Nigeria

This update represents violence in Nigeria and related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger from July 10 to July 16, 2021.

Prophet T.B. Joshua, who died aged fifty-seven in Lagos in June and was buried last Friday, is an example of an African religious leader who, within his own country, was probably more influential than any political figure.

This update represents violence in Nigeria and related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger from July 3 to July 9, 2021.

The Buhari administration's June ban on Twitter in Nigeria, combined with proposals within Buhari's All Progressives Congress (APC) to allow the federal government to establish a "code of conduct" for Nigeria's media to counter, among other things, "fake news," rightly sets off alarm bells within the human rights community. Nigeria is challenged on multiple fronts: a jihadi insurrection in the North East and increasingly in the North West; quarrels over water and land, especially in the Middle Belt; separatism in the South West and the South East; and kidnapping nearly everywhere. The growing perception among many in Nigeria is that the country does not meet the first condition of statehood: the provision of security for its citizens. This is the context for a drift to authoritarianism by a government under siege. As one observer writes in Foreign Policy, the Twitter ban is “another sign that dictatorship is back” in Nigeria. Such reactions draw on a well of suspicion—based on Buhari's 1983–85 tenure as military chief of state—that the now-civilian president remains, at heart, an authoritarian. While at present these concerns are overstated—institutional security-service weakness makes authoritarianism difficulty to implement—they are cause for concern and require close monitoring. Media is reporting that discussions are underway between the Nigerian authorities and Twitter about ending the ban. The proposed APC legislation for a code of conduct framework has not become law. Nevertheless, the Twitter ban, which remains in force, is certainly a blight on Nigeria's free-wheeling culture of freedom of speech, especially among young, well-educated urbanites not sympathetic to Nigeria's political economy. It also hurts Nigeria's reputation abroad. The Nigerian government banned Twitter after the tech company took down a tweet that violated Twitter guidelines. The text of the offending tweet, which made reference to the always neuralgic topic of Biafran separatism, is below. "Many of those misbehaving today are too young to be aware of the destruction and loss of lives that occurred during the Nigerian Civil War. Those of us in the fields for 30 months who went through the war, will treat them in the language they understand." Awkward relations between Twitter and the Nigerian government and between Jack Dorsey, Twitter's chief executive, and Muhammadu Buhari have a history. Many of the October 2020 #EndSARS demonstrations against police brutality—in particular, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) police unit—were organized on Twitter; the #EndSARS protests were supported by Jack Dorsey. Then Twitter placed its African base of operations in Ghana, a country with a much smaller population, rather than Nigeria—a slap in the face of Nigerian aspirations to become the tech hub of Africa. In terms of cultural expectations, Dorsey aligns with the outward-looking, young, relatively well-educated urban elite. That is far from Buhari's political base and from the majority of rural, poor Nigerians. Nevertheless, Nigeria has by far the greatest population in Africa, and, with an underdeveloped banking system, it is a potential market for Square, the highly profitable bill-paying platform for which Dorsey also serves as chief executive. As for the Twitter ban, it would appear to shoot all parties in the foot—one estimate is that the ban costs the Nigerian economy $6 million per day—and it is likely that the government will rescind it as part of a face-saving deal with Dorsey. The capture of Biafran separatist leader Nnamdi Kanu is likely to increase government self-confidence, thereby facilitating an end to the standoff with Twitter. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 26 to July 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 26: Herders killed one and kidnapped one in Offa, Kwara. June 26: The Joint Task Force killed two kidnappers in Koton-Karfe, Kogi. June 27: Two soldiers and thirty-seven Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Abadam, Borno. June 27: A masquerade group killed one at a mosque in Osogbo, Osun. June 27: Gunmen killed three in Bassa, Plateau. June 28: Police killed three in Ogo-Oluwa, Oyo. June 28: Police killed one student during a protest in Jema'a, Kaduna. June 29: Bandits killed a Zamfara lawmaker and kidnapped two others in Faskari, Katsina. June 29: Hunters and police officers killed two kidnapers in Okehi, Kogi. June 30: Kidnappers abducted eight ceramic workers in Ajaokuta, Kogi. June 30: Vigilantes killed three kidnappers in Lokoja, Kogi. June 30: A communal clash resulted in three deaths in Lavun, Niger State. June 18–June 30: Nigerian troops killed seventy-three Boko Haram militants (estimated at seven unaccounted for by reported incidents) in Borno. July 1: Security forces killed five at Sunday Igboho's residence in Ibadan, Oyo and kidnapped his wife along with others (estimated at five kidnapped total). July 1: Robbers killed one police officer at a bank in Moba, Ekiti. July 1: Gunmen killed seven herdsmen in Jos South, Plateau. July 2: Bandits kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna. July 2: Three police officers and twenty-eight Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno.

