Nigeria

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 6 to March 12, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     (Last week, March 2: Bandits killed ten and kidnapped one hundred miners in Maru, Zamfara.) March 6: Bandits kidnapped twelve at Kaduna Airport in Igabi, Kaduna. March 6: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno. March 6: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) and one bandit in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. March 7: Three soldiers and "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno. March 7: Bandits kidnapped twenty-five in Sabuwa, Katsina. March 8: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Sabuwa, Katsina. March 8: Gunmen killed four in Ibarapa, Oyo. March 8: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Rafi LGA and nineteen in Wushishi LGA in Niger State. March 8: Kidnappers abducted eight in Wukari, Taraba. March 8: Nigerian troops killed thirty-three Boko Haram militants and lost two soldiers in Marte, Borno. March 8: Kidnappers abducted five in Kosofe, Lagos. March 9: Kidnappers abducted three in Koton Karfe, Kogi. March 9: Vigilantes killed forty bandits in Lavun, Niger State. March 9: Communal violence resulted in seven deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. March 9: Bandits killed one and kidnapped eighteen in Munya, Niger State. March 10: Bandits killed thirteen in Maradun, Zamfara. March 10: Gangs killed seventeen in Toto, Nassarawa. March 10: Kidnappers abducted five in Koton Karfe, Kogi. March 10: Kidnappers abducted three from a college in Esan North-East, Edo. March 10: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. March 10: Bandits killed four in Igabi LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and two in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. March 11: Gunmen kidnapped thirty-nine students from a college in Igabi, Kaduna. March 11: Bank robbers killed five in Odo-Otin, Osun. March 11: Bandits kidnapped fifty on a Maulud journey in Faskari, Katsina. March 11: Bandits killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 11: The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) killed fifteen soldiers and four Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members in Guzamala, Borno. March 11: Bandits killed "scores" (estimated at forty) in Maradun and Tsafe LGAs in Zamfara.

According to the Nigerian army, a ransom of $300,000 was paid to pirates in the Gulf of Guinea to secure the release of the crew of a Chinese fishing boat. The party that paid the ransom is not reported. The most likely possibility is that it was the Chinese company that operated the fishing boat. The episode sheds some light of the murky operation of kidnapping and ransom payment in the Gulf of Guinea. The Chinese fishing boat was registered in Gabon. The crew consisted of six Chinese, three Indonesians, one Gabonese, and four Nigerians. The crew was held captive for about a month. A maritime security expert was cited as saying that the pirates used the hijacked vessel as a "mothership" for attacks on oil tankers.  The Gulf of Guinea is now the center of piracy in the world: in 2019, it accounted for over 90 percent of maritime kidnappings globally. Most of the pirates are Nigerian, from the Niger Delta, the region where most of Nigeria's oil comes from. The Delta has been rocked by the fall in international oil prices and the degradation of the environment by oil spills, which have damaged local agriculture and fishing while adversely impacting human health. The Nigerian government's official policy is against the payment of ransom, so the amounts are usually not made public. In this particular case, the ransom could have been paid outside of Nigeria, perhaps in Gabon. The episode illustrates how lucrative kidnapping can be, in the Gulf Guinea as well as elsewhere. The $300,000 sum is large, especially for communities that ring the Gulf of Guinea.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 27 to March 5, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 27: Bandits killed four and kidnapped twenty-six in Rafi, Niger State. February 27: Bandits killed four in Igabi Local Government Area (LGA) and three in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. February 27: Bandits killed three in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. February 28: Police officers killed nine bandits in Safana, Katsina. February 28: Bandits kidnapped seven in Rafi LGA and three in Katcha LGA in Niger State. February 28: Gunmen killed five in Zangon Kataf LGA and five in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. February 28: Gunmen killed three in Tsafe, Zamfara. February 28: Nigerian troops killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) in late February in Igabi, Kaduna. March 1: Bandits killed five in Igabi LGA and one in Kauru LGA while airstrikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in the surrounding area in Kaduna. March 1: Bandits kidnapped one and killed twelve in Illela, Sokoto. March 1: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Okobo, Akwa Ibom. March 1: Boko Haram abducted seven aid workers in Dikwa, Borno. March 2: Kidnappers abducted three students in Safana, Katsina. March 2: Bandits kidnapped fifty in Rafi, Niger State. March 2: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "some" (estimated at five) in Obokun, Osun. March 3: Gunmen killed six police officers in Obubra, Cross River. March 3: Bandits kidnapped seventy in Maru, Zamfara. March 3: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. March 4: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Offa, Kwara. March 4: Bandits killed one and kidnapped two in Bodinga, Sokoto. March 4: Four bandits and one soldier were killed during a clash in Safana, Katsina. March 4: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Ngala LGA and five militants in Dikwa LGA in Borno. March 5: Bandits killed seventeen in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. March 5: Suspected herders killed two farmers in Ikole, Ekiti.

