Nigeria

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 17 to April 23, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 17: Nigerian troops killed five bandits who had killed seven in Makurdi, Benue. April 17: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Gwer West, Benue. April 17: Police officers killed six bandits in Shiroro, Niger State. April 18: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. April 18: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, resulting in "heavy casualties" for the militants (estimated at twenty) in Dikwa, Borno. April 18: Bandits killed one in Kajuru Local Government Area (LGA) and two in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. April 19: Police officers killed three bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 19: Two police officers and three gunmen were killed during a clash in Dunukofia, Anambra. April 19: Bandits killed two in Zurmi, Zamfara. April 19: Bandits killed ten as police officers repelled the attack and killed thirty bandits in Maradun, Zamfara. April 19: Kidnappers abducted five in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 20: Kidnappers abducted three in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 20: Bandits killed an Amotekun operative in Afijio, Oyo. April 20: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted twenty-three from a university in Chikun, Kaduna; three of the kidnapped students were later found dead. April 21: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Uzo-Uwani, Enugu. April 21: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Makrudi LGA, two in Agatu LGA, and two in Guma LGA in Benue. April 21: Bandits killed sixty in Gusau LGA, fifteen in Maradun LGA, and fifteen in Bakura LGA in Zamfara. April 21: Bandits kidnapped seventy-seven in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted two nurses from a hospital in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted eighteen in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 23: Bandits kidnapped twenty in Dandume, Katsina. April 23: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one Boko Haram militants who killed eleven civilians during an attack on Geidam, Yobe. April 23: Sectarian violence led to seventeen deaths in Guma, Benue.

According to Nigerian media, the Federal Ministry of Aviation has directed the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) to increase airport security. Specific reference is made to the airports at Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, and Maiduguri, with reports of an increased presence of Nigerian military personnel. (The Nigerian army has already assumed responsibility for security at the airports in northern Nigeria.) Of the airports cited, all but Lagos and Abuja, the two with by far the largest international and domestic traffic, are in the north in areas where jihadis or bandits—sometimes both—have been active. Nigeria has twenty-six airports under the authority of FAAN. In an April 9 memo, FAAN ordered all airports to operate a “heightened threat level,” though whether enhanced security is also being implemented at all of them is unclear. Travelers have taken to the skies in Nigeria. In 2019—pre-COVID-19—there were 8.5 million air passengers between January and June, an increase of 5.4 percent over the corresponding period in the previous year. Insecurity is a driver of air travel. Abuja and Kaduna are only about 116 miles apart, with train and bus service available for travel between the two. Yet airlines have launched a shuttle service, at least in part because of the increase in banditry on the road between the two cities and alleged attempts to attack the train appear to be growing. The air shuttle fare is $250 to $320, while rail is $7 to $16. The elites can insulate themselves at least somewhat from the banditry that curses the Abuja-Kaduna road, but not most people.

Nigerian public opinion is intensely homophobic. In 2014, the Nigerian National Assembly passed—and then President Goodluck Jonathan signed—a law against homosexual activity as draconian as that of Uganda, which is better known. In a time of intense polarization along religious and ethnic lines in Nigeria, the legislation had near universal support. In Europe and North America, homosexual activity has long been decriminalized and same-sex marriage is legal in most places. Born in 1963 into a Yoruba family, T.B. Joshua is a Pentecostal preacher with a huge following. He is pastor of the megachurch Synagogue Church of All Nations, with tens of thousands attending his weekly services in Lagos. He and his church are well-known for their extensive philanthropies; his personal net worth is estimated to be $10 million. His church is fiercely homophobic. He regularly performs "exorcisms" to rid persons of evil spirits and demons that were the cause of their homosexuality. Some of these exorcisms appeared to be violent. The United Kingdom-based website openDemocracy complained about the homophobic content on the pastor's YouTube channel. YouTube has now shut down the channel, which claimed over 1.8 million subscribers and 600 million viewers. YouTube says that it "prohibits content which alleges that someone is mentally ill, diseased, or inferior because of their membership in a protected group including sexual orientation." Joshua is appealing the decision and has called on his flock—which is found across Africa and Latin America, but includes congregations in the United States and elsewhere—to "pray for YouTube." T.B. Joshua's hostility to homosexuality is a reflection of a deep-seated consensus in Nigeria, at least for the time being. (Homophobic attitudes in Nigeria have been decreasing but are still widely held.) The Obama administration made LGBTQ+ issues an important part of its human rights agenda in international affairs. The Biden administration could do the same. If it does, the administration is unlikely to have much success in Nigeria or in a number of other African countries where same-sex relations remain outlawed.