Nigeria

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 30 to February 5, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     January 30: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Akure North, Ondo. January 31: Boko Haram killed two police officers and one Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) member, and kidnapped two police officers in Magumeri, Borno. January 31: Bandits killed one in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed two and kidnapped two in Giwa, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed five in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. February 1: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Igabi Local Government Area (LGA), "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Ikara LGA, and two bandits in Zaria LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Bandits killed two in Lere LGA and one in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer in Isiala Ngwa North, Abia. February 1: Bandits killed twenty-seven and kidnapped forty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer and kidnapped three Chinese nationals in Atakumosa West, Osun. February 1: Gunmen killed four in Aba, Abia. February 1: Herdsmen killed three in Orhionmwon, Edo. February 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Bwari, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). February 2: Police officers killed three bandits in Dutsin-Ma, Katsina. February 2: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Kidnappers abducted one journalist and two others in Abuja, FCT. February 3: Bandits killed two in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 3: Nigerian troops killed thirty-two bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. February 4: Gunmen killed three at a church in Ihiala, Anambra. February 4: Gunmen killed five in Khana, Rivers. February 4: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 4: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. February 5: Bandits killed six in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 5: Two police officers and one gunman were killed during an attack on a police station in Obowo, Imo. February 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped five in Zaria, Kaduna. February 5: Police officers killed six cultists in Egbado North, Ogun. February 5: Nigerian troops killed twenty bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. January 13–February 5: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Edo.

Kaduna is increasingly the epicenter of violence in Nigeria, rivaling Borno state, the home turf of Boko Haram. In rural areas, conflicts over water and land use are escalating, and Ansaru, a less prominent Islamist group, is active. Over the past year, some four hundred people were abducted for ransom in the state by criminal gangs; more than two hundred violent events resulted in nearly one thousand fatalities, and some fifty thousand are internally displaced. These estimates apply to the state as a whole, including the city of Kaduna, the capital of the state. The city of Kaduna has long been a center of political, ethnic, and religious violence. The city has undergone ethnic "cleansing," with Christians now concentrated in south Kaduna city and the Muslims in the north. Since the end of military rule in 1998–99, Kaduna city saw election-related violence that soon turned into bloodshed along ethnic and religious lines. Like the Nigerian state, the city of Kaduna is a British colonial creation orchestrated by Lord Frederick Lugard, first governor general of an amalgamated Nigeria. He established Kaduna as the British administrative capital of the northern half of the country, to be situated on the railway that linked Lagos and Kano—then, as now, Nigeria's largest cities. As the administrative capital of the north, Kaduna acquired some of the accoutrements of British colonialism, including a race track, polo, and expat club. A number of foreign governments, including the United States, established consulates in Kaduna, an "artificial," planned city reminiscent of the current capital, Abuja. The British encouraged Muslims incomers to settle in the north and Christians in the south. In part because of the railway connections, Kaduna became an important manufacturing center, especially for textiles. An international airport was eventually built. But the last half-century has not been kind. Nigeria moved from four regions, of which Kaduna was the capital of the largest, to thirty-six states. The establishment of a new national capital at Abuja led to the departure of consulates and many international business links, and, while the airport survives, most regional air traffic goes to Abuja. The textile industry and most heavy manufacturing have also collapsed, the consequence of erratic economic policy, underinvestment, and foreign competition. The national railway network became moribund and is only now being restored by the Chinese. Yet Kaduna's urban population has exploded. In the 2006 census [PDF], the state capital's population was 760,084; now, the estimate is closer to 1.8 million. Agricultural output has collapsed, the result of climate change and the breakdown of security, resulting in waves of migrants into a city that does not have the infrastructure to accommodate them. Very high levels of unemployment (nobody really knows how high), a youth bulge, and shortage of housing makes the city a veritable petri dish for violence that acquires an ethnic and religious coloration. Further, the traditional Islamic institutions to be found elsewhere in the north were either never present in the British-founded city or have been weak.  Hence, in the city of Kaduna, violence is multifaceted in origin, and no one strategy is likely to bring it under control. At best, small steps to improve services to the population could buy some time for the larger political, economic, and social changes that will be necessary to restore the health of the city.