On February 27, "bandits" attacked the Government Girls Secondary School in Jangebe, Zamfara State and kidnapped some three hundred girls. Government reaction was predictable: search-and-rescue missions and strong statements. President Muhammadu Buhari said "let bandits, kidnappers, and terrorists not entertain any illusions that they are more powerful than the government." At the time of the kidnapping, some of the girls avoided capture by hiding. According to media, the victims were forced to march into a forest so dense that they could not be seen by aircraft. Negotiations were soon underway with the bandits and all of the girls were freed March 1. Despite its protests to the contrary, either the federal or Zamfara State government—or both—likely paid a ransom. Payment of ransom to kidnappers is almost always denied by government spokespersons. The denials lack credibility: even President Buhari last Friday conceded that "State Governments must review their policy of rewarding bandits with money and vehicles." Two days later, bandits freed forty-two victims of a separate kidnapping incident following "negotiations." Prior to the victims’ release, state officials claimed—again, with little credibility—that no ransom would be paid; no details were given as to the circumstances of their eventual release. Jangebe captured more international attention than any mass kidnapping since at least 276 schoolgirls at Chibok were abducted by Boko Haram in 2014. The then-First Lady Michelle Obama publicly supported an international #BringBackOurGirls campaign. With respect to Jangebe, Pope Francis prayed for the release of the captives; UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield both called for punishment of the perpetrators in addition to the schoolgirls’ release. Unlike Chibok, the perpetrators at Jangebe were one of several heavily armed gangs that operate in northwest Nigeria, not the Islamist Boko Haram. Chibok indicates that high-level international attention can cut two ways. On the one hand, international outcry forced then-President Goodluck Jonathan to act, even if with little success. On the other hand, international attention made the Chibok girls more valuable to Boko Haram and thereby could have delayed their release. More than one hundred remain in captivity.

Against an immediate backdrop of escalating mass kidnappings, jihadi resurgence, growing separatist sentiment in the old Biafra, and conflict over water and land that often assumes a religious and ethnic coloration, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria has issued a statement sounding the alarm over the very survival of the nation. The statement expresses concern, inter alia, over high-level government officials advising citizens to resort to self-defense as exacerbating ethnic conflict. The statement acknowledges the costs of nation-building but affirms that the costs of Nigeria's tearing itself apart would be far higher. The statement does not directly attack President Muhammadu Buhari but rather calls on Nigerians to rededicate themselves to the "Nigeria project"—building a multiethnic, democratic society. The specific points made by the Catholic bishops are widely heard in Nigeria among thoughtful, engaged citizens. Nevertheless, the bishops' statement is authoritative, blunt, and to-the-point. The Roman Catholic Church is one of Nigeria's few national institutions. (Others are the Nigerian army and the Anglican Church.) The Catholic bishops have an almost unique access to what is going on at the grassroots all over the country. The bishops tend to be judicious and advocate for Nigerian unity—hence the significance, in part, of the bluntness of their statement. Though its adherents are mostly in the south and east, the Catholic Church's network of dioceses covers the entire country, even in the predominately Muslim north. It and the Anglican Church were long the two largest denominations of European origin, but both have been usurped in size by Pentecostal churches. Moreover, the Roman Catholic Church is an "establishment" institution, and its bishops by and large have good relations with the traditional Muslim leadership. The Catholic bishops' statement should be a wake-up call for Nigeria's foreign friends as well as for those Nigerians that too readily ignore what is going on around them until it impacts on them directly, such as with kidnapping.