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 10 to April 16, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 10: Gunmen killed four in Faskari, Katsina. April 10: Three soldiers, six civilians, and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on UN facilities in Mobbar, Borno. April 10: Boko Haram killed three soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno. April 11: Civilians killed three bandits in Jibia, Katsina. April 11: Kidnappers abducted fifteen people in Safana, Katsina. April 12: Bandits killed four in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Giwa LGA while one bandit was killed in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. April 12: Bandits killed five vigilantes in Shiroro, Niger State. April 12: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 12: Bandits kidnapped three in Ibadan North, Oyo. April 12: Communal violence led to nineteen deaths in Balanga, Gombe. April 12: Bandits killed three while residents and vigilantes killed thirty bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 13: Bandits killed four in Igabi LGA and one in Zangon Kataf LGA in Kaduna. April 13: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped four who were later released in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. April 13: Fifteen beheaded bodies were found in Calabar, Cross River. April 13: Boko Haram killed seventeen civilians and lost one militant in Mobbar, Borno. April 13: Police officers killed four pirates in Oron, Akwa Ibom. April 14: Gunmen killed three police officers in Izzi, Ebonyi. April 14: Communal violence led to thirteen deaths in Guyuk, Adamawa. April 15: Gunmen killed three in Wukari, Taraba. April 15: Gunmen killed six at a beer parlor in Riyom, Plateau. April 15: Gunmen invaded the palace in Oye, Ekiti and kidnapped the monarch. April 15: Bandits killed nine in Rabah, Sokoto. April 15: Nigerian troops killed thirteen Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) fighters in Mobbar, Borno. April 15: Communal violence led to eleven deaths in Fika, Yobe. April 16: Clashes between bandits and vigilantes led to the deaths of twenty civilians in Maru, Zamfara. April 16: Boko Haram killed five soldiers in Gujba, Yobe. April 16: Gunmen killed seven traders in Orlu, Imo.

Aare Ona Kakanfo of Yorubaland Gani Adams, in a speech at a book launch in Lagos on April 14 said that the Yoruba people have "graduated from restructuring to self-determination." He continued by saying that Nigeria is dominated by a "main powerful bloc" that, he implied, makes restructuring impossible. Specifically, he is advocating autonomy for Nigeria’s regions, in which “70 to 80 percent” of political power would be exercised by the regions rather than the federal government. The Aare seems to advocating a form of governance similar to that of the Federal Republic of Germany—an example often cited in Nigeria of successful regional devolution. These sentiments were also expressed by other representatives present of the Yoruba elite. The Aare and other speakers also vented against President Muhammadu Buhari and the Muslim north—especially the pastoral Fulani. (Buhari is a northern Fulani.) The representative of the Ooni of Ife, regarded as one of the two paramount Yoruba traditional rulers, complained that most of the wealth of the south was enjoyed in the north. Reflecting Yoruba cultural concerns, he also called for the reintroduction of history in school curricula, presumably in support of Yoruba identity. Calls for restructuring Nigeria are widespread across the country. In Yorubaland, agitation for autonomy rather than restructuring could presage a drift toward Yoruba separatist sentiment. The leader of Igbo separatism, Nnamdi Kanu, appears to see that possibility. He welcomed the Aare's speech on social media. Yoruba calls for "autonomy," even if falling short of calls for separatism, do not bode well for the unity of Nigeria, already challenged in the oil patch, in Igboland, and by jihadis in the north. The Aare has long been involved in Yoruba cultural and political movements. He led the militant wing of the Oodua Peoples' Congress, which advocates for an "autonomous" Yoruba state and has been accused of terrorism. (Gani Adams was jailed for a time.) He was raised to the Aare rank by the Alaafin of Oyo, the other paramount Yoruba traditional ruler. The previous holder of the Aare title was Moshood Abiola, presidential victor in the 1993 elections—Nigeria's most credible—but excluded from office by the army; he later died in prison under suspicious circumstances. The Aare appears to be at the center of Yoruba political ferment. The media reports that Afenifere, another Yoruba cultural/political organization, effected the Aare’s reconciliation with former President Olusegun Obasanjo. The Yoruba are one of the "big three" ethnic