Nigerians like to say that they are the world's happiest people and the most religious. The basis of their happiness, they go on to say in the face of poor well-being statistics (such as one of the world's highest levels of maternal mortality), is the hope provided by their faith. Religion is central to the lives of most Nigerians, whether they self-identify as Christian or Muslim. In a recent poll of Nigerians, among the 28 percent of respondents that claimed to be immune to COVID-19, nearly half attributed such confidence to their faith in God. Nigeria has never conducted a religious census, but the politically motivated, conventional wisdom is that Christians and Muslims are each about half of the population, and that, therefore, neither of the world faiths is a minority. Traditional religious faith and practice predating the arrival of Islam and Christianity are pervasive, though often beneath a veneer provided by the two world faiths. In part because religion is so central, disputes over water and land or ethnic rivalries often assume a religious coloration. The power of religious leaders over their flocks is particularly salient during periods—such as now—when popular distrust of the Nigerian government is endemic and national identity is weak. Some African scholars have recently highlighted the role of Nigeria's religious leaders by providing specific instances of them exercising their power and influence. Particularly notable was that of imams in northern Nigeria and even the Sultan of Sokoto in promoting vaccination against polio in the face of fundamentalist claims that vaccines were part of a Christian plot to limit Muslim births. Religious leaders play a central role in determining whether an individual will accept contraceptives and family planning. Also important are their ability to deliver medical information and services, especially in rural areas. Many spiritual leaders, both Christian and Muslim, also play a vital part in conflict resolution and peace and reconciliation processes. However, from an outside perspective, if religious leaders can be a force for good, they can also undermine public health and human rights initiatives. In the COVID-19 crisis, some religious leaders have opposed government measures designed to curb the spread of the disease; others have claimed they have special miracle cures. Religious leaders in Nigeria, Uganda, and elsewhere have been at the forefront of agitation for punitive measures against gay people. The rhetoric employed by Christian and Muslim religious leaders against each other is often far from the milk of human kindness.  COVID-19 dominates the international discourse, hence a focus on religious leaders in the context of health and disease. But religious leaders in Nigeria and many other post-colonial states are a powerful influence on politics and a host of other social issues. With this in mind, Western diplomats, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and the business community have every reason to open and sustain dialogue with them. Faith leaders are crucial sources of information, especially where governments lack credibility, and they may have a powerful influence over the suppression—or aggravation—of violence. As I argue in Nigeria and the Nation-State, outreach to religious leaders should be an essential part of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Nigeria and other post-colonial states.

Security across Nigeria is challenged, with Islamist groups in the north far from defeated, a seeming resurgence of a low-level insurrection in the oil patch, ongoing conflict in the middle of the country over water and land use that sometimes acquires ethnic and religious dimensions, and a general wave of criminality around the country. President Muhammadu Buhari is facing criticism for his failure to address security issues and, at the same time, especially in the predominantly Christian south, for choosing his military chiefs from among his own northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani community. President Buhari's January 26 announcement that he has fired all four of his military service chiefs will be welcomed by his critics. His new appointments appear to be of high quality in terms of official announcements about their background. Buhari has also, apparently, balanced the appoints with respect to region of origin. This is congruent with the principle of "federal character," which holds that government positions should be equally distributed across the federation. The new chief of defense staff, Maj. Gen. Leo Irabor, is from Delta state in the south. The chief of army staff, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru is from Kaduna in the north. The chief of navy staff is Rear Admiral Awwal Zubairu Gambo, from Kano in the north, and the new air force chief of staff is Air Vice Marshal Isiaka Oladayo Amao, from Osun state, near Lagos. (By population Lagos and Kano are the largest states in the federation.) Ethnic and religious identities predominate in Nigeria and national identity is weaker than in other African states. Nevertheless, within the military an effort has been made to downplay ethnic and religious identities. Accordingly, the official announcement of the new service chiefs makes no reference to their religion or ethnicity any more than the Pentagon does about senior American military appointments. However, speculation on social media identifies Leo Irabor as a Christian, with a lively dispute covered in conventional media over whether he is or is not an Igbo. Ibrahim Attahiru is identified as a "Hausa" Muslim; Awwal Gambo is identified as a "Fulani" Muslim; and Isiaka Amao is identified as a Yoruba Christian. Based on where they were born and their names, these designations from social media are plausible but by no means definitive. However, if the designations are accurate, two are from the north, and two are from the south. Two are Muslim and two are Christian. Two are Hausa and/or Fulani, while one is Yoruba while one is Igbo. Hence the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria appear to be represented: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. (Hausa is a language, Fulani is an ethnic group; northern Hausa-speaking Muslims are often designated as "Hausa-Fulani," though Hausa speakers may come from small ethnic groups and some are Christian.)  