Nigeria

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 13 to February 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 13: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 13: Two Nigerian Air Force personnel and "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of bandits were killed during a clash in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 13: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Egbado North, Ogun. February 13: Herdsmen killed three in Owo, Ondo. February 13: Bandits killed three in Chikun, Kaduna. February 13: Two police officers, two robbers, and one civilian were killed during a clash in Oshimili North, Delta. February 14: Gunmen killed one police officer at a church in Ughelli North, Delta. February 14: Kidnappers killed three and abducted thirty in Rafi, Niger State. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau. February 14: Nigerian troops killed eighty-one Boko Haram militants and lost one soldier to a landmine in Gwoza, Borno. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 15: Seven children were killed by a leftover explosive device in Maradun, Zamfara. February 15: Boko Haram killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno. February 16: Bandits killed eleven in Rafi, Niger State. February 16: Boko Haram killed five police officers and two civilians in Bursari, Yobe. February 16: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra members killed six children in Idemili North, Anambra. February 16: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped forty-two at a school in Rafi, Niger State. February 17: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits who kidnapped four in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 17: Suspected herdsmen killed seven in Ovia North-East, Edo. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped thirty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 18: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Faskari, Katsina. February 19: Boko Haram killed "many" (estimated at twenty) civilians in Dikwa, Borno. February 19: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "several" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger State. February 19: Three were killed during protests in Billiri, Gombe.

On February 17, a gang of "gunmen" kidnapped more than forty students, teachers, and administrators from a secondary school in Niger State. At least one student was killed. Niger State Governor Abubakar Sani Bello has appealed for assistance from President Muhammadu Buhari, who has ordered all four service chiefs to go to Niger State to coordinate rescue operations. In December, "bandits" kidnapped some three hundred schoolboys from a school in Kankara, located in Katsina State. There have been several other mass kidnappings, though none has acquired the international notoriety of the 2014 kidnapping of more than two hundred school girls from a school in Chibok. (More than one hundred are still missing, but some recently escaped.) Most—not all—of these mass kidnappings appear to be purely mercenary. These kidnappings are different from Boko Haram attacks in the past decade where the goal was to kill those who were benefitting from Western education. In these recent instances, kidnappers are after ransom, and appear to try to keep their victims alive. Nigerian federal and state authorities always deny paying ransom. Yet they often do so. Schoolboys and bandits involved in the Kankara abduction contradicted official denials that ransom was paid. Reports suggest the Katsina State government paid N30 million (about $76,000) to recover the schoolboys. Hence, the expectation should be that unless the Kagara victims are quickly recovered, which is unlikely, either the state or federal government will pay ransom to secure the release of those who have survived. Kidnapping in Nigeria and across the Sahel can be an extraordinarily lucrative enterprise in what is one of the poorest regions in the world. "Bandits" particularly prize citizens of the European Union. As rich countries with governments susceptible to emotional public opinion, EU member states can pay enormous ransoms while always denying that they are doing so. Jihadi and criminal networks overlap in the Sahel, so kidnapping can also provide both funding and manpower for jihadi groups. At Kankara, Boko Haram's Abubakar Shekau claimed his group was behind the kidnapping, though it appears to have been purely a criminal enterprise. The United States as a matter of policy never pays ransom. The U.S. government had previously threatened to prosecute private individuals who seek to do so. Refusing to pay ransom may provide some cover for American citizens that find themselves in the Sahel. However, Americans are few in number in those areas where kidnapping is rampant.