On June 9, following a closed-door meeting, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) issued a public statement that the Igbo-dominated southeast should be allowed to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria if it was necessary to avoid a civil war. NEF spokesman Hakeem Baba-Ahmed said “the Forum has arrived at the difficult conclusion that if support for secession among the Igbo is as widespread as it is being made to look, and Igbo leadership appears to be in support of it, then the country should be advised not to stand in the way.” His statement continued that secession was not in the best interest of the Igbos or of Nigerians. Rather, all should work to rebuild Nigeria. But, blocking secession “will not help a country already burdened with failures on its knees to fight another war to keep the Igbo in Nigeria.” The statement also suggested that northerners subject to harassment in the southeast should return to the north. There was no reference to secessionist sentiment in Yorubaland, in southwest Nigeria, to which former President Olusegun Obasanjo has referred. The former president said that Yoruba secession, too, would be unwise, but that maintaining unity should not come “at any cost.” Though there is no specific reference to it, clearly animating the NEF statement is the memory of Nigeria’s 1967-70 civil war, successfully fought by Nigerian nationalists to keep Igbo-dominated Biafra in the federation; it left up to two million dead. It, too, involved massive population movements, with Igbos fleeing to the south a northern pogrom and fewer northerners leaving the southeast. In the civil war, northern elites strongly supported the nationalists. Current Igbo disgruntlement has its roots in defeat in the civil war and the belief that they are marginalized from the upper reaches of the Nigerian state. (There has never been an Igbo president of Nigeria.) Such feelings of marginalization are exacerbated by Nigeria’s nationwide epidemic of violence and economic malaise. The NEF, for its part, has responded to rising insecurity in Nigeria by calling for President Buhari to resign or to be impeached. Resignation or impeachment is a reversal of the NEF’s support of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidential candidacy in 2015. It should be noted that the NEF statement in support of allowing secession had two caveats: that there be widespread support for it among the Igbo but also among their “leadership” (not further defined). While secessionist advocates will argue to the contrary, prima facie evidence for both either way is thin. Do the views of the NEF matter? How representative is it of northern elite opinion? Buhari’s Special Adviser on Media Femi Adesina responded to its June 9 statement by dismissing the NEF as “a mere irritant” that hardly exists beyond its convener, Ango Abdullahi—a distinguished, former vice chancellor (president) of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. According to Adesina, the former vice chancellor is a general with no troops. Indeed, the influence of the NEF is hard to judge. But, its public statements attract widespread media attention. As with former President Obasanjo’s comments on Yoruba separatism, at the very least the NEF statements is an indication that rising insecurity is leading at least some of Nigeria’s elites to rethink the basis of the Nigerian state—and of the consequences of its civil war.

