• Nigeria
    Jihadis Claim to be Uniting in Northeast Nigeria
    The death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau could lead to a more unified jihadi insurgency in northeast Nigeria.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: July 10–16
    This update represents violence in Nigeria and related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger from July 10 to July 16, 2021.
  • Nigeria
    T.B. Joshua: A Preacher Who Held Outsized Influence in Nigeria and Africa
    Prophet T.B. Joshua, who died aged fifty-seven in Lagos in June and was buried last Friday, is an example of an African religious leader who, within his own country, was probably more influential than any political figure.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: July 3–9
    This update represents violence in Nigeria and related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger from July 3 to July 9, 2021.
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian President Buhari Clashes With Twitter Chief Executive Dorsey
    The Buhari administration's June ban on Twitter in Nigeria, combined with proposals within Buhari's All Progressives Congress (APC) to allow the federal government to establish a "code of conduct" for Nigeria's media to counter, among other things, "fake news," rightly sets off alarm bells within the human rights community. Nigeria is challenged on multiple fronts: a jihadi insurrection in the North East and increasingly in the North West; quarrels over water and land, especially in the Middle Belt; separatism in the South West and the South East; and kidnapping nearly everywhere. The growing perception among many in Nigeria is that the country does not meet the first condition of statehood: the provision of security for its citizens. This is the context for a drift to authoritarianism by a government under siege. As one observer writes in Foreign Policy, the Twitter ban is “another sign that dictatorship is back” in Nigeria. Such reactions draw on a well of suspicion—based on Buhari's 1983–85 tenure as military chief of state—that the now-civilian president remains, at heart, an authoritarian. While at present these concerns are overstated—institutional security-service weakness makes authoritarianism difficulty to implement—they are cause for concern and require close monitoring. Media is reporting that discussions are underway between the Nigerian authorities and Twitter about ending the ban. The proposed APC legislation for a code of conduct framework has not become law. Nevertheless, the Twitter ban, which remains in force, is certainly a blight on Nigeria's free-wheeling culture of freedom of speech, especially among young, well-educated urbanites not sympathetic to Nigeria's political economy. It also hurts Nigeria's reputation abroad. The Nigerian government banned Twitter after the tech company took down a tweet that violated Twitter guidelines. The text of the offending tweet, which made reference to the always neuralgic topic of Biafran separatism, is below. "Many of those misbehaving today are too young to be aware of the destruction and loss of lives that occurred during the Nigerian Civil War. Those of us in the fields for 30 months who went through the war, will treat them in the language they understand." Awkward relations between Twitter and the Nigerian government and between Jack Dorsey, Twitter's chief executive, and Muhammadu Buhari have a history. Many of the October 2020 #EndSARS demonstrations against police brutality—in particular, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) police unit—were organized on Twitter; the #EndSARS protests were supported by Jack Dorsey. Then Twitter placed its African base of operations in Ghana, a country with a much smaller population, rather than Nigeria—a slap in the face of Nigerian aspirations to become the tech hub of Africa. In terms of cultural expectations, Dorsey aligns with the outward-looking, young, relatively well-educated urban elite. That is far from Buhari's political base and from the majority of rural, poor Nigerians. Nevertheless, Nigeria has by far the greatest population in Africa, and, with an underdeveloped banking system, it is a potential market for Square, the highly profitable bill-paying platform for which Dorsey also serves as chief executive. As for the Twitter ban, it would appear to shoot all parties in the foot—one estimate is that the ban costs the Nigerian economy $6 million per day—and it is likely that the government will rescind it as part of a face-saving deal with Dorsey. The capture of Biafran separatist leader Nnamdi Kanu is likely to increase government self-confidence, thereby facilitating an end to the standoff with Twitter. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 26–July 2