When Robert Azevedo stepped down last year from the post of director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade body’s top leadership position, former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala quickly became the universal favorite to land the job—except for among members of the Trump administration. Because the WTO operates on the basis of consensus, the Trump administration's opposition effectively vetoed her in favor of the current South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee. In an interview with the Financial Times, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer outlined the Trump administration’s objection, claiming that Okonjo-Iweala is “somebody from the World Bank who does development” with no “real trade experience.” (Okonjo-Iweala previously held the number-two position at the Bank.) However, Lighthizer’s comments are not altogether credible, given Okonjo-Iweala’s experience with trade issues as finance minister. Nevertheless, the WTO and its membership could read a calendar as well as anyone else, and so the debate over the next director general remained frozen until after the U.S. presidential elections. After consulting with U.S. officials earlier this month, Myung-hee withdrew her candidacy. The Biden administration then formally expressed its support for Okonjo-Iweala. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is, among other things, board chair of Gavi, a global alliance to ensure low-income countries can access life-saving vaccines. She has already signaled that high on her agenda at the WTO will be to promote and facilitate the enhanced distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and protective equipment. In traditional and social media, the focus on Okonjo-Iweala has been that she is the first woman and the first African to head the WTO. As such she is a symbol, and symbols are important: many Africans see her as validating the competency and leadership skills of African women.  With the popular focus on Okonjo-Iweala’s gender, race, and country of origin, overlooked could be her competency and expertise, regularly demonstrated during her career at the World Bank and twice as Nigeria's finance minister. Demonstrated competency accounts, at least in part, for her strong support from the beginning within the WTO.  Okonjo-Iweala self-identifies as foremost a Nigerian, and in public always wears Igbo dress. She worked as a cook for rebels on the frontlines in the 1967–70 civil war between Nigeria and Igbo-dominated Biafra. That said, her higher education was at Harvard and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She worked in Washington, D.C. for twenty-five years. Her husband is a physician practicing in Washington, D.C. She became an American citizen in 2019.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 6 to February 12, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 6: Bandits killed fourteen in Birnin-Gwari Local Government Area (LGA) and five in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. February 6: Police officers killed two in Surulere, Lagos. February 6: A communal clash led to two deaths in Irepodun, Osun. February 6: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Warri South, Delta. February 7: A communal clash led to one death in Irepodun, Osun. February 7: Kidnappers abducted four in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. February 7: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Ajaokuta, Kogi. February 8: Herdsmen killed six in Bassa, Plateau. February 8: Bandits kidnapped seven in Oriade, Osun. February 8: Bandits killed ten in Birnin-Gwari LGA, one in Giwa LGA, seven in Chikun LGA, one in Igabi LGA, and five in Kauru LGA in Kaduna. February 8: Pirates abducted one in Brass, Bayelsa. February 9: Pirates abducted one in Brass LGA and four in Nembe LGA in Bayelsa. February 9: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ethiope East, Delta. February 9: Boko Haram kidnapped three customs officers in Geidam, Yobe. February 9: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. February 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" bandits in both Birnin-Gwari LGA and Giwa LGA (estimated at twenty total) in Kaduna. February 10: Gunmen killed three at a town hall meeting in Idemli North, Anambra. February 10: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of two police officers in Takum, Taraba. February 10: Violence around a university student election led to the deaths of two students in Owo, Ondo. February 10: Nigerian troops killed thirty-one Boko Haram militants in Askira/Uba, Borno. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Owo, Ondo. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Egbado North, Ogun. February 11: Gunmen killed three in Oyigbo, Rivers. February 12: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 12: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Akinyele, Oyo. February 12: Boko Haram killed four in Biu, Borno. February 12: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram commanders in Gwoza, Borno. February 12: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Kukawa, Borno.

