Nigeria

Nolan Quinn contributed to this post. The plane crash May 21 killing Chief of Army Staff General Ibrahim Attahiru and all passengers and crew aboard is the fourth air tragedy in the past five months involving Nigeria Air Force aircraft. Initially, few details on the most recent crash were released, allowing conspiracy theories and falsely claimed videos of the crash to emerge on social media. The opposition Peoples Democratic Party caucus in the National Assembly called for a thorough investigation of the crash that killed Attahiru, while the Christian Association of Nigeria asked President Buhari to declare military plane crashes a national emergency. General Attahiru was buried on May 22, following Muslim customs. While tragic, the cause of this latest crash appears to be straightforward. The general was flying to Kaduna to attend the Passing Out Parade on May 22 at the Nigerian Defense Academy. The plane was to have landed at a Nigerian Air Force facility but was diverted to the civilian Kaduna International Airport, where it crashed because of weather. A huge country with a weak transportation infrastructure and serious banditry issues, Nigeria is particularly dependent on aviation. Plane crashes seem to cluster; serious crashes occurred in October 2005, December 2005, September 2006, and October 2006. The May 21 crash was preceded by a crash in February 2021. In response to the recent accidents, a committee has been established to conduct a safety audit of all Nigerian Air Force operational and engineering units. With the Nigerian government’s penchant for secrecy about bad news, details about plane crashes are slow to come, giving space for conspiracy theories. This time, it is to be hoped that the quick release of the details of the crash will forestall the rumor mill. General Attahiru was made chief of army staff—in effect the most powerful military position—by President Muhammadu Buhari as part of his January 2021 shake-up of the military’s top brass in the face of the rapid deterioration of security around the country. Attahiru's death is a setback for the Buhari government’s flagging efforts to curb insecurity in Nigeria.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 15 to May 21, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 15: Herdsmen killed three and a police officer killed one in Guma, Benue. May 15: Gunmen killed four in Khana, Rivers. May 15: Herdsmen killed three in Keana, Nassarawa. May 15: Police officers killed four gunmen and one nurse in Oyigbo, Rivers. May 16: Gunmen killed three police officers during an attack on a police station in Aniocha South, Delta. May 16: Communal violence resulted in three deaths in Ayamelum, Anambra. May 16: Herdsmen killed four in Gwer West, Benue. May 16: Sectarian violence resulted in sixteen deaths in Bali, Taraba. May 16: Police officers killed four robbers in Ethiope East, Delta. May 16: Nigerian troops killed forty Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. May 17: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Umuahia South, Abia. May 17: Bandits killed three soldiers and kidnapped two expatriates while two bandits were also killed in Magama, Niger State. May 17: Bandits killed eight and kidnapped eleven in Kachia, Kaduna. May 17: Sectarian violence resulted in two deaths in Edu, Kwara. May 18: Kidnappers abducted a Shariah Court judge in Safana, Katsina. May 18: Bandits killed one and kidnapped twenty-one in Batsari, Katsina. May 18: "Hoodlums" set two Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officers on fire in Ebonyi and Ezza North Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Ebonyi. May 18: Bandits killed nine and kidnapped eighteen in Maru, Zamfara. May 19: Bandits killed eight while troops killed three bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. May 19: Herdsmen kill three in Igabi, Kaduna. May 19: Gunmen killed one police officer in Owerri North, Imo. May 19: Communal violence led to three deaths in Odukpani, Cross River. May 19: During an attack by the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) on a Boko Haram base, there was a gunfight that led to a number of deaths followed by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau allegedly blowing himself up along with high-ranking members of ISWA (estimated at twenty total) in Gwoza, Borno. May 19: Bandits killed three and kidnapped twenty in Suleja, Niger State. May 19: Bandits killed eight while troops killed three bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. May 20: Bandits killed five in Kontagora, Niger State. May 20: Gunmen killed one Catholic priest and kidnapped another in Malumfashi, Katsina. May 20: Gunmen killed two in Igabi LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and one in Jema'a LGA in Kaduna. May 21: Robbers killed one police officer and one other in Umuahia North, Abia. May 21: Gunmen killed nine in Makurdi, Benue. May 21: Gunmen killed two Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officers in Anambra East, Anambra. May 21: A cult clash led to eight deaths in Esit Eket, Akwa Ibom.

