways are dotted with military assets of the Joint Task Force. A running joke in the region goes that while development remains elusive, the ballot box has no problem getting to Delta communities on election days. The federal government should also exercise good faith by committing to its obligations under the Strategic Implementation Work Plan, established in 2017 in response to militant agitations in the region, as well as the Action Plan enacted by the Ministry of the Niger Delta. Prioritizing the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill is another necessary step. When Niger Delta residents see more development and fewer bullets from the military, agitations of armed groups in the region will cease.

In response to the latest atrocity—the November 28 killing of civilians working in rice fields in villages in the Jere local government area, which is close to the Borno State capital of Maiduguri—Borno State Governor Babagana Umara Zulum appears to be looking for Borno State and local entities to restore security. In a public statement, he did call on the federal government to recruit more troops, but his emphasis appears to have been on growing the Civilian Joint Task Force and civil defense forces. These are state and local forces, rather than federal, often with little coordination with the Nigerian army. In the northeast, as federal security provision is breaking down, it is being replaced by state and local entities, as the governor signaled. This trend, to be seen elsewhere in Nigeria, does not bode well for national unity, which has been dependent on the Nigerian army. (Gov. Zulum is a member of President Muhammadu Buhari's political party; the latter issued a statement condemning the atrocity, but despite domestic political pressure, he has thus far has not advanced a new security initiative in response to escalating attacks on civilians.) With some eight hundred casualties in 2020, the Nigerian army has withdrawn into fortified bases, thereby reducing their deaths but ceding control of the countryside to violent armed groups—mostly jihadi, but also criminal outfits. Boko Haram warlord Abubakar Shekau claims responsibility for the killing of seventy-eight rice farmers. (Estimates of the exact number of those killed range up to 110 or even more.) Shekau, according to African media, states that the killing was revenge for local people turning over a Boko Haram operative to the Nigerian army. Boko Haram perpetrators resorted to a familiar form of terror: deliberate throat-slitting. The numbers killed guaranteed national and international media attention, perhaps Shekau’s goal. As in other atrocities, local factors unknown to the Borno State government—much less to the federal government and international media—played a role in the killing.

On the night of October 20, Nigerian army units attacked demonstrators calling for the abolition of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), an elite police unit known for its brutality. Demonstrators were killed—the army acknowledged two, but demonstrators and human rights groups said the number was far higher. The army first claimed that it had not used live ammunition. Now, the army acknowledges that it did—to counter "hoodlums" that had infiltrated the demonstrators. CNN has conducted an investigation of the Lekki episode, and it has broadcast horrifying footage that leaves little doubt that the army fired on peaceful demonstrators with live ammunition. The unanswered questions are “why?” and “who gave the orders?” Officially, the answers will be forthcoming following a "judicial panel of inquiry." Yet, the government has not acknowledged any wrongdoing. The most likely outcome is that there will never be any answers or that the results of a credible investigation will not be made public. Episodes like Lekki, and the refusal of either the federal government or the Lagos state government to be forthcoming, are reasons for the profound alienation of many Nigerians—from the army and the police, but also more generally from the Nigerian political system, as I discuss in my forthcoming book, Nigeria and Nation-State: Rethinking Diplomacy with the Postcolonial World. The Lekki episode also calls attention to the risks of the United States and others becoming identified with the Nigerian army.