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 26 to July 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 26: Herders killed one and kidnapped one in Offa, Kwara. June 26: The Joint Task Force killed two kidnappers in Koton-Karfe, Kogi. June 27: Two soldiers and thirty-seven Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Abadam, Borno. June 27: A masquerade group killed one at a mosque in Osogbo, Osun. June 27: Gunmen killed three in Bassa, Plateau. June 28: Police killed three in Ogo-Oluwa, Oyo. June 28: Police killed one student during a protest in Jema'a, Kaduna. June 29: Bandits killed a Zamfara lawmaker and kidnapped two others in Faskari, Katsina. June 29: Hunters and police officers killed two kidnapers in Okehi, Kogi. June 30: Kidnappers abducted eight ceramic workers in Ajaokuta, Kogi. June 30: Vigilantes killed three kidnappers in Lokoja, Kogi. June 30: A communal clash resulted in three deaths in Lavun, Niger State. June 18–June 30: Nigerian troops killed seventy-three Boko Haram militants (estimated at seven unaccounted for by reported incidents) in Borno. July 1: Security forces killed five at Sunday Igboho's residence in Ibadan, Oyo and kidnapped his wife along with others (estimated at five kidnapped total). July 1: Robbers killed one police officer at a bank in Moba, Ekiti. July 1: Gunmen killed seven herdsmen in Jos South, Plateau. July 2: Bandits kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna. July 2: Three police officers and twenty-eight Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria’s Northern Elders Forum: Keeping the Igbo is Not Worth a Civil War
    On June 9, following a closed-door meeting, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) issued a public statement that the Igbo-dominated southeast should be allowed to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria if it was necessary to avoid a civil war. NEF spokesman Hakeem Baba-Ahmed said “the Forum has arrived at the difficult conclusion that if support for secession among the Igbo is as widespread as it is being made to look, and Igbo leadership appears to be in support of it, then the country should be advised not to stand in the way.” His statement continued that secession was not in the best interest of the Igbos or of Nigerians. Rather, all should work to rebuild Nigeria. But, blocking secession “will not help a country already burdened with failures on its knees to fight another war to keep the Igbo in Nigeria.” The statement also suggested that northerners subject to harassment in the southeast should return to the north. There was no reference to secessionist sentiment in Yorubaland, in southwest Nigeria, to which former President Olusegun Obasanjo has referred. The former president said that Yoruba secession, too, would be unwise, but that maintaining unity should not come “at any cost.” Though there is no specific reference to it, clearly animating the NEF statement is the memory of Nigeria’s 1967-70 civil war, successfully fought by Nigerian nationalists to keep Igbo-dominated Biafra in the federation; it left up to two million dead. It, too, involved massive population movements, with Igbos fleeing to the south a northern pogrom and fewer northerners leaving the southeast. In the civil war, northern elites strongly supported the nationalists. Current Igbo disgruntlement has its roots in defeat in the civil war and the belief that they are marginalized from the upper reaches of the Nigerian state. (There has never been an Igbo president of Nigeria.) Such feelings of marginalization are exacerbated by Nigeria’s nationwide epidemic of violence and economic malaise. The NEF, for its part, has responded to rising insecurity in Nigeria by calling for President Buhari to resign or to be impeached. Resignation or impeachment is a reversal of the NEF’s support of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential candidacy in 2015. It should be noted that the NEF statement in support of allowing secession had two caveats: that there be widespread support for it among the Igbo but also among their “leadership” (not further defined). While secessionist advocates will argue to the contrary, prima facie evidence for both either way is thin. Do the views of the NEF matter? How representative is it of northern elite opinion? Buhari’s Special Adviser on Media Femi Adesina responded to its June 9 statement by dismissing the NEF as “a mere irritant” that hardly exists beyond its convener, Ango Abdullahi—a distinguished, former vice chancellor (president) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. According to Adesina, the former vice chancellor is a general with no troops. Indeed, the influence of the NEF is hard to judge. But, its public statements attract widespread media attention. As with former President Obasanjo’s comments on Yoruba separatism, at the very least the NEF statements is an indication that rising insecurity is leading at least some of Nigeria’s elites to rethink the basis of the Nigerian state—and of the consequences of its civil war.