Multiple Nigerian media outlets reported last week that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has died or been mortally wounded in a confrontation with fighters from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a group that separated from Shekau’s Boko Haram in 2016. The Nigerian government has not confirmed the reports and is investigating. The caution is well-placed: Shekau has been reported dead at least four times since he became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009 following the police killing of founder Mohammed Yusuf. This time, however, the reports have more credibility. The story is that ISWA fighters tracked down Shekau, killed his fighters, and then demanded that he swear allegiance to Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of ISWA. After a fruitless parley, so the story goes, Shekau tried to kill himself—and some within ISWA leadership—using a suicide vest. Another version has it that he shot himself in the chest, and a few of his followers escaped with the badly wounded Shekau, living to fight another day. The split [PDF] between ISWA and Shekau's faction in 2016 was over Shekau's brutality against other Muslims and his use of child suicide bombers. Otherwise, the goals of the two were the same: destruction of the secular state, creation of a polity based on Islamic law, and the end of Western influence. Since the split, relations between the two factions have varied. Shekau was the recognized successor to Yusuf, while al-Barnawi was the latter's son. Sometimes, they appear to have cooperated tactically. Of late, however, relations have been murderous. That ISWA tracked down Shekau and sought to compel him to accept al-Barnawi's leadership is credible, as is that the erratic Shekau chose suicide instead. Assuming Shekau is, indeed, dead, what difference will it make? ISWA has become the much stronger and better organized of the two factions. It trumpets its ties to the Islamic State (IS) group and cooperates with other jihadi groups under the IS umbrella active in the Sahel. ISWA could well absorb Shekau's jihadi fighters. Shekau's faction appeared focused on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin while ISWA has looked further beyond its borders. If ISWA is able to establish dominance over the various jihadi factions across the Sahel, it will become more formidable than Shekau's faction was and a greater threat to the fragile states in the neighborhood. Shekau was a monster, known for his brutal executions that he publicized, his use of women and children as suicide bombers, and his wholesale kidnapping: he orchestrated the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, more than a hundred of whom remain in captivity. He mastered the politics of terror. He was charismatic and erratic with some education: he deliberately misquoted Abraham Lincoln. He was also a religious leader and drew on the well of Islamic grievance in northern Nigeria to produce a belief system largely regarded as a perversion of Salafist-inflected Islam but one which has spread in the Sahel.

The Nigerian government has launched Operation Restore Peace, designed to destroy the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist group in support of independence for the former breakaway Republic of Biafra, and its security wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). According to Acting Inspector General of Police (IGP) Usman Baba, the security services are not to be constrained by human rights considerations. In comments reported in the Nigerian media, he said: "Don’t mind the media shout; do the job I command you. If anyone accuses you of human rights violation, the report will come to my table and you know what I will do. So, take the battle to them wherever they are and kill them all. Don’t wait for an order." "What another order are you waiting for when Mr. President had ordered you to shoot anybody carrying AK-47 rifle? Quote me, even a dead policeman can be tried and dismissed from the force and his family will not get his benefits." "So, don’t sit and wait for them to come; take attack to them and don’t lose your arms to criminals." So, the IGP is not only giving the green light to human rights violations, but also promising his protection for those who commit them. In addition, he is threatening those who might hang back with the loss of pension benefits! Usman is implying that he has the full support of President Muhammadu Buhari. Other reporting alleges that security services are conducting house-to-house searches in Ebonyi, Imo, and Rivers states, all with large Igbo populations. Local people are saying that the security services are rounding up young men and their family members and taking them away for questioning. IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu has dubbed the police initiative "Operation Massacre Biafrans." Usman Baba is a northern Muslim from Yobe State—long a Boko Haram stronghold. He is a career police officer. There is nothing in his background that would suggest an understanding of southern and eastern grievances and fears of the "establishment of a Fulani Caliphate." Operation Restore Peace and Baba's rhetoric would seem tailor-made to feed the revived Biafra secessionist movement and general southern and Christian fears of a Fulani-Muslim onslaught against Christians. It should be anticipated that local people will fight back viciously and the security services—as directed by Usman Baba—will respond in kind. It is to be hoped that President Buhari will repudiate Baba's rhetoric and methods, not least for the sake of the unity of Nigeria.