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 20 to February 26, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 20: Bandits killed three and a suspected informant was lynched in Kajuru, Kaduna. February 20: Bandits killed nine and kidnapped seventeen in Shiroro, Niger State. February 20: Bandits killed two and kidnapped nine in Igabi, Kaduna. February 20: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped ten in Safana, Katsina. February 21: Kidnappers abducted five in Andoni, Rivers. February 21: Gunmen killed four at a market in Ibadan, Oyo. February 21: Boko Haram killed six internally displace persons (IDPs) in Damboa, Borno. February 21: "Scores" (estimated at forty) of militants were killed during a clash between Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) factions (location estimated around Mobbar, Borno). February 22: Communal clashes led to twenty-five deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. February 22: Gunmen killed two police officers in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. February 23: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped nine in Sabuwa, Katsina. February 23: A Boko Haram rocket attack killed sixteen in Maiduguri, Borno. February 23: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Ikpoba-Okha, Edo. February 23: Nigerian troops killed fourteen Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. February 23: Four gunmen and two police officers were killed during an attack on a police station in Osisioma Ngwa, Abia. February 23: Bandits killed seven while "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed by airstrikes in Igabi, Kaduna. February 23: Bandits killed eight and kidnapped "some" (estimated at five) in Chikun, Kaduna. February 24: Gunmen killed four police officers in Aguata, Anambra. February 24: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. February 25: Bandits killed nine in Maru, Zamfara. February 25: Gunmen killed four police officers in Calabar, Cross River. February 25: Boko Haram kidnapped "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) in Konduga, Borno. February 25: Bandits killed three in Isa Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Sabon Birni LGA in Sokoto. February 26: Bandits kidnapped 317 students in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.

Nkasi Wodu, a New Voices Fellow at the Aspen Institute, is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The Nigerian minister of defense recently enjoined Nigerians to take up arms to defend themselves against marauding bandits in their communities. The minister’s statement aligns with the grim reality that Nigeria has a serious internal security problem—and nobody knows exactly how to solve it. Nigeria has experienced devastating attacks from armed bandits for more than two years. While these attacks initially started in the North West region of Nigeria, they have since spread to other parts of the country. Armed bandits frequently kidnap unsuspecting members of the public before using their captives to secure huge ransoms in return for their release. Ransom frequently comes in the form of opaque government payments, a strategy that tends to undermine government authority. The level of coordination in the attacks seems to betray some type of paramilitary training or, at the very least, organization by leaders with military training. Making the problem worse, bandits have recently taken to targeting softer targets, such as schools, illustrated most recently by today’s mass kidnapping in Zamfara State, where gunmen took captive over three hundred schoolgirls. The kidnapping is the latest in a string of incidents. In December 2020, eighty students were kidnapped from an Islamic school in Katsina State, although they were later rescued or released. Last month, over forty-two people, including twenty-seven students, were kidnapped from a secondary school in Niger State—signaling a geographical expansion into the North Central region, part of the Middle Belt. The targeting of schools, worrying in itself, also further discourages students in a country with dismal rates of school attendance and completion. Banditry alone fails to explain the full scale of Nigeria’s internal security problem. For much of this decade, a murderous conflict between herders and farmers has plagued Nigeria, particularly in the Middle Belt. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2015 [PDF], Fulani militants—the most violent actor in the Middle Belt’s farmer-herder conflict—were adjudged the fourth-deadliest terror group in the world. In 2018, Fulani extremists were responsible for [PDF] 1,158 fatalities in Nigeria—a majority of terror-related deaths in the country that year. Intense violence perpetrated by militant herdsmen has since begun to expand further, towards the South West and South East regions, as herders search for grazing routes for their cattle. Unfortunately, a combination of drought occasioned by the rapid disappearance of Lake Chad, political instability driven by Boko Haram, and banditry made herders’ southward march an inevitability that will be difficult to reverse. A common feature of these attacks is the perceived lack of response—even complicity—from security agents. Recent rhetoric from the presidency against the response by some state governors to stem the tide of attacks from herdsmen further promotes this perception and impels communities to take up arms to protect themselves. This reality has already come to pass: southern Nigeria hosts armed, non-state actors such as the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the Western Nigeria Security Network—also known as Amotekun—in the South West, and several armed groups in the South South region. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons, a troubling feature of Nigeria’s security landscape, make the situation yet more combustible. Clashes between “self-defense” militias and herdsmen in the South East and the South West are on the rise, and they will continue to intensify as long as security agencies are beset by inaction and ineffectiveness. Layered on top of this conflagration is the ethnic dimension, with entire ethnic groups subsumed into conflicts and pitched against one another. In Oyo State, Hausa/Fulani communities have clashed with indigenes, while Nnamdi Kanu’s ESN continue to see attacks as a northern agenda against the Igbos. Nigeria’s troublesome security forces are, at present, ill-equipped to tackle frequent clashes between non-state actors. To address the worrying array of interlinked security threats, President Muhammadu Buhari needs to first shed his characteristic apathy and lack of empathy. In doing so, he should address the nation, pleading for national unity; his aides, meanwhile, should endeavor to appear neutral in their rhetoric rather than buttress perceptions of siding with particular groups. Below the state level, political actors from the various tribes would do well to see that their words and actions play an impactful role in either exacerbating or improving violent conditions. Consequently, they should eschew divisive action and instead pursue constructive solutions to the issues at hand.

Nigeria's Vice President Yemi Osinbajo addressed on February 23 a UN Food Systems Summit organized by the Nigerian government in Abuja, the national capital. He was blunt about the country's food insecurity problem. He noted that Nigeria's population is growing much faster than the economy, limiting its ability to build resilient, sustainable food systems. The conference considered a variety of possible approaches to increasing food production. Their relevance to Nigeria's realities remains to be seen. But Osinbajo addressed an important driver of food insecurity—Nigeria's rapidly growing population. Already an estimated 219 million, the population is projected to reach more than 400 million by mid-century, by which time it would displace the United States as the third largest country in the world. Nigeria is also, at the same time, quickly urbanizing. More than half of the population already lives in cities, most of which lack the necessary infrastructure to accommodate their residents. Nigerians often cite an abundance of good farmland and lament a lack of investment in agriculture. Certainly, agricultural investment has suffered from the diversion of investment capital to the oil industry and also from misguided public policy in the years before and after independence. But the abundance of good agricultural land is overstated: desertification affects as much as 60 percent of Nigeria's land, with drought and climate change exacerbating land deterioration. The Sahara Desert is creeping south while a rising Gulf of Guinea, coupled with a sinking continental shelf, threatens coastal areas. If increasing agricultural production will be a challenge, so, too, is reducing the birthrate. The statistically average Nigerian woman bears more than five children. But the rate varies across ethnic, religious, and local government lines, with a high of 7.3 births per woman in Katsina State and a low of 3.4 births per woman in Lagos State. In addition, among many “Big Men,” fathering large numbers of children is viewed as a dimension of their power. The government has tried to impose a population policy but failed to achieve its aims due to weak political will and hard-to-overcome cultural factors favoring a high birth rate. Nevertheless, Osinbajo's straight talk about an awkward issue is to be commended. In 2022, the ruling party is likely to nominate a southern Christian for the presidency, preserving the alternation of the office between the Muslim north and the Christian south. Osinbajo is a Christian, a Pentecostal preacher. However, he has described himself as "on loan" from the church to the government, and it is unclear that he will actively seek the nomination.