groups in Nigeria. (The other two are the Hausa and the Igbo.) Estimates of their size are up to 40 million. They are concentrated in southwest Nigeria, but some Yoruba in Brazil recognize Yoruba traditional rulers in Nigeria. Yoruba identity and culture are strong. Nominally, the Yoruba are divided between Christianity and Islam, but religious tension among adherents of the two is absent. Yoruba families usually include both Christians and Muslims, and adherents of each religion celebrate the other's holidays as well as their own. Some ascribe this tranquility to the fact that, whether Christian or Muslim, Yoruba respect the traditional Yoruba gods. A hierarchy of traditional rulers commands popular respect. At the pinnacle are the Ooni of Ife and the Alaafin of Oyo, often rivals in the past. The Yoruba have a tradition of political fractiousness, which led to British occupation in the mid-nineteenth century. Olusegun Obasanjo, military ruler in the 1970s and civilian president from 1999 to 2007, is a Yoruba. The Yoruba dominate the Lagos-Ibadan corridor, the most developed part of Nigeria. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

The Voice of America now has a presence in Maiduguri, providing welcome firsthand reporting on the Boko Haram insurgency. A recent report describes the gradual resumption of cross-border economic activity with Cameroon in the far northeastern sliver of Nigeria that borders on Cameroon and Chad. Specifically, the cattle market in Kolofata has reopened, with ranchers coming from across Africa. In another border town, Amchide, purveyors of small consumer goods crossing into Cameroon from Nigeria have reappeared. Local people are saying that security has improved because of the large number of soldiers that are now present. (It is not clear whether the soldiers are Nigerian, Cameroonian, or both.) However, a local employee of Human Rights Watch, a highly credible non-governmental organization, is also warning that the security in the region is too uncertain for those internally displaced to return to their homes. Boko Haram activity continues—the group conducted an attack in Kolofata only a few days after the reopening of the cattle market. Generalization is always risky. For now, however, the experience in Kolofata and Amchide indicates that once a modicum of security is achieved, economic activity bounces back. But security appears to be achieved only by large troop deployments. And, even if the area is more secure now than in the past, Boko Haram continues to be able to operate.

The voice of Nigeria’s youth was heard at the EndSars protests and through the emergence of Paystack and Flutterwave, which were a breath of fresh air in an otherwise foul news climate around the country.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 3 to April 9, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 3: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Anambra East, Anambra. April 3 Gunmen killed two civilians and two police officers in Uvwie, Delta. April 3: Gunmen killed seven in Orlu, Imo. April 3: Kidnappers killed two in Sapele, Delta. April 4: Bandits killed five soldiers in Shiroro, Niger State. April 4: Kidnappers abducted five in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 4: Nigerian soldiers killed eleven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. April 5: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese mineworkers in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 5: Kidnappers abducted eight in Damnusa, Katsina. April 5: Gunmen killed two police officers in Takum, Taraba. April 5: Bandits killed two soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 5: Gunmen killed three and released 1,844 prisoners from a prison in Owerri, Imo. April 6: Bandits killed two in Kachia Local Government Area (LGA), two in Chikun LGA, and killed nine and kidnapped twenty-five in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 6: One assailant was killed when police officers repelled an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. April 6: A military operation killed "several" (estimated at ten) criminals in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. April 7: Gunmen killed two police officers and one other in Ukum, Benue. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Awka South, Anambra. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Port Harcourt, Rivers. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three quarry workers in Oluyole, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted a monarch and seven chiefs in Ihitte Uboma, Imo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted two in Imeko-Afon, Ogun. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twenty-four bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. April 7: Gunmen killed three farmers in Wuarki, Taraba. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twelve bandits in Konshisha, Benue. April 8: Gunmen kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Mbaitolli, Imo. April 8: Nigerian soldiers allegedly killed seventy civilians in Konshisha, Benue. The military disputed these claims. April 8: Gunmen killed one officer and ten soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 9: Bandits killed one and kidnapped ten in Shiroro, Niger State. April 9: Boko Haram killed five and kidnapped thirty in Hong, Adamawa. April 9: Gunmen killed eight at a mining site in Jos South, Plateau.