Fola Aina is a doctoral fellow at King’s College London. He is an international security analyst with expertise on peace and security in the Lake Chad region and the Sahel region. Nolan Quinn contributed to this piece. Insecurity in northwest Nigeria and much of Sahelian West Africa has its roots in tensions and competition over resources. Oft cited are shortages of land and water, driven by environmental degradation and climate change as well as rapid population growth. However, conflicts in the region over access to minerals—especially gold—are also heating up. Moreover, illicit mining causes environmental damage, thus exacerbating land and water shortages. The mining sector in Nigeria benefits from substantial untapped solid mineral deposits, including gold and iron ore. (Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, the governor of Kaduna State, has claimed that a single local government area in his state has more gold than South Africa.) Nigerian federal and state governments are in the process of exploring how to develop the minerals industry, which, at present, accounts for less than 1 percent [PDF] of the country’s GDP. A major impediment is the predominance of artisanal and small-scale miners, who produce an estimated 80 to 85 percent [PDF] of Nigeria’s mining output. This deprives the government of a potentially huge source of revenue: data from UN Comtrade reveals that between 2012 and 2018, about ninety-seven tonnes of gold worth over $3 billion was illegally smuggled out of Nigeria. Drawbacks from artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) in Nigeria go beyond lost revenue. Between 2010 and 2013, over seven hundred children died [PDF] in Zamfara State due to lead poisoning associated with ASGM activities. ASGM also contaminates surrounding land, water, and air with other toxic chemicals such as mercury. Perhaps most damaging is ASGM in northwest Nigeria’s apparent links to criminal consortia. The region’s gold-tinged cash windfall has established new centers of power beyond the state’s control—a retired military officer told the International Crisis Group that ASGM activities had created “a fiefdom of deadly gangs”— leading to a destabilizing wave of rural banditry and criminality. The governments of Zamfara State—the epicenter of ASGM-related violence—and Katsina State have cautioned that proceeds from the illegal sale of gold are funding weapons purchases by armed groups. In an attempt to sever what Zamfara’s police chief called a “strong and glaring nexus between the activities of armed bandits and illicit miners,” in April 2019 the federal government suspended mining in Zamfara State. The ban, which was largely ineffective, was lifted early last year. Numerous military and police operations in the northwest have also failed to restore security. Zamfara’s government has now resorted to offering repentant bandits two cows for every AK-47 they surrender as part of a peace initiative. A nascent, alternative countermeasure has been the 2019 launch of the Presidential Gold Mining Development Initiative (PAGMI). An ambitious initiative, PAGMI is currently in early stages of implementation, with Kebbi and Osun States—the latter located in Nigeria’s southwest—serving as “pilots” before the program scales up to Kaduna, Zamfara, and Niger States. (Niger State borders to the south the North West geopolitical zone.) The initiative aims to create over 500,000 new mining and formalized jobs and register thousands of artisanal miners in the national identity management system. By July of last year, about 20,000 miners had already been registered in Kebbi and Osun States. PAGMI allows artisanal miners to sell gold through the National Gold Purchase Program, which will be able to supply the Central Bank of Nigeria with much-needed foreign reserves. PAGMI’s success—or lack thereof—will come down to implementation. When villagers who received food handouts during COVID-19 lockdowns were attacked by bandits, it highlighted the challenges the government faces in providing services in the northwest. The government will need to enhance security to allow it to interact with locals hoping to benefit from formalized ASGM. But a strategy to restore security that focuses on use of force will continue to fail. A well implemented, multilayered strategy, meanwhile, could herald the gradual restoration of peace and security in the troubled region—a necessity for kickstarting development in the face of resource shortages. Prioritizing cooperation between the federal and state governments in the affected region is important yet insufficient. A more effective approach would empower local actors such as traditional rulers, district heads, women, and youth, all of whom have exhibited commendable resilience amid widespread insecurity, by providing resources to address social ills and establishing lines of communication for better information sharing. With lives and livelihoods at stake, time is a luxury the region does not have. A better approach is needed now.

Civil organizations in Nigeria have thrown their support behind planned demonstrations on February 13 at the Lekki Toll Gate, the site of the October 20, 2020 killing of demonstrators calling for the disbandment of the notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a police unit widely accused of human rights abuse. The occasion of the demonstration is the decision of the Lagos State Judicial Panel to reopen the toll gate, which is administered by the Lekki Concession Company, a private enterprise. As was the case in October, the demonstration appears to be organized through social media. However, the organizers are providing advance publicity. The demonstrators will protest the lack of meaningful police reform, continuing intimidation of the October demonstrators, the lack of an investigation of the Lekki incident, and the failure to hold accountable the perpetrators of the killing. The government has disbanded SARS, but from the perspective of human rights organizations and other observers, there has been no meaningful improvement in police behavior. Amnesty International credibly accuses an official cover-up. In a recent development, Lagos State’s Environmental Tasks Force cleared—with little notice—an "informal settlement" adjacent to the toll gate, some residents of which talked to the press contradicting the official narrative of what happened. Official clearances of informal settlements happens frequently and for a variety of reasons. In this case, however, many will take it as retribution. It remains to be seen how many demonstrators will actually show. If the demonstration is large, it will be an indication that in Lagos, at least, anger about the Lekki Toll Gate episode and abusive police behavior has not gone away, with political consequences that are unpredictable. On social media there are expressions of unease about the potential of violence. In Nigeria, violence is by no means rare in demonstrations against official authority. It should be noted that the Lekki Toll Gate episode involves divided official authority. Lagos State—not the federal government in Abuja—has ordered the reopening of the toll gate. The lead in the investigation of the October incident also rests with Lagos State. It was also Lagos State authorities that cleared the informal settlement. But SARS and the Nigerian police are a federal, not state, entity. As for a cover-up or suppression of the results of an investigation, that is an old song in Nigeria.

Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. Fighting between government forces and an Igbo separatist group risks adding yet another challenge for the Buhari administration. The emergence of an Igbo paramilitary force highlights the growing breakdown of any federal government monopoly on the use of force in the face of multiple security challenges. Even in good times, security is fragile in the former Biafra. Insecurity has multiple dimensions. The Igbo people are Nigeria's third largest ethnic group. They were the losers in the 1967–70 civil war in which they tried to establish a separate, Igbo-dominated state, Biafra. Many Igbo continue to believe that they are disadvantaged in Nigeria, and there continues to be residual support for Biafran independence, though not among the Igbo "establishment." Conflict over land and water, once largely restricted to the Middle Belt, is spreading to the south, where it frequently acquires ethnic and religious overtones. Many Igbo—mostly Christian—believe they are targeted by the Muslim Fulani herdsmen bringing their flocks south in search of better pastures. Criminal activity is widespread and often the Igbo attribute it to the Fulani. Many residents of the former Biafra are alienated from the federal government and see the Buhari administration as Muslim-dominated and as enabling Fulani atrocities. Added to this mix is Nnamdi Kanu's Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist movement that reflects and facilitates popular discontent. The federal government, recalling the civil war, is bitterly opposed to Igbo separatism, as is most of the Igbo establishment. The government has long sought to defang the IPOB and silence Kanu, sometimes through illegal or quasi-legal methods. He, in turn, has used alleged Fulani depredations as a means of attacking the Buhari administration. Starting in August 2020, violence between IPOB and the federal police and the army has escalated. In that month, the Nigerian police killed up to twenty-one civilians at an IPOB meeting in Enugu State. In response, the IPOB promised retaliation and urged its members to practice self-defense. In December, Kanu announced the establishment of a paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), allegedly to protect the Igbo against the Fulani. For the federal government, a non-state sanctioned, paramilitary organization in the old Biafran heartland was unacceptable, and it moved against ESN camps. In late January 2021, serious fighting broke out in the town of Orlu in Imo State, leading to significant numbers of displaced persons. Fighting stopped when Kanu declared a cease-fire, saying that he was redirecting ESN efforts against "Fulani raiders." (He also claimed that the federal forces had withdrawn from Orlu.) Supporters of the ESN, including in the Igbo diaspora, justify it as being like Miyetti Allah in the north and Amotekun in Yorubaland in the west. Both are paramilitary operations outside the federal government's legal purview but with some ambiguous level of government approval. The north and the west were on the winning side in the civil war, and that may help account for the federal government's greater tolerance for their paramilitary organizations than for one associated with the Igbo. The escalating fighting in IPOB strongholds carries the risk of radicalizing the population and building support for the IPOB. Credible evidence suggests police assaulted residents in Orlu, and some police perpetrators have been arrested. The commissioner of police for Imo State has apologized. But as recently as December 2020, IPOB was saying that ESN forces were merely a "vigilante" group protecting the Igbo against the Fulani. Now Kanu has an organized wing, the ESN, and believes he has the authority to order a cease-fire in a fight with federal forces. Violence is escalating, and the outcome is unpredictable.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 30 to February 5, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     January 30: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Akure North, Ondo. January 31: Boko Haram killed two police officers and one Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) member, and kidnapped two police officers in Magumeri, Borno. January 31: Bandits killed one in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed two and kidnapped two in Giwa, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed five in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. February 1: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Igabi Local Government Area (LGA), "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Ikara LGA, and two bandits in Zaria LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Bandits killed two in Lere LGA and one in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer in Isiala Ngwa North, Abia. February 1: Bandits killed twenty-seven and kidnapped forty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer and kidnapped three Chinese nationals in Atakumosa West, Osun. February 1: Gunmen killed four in Aba, Abia. February 1: Herdsmen killed three in Orhionmwon, Edo. February 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Bwari, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). February 2: Police officers killed three bandits in Dutsin-Ma, Katsina. February 2: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Kidnappers abducted one journalist and two others in Abuja, FCT. February 3: Bandits killed two in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 3: Nigerian troops killed thirty-two bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. February 4: Gunmen killed three at a church in Ihiala, Anambra. February 4: Gunmen killed five in Khana, Rivers. February 4: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 4: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. February 5: Bandits killed six in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 5: Two police officers and one gunman were killed during an attack on a police station in Obowo, Imo. February 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped five in Zaria, Kaduna. February 5: Police officers killed six cultists in Egbado North, Ogun. February 5: Nigerian troops killed twenty bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. January 13–February 5: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Edo.