The Western media is focused on the struggle between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, with searing images of the humanitarian disaster that is unfolding. Yet the magnitude is tiny compared to the humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Total confirmed deaths number 239 in the current round of fighting between Hamas and the Israelis. In comparison, there have been at least 755 deaths since January 1, 2021 in northeastern Borno State, the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency; in northeastern Nigeria alone, over 2.9 million are internally displaced. In northwestern Kaduna and Zamfara states, both heavily afflicted by armed banditry, cumulative deaths since the turn of the year are at least 705. (Many more have been kidnapped.) Reporting from northern Nigeria is difficult, and thus casualty figures are likely an undercount. Now, the World Food Program is sounding the alarm over the looming prospect of famine. Already, a large majority of Nigerians (86 percent) lack access to a safely managed source of potable water. In northeastern Nigeria, food and other relief is provided almost entirely by UN agencies and some 150 Nigerian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet their personnel are under attack from Boko Haram and other jihadi organizations who accuse aid workers of, among other things, "Christianizing" the indigenous Muslim population. The other bookend of humanitarian frustration is that relief workers credibly complain that their efforts are too often thwarted by the army and the police in the name of "security." At least some security operatives complain that humanitarian relief reaches jihadis. Why does the ongoing tragedy in northern Nigeria—and indeed much of the rest of the Sahel—attract so little attention in the developed world? Part of the answer is that the Sahel and northern Nigeria are far away. Few Americans have a personal link to it, unlike the large number that are invested in Israel and Palestine in one way or another. Many, perhaps most, Americans are convinced that what happens in Israel and Palestine directly affects U.S. interests. Further, issues in the conflict in northern Nigeria and the Sahel, in many ways a civil war within Islam, are obscure to twenty-first-century Americans. Popular media coverage is also limited: for a long time, media access to the war zone has been inhibited both by jihadis and the security services. "Compassion fatigue" in the aftermath of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria also plays a role. Whatever the reasons, the bottom line is that the ongoing tragedy in the Sahel and northern Nigeria merits more humanitarian attention from the United States than it receives.