On April 5, gunmen attacked a prison in Owerri, Nigeria, freeing 1,844 inmates. (Owerri, the capital of Imo State, is a major trading center with more than one million residents.) On April 6, “bandits” stormed a police station in Ehime Mbano, also in Imo State, freeing detainees. No group has claimed responsibility, but police say the likely perpetrators are the Eastern Security Network, the armed wing of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). President Buhari, in London for medical reasons, characterized the perpetrators as “terrorists”; the army pledged to “flush out the miscreants” from the region. Vice President Yemi Osinbajo arrived in Imo State yesterday to assess the damage in Owerri. Imo is mostly Igbo and Christian in population. It was the heartland of support for an independent Biafra during the 1967-70 civil war. Since then, successive federal governments have taken a hard line on separatism. Since 2015, when Buhari, a northern Muslim, was elected president, separatist sentiment has been growing. The movement of Muslim, ethnically Fulani herdsmen into the region looking for pasture has exacerbated the situation, as has the influx of mostly Muslim internally displaced persons fleeing Boko Haram in the North East. Some advocates for renewed Biafran separatism claim an Islamic plot, abetted by the Buhari government, to place all of Nigeria under the crescent. The jailbreaks will likely increase violence and insecurity in Imo State. It should be noted, however, that pro-Biafra sentiment is not widespread in the adjacent oil patch in the Niger Delta, specifically Bayelsa and Rivers States. The low-level insurrection in the Niger Delta has different drivers.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 27 to April 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 27-28: A cult war resulted in four deaths in Awka North, Anambra. March 28: Gunmen killed a Peoples Democratic Party chieftain and kidnapped his wife in Tafa, Niger State. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Ogbadibo, Benue. March 28: Sectarian violence resulted in eight deaths in Uzu-Uwani, Enugu. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Osogbo, Osun. March 29: Herdsmen killed twenty in Ishielu, Ebonyi. March 29: Gunmen killed three in Ezza South, Ebonyi. March 29: Kidnappers abducted three in Oluyole, Oyo. March 29: Kidnappers abducted a Catholic priest and three others in Kagarko, Kaduna. March 29: Sectarian violence resulted in three deaths in Bassa, Plateau. March 29: Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) killed four police officers in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Gunmen killed a Catholic priest and three others in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 30: A bank robbery resulted in the deaths of one police officer, one robber, and four civilians in Aniocha North, Delta. March 30: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese farmers in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. March 30: Bandits killed six in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA), one in Giwa LGA, and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. March 30: Communal violence led to seven deaths in Ibiono Ibom, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Communal violence led to three deaths in Owan West, Edo. March 31: Gunmen killed three police officers and kidnapped a commissioner at a rally in Aguata, Anambra. March 31: Boko Haram claimed responsibility for gunning down a Nigerian Air Force jet with two pilots around Gwoza, Borno; the air force rejected this claim. April 1: Bandits killed five soldiers and nine civilians and kidnapped twenty in Shiroro, Niger State. April 1: Kidnappers abducted five in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 1: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Ekeremor, Bayelsa. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed eight Boko Haram militants in Monguno, Borno. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed five youths in Ardo-Kola, Taraba. April 2: Bandits killed two in Kokona, Nassarawa.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 20 to March 26, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 20: Three were killed in election-related violence in Ekiti East, Ekiti. March 20: Gunmen killed a police inspector during an attack on a police station in Isiala Mbano, Imo. March 20: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers and lost "several" (estimated at ten) militants in Ngala, Borno. March 21: Herdsmen killed three in Ukwuani, Edo. March 21: Cultists killed four in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. March 22: Gunmen killed three police officers in Ohafia, Abia. March 22: Bandits killed one in Jema'a Local Government Area (LGA) and three in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. March 23: Nigerian troops and police officers killed sixteen members of the Indigenous People of Biafra's Eastern Security Network in Aba, Abia. March 23: Gunmen killed twelve in Takum, Taraba. March 24: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 24: Kidnappers abducted four in Kuje, Federal Capital Territory. March 24: Bandits killed three in Illela, Sokoto. March 24: Bandits killed two civilians and troops retaliated, killing two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 24: Bandits killed one soldier and twenty vigilantes in Mariga, Niger State. March 24: Bandits killed two in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. March 25: Bandits killed eight in Birnin-Gwari LGA and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. March 25: Kidnappers abducted three from airport quarters in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. March 25: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. March 26: Kidnappers abducted eight in Kachia, Kaduna. March 26: Nigerian troops killed forty-eight Boko Haram militants in Chibok, Borno.

