Niger

Correction: After this blog was originally posted, it was confirmed that four, not three, Green Berets were killed in western Niger. The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has announced that three U.S. Army Special Forces, Green Berets, were killed while two were wounded in an ambush in western Niger. There were also five Nigerien casualties. AFRICOM says that the operation was a routine training mission, not a combat operation. The perpetrators are unknown and, thus far, no group has claimed responsibility. Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State (IS) operate in western Niger, as do numerous criminal gangs involved in smuggling and kidnapping, and whose allegiance is constantly shifting. According to the New York Times, these are the first U.S. casualties from hostile fire in Niger. Across the Sahel region, American casualties of any sort have been few and far between, in part because the U.S. presence is very small. As part of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, the U.S. military provides training to Sahelian militaries, including Niger’s, but this involves relatively few U.S. civilian and military personnel. The Sahel is not an area of American tourism, there are limited economic interests, and most victims of kidnapping are European. Thus, there is little reason for a large U.S. presence. France, on the other hand, has a much more robust security relationship with the Sahelian states, most of which are francophone, and French casualties from hostile fire are accordingly much higher. So, too, is the number of French civilian victims, reflecting greater French economic interests and a tradition of French tourism in the region.   Nevertheless, U.S. military personnel have now been killed and wounded in combat in the Sahel. It remains to be seen if there is a domestic U.S. reaction, and what impact that may have on AFRICOM’s mission. In the 1993 “Blackhawk Down” episode in Mogadishu, Somalia, eighteen U.S. uniformed personnel were killed, and a mob dragged some of their corpses through the streets. At the time, U.S. public opinion appeared to have little tolerance for U.S. causalities in African operations. In the aftermath of Blackhawk Down, the Clinton administration backed away from security engagement in Africa. As the New York Times observes, the Trump administration appears to be continuing the policy of his Democratic and Republican predecessors by providing training and equipment to indigenous militaries rather than deploying large numbers of U.S. military personnel. That policy, if sustained, will limit U.S. casualties in the region, which likely remain unacceptable to American public opinion.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 3, 2016 to December 9, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1481566621384’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); December 3: One person was killed in a communal clash in Ikwo, Ebonyi. December 4: Nigerian troops battled Boko Haram militants, killing thirteen and losing one soldier in Kukawa, Borno. December 5: A battle between Nigerian troops and Boko Harm militants in Bama, Borno led to "heavy casualties" for Boko Haram (estimated at twenty) and the deaths of one soldier and one CJTF member. December 7: PDP and APC supporters clashed in Obi Ngwa, Abia, leading to a number of injuries. December 9: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and fifty-six others in Madagali, Adamawa. Boko Haram was suspected.  

Conflict Armament Research, a UK organization that monitors armaments transfers and supply chains, has just published an important report, “Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in the Sahel.” The report was funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the European Union, and the German Foreign Office. It carries the normal disclaimer that it does not reflect “the positions of the UK Government, the European Union, or the German Federal Foreign Office.” More than fifty pages long, the report is thoroughly detailed. It is based on ten months of well-funded research with visits to Algeria, the Central African Republic, Chad, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, and Syria. The report confirms that a flow of weapons from Libyan dictator Qaddafi’s stockpiles after his fall played a major role in the Tuareg and Islamist insurgencies in Mali in 2012. That same stockpile supplied weapons systems that included man-portable air defense systems to insurgents throughout the Sahel region. But, the report documents that weapons flows since 2011 are no longer predominately from Libya. Instead, the weapons now come from African countries with weak control of their own weapons stockpiles, notably the Central African Republic and Ivory Coast. Sudan has also been an important source since 2015 of weapons used by insurgents in the Sahel. The report posits that the jihadist attacks in 2015 and 2016 on hotels and government installations specifically in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast also included weapons from a common source in the Middle East, these Iraqi assault rifles and Chinese-manufactured weapons are also used by the Islamic State. Conflict Armament Research’s report does not address Nigeria or Boko Haram. During the period up to 2015 when Boko Haram was amassing territory in northeast Nigeria, there was speculation as to where it was getting its weapons. One hypothesis was that they were coming primarily from local stockpiles inadequately controlled by the Nigerian government. Conflict Armament Research’s report shows a pattern that lends credibility to that hypothesis.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 29, 2016 to November 3, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1478555422162’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); October 29: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and seven others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. October 29: Boko Haram killed ten soldiers and seven civilians, and lost fives of their own in an attack on Damboa, Borno. October 30: A sniper killed a would-be suicide bomber in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. October 31: Cattle rustlers killed five in Shiroro, Niger. November 1: Eight suicide bombers killed themselves in Gubio, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. November 3: Soldiers killed two Boko Haram militants in Monguno, Borno. November 3: Five terrorists and one soldier were killed in an attempted suicide bombing in Gwoza, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected.