Following President Muhammadu Buhari's May 11 meeting with the military service chiefs and the inspector general of police, Nigerian military sources confirmed that some troops were being moved from Borno State, where they have been engaged with Boko Haram and other jihadis, to the South East, to counter "bandits" and the regional separatist organization, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), along with its security force, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). The army and police have sustained increased casualties in the South East, so aircraft—including combat helicopters—will be "deployed to conduct massive raids" on the hideouts of "criminals" from the IPOB and ESN. Another source suggested traditional rulers, community heads, and chiefs could be arrested to warn them against "conniving with the agitators." The police announced yesterday the launch of Operation Restore Peace to confront the IPOB and ESN. So, rather than a counterinsurgency approach to Igbo separatism with a political dimension, the federal government is resorting to military and police force. The use of helicopters and other aircraft is concerning in that it could—and likely will—result in growing civilian casualties, thereby feeding the very separatist movements that the government is seeking to contain. It will also likely exacerbate ethnic tensions. Military and police personnel are increasingly unwilling to serve in the South East and, if there, unwilling to wear their uniforms, especially if they are not Igbos, the ethnic majority in the region. For President Buhari and others of his generation, the central event of Nigeria's post-independence history was the 1967-70 civil war, in which the primarily Igbo separatists attempted to leave the federation and establish an independent state of Biafra. The federal forces defeated Biafra, and the territory was reincorporated into Nigeria; deaths from the fighting and associated disease and famine were up to two million. Hence, successive federal administrations have reacted strongly against any resurgence of Biafran separatism.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 8 to May 14, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     (March 23–April 2 and April 19–May 3: Nigerian troops reported that they killed fifty-three bandits in and around Maradun, Zamfara.) May 8: Gunmen killed six police officers during an attack on a police station in Ini, Akwa Ibom. May 8: Bandits killed three in Jema'a, Kaduna. May 8: Bandits killed eleven in Safana, Katsina. May 9: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Essien-Udium, Akwa Ibom. May 9: Gunmen killed five in Ekwusigo, Anambra. May 9: A Nigerian soldier killed one civilian in Gusau, Zamfara. May 10: Bandits kidnapped forty from a mosque in Jibia, Katsina; thirty were rescued immediately. May 10: Police killed three kidnappers in Oredo, Edo. May 10: Kidnappers abducted a pastor from his church in Akure, Ondo. May 10: Herdsmen killed one in Iwajowa, Oyo. May 10: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Bakassi, Cross River. May 11: Bandits killed one police officer in Sokoto, Sokoto. May 11: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, killing nine militants in Maiduguri, Borno. May 11: Kidnappers abducted two in Akoko North-West, Ondo. May 11: Gunmen killed two in Ife North, Osun. May 12: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Etim Ekpo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Pirates killed two in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Security operatives killed two gunmen in Obowo, Imo. May 13: Customs officers killed five civilians in Iseyin, Oyo. May 13: Herdsmen killed eleven in Bali, Taraba. May 13: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at twenty total) in Chikun and Birnin-Gwari Local Government Areas in Kaduna. May 13: A cult clash resulted in eight deaths in Esit Eket, Akwa Ibom. May 14: Gunmen killed one in Port Harcourt, Rivers.

In another sign of elite alarm over the deterioration of security in Nigeria, representatives from fifteen of the seventeen southern states—hailing from the South West, South South, and South East geopolitical zones—met virtually on May 4 and again on May 11 for an in-person meeting in Asaba, Delta State to "harmonise their positions." (Representatives from Osun and Cross River states were absent from the in-person meeting, though Osun State’s governor was present at the virtual meeting.) Representatives included governors—a large majority—and deputy governors. They met under the auspices of the Southern Nigerian Governors' Forum (SNGF), which has long been moribund but is now revived. At the end of the most recent meeting, SNGF chairman Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, the governor of Ondo State, read out a communique issued by the group. The group called on President Muhammadu Buhari to convene a "national dialogue," insisted on the banning of open grazing in southern Nigeria, and "affirmed that the peoples of Southern Nigeria remain committed to the unity of Nigeria on the basis of justice, fairness, equity and oneness and peaceful co-existence between and among its peoples, with a focus on the attainment of shared goals for economic development and prosperity." Southern senators threw their weight behind the proposals put forward by the SNGF. Security issues, incursions by Muslim "Fulani" cattle herders, and frustration with the federal government's inability to provide security appears to have brought together governors from Yoruba, Igbo, and minority-ethnic group states. Most, but not all, are Christian. It remains to be seen whether the SNGF, after years of irrelevance, becomes an important political entity. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