Nigerian lawmakers are seeking passage of a Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that would reorganize the oil industry. Since the establishment of civilian government in 1999 after a generation of military rule, repeated attempts at passing a PIB have been made. But the government, the political class, and the industry's leaders (foreign and domestic) have never reached a consensus that would make the reordering possible of such a crucial industry. The technical issues are exceedingly complex. Uncertainty around the bill has contributed to low levels of new investment in the industry.  However, against the backdrop of low international oil prices, the worldwide move away from fossil fuels, and pervasive security and other crises in the country, the Buhari administration appears to believe that passage now has a good chance. More generally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the political class has recognized that oil is likely to be less important in the future than it has been in the past. Oil and natural gas are the property of the state. They are exploited in partnerships and joint agreements between the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and privately owned oil companies, both international (such as Agip, Total, Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron) and now numerous small Nigerian firms. In part because of security issues in the oil patch—including attacks on oil facilities reflecting an alienated population—about half of all oil production is offshore. Oil and gas are a relatively small percentage of Nigeria's economy and employ few but are nonetheless central to government revenue. Revenue from oil provides about 65 percent of government revenue (as of 2018), and securing and maintaining access to it is an essential driver of political-class behavior. Further, successive Nigerian governments made use of below-market-price oil to expand the country’s political influence, especially with member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Hence the PIB is a profoundly political document, with winner and losers.  Earlier in this century, oil was at the center of the Washington-Abuja bilateral partnership. The United States typically purchased about half of Nigeria's two million-barrels-per-day production. Further, successive military and civilian governments assured Washington that in the event of a cut in Middle Eastern oil because of a political crisis, Nigeria would do what it could to increase its own production. (Nigeria's capacity to increase production was limited, but the commitment to do so was important politically.) Hence, in those days, a PIB was closely watched in Washington and in American board rooms. Now, however, the United States imports almost no oil from Nigeria, the result of domestic fracking and the expansion of oil production in the Western hemisphere. That reality reduces the political significance for Washington of a PIB—though not for the big American oil companies active in Nigeria. Nigeria now sells oil that once was bound to the United States to India, Indonesia, China, and elsewhere in Asia.  Will the Buhari administration succeed in passing a PIB? The chances would appear to be good for the passage of some sort of legislation. But what the new bill will actually mean will depend on the details—and also on the institutions and schedules required for its implementation. Hence a passed PIB is not over "until the fat lady sings."