Kaduna is increasingly the epicenter of violence in Nigeria, rivaling Borno state, the home turf of Boko Haram. In rural areas, conflicts over water and land use are escalating, and Ansaru, a less prominent Islamist group, is active. Over the past year, some four hundred people were abducted for ransom in the state by criminal gangs; more than two hundred violent events resulted in nearly one thousand fatalities, and some fifty thousand are internally displaced. These estimates apply to the state as a whole, including the city of Kaduna, the capital of the state. The city of Kaduna has long been a center of political, ethnic, and religious violence. The city has undergone ethnic "cleansing," with Christians now concentrated in south Kaduna city and the Muslims in the north. Since the end of military rule in 1998–99, Kaduna city saw election-related violence that soon turned into bloodshed along ethnic and religious lines. Like the Nigerian state, the city of Kaduna is a British colonial creation orchestrated by Lord Frederick Lugard, first governor general of an amalgamated Nigeria. He established Kaduna as the British administrative capital of the northern half of the country, to be situated on the railway that linked Lagos and Kano—then, as now, Nigeria's largest cities. As the administrative capital of the north, Kaduna acquired some of the accoutrements of British colonialism, including a race track, polo, and expat club. A number of foreign governments, including the United States, established consulates in Kaduna, an "artificial," planned city reminiscent of the current capital, Abuja. The British encouraged Muslims incomers to settle in the north and Christians in the south. In part because of the railway connections, Kaduna became an important manufacturing center, especially for textiles. An international airport was eventually built. But the last half-century has not been kind. Nigeria moved from four regions, of which Kaduna was the capital of the largest, to thirty-six states. The establishment of a new national capital at Abuja led to the departure of consulates and many international business links, and, while the airport survives, most regional air traffic goes to Abuja. The textile industry and most heavy manufacturing have also collapsed, the consequence of erratic economic policy, underinvestment, and foreign competition. The national railway network became moribund and is only now being restored by the Chinese. Yet Kaduna's urban population has exploded. In the 2006 census [PDF], the state capital's population was 760,084; now, the estimate is closer to 1.8 million. Agricultural output has collapsed, the result of climate change and the breakdown of security, resulting in waves of migrants into a city that does not have the infrastructure to accommodate them. Very high levels of unemployment (nobody really knows how high), a youth bulge, and shortage of housing makes the city a veritable petri dish for violence that acquires an ethnic and religious coloration. Further, the traditional Islamic institutions to be found elsewhere in the north were either never present in the British-founded city or have been weak.  Hence, in the city of Kaduna, violence is multifaceted in origin, and no one strategy is likely to bring it under control. At best, small steps to improve services to the population could buy some time for the larger political, economic, and social changes that will be necessary to restore the health of the city.