The public reappearance of polio in northeast Nigeria is a disappointment. Nigeria had been thought to be free of polio for two years. The recent cases of paralysis caused by polio are likely the result of ongoing, undetected transmission rather than a new introduction of the disease from elsewhere. The small numbers of paralysis probably masks the extent of the presence of the disease. Only about one in two hundred polio cases results in paralysis. Polio would appear to remain present in areas formerly under control of Boko Haram, which is opposed to vaccination and western medicine in general. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, a consortium that includes UNICEF, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations, is responding to the newly detected outbreak with a major campaign to vaccinate 41 million children against polio in the Lake Chad basin, which comprises Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. UNICEF states that the Initiative has deployed 39,000 health workers in the region and has already vaccinated approximately 30 million children using oral polio vaccine. UN spokesmen identify two challenges: continued insecurity in the region and a shortage of funds. Boko Haram has not been destroyed and continues to attack soft targets. For example, Nigerian media report that a Boko Haram bombing killed at least eighteen in Maiduguri on October 11. UNICEF has also not received all of it’s necessary funding, it has received only $50.4 million of the $158 million it needs for the Lake Chad basin campaign. Victims of paralysis in the Lake Chad basin lack even the most rudimentary medical care where wheelchairs are a rare luxury. Given the horror of polio, surely the international community can cover the $108 million shortfall, a pittance compared to other government expenditures.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 1, 2016 to October 7, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1476111390776’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); October 2: Unknown gunmen killed four police officers at a police station in Ado, Benue. October 2: Nigerian troops killed five kidnappers in Ningi, Bauchi. October 3: A former Nigerian minister and her husband were kidnapped in Kagarko, Kaduna. October 4: Gunmen kidnapped an APC chieftain in Obio/Akpor, Rivers October 6: Unknown gunmen kidnapped six at a school in Lagos State, Lagos. October 6: Nigerian troops killed two female suicide bombers in Gwoza, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. October 6: Nigerian troops killed one male suicide bomber in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. October 6: Unknown gunmen attacked a Malian refugee camp in Tassalit, Niger, killing twenty-two Nigerien soldiers. October 7: Gunmen kidnapped the Ekiti APC chieftain’s wife in Ekiti East, Ekiti.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 11, 2016 to June 18, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   June 12: Nigerian soldiers killed eight cultists in Emuoha, Rivers. June 12: Nigerian soldiers repelled a Boko Haram attack in Gwoza, Borno, killing six insurgents. June 14: Boko Haram killed four and abducted four in Damboa, Borno. June 15: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. June 15: Cultists killed eleven and kidnapped two in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. June 16: Niger Delta militants blew up a pipeline in Oruk Anam, Akwa Ibom. June 16: Boko Haram killed twenty-four in Madagali, Adamawa. June 16: Boko Haram killed seven Nigerien police in Diffa, Niger. June 17: Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) killed two would-be suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno.