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 13 to February 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 13: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 13: Two Nigerian Air Force personnel and "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of bandits were killed during a clash in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 13: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Egbado North, Ogun. February 13: Herdsmen killed three in Owo, Ondo. February 13: Bandits killed three in Chikun, Kaduna. February 13: Two police officers, two robbers, and one civilian were killed during a clash in Oshimili North, Delta. February 14: Gunmen killed one police officer at a church in Ughelli North, Delta. February 14: Kidnappers killed three and abducted thirty in Rafi, Niger State. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau. February 14: Nigerian troops killed eighty-one Boko Haram militants and lost one soldier to a landmine in Gwoza, Borno. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 15: Seven children were killed by a leftover explosive device in Maradun, Zamfara. February 15: Boko Haram killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno. February 16: Bandits killed eleven in Rafi, Niger State. February 16: Boko Haram killed five police officers and two civilians in Bursari, Yobe. February 16: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra members killed six children in Idemili North, Anambra. February 16: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped forty-two at a school in Rafi, Niger State. February 17: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits who kidnapped four in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 17: Suspected herdsmen killed seven in Ovia North-East, Edo. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped thirty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 18: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Faskari, Katsina. February 19: Boko Haram killed "many" (estimated at twenty) civilians in Dikwa, Borno. February 19: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "several" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger State. February 19: Three were killed during protests in Billiri, Gombe.

On February 17, a gang of "gunmen" kidnapped more than forty students, teachers, and administrators from a secondary school in Niger State. At least one student was killed. Niger State Governor Abubakar Sani Bello has appealed for assistance from President Muhammadu Buhari, who has ordered all four service chiefs to go to Niger State to coordinate rescue operations. In December, "bandits" kidnapped some three hundred schoolboys from a school in Kankara, located in Katsina State. There have been several other mass kidnappings, though none has acquired the international notoriety of the 2014 kidnapping of more than two hundred school girls from a school in Chibok. (More than one hundred are still missing, but some recently escaped.) Most—not all—of these mass kidnappings appear to be purely mercenary. These kidnappings are different from Boko Haram attacks in the past decade where the goal was to kill those who were benefitting from Western education. In these recent instances, kidnappers are after ransom, and appear to try to keep their victims alive. Nigerian federal and state authorities always deny paying ransom. Yet they often do so. Schoolboys and bandits involved in the Kankara abduction contradicted official denials that ransom was paid. Reports suggest the Katsina State government paid N30 million (about $76,000) to recover the schoolboys. Hence, the expectation should be that unless the Kagara victims are quickly recovered, which is unlikely, either the state or federal government will pay ransom to secure the release of those who have survived. Kidnapping in Nigeria and across the Sahel can be an extraordinarily lucrative enterprise in what is one of the poorest regions in the world. "Bandits" particularly prize citizens of the European Union. As rich countries with governments susceptible to emotional public opinion, EU member states can pay enormous ransoms while always denying that they are doing so. Jihadi and criminal networks overlap in the Sahel, so kidnapping can also provide both funding and manpower for jihadi groups. At Kankara, Boko Haram's Abubakar Shekau claimed his group was behind the kidnapping, though it appears to have been purely a criminal enterprise. The United States as a matter of policy never pays ransom. The U.S. government had previously threatened to prosecute private individuals who seek to do so. Refusing to pay ransom may provide some cover for American citizens that find themselves in the Sahel. However, Americans are few in number in those areas where kidnapping is rampant.