Nigerians like to say that they are the world's happiest people and the most religious. The basis of their happiness, they go on to say in the face of poor well-being statistics (such as one of the world's highest levels of maternal mortality), is the hope provided by their faith. Religion is central to the lives of most Nigerians, whether they self-identify as Christian or Muslim. In a recent poll of Nigerians, among the 28 percent of respondents that claimed to be immune to COVID-19, nearly half attributed such confidence to their faith in God. Nigeria has never conducted a religious census, but the politically motivated, conventional wisdom is that Christians and Muslims are each about half of the population, and that, therefore, neither of the world faiths is a minority. Traditional religious faith and practice predating the arrival of Islam and Christianity are pervasive, though often beneath a veneer provided by the two world faiths. In part because religion is so central, disputes over water and land or ethnic rivalries often assume a religious coloration. The power of religious leaders over their flocks is particularly salient during periods—such as now—when popular distrust of the Nigerian government is endemic and national identity is weak. Some African scholars have recently highlighted the role of Nigeria's religious leaders by providing specific instances of them exercising their power and influence. Particularly notable was that of imams in northern Nigeria and even the Sultan of Sokoto in promoting vaccination against polio in the face of fundamentalist claims that vaccines were part of a Christian plot to limit Muslim births. Religious leaders play a central role in determining whether an individual will accept contraceptives and family planning. Also important are their ability to deliver medical information and services, especially in rural areas. Many spiritual leaders, both Christian and Muslim, also play a vital part in conflict resolution and peace and reconciliation processes. However, from an outside perspective, if religious leaders can be a force for good, they can also undermine public health and human rights initiatives. In the COVID-19 crisis, some religious leaders have opposed government measures designed to curb the spread of the disease; others have claimed they have special miracle cures. Religious leaders in Nigeria, Uganda, and elsewhere have been at the forefront of agitation for punitive measures against gay people. The rhetoric employed by Christian and Muslim religious leaders against each other is often far from the milk of human kindness.  COVID-19 dominates the international discourse, hence a focus on religious leaders in the context of health and disease. But religious leaders in Nigeria and many other post-colonial states are a powerful influence on politics and a host of other social issues. With this in mind, Western diplomats, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and the business community have every reason to open and sustain dialogue with them. Faith leaders are crucial sources of information, especially where governments lack credibility, and they may have a powerful influence over the suppression—or aggravation—of violence. As I argue in Nigeria and the Nation-State, outreach to religious leaders should be an essential part of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Nigeria and other post-colonial states.

Security across Nigeria is challenged, with Islamist groups in the north far from defeated, a seeming resurgence of a low-level insurrection in the oil patch, ongoing conflict in the middle of the country over water and land use that sometimes acquires ethnic and religious dimensions, and a general wave of criminality around the country. President Muhammadu Buhari is facing criticism for his failure to address security issues and, at the same time, especially in the predominantly Christian south, for choosing his military chiefs from among his own northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani community. President Buhari's January 26 announcement that he has fired all four of his military service chiefs will be welcomed by his critics. His new appointments appear to be of high quality in terms of official announcements about their background. Buhari has also, apparently, balanced the appoints with respect to region of origin. This is congruent with the principle of "federal character," which holds that government positions should be equally distributed across the federation. The new chief of defense staff, Maj. Gen. Leo Irabor, is from Delta state in the south. The chief of army staff, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru is from Kaduna in the north. The chief of navy staff is Rear Admiral Awwal Zubairu Gambo, from Kano in the north, and the new air force chief of staff is Air Vice Marshal Isiaka Oladayo Amao, from Osun state, near Lagos. (By population Lagos and Kano are the largest states in the federation.) Ethnic and religious identities predominate in Nigeria and national identity is weaker than in other African states. Nevertheless, within the military an effort has been made to downplay ethnic and religious identities. Accordingly, the official announcement of the new service chiefs makes no reference to their religion or ethnicity any more than the Pentagon does about senior American military appointments. However, speculation on social media identifies Leo Irabor as a Christian, with a lively dispute covered in conventional media over whether he is or is not an Igbo. Ibrahim Attahiru is identified as a "Hausa" Muslim; Awwal Gambo is identified as a "Fulani" Muslim; and Isiaka Amao is identified as a Yoruba Christian. Based on where they were born and their names, these designations from social media are plausible but by no means definitive. However, if the designations are accurate, two are from the north, and two are from the south. Two are Muslim and two are Christian. Two are Hausa and/or Fulani, while one is Yoruba while one is Igbo. Hence the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria appear to be represented: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. (Hausa is a language, Fulani is an ethnic group; northern Hausa-speaking Muslims are often designated as "Hausa-Fulani," though Hausa speakers may come from small ethnic groups and some are Christian.)  