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 13 to March 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 13: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 13: Gunmen killed six in Irewole, Osun. March 13: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants and lost four soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. March 14: Vigilantes killed nine bandits in Lapai, Niger State. March 14: Gunmen kidnapped ten in Suleja, Niger State. March 14: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Safana Local Government Area (LGA) and kidnapped four in Danmusa LGA in Katsina. March 14: Boko Haram killed twenty-two herdsmen in Monguno, Borno. March 15: Three teachers were kidnapped from a school in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed forty-one Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. March 15: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno. March 15: Bandits killed two in Kauru, Kaduna. March 15: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Ayamelum, Anambra. March 15: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) Nigerian soldiers during an attack on a military base in Mobbar, Borno. March 16: Bandits killed three soldiers and five civilians in Gusau, Zamfara. March 17: Bandits killed one police officer and kidnapped three civilians in Chikun, Kaduna. March 17: Bandits killed one and kidnapped two in Bakori, Katsina. March 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Birnin Kudu, Jigawa. March 17: Police officers killed two bandits in Lere, Kaduna. March 18: Gunmen killed four naval officers in Oyi LGA and three police officers in Anaocha LGA in Anambra. March 18: Nigerian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. March 19: Gunmen killed two police officers and two prison warders in Aguata, Anambra. March 19: Bandits killed one in Zangon Kataf LGA, ten in Kauru LGA, and two in Chikun LGA in Kaduna.

Fola Aina is a doctoral fellow at King’s College London. He is an international security analyst with expertise on peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. Nigeria’s northern regions continue to struggle with insecurity, claiming the lives of tens of thousands and displacing millions due to armed banditry and Boko Haram. Significant battlefield defeats led the military to resort to a strategy of establishing super camps to prevent terrorists and armed bandits from overrunning areas of relative peace. However, as that approach has largely failed, President Muhammadu Buhari decided to heed months of repeated calls for change among the military’s top brass when he appointed new service chiefs in late January. The new service chiefs should, as a matter of operational urgency, begin to work closely towards prioritizing the establishment of Nigeria’s first—and long overdue—Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Countries located in or near the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions lack any JSOC-like structures, despite facing increasingly complex threats from violent extremist organizations. Nigeria, should it establish and successfully operationalize a JSOC, would be a trend-setter. As it is, the Nigerian military is overstretched across multiple fronts—onshore and offshore. Worsening matters, Kabir Adamu, a Nigeria-based security analyst, diagnoses Nigeria’s security architecture as lacking an “element of coordination” and any “mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation that would allow anyone to understand what they are doing.” A focused and dedicated command that draws on the expertise of elite Special Operations Forces (SOFs), such as the navy’s Special Boat Service, would improve execution of ongoing military operations against violent extremism while enabling better-coordinated strategic planning. Up to now, the government, rather than address the lack of coordination directly, has stuck mostly to replacing service chiefs and increasing manpower in regions blighted by insecurity—the number of which is growing. An advantage of creating a JSOC is that it would unify the chain of command; at present, Nigeria suffers from an overreliance of tactical direction from the command-and-control structure in Abuja. Bringing together the expertise of elite SOFs across the various arms of Nigeria’s military—including the army, air force, and navy—under a JSOC would encourage data-sharing, the lack of which has been a consequential shortcoming in the war against Boko Haram. A case in point is the 2011 attack on the UN office in Abuja, which the military failed to prevent despite receiving intelligence on the plot nine days before its execution. The appointment in late February of a new deputy chief of counter-insurgency command demonstrates a recognition of the need for greater synergy between Nigeria’s different chains of command, particularly the air force and the army. But the February appointment does not go far enough, as it does not formalize strategic cooperation between all branches of the armed forces in the way a JSOC would. A well-implemented JSOC would also enhance the Nigerian military’s ability to collect, share, and act upon various forms of intelligence—such as human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT)—thus enabling rapid response to asymmetric threats, as was the case when the army foiled an attempted abduction in Kaduna State earlier this month. National Security Adviser Babagana Monguno has said the government’s intelligence agencies are attuned to individuals involved in kidnappings, but the increasing frequency of mass abductions suggests that not enough is being done to act on available intelligence. Significant to note is that, for the JSOC to be fully effective, SOFs would need to be equipped with state-of-the-art technology, such as night vision goggles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The government could invest more in research and development through the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria to encourage domestic production. However, given that it would likely take a decade or more to produce high-grade military hardware, Nigeria in the meantime will continue to rely on foreign suppliers. The purchase of a dozen A-29 Super Tucanos, approved by the U.S. State Department in 2017 despite human rights concerns, will improve the air force’s ability to provide close air support. The aircraft’s state-of-the-art capabilities—the Super Tucano boasts advanced optics and secure radio systems with data links—also make it well-suited to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Similarly, the Chinese government has supplied the Nigerian military with VT-4 main battle tanks, SH-5 self-propelled howitzers, and eight new UAVs which can be armed with laser-guided bombs and missiles. Successfully curbing insecurity in Nigeria’s northern regions will require winning a military-focused “hard war” alongside a “soft war” of winning hearts and minds—which itself should be pursued with greater emphasis if there is to be progress in ending the Boko Haram-driven insurgency. Nevertheless, with respect to the “hard war,” Nigeria should establish a JSOC as part of a more effective military strategy. Additional troop deployments and reorganizations of service chiefs are not enough.