Nigerian Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami announced yesterday that Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was apprehended abroad on June 27 and has been returned to Nigeria for trial. Kanu poses a challenge to the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and, indeed, to the unity of Nigeria. Separatist sentiment in the South East—the heart of the former Biafra—has been growing, and Kanu appears to have some degree of popular support. If the government botches Kanu's trial and the atmospherics around it, it risks further inflaming separatism. Initial signs are not good. The government has not announced where abroad or how Kanu was apprehended, except to say that it was with the assistance of Interpol. Kanu is a British citizen and his headquarters has been in London. One source says that he was apprehended in the United Kingdom, but British authorities deny it. It seems inevitable that social media will include claims that he was kidnapped. For his initial court appearance, the security services allegedly blindfolded him, handcuffed him, chained his legs, and smuggled him in through the back door. He made no statement. Kanu was arrested in 2015 on numerous charges, including treason; he was released on bail in 2017 and then fled abroad. Since then, he has been a thorn in the side of the Buhari government, and his Radio Biafra, based in the United Kingdom, continues to advocate for Biafran independence. He is the leader of the IPOB which the Nigerian government has designated a terrorist organization. He also helped establish IPOB's armed wing, the Eastern Security Network, which has attacked police stations. In addition to pushing for Biafran independence, Kanu's rhetoric is bitterly hostile to Hausa-Fulani Muslims, especially herders moving south in search of pasture. He and other Biafra separatists denounce the Buhari government as Muslim and Fulani dominated.  For its part, President Buhari's government has long reacted viscerally to Biafran separatism. Buhari and his generation fought in the 1967-70 civil war against Biafran separatism. They were successful, but up to two million died in the conflict, mostly of disease and starvation. Biafra was quickly reincorporated into Nigeria, but many Igbos retain a sense of grievance. In the face of current rampant insecurity in Nigeria and a stalled or declining economy, separatist sentiment has been growing in the South East (Biafra) but also in Yorubaland. Removing Kanu from the picture is unlikely to set back Biafran separatism, just as the death of warlord Abubakar Shekau does not appear to have set back jihadi terrorism in the North East. Indeed, Kanu's jailing could provide the space for other Biafran separatist leaders to emerge.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 19 to June 25, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 19: Gunmen killed a radio presenter in Ibadan, Oyo. June 19: Fifteen bandits and one military personnel were killed during a clash in Kontagora, Niger State. June 19: Bandits killed an All Progressives Congress (APC) chieftain in Osei, Ondo. June 20: Police killed fourteen bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. June 20: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. June 20: A police inspector killed five civilians in Enugu, Enugu. June 20: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno. June 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted three in Obi, Nassarawa. June 20: Gunmen killed three in Ibadan South-East, Ondo. June 20: Thirty vigilantes and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed during a clash in Magama, Niger State. June 21: Police foiled a kidnapping, killing one bandit in Igabi, Kaduna. June 22: Kidnappers abducted two in Ido, Oyo. June 22: Police killed one kidnapper in Uhunmwonde, Edo. June 22: Boko Haram killed two in Tillaberi, Niger while Nigerien troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Bosso, Niger. June 23: Bandits killed one and kidnapped thirty-three in Kachia, Kaduna. June 23: Kidnappers abducted nine in Gwagwalada, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Gassol, Taraba. June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Egbeda, Oyo. June 24: A special taskforce killed five bandits in Rafi, Niger State. June 24: Kidnappers killed two in Jos East, Plateau. June 25: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kajuru, Kaduna. June 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. June 25: Police killed "several" (estimated at thirty total) bandits in Ikeduru Local Government Area (LGA), Oguta LGA, and Ideato North LGA in Imo. June 25: Boko Haram kidnapped "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kaga, Borno.