The German minister of culture has announced plans to return hundreds of art objects to Nigeria. Their provenance is the Benin Royal Palace—located in Benin City, which is situated in southern Nigeria—looted and destroyed by the British in 1897. Apparently, the objects will be deposited at the Edo Museum of West African Art, under construction in Benin City. Its architect—or, rather, starchitect—is David Adjaye, the Anglo-Ghanaian architect who served as the lead designer for the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and Culture in Washington, D.C. When the objects will return is unclear. The construction of the museum is far from complete; Adjaye indicated that it could take five years. The German minister characterized the return as a matter of "moral responsibility." Some Western media are tying agitation for return of African art in European and American collections to the "reckoning" underway of colonialism and Western racism. Germany's form of colonialism was especially brutal. The Germans, however, were not in Edo and, presumably, the objects from there were looted objects purchased on the international art market and then donated to German museums. The German decision has raised pressure on London’s British Museum—which holds seven hundred pieces of the Benin Bronzes collection, more than any other museum—and other institutions to lend or return bronzes to Nigeria. Perhaps as few as fifty pieces remain in Nigeria at present. Calls for the return of art acquired by Western countries during the colonial period is an old song. Some countries, especially where national identity is weak, see the return of art as a dimension of nation-building. Other cases are more narrowly a matter of principle. Since the nineteenth century, the Greeks have agitated for the British return of the Parthenon sculptures (the "Elgin Marbles"). This perspective takes for granted that the art produced in a particular locale uniquely belongs to the people who live there now, hence the importance of its physical repatriation. Another perspective is that art belongs to humanity as a whole. What matters in that case is the art’s accessibility to all who wish to see and study it and its conservation and security, not its physical location. To take specific example, the Elgin Marbles are on permanent display in the British Museum, where they are fully protected in a country characterized by political stability and where the public has full access. An issue with respect to the return of African art to Africa has been the lack of places where it could be exhibited, stored securely, and curated. That appears to be changing. The Edo Museum is designed to be a world-class facility. However, the museum located in a poor, increasingly unstable country. Where sustainable funding will come from or how security of the art can be maintained is unclear. The sponsors of the Edo Museum are looking toward rotating exhibits of artwork to be borrowed from European and American collections and then returned. Such an approach might satisfy those who see the art as a badge of their ethnic or national identity and those who see the art as belonging to all of humanity.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 1 to May 7, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 1: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Onicha, Ebonyi. May 1: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Ikono, Akwa Ibom. May 1: Gunmen killed a commissioner and kidnapped the local government chairman in Yagba West, Kogi. May 1: One civilian died during a battle between Nigerian troops and Boko Haram in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 2: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and six civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 2: Herdsmen killed nineteen in Gwer West, Benue. May 2: A task force killed two kidnappers in Dekina, Kogi. May 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa North, Oyo. May 3: The Nigerian Air Force killed bandits (no number given; estimated at ten) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. May 3: Bandits killed one journalist and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Jibia, Katsina. May 3: Boko Haram killed fifteen Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members, five soldiers, and ten civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 3: Communal violence led to four deaths in Akoko North-East, Ondo. May 3: Bandits killed one in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. May 3: Communal violence led to six deaths in Agatu, Benue. May 4: Kidnappers abducted four in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 4: Kidnappers abducted two in Jos North, Plateau. May 5: Gunmen abducted university students (no number given; estimated at ten) in Isuikwua, Abia. May 5: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Idemili North, Anambra. May 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna; the kidnapped victims were later rescued after a gunfight with police. May 5: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped another police officer and three others in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 6: Eleven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN) militants and one Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officer were killed during a clash in Orlu, Imo. May 6: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ohaozara, Ebonyi. May 6: Robbers killed two during an attack on a bullion van in Ondo, Ondo. May 6: Bandits killed seven in Magama, Niger State. May 7: Protestors killed a police officer in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). May 7: Communal violence led to the deaths of one police officer and two others in Iwo, Osun. May 7: Gunmen killed five police officers in Port Harcourt LGA and two police officers in Emuoha LGA while losing two of their own during attacks on police stations in Rivers.