Nkasi Wodu, a New Voices Fellow at the Aspen Institute, is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In early March, over three hundred schoolgirls abducted by armed groups from a secondary school in Zamfara State in northern Nigeria were released by their abductors. Unfortunately, the global outrage this incident stoked has not deterred the armed groups operating in the north. Just last week, another set of students was kidnapped from a college in Kaduna State—the third mass kidnapping of students in Nigeria in 2021. An ugly video released by the kidnappers in Kaduna showed the students being brutalized by their abductors. Nigeria clearly needs to do more to protect its children. The country’s future depends on it. The recent abductions are part of a worrying trend that underscores students’ lack of safety in Nigeria. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), over 13 million Nigerian children are not enrolled in school, more than anywhere else in the world. About 8 million of those children are located in Nigeria’s northern states, where violent conflicts spanning more than a decade have exacerbated the situation. Boko Haram, an Islamist insurgent group, is known for targeting schoolchildren and using them as leverage to negotiate with the Nigerian government for the release of prisoners. In 2014, the insurgent group attacked Chibok, a community in the northern state of Borno, abducting more than 250 schoolgirls. The Chibok incident sparked global outrage, but previous attacks occurred with little international attention. Earlier the same year, over fifty schoolboys from Buni Yadi, a town in Yobe State, were killed by suspected Boko Haram militants. Since February 2014, northern Nigeria has experienced at least seven high-profile attacks on secondary schools. More than one thousand schoolchildren have been victims of mass abductions by armed groups. While some of these students have been released, a significant number remain in captivity. Even beyond the most noteworthy kidnapping episodes, Boko Haram has continued to attack schools, abducting students and using them as suicide bombers or marrying off girls as brides to their soldiers. What is driving the recent spate of abductions? Several factors contribute: a proliferation of small arms and overstretched security forces make it difficult for the government to maintain control, while peace deals and huge ransom payments create perverse incentives that encourage more kidnappings. Blanket amnesties have recently gained even more traction through the support of Sheik Gumi, a leading Islamic cleric in northern Nigeria who appointed himself as a negotiator working to secure the release of victims of kidnapping. Attacks on students have many implications—for students themselves, along with their families and the country at large. Insecurity focused on centers of learning fuels parents’ unwillingness to send their children to school, thereby advancing Boko Haram’s goal of preventing Western education. A recent report revealed that over six hundred schools in six states in northern Nigeria have been shut down due to widespread insecurity. The attacks also provide armed groups with leverage to negotiate with the government, either for the release of prisoners or a request for a general amnesty. Compounding the situation, children without education can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by bandits and jihadis. The wave of insecurity in northern Nigeria is therefore creating a generation of children whose education has been permanently dented. The broad shortage of education could also lead to a skills gap in the workforce, reducing youths’ ability to catalyze sorely needed economic development. According to the World Bank, countries impacted by prolonged conflict are most likely to remain poor. This, in turn, leads to more violence. To improve the situation, Nigeria needs to intensify the Safe Schools Initiative established in 2014 in response to the Chibok abductions. Although armed groups have proliferated since its launch, the initiative can be tweaked to meet current realities. Better coordination between state and federal governments would also improve the response to banditry and general insecurity. Part of this strategy should involve the use of early warning and early response systems involving the federal government, state governments, local vigilantes, and community leaders. Without decisive action, abductions and the instability they cause will continue to plague Nigeria, holding back the futures of children and the country they will inherit.