It remains to be seen whether the new team will be any more successful than the last. The military remains under-resourced. But the drivers of conflict, especially in the north and in the oil patch, are primarily (not exclusively) political. But no political initiatives are underway to address the widespread sense of grievance. Absent political initiatives, critics see replacement of the service chiefs as reminiscent of "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 23 to January 29, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 23: A communal clash resulted in forty deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. January 23: Pirates killed one sailor and kidnapped fifteen off the coast of Nigeria (estimated at Bonny, Rivers). January 23: Kidnappers abducted eight children from an orphanage and three others in Abaji, FCT. January 23: Military airstrikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. January 24: Bandits killed six and kidnapped fifteen in Paikoro, Niger State. January 24: Gunmen killed one police officer and one soldier in Sapele, Delta. January 24: Bandits killed seven in Maradun, Zamfara. January 25: Kidnappers abducted fourteen in Ijumu, Kogi. January 25: One soldier and nine civilians were killed during a clash between the military and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) protestors in Orlu, Imo. January 25: Gunmen killed two police officers in Karim-Lamido, Taraba. January 25: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in the town of Chindila, Yobe (no LGA given/found). January 25: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in the town of Mayankari, Borno (no LGA given/found). January 26: Bandits killed three in Zurmi, Zamfara. January 27: Bandits killed ten in Faskari, Katsina. January 27: Cult clashes resulted in four deaths in Warri South, Delta. January 27: Kidnappers abducted twenty-seven in Takum, Taraba. January 27: Bandits kidnapped ten in Chikun, Kaduna. January 28: Bandits kidnapped fifty in Shiroro LGA and killed one and kidnapped six in Lapai LGA in Niger State. January 28: Two were killed when gunmen attacked a police station in Ibadan, Oyo. January 28: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, three in Kajuru LGA, and twelve in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 28: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped five in Faskari, Katsina. January 28: Military airstrikes killed "many" bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Chikun, and Giwa LGAs in Kaduna (estimated at sixty total). January 29: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and kidnapped two police officers in Dikwa, Borno. January 29: Amotekun killed five civilians in Ibadan, Oyo. January 29: Kidnappers abducted twenty-one in Kajuru, Kaduna. January 29: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Bama LGA and four militants in Mafa LGA in Borno.

In Nigeria, causation of arrests and release are murky, and the rumor mill operates overtime. Some Nigerians are suggesting that Omoyele Sowore was released because the authorities are aware of the stronger human rights emphasis of the Biden administration and wanted to start off on the right foot with the new administration. Sowore is a well-known Nigerian human rights activist and strong critic of the Buhari administration and of Nigeria's political economy in general. He is the founder of Sahara Reporters, a well-regarded news agency based in New York. He is a U.S. permanent resident and his wife and children are U.S. citizens. In 2017, he ran for the Nigeria presidency as fierce critic of the status quo, though he received few votes. The Buhari administration and Nigeria's "movers and shakers" generally regard Sowore as a thorn in their side. He has been arrested for "treason" for calling for nonviolent "revolution." He was finally released on bail after human rights activists made his case a cause célèbre with the support of Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), among others. On December 31, 2020, Sowore was re-arrested in Abuja along with four other activists following a small demonstration denouncing police and other violations of human rights. This time, he was charged with unlawful assembly, criminal conspiracy, and inciting a public disturbance. But, on January 12, the Chief Magistrates Court in Abuja ordered his release on bail, and the police complied. The court set Sowore's bail at N20 million ($52,459). The police and other Nigerian security services frequently ignore court orders, especially in high-profile political cases. Why, this time, did they allow Sowore to be released? Parts of the Buhari administration are well aware that the incoming Biden administration will be more concerned about human rights than its predecessor. Further, Sen. Menendez, a strong supporter of the Biden presidential candidacy, is the incoming chair of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is likely that at least a part of the Buhari administration advocated for Sowore’s release to cultivate good relations with the Biden administration.