Boko Haram’s suicide bomber female recruits are objects of fascination and horror. The New York Times, citing the Long War Journal, says that Boko Haram has used at least 105 women and girls for suicide attacks since June 2014. In addition, UNICEF reports that Boko Haram has used an increased number of child suicide bombers; 75 percent of these children are young girls. As a tactic, suicide bombing is remarkably successful, killing hundreds and undermining popular confidence in the Nigerian government’s ability to provide security in areas liberated from Boko Haram. An important article by Dionne Searcey that appeared in the New York Times on April 7 includes numerous anecdotes that may shed light on Boko Haram suicide bombers. Her reporting is based on interviews at a refugee camp in Cameroon. One of Searcey’s interlocutors describes a process of forcible conversion to Islam, followed by sophisticated terrorist training. The training is carefully sequenced, and at the upper levels is secret. However, for her, it culminated with instruction in suicide bombing and beheading. The interlocutor reported that motivation for the training includes access to food and water. Though not all of the victims are unwilling. Searcey notes that according to her interlocutor, in one group of thirty enrolled in terrorist training, seven were enthusiastic: “It was a direct path to heaven.” The New York Times reportage is perforce anecdotal. After seven years of war, there remains remarkably little hard information about Boko Haram and its leadership, let alone about the motivation of female suicide bombers. The New York Times piece is especially important because it keeps Nigeria and the plague of suicide bombing on the public’s radar in the United States.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 26, to April 1, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   March 26: Boko Haram killed four in Askira/Uba, Borno. March 26: Ten were killed in a cult clash in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo. March 27: Unknown actors bombed a pipeline in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa, killing three. March 27: An army colonel was kidnapped and then killed in Chikun, Kaduna. March 27: Nigerian troops killed twenty-nine Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. March 29: Nigerian troops killed thirty-five Boko Haram insurgents in Kala/Balge, Borno. March 30: Boko Haram killed six Nigerien solders in Diffa, Niger. March 31: Nigerian troops killed nine Boko Haram insurgents in Bama, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 28, 2015 to December 4, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 26-28: Cameroonian troops killed one hundred Boko Haram insurgents in Mayo Sava, Cameroon. November 28: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and six others in Dabanga, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. November 28: Boko Haram killed five in Gouzoudou, Cameroon November 28: Boko Haram killed eight in Diffa, Niger. November 29: Boko Haram killed seven and abducted an unspecified number of girls (estimated at ten) in Biu, Borno. November 29: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack in Madagali, Adamawa, killing twenty insurgents and losing one soldier. December 1: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Waza, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. December 4: Two suicide bombers killed three in Sabon Gari, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 4: One suicide bomber killed two in Biu, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 21, 2015 to November 27, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 21: Four suicide bombers killed themselves and six others in Nigue, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. November 22: One female suicide bomber killed herself and seven others in Mafa, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. November 22: Cult clashes in Osogbo, Osun, resulted in the deaths of three. November 23: One female suicide bomber killed herself and ten others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. November 25: Boko Haram killed thirty-eight in Gogone, Niger. November 26: Pirates kidnapped three Polish sailors off the coast of Nigeria (estimated at Port Harcourt, Rivers as that was their destination). November 27: One Boko Haram suicide bomber killed himself and twenty others at a Shiite Muslim march in Kura, Kano.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 7, 2015 to November 13, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 8: Two suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Ngouboua, Chad. November 8: Twelve died in a clash between members of the All Progressives Congress and People’s Democratic Party  in Wukari, Taraba. November 9: One suicide bomber killed three in an attack on a mosque in Fokotol, Cameroon. A second suicide bomber was killed by Cameroonian troops before she could detonate. Boko Haram is suspected November 9: Fulani herdsmen killed twenty-two in Dekina, Kogi. November 11: Boko Haram killed five civilians, and Nigerien troops killed twenty insurgents in Bosso, Niger. November 11: Two died in a cult clash in Idemili North, Anambra. November 12: Five died in a cult clash in Warri, Delta. November 12: Nigerian troops killed Four Boko Haram insurgents in Damboa, Borno. November 13: Boko Haram attacked a military base in Gwoza, Borno, but Nigerian soldiers successfully repelled the attack, killing nine insurgents.