Against a backdrop of growing calls for ethnically based separatism, including in former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s native Yorubaland, the former president in a speech laid out the arguments for maintaining Nigeria’s unity—though not at any cost. Speaking June 9 in the Yoruba heartland city of Abeokuta, where he lives in retirement, Obasanjo argued that Nigerians will fare better staying together: “it is better for Nigeria to remain as one indivisible nation than for each tribe to go its separate way.” The summary of his argument: “I am a strong believer of one Nigeria, but not one Nigeria at any cost, but one Nigeria where every Nigerian can feel proud that he or she has a stake in this country.” Power—that of the Nigerian state and of individual Nigerians—is the heart of his argument. Disintegration would result in successor “weak republics.” In Yorubaland, advocates for separatism look to the creation of an independent, ethnically based Republic of Oduduwa. Obasanjo argues that “if all that we have is Republic of Oduduwa for those who say so, members of that country will be diminished compared to being citizens of Nigeria.” Arguments for separatism center on the big three ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, predominant in the north; the Igbo in the southeast; and the Yoruba in the southwest. Together they are probably a majority—though small—of Nigeria’s population, and they are by no means contained exclusively in the region where they predominate. In addition to the big three, some three hundred other ethnic groups together approach being half of the population, and they are to be found across the country. How to balance the big three and the minorities has been an issue in Nigeria’s governance since the colonial period. The consensus has been that this diversity can best be managed within a federal republic, of which only the form, not the substance, has ever been achieved. Nevertheless, Obasanjo asks what the future would be for the minorities if Nigeria were to break up into three republics dominated respectively by one of the big three. Obasanjo also reminds his audience of the chaos and bloodshed that resulted elsewhere when the genie of ethnic rivalry escaped from the bottle because of the disintegration of a larger state. He cited specific bloody conflicts: India and Pakistan, Sudan and South Sudan, and the civil wars and other conflicts among the successor states of Yugoslavia. In his speech, Obasanjo acknowledged that Nigeria is severely challenged: “any Nigerian who does not feel concerned about the challenges of this country is a human being without being human.” And, “the fact that we are not making Nigeria what God wants it to be is not the fault of God but our fault, particularly the leaders.” But, for Obasanjo, the solution is to work for a united Nigeria, not its disintegration. Obasanjo has presented the central, credible arguments for the unity of Nigeria. Some of his arguments, especially with respect to the decline of state and elite power, are reminiscent of those advanced in other parts of the world by opponents of secession, such as in Catalonia or Scotland or even among those opposed to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. (Often separatism is a popular movement opposed by entrenched elites.) However, Obasanjo’s focus on the dangers of ethnicity and his invoking of God is more characteristic of Nigeria than elsewhere. Throughout his career, Obasanjo has been a Nigerian nationalist. He played a prominent role in the 1967-70 civil war in which the nationalists—for whom he fought—defeated predominantly Igbo efforts to establish an independent Biafra. He was military ruler of Nigeria from 1976 to 1979 and subsequently an ostensibly civilian president from 1999 to 2007 after the nominal restoration of civilian, democratic government. During his civilian presidency, Nigeria played a highly positive role in Africa, promoting a democratic trajectory and ending conflicts. After he left office in 2007, his ambitions to remain president having been thwarted, he retained political influence, especially with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). But, that party is now in opposition, and Obasanjo’s relationship with the PDP since departing office has been fractious. He left the party in 2015 and started a new political coalition, though it has been a bit-part player in Nigerian politics. Nevertheless, he retains some political influence, and many Nigerians will listen to what he has to say. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 12 to June 18, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 12: Herdsmen killed one and kidnapped six in Nkanu East, Enugu. June 12: Seven soldiers and an "unkown number" (estimated at seven as well) of gunmen were killed during a clash in Ohafia, Abia. June 12: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Zaria, Kaduna. June 12: Nigerian Air Force airstrikes killed "scores" of bandits (estimated at forty) and two civilians in Rijau, Niger State. June 13: Gunmen killed twelve in Josh South Local Government Area (LGA) and five in Bassa LGA in Plateau. June 13: Kidnappers abducted one in Owerri West LGA and one in Nwangele LGA in Imo. June 13: Bandits killed six police officers and two others while police killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Bakura, Zamfara. June 13: Communal violence led to eleven deaths in Agatu, Benue. June 14: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two Chinese expatriates in Wukari, Taraba. June 14: Bandits killed five and kidnapped ten in Rafi, Niger State. June 14: Vigilantes killed six in Awka, Anambra. June 15: Three soldiers and seven Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno. June 15: Gunmen killed