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Matthew Kukah, in a Christmas message titled "A Nation In Search Of Vindication," delivered a blistering critique of Nigeria's governance and political economy. The message was not a sermon, nor was it, apparently, delivered in a church setting. Rather it appears to be a message addressed to a wider audience than his fellow Catholics. In it he accused President Muhammadu Buhari of nepotism and making too many high-level appointments among his fellow northern Muslims. He said, “Every honest Nigerian knows that there is no way any non-Northern Muslim President could have done a fraction of what President Buhari has done by his nepotism and gotten away with it. There would have been a military coup a long time ago or we would have been at war.” Some Islamic organizations have reacted strongly against the bishop, with calls for him to apologize or to leave northern Nigeria, where his diocese is located. That was the response of the Muslim Solidarity Forum, based in Sokoto, which also referred to northern Christians as “guests” in Sokoto. The Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) called the bishop's message a “treasonable felony against the Nigerian state.” A variety of Christian groups, including the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria defended him equally vociferously. PFN said the bishop “spoke truth to power.” President Buhari's initial response should have lowered the temperature. Through the president’s spokesman Garba Shehu, the presidency stated that the bishop should be allowed to practice his faith and his politics as provided for by the constitution. Subsequently, however, Minister of Information and Culture Alhaji Lai Mohammed said that “calling for a violent overthrow of a democratically-elected government, no matter how disguised such a call is, and casting a particular religion as violent is not what any religious leader should engage in, and certainly not in a season of peace.” However, a careful reading of the bishop’s statement shows he was not calling for the violent overthrow of the government. The knee-jerk reaction to the bishop is perhaps more significant than the message itself, concise analysis of Nigeria's ills though it was. Commentators and organizations cast the bishop's remarks as an attack on Islam, with Muslims against it and Christians for it. In fact, the statement was not cast in Christian/Muslim terms. In strong language, the bishop's message cited Nigeria's ills that have been identified by numerous Christian and Muslim leaders, including the Sultan of Sokoto, to whom the bishop made explicit reference. In effect, peppered with quotations about justice, especially from the Old Testament, he denounced the self-serving elites that dominate Nigeria. Moreover, he argues that only the Nigerian people themselves can bring about fundamental political reform. The uproar owes something to Nigeria's current security crisis, with the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram far from defeated, increasing activism of Islamist radical groups in the northwest, ongoing quarrels over land and water in the Middle Belt, and a low-level insurrection in the oil patch. President Buhari's government is widely criticized for apparent inactivity, though it moved with dispatch to try to counter COVID-19. Bishop Kukah, born in 1952, was educated at the Kennedy School at Harvard and the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, among other places. A highly charismatic figure, he identifies strongly with Nigeria in a country in which national identity is weak [PDF]. He has long been involved with peace and reconciliation movements, and has cooperated closely with the Sultan of Sokoto, by protocol the highest-ranking Muslim traditional ruler in Nigeria.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 16 to January 22, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 16: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, three in Chikun LGA, and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 16: Soldiers killed five civilians, and one soldier was killed in retaliation in Maiduguri, Borno. January 16: Communal violence led to two deaths in Anambra East, Anambra. January 16: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Shiroro, Niger State. January 17: Bandits killed ten, including one soldier, and five bandits were killed in Maradun, Zamfara. January 17: Gunmen killed two police officers and two others in Port Harcourt, Rivers. January 17: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits and lost one soldier in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 17: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, killed one and kidnapped one in Zaria LGA, and killed two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 18: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Mangu, Plateau. January 18: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kagarko, Kaduna. January 18: A roadside bomb planted by Boko Haram killed four Nigerien soldiers in Diffa, Niger. January 18: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. January 18: Nine soldiers and five Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. January 18: Bandits killed thirty-five in Maru, Zamfara. January 18: Bandits killed seven vigilantes in Mashegu, Niger State. January 20: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. January 20: Bandits killed two in Chikun LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and one in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. January 21: Bandits killed thirteen and kidnapped eleven in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 21: Yansakai, an outlawed vigilante group, killed two herdsmen in Maradun, Zamfara. January 22: Soldiers killed four kidnappers in Owo, Ondo. January 22: Bandits killed four in Chikun LGA and two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna.

Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, writing for the BBC, argues that Western media distorted the 2014 Boko Haram kidnapping of more than two hundred girls sitting for high school examinations. Based on conversations with some of the freed schoolgirls, she argues that the episode was not so much an attack on female education, as portrayed in Western media, but rather banditry gone wrong. A consequence of Western media attention was that it inflated Boko Haram's prestige and set the stage for its later use of female suicide bombers. Nwaubani's perspective on the nature of Boko Haram differs from that of many observers. She downplays the religious or ideological dimension of the movement, its ability to recruit, and its strength. However, her criticism of Western media's treatment of the Chibok episode is well placed. The Chibok kidnapping took place in 2014, a period in which opinion leaders in the United States were focused on assaults on female education in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in those parts of Syria and Iraq dominated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The activist movement’s face was Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani girl who became a Western folk hero after she was shot by the Taliban for seeking an education. (She survived and received a Nobel Peace Prize.) Against this background, U.S. media and opinion leaders, including First Lady Michelle Obama, placed the Chibok kidnapping in the context of yet another Islamist attack on female education. There was a general lack of granular knowledge of northern Nigeria that could have resulted in more sophisticated analysis. Rather than reflecting particular Nigerian-Sahelian history and circumstance, they saw Boko Haram as somehow part of a peril posed by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Boko Haram has indeed long been opposed to Western education—the group’s name translates to “Western education is forbidden”—such as that which the Chibok girls were receiving. The movement’s views of the position of women in society is anathema to almost all Americans. But the beliefs and ideology of Boko Haram are complex and diffuse. The movement should be seen in a Nigerian and Sahelian context rather than that of international terrorism, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic state—especially in 2014, when the Islamic State ruled large parts of Syria and Iraq. By 2014, Boko Haram posed a serious threat to the Nigerian government in the north. It occupied territory larger than Belgium or Maryland, and there was realistic concern that it would establish an Islamist state. At that point, it is unlikely that Western media attention, with all of its shortcomings, played any significant role in inflating the movement's importance or prestige in Nigeria.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 9 to January 15, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 9: Amotekun operatives killed seven in Ibarapa North, Oyo. January 9: Gunmen killed three in Kauru, Kaduna. January 9: Twenty-eight Boko Haram militants and thirteen soldiers were killed during a clash in Gujba, Yobe; in a separate incident, Nigerian soldiers killed another thirty militants in Gujba. January 9: Nigerian troops killed fifty bandits in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. January 10: Gunmen killed three mobile police officers in Ughelli North, Delta. January 10: Gunmen killed two in Riyom, Plateau. January 10: Nigerian troops killed five bandits and lost one soldier in Faskari, Katsina. January 10: Kidnappers abducted twenty-seven traders in Etsako West, Edo. January 11: Five soldiers and six Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno. January 11: Gunmen killed a councillorship candidate and kidnapped two others in Oshimili South, Delta. January 11: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed themselves and six Nigerian soldiers in Damboa, Borno. January 12: Gunmen killed two in Kauru, Kaduna. January 12: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno. January 12: Suspected land grabbers killed four in Ikorodu, Lagos. January 12: Security forces killed four bandits in Shiroro, Niger State. January 10-January 12: Cult clashes resulted in fourteen deaths in Ikorodu, Lagos. January 13: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. January 13: An Amotekun operative killed one civilian in Ibadan North, Oyo. January 13: Bandits kidnapped eighteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 13: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. January 13: Suspected herders killed two in Guma, Benue. January 14: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. January 14: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. January 14: Boko Haram landmines killed five soldiers in Chibok, Borno. January 14: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 15: Communal violence led to two deaths in Ibarapa North, Oyo. January 15: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. January 15: Bandits killed five police officers and kidnapped thirteen others in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.

Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. Twitter and other social media platforms have suspended or restricted President Donald J. Trump's access, mostly because of his and his followers’ use of them to incite violence, though their stated, precise reasons vary from one to another. They are all private companies, and thus are subject to few restrictions [PDF] on what content they choose to moderate or remove. Mainstream American opinion is outraged over the assault on the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 6 and many Americans are incensed by related efforts to suborn the Constitution in blocking the certification of President-Elect Joseph Biden’s electoral victory. Barring the president from social media platforms has not been seen as an infringement on his constitutional right to free speech. The legal argument runs that companies are free to enforce their own standards and policies regarding the content they host. Further, President Trump remains free to make his views known by the myriad other means of mass communication that exist in the United States such as the press, television, radio, and other social media sites. Polling data shows [PDF] that a majority of Americans do indeed favor increased regulation of social media. But reactions to the moves by Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, and others to limit Trump’s social media access have followed a familiar partisan split. An ongoing debate about how much governments should regulate social media and what the boundaries are (or should be) between free speech and incitement to hatred and violence has been made more pressing by the events of January 6. This same debate is underway in sub-Saharan Africa, where social media is of growing importance and other types of media are weak or even absent. In some states trending toward authoritarianism or worse—Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, for example—regimes seek to limit social media to enhance their power by muzzling the opposition. But in others, especially those riven by ethnic and religious conflict, there is legitimate concern that media, now including social media, are a means to incite violence.  Nigeria is a case in point. The country is besieged by an Islamist revolt in the northeast, conflict over land and water in the middle of the country that often acquires an ethnic and religious coloration, and a low-level insurrection in the oil patch. The government is weak and commands little popular support. Under these circumstances, Nigeria is ripe for social media incitement to violence. Weak African governments are often heavy-handed and resort to draconian punishments which are difficult to carry out in practice; their responses to incendiary social media posts have been no different. In Nigeria, the government has introduced legislation to regulate social media that includes the death penalty for certain types of violations. Human rights organizations, many of which are suspicious the administration of Muhammadu Buhari is moving towards authoritarianism, see the legislation as infringing on free speech and stifling the ability to criticize the government. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, while social media is strong, more conventional media is less so. Hence restrictions on access to social media would, indeed, impede the flow of news and information to a greater extent than in the United States. Though it remains to be seen, major social media platforms’ barring of Donald Trump is likely to be cited in the Nigerian debate by those that favor the proposed legislation. In commentary by outside friends of Nigeria, it will be important not to impose on Nigeria the circumstances of the United States, which are not necessarily parallel.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 2 to January 8, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 2: Bandits killed nineteen in Giwa, Kaduna. January 2: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped two in Ibarapa, Oyo. January 2: Robbers killed two civilians and police officers killed two robbers in Ughelli, Delta. January 2: Military airstrikes killed "several" Boko Haram militants at two separate locations (estimated at twenty total) in Bama, Borno. January 2: Boko Haram kidnapped fifty in Konduga, Borno. January 3: Boko Haram killed six soldiers and one civilian in Chibok, Borno. January 3: Bandits killed nine in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 4: Bandits kidnapped eleven in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 4: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped four in Aniocha South, Delta. January 4: Nigerian troops killed "several" bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Giwa, Igabi, and Chikun LGAs in Kaduna (estimated at twenty total). January 5: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped twenty in Toto, Nassarawa. January 5: Boko Haram attacked Askira/Uba, Borno but were repelled by military airstrikes that killed "several" (estimated at ten) militants. January 5: Bandits kidnapped five in Rafi, Niger State. January 5: Pirates killed two in Bonny, Rivers. January 6: Bandits killed four in Chikun, Kaduna. January 6: Amotekun killed three civilians in Ibarapa, Oyo. January 6: Boko Haram killed commuters (no number given, estimated at ten) in Nganzai, Borno. January 6: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. January 8: Soldiers killed five civilians during a clash in Baruten, Kwara. January 8: Bandits kidnapped seven children in Maru, Zamfara. January 8: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and thirteen others in Mayo Tsanaga, Cameroon. January 8: Gunmen attacked a police station and killed three police officers in Ezza South, Ebonyi.

Americans should be under no illusion about the serious damage to their country’s remaining moral authority and capacity for international leadership caused by yesterday's assault on the U.S. Capitol in Washington. In addition to its function as the seat of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Capitol has been a symbol around the world of representative government and of the strength of American democratic institutions. The assault on it by a mob—egged on by a sitting American president—the apparent incompetence of the security services charged with protecting it, and the pictures of mob looting have been spread all over Africa. With its extensive internet coverage, it is safe to say that many Nigerians know as much about what happened as Americans do. A sample of tweets from my roughly 18,000 Twitter followers highlights the themes of American hypocrisy in presuming to criticize Nigeria's poor governance, a strongly negative reaction to police use of live ammunition and the killing of a demonstrator, and the collapse of the American pretense (from their perspective) of American moral leadership. Here are some representative tweets (omitted are the personal attacks on me, mostly for "hypocrisy"): “Leave Nigeria internal affairs alone and face your country, your democracy is under siege, capitol Hill is being ransacked by protesters, people being shot!” “The arrest and killings of American peaceful protesters are poor representation of America to the ongoing Buhari administration. who gave the order to shoot a peaceful protesters at the #CapitolHillmassacre? Her last words were peace and unity!” “Quench this fire first. Frankly speaking, you guys have lost moral authority.” “Face your undemocratic terror country.” “Before you start to fix the problems overseas please fix the problems in your home first.” “How is your country fairing today democratically?” “You guys should all hide your heads in shame!” “At this point I think Americans should keep quiet about all happenings in the world.” “Go and settle the coup at Capitol building today. I thought USA was a nice country until I met Trump. Mr John, charity begins at home” “Sir it'll be advisable you concentrate on what tyrant @realDonaldTrump is doing to American democracy and institutions of governance. Thank you” “The use of live bullet on Peaceful Protesters in the state is a poor representation of America This is condemnable.” Rebuilding American moral authority will be a difficult, lengthy process. It is to be hoped that starting this process will be a foreign policy prerogative of President-Elect Joe Biden and Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken. For now, American prestige in Nigeria, at least, is in the gutter and American soft power in the world's second largest continent is evaporating.

Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. Omoyele Sowore, human rights activist and former presidential candidate of the African Action Congress, was arrested New Year’s Eve following a peaceful protest in the capital, Abuja. According to Nigerian media, he has been denied bail and arraigned at the Magistrate Court in Abuja; he and other activists are now being held in Kuje prison. Initially he and a small group of fellow protestors were taken to Abattoir police station, formerly a facility of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), the police unit whose brutality ignited the October anti-SARS protests in Lagos that led to the notorious police murder of protestors at the Lekki Toll Gate. (Abattoir is the formal name of the police station, which is situated in a defunct abattoir.) SARS has officially been disbanded, but critics fear that it has merely been reconstituted with a new name. Though he has been a thorn in the side of the Buhari administration, why did the police arrest Sowore in the aftermath of a small, peaceful protest? He is an internationally known human rights activist and founder of Sahara Reporters, a well-regarded news site based in New York. He is a permanent resident of the United States; his family lives in New Jersey. His 2019 detention of 144 days without charge attracted the protest of Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ). Sowore is a fierce critic of Nigeria's political economy in general and President Muhammadu Buhari in particular. He has called for a “revolution” and organized peaceful protests across the nation. Some critics see his use of “revolution” as evidence that he is trying to overthrow the government extralegally, though his protests have been peaceful. He is at present charged with “treason” and had been out on bail following his previous arrest; one of the conditions was that he could not leave Abuja. Just before New Year's he was calling for nationwide “crossover protests” against bad government, the Lekki massacre, and other human rights grievances. In Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, opposition to a government may be construed as treason. Because the protests were to be nationwide, the authorities (or some of them) may have seen Sowore as violating the provision of his parole that restricts him to Abuja even though he had not left the city. For them, that could be a pretext for jailing him. From media accounts, the arrests were heavy-handed: multiple police vans appeared and Sowore is reported to have been beaten.  Many of those who benefit from Nigeria's political economy, not least the police, detest Sowore. Instigation for his arrest could have a variety of sources, not necessarily including the presidency. The episode, if not quickly resolved, could further damage Nigeria's international reputation—particularly among the diaspora living in the United States. The incoming Biden administration has signaled that it will be deeply concerned about human rights issues. The arrest of Sowore and the denial of bail is a poor representation of Nigeria to the incoming administration.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 26, 2020, to January 1, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 26: Police officers killed a traditional ruler in Nkanu East, Enugu. December 26: Boko Haram killed four security personnel and six civilians in Hawul, Borno. December 26: Bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Bosso, Niger. December 26: Gunmen killed two and kidnapped fifty in Batsari, Katsina. December 27: Gunmen kidnapped seventeen in Munya, Niger State. December 27: Bandits kidnapped two in Bosso, Niger. December 27: A gang clash resulted in ten deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna. December 27: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped six in Sabuwa, Katsina. December 27: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa. December 28: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. December 28: Boko Haram landmines killed four soldiers in Konduga, Borno. December 28: Nigerian troops killed eight bandits in Kaduna, Kaduna. December 28: Boko Haram kidnapped four in Madagali, Adamawa. December 29: One vigilante and one bandit were killed in Kaduna, Kaduna. December 29: Boko Haram landmines killed seven hunters in Ngala, Borno. December 29: Six bandits and two others were killed in Kurfi, Katsina. December 29: Nigerian troops killed three Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Konduga, Borno. December 30: Cultists killed four in Oredo, Edo. December 30: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. December 30: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. December 31: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Batsari, Katsina. December 31: Bandits killed seven in Mashegu, Niger State. January 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.