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s most recent Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram is the “world’s deadliest terror organization.” Their figures claim that Boko Haram was responsible the death of 6,665 people in 2014. The self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) was responsible for 6,073 during that same period. The report was released at a time that the tragedy and high drama of ISIS attacks in Paris have dominated the political discourse and the media. Yet, Boko Haram attacks have not abated. As recently as November 18, Boko Haram killed at least thirty people in a suicide attack in a market in Yola, in Adamawa state. The attack adds to the over five thousand fatalities already attributed to the group in 2015. At least eighty more victims have been taken to hospitals for their injuries from that particular occurrence. Though there is a brief New York Times November 18, report on the incident, Boko Haram does not receive the same level of coverage or popular attention as ISIS. The Global Terrorism Index shows that Boko Haram and ISIS were responsible for 51 percent of all terrorist fatalities world-wide in 2014: the world total was 32,658 compared to 18,111 in 2013. Seventy-seven percent of Boko Haram’s victims were private citizens. The Index notes that Boko Haram kills an average of fifteen people per attack. Relative lack of international attention to Boko Haram in comparison with ISIS reflects the former’s area of operation in northeast Nigeria and adjacent parts of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon – far from media centers and more distant than the Middle East from the interests and concerns of Europe and the United States. Boko Haram represents something of a civil war in northern Nigeria, the issues of which are difficult for outsiders to understand. And Boko Haram, while hostile to the United States and Western civilization in its rhetoric, has yet to attack a single American facility or installation and, at present, does not appear to have the capability that ISIS has recently demonstrated. (It has, however, been involved with the kidnapping of Europeans.) Similarly, the huge numbers of internally displaced persons in northern Nigeria receive a fraction of the attention devoted to Middle Eastern and other migrants trying to reach Europe. Maggie Fick in the November 12, Financial Times has a poignant story about how Nigerians take in refugees and displaced persons at a high cost to themselves. She concludes: “We in the West should not forget that the vast majority of the worlds displaced are hosted in nations like Nigeria and Lebanon, whose citizens and governments have far fewer resources.”

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 31, 2015 to November 6, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   November 1: Boko Haram attacked military posts in Bamou, Chad, killing two Chadian soldiers and losing eleven of their own. November 1: Nigerian troops cleared a Boko Haram camp in Maiduguri, Borno, killing four insurgents. November 1: Cult clashes in Abakaliki, Ebonyi resulted in the deaths of three. November 2: A cult clash in Abeokuta, Ogun resulted in the deaths of two. November 3: Robbers attacked a police station and banks in Akoko-Edo, Edo, killing two policemen and four civilians. One of the robbers was also killed when vigilantes retaliated. November 4: Nigerian troops destroyed Boko Haram camps in Marte, Borno, killing two insurgents. November 6: Nigerian troops destroyed Boko Haram camps in Askira and Uba, Borno, killing four insurgents. November 6: Boko Haram militants attacked Afikpo, Ebonyi, killing one police officer.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 24, 2015 to October 30, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 24: Four suicide bombers killed themselves and one other in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. October 25: A suicide bomb detonated early in Maiduguri, Borno, killing the four attempted bombers. Boko Haram is suspected. October 27: Nigerian troops killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents in Gwoza, Borno. October 27: Nigerian troops killed four suspected Boko Haram insurgents in Madagali, Adamawa. October 27: Boko Haram killed fourteen in Ala, Niger. October 28: Gunmen kidnapped five children in Toro, Bauchi. October 28: Boko Haram attacked Gulani, Yobe, killing "many" (estimated at twenty).