When Robert Azevedo stepped down last year from the post of director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade body’s top leadership position, former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala quickly became the universal favorite to land the job—except for among members of the Trump administration. Because the WTO operates on the basis of consensus, the Trump administration's opposition effectively vetoed her in favor of the current South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee. In an interview with the Financial Times, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer outlined the Trump administration’s objection, claiming that Okonjo-Iweala is “somebody from the World Bank who does development” with no “real trade experience.” (Okonjo-Iweala previously held the number-two position at the Bank.) However, Lighthizer’s comments are not altogether credible, given Okonjo-Iweala’s experience with trade issues as finance minister. Nevertheless, the WTO and its membership could read a calendar as well as anyone else, and so the debate over the next director general remained frozen until after the U.S. presidential elections. After consulting with U.S. officials earlier this month, Myung-hee withdrew her candidacy. The Biden administration then formally expressed its support for Okonjo-Iweala. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is, among other things, board chair of Gavi, a global alliance to ensure low-income countries can access life-saving vaccines. She has already signaled that high on her agenda at the WTO will be to promote and facilitate the enhanced distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and protective equipment. In traditional and social media, the focus on Okonjo-Iweala has been that she is the first woman and the first African to head the WTO. As such she is a symbol, and symbols are important: many Africans see her as validating the competency and leadership skills of African women.  With the popular focus on Okonjo-Iweala’s gender, race, and country of origin, overlooked could be her competency and expertise, regularly demonstrated during her career at the World Bank and twice as Nigeria's finance minister. Demonstrated competency accounts, at least in part, for her strong support from the beginning within the WTO.  Okonjo-Iweala self-identifies as foremost a Nigerian, and in public always wears Igbo dress. She worked as a cook for rebels on the frontlines in the 1967–70 civil war between Nigeria and Igbo-dominated Biafra. That said, her higher education was at Harvard and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She worked in Washington, D.C. for twenty-five years. Her husband is a physician practicing in Washington, D.C. She became an American citizen in 2019.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 6 to February 12, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 6: Bandits killed fourteen in Birnin-Gwari Local Government Area (LGA) and five in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. February 6: Police officers killed two in Surulere, Lagos. February 6: A communal clash led to two deaths in Irepodun, Osun. February 6: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Warri South, Delta. February 7: A communal clash led to one death in Irepodun, Osun. February 7: Kidnappers abducted four in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. February 7: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Ajaokuta, Kogi. February 8: Herdsmen killed six in Bassa, Plateau. February 8: Bandits kidnapped seven in Oriade, Osun. February 8: Bandits killed ten in Birnin-Gwari LGA, one in Giwa LGA, seven in Chikun LGA, one in Igabi LGA, and five in Kauru LGA in Kaduna. February 8: Pirates abducted one in Brass, Bayelsa. February 9: Pirates abducted one in Brass LGA and four in Nembe LGA in Bayelsa. February 9: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ethiope East, Delta. February 9: Boko Haram kidnapped three customs officers in Geidam, Yobe. February 9: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. February 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" bandits in both Birnin-Gwari LGA and Giwa LGA (estimated at twenty total) in Kaduna. February 10: Gunmen killed three at a town hall meeting in Idemli North, Anambra. February 10: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of two police officers in Takum, Taraba. February 10: Violence around a university student election led to the deaths of two students in Owo, Ondo. February 10: Nigerian troops killed thirty-one Boko Haram militants in Askira/Uba, Borno. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Owo, Ondo. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Egbado North, Ogun. February 11: Gunmen killed three in Oyigbo, Rivers. February 12: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 12: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Akinyele, Oyo. February 12: Boko Haram killed four in Biu, Borno. February 12: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram commanders in Gwoza, Borno. February 12: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Kukawa, Borno.