five security personnel in Maradun, Zamfara. June 15: Bandits kidnapped fifteen in Chikun, Kaduna. June 16: Attackers beheaded two in Orsu, Imo. June 16: Kidnappers abducted four Chinese expatriates and killed one police inspector in Odeda, Ogun. June 16: Kidnappers killed two and abducted two in Akoko North-West, Ondo. June 16: Suspected herdsmen killed one and kidnapped six in Isi-Uzo, Enugu. June 17: Bandits killed one police officer and abducted 102 from a school in Yauri, Kebbi; troops then killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of the fleeing bandits. June 17: A gang war resulted in eleven deaths in Ibadan, Oyo. June 17: Bandits killed two and kidnapped fourteen in Chikun, Kaduna. June 18: Communal violence led to ten deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. June 18: Bandits killed twenty-nine in Gusau, Zamfara. June 18: Three of the kidnapped students were killed during a clash between bandits and vigilantes in Sakaba, Kebbi. June 18: Bandits killed two and kidnapped twenty in Chikun, Kaduna.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 5 to June 11, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 5: Gunmen killed six in Danmusa, Katsina. June 5: Bandits killed one police officer and forty farmers in Bungudu, Zamfara. June 6: Police officers killed five attackers during an assault on a police station in Owerri, Imo. June 6: Suspected herdsmen killed twenty in Ibarapa North, Oyo. June 6: Bandits killed thirty in Zurmi, Zamfara. June 6: Bandits killed thirty in Agatu, Benue. June 7: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Imeko-Afon, Ogun. June 7: Bandits killed three in Igabi, Kaduna. June 8: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Asa, Kwara. June 8: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Ajaokuta, Kogi. June 8: Nigerian troops killed six Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Dikwa, Borno. June 9: Kidnappers abducted a University of Jos lecturer in Jos North, Plateau. June 9: Herdsmen killed three in Asa, Kwara. June 9: Suspected herdsmen killed six in Katsina-Ala, Benue. June 10: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Makurdi, Benue. June 10: Gunmen killed one police inspector during an attack on a police station in Idemili South, Anambra. June 10: Kidnappers killed one and abducted ten from a school in Zaria, Kaduna. June 10: Kidnappers abducted four in Ibadan, Oyo. June 10: Bandits killed ninety-three in Zurmi, Zamfara. June 10: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped fifteen in Okigwe, Imo. June 11: Herdsmen kidnapped a farmer in Ikole, Ekiti. June 11: Bandits killed one in Yola South, Adamawa. June 11: Suspected herdsmen killed six in Keana, Nassarawa.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 29 to June 4, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 29: Police repelled an assault on a police station, killing four attackers in Oguta, Imo. May 29: A former advisor to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan was killed in Owerri, Imo. May 29: Two police officers and eight Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members were killed during an attack on a police station in Umuahia North, Abia. May 29: Electoral violence resulted in five deaths in Surulere, Lagos. May 30: Police officers killed ten gang members in Enugu, Enugu. May 30: Bandits kidnapped 208 and killed two at a school in Rafi, Niger State. May 30: Sectarian violence led to fifty deaths in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. May 30: Pirates killed two in Asari Toru, Rivers. May 30: Herdsmen killed nine in Isi-Uzo, Enugu. May 31: Bandits killed one police officer and fifteen civilians while five bandits were killed by vigilantes in Mariga, Niger State. May 31: One police officer, three civilians, and three bandits were killed during an attack in Jibia, Katsina. May 31: Gunmen killed three in Oru East, Imo. May 31: Boko Haram killed seven soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno. May 31: Three police officers were killed by unknown attackers in Enugu, Enugu. June 1: Bandits killed four in Jema'a Local Government Area (LGA), one in Giwa LGA, and one in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. June 1: Police officers killed three gunrunners in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. June 2: Nigerian troops killed fifty Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Damboa, Borno. June 2: Robbers killed four police officers and three civilians in Isokan and Irewole LGAs in Osun. June 2: Police killed five bandits in Kurfi, Katsina. June 3: One police officer, four attackers, and two civilians were killed during a clash in Owerri, Imo. June 3: Bandits killed twelve in Gusau LGA and ten in Anka LGA in Zamfara. June 3: Pirates killed two in Degema, Rivers. June 3: Bandits killed eight in Danko Wasagu, Kebbi. June 4: Bandits killed two in Chikun LGA and three in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. June 4: Soldiers killed a Department of State Services (DSS) operative in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti. June 4: Police killed five robbers in Logo, Benue. June 4: Herdsmen killed one in Ibarapa North, Oyo. June 4: Herdsmen killed two and kidnapped one in Logo, Benue.

As the results of the 2020 U.S. national census become known, the American media is digesting the finding that the country's population is no longer growing. The May 23 Sunday New York Times lead article "above the fold" highlighted how new a stagnant or declining birthrate and immigration is for the United States. The United States is joining Europe and East Asia, where a demographic decline and collapse of birth rates has long been underway—paradoxically often accompanied by a dysfunctional response to immigration. Demographic stagnation or decline is a worldwide phenomenon, except for Africa, where the population is exploding in size. Nowhere is the African demographic boom more obvious than in Nigeria, where the current population of 219 million, according to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook most recent estimate, is projected to increase to around 400 million by 2050, at which point it will likely displace the United States as the third largest country in the world by population. By the end of the century, some credibly project that Nigeria’s population will be greater than China's—where the birth-rate fall has been especially dramatic—leaving it second to only India in populational globally. How is Africa to feed its enormous population increase? Nigeria in 1960 was a food-exporting country. But the economy has grown more slowly than the population, and Nigeria now imports food. Slow economic growth in tandem with high population growth will be a push factor for African migration, leaving aside other factors, such as insecurity and climate change. In North America, Europe, and East Asia, low demographic growth—if any—and an aging population will be a pull factor for African migration. Migration, with its push-pull factors, can be destabilizing, as Americans have seen when facing migration from Central America or Europe has from the war zones of the Middle East and the cross-Mediterranean flow of African economic and political refugees. Successful management of migration flows will require a granular knowledge and understanding of the push-pull factors at play in Africa. One size does not fit all: those factors will be different in Nigeria, where the “push” is especially strong and, say, South Africa, where its developed economy is an important “pull” factor for the rest of the continent. Migration is yet another reason why Washington needs enhanced engagement with Africa that draws on expertise rather than an amateur absentmindedness in policy making.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 22 to May 28, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 22: Two police officers and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed in a shootout in Gusau, Zamfara. May 22: Bandits killed eight in Maradun Local Government Area (LGA), nine in Zurmi LGA, and ten in Kaura-Namode LGA in Zamfara. May 22: Sectarian violence led to one hundred deaths in Katsina-Ala, Benue. May 23: One police officer and one attacker were killed during an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. May 23: Police killed four attackers during an assault on an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) office in Awka, Anambra. May 23: Gunmen killed eight in Jos South LGA, eight in Riyom LGA, and six in Wase LGA in Plateau. May 23: Herdsmen killed five in Takum, Taraba. May 23: Bandits killed twenty-one vigilantes in Rabah, Sokoto. May 24: Bandits killed ten while police officers repelled the attack, killing ten bandits in Bungudu, Zamfara. May 24: Bandits kidnapped fifteen in Tafa, Niger State. May 25: Gunmen killed five police officers during an attack on a police station in Ezeagu, Enugu. May 25: Police killed two bandits in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo. May 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped one in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 26: Gunmen killed one police officer in Oshimili North, Delta. May 26: Boko Haram kidnapped "some" (estimated at ten) in Kaga, Borno. May 26: Police officers killed five bandits in Batsari, Katsina. May 26: Land grabbers killed two in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. May 27: Herdsmen killed thirty-six in Katsina-Ala LGA and seven in Gwer West LGA in Benue. May 27: Herdsmen killed twelve in Gassol LGA and two in Bali LGA in Taraba. May 27: Security operatives killed seven Eastern Security Network (ESN) members in Eleme, Rivers. May 27: Bandits killed three while two bandits were also killed in Giwa LGA, bandits killed four in Igabi LGA, and bandits killed one in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. May 28: Bandits killed twenty across the Wushishi and Lavun LGAs in Niger State. May 28: Three police officers and two attackers were killed during an assault on a police station in Ukwuani, Delta. May 28: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 28: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Ihiala, Anambra. May 28: A Boko Haram attack in Diffa, Niger resulted in the deaths of three militants, four Nigerien soldiers, and four civilians. May 28: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at ten) around Kachia LGA, Kaduna.

The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) has announced that it has replaced Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Abu Musab "takes over all territories that were under Shekau. The immediate replacement of Shekau was a major revenge against the former Boko Haram leader that exhibited ‘highhandedness and ruthlessness’ against humanity in the Northeast." The announcement also included that ISWA had arrested thirty top commanders that were loyal to Shekau. It appears that ISWA has absorbed Shekau's faction. A credible hypothesis is that the thirty commanders "arrested" will either switch allegiance to Abu Musab or be killed, with the former alternative the more likely. ISWA is already the larger fighting force: in February 2019 it was estimated to boast around two to three times more fighters (3,500-5,000) than Shekau’s faction (1,500-2,000). It should be noted that there is still no definitive evidence that Shekau is dead. The Nigerian government has been careful to say that it is still investigating; no corpse, or even a picture of a corpse that might serve as proof of death, has been found. That said, there has been no statement by Shekau's supporters that he is still alive. It remains to be seen whether this apparent consolidation of Boko Haram factions will make the movement more lethal and dangerous to the Nigerian state. Shekau's displacement or demise raises the question of what group now hold the more than one hundred Chibok schoolgirls that remain in captivity. It is to be hoped that there might be some movement toward their release.