Some Nigerian movers and shakers appear to be panicking over the continued deterioration of security nationwide. Longtime political heavyweight Bukola Saraki—former governor of Kwara State, former president of the senate, and former chairman of the National Assembly—and Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka have urged President Muhammadu Buhari to seek outside assistance. Senior Advocate of Nigeria Robert Clarke at a Sunday, May 2 Channels Television news show questioned whether Nigeria would survive another six months and recommended that Nigeria’s political leadership hand over power to the military because the country is on the brink of collapse; he would have the military (in effect, the army) oversee the often mooted fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian state. (Clarke, Saraki, and Soyinka have long been critical of Nigeria’s governance; Channels Television is a major network and its Sunday morning news/talk shows follow a familiar American format.) At his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, President Muhammadu Buhari asked that the headquarters of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) be moved from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa, so that it would be closer to the fighting against jihadism in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Since AFRICOM’s establishment in 2007, Nigeria has generally opposed any permanent AFRICOM presence in Africa. Critics have alleged that AFRICOM is “neocolonialist.” Buhari’s request was a reversal of longstanding policy. Perhaps in direct response to Clarke’s televised remarks on May 4—as well as Sen. Saraki and other critics—Acting Director of Defense Information Brig. Gen. Onyema Nwachukwu publicly stated that the military has no intention of taking power: “We shall continue to remain apolitical, subordinate to civil authority, firmly loyal to the president…and the 1999 constitution.” In the face of the deterioration of security, doom and gloom about the future of Nigeria is widespread in public discourse. Still, Clarke went further than most—and on national television. Buhari’s AFRICOM request is an indication of a willingness to consider hitherto unacceptable options. Twenty-two years after the military left power and civilian, ostensibly democratic federalism was restored, it is striking that the army felt it necessary to issue a denial of any intention to seize power. The bottom line is that while Clarke is an outlier, something of a consensus among Nigerian elites seems to be forming that the country is in deep trouble and that radical options must be considered. But no consensus exists about what state collapse would look like, what the way forward should be, and what “radical restructuring of the Nigerian state” would actually mean or how it could be achieved. For now, however, the outlook would seem to be continuing, perhaps accelerating instability and uncertainty.

Asch Harwood, a former research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, is the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker and the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  The Nigerian state security apparatus has a long history of human rights violations. Most recently, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notorious Nigerian police unit, made international headlines for its brutality and a wave of massive protests calling for its disbandment—which were then quashed by security services in a horrifying massacre of peaceful protestors. In many instances, the military’s response to Boko Haram has been similarly heavy-handed and indiscriminate. Abuses have been well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and even the State Department. A former colleague of mine gained access in 2017 to a prison holding suspected Boko Haram operatives, where he confirmed the abhorrent conditions and presence of significant numbers of women and children. Nevertheless, members of the military and police have also been victims of Boko Haram in their own right. The impact of the Boko Haram conflict on security services has been far-reaching, but in this analysis, the focus is on the geographic heart of the conflict—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in Nigeria, the Lac region in Chad, Diffa in Niger, and Extreme-Nord in Cameroon.     Since 2012, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) has documented roughly 3,384 state security service deaths in the Boko Haram conflict. The epicenter of the violence is Borno State, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of all security personnel deaths in the NST dataset. Though the militaries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria cooperate under the guise of the African Union-authorized Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the NST does not distinguish the nationality of security personnel victims, only the approximate geographic location.   