Fola Aina is a doctoral fellow at King’s College London. He is an international security analyst with expertise on peace and security in the Lake Chad region and the Sahel region. Nolan Quinn contributed to this piece. Insecurity in northwest Nigeria and much of Sahelian West Africa has its roots in tensions and competition over resources. Oft cited are shortages of land and water, driven by environmental degradation and climate change as well as rapid population growth. However, conflicts in the region over access to minerals—especially gold—are also heating up. Moreover, illicit mining causes environmental damage, thus exacerbating land and water shortages. The mining sector in Nigeria benefits from substantial untapped solid mineral deposits, including gold and iron ore. (Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, the governor of Kaduna State, has claimed that a single local government area in his state has more gold than South Africa.) Nigerian federal and state governments are in the process of exploring how to develop the minerals industry, which, at present, accounts for less than 1 percent [PDF] of the country’s GDP. A major impediment is the predominance of artisanal and small-scale miners, who produce an estimated 80 to 85 percent [PDF] of Nigeria’s mining output. This deprives the government of a potentially huge source of revenue: data from UN Comtrade reveals that between 2012 and 2018, about ninety-seven tonnes of gold worth over $3 billion was illegally smuggled out of Nigeria. Drawbacks from artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) in Nigeria go beyond lost revenue. Between 2010 and 2013, over seven hundred children died [PDF] in Zamfara State due to lead poisoning associated with ASGM activities. ASGM also contaminates surrounding land, water, and air with other toxic chemicals such as mercury. Perhaps most damaging is ASGM in northwest Nigeria’s apparent links to criminal consortia. The region’s gold-tinged cash windfall has established new centers of power beyond the state’s control—a retired military officer told the International Crisis Group that ASGM activities had created “a fiefdom of deadly gangs”— leading to a destabilizing wave of rural banditry and criminality. The governments of Zamfara State—the epicenter of ASGM-related violence—and Katsina State have cautioned that proceeds from the illegal sale of gold are funding weapons purchases by armed groups. In an attempt to sever what Zamfara’s police chief called a “strong and glaring nexus between the activities of armed bandits and illicit miners,” in April 2019 the federal government suspended mining in Zamfara State. The ban, which was largely ineffective, was lifted early last year. Numerous military and police operations in the northwest have also failed to restore security. Zamfara’s government has now resorted to offering repentant bandits two cows for every AK-47 they surrender as part of a peace initiative. A nascent, alternative countermeasure has been the 2019 launch of the Presidential Gold Mining Development Initiative (PAGMI). An ambitious initiative, PAGMI is currently in early stages of implementation, with Kebbi and Osun States—the latter located in Nigeria’s southwest—serving as “pilots” before the program scales up to Kaduna, Zamfara, and Niger States. (Niger State borders to the south the North West geopolitical zone.) The initiative aims to create over 500,000 new mining and formalized jobs and register thousands of artisanal miners in the national identity management system. By July of last year, about 20,000 miners had already been registered in Kebbi and Osun States. PAGMI allows artisanal miners to sell gold through the National Gold Purchase Program, which will be able to supply the Central Bank of Nigeria with much-needed foreign reserves. PAGMI’s success—or lack thereof—will come down to implementation. When villagers who received food handouts during COVID-19 lockdowns were attacked by bandits, it highlighted the challenges the government faces in providing services in the northwest. The government will need to enhance security to allow it to interact with locals hoping to benefit from formalized ASGM. But a strategy to restore security that focuses on use of force will continue to fail. A well implemented, multilayered strategy, meanwhile, could herald the gradual restoration of peace and security in the troubled region—a necessity for kickstarting development in the face of resource shortages. Prioritizing cooperation between the federal and state governments in the affected region is important yet insufficient. A more effective approach would empower local actors such as traditional rulers, district heads, women, and youth, all of whom have exhibited commendable resilience amid widespread insecurity, by providing resources to address social ills and establishing lines of communication for better information sharing. With lives and livelihoods at stake, time is a luxury the region does not have. A better approach is needed now.

Civil organizations in Nigeria have thrown their support behind planned demonstrations on February 13 at the Lekki Toll Gate, the site of the October 20, 2020 killing of demonstrators calling for the disbandment of the notorious Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a police unit widely accused of human rights abuse. The occasion of the demonstration is the decision of the Lagos State Judicial Panel to reopen the toll gate, which is administered by the Lekki Concession Company, a private enterprise. As was the case in October, the demonstration appears to be organized through social media. However, the organizers are providing advance publicity. The demonstrators will protest the lack of meaningful police reform, continuing intimidation of the October demonstrators, the lack of an investigation of the Lekki incident, and the failure to hold accountable the perpetrators of the killing. The government has disbanded SARS, but from the perspective of human rights organizations and other observers, there has been no meaningful improvement in police behavior. Amnesty International credibly accuses an official cover-up. In a recent development, Lagos State’s Environmental Tasks Force cleared—with little notice—an "informal settlement" adjacent to the toll gate, some residents of which talked to the press contradicting the official narrative of what happened. Official clearances of informal settlements happens frequently and for a variety of reasons. In this case, however, many will take it as retribution. It remains to be seen how many demonstrators will actually show. If the demonstration is large, it will be an indication that in Lagos, at least, anger about the Lekki Toll Gate episode and abusive police behavior has not gone away, with political consequences that are unpredictable. On social media there are expressions of unease about the potential of violence. In Nigeria, violence is by no means rare in demonstrations against official authority. It should be noted that the Lekki Toll Gate episode involves divided official authority. Lagos State—not the federal government in Abuja—has ordered the reopening of the toll gate. The lead in the investigation of the October incident also rests with Lagos State. It was also Lagos State authorities that cleared the informal settlement. But SARS and the Nigerian police are a federal, not state, entity. As for a cover-up or suppression of the results of an investigation, that is an old song in Nigeria.

Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. Fighting between government forces and an Igbo separatist group risks adding yet another challenge for the Buhari administration. The emergence of an Igbo paramilitary force highlights the growing breakdown of any federal government monopoly on the use of force in the face of multiple security challenges. Even in good times, security is fragile in the former Biafra. Insecurity has multiple dimensions. The Igbo people are Nigeria's third largest ethnic group. They were the losers in the 1967–70 civil war in which they tried to establish a separate, Igbo-dominated state, Biafra. Many Igbo continue to believe that they are disadvantaged in Nigeria, and there continues to be residual support for Biafran independence, though not among the Igbo "establishment." Conflict over land and water, once largely restricted to the Middle Belt, is spreading to the south, where it frequently acquires ethnic and religious overtones. Many Igbo—mostly Christian—believe they are targeted by the Muslim Fulani herdsmen bringing their flocks south in search of better pastures. Criminal activity is widespread and often the Igbo attribute it to the Fulani. Many residents of the former Biafra are alienated from the federal government and see the Buhari administration as Muslim-dominated and as enabling Fulani atrocities. Added to this mix is Nnamdi Kanu's Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist movement that reflects and facilitates popular discontent. The federal government, recalling the civil war, is bitterly opposed to Igbo separatism, as is most of the Igbo establishment. The government has long sought to defang the IPOB and silence Kanu, sometimes through illegal or quasi-legal methods. He, in turn, has used alleged Fulani depredations as a means of attacking the Buhari administration. Starting in August 2020, violence between IPOB and the federal police and the army has escalated. In that month, the Nigerian police killed up to twenty-one civilians at an IPOB meeting in Enugu State. In response, the IPOB promised retaliation and urged its members to practice self-defense. In December, Kanu announced the establishment of a paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), allegedly to protect the Igbo against the Fulani. For the federal government, a non-state sanctioned, paramilitary organization in the old Biafran heartland was unacceptable, and it moved against ESN camps. In late January 2021, serious fighting broke out in the town of Orlu in Imo State, leading to significant numbers of displaced persons. Fighting stopped when Kanu declared a cease-fire, saying that he was redirecting ESN efforts against "Fulani raiders." (He also claimed that the federal forces had withdrawn from Orlu.) Supporters of the ESN, including in the Igbo diaspora, justify it as being like Miyetti Allah in the north and Amotekun in Yorubaland in the west. Both are paramilitary operations outside the federal government's legal purview but with some ambiguous level of government approval. The north and the west were on the winning side in the civil war, and that may help account for the federal government's greater tolerance for their paramilitary organizations than for one associated with the Igbo. The escalating fighting in IPOB strongholds carries the risk of radicalizing the population and building support for the IPOB. Credible evidence suggests police assaulted residents in Orlu, and some police perpetrators have been arrested. The commissioner of police for Imo State has apologized. But as recently as December 2020, IPOB was saying that ESN forces were merely a "vigilante" group protecting the Igbo against the Fulani. Now Kanu has an organized wing, the ESN, and believes he has the authority to order a cease-fire in a fight with federal forces. Violence is escalating, and the outcome is unpredictable.