It remains to be seen whether the new team will be any more successful than the last. The military remains under-resourced. But the drivers of conflict, especially in the north and in the oil patch, are primarily (not exclusively) political. But no political initiatives are underway to address the widespread sense of grievance. Absent political initiatives, critics see replacement of the service chiefs as reminiscent of "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 23 to January 29, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 23: A communal clash resulted in forty deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. January 23: Pirates killed one sailor and kidnapped fifteen off the coast of Nigeria (estimated at Bonny, Rivers). January 23: Kidnappers abducted eight children from an orphanage and three others in Abaji, FCT. January 23: Military airstrikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. January 24: Bandits killed six and kidnapped fifteen in Paikoro, Niger State. January 24: Gunmen killed one police officer and one soldier in Sapele, Delta. January 24: Bandits killed seven in Maradun, Zamfara. January 25: Kidnappers abducted fourteen in Ijumu, Kogi. January 25: One soldier and nine civilians were killed during a clash between the military and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) protestors in Orlu, Imo. January 25: Gunmen killed two police officers in Karim-Lamido, Taraba. January 25: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in the town of Chindila, Yobe (no LGA given/found). January 25: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in the town of Mayankari, Borno (no LGA given/found). January 26: Bandits killed three in Zurmi, Zamfara. January 27: Bandits killed ten in Faskari, Katsina. January 27: Cult clashes resulted in four deaths in Warri South, Delta. January 27: Kidnappers abducted twenty-seven in Takum, Taraba. January 27: Bandits kidnapped ten in Chikun, Kaduna. January 28: Bandits kidnapped fifty in Shiroro LGA and killed one and kidnapped six in Lapai LGA in Niger State. January 28: Two were killed when gunmen attacked a police station in Ibadan, Oyo. January 28: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, three in Kajuru LGA, and twelve in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 28: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped five in Faskari, Katsina. January 28: Military airstrikes killed "many" bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Chikun, and Giwa LGAs in Kaduna (estimated at sixty total). January 29: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and kidnapped two police officers in Dikwa, Borno. January 29: Amotekun killed five civilians in Ibadan, Oyo. January 29: Kidnappers abducted twenty-one in Kajuru, Kaduna. January 29: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Bama LGA and four militants in Mafa LGA in Borno.

In Nigeria, causation of arrests and release are murky, and the rumor mill operates overtime. Some Nigerians are suggesting that Omoyele Sowore was released because the authorities are aware of the stronger human rights emphasis of the Biden administration and wanted to start off on the right foot with the new administration. Sowore is a well-known Nigerian human rights activist and strong critic of the Buhari administration and of Nigeria's political economy in general. He is the founder of Sahara Reporters, a well-regarded news agency based in New York. He is a U.S. permanent resident and his wife and children are U.S. citizens. In 2017, he ran for the Nigeria presidency as fierce critic of the status quo, though he received few votes. The Buhari administration and Nigeria's "movers and shakers" generally regard Sowore as a thorn in their side. He has been arrested for "treason" for calling for nonviolent "revolution." He was finally released on bail after human rights activists made his case a cause célèbre with the support of Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), among others. On December 31, 2020, Sowore was re-arrested in Abuja along with four other activists following a small demonstration denouncing police and other violations of human rights. This time, he was charged with unlawful assembly, criminal conspiracy, and inciting a public disturbance. But, on January 12, the Chief Magistrates Court in Abuja ordered his release on bail, and the police complied. The court set Sowore's bail at N20 million ($52,459). The police and other Nigerian security services frequently ignore court orders, especially in high-profile political cases. Why, this time, did they allow Sowore to be released? Parts of the Buhari administration are well aware that the incoming Biden administration will be more concerned about human rights than its predecessor. Further, Sen. Menendez, a strong supporter of the Biden presidential candidacy, is the incoming chair of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is likely that at least a part of the Buhari administration advocated for Sowore’s release to cultivate good relations with the Biden administration.