The deadliest years for security services overall have been 2018, 2019, and 2020, with 2019 the deadliest at an estimated 719 security personnel killed. This represents a shift from the height of the conflict in 2014-2015, when security personnel deaths were relatively low compared to the astronomical number of Boko Haram and civilian deaths, as can be seen in the chart below.   Since 2014, at least, Boko Haram has split into factions which sometimes cooperate. New factions are especially hostile to the police and the security services. In response to high casualty rates, the military and security services have withdrawn into highly fortified encampments. Their death rates have declined, but the jihadi factions are able to move about the countryside almost at will.   In 2019 and 2020, security personnel deaths jumped in Chad’s Lac region. In one incident in Bohoma in 2020, over ninety Chadian troops were killed. But Nigeria, and Borno State in particular, still remain the geographic center of the conflict. The borders in northeastern Nigeria, and particularly around Lake Chad, are porous, facilitating both Boko Haram and MNJTF’s regular movement across them. While these numbers appear to bring a sense of precision to the conflict, important to remember is that the NST relies on open-source reporting of casualties, which is subject to a number of biases in the context of the Boko Haram conflict. For one, many incidents take place in remote areas. As a result, estimates come from the military or Boko Haram themselves, both of which have incentives to downplay the number of deaths on their respective sides while overstating enemy casualties. Nevertheless, they provide a sense of the shape and trajectory of the conflict. The data shows that Boko Haram is far from defeated, and that the decline in military and security-service casualties are likely the result of their withdrawal from much of the countryside.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 24 to April 30, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 24: Gunmen killed eight security personnel in Ikwerre, Rivers. April 24: Gunmen killed nine farmers in Doma, Nassarawa. April 24: Security forces killed seven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Gunmen killed eight in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Bandits kidnapped five in Dandume, Katsina. April 24: Kidnappers abducted ten in Ogo-Oluwa, Osun. April 24: Kidnappers abducted three in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 24: Bandits kidnapped thirty-five in Shiroro, Niger State. April 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four at a church in Chikun, Kaduna. April 25: Kidnappers abducted three students in Makurdi, Benue. April 25: Bandits killed nine police officers and two vigilantes in Sakaba, Kebbi. April 25: Bandits kidnapped two in Zaria Local Government Area (LGA), killed six in Birnin-Gwari LGA, and killed one in Kachia LGA in Kaduna. April 25: Boko Haram killed thirty-three Nigerian soldiers in Kaga, Borno. April 25: The Nigerian Air Force accidentally killed twenty soldiers during an airstrike meant to target Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. April 26: Sectarian violence led to nineteen deaths in Oyi, Anambra. April 26: Gunmen killed six police officers and kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ehime-Mbano, Imo. April 26: Bandits killed two Kaduna private varsity students in Chikun, Kaduna. April 26: Bandits killed six in Sabuwa, Katsina. April 26: Six were killed during a clash between okada (motorcycle taxi) riders and transport union members in Ojo, Lagos. April 26: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Abua/Odu, Rivers. April 26: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one civilian in Afikpo, Ebonyi. April 26: Boko Haram attacked Gwoza, Borno; no casualty figures were given. April 27: Herdsmen killed seven at a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Makurdi, Benue. April 27: Gunmen killed two police officers in Ika, Akwa Ibom. April 27: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Onitsha, Anambra. April 27: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue. April 27: Kidnappers abducted seven in Toto, Nassarawa. April 28: Kidnappers abducted four students but three escaped from a school in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. April 28: Police officers killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 29: Boko Haram attacked Yunusari, Yobe; no casualty figures were given. April 30: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four in Musawa, Katsina. April 30: Herdsmen killed five in Gwer West, Benue. April 30: Bandits killed ten and kidnapped four in Chikun, Kaduna.

On April 27, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, in a virtual meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, requested that the United States move the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa. The request marks a reversal of official Nigerian opposition—first made public twelve years ago—to AFRICOM plans to move to the continent. The shift likely reflects the conclusion that the security situation in West Africa and Nigeria is out of control, spurring a willingness to consider options hitherto unacceptable. Buhari argued that AFRICOM's headquarters should be closer to the theater of operations. He also seemed to imply greater U.S. involvement in West African security, including a kinetic dimension in the context of greater Western support for West Africa's response to its security threats. The statement released by President Buhari’s office following the meeting did not indicate whether the president offered Nigeria to host the AFRICOM headquarters. When President George W. Bush established AFRICOM in 2007, a military-civilian hybrid command in support of Africa, African official reaction was largely hostile, seeing the effort as "neo-colonialist." The Nigerian government took the lead in persuading or strong-arming other African states against accepting the AFRICOM headquarters, which was thereupon established at Stuttgart, Germany, already the headquarters of the European Command. However, AFRICOM's effective response to humanitarian crises, such as quickly establishing field hospitals in Ebola-affected areas in 2014, has ameliorated—at least somewhat—African hostility. More immediately, West Africa especially is facing security challenges beyond the ability of African states to control on their own. France has been the most important outside force against jihadi terrorism, but French involvement in seemingly never-ending military operations is unpopular at home, and President Emmanuel Macron has raised the specter of a drawdown or withdrawal in West Africa as he prepares for potentially strong opposition in the 2022 French presidential election. Up to the death of dictator Idriss Déby on April 27, Chad fielded the most effective West African fighting force against various jihadi groups and worked closely with France, the United States, and other partners. However, post-Déby, Chad is becoming a security unknown, with indigenous insurrections far from quelled and opposition demonstrations to the succession in the capital, N'Djamena. In Nigeria, in some quarters at least, panic has emerged over the erosion of security, and calls on the Buhari administration to seek outside help have been growing. In addition to opposing AFRICOM in the first place, the Nigerian military authorities have been largely uncooperative with the U.S. military. Hence, U.S. military involvement in Nigeria beyond limited training operations is minimal, and the country does not host any American defense installations. Successive Nigerian governments have wanted to purchase sophisticated American military equipment but have rejected U.S. oversight. In fact, Nigerian purchases of U.S. military material have been rare, despite their high-profile, ultimately successful purchase of twelve A-29 Super Tucanos—sophisticated aircraft. If opposition to AFRICOM is now muted, it has not gone away. Former Nigerian Senator Shehu Sani, an outspoken critic of the United States, characterized Buhari's volte-face as "an open invitation for recolonisation of Africa." In his view, Nigeria should seek only "technical assistance." Buhari is promising much better multilateral cooperation; it remains to be seen whether he can deliver. From an American perspective, moving AFRICOM's headquarters after fourteen years in Stuttgart would be a major undertaking. The defense review, now underway, will likely include the AFRICOM headquarters location issue. However, should the AFRICOM headquarters move, it is unlikely—if not impossible—that it would be to Africa, with its logistical challenges. Some in the U.S. Congress support moving AFRICOM's headquarters to the United States as a cost-effective alternative. For example, South Carolina's senators, both Republican, have advocated moving it to Charleston, the site of large U.S. military installations.

Isa Pantami is minister of communications and digital economy in President Muhammadu Buhari's government. Some years ago, in sermons and other statements, he used rhetoric about Christians and the West that mimics that of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He also fulsomely praised Osama bin Laden. Some years later, he apologized. Recently, however, those statements surfaced on social media. One Nigerian newspaper claimed that Pantami was on a U.S. government watch list for terrorists—a claim with no U.S. confirmation. For the time being, Pantami has become a lightning rod for those deeply suspicious of Islam and also of the Buhari administration. The opposition even sought a debate in the National Assembly but was blocked by the ruling party. However, the debate appears to be centered on social media, with dueling hashtags: #PantamiMustGo versus #PantamiMustStay. President Buhari's spokesman, Garba Shehu, issued a balanced statement affirming continuing support for Pantami while at the same time denouncing the jihadi statements he once made. The spokesman pointed out that Pantami's rhetoric was years old and that he had apologized. Those opposed to Pantami, however, express concern that his ministerial position gives him access to personal information about, not least, foreign diplomats in Nigeria. Some have called on the United States to press Buhari to investigate Pantami. In principle, U.S. law enforcement organizations do not comment on the presence or absence of individuals on watchlists. It would also be highly unusual for the U.S. government to express a view on a minister in a friendly government. The significance of the episode would seem to be that it illustrates the polarization in Nigerian society and politics—and that past injudicious and harmful statements can catch up.