  • Nigeria
    Apprehension of Biafra Leader Poses Challenges for Nigeria's Government
    Nigerian Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami announced yesterday that Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was apprehended abroad on June 27 and has been returned to Nigeria for trial. Kanu poses a challenge to the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and, indeed, to the unity of Nigeria. Separatist sentiment in the South East—the heart of the former Biafra—has been growing, and Kanu appears to have some degree of popular support. If the government botches Kanu's trial and the atmospherics around it, it risks further inflaming separatism. Initial signs are not good. The government has not announced where abroad or how Kanu was apprehended, except to say that it was with the assistance of Interpol. Kanu is a British citizen and his headquarters has been in London. One source says that he was apprehended in the United Kingdom, but British authorities deny it. It seems inevitable that social media will include claims that he was kidnapped. For his initial court appearance, the security services allegedly blindfolded him, handcuffed him, chained his legs, and smuggled him in through the back door. He made no statement. Kanu was arrested in 2015 on numerous charges, including treason; he was released on bail in 2017 and then fled abroad. Since then, he has been a thorn in the side of the Buhari government, and his Radio Biafra, based in the United Kingdom, continues to advocate for Biafran independence. He is the leader of the IPOB which the Nigerian government has designated a terrorist organization. He also helped establish IPOB's armed wing, the Eastern Security Network, which has attacked police stations. In addition to pushing for Biafran independence, Kanu's rhetoric is bitterly hostile to Hausa-Fulani Muslims, especially herders moving south in search of pasture. He and other Biafra separatists denounce the Buhari government as Muslim and Fulani dominated.  For its part, President Buhari's government has long reacted viscerally to Biafran separatism. Buhari and his generation fought in the 1967-70 civil war against Biafran separatism. They were successful, but up to two million died in the conflict, mostly of disease and starvation. Biafra was quickly reincorporated into Nigeria, but many Igbos retain a sense of grievance. In the face of current rampant insecurity in Nigeria and a stalled or declining economy, separatist sentiment has been growing in the South East (Biafra) but also in Yorubaland. Removing Kanu from the picture is unlikely to set back Biafran separatism, just as the death of warlord Abubakar Shekau does not appear to have set back jihadi terrorism in the North East. Indeed, Kanu's jailing could provide the space for other Biafran separatist leaders to emerge.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 19–25
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 19 to June 25, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 19: Gunmen killed a radio presenter in Ibadan, Oyo. June 19: Fifteen bandits and one military personnel were killed during a clash in Kontagora, Niger State. June 19: Bandits killed an All Progressives Congress (APC) chieftain in Osei, Ondo. June 20: Police killed fourteen bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. June 20: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. June 20: A police inspector killed five civilians in Enugu, Enugu. June 20: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno. June 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted three in Obi, Nassarawa. June 20: Gunmen killed three in Ibadan South-East, Ondo. June 20: Thirty vigilantes and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed during a clash in Magama, Niger State. June 21: Police foiled a kidnapping, killing one bandit in Igabi, Kaduna. June 22: Kidnappers abducted two in Ido, Oyo. June 22: Police killed one kidnapper in Uhunmwonde, Edo. June 22: Boko Haram killed two in Tillaberi, Niger while Nigerien troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Bosso, Niger. June 23: Bandits killed one and kidnapped thirty-three in Kachia, Kaduna. June 23: Kidnappers abducted nine in Gwagwalada, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Gassol, Taraba. June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Egbeda, Oyo. June 24: A special taskforce killed five bandits in Rafi, Niger State. June 24: Kidnappers killed two in Jos East, Plateau. June 25: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kajuru, Kaduna. June 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. June 25: Police killed "several" (estimated at thirty total) bandits in Ikeduru Local Government Area (LGA), Oguta LGA, and Ideato North LGA in Imo. June 25: Boko Haram kidnapped "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kaga, Borno.