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Matthew Kukah, in a Christmas message titled "A Nation In Search Of Vindication," delivered a blistering critique of Nigeria's governance and political economy. The message was not a sermon, nor was it, apparently, delivered in a church setting. Rather it appears to be a message addressed to a wider audience than his fellow Catholics. In it he accused President Muhammadu Buhari of nepotism and making too many high-level appointments among his fellow northern Muslims. He said, “Every honest Nigerian knows that there is no way any non-Northern Muslim President could have done a fraction of what President Buhari has done by his nepotism and gotten away with it. There would have been a military coup a long time ago or we would have been at war.” Some Islamic organizations have reacted strongly against the bishop, with calls for him to apologize or to leave northern Nigeria, where his diocese is located. That was the response of the Muslim Solidarity Forum, based in Sokoto, which also referred to northern Christians as “guests” in Sokoto. The Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) called the bishop's message a “treasonable felony against the Nigerian state.” A variety of Christian groups, including the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria defended him equally vociferously. PFN said the bishop “spoke truth to power.” President Buhari's initial response should have lowered the temperature. Through the president’s spokesman Garba Shehu, the presidency stated that the bishop should be allowed to practice his faith and his politics as provided for by the constitution. Subsequently, however, Minister of Information and Culture Alhaji Lai Mohammed said that “calling for a violent overthrow of a democratically-elected government, no matter how disguised such a call is, and casting a particular religion as violent is not what any religious leader should engage in, and certainly not in a season of peace.” However, a careful reading of the bishop’s statement shows he was not calling for the violent overthrow of the government. The knee-jerk reaction to the bishop is perhaps more significant than the message itself, concise analysis of Nigeria's ills though it was. Commentators and organizations cast the bishop's remarks as an attack on Islam, with Muslims against it and Christians for it. In fact, the statement was not cast in Christian/Muslim terms. In strong language, the bishop's message cited Nigeria's ills that have been identified by numerous Christian and Muslim leaders, including the Sultan of Sokoto, to whom the bishop made explicit reference. In effect, peppered with quotations about justice, especially from the Old Testament, he denounced the self-serving elites that dominate Nigeria. Moreover, he argues that only the Nigerian people themselves can bring about fundamental political reform. The uproar owes something to Nigeria's current security crisis, with the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram far from defeated, increasing activism of Islamist radical groups in the northwest, ongoing quarrels over land and water in the Middle Belt, and a low-level insurrection in the oil patch. President Buhari's government is widely criticized for apparent inactivity, though it moved with dispatch to try to counter COVID-19. Bishop Kukah, born in 1952, was educated at the Kennedy School at Harvard and the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, among other places. A highly charismatic figure, he identifies strongly with Nigeria in a country in which national identity is weak [PDF]. He has long been involved with peace and reconciliation movements, and has cooperated closely with the Sultan of Sokoto, by protocol the highest-ranking Muslim traditional ruler in Nigeria.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 16 to January 22, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 16: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, three in Chikun LGA, and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 16: Soldiers killed five civilians, and one soldier was killed in retaliation in Maiduguri, Borno. January 16: Communal violence led to two deaths in Anambra East, Anambra. January 16: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Shiroro, Niger State. January 17: Bandits killed ten, including one soldier, and five bandits were killed in Maradun, Zamfara. January 17: Gunmen killed two police officers and two others in Port Harcourt, Rivers. January 17: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits and lost one soldier in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 17: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, killed one and kidnapped one in Zaria LGA, and killed two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 18: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Mangu, Plateau. January 18: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kagarko, Kaduna. January 18: A roadside bomb planted by Boko Haram killed four Nigerien soldiers in Diffa, Niger. January 18: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. January 18: Nine soldiers and five Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. January 18: Bandits killed thirty-five in Maru, Zamfara. January 18: Bandits killed seven vigilantes in Mashegu, Niger State. January 20: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. January 20: Bandits killed two in Chikun LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and one in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. January 21: Bandits killed thirteen and kidnapped eleven in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 21: Yansakai, an outlawed vigilante group, killed two herdsmen in Maradun, Zamfara. January 22: Soldiers killed four kidnappers in Owo, Ondo. January 22: Bandits